1
Rule 58
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
PURPOSE OF THE WRIT
PNB vs. RJ Ventures (2006)
RJ Ventures Realty & Dev’t Corp. and Rajah Broadcasting Network
Inc. filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction4
against PNB and Juan S. Baun, Jr.
In their Complaint, they contended that on 13 Jun 1996, First
Women’s Credit Corp. received an invitation to bid from PNB anent the
sale of an 8,000 sqm property (Buendia Property).
10 Jul: FWCC bid the amount of P455k per sqm or total of P3.640B.
Pursuant to PNB Rules, it deposited 10% of the offered price or P364M
with PNB by way of 2 checks. The next day, FWCC submitted a revised
offer increasing its bid by P5k per sqm or a total add amount of P40M.
In view of this, it deposited with PNB an additional amount of P4M.
17 Jul: FWCC was awarded the Buendia Property.
24 Jul: FWCC requested PNB to finance the entire balance of the
purchase price.
17 Sep: FWCC assigned all its rights, claims, interest, and title over
the Buendia Property to RJVRD. The latter assumed the right to
purchase the Buendia Property and the obligations of FWCC to PNB
on the balance of the purchase price.
However, PNB refused to finance the entire balance of the purchase
price except to the extent of 75% thereof. But it finally agreed to grant
a loan to RJVRD to 80% of the purchase price, P2.944B. This grant
was conditioned on the deposit by RJVRD with PNB of an additional
10% of the purchase price to the first 10% downpayment which the
former had paid. Otherwise stated, RJ Ventures was required to raise
an additional amount of P368M.
30 Sep: Following the payment by RJVRD to PNB of the additional
deposit of P368M, the parties entered into a loan agreement wherein
PNB will finance the balance of the purchase price in the amount of
P2.944B subject to conditions that after the transfer of the Buendia
Property in the name of RJVRD, the same shall be mortgaged in favor
of PNB. RJVRD and PNB executed a Loan Agreement. A Deed of Sale
and a Real Estate Mortgage were similarly executed between RJVRD
and PNB over the Buendia Property.
RJVRD undertook to engage foreign investors for the project.
However, the Asian currency crisis caused a depreciation of the PH
Peso which increased the obligation of RJVRD to PNB from P2.944B
to P5,405,301,470.82.
30 Sep ’97: RJVRD entered into a JVA with Fil-Estate Management
Inc. for the development of the Buendia Property. RBN secured
another loan from PNB for P100M, part of which was used in paying
the interest for the loan it had secured in favor of RJVRD. By way of
security, RBN assigned in favor of PNB, all its rights and interest over
radio and TV frequencies issued by NTC.
Mar ’98: RJVRD, RBN and PNB entered into discussions on the
restructuring of the loans. While this was ongoing, the accounts of
RJVRD and RBN became delinquent. PNB sent RJVRD a notice
declaring their accounts delinquent and demanding settlement.
25 Jan ’99: PNB sent RBN a demand letter, requiring it to settle
their outstanding account of P841,460,891.91. In same letter, PNB
demanded from RJVRD the settlement of its obligation of
P5,405,301,470.82. This surprised RBN, considering that they still
continuing their negotiations with PNB for the restructuring of the loan.
18 Feb: PNB demanded that RBN turn over the possession and
control of Broadcasting Equipment Inventory. Also, RJVRD received a
Notice of Extrajudicial Sale for the sale of the Buendia Property.
In support of its Application for the Issuance of a TRO and a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, RJVRD and RBN alleged that they would suffer
great and irreparable injury by the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
property and the take over of RBN's radio facilities in Baguio, unless a
TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is issued enjoining PNB
from implementing the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale dated 1 Feb 1999,
and enjoining PNB from taking possession and control of RBN's radio
facilities in Baguio City. They maintained that the commission or
continuance of the acts complained of during the litigation or the nonperformance thereof would work injustice to RJVRD and RBN. They
manifested their willingness to post a bond as the court a quo
may fix in its discretion, to answer for whatever damages PNB
may sustain for the reason of the restraining order or injunction, if
finally determined that they are not entitled thereto.
RTC denied the prayer for the issuance of the TRO. RTC ruled that
RJVRD and RBN failed to prove that they have clear right to restrain
the foreclosure of the Buendia Property. Also, the evidence failed to
prove that they will suffer "irreparable injury" if the foreclosure of the
Buendia Property is not enjoined, for under the law, they have 1 year
from the date of the registration of the sale with the ROD within which
to redeem the Buendia Property; thus, they will have a chance to
recover the ownership thereof by way of redemption.
2 Mar ’99: Buendia Property was sold in public auction. It was sold
to PNB for P2.8B.
3 May: RBN received Notice of Extrajudicial Sale from PNB,
specifying that the property covered by the Broadcasting Equipment
Inventory will be sold for cash at public auction.
4 May: RJVRD and RBN filed an Urgent Application for Issuance of
a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
7 May: RTC issued an order, granting the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, enjoining PNB from foreclosing all collaterals pledged or
mortgaged by RJVRD and RBN to PNB after the posting of a bond in
the amount of P5M. It ruled that the right of PNB to foreclose the
chattel mortgages is still challenged by RJVRD and RBN, and therefore,
is not yet clearly established. Hence, if PNB is allowed to foreclose the
subject chattel mortgages, the determination of the right of PNB to
foreclose the subject properties will become moot and academic.
28 May: A Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued. PNB filed MR.
28 Jul: RTC issued Order, granting PNB’s MR. In lifting the writ, RTC
rationalized that the failure of RBN to pay 3 credit facilities it obtained
from PNB was established. Thus, RBN was considered to have
effectively defaulted on its loan obligations.
RJVRD and RBN filed MR. RTC denied. Filed a petition for certiorari.
CA granted the Writ.
PNB’s contention: RBN failed to produce any evidence to
substantiate and support its claim that it is entitled to the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in order to enjoin PNB from foreclosing on the
subject chattels. PNB was able to show that RBN failed without
justifiable cause or reason to service the credit facilities extended to it.
RBN has no clear right in esse; therefore, it cannot seek relief from the
court. PNB claimed that they were able to prove irreparable damage
to the bank if PNB will be enjoined from foreclosing on the chattel
mortgages.
RJVRD’s contention: Irreparable damage would be caused to RBN
if PNB is allowed to foreclose its equipment. It would also disrupt, if
not, paralyze, the operations of RBN's stations. There is no reason to
disturb the injunction issued by the court absent a showing of manifest
abuse.
ISSUE: WON RJVRD and RBN is entitled to a writ of preliminary
injunction
Yes. A preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct
to the main case subject to the latter's outcome. It is not a cause of
action in itself. The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to maintain
the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction
is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final
order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the
protection of a party's substantive rights or interests pending the final
judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon
the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which
should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be
useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.
For a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the following requisites
must be present, to wit: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable
right that must be protected, and (2) an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Indubitably, the very
foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the
existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable
injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation and the prevention of
multiplicity of suits. The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary
injunction in a pending case rests in the sound discretion of the court
taking cognizance of the case since the assessment and evaluation of
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evidence towards that end involve findings of facts left to the said
court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of
judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be
interfered with except when there is grave abuse of discretion. Grave
abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction
implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
In the case at bar, RJVRD and RBN were able to establish a clear
and unmistakable right to the possession of the subject collaterals.
Evidently, as owner of the subject collaterals that stand to be
extrajudicially foreclosed, they are entitled to the possession and
protection thereof. RBN as the owner and operator of the subject radio
equipment and radio stations have a clear right over them.
PNB’s claim that they have lost their rights to the subject collaterals
in the face of their admission of default is best threshed out in a fullblown trial a quo where the merits of the case can be tried and
determined.
Secondly, there is an urgent and paramount necessity to prevent
serious damage. Indeed, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to
when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences
which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.
The term irreparable injury has a definite meaning in law. It does
not have reference to the amount of damages that may be caused but
rather to the difficulty of measuring the damages inflicted. If full
compensation can be obtained by way of damages, equity will not
apply the remedy of injunction.
In the present case, CA declared that the evidence adduced by
RJVRD and RBN more than satisfies the legal and jurisprudential
requirements of irreparable injury. It behooves this court to appreciate
the unique character of the collaterals that stand to be affected should
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be dissolved as PNB would have it.
The direct and inevitable result would be the stoppage of the
operations of respondents' radio stations, consequently, losing its
listenership, and tarnishing the image that it has built over time. It does
not stretch one's imagination to see that the cost of a destroyed image
is significantly the loss of its good name and reputation. The value of
a radio station's image and reputation are not quantifiable in terms of
monetary value.
STATUS QUO ANTE
First Global Realty vs. Agustin (2002)
1994: A parcel of land was sold to Sps. Camacho for P2.5M.
Sps. Camacho succeeded in convincing Agustin to accept a partial
payment of P100k upon the execution of a DOAS in their favor over
the subject property. The balance of P2.4M would be paid once the
title over the same was transferred in the name of Sps. Camacho. This
agreement came about because Sps. Camacho would use the subject
property to raise the amount of P2.4M, that is to say, they would secure
a loan from a bank or financial institution with the subject property as
collateral.
24 May ‘94: DBP released the subject property to Agustin upon full
payment of the latter’s outstanding loan. Thereafter, DOS in favor of
Sps. Camacho was executed, who in turn paid P100k.
26 May ’94: TCT No. 194868 was issued in the name Sps. Camacho.
First Global granted Sps. Camacho’s loan application with the
subject property as collateral, in the amount of P1.190M. However,
despite receipt of the loan and Agustin’s demand to pay the balance
of the purchase price of the subject property, Sps. Camacho did not
pay the same.
Agustin filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Sps. Camacho.
Unfortunately, the case did not prosper because Sps. Camacho could
not be located for the proper service of the warrant of arrest.
Agustin, then, discovered that First Global filed a special civil action
for the foreclosure of the subject property inasmuch as Sps. Camacho
defaulted in the payment of their loan obligation.
28 Jun ’96: Branch 143 ordered the foreclosure of the subject
property and the subsequent sale at public auction. Sps. Camacho did
not file MR. Hence, First Global’s motion for execution was granted.
However, the sale at public auction was thrust aside in view
of the dacion en pago which Sps. Camacho executed in favor of
First Global. A TCT was issued in the name of First Global.
8 Sep ’97: First Global demanded rentals from Agustin for the
latter’s use of the subject property. When First Global’s demand was
unheeded, it filed a motion for issuance of a writ of possession.
20 Nov: Agustin filed a motion for intervention, wherein he asked for
the rescission of the DOAS, dacion en pago and cancellation of First
Global’s title over the subject property.
Agustin filed a separate complaint for ‘rescission of the deed of
absolute sale, annulment of the dacion en pago and cancellation of
title and issuance of a new title with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or a writ of injunction’ against First
Global, seeking to enjoin the latter from taking possession of the
subject property.
RTC denied the application of Agustin for preliminary injunction. CA,
however, reversed the RTC and granted the injunctive relief.
Agustin’s contention: First Global failed to show a clear right to
possess it. To dispossess him pendente lite would be clearly unjust.
ISSUE: WON Agustin is entitled to the possession of the property while
the main case for rescission is pending with RTC
Yes. A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party
may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and
interests during the pendency of an action. It is issued to preserve the
status quo ante -- the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that
preceded the actual controversy.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action
prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular
act. It may be granted at any time after the commencement of the
action and before final judgment, when it is established that the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of
the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either
for a limited period or perpetually; that the commission or continuance
of some act complained of during the litigation or the nonperformance thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or
that the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring
or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's
rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
A preliminary injunction is merely temporary, subject to the final
disposition of the principal action and its purpose is to preserve the
status quo of the things subject of the action and/or the relation
between the parties, in order to protect the right of the plaintiff
respecting the subject of the action during the pendency of the suit.
Otherwise or if no preliminary injunction were issued, the defendant
may, before final judgment, do or continue the doing of the act which
the plaintiff asks the court to restrain, and thus make ineffectual the
final judgment rendered afterwards granting the relief sought by the
plaintiff. Its issuance rests entirely within the discretion of the court
taking cognizance of the case and is generally not interfered with
except in cases of manifest abuse.
The purpose of a preliminary injunction, then, is "to prevent
threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties
before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole
aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
heard fully.” Thus, it will be issued only upon a showing of a clear and
unmistakable right that is violated. Moreover, an urgent and
permanent necessity for its issuance must be shown by the applicant.
In the present case, the status quo that is sought to be preserved is
the possession of the property by Agustin and his right to use it as his
dwelling, pending determination of whether or not he had indeed sold
it to the Camachos and, consequently, whether the latter’s transfer of
its ownership to petitioner via dacion en pago should be upheld.
Ca found that First Global was aware that Agustin remained an
unpaid seller, when it conducted an on-site investigation of the
property in connection with the couple’s application for a loan. First
Global learned that Agustin was living in the subject premises and was
thus in actual possession of it.
Moreover, the records show that the dacion en pago signed in 1994
was registered only in 1997. It was executed in lieu of the foreclosure
of the property when the Camachos failed to pay their loan obligations.
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The amount stated in the dacion as consideration was the
P1,190,000 loan that they had obtained from First Global. It is
therefore strange that the couple would buy a parcel of land for P2.5M
to obtain a loan to help finance payment for the same, and finally cede
the same property for an amount much lower than that for which they
purchased it. Moreover, by executing a dacion, the sellers effectively
waived the redemption period normally given a mortgagor.
Therefore, Agustin was able to show a prima facie right to the relief
demanded in his Complaint. The Camachos’ nonpayment of the
purchase price agreed upon and the irregularities surrounding the
dacion en pago are serious enough to allow him to possess the
property pendente lite.
In addition, Agustin has shown that to allow First Global to take
immediate possession of the property would result in grave injustice.
It must be noted that the ownership of the property, the validity of the
sale between Agustin and the Camachos and the legitimacy of the
dacion en pago executed by the latter in favor of First Global are still
subject to determination in the court below. Furthermore, there is no
question that Agustinhas been in possession of the premises during
all this time -- prior to and during the institution of the Complaint. He
and his family have long owned, possessed and occupied it as their
family home since 1967. To dispossess him of it now would definitely
alter the status quo to their detriment.
SECTION 1
DOH vs. Phil. Pharmawealth (2007)
Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of manufacturing and supplying pharmaceutical products to
government hospitals in the Philippines.
22 Dec ’98: Secretary of Health Romualdez, Jr. issued AO No. 27, s.
1998, outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of
government suppliers for pharmaceutical products.
AO No. 27 was later amended by AO No. 10, s. 2000, providing for
additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at
ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with DOH.
It provided that “only products accredited by the Committee shall be
allowed to be procured by the DOH and all other entities under its
jurisdiction.”
9 and 29 May 2000: Phil. Pharmawealth submitted to DOH a
request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited
drug products, including the antibiotic "Penicillin G Benzathine." Based
on the schedule provided by DOH, it appears that processing of and
release of the result of Phil. Pharmawealth request were due on Sep
2000, the last month of the quarter following the date of its filing.
Sep 2000: DOH, through Lopez, issued an Invitation for Bids for the
procurement of 1.2M units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine.
Phil. Pharmawealth submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine
contract. When the bids were opened on 11 Oct 2000, only two
companies participated, with Phil. Pharmawealth submitting the lower
bid at P82.24/unit, compared to Cathay/YSS Laboratories’ bid of
P95.00/unit. In view, however, of the non-accreditation of Phil.
Pharmawealth’s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was
awarded to YSS.
Phil. Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or TRO, praying that the RTC “nullify the award of the Penicillin G
Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, and direct DOH, Romualdez,
Galon and Lopez to declare Pharmawealth as the lowest complying
responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, among others.
DOH filed Manifestation and Motion to dismiss, praying for the
outright dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state
immunity.
Phil. Pharmawealth’s contention: The doctrine of state immunity is
not applicable considering that individual petitioners are being sued
both in their official and personal capacities, hence, they, not the state,
would be liable for damages.
ISSUE: WON the non-suability of the state applies in this case
No. The suability of a government official depends on whether the
official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional
capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official
functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the
government. In the first case, the Constitution itself assures the
availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned who should
be impleaded as the proper party.
In its complaint, Pharmawealth sufficiently imputes grave abuse of
discretion against petitioners in their official capacity. Since judicial
review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of
discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that
it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or
respondent in an appropriate suit
Moreover, part of the reliefs prayed for by Pharmawealth is the
enjoinment of the implementation, as well as the nullification of the
award to YSS, the grant of which may not be enforced against
individual petitioners and their successors except in their official
capacities as officials of the DOH.
As regards DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail
despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the
only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and
mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58, preliminary injunction may be
directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the
defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action
which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the
State.
As regards individual petitioners’ suability for damages, the
following discussion on the applicability of the defense of state
immunity from suit is relevant.
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now
embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, is one of
the generally accepted principles of international law, which we have
now adopted as part of the law of the land.
While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits
against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints
filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them
in the discharge of their duties. The suit is regarded as one against the
state where satisfaction of the judgment against the officials will
require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as the
appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded
against them.
However, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged
in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and
injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public
official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his
personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been
committed while he occupied a public position.
In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal
capacities for damages in connection with their alleged act of "illegally
abusing their official positions to make sure that Pharmawealth would
not be awarded the Benzathine contract which act was done in bad
faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers
given by law" is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing
principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by
law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear
the liability personally.
It bears stressing, however, that the statements in the immediately
foregoing paragraph in no way reflect a ruling on the actual liability of
petitioners to Pharmawealth. The mere allegation that a government
official is being sued in his personal capacity does not automatically
remove the same from the protection of the doctrine of state immunity.
Neither, upon the other hand, does the mere invocation of official
character suffice to insulate such official from suability and liability for
an act committed without or in excess of his or her authority. These
are matters of evidence which should be presented and proven at the
trial.
Levi Strauss vs. Clinton Apparelle (2005)
A complaint for trademark infringement, injunction and damages
was filed by Levi Strauss against Clinton Apparelle.
Levi Strauss is the owner by prior adoption and use since 1986 of
the internationally famous “Dockers and Design” trademark. In the
Philippines, it has a Certificate of Registration No. 46619 in the
Principal Register for use of said trademark on pants, shirts, blouses,
skirts, shorts, sweatshirts and jackets under Class 25.
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Levi Strauss discovered the presence in the local market of
jeans under the brand name "Paddocks" using a device which is
substantially, if not exactly, similar to the "Dockers and Design"
trademark owned by and registered in the name of LS & Co., without
its consent. Based on their information and belief, Clinton Apparelle
manufactured and continues to manufacture such "Paddocks" jeans
and other apparel.
RTC issued an order setting the prayer for the issuance of a TRO for
hearing on 5 May 1998. On said date, Clinton Apparelle failed to
appear despite notice and Olympian Garments, the other defendant,
had yet to be notified. Hearing was rescheduled on 14 May 1998. On
said hearing, both defendants failed to appear. Clinton Apparelle
claimed that it was not notified of such hearing. Only Olympian
Garments allegedly had been issued with summons. Despite the
absence of the defendants, the hearing on the application for the
issuance of a TRO continued.
RTC granted the TRO applied for. The hearing for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction was set on 26 May 1998, which setting
cannot be transferred considering that the lifetime of the TRO is only
20 days from date of grant.
4 Jun ’98: RTC granted the writ of preliminary injunction. It ordered
that payment of P2.5M as injunction bond.
Clinton Apparelle filed MTD and MR of the order granting the writ of
preliminary injunction. Meantime, RTC issued an order approving the
bond filed by Levi Strauss. Subsequently, RTC denied the MTD and
MR, and the writ of preliminary injunction was issued on 8 Oct ’98.
Clinton Apparelle filed with CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with prayer for issuance of TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.
CA held that RTC did not follow the procedure required by law for
the issuance of a TRO as Clinton Apparelle was not duly notified of the
date of the summary hearing for its issuance. Thus, CA ruled that the
TRO had been improperly issued. CA also held that the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction is questionable. In its opinion, Levi
Strauss failed to sufficiently establish its material and substantial right
to have the writ issued. Secondly, it observed that the survey presented
by Levi Strauss to support their contentions was commissioned by Levi
Strauss.
ISSUE: WON the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was
proper
No. Section 1, Rule 58 defines a preliminary injunction as an order
granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order
requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. Injunction is accepted as the strong arm of equity
or a transcendent remedy to be used cautiously as it affects the
respective rights of the parties, and only upon full conviction on the
part of the court of its extreme necessity. An extraordinary remedy,
injunction is designed to preserve or maintain the status quo of things
and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts until
the merits of the case can be heard. It may be resorted to only by a
litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests and
for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is
resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences, which cannot be remedied under any standard
compensation. The resolution of an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special
recourse before the main case can be heard in due course of
proceedings.
Under section 3, a clear and positive right especially calling for
judicial protection must be shown. Injunction is not a remedy to
protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue
to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain
an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist
an actual right. There must be a patent showing by the complaint that
there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the
writ is to be directed are violative of said right.
There are two kinds of preliminary injunction: (1) a prohibitory
injunction which commands a party to refrain from doing a particular
act; and (2) a mandatory injunction which commands the
performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.
CA did not err in reviewing proof adduced by Levi Strauss to support
its application for the issuance of the writ. While the matter of the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court, this discretion must be
exercised based upon the grounds and in the manner provided by law.
The exercise of discretion by the trial court in injunctive matters is
generally not interfered with save in cases of manifest abuse. And to
determine whether there was abuse of discretion, a scrutiny must be
made of the bases, if any, considered by the trial court in granting
injunctive relief. Be it stressed that injunction is the strong arm of
equity which must be issued with great caution and deliberation, and
only in cases of great injury where there is no commensurate remedy
in damages.
In the present case, we find that there was scant justification for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Levi Strauss anchor their legal right to "Dockers and Design"
trademark on the Certificate of Registration issued in their favor by the
Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer. This
Certificate of Registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of the
registration, the registrant’s ownership of the mark and of the exclusive
right to use the same in connection with the goods or services and
those that are related thereto specified in the certificate. The owner is
also granted the exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having
the owner’s consent from using in the course of trade identical or
similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to
those in respect of which the trademark is registered if such use results
in a likelihood of confusion.
However, attention should be given to the fact that Levi Strauss’
registered trademark consists of two elements: (1) the word mark
"Dockers" and (2) the wing-shaped design or logo. Notably, there is
only one registration for both features of the trademark giving the
impression that the two should be considered as a single unit. Clinton
Apparelle’s trademark, on the other hand, uses the "Paddocks" word
mark on top of a logo which according to petitioners is a slavish
imitation of the "Dockers" design. The two trademarks apparently differ
in their word marks ("Dockers" and "Paddocks"), but again according
to Levi Strauss, they employ similar or identical logos. It could thus be
said that Clinton Apparelle only "appropriates" Levi Strauss’ logo and
not the word mark "Dockers"; it uses only a portion of the registered
trademark and not the whole.
It is not evident whether the single registration of the trademark
"Dockers and Design" confers on the owner the right to prevent the use
of a fraction thereof in the course of trade. It is also unclear whether
the use without the owner’s consent of a portion of a trademark
registered in its entirety constitutes material or substantial invasion of
the owner’s right.
It is likewise not settled whether the wing-shaped logo, as opposed
to the word mark, is the dominant or central feature of Levi Strauss’
trademark—the feature that prevails or is retained in the minds of the
public—an imitation of which creates the likelihood of deceiving the
public and constitutes trademark infringement. In sum, there are vital
matters which have yet and may only be established through a fullblown trial.
Levi Strauss’ right to injunctive relief has not been clearly and
unmistakably demonstrated. The right has yet to be determined. Levi
Strauss also failed to show proof that there is material and substantial
invasion of their right to warrant the issuance of an injunctive writ.
Neither was Levi Strauss able to show any urgent and permanent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Moreover, the RTC’s order granting the writ did not adequately detail
the reasons for the grant. The trial court must state its own findings of
fact and cite particular law to justify grant of preliminary injunction.
Utmost care in this regard is demanded.
The trial court in granting the injunctive relief tersely ratiocinated
that "the plaintiffs appear to be entitled to the relief prayed for and this
Court is of the considered belief and humble view that, without necessarily
delving on the merits, the paramount interest of justice will be better
served if the status quo shall be maintained." Clearly, this statement falls
short of the requirement laid down by the above-quoted case.
In addition, the damages that Levi Strauss had suffered or continue
to suffer may be compensated in terms of monetary consideration.
A writ of injunction should never have been issued when an action
for damages would adequately compensate the injuries caused. The
very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction rests
in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary
estimation and the prevention of the multiplicity of suits, and where
5
facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the
relief of injunction should be refused.
Further, the issued injunctive writ, if allowed, would dispose of the
case on the merits as it would effectively enjoin the use of the
"Paddocks" device without proof that there is basis for such action. The
prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction that would in effect dispose of the main case without trial.
There would be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the
rule on the burden of proof since it would assume the proposition
which petitioners are inceptively bound to prove.
The injunction issued in the instant case is of a serious nature as it
tends to do more than to maintain the status quo. In fact, the assailed
injunction if sustained would bring about the result desired by Levi
Strauss without a trial on the merits.
Finally, we have no contention against the procedure adopted by the
trial court in resolving the application for an injunctive writ and we
believe that Clinton Apparelle was accorded due process. Due process,
in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard. And in applications
for preliminary injunction, the requirement of hearing and prior notice
before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all
petitions for preliminary injunction must undergo a trial-type hearing,
it being a hornbook doctrine that a formal or trial-type hearing is not
at all times and in all instances essential to due process. Due process
simply means giving every contending party the opportunity to be
heard and the court to consider every piece of evidence presented in
their favor.
In the present case, Levi Strauss did not adequately prove its
entitlement to the injunctive writ. In the absence of proof of a legal
right and the injury sustained by the applicant, an order of the trial
court granting the issuance of an injunctive writ will be set aside for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
SECTION 2
Doctrine of Non-Jurisdiction
Gomos vs. Adiong (2004)
26 Feb 2001: Saripada Ali Pacasum filed Special Civil Action No.
690-01 for mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory
injunction against Fund for Assistance To Private Education, alleging
that FAPE was required by law to pay subsidy to Pacasum College, Inc.
under the Educational Service Program of DECS; that although the
DECS has already released to FAPE the total amount of P746M for
payment to different participating schools, FAPE refused to release to
Pacasum College, Inc. the sum of P1,845,040 which represented the
remaining unpaid collectible of the said institution for the school year
2000-2001; that the continued refusal by FAPE to release the said
amount has caused the school to fail in its obligation to pay the salaries
of its teachers for 3 months.
On same day, Judge Adiong granted the application for preliminary
mandatory injunction upon posting by Pacasum of a surety or property
bond of P200k.
28 Feb: Judge Adiong issued another order directing FAPE President
Borromeo to prepare and issue a check for P1,845,040 representing
the payment to the Pacasum College, Inc. Subsequently, Sheriff
Alipanto served upon FAPE summons and a copy of the petition.
5 Mar: FAPE filed petition for certiorari and prohibition, challenging
the orders of Judge Adiong, arguing that the RTC of Marawi City has
no jurisdiction to enforce the writs of mandamus and preliminary
injunction to FAPE, in its principal office in Makati City, since the place
is outside the 12th judicial region where it belongs, among others.
14 Mar: CA issued TRO enjoining Judge Adiong from enforcing the
orders. Despite the TRO, Judge Adiong ordered the arrest of Dr.
Borromeo and FAPE employees for failure to comply with his orders.
Sultan Sabdulah Ali Pacasum filed a letter complaint, charging
Judge Adiong with gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct
on the ground that Judge Adiong violated the hearing, notice and
jurisdictional requirements of the Rules of Court in issuing his orders.
OCA found that Judge Adiong was liable.
ISSUE: WON Judge Adiong is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
gross misconduct
Yes. Judge Adiong granted Saripada Ali Pacasum’s
application for preliminary mandatory injunction on the very
same day the Special Civil Action was filed on 26 Feb 2001. Sections
4(c) and 5, Rule 58 is very explicit that the writ of preliminary
injunction may issue only after prior notice and hearing upon the
adverse party. In issuing the subject writ on the very same day, the
application was filed and considering that the person against whom
the same was to be served was located in Makati, summons could not
have been served upon them or a hearing conducted in evident
disregard of the due process requirements of the Rules of Court.
Judge Adiong’s failure to comply with procedural due process is
aggravated by his total inattention to the parameters of his jurisdiction.
As the presiding judge of RTC Marawi City, he should have known that
Makati City was way beyond the boundaries of his territorial
jurisdiction insofar as enforcing a writ of preliminary injunction is
concerned. Section 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, provides that
the RTC shall exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective
regions. The trial court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin acts being performed or about to be performed
outside its territorial jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
is not a mere deficiency in prudence, or lapse of judgment on the part
of Judge Adiong but a blatant disregard of basic rules constitutive of
gross ignorance of the law. The responsibility of judges to keep abreast
of the law and changes therein, as well as with the latest decisions of
the Supreme Court, is a pressing need. One cannot seek refuge in a
mere cursory acquaintance with the statute and procedural rules.
Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one
– not even judges.
Judge Adiong is suspended for six months without salary and
benefits.
Dela Paz vs. Adiong (2004)
15 May 2002: Gabriel dela Paz charged Judge Adiong of RTC
Marawi of gross ignorance of the law and/or abuse of authority for his
orders issued in a civil case.
Judge Adiong’s orders were: (1) granting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and requiring FAPE to prepare and issue a
check in the amount of P4M representing the entitlement of Pacasum
College for SY 2001-2002, (2) ordering the sheriffs of Makati and
Mandaluyong to serve the writ and make a return on their actions, and
(3) ordering sheriff of Makati to take custody of the funds/check in the
name of Pacasum College in the amount of P4M.
8 May: Makati Sheriff Gaspar issued notices of garnishment to Land
Bank Ortigas and BPI-Far East Bank Pasay.
FAPE’s contention: It was not served with summons but received
copies of the questioned orders on March 8, 2002; that the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction which was intended to be enforced
in Makati is outside the jurisdiction of the 12th Judicial Region of RTC
Marawi City; that Section 21 of BP Blg. 129, as amended, provides that
the RTC has jurisdiction to issue writ of injunction which may be
enforced in any part of its respective regions; that the writ was granted
without hearing and notice; neither was there a showing of an affidavit
that would establish that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard nor was there a showing that
a bond had been filed.
Dela Paz’s claim: Judge Adiong’s issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction dated March 4, 2002 was in glaring disregard
and defiance of Section 21 of BP Blg. 129 which limits the authority
of RTCs to issue writs of mandamus within their respective regions.
The issuance of the writ was in disregard of the notice and hearing
requirements under Rule 58. Judge Adiong continues to issue orders
directing FAPE to release the amount of P4M to Datu Saripada Ali
Pacasum even in a case where it was not a party thereto.
ISSUE: WON Judge Adiong is guilty of the charge
Yes. The rule on injunction as found under Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court provides that the same can only be granted upon a verified
application showing facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded
and upon the filing of a bond executed to the party or person enjoined.
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It is also provided that no preliminary injunction shall be granted
without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to
be enjoined unless shown that great or irreparable injury would result
to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice; that a
temporary restraining order may be issued effective for a period of 20
days from service on the party sought to be enjoined.
A perusal of the Order dated March 4, 2002 failed to show that
Judge Adiong conducted a hearing before the injunction was granted
or that complainant was given prior notice thereof. In fact, Dela Paz
stressed that FAPE was not at all served with summons before the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued. It was not also shown
whether the applicant posted a bond and the same was approved
before the order granting the preliminary mandatory injunction was
issued. A bond is required unless exempted by the court. The Order
merely stated that the petition was sufficient in form and substance
without even stating the facts which would support the granting of the
injunction. This is a clear violation of the rule.
Judge Adiong’s court is in Marawi City which falls within the 12th
judicial region. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by
Judge Adiong requiring FAPE, which is holding office in Makati City,
and its officials who have their residences in Metro Manila, to issue a
check in the amount of P4M payable to Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum, is
outside the territorial jurisdiction of his court. Thus, the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the Judge Adiong is void
considering that his authority to issue an injunction is limited only to
and operative only within his respective provinces or districts.
Consequently, the Order dated March 5, 2002 directing the sheriff
of Makati and Mandaluyong to serve the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to FAPE, et al. is a jurisdictional faux pas as Judge Adiong
can only enforce his orders within his court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Likewise, Judge Adiong has also shown abuse of his authority in
issuing his Order dated April 22, 2002 in Corporate Case No. 010
requiring FAPE, a non-party to the case, to comply with the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
Mangahas vs. Paredes (2007)
31 Jan ’97: Avelino Banaag filed a verified complaint for ejectment
against Augusto Mangahas and Marilou Verdejo, averring that the latter
constructed houses on the property without his knowledge and
consent and that several demands were made, but the same fell on
deaf ears as they refused to vacate the premises.
Mangahas and Verdejo filed their answer denying having unlawfully
deprived Banaag possession of the contested property and claimed
that they have resided in the subject lot with the knowledge and
conformity of the true owner thereof, Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro
Development Corporation (PIADECO).
10 Jul: Mangahas and Verdejo filed a Manifestation And Motion To
Suspend Proceedings on the ground that the subject property is part
of the Tala Estate and that the RTC Quezon City issued a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated 10 Nov 1997, enjoining the MeTCs of
Quezon City and Caloocan City from ordering the eviction and
demolition of all occupants of the Tala Estate. They posited that the
injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC is enforceable in Caloocan
City because both cities are situated within the National Capital Region.
7 Aug: MeTC denied said manifestation and motion, ratiocinating
that the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC has binding effect
only within the territorial boundaries of the said court and since
Caloocan City is not within the territorial area of same, the injunction
it issued is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
5 Oct ’99: MeTC ruled in favor of Banaag. Mangahas and Verdejo
appealed to RTC. RTC affirmed MeTC. Filed MR, denied. Mangahas
appealed to CA. CA affirmed RTC. CA decision became final on 2002.
11 Dec 2000: Banaag filed a motion for execution pending appeal.
A writ of execution was issued on 27 Sep 2001.
17 Jan 2003: Mangahas and Verdejo filed a motion to suspend the
execution before the RTC. Denied. The writ was implemented.
Mangahas’ contention: The Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 10
Nov 1997 which emanated from the RTC of Quezon City should have
prompted the RTC of Caloocan City to suspend the ejectment
proceedings then pending before it. They contended that the
injunction writ issued in Quezon City is enforceable also in Caloocan
City inasmuch as both cities are situated within the NCR.
ISSUE: WON the writ of execution was proper
Yes. Under Sec. 17 of BP 129, the exercise of jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts and their judges is basically regional in scope but
under Sec. 18, it may be limited to the territorial area of the branch in
which the judge sits.
The RTC of Caloocan City could not be deemed to have committed
a reversible error when it denied Mangahas’ Motion to Suspend
Proceedings. Apparently, the extent of the enforceability of an
injunction writ issued by the RTC is defined by the territorial region
where the magistrate presides.
Consequently, the issue involving the binding effect of the injunction
issued by the Quezon City RTC became the law of the case between
the parties. Under this legal principle, whatever is irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the parties
in the same case continues to be the law of the case, so long as the
facts on which the decision was predicated continue. Stated otherwise,
the doctrine holds that once an appellate court has declared the law
in a case that declaration continues to hold even in subsequent appeal.
The reason lies in the fact that public policy dictates that litigations
must be terminated at some definite time and that the prevailing party
should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge
devised by the losing party.
Mangahas and Verdejo are therefore barred from assailing the ruling
that the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC has no binding effect
to the courts of Caloocan City as this issue had already been passed
upon with finality. Issues should be laid to rest at some point; otherwise
there would be no end to litigation.
Quite conspicuously, the instant petition assailing the order of the
RTC denying Mangahas’ motion to suspend execution is a ploy to
deprive Banaag of the fruits of his hard-won case. It must be stressed
that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial
duty of the presiding judge to issue a writ of execution except in certain
cases, as when subsequent events would render execution of judgment
unjust. Mangahas and Verdejo did not allege nor proffer any evidence
that this case falls within the exception. Hence, there is no reason to
vacate the writ of execution issued by the RTC.
Note: It must be pointed out that Mangahas and Verdejo’s direct
recourse to this Court via petition for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari,
Prohibition With Prayer For Provisional Remedy is an utter disregard
of the hierarchy of courts and should have been dismissed outright.
This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with the Regional Trial Courts and
the Court of Appeals. Such concurrence of jurisdiction does not give
the petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum. A direct
recourse of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In the
instant case, they have not offered any exceptional or compelling
reason not to observe the hierarchy of courts. Hence, the petition
should have been filed with the RTC.
Exceptions
Decano vs. Edu (1980)
12 Sep ’62: Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications
issued to Federico Decano a temporary appointment to the position of
janitor in the Motor Vehicles Office with compensation at the rate of
P1,440/annum. The appointment having been approved by the CSC,
Decano assumed office on September 10, 1962 and he served therein
for almost four years.
29 Apr ’66: Decano received a telegram from Romeo F. Edu, in his
then capacity as Acting Commissioner of Land Transportation
Commission, terminating his services effective as of the close of
business on that day.
Aggrieved, Decano filed a petition for "Mandamus and Injunction"
claiming that the aforementioned officials of the LTC acted without
power and in excess of authority in removing him from the service, and
therefore praying for the court to declare as null and void the order for
his removal, to declare him entitled to the position, to compel his
reinstatement and payment of his regular salary, and to enjoin,
7
preliminary, and then permanently, Edu from disturbing,
molesting or otherwise ousting him from his position as janitor.
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued. After trial, the lower court
declared Decano’s removal was null and void upon the ground that the
Commissioner of Land Transportation was not the appointing authority
insofar as the position of Decano and other minor positions in his office
were concerned; and thus lacking the power of appointment, Edu had
neither the power of removal.
ISSUE: WON non-jurisdiction applies in the case at bar
No. There is no question that Decano could be removed from office
at any time, for it has been held repeatedly that the acceptance of a
temporary appointment divests an appointee of the right to security of
tenure against removal without cause. He could therefore be removed
at the pleasure of the appointing official.
But this is not to say that Decano could be removed by the
Commissioner of Land Transportation since the latter was not the
official who appointed him but the Undersecretary acting for the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications nor had said
respondent been granted by law the power of removal.
It is true that under Section 2 of Rule 58, a court of first instance
has no jurisdiction to require or control the execution of an act
committed beyond the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. These cases
invariably involved petitions for writs of injunction seeking to control
the actions of courts or officers outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
respondent courts of first instance where said petitions had been filed.
However, this ruling on non-jurisdiction does not apply to the facts and
circumstance at bar.
Here, Decano seeks primarily the annulment of the dismissal order
issued by Edu, mandamus and injunction being then merely corollary
remedies to the main relief sought, and what is prayed to be enjoined,
as in fact the trial court did enjoin by preliminary injunction, is the
implementation of the termination order against Decano.
It is true that the order of dismissal was issued by Edu, but it was to
be implemented in Dagupan City by his subordinate officer, the Acting
Registrar of the LTC stationed at Dagupan. Insofar, therefore, as Edu is
concerned, the order terminating the services of Decano was a fait
accompli and this he had done without authority, as earlier discussed.
The injunction in question, consequently, must be taken only to
restrain the implementation of Edu's order by his co-respondent whose
official station at Dagupan City is within the territorial boundaries of
the trial court's jurisdictional district.
The national official stationed at Quezon City, namely,
Commissioner Edu, was impleaded as respondent in the Pangasinan
court for a complete determination of the issues involved, the legality
of Edu's order of dismissal being the pivotal issue to determine the
merits of the mandamus and injunction aspects of the petition. In other
words, Mr. Edu was joined as respondent not for injunction purposes
but mainly for testing the legality of his dismissal order and his
transmittal thereof to his co-respondent registrar at Dagupan City to
implement the same and terminate the services of Decano in Dagupan.
It has been held that where the issue is the correctness of a national
official's decision, the provincial courts of first instance have equal
jurisdiction with the Manila courts to review decisions of national
officials, as otherwise litigants of ted means would practically be
denied access to the courts of the localities where the reside and where
the questioned acts are sought to be enforced.
The doctrines invoked in support of the theory of non-jurisdiction
are inapplicable, in that those cases involved petitions for writs of
injunction seeking to control the actions of courts or officers outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent courts involved. It is easy
to see that if the contested ruling of the court below is sustained, the
same would result not only in hardship to litigants of limited means,
practically amounting to denial of access to the courts, but would also
unnecessarily encumber the Manila courts whose dockets are already
over. The power of provincial courts of first instance to review
administrative decisions of national officials has been consistently
recognized.
Dagupan Electric Corp. vs. Paño (1980)
DECORP is a domestic corporation with a principal office in Quezon
City, although its generating plant is located in Pangasinan. MC Adore
is also a domestic corporation with office in Cubao, Quezon City.
MC Adore owns and operates the MC Adore Int’l Palace Hotel at
Dagupan City. MC Adore entered into a contract for power service with
DECORP. DECORP rendered full power services.
MC Adore Int’l Palace Hotel failed to pay its September and October
1978 bills to Dagupan Electric Corp. Due to this, DECORP served a
Notice of Disconnection that unless payment is made within the usual
period of 48 hours, the disconnection service will be made. Indeed,
DECORP disconnected the electrical services of MC Adore.
6 Dec ’78: MC Adore filed a complaint for damages with writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against DECORP in CFI Rizal. On the
same day, Judge issued an ex parte order for a preliminary injunction,
commanding DECORP as well as its agents in Dagupan City to "restore
immediately not later than 5-M p.m., December 7, 1978, the electrical
power of the MC Adore International Palace Hotel and resume the
electrical supply of and the electrical services and facilities to said hotel
to enable it to operate it fully, under pain of contempt.
8 Dec: MC Adore also moved that its "cash bond in the sum of P50k
represented by Check No. 12100 of the BPI payable to the clerk of
court" be substituted by a surety bond.
For failure of DECORP and its agents in Dagupan City to comply with
the aforesaid preliminary mandatory injunction, MC Adore filed a
petition to declare DECORP and its corporate officers in contempt of
court, also on the same day.
The judge issued an order, stating: “DECORP’s corporate officers,
except Atty. Leonardo Baro may be held in custody until the order is
complied, as the Court finds no valid justification for this contumacious
disobedience. Defendant Corporation has its head offices in Quezon City,
and although the plant is in Dagupan City, the plant can only act upon
orders of the Quezon City head office.”
11 Dec: On the hearing for preliminary mandatory injunction,
DECORP appeared and moved for reconsideration of the orders for
want of jurisdiction or GAD.
19 Dec: MR was denied. Judge ordered the enforcement of the
preliminary mandatory injunction.
The Court issued a resolution temporarily restraining DECORP from
enforcing or continuing to enforce the orders of 6 and 12 Dec ’78 .
21 Mar ’79: MC Adore manifested that it had filed a counterbond of
P225k.
12 May: DECORP filed an urgent supplemental motion reiterating
their prayer that they be allowed to redisconnect the electric power
from the hotel of MC Adore on the ground that MC Adore had failed
and refused to pay its electric power consumption based on the actual
meter readings as directed by the Court. Granted.
MC Adore filed an urgent motion to hold in abeyance the
compliance with the resolution on the ground that the current monthly
bills being presented by DECORP to MC Adore are the result of
readings taken from the electric meter which was tampered and asked
that it be allowed to continue depositing the regular payment in the
amount of P35k per month with the court until such time that the issue
on the tampered meter and questionable bins shall have been finally
resolved. Granted.
DECORP’s contention: CFI Rizal at Quezon City has no jurisdiction
over the case because the act of disconnecting the power to the hotel
of the MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. took place in Dagupan
City, outside the Province of Rizal and Quezon City.
MC Adore’s contention: The act of disconnection was the result of
an order issued by DECORP from its business office in Quezon City.
ISSUE: WON Judge Paño acted with GAD in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction ordering DECORP to restore the connection of
the electric power of MC Adore in Dagupan City
No. Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City has jurisdiction.
DECORP has its principal office in Quezon City where the business of
the corporation is managed by the Board of Directors. Decisions of the
said corporation are made in Quezon City. The employees of DECORP
in Dagupan City merely carry out the orders issued by the officials of
said corporation in Quezon City. Hence the acts sought to be restrained
are being committed in Quezon City.
Judge Pano did not commit GAD in issuing the questioned order
directing DECORP to restore the connection of the electric power to
the hotel owned by MC Adore. The record shows that Judge Pano
8
conducted hearings and gave the parties full opportunity to
present their evidence before issuing the orders sought to be set
aside.
Judge Pano’s findings: On the question of jurisdiction, both parties
are residents of Quezon City, as they have their principal offices in
Quezon City. The disconnection order was initiated and had its life and
source in Quezon City. The mandatory injunction is addressed to the
corporation in Quezon City. The Dagupan plant acts only upon order
of its officers in Quezon City. In the cases where the Supreme Court
ruled that the district court has improperly issued the writ, no private
right of ownership was involved. Rather they involved licenses or
privileges granted by government agencies with offices located beyond
the district court's territorial jurisdiction. Where private rights are
involved, the Supreme Court had upheld the issuance of the writ. Here
we have a case of the interference of plaintiff's property rights, with
situs in Quezon City by a corporation with situs in Quezon City. The
exercise of will by defendant had its origin in Quezon City. This Court
can grant relief when that exercise of will causes irreparable prejudice.
It is clear from the foregoing order that Judge Pano did not act
capriciously or whimsically in ordering DECORP to restore the
connection of the electric power to the hotel in Dagupan City of the MC
Adore Finance and Investment, Inc..
The various incidents regarding the correctness of the monthly bill
presented by DECORP to the MC Adore can be better heard and
resolved by Judge Pano. The correct amounts due prior to June 1979
shall be resolved by Judge Pano after hearing the parties.
Allgemeine-Bau-Chemie Phils. Vs. Metrobank (2006)
19 Nov ’96: Asian Appraisal Holdings, Inc. obtained a loan
amounting to P442.5M from Solidbank Corp. for the construction of
Asian Star Building, a 20-storey commercial condominium built on lots
located at Filinvest Corporate City, Alabang, Muntinlupa City.
As security for the loan, AAHI executed a security agreement or real
estate mortgage dated 19 Nov ‘96 over its property consisting of the
lots covered by TCT Nos. 205967 and 205969 and the condominium
built thereon including all units, parking slots, common areas and
other improvements, machineries and equipment. The REM was
registered with the ROD on 19 Nov ‘96 and duly annotated on the
individual Condominium Certificates of Title on even date.
17 Nov ‘99: AAHI entered into a contract to sell with Allgemeine for
the purchase of Units 1004 and 1005 and the right to the exclusive
use of 4 parking slots for a total purchase price of P23,571,280.
22 Dec: the parties executed an addendum to the contract to sell
whereby AAHI assigned to Allgemeine the right to the exclusive use of
parking slot P504 covered by CTC No. 54975 for a consideration of
P600k, which Allgemeine paid on even date.
23 Mar 2000: AAHI and Solidbank informed Allgemeine of the real
estate mortgage forged by them and was advised to remit its monthly
amortizations for the units and parking slots it purchased to Solidbank.
Allgemeine was also requested to inform Solidbank of the total
installments it had paid for these units and parking slots and the
balance still due thereon.
Oct 2001: Allgemeine fully settled its obligation to AAHI in the total
amount of P26,588,409.30.
21 Oct: AAHI defaulted on its loan obligation. Metrobank filed before
RTC Muntinlupa a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of the REM.
30 Oct: AAHI also filed a complaint against Solidbank for specific
performance with preliminary injunction to enjoin the foreclosure of
the REM before RTC Muntinlupa.
31 Oct: The mortgaged properties were sold at public auction to
Metrobank, to which the banking operations of Solidbank were
integrated.
24 Jan 2002: Metrobank filed an Ex-Parte petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Possession of the properties subject of the foreclosed
mortgage. Granted.
9 Apr: Allgemeine filed a motion for intervention in AAHI’s complaint
against Solidbank, with prayer for the annulment of the extra-judicial
foreclosure sale, delivery of title, and damages and for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining Metrobank to consolidate its title and to take possession of
its properties.
15 Apr: Court Sheriff issued a notice to vacate which was served on
16 May 2002 upon all building occupants who were advised to make
the necessary arrangements with Metrobank regarding their
occupancy.
AAHI filed MR. Denied.
18 Jun 2002: Allgemeine filed a separate petition for the issuance
of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction with the appellate court,
and also to enjoin the implementation of the writ of possession issued
by Muntinlupa RTC. It alleged that its complaint-in-intervention is its
principal action but as the said court could not enjoin Branch 276 from
implementing the writ of possession, both courts being of equal
jurisdiction, it had no choice but to file the petition with the appellate
court. CA denied the prayer.
ISSUE: WON the CA committed grave and palpable error in denying
its prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
No. It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action and
hence, the jurisdiction of a court, are the allegations of the complaint
and the character of the relief sought.
What Allgemeine filed with the CA was an original action for
preliminary injunction which is a provisional and extra-ordinary
remedy calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and
is availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the
case can be heard.
An original action for injunction is outside the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals, however. Under BP 129, the appellate court has
original jurisdiction only over actions for annulment of judgments of
the RTCs and has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, and auxiliary
writs or processes whether or not they are in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
The appellate court’s jurisdiction to grant a writ of preliminary
injunction is limited to actions or proceedings pending before it, as
Section 2 of Rule 58.
In the case at bar, Allgemeine’s complaint-in-intervention in Civil
Case No. 00-196 was pending before Branch 256 of the Muntinlupa
RTC, not with the appellate court. It’s petition before the appellate
court does not show, nay allege, that in issuing the writ of possession,
the Muntinlupa RTC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion for it to be treated as either one for
certiorari or prohibition.
CSC vs. CA (2005)
22 Dec ’95: A Complaint for Grave Misconduct and Moonlighting
with Urgent Prayer for Preventive Suspension and Disarming was filed
by the stockholders and board members of United Workers Transport
Corp. against SPO1 Rimando Gannapao before the PNP, Inspectorate
Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
A Summary Hearing was conducted by the Office of the Legal
Service of the National Headquarters PNP against Gannapao for the
alleged moonlighting. Records show that prior to the investigation
conducted by the Office of Legal Service, however, another pre-charge
investigation had been held for the same case by the Headquarters
Support Services also of the National Headquarters of the PNP. The
investigation appears to have been dismissed.
26 Nov ’97: PNP Chief Sarmiento rendered a decision imposing 3
mos suspension to Gannapao.
6 Feb ’98: Gannapao filed an urgent motion for reconsideration.
Denied by PNP Director General Aliño. Gannapao appealed to National
Appellate Board, which was dismissed. Gannapao then filed a petition
for appeal with the DILG, which was also denied. Thereafter, he
appealed to the CSC, praying the setting aside of the penalty of 3
months suspension and/or for the Commission to conduct a hearing
or a reinvestigation alleging lack of due process.
3 Apr 2002: CSC rendered a resolution dismissing the appeal and
modifying the suspension to a dismissal from service.
30 May: Gannapao filed a petition for review with CA assailing the
CSC’s resolution.
8 Jan 2003: CSC through the Office of the Sol-Gen filed its Comment
on the Petition specifically stating among others that Gannapao was
not entitled to a preliminary injunction.
14 Jan: CA issued a Resolution granting Gannapao’s motion for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining, restraining and
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prohibiting CSC from implementing its assailed CSC resolution
dismissing Gannapao.
CSC’s contention: CA erred in issuing the writ because the
Commission found that Gannapao was guilty of misconduct. The
injunctive relief violates the Administrative Code and the CSC rules
stating that administrative disciplinary penalties shall be immediately
executory, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal.
ISSUE: WON CA committed GAD in granting the motion for issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Gannapao
No. Neither the Administrative Code nor the CSC rules deprive
courts of their power to grant restraining orders or preliminary
injunctions to stay the execution of CSC decisions pending appeal.
Moreover, a court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction, when proper,
is expressly authorized by Section 2 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, Section 82 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 1999 recognizes the authority of the CA and the Supreme Court to issue
restraining orders or injunctions.
Having appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the CSC, the CA
clearly has the discretion to issue an ancillary writ of preliminary
injunction to secure the rights of private respondent pending appeal
of his dismissal. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion,
the exercise of judgment by the courts in injunctive matters should not
be interfered with.
Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise defined, grave
abuse is the exercise of power in an arbitrary or a despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an
evasion of a positive duty, or a refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law.
Certiorari will not issue to cure errors in proceedings or to correct
mere erroneous conclusions of law or fact. The burden is upon
petitioner to demonstrate that the questioned writ constitutes a
whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. As long as a court acts
within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of
that jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment
which, as a rule, are reviewable by a timely appeal of the final
disposition of the case.
As to issuance of the preliminary injunction. Section 3 of Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court prescribes the grounds for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. The requisites for the issuance of the writ are
the following: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that
must be protected and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage. In taking cognizance of a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction, a court has the duty to determine
whether the requisites for the grant of the injunction are present in the
case before it.
In the present controversy, however, the assailed Order does not
state the basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The
CA made no findings of fact or law indicating that any of the elements
essential for the grant of an injunctive writ existed. After merely stating
that it took "into consideration the allegations and the arguments set
forth" in the Urgent Motion filed by Gannapao, the CA immediately
concluded afterwards that Gannapao was entitled to the relief
demanded.
Nevertheless, in the interest of justice and fair play, this Court
scrutinized the records of the case and, indeed, found sufficient
grounds for the grant of the injunctive Writ. Prior to the finality of the
CSC Decision dismissing him, Gannapao has a clear and unmistakable
right to his current position in the police service. Unquestionably, the
right to employment, oftentimes the lowly employee’s only noble
source of bread and butter, is entitled to protection by the State.
Moreover, the immediate implementation of the not yet final penalty
of dismissal from the service would surely cause Gannapao (and his
family) irreparable damage. As pleaded, his salary and benefits as a
policeman are his family’s only source of income. Furthermore, he
incessantly asserted that the case against him had already been
dismissed in an earlier PNP pre-charge investigation. When the case
was reopened, he allegedly moved for dismissal on the ground of re
judicata.
Instead of ruling on the issue of whether the prior dismissal was in
fact a bar to the reopening of the case, the PNP Office of Legal Service
merely considered the filing of the Motion to Dismiss as a waiver
of his right to file an answer. Then it proceeded to rule on the
case on its merits. He subsequently appealed to the CSC his threemonth suspension, which had been affirmed by the DILG. Specifically,
he claimed lack of due process and requested the CSC to grant him a
hearing. Not only did it affirm the assailed Order of the DILG, it
moreover increased the penalty to dismissal from the service.
Under the above circumstances, it appears that Gannapao, without
prejudging his case on its merits, has raised a prima facie defense of
lack of due process.
City Government of Baguio vs. Masweng (2009)
The case stemmed from the 3 Demolition Orders issued by the City
Mayor of Baguio, Braulio D. Yaranon, ordering the demolition of the
illegal structures constructed by Lazaro Bawas, Alexander Ampaguey,
Sr. and a certain Mr. Basatan on a portion of the Busol Watershed
Reservation without the required building permits.
Pursuant thereto, the corresponding demolition advices dated 19
Sep 2006 were issued informing the occupants thereon of the
intended demolition of the erected structures on Oct 17 to 20, 2006.
Consequently, Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro Bawas
filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
against the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio before the NCIP-CAR,
Regional Office, La Trinidad, Benguet.
16 and 19 Oct 2006: Regional Hearing Officer Atty. Masweng of the
NCIP issued the 2 assailed TRO directing the City Government and all
persons acting for and in their behalf to refrain from enforcing the
demolition advice and orders.
Subsequently, the NCIP issued the other assailed Resolution dated
10 Nov 2006, granting the private respondents’ application for
preliminary injunction subject to the posting of an injunctive bond
each in the amount of P10k.
CA upheld the jurisdiction of the NCIP over the action filed by private
respondents and affirmed the TRO and the grant of the writ.
City Government’s contention: NCIP has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide main actions for injunction such as the one filed by private
respondents. They claim that the NCIP has the authority to issue TRO
and writs of preliminary injunction only as auxiliary remedies to cases
pending before it. Further, the IPRA provides that Baguio City shall be
governed by its Charter. Thus, private respondents cannot claim their
alleged ancestral lands under the provisions of the IPRA.
Private respondents’ contention: NCIP has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and decide main actions for injunction arguing that the
IPRA does not state that the NCIP may only issue such writs of
injunction as auxiliary remedies. Also contend that the IPRA does not
exempt Baguio City from its coverage nor does it state that there are
no ancestral lands in Baguio City.
ISSUE: WON NCIP has jurisdiction over the action / WON NCIP has the
power to issue writs of preliminary injunction
Yes. The NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the
formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to
protect and promote the rights and well-being of indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of
their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto. In order to fully
effectuate its mandate, the NCIP is vested with jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs. The only condition
precedent to the NCIP’s assumption of jurisdiction over such disputes
is that the parties thereto shall have exhausted all remedies provided
under their customary laws and have obtained a certification from the
Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt.
In addition, NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 reiterates the
jurisdiction of the NCIP over claims and disputes involving ancestral
lands and enumerates the actions that may be brought before the
commission.
In order to determine whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over the
dispute in accordance with the foregoing provisions, it is necessary to
resolve, on the basis of the allegations in their petition, whether private
respondents are members of ICCs/IPs. In their petition filed before the
NCIP, private respondents, members of the Ibaloi tribe who first settled
in Baguio City, were asserting ownership of portions of the Busol Forest
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Reservation which they claim to be their ancestral lands. Correctly
denominated as a petition for injunction as it sought to prevent
the enforcement of the demolition orders issued by the City Mayor, the
petition traced private respondents’ ancestry to Molintas and
Gumangan and asserted their possession, occupation and utilization
of their ancestral lands. The petition also alleged that private
respondents’ claim over these lands had been recognized by
Proclamation No. 15 which mentions the names of Molintas and
Gumangan as having claims over portions of the Busol Forest
Reservation.
Clearly then, the allegations in the petition, which axiomatically
determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of a particular
tribunal, squarely qualify it as a "disputes or controversies over
ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs" within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO.
The IPRA, furthermore, endows the NCIP with the power to issue
temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction. Sec. 69 of IPRA
Law provides that the NCIP shall have the power and authority to “xxx
enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending before it
which, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage
to any of the parties to the case or seriously affect social or economic
activity.”
Also, NCIP Administrative Circular 1-03 echoes the above provision,
which states: “A writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order may be
granted by the Commission xxx when it is established, on the basis of
sworn allegations in a petition, that the acts complained of involving or
arising from any case, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage or injury to any of the parties, or seriously affect social
or economic activity. This power may also be exercised by RHOs in cases
pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties.”
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP may issue
TROs and writs of injunction without any prohibition against the
issuance of the writ when the main action is for injunction. The power
to issue TROs or writs of injunction allows parties to a dispute over
which the NCIP has jurisdiction to seek relief against any action which
may cause them grave or irreparable damage or injury. In this case,
the Regional Hearing Officer issued the injunctive writ because its
jurisdiction was called upon to protect and preserve the rights of
private respondents who are undoubtedly members of ICCs/IPs.
Parenthetically, in order to reinforce the powers of the NCIP, the
IPRA even provides that no restraining order or preliminary injunction
may be issued by any inferior court against the NCIP in any case,
dispute or controversy arising from or necessary to the interpretation
of the IPRA and other laws relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.
ISSUE: WON private respondents’ ancestral land claim was indeed
recognized by Proclamation No. 15 in which case, their right thereto
may be protected by an injunctive writ
No. Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners
must show that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts
against which injunction is directed are violative of said right.
Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive
recognition of private respondents’ ancestral land claim. The
proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families,
the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as claimants of a
portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge
vested rights over the same. In fact, Proclamation No. 15 explicitly
withdraws the Busol Forest Reservation from sale or settlement.
The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was
declared by the Court as inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of
Appeals. The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such
precludes its conversion into private property. Relatedly, the courts are
not endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands.
All told, although the NCIP has the authority to issue TROs and writs
of injunction, we are not convinced that private respondents are
entitled to the relief granted by the Commission.
Reyes vs. Demetria (2003)
Demetrio Demetria filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that
the Resolution en banc dated 23 Jan 2002 be reconsidered and that
he be absolved of all administrative charges leveled against him.
In said Resolution, Demetria was found guilty of gross
misconduct: (a) by issuing a TRO with the signature of only two
out of three justices of the CA; (b) by enforcing the decision of the
appellate court notwithstanding the fact that the same is pending
appeal with the Supreme Court and (c) by showing his keen interest in
the immediate execution of the decision despite the lack of authority
of the Court of Appeals to appoint a Special Sheriff.
Demetria’s contention: He was denied due process; he is not guilty
of gross misconduct for the failure of one of the Justices of the Court
of Appeals to sign the Resolution granting the issuance of a temporary
restraining order; and, he is not guilty of misconduct "in allegedly
directing the appointment of a special sheriff".
ISSUE: WON Demetria’s contention is with merit
Partly meritorious. Demetria was found guilty of gross ignorance of
the law for disregarding existing rules of procedure in issuing a
temporary restraining order which bore the signatures of only two
justices of the CA.
Section 5 of Rule 58 provides the phrase: “xxx if issued by the Court
of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary restraining order shall be
effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person sought to
be enjoined.”
Moreover, under Section 10 of Rule 3 of the Revised Internal Rules
of the CA, it is provided: “When the Justice to whom the case is assigned
for study and report is absent, the motions and incidents enumerated in
the proceeding section may be acted upon by the Chairman or by the
other member of the Division to which that Justice belongs. If the
members of the division are all absent, any motion for the issuance of a
restraining order shall be referred to the Presiding Justice for appropriate
action.”
Under the foregoing, even only one (1) member of the CA may issue
a temporary restraining order. Thus, on this matter, Demetria could
not be held guilty of gross misconduct.
Nevertheless, we maintain that the issuance of TRO by only one or
two justices of the CA must be exercised sparingly, that is, only in case
of extreme necessity where there is compelling reason to abate or
avoid a grave injury to a party.