Running head: NATURE AND SCOPE OF GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY
A Critical Review of ​The Nature and Scope of Genetic Epistemology ​(Kitchener, 1981)
Oluwadeaduramilade Tawak
University of Lagos
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A critical review of Kitchener, R. F. (1981). The Nature and Scope of Genetic Epistemology.
Philosophy of Science​, 400-415.
The article, “​The Nature and Scope of Genetic Epistemology​”, as the title suggests
attempts to define what genetic epistemology is and what exactly it is concerned with. The
argument on what exactly Piaget meant by Genetic Epistemology is explored in the paper.
Citing sources, including papers written by Piaget, the writer explores the biological model
with which Piaget used in defining the concept of genetic epistemology. The paper is based
on arguments around the controversial matter of what genetic epistemology really is. Is it
focused on the individual alone (psychogenesis) or on the history of science (historiogenesis
or sociogenesis) or both? In addition, the writer attempts to answer the question: if genetic
epistemology does focus on both psychogenesis and sociogenesis, does one play a more
important role than the other?
From the abstract of the paper, Kitchener clearly lays out the issue he wishes to
tackle. He argues that although Piaget seemed to have contradicted himself on occasion,
much of his work highly supports the liberal interpretation to understanding the scope and
nature of genetic epistemology. In light of this, he concludes his argument that genetic
epistemology focuses on both the development of knowledge in the individual and the growth
of knowledge in science by highlighting three reasons that support his claim. His evidence is
based in other sources including some of Piaget’s own work and Kitchener’s previous works.
The paper is separated into five clearly defined sections that flow well into each other
and gives the reader a broad idea of what he will be reading about. The first section
introduces the issue to be addressed and why it is important. In the second section, Kitchener
defines genetic epistemology; in the third, he expounds on its possible scope - psychogenesis
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and sociogenesis; in the fourth, he looks at how existing literature on the topic of genetic
epistemology might be contradictory. Finally, he suggests an answer to the problem, which is
to identify the nature and scope of genetic epistemology, and backs up his suggestions with
well-founded explanations.
Kitchener claims that Piaget’s theory has been mistakenly conceptualised as a theory
of child psychology whereas it is really a theory of genetic epistemology. Thus, it is
important to identify what exactly genetic epistemology is, and the differences between
genetic epistemology and child psychology. He further states that most other papers are
focused on the importance of genetic epistemology and not its scope and he cites Hamlyn,
Kaplan, Russell, Taylor, Tolman, Wartofsky and even himself to back this up.
In addition, Kitchener presents other arguments on the scope of genetic epistemology.
He cites and quotes Hamyln and Toulmin who believed that the scope of genetic
epistemology was limited to psychogenesis, but later misinterpreted Kaplan saying that
“according to Kaplan, genetic epistemology is really about the history of science” (p. 401).
Kitchener points out that Kaplan’s view is actually contrary to what Hamyln and Toulmin
concluded as Kaplan stated that “according to Piaget, “genetic psychology of intelligence is
clearly relevant to epistemology” (p. 401). These statements lend credence to the purpose of
Kitchener’s paper as we can see that there is indeed an existing argument as to what genetic
epistemology really focuses on.
Kitchener presents evidence to support his claim that the scope of genetic
epistemology must be defined in a liberal manner to include both psychogenesis and
sociogenesis, but before doing this, he presents the reader with two definitions of genetic
epistemology by Piaget. He points out that these definitions do not give much information
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concerning the scope and the nature of genetic epistemology. He also points out that Piaget’s
conceptualization of genetic epistemology is rooted in a biological model. The reader might
later on infer that ontogenesis is similar to psychogenesis while phylogenesis is similar to
sociogenesis.
In addition, Kitchener points out the two methods of explaining the scope of genetic
epistemology (a mental comparative anatomy) identified by Piaget using a biological
analogy: historical-critical method and the psychogenesis. He states that Piaget believed that
the historical-critical method (also known as the historico-critical method) on its own is not
sufficient in explaining the study of the history of knowledge because it does not take into
account how the individual evolves intellectually as he constructs categories of thought. For
this reason, it is important to emphasise individual intellectual development (psychogenesis)
in addition to using the historico-critical method, which is “concerned with the development
of particular scientific concepts during the course of the history of science … and with
conceptual relationships with other concepts” (p. 405).
Kitchener further points out that Piaget is interested in a conceptual history of science
and not the connection between science and its larger societal context (external history) nor
does he focus on professional activities of members of a particular scientific community
(internal history). In this view, historico-critical approach will only provide the structural
network within which concepts form and not about how the individual develops the concept,
that is, “the developmentally necessary conditions of thought and knowledge” (p. 408). In
this case, Piaget is more interested in the form or structure of knowledge (Kantian view) and
not how the individual acquires knowledge, Because the Kantian view of knowledge
highlights the importance of individual differences, psychogenesis (which is individual
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focused) is seen as an important part of genetic epistemology.
Although Kitchener repeatedly points out that there is a conflict in the interpretation
of Piaget’s conceptualization of genetic epistemology, and he dedicates a whole section to
this, it is not immediately evident to the reader where this conflict happens and how. There is
no clear explanation of the conflict that Kitchener speaks of, especially in the section that he
dedicated to this apparent issue. In his attempt to explain this conflict, he only points the
reader to believe that Piaget insists that genetic epistemology must be approached from both a
psychogenetic and sociogenetic point of view. Kitchener quotes Piaget who insists that
because psychogenesis and historiogenesis are entangled, “the genetic theory of knowledge
must therefore reach out into a historico-critical analysis of scientific thought, and also into
genetic logic” (p. 410). Kitchener also fails to answer his question on whether psychogenesis
is more important than sociogenesis or vice versa, but the reader is able to infer that both of
them play equally important roles in explaining genetic epistemology.
Kitchener’s concluding arguments in support of the liberal interpretation of genetic
epistemology are that Piaget’s conception is based on a biological method of comparative
anatomy, which I have compared psychogenesis and sociogenesis above to ontogenesis and
phylogenesis respectively. In addition, the concept of orthogenesis, which means that
evolution is directional, points to the notion that one cannot study only social development
without accounting for individual development. Lastly, nothing Piaget has said in his works
points to a reductionist interpretation on genetic epistemology, but instead, he takes a holistic
approach (p. 413). All the three points stated here lead to the conclusion that the most
plausible interpretation of the scope and nature of genetic epistemology is the liberal
interpretation and that both psychogenesis and sociogenesis play complementary roles in
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understanding genetic epistemology.
In summary, Kitchener’s conclusion that the best approach to understanding genetic
epistemology is to choose the liberal interpretation that genetic epistemology combines both
sociogenesis and psychogenesis, over the narrower interpretation that genetic epistemology is
basically psychogenesis (focused on the individual only), is supported by the information he
provides. Although he talks about conflicting interpretations, he never really clearly states
how exactly how the scope of genetic epistemology, according to Piaget’s work, has been
interpreted in a conflicting manner. Instead, the evidence he provides solidifies the stance that
Piaget proposed that the scope of genetic epistemology includes psychogenesis and
historiogenesis. The piece as a whole is convincing in its liberal interpretation of genetic
epistemology.
NATURE AND SCOPE OF GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY
References
Kitchener, R. F. (1981). The Nature and Scope of Genetic Epistemology. ​Philosophy of
Science​, 400-415.
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