CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1. 1 Background to the Study
The place of Nigeria in Africa cannot be easily wished away. By any
acceptable standard, Nigeria deserves to be called the “Giant of Africa” by virtue
of its stupendous resource endowments and population. In her over 56 years of
nationhood, the influence wielded by Nigeria through the instrumentality of
foreign policy can better be assessed within the context of its regional and
continental leadership aspirations. This ambition is the underpinning philosophy
and consuming impetus for adopting the theory of four “concentric circles” as
postulated by Akinyemi (2013:17) as a defining parameter for Nigeria’s national
interest. The expansionary nature of capitalism has led to its universalisation and
the consequent integration of all economies of the world a phenomenon known as
formation of international organizations.
It is however, pertinent to see integration as a process that became
intensified as a result of global political-economic metamorphoses that occurred in
the 1980s; particularly, the neo-liberal ideological prescription of Reagan/Thatcher
revolution rooted on privatization, liberalization and deregulation. This was further
aggravated by the collapse of the “socialist bloc” and the concomitant de1
ideologisation all of which stimulated the pervasive networks of capitalism
(Okolie, 2007: 3-4).
Contemporary regional integration is therefore, a multi-dimensional
phenomenon which entails the removal and dismantling of all forms of barriers to
the free and unfettered movement of goods, services, international investment and
capital. It is a process that brings about the integration of national economies into
the global economy involving increasing volume of transnational capital flows and
through rapid and wide-spread diffusion of technology (Okolie, 2006:72; Khor,
2001:2; Garcia, 1998:96; Iglesias, 1997:2; Reich, 1998:6 etc).
It is equally germane to note that the major facets of formation of
international organizations remain liberalization of trade, investment and finance
(Khor, 2001:1; Ohiorhenuan, 1998:6; Okolie, 2007:7 etc). Meanwhile, formation
of international organizations is a phenomenon that has widespread impacts (both
negative and positive) on countries of the world. Thus, capitalizing on its benefits
while mitigating its risks remains the most important challenge to countries of the
world.
Regional integration has been adopted as the most viable strategic response
to the challenges of formation of international organizations. As a result, regional
integration is ubiquitous as there has been proliferation and strengthening of
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various regional and sub-regional groupings in various parts of the globe; for
instance: the European Union (EU) in Europe; the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) in Asia; the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
in America; MERCOSUR in Latin America; et cetera.
Despite efforts made in West Africa to integrate countries of the sub-region
and form a formidable regional bloc, not much success has been achieved. Intraregional trade among ECOWAS member states is still minimal while most West
African countries still trade more with Europe and America than with her
members. Again, monetary cooperation and integration remains a big hurdle in the
sub-region while the flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has continued to
decline, the region continues to experience massive de-industrialization.
Essentially, though formation of international organizations is antithetical to
regional integration, this is however the inextricable complex interdependent world
engendered by formation of international organizations serves as a centripetal force
which engenders vertical integration of the economies of West Africa to the global
economy and undermines any effort to integrate at the sub-regional level.
It is against this background that we shall explicate the role of Nigeria in the
formation and development of international organizations with special attention on
3
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) between 2007 and
2019.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
In order to mitigate the risks of isolationism and exploit the benefits of interstate relations, most nations have resorted to the formation of regional blocs. Thus,
regional integration is ubiquitous and has been seen as a veritable strategy in
reducing the impacts of formation of international organizations (Nnanna, 2006:9).
Nigeria has made efforts in West Africa to integrate both at domestic and
sub-regional levels, however, not much success have been achieved especially in
West Africa. Formation of international organizations for instance is a multifaceted phenomenon which impacts on regional integration in a variegated way.
The major facets of formation of international organizations are financial, trade
and investment liberalization (Khor, 2001:2; Okolie, 2007:7). Each of these facets
poses serious challenge to integration in West Africa. While trade liberalization
impinges on intra-regional trade, financial liberalization undermines monetary
cooperation and integration in West Africa, and liberalization of investment
impacts negatively on the flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the subregion.
4
Thus, intra-regional trade among West African countries of which Nigeria
has remained a major player is not just minimal but have continued to decline
(World Bank, 2006; Oyejide, 2004; Ouya, 2003 etc); monetary cooperation and
integration within the sub-region is far from being attained, while flow of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) to the sub-region has continued to decline.
Although, considerable attention has been directed to the study of the
challenges posed to regional integration by formation of international
organizations, existing studies only gloss over the issue without analytically
examining how the different facets of formation of international organizations
impacts on integration in West Africa. Further, most studies tend to only explain
how formation of international organizations engenders specialization of African
economies in primary commodity production, and how these economies have been
vertically integrated into the global economy (Oyejide, 1998; Onuoha, 2004 etc).
Conscious effort has not been made to explicate the mechanisms through
which formation of international organizations undermines regional integration
especially how the major forces of formation of international organizations (trade,
investment and financial liberalization) undermine regional integration in West
Africa. Generally, little is known on how the various facets of formation of
international organizations undermine intra-regional trade in West Africa, their
5
impact on the mechanisms and strategies of monetary cooperation and integration
is still vague while the impact of these facets of formation of international
organizations on the flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the sub-region,
and how this in turn impinges on the intensity of integration in West Africa have
not been systematically articulated.
It is against this backdrop that rigorous effort is made in this study to
explicate the role of Nigeria in the formation and development of international
organizations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
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1.3 Research Questions
Specifically, this study shall attempt to interrogate the questions stated below:
i. How has Nigeria helped in the formation and development of Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) from 2007 to 2019?
ii. What impacts has the formation of ECOWAS made on the cooperation and
integration among states in West Africa?
iii. What are the challenges facing the realization of the objectives of ECOWAS?
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1. 4 Objectives of the Study
The broad objective of this dissertation is to examine the role of Nigeria in
the formation and development of international organizations with special attention
of the Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS). The specific
objectives of this study are:
i. To examine how Nigeria has helped in the formation and development of
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
ii. To assess the impacts of the formation of ECOWAS on the cooperation and
integration among states in West Africa
iii. To identify the challenges facing the realization of the objectives of ECOWAS
1.5 Research Propositions
The following propositions guided this dissertation:
i. Nigeria has helped in the formation and development of Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS)
ii. There are impacts of the formation of ECOWAS on the cooperation and
integration among states in West Africa
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iii. That there identify the challenges facing the realization of the objectives of
ECOWAS
1.6 Significance of the Study
This study is practically and theoretically significant because it will add
value to existing knowledge and aid in solving practical societal problem, in this
case, the problem of regional integration in West Africa in the era of globalization.
Theoretically, this study is a sine-qua-non because it will add value to the existing
literature and ipso facto fill the gap in knowledge. Again, not only will the study be
an indispensable piece for political pundits and the academia, it will also serve as a
convenient starting point for further inquiry in the field of political science.
Furthermore, the study will open up new vistas in the intellectual debate and
provoke further academic excursion especially in the areas of cooperation and
regional integration. A study such as this, is therefore a desideratum and is
believed to have served its purpose if it succeeds in systematically explicating
issues and is able to stimulate further academic discourse.
Practically, the study will be a viable guide to African political leaders and
policy makers especially ECOWAS member states to maximize the gains of
integration while mitigating its risks. More so the recommendations and findings
will educate West African states in general and Nigerian society in particular on
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the areas of international relations and its impact in integrating the economies of
West African countries.
1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study
The scope of this study centered on the role of Nigeria in the formation and
development of international organizations with emphasis on the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) from 2007 to 2019. This study
covered the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) from 2007
to 2019. The first factor that could have limited this study was the internal validity
of using case study qualitative method because the researcher does not have
control over the events.
Therefore, findings from this study are only applicable to this study; however, to
reduce internal validity issue, the sampling was done purposefully, and member
checking was applied at the end of data interpretation.
Finally, the finding from this study may also influence positive change through
using collaborative engagement between nations to pursue development. Using
insight from this study, the stakeholders may improve the commitment to integrate
efforts.
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1.8 Definitions of Terms
International Organizations: These are organizations that are formed by
independent countries in order to achieve a set of objectives.
Economic Integration: This involved the use of full economic tools of the state to
achieve its national interest. It includes all the economics activities such as export,
import, investment, lending, borrowing, foreign aids, free trade agreements, etc
that state employ in achieving their national interests.
Economic Dependency: By this, we refer to the inability of a nation to become
financially self-reliant thereby relying on other counties for her economic needs. It
could also mean the lack of capacity and ability to control the economic system or
productive process of a society such that the society as a state depends on foreign
developed economies for leadership, aids and control through directions and some
economic and financial institutions.
Foreign Policy: Foreign policy otherwise referred to as foreign relation. Policy
consists of self-interest strategies chosen by the state to safeguard its national
interest and to achieve its goals within the international relations milieu. More so,
foreign policy can be defined as a dynamic process of interaction between the
changing external circumstances. In additions, foreign policy is presumably
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something less them the sum total of all the policies which has an external effect
upon the national government.
Bilateral Relations: This involves the relationship that exists between two
independent countries interacting on political, social, economic, cultural,
ideological or technological bases.
Multilateral Relations: This involves a diplomatic relations that is carried out
between more than two countries. It usually involves the interactions between
many independent countries, usually carried out under the disguise of international
organizations which could either be governmental, or no-governmental or both.
1.9 Organization of the Study
This study is organized into six chapters. Chapter one; titled Introduction contains
the background to the study, statement of the research problem, research questions,
objectives of the study, research propositions, scope and limitations of the study,
significance of the study as well as conceptual clarifications. In chapter two, a
review of relevant literatures and theoretical framework are captured. Chapter three
has the research methodology, chapter four has the general overview of Nigerian
foreign relations while chapter five contains the Nigerian and ECOWAS. Chapter
six has the summary, conclusion and recommendations of the study.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1.1Foreign Policy
There is no generally agreed definition of foreign policy; hence different scholars
have attempted to define the concept from their own perspectives. Obi (2006)
defines foreign policy as the system of activities evolved by communities for
changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the
international environment. Similarly, Frankel in Obi defines foreign policy as
consisting of decisions and actions that involve some appreciable extent
relationship between one state and another.
A country's foreign policy consists of self-interest strategies chosen by the state to
safeguard its national interests and to achieve its goals within the international
relations milieu. It is the aggregate of a country’s national interest which results
from the interaction of internal and external forces as perceived by the foreign
policy decision makers. The approaches used are strategically employed to interact
with other countries.
For countries to relate effectively with one another, foreign policy must be well
defined, well thought out, and must possess direction. Hence, Wogu, Sholarin &
Chidozie, 2013) infers that foreign policy can best be understood through an
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explanation of what it actually is. Foreign policy, according to him consists of
three elements. One is the overall orientation and policy intentions of a particular
country toward another. The second element is the objective that a country seeks to
achieve in her relations or dealings with other countries. The third element of
foreign policy is the means for achieving that particular goal or objectives.
In recent times however, due to the deepening level of globalization and
transnational activities, relations and interactions have been known to exist
between state and non- state actors in the international political arena. These
relations in their own way have influenced several foreign policies between nation
states. The foreign policy of any nation is the external projection of some of the
domestic policies of that country that may have relevance in such arena. Both
domestic and foreign policies of a country are interrelated, or perhaps more
accurately stated, are more inter-penetrated. It is thus appropriately defined as:
A country’s response to the world outside or
beyond its own frontiers or boundaries. That
response may be friendly or aggressive, causal or
intense, simple or complex, but it is always there.
It comprises many elements – Diplomatic,
Military, Trade, Economics, Social, Cultural,
Educational, Sporting etc. and it varies in form
and focus according to the circumstance
(Chibundu, 2003:11).
Some countries can at different times be friends or enemies or valued allies, with a
relatively long or short period of time. For example Nigeria broke diplomatic
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relations with Cote d’ Ivoire, Gabon, Tanzania and Zambia, during the Nigerian
civil war (1967-1970), because they recognized and traded with Biafra –The Break
way Eastern Region of Nigerian. But the relationship was restored at the end of the
war. Besides, the policy of non-recognition of the apartheid regime of South Africa
by Nigeria changed with the installation of a black majority rule by the African
National Congress (ANC) country. The point to keep in mind is that whatever
forms it takes; some response to the outside world is always there. In effect, every
country must have a foreign policy in order to live and survive as an independent
body in the complex, sometime dangerous, world we live in today
Essentially therefore, countries all over the world design and implement foreign
policies in order to guide their external relations as well as protect, promote and
defend their vital national interests.
This could be in areas like defence of territorial integrity, the promotion of
economic, military, strategic and diplomatic interests and whatever a country
might consider as its vital national interest. It is therefore naturally expected that
Nigeria’s foreign policy ought to be fundamentally guided by her national interest
which should ordinarily serve to either justify or repudiate the nation’s action or
inaction in international relations. According to Yaqub (2004), it should be
understood that a county’s foreign policy should be dynamic enough to respond to
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the challenges that might be taking place in the world which are outside its
territorial confines. Indeed the dictum in international relations
is summed up by the saying that, “there is no permanent friend but permanent
interest” (Yaqub, 2004), Section 19 of 1979 and 1999 constitution of the Federal
Republic had gone further to set the foreign policy objectives of the Nigerian state
thus:
The foreign policy shall be:
i.
Promotion and protection of national interest;
ii.
Promotion of African integration and support of African unity;
iii.
Promotion of international cooperation for consolidation of universal peace
and mutual respect among all nations and elimination in all its manifestation;
iv.
Respect for international law and treaty. Obligations as well as the seeking
of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration and adjudication and Promotion of a just world economic order.
The above policies as contained in the 1979 and 1999 constitution Yusuf and
Akinboye averred that “the protection of our national interest has remained the
permanent focus of Nigeria’s foreign policy, but the strategies for such protection
have varied from one regime/government to another”. By this statement, he infers
that various governments from independence to date have pursued the same goals
and objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy but in deferent ways.
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2.1.2 Regional Integration
Regional integration is a contested concept. Available definitions are varied,
ranging from the shortest and selective to the longest and all inclusive. De
Lombaerde and van Langenhove (2007) define regional integration as a worldwide
phenomenon of territorial systems that increase the interactions between their
components and create new forms of organisations co-existing with traditional
forms of state-led organisation at the national level. In addition, van Ginkel (2003)
describes regional integration as the process by which the States within a particular
region increase their level of interaction with regard to economic, security,
political, and also social and cultural issues.
Regional integration between countries can occur on three levels. Coordination is
the lowest level of economic cooperation. It usually involves the voluntary
alignment of national policies and investments in certain sectors of the economy.
Harmonisation is a higher level of cooperation, and it usually involves
harmonisation of national legislation or the adoption of common legislation.
De Lombaerde and van Langenhove (2007), on this level, all legislation is still
national, and all policies and instruments are nationally controlled and
implemented, although they might be regionally agreed upon. Integration is the
highest level of economic cooperation. In a regionally integrated market, some of
16
the traditional decision-making powers of nation states have been handed over to
the regional level, and regional rules and decisions supersede national legislation.
Furthermore, at least some economic policies are formulated on the regional level.
Integration can thus refer both to the process as a whole, but also to a certain
advanced level of cooperation.
Regional Integration increases trade between member states; enlarges their markets
and expands their production capabilities (economies of scale) and allows them to
develop common laws and regulations that improve the region’s institutional
strength (Alves, Draper, and Khumalo, 2009). Regional Integration initiatives in
LDCs have a long history dating back to the formation of the SACU in 1969,
ECOWAS in 1975, SADC in 1980, COMESA in 1994 and EAC in 1999 with a
view of African governments to achieve free trade and faster economic growth. A
significant body of international evidence confirms that greater openness to trade
is, on average, associated with increasing productivity and faster growth. Trade
openness can influence both economic growth and the level of income through
technological Innovation, competition and economies of Scale, (Winters, and
Masters, 2010). As economic integration lowers barriers between regions and
dissolves national boundaries, there is a question of whether trade develops more
or less.
17
According to Balassa (1961) one of the foremost integration theorists, defined
economic integration as both a process and a state of affairs. When viewed as
process, it encompasses measures designed to abolish discrimination between two
or more economic entities belonging to different sovereign states. When viewed as
a state of affairs, it can be characterized by the absence of various forms of barriers
(both economic and non-economic) between independent sovereign economies.
Moreover, Balassa, Kahnert, Stoutjesdijk, and Thomopoulos, makes the distinction
between integration and cooperation, which is qualitative as well as quantitative.
Another integration theorist, Overturf postulates a more generalized definition
which states that:
Economic integration would imply the greatest possible
division of labor, the fullest possible mobility of factors,
and the least possible discrimination within the grouping.
Movement toward this state may take place by various
forms, or degrees, of unification, including international
trade integration, factor integration, and policy
integration. (Overturf, 1986:1)
The phrase regional integration has only fairly recently been used to denote the
combination of separate economies into larger groupings. As such, its use in
practice seems to refer either to the state of being integrated or to the process of
achieving that state, and more than occasionally to both at same time.
18
For example, international agreement on trade policies constitutes a form of
cooperation, whereas the abolition of trade barriers is an act of economic
integration. Integration is the abolition of discrimination within an area. Kahnert
(1969) on his part defines regional integration as the process of removing
progressively those discriminations which occur at national borders. This
definition is indeed broad as it links regional integration with international
relations.
Allen (1963) claims that every researcher understands regional integration
differently. That is why according to him one of the main contributions of Balassa
is that he defines integration and shows its difference from cooperation, integration
is a restriction of discrimination while cooperation just reduces its negative effects.
To Jacqueline Mambara, regional integration connotes the formation of closer
economic linkages among countries that are geographically close to each-other,
mainly through Special Trade Agreements (STAs).
The Eurostep (2000) defines regional integration as the process of overcoming, by
common accord, political, physical, economic and social barriers that divide
countries from their neighbors, and of collaborating in the management of shared
resources and common national goals. Put simply, regional integration denotes
bringing parts or units together to form a whole or create interdependence. It could
also represent a situation in which states become interdependent in whatever
19
aspects of their relations they desire. Nonetheless, integration can be said to exist
when units join together in order to satisfy objectives which they cannot meet
autonomously. In this way, integration can be a process which hastens up the
achievement of certain objectives in the interest of a larger body. Such a process
would involve the shifting of loyalties, expectations and political activities towards
a new and larger center whose institutions and processes demand some justification
over those of the national states.
The extent of such a transfer of loyalties and jurisdiction enjoyed by the new center
would depend on the level and goals of integration schemes as well as the socioeconomic and political ramifications which the implementations of integrative
policies generate within and between the integrating units (Adetula, 2004).
Regional Integration may thus be defined as the commercial policy of
discriminatively reducing or eliminating trade barriers only among nations joining
together. The degree, of economic integration varies.
Regional integration initiatives, according to Van Langenhove, should fulfill at
least eight important functions: the strengthening of trade integration in the (sub-)
region, the creation of an appropriate enabling environment for private sector
development, the development of infrastructure programmes in support of
economic growth and regional integration. Also, it entails the development of
strong public sector institutions and good governance, the reduction of social
20
exclusion and the development of an inclusive civil society, contribution to peace
and security in the region, the building of environment programmes at the regional
level and the strengthening of the region’s interaction with other regions of the
world.
Robson (1968) argues that the economic integration between sovereign states has
become a trend in the mid-twentieth century and the increasing formation of such
integrated bodies has led to this era being termed ‘the age of integration’. This
need for integration is manifested in the establishment of organizations such as the
European Economic Community (EEC), the European Free Trade Area (EFTA),
the Central American Common Market, and the Arab Common Market across the
developed, Latin American and Middle Eastern world respectively. With the
formation of institutions such as the Southern African Custom Unions (SACU),
African countries have increasingly joined the integration bandwagon and their
interest not only comes from the economic benefits of such bodies but is also as a
result of the political and social aspects, all of which are closely associated to one
another.
Although regional integration is not a new concept to Africans, it has increasingly
become a high priority in the political agenda of many African countries and its
importance is associated with the need to form strong Regional Economic
Integration (REI) mechanisms which would in turn lead to an increase in economic
21
growth through the convergence of macroeconomic and fiscal policies, and an
increase in intra-regional trade.
Robson (1968) further argues that for Africa to be significantly free of external
dependence and overcome the disadvantages of state size, there has to be a certain
level of economic integration across the continent and in terms of the political
aspects, integration occurs because of the assumption that for all but a few larger
African states, considerations of modernization and genuine independence render
some form of international cooperation or interdependence inescapable. From the
above, it is safe to define regional integration as the process of bringing nations
with close economic interests together for the purpose of mutuality and
commensality.
2.1.3 Trade Liberalisation and Intra-Regional Trade in West Africa
Regional integration in West Africa is anchored primarily on trade, any process
which impedes both extra and intra-regional trade constitutes an obstacle to
integration in the sub-region (Alaba, 1998:8). In this light, a lot of studies have
tried to examine the factors that impinge on intra-regional trade in West Africa
especially how trade liberalization, engendered by formation of international
organizations undermines intra-regional trade in West Africa. However, most of
22
the studies only present a vague analysis without actually establishing a link
between trade liberalization and diminishing intra-regional trade in West Africa.
World Bank (2006) argued that trade among West African countries is only
a small fraction of their total external trade. In 2004 alone, the total amount of
merchandise exported by member countries to other member countries was about
8.6 percent of their total exports and 9.1 percent of their total imports. It argued
that even at that, the figure for total exports from West African countries is heavily
based on the importance of Nigeria’s total exports of which oil represents close to
98%. Thus, Nigeria’s oil exports to other West African countries accounts for large
part of intra-regional trade. They argued that eliminating oil trade from total
imports by member countries would reduce the ratio of intra-regional trade to total
imports to a low 5.7 percent. Page and Bilal (2001) opposed this view, using
ECOWAS as an institutional framework. They opined that there has been an
increase in intra-regional trade within ECOWAS as several members of UEMOA
have increased their trade with the rest of ECOWAS, and the non UEMOA
members of ECOWAS also show an increase in trade within ECOWAS. They
argued that this increase in ECOWAS trade, however, may also be explained by
shifts from unrecorded to recorded trade. These studies only examined the rate of
intra-regional trade without examining factors that affect increase or decrease of
intra-regional trade in West Africa.
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Abdoulahi (2005) examined trade liberalization vis-â-vis intra-regional trade
in West Africa and argued that trade liberalization is a reform measure adumbrated
in the Structural Adjustment Programmes financed by Bretton Woods institutions
under which countries pursue trade reform measures relating to the liberalization of
imports and currency regimes as well as the reduction of tariff and non-tariff
barriers. He argued that although, African countries have liberalized trade, intraECOWAS trade is still low consisting of only 10% of total exports. He further
argued that despite the importance attached to bolstering intra-regional trade and
the many institutional mechanisms put in place with a view to improving intraregional trade, the share of intra-regional trade has remained modest with export
mostly targeted to the European, Asian and North American markets.
In the same vein, Oyejide (2004) examined trade liberalization and regional
integration in Africa and argued that an assessment of the performance of most
African regional integration reveals, inter alia, that intra-regional trade as a
proportion of total trade is quite low and that trade performance (measured by
changes in trade/GDP ratio) of the “integrated” areas worsened significantly. He
saw trade liberalization as a policy objective of structural adjustment programme
which is an outward-oriented trade policy that brings about closer integration of
African countries into the world economy. Based on this, he argued that the
unilateral trade liberalization measures taken by individual countries under SAP
24
effectively reduces the degree of preferences enjoyed by her regional partners
because these measures do not take cognizance of any obligation to regional
partners. WAMA (1998) corroborates this view and argued that trade liberalization
as pursued under SAP objectives orient the economies of West Africa countries
toward the major world economies thereby making the developed capitalist
countries the major trading partners of countries of the sub-region. These scholars
see trade liberalization only as a policy objective of structural adjustment
programme implemented by African countries. However, they fail to understand
the contemporary trade liberalization as an inevitable aspect of formation of
international organizations implemented by all countries and not necessarily only
countries carrying out structural adjustment.
Some recent studies have tried to examine trade liberalization agreement
between Africa and other developed capitalist countries, and its implication for
African trade. In this light, Alaba (2006) examined the trade liberalization
agreement established between the EU and the 77 Africa, Caribbean and Pacific
(ACP) countries under the Yaunde and the Lome IV conventions in which EU
offered market access to West African exports. He posits that despite this
arrangement, the magnitude of intra-ECOWAS trade compared with the rest of the
world remains very minimal as intra-community trade with the West African subregion remains far less than 15 percent. He went further to show that intra25
community trade in West Africa in terms of exports and imports within the subregion shows dismal performance between 1996 — 2001, and on the average,
intra-community trade is only about 11 percent of total trade of the sub-region. He
advocated the need for West African countries to acquire the necessary capacity
and competitive clout before facing the competition with EU countries under the
trade liberalization agreement.
Similarly, Hebebrand (2007) examined the trade liberalization between EU
and ACP as facilitated by the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 and the various
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations. He argued that trade
liberalization under these agreements grant market access to ACP countries into
the EU market as around 98% of ACP exports to the EU already come in duty free.
He recognized that intraregional trade in Africa have been very low, but argued
that the trade liberalization between ACP and EU would increase and foster intraregional trade in Africa because the EPAs are being negotiated between EU and
regional groupings of the ACP countries.
Conversely, Ndirangu (2007), opposing this view, argued that the broad
liberalization of trade with the EU has an adverse effect on intra-regional trade of
ACP countries (especially West Africa). According to him, the entry of EU goods
into ACP countries on more favourable terms has raised concerns that the more
26
efficient EU firms and subsidized agricultural goods will out-compete local
enterprises involved in value-added production, thus limiting the benefits of
regional integration to individual countries. Again, the isolation of members of the
same regional trading blocs forced to negotiate under different EPA configurations
creates the risk of members of one regional bloc committing to different tariffs and
trade liberalization measures from those agreed upon under regional blocs. This
situation according to him is replicated in West Africa, where the ECA estimates
that ECOWAS countries could lose trade worth 365 million dollars to EU
competitors.
These scholars merely analyze trade liberalization as facilitated by the EUACP Agreements and not as one of the major thrusts of formation of international
organizations. More so, their analysis were confined to the trade relations between
EU and ACP countries and not the global free trade brought about by trade
liberalization. Thus, such analysis cannot give detailed understanding of the
implications of trade liberalization as an aspect of formation of international
organizations for intra-regional trade.
A number of other studies have tried to situate trade liberalization within the
context of contemporary formation of international organizations and its
implications for intra-regional trade. In view of this, Okolie (2007) posits that trade
27
liberalization suggests unfettered movement of goods across global boundaries. It
involves dismantling territorial boundaries and removal of tariffs for free
movement of goods and for trade to take place under the regulatory framework of
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Ouya (2003) recognized trade liberalization
as one of the major thrusts of formation of international organizations which
engenders international specialization. Using West and Central Africa as examples,
she argued that regional integration in the context of trade liberalization has
suffered many set-backs, one of which is the fact that non-complementary nature
of production structures hinders tariff reduction among member countries. Again,
the vertical integration of African economies into the Northern Hemisphere via
formation of international organizations makes African countries dependent and
devoted to the export of raw materials, this hinders industrialization and thereby
impedes exchange of goods within the region. Accordingly, Ozor (2006) avers that
trade liberalization has brought about decline in Africa’s volume and terms of trade
in the world market because of the specialization of the region in primary
commodities.
According to Iglesias (1997), multilateral trade liberalization is one of the
key thrusts of formation of international organizations. Trade liberalization in the
framework of the WTO permits countries easy access to the global market for its
export. Based on this, he argued that liberalization of trade has brought about an
28
accelerated increase in international trade. The question he posed is whether
regionalism is detrimental to formation of international organizations. He
therefore, sees intra-regional trade as a vehicle that enhances global trade. Despite
his effort, he failed to examine how trade liberalization undermines intra-regional
trade through the specialization and vertical integration it engenders, he rather sees
intraregional trade as a factor that stimulates global trade.
In his view, Oyejide (1998) posits that trade liberalization has intensified the
international specialization of Africa in production of primary commodities and
has also led to the drastic decline in the demand of these commodities because of
the competition from new and relatively more efficient producers in Asia and Latin
America. In the same vein, Sandrey, Matlanyane & Maleleka (2006) examined the
impacts of trade liberalization on Southern African Customs Unions (SACU) and
argued that trade liberalization greatly reduce the tariff revenue accruable to
countries of a region. Though these scholars were able to explain how trade
liberalization engenders international specialization and reduces revenue derivable
from tariff, they failed to show how these impediments impinge on regional
integration.
ECA (1997) sees trade liberalization as a policy option of structural
adjustment programme which impinges on the degree to which member states
29
adhere to rules of intra-regional trade liberalization within the West African subregion. Apparently, there are corpus of literature dealing with trade liberalization
and intraregional trade. However, despite contributions from scholars such as
Alaba, (2006); Maleleka, (2006); Ozor, (2006); Onyejide, (1998); Ouya, (2003)
among others, the literature have not been able to systematically explain how trade
liberalization as a thrust of contemporary formation of international organizations
impedes intra-regional trade in West Africa. Thus, the question on whether trade
liberalization undermines intraregional trade in West Africa still remains
unanswered in the existing literature.
2.1.4 Conceptualizing National Interest
The notion of national interest is vague and so it is difficult to give a precise
definition of the term. In spite of that, national interest is defined as the general
long term and continuing purpose which the states, nation and the government see
themselves as serving. In practice, the national interest of a country is synthesized
and checked by political leaders or policy makers. That is why national interest is
defined as what policy makers say it is. Babangida (1986) maintained that he
would like to think of national interest as national security interest. This is because
to him the concept of national interest has become so vague and elastic. We have
been warned by social scientists that national security has many tangible
30
ingredients which may be more menacing than external military threat. It can take
subtle forms such as subversion of core values through economic sabotage,
counterfeiting, drug trafficking, espionage, and cultural subversion. We are all
aware of the damage which these elements can cause on a nation’s psyche and
survival. National security interest can be used to refer to such concepts as “selfpreservation”, self-defense”, and even “survival”. In short national security means
that the state should survive. It means it should live without serious threat to all
values that are regarded as important or vital (Wolfers 1962:19).
The generally acceptable view is that national interest is a manifestation of the core
values, objectives and philosophy underlying the actions of the leaders. Whereas
the grand norm provides a veritable basis for the collective actions of leaders, their
preferences, predilections and sentiments of leaders making the national interest an
expression of leadership interests pursued across the national boundaries. National
interest is inextricably wedded to the leadership of a nation. Apparently, leadership
itself depends on the aggregate need disposition, ideology and perceptions of the
role incumbents. In Nigeria, whereas it may be true that certain core values are
pursued within the context of national interest, the perception of leaders always
differ .
Thus, Obasanjo (1976) defined the national interest of Nigeria as consisting of four
components: namely:
31
(a) The creation of a suitable political and economic environment in Africa and the
world at large, which will facilitate the defense of the territorial integrity of
African States.
(b) The promotion of equality and self-reliance in Africa and the World.
(c) Defense of social justice and human dignity of the Black man, and
(d) The defense and promotion of world peace.
According to Morgenthau (1973:533), national interest of a state “can only be
defined in terms of national security and national security must be defined as
integrity of the national territory and its institutions.” Kennan (1987) like
Morgenthau believes that national interest is a more realistic guide to intelligent
policy, as well as for political analysis than the factor of morality or ideology.
Kennan (1987) agreed with Morgenthau (1973) that it is national interest, and not
moral principles, that essentially, should guide a nation’s foreign policy and
external relations. Kennan’s view is that a nation should try to conduct its foreign
policy in accordance with both its national interest and the moral or ethical
principles inherent in the spirit of its civilization. At the same time, a nation should
not try to impose its moral principle on other nations (Kumar, 1975).
To appreciate the policy implications of the two variants of the realist tradition, it
is necessary to place them in the context of their philosophical roots. The
32
philosophical basis of Morgenthau’s conception of national interest is Hobbes’
theory of the state in contrast; the philosophical foundation of Kennan’s version of
the realist view of national interest is the liberal theory of the state as expounded
by John Locke.
Furthermore, in the view of decision making theorists, such as Richard Snyder,
Bruck and Sapin, the basic national interests of all states are broadly similar, but
only in the sense that the basic needs and wants of states centre on their security
and welfare, the preservation of the political system and their national life-style
(Asobie, 2007). They however, reject the idea that national interest is a single,
objective reality or truth that prevails whether or not it is perceived by the
members of the nation. They are also not persuaded that there are some general, or
common, continuing ends which a state permanently pursues. Rather, they interpret
the concept of national interest as a constantly changing “pluralistic set of
subjective preferences” (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 1980 cited in Asobie, 2007: 14).
In relation to Nigeria, Ade-Ibijola (2013:566) affirms that national interest is used
to explain the motives behind Nigeria’s relations with other countries of the world.
The country’s foreign policy is driven by a set of principles and objectives that the
state intend to actualize in the course of her relations with other countries. Hence,
national interest is defined as the totality or aggregate interest of groups in a given
state.
33
In short, according to Amoda (1988:2), national interest therefore, has continued to
play a significant role in the foreign policies of sovereign state. A state foreign
policy is not operated in a vacuum. The main policy instrument in the conduct of
foreign policy is invariably the promotion and pursuit of national interest. Thus,
national interest can further be illustrated to mean the totality or the aggregate of
interests of individuals and groups within a given nation state. In the same vein,
Akinyemi (2013:1) observes that national interest is the aggregate of interest of
individuals and groups within a given state. It is all that a nation considers vital for
its survival and prosperity. Proximate to this is protecting and preserving the
interest of our citizens within the country and abroad. National capability on the
other hand is described as the ability of a nation to protect its national integrity
which is premised on national interest.
National interest is therefore prerequisite to attaining national goal and
development in a country’s interaction with the outside world. No wonder, it is a
constitutional based statement, for instance Section 19 of the 1999 Constitution of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria itemized the promotion and protection of Nigeria’s
national interest as one of the country’s foreign policy objectives. But the
adherence to this has remained a worrisome phase of the Nigeria’s foreign policy
pursuit since independence (Oyetunde, 2008).
34
In the writing of Alli (2007:47), national interest can be seen from the point of
view of whose interest-class, or ethnic, is served by the adopted set of national
goals. The liberal school always argues that the state is the purveyor of national
interests, while the radical school believes that it is the ruling class which
expresses it. Thus, for the liberals, since the state represent the interest of all, an
aggregation of all private interests, the policies of the state thus represent the
interests of all. Accordingly, national interests are the interest of the people as
interpreted and conceived by the decision makers known as the ruling elites.
In summary, there is no general consensus, among scholars, about what constitute
national interest. But there is a general agreement among scholars about National
Interest being the core and vital interests of a state in the conduct of inter-state
affairs. The next review is on the Free Trade Area as provided by ECOWAS for its
members.
2.1.5 Free Trade Areas
Free trade areas have been explained in different ways by scholars of different
perspectives. Baldwin and Venables (1995:21) define a free trade area (FTA) as an
area;
35
formed by removing tariffs on trade among
member nations and leaving members with
autonomy in setting their tariffs on trade with nonmember countries.
Free Trade Areas (FTAs) are not consistent with the most favored nation (MFN)
provision, established within the legal framework of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Article I ("General MFN treatment") of the 1947 General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs (GATT) specifies that "any advantage, favor, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally
to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties".
However, article XXIV ("Territorial application, frontier traffic, customs union and
free trade areas") of the same agreement introduces exceptions to the MFN
principle: "the provisions of this agreement shall not prevent, as between the
territories of contracting countries, the formation of a customs union or a free trade
area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a
customs union or of a free trade area provided that (with respect to a free trade area
or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a free trade area) the duties and
other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constituents shall not be
higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties and other regulations of
36
commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior to the formation of the
free trade area or interim agreement as the case may be" (WTO, 2004).
Modern FTAs started in the 1960s. As early as 1965, the first free trade agreement
between Canada and the U.S. was established in the automobile industry and in
1968 an advanced form of FTA was established in Western Europe through the
European Common Market, which removed contingent protection measures and
allowed free mobility of labor and capital. In the 1980's, these FTAs evolved into
more comprehensive forms of free trade: in North America with the creation of a
FTA between Canada and the U.S. in 1988, which removed tariffs and many nontariff barriers to bilateral trade in most industrial goods and liberalized the rules
covering foreign investment; and in Western Europe with the establishment of the
Single Market in 1986, which removed all barriers to trade of goods and services
and movement of people and capital (Baldwin and Venables, 1995). The European
Union (EU) has been expanding since then: in 1973, 1981, 1986, 1992 and lastly in
2004 and 2007 with the addition of twelve more Central and Eastern European
countries, which raised the number of member countries to twenty seven
(European Commission, 2009).
In the 1990s, the former FTAs started including less developed third countries. In
37
North America, the North American FTA (NAFTA) was concluded between
Canada, the U.S. and Mexico in 1992 (U.S. Customs Service, 2004). In Europe, the
EU concluded association agreements with Eastern European countries - some of
them are now EU members - and a customs union with Turkey - currently an EU
candidate - in 1995 (European Commission, 2004). According to Baldwin (1993),
the reasons that explain this initial enlargement of the FTA to include less
developed neighbors were geopolitical enhancing political stability by engaging
economic reforms and stimulating growth in less developed countries.
However, the third countries that were left out of this enlargement did not view it
as favorable to their economic interests. On the American continent, the conclusion
of the NAFTA was perceived by third American countries as a threat to their
market shares in the U.S. and a diversion of foreign investments to Mexico. Hence
countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay approached the
U.S. to start bilateral FTA talks. Subsequently, a free trade agreement was signed
in 2003 with Chile (U.S. Customs Service, 2004). Talks involving the other
countries for the conclusion of the FTA of the Americas (FTAA) have been under
way since 1994 (FTAA, 2004). A somewhat similar process has taken place
between the EU and its Southern and Eastern Mediterranean trading partners,
which in 1995 agreed to create a FTA around the Mediterranean by 2010 through
38
the conclusion of bilateral free trade agreements called "association" agreements
across the Mediterranean (European Commission, 2004).
The countries that are part of this process are Algeria, part of Cyprus, Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. Since Libya
normalized its relationships with the EU, its inclusion in the process has been
discussed. The association agreements or FTA agreements have been replacing a
first generation of economic agreements called "cooperation" agreements
concluded in the 1970s between the EU and some of its Mediterranean partners.
The fundamental difference between the cooperation agreements and the
association agreements is that the former only included unilateral concessions of
the EU in favor of the manufacturing goods imported from the Mediterranean
countries.
There are a number of other FTAs around the world. The European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) was created among Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and
Switzerland in 1960. Mercosur was established in 1991 among Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations concluded a
free trade agreement (AFTA) in 1992. The Common Market of Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA) was signed in 1993. The pan-Arab free trade
agreement was concluded in 1999. There are a number of other regional trade
39
agreements as well as a multitude of bilateral free trade agreements that exist
between countries or between a regional trade area and an individual country.
Nearly 200 FTAs have been implemented as of March 2009 (WTO, 2009).
2.1.6 Relationship between Foreign Policy and National Interest
The concept of national interest has continued to play a significant role on foreign
policies of sovereign state. A states foreign policy is not operated in vacuum. The
main policy instrument in the conduct of foreign policy is invariably the promotion
and pursuit of national interest. Thus, national interest refers to totality or
aggregate of interest of individuals and groups with a given nation state. Viewed
from its classical perspective, the national interest of state is framed in order to
ensure the presentation of the international interaction of state in order to ensure
the presentation of the stated goal of society.
In political discussed, national interest serves the purpose as an tool it analytical it
serves it as a conceptual guide by providing the objective often considered by
states while weighing an intended foreign policy option. As an instrument of
political actions, it serves to justify or repudiate a state foreign policy option and
action in the international system. This explains the inter-connectivity of foreign
policy and national interest. Indeed, the concept of national interest is deeply
interwoven with that of foreign policy that the renowned international scholars
40
hands Morgethau (1973) once stated “ No nation can have true guide as to what it
must do and what it needs to do in foreign policy. It is not an end on itself but a
means to an end. In other words, it is a method of reaching a goal and formulating
such goals core values and national ethnics must be considered. The central role
that values policy in defining national interest has been underscored by Frankel
(1964). According to him “value describes the inner element brought to bear by the
decision makers upon the process of making decision” Thus, in his address to the
conference of Nigeria’s foreign policy held in Cairo in 1986, president Babangida
aggregated the concept of Nigeria’s national interest in the following words
“Nigeria national interest can be identified as predicated on the nation’s military
economic, political and social security must be seen as being I their national
interest. Anything that promote Nigeria politically is also in the national interest”
Babangida (1986). There was a functional relationship between foreign policy and
national interest in that the former is predictable on the later in the field of
international politics and diplomacy. According to Akintola (1999), foreign policy
and national interest are inseparable concept in international relations: the function
of a state foreign policy on her national interest which in turn directs the course of
foreign policy.
41
2.2 Theoretical Framework
Theories are vital tool in the conduct of research work particularly in social science
field of study. Even the introduction of scientific theories to advance the course of
studying human related issues and events has greatly influenced the perception and
interpretation of terms, concepts and phenomena in this field of study. Russet et al
in Dauda (2013) see theory as an intellectual tool that provides us with a way to
organize the complexity of the world and help us to see how phenomena are interrelated. Theory simplifies reality, helping to separate the important from the trivial
by pointing out what we really wish to look at and what we may safely ignore our
present purposes.
This research is situated within the Neofunctionalist theory of integration.
Neofunctionalism's intellectual roots lie in functionalism. The key work in the
functionalist tradition is David Mitrany's A Working Peace System published in
1943. As its name and original publishing year imply, Mitrany's book was also
trying to track the conditions which would ensure the avoidance of military
conflicts in the international system. In a sense, functionalism challenges the statecentric worldview, and is concerned with whether nation-states are the optimal
form (most functional) of an organisation to fulfill human needs. According to Ben
Rosamond, functionalist reasoning sees states as an impediment to the functional
organisation of human activity:
42
To regard the state as a given, was to impose an
unnecessary inflexibility when it came to thinking
about how the requirements of human beings could
best be served. Thus, it followed that some needs
would be best served by ignoring the conventions
of national territories (Rosamond 2000, 33).
However, no other theoretical approach has affected both the process and study of
regional integration as much as neofunctionalism. Ironically, it first emerged in a
very specific conjuncture of certain historical events and the development of
integration theory, and in a sense it was only an attempt to attach more theoretical
rigor to the thinking of the founding fathers of European integration.
Neofunctionalist reasoning was first formulated in the Schuman declaration and in
a sense the origin of this model was in politics as was the case with federalism.
However, neofunctionalism did not remain only as a political project, but soon
developed also towards a theoretical approach to the study of regional integration.
Although neofunctionalism gained characters of a real theoretical approach, its
roots remained tightly in practice. It used the approach of the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) as the starting point of its theorising, and in this sense, it
was an attempt to attach a theoretical angle to the thinking of the founders of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). On the one hand, the theorising that
soon evolved reflected the current trends of American political science research of
43
that time. The impact of behaviourism directed the study of integration in a 'more
theoretical' direction, but, on the other hand, this attempt to do 'value-free' and
general social science regardless of policy consequences, also sowed the seeds that
later caused the whole theory to run into an impasse.
Neofunctionalism was at the peak of its dominance during the 1960s and most of
the key works of neofunctionalists also date back to that period. The theory began
to take shape in 1958, when Ernst Haas published The Uniting of Europe, which
was a theoretically oriented case study on the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC). It was followed by several articles by Haas and another book, Beyond the
Nation-State, in 1964. Another milestone was Leon Lindberg's The Political
Dynamics of European Economic Integration in 1963.
Using these volumes, it is possible to quickly sketch the core arguments of
neofunctionalist reasoning. Neofunctionalism included clear departures from
transactionalism, federalism and functionalism, which made it clearly a distinct
and independent theoretical entity. First, the clearest difference existed between
neofunctionalism and transactionalism. Transactionalism had defined integration
as a condition, and the attainment of integration was measured by the existence of
a 'security-community'. Neofunctionalists, on the contrary, defined integration as a
process. According to Haas,
44
Political integration is the process whereby
political actors in several distinct national settings
are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations
and political activities towards a new centre,
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction
over the pre-existing national states. The end result
of the process of political integration is a new
political community, superimposed over the preexisting ones. (Haas 1968, 16).
Neofunctionalism was also clearly distinct from federalism, although even the
Schuman declaration included certain federalist views. Nevertheless, the chosen
strategy that narrowed the field of cooperation only to one specific sector made it
distinct from federalism. The main departure from functionalism relates to one of
the main criticisms of functionalism mentioned earlier: its inability to see the
relevance of political processes in international cooperation. As Rosamond
clarifies this distinction:
Perhaps the main departure from earlier functionalist
approaches to international order was what
neofunctionalists saw as the reinstatement of political
agency into the integration process (Rosamond 2000:
55).
In his definition of integration, Lindberg rejected Haas's definition of integration
by leaving the reference to an end point completely out, focusing thus only on the
45
analysis of the political process of integration (Lindberg 1963). However, when all
this was put together: departures from earlier models, the definition of integration
as a process and an attempt at a more scientific approach without a normative
viewpoint on the preferable terminal condition, the outcome was twofold. On the
other hand, neofunctionalism was more scientific than its predecessors,
functionalism and federalism. But on the other hand, the focus on the process of
integration caused the 'problem of a dependent variable', which will be dealt with
in more detail later.
Neofunctionalism's more analytical approach benefited the integration theory in
general. An example of this is Lindberg (1963) attempts to try to define the
preconditions that had to prevail before the process of integration could be
launched successfully. These conditions included, according to him:
1) Central institutions and central policies should be established and developed,
because only they can assure that someone represents and promotes the 'regional
view' as well as solves disputes between member states;
2) Their tasks and capacity to implement those tasks should go well beyond the
mandate of normal international institutions;
3) Their tasks should be inherently expansive;
46
4) There should be some link between the interests of member states and the
process of integration (Lindberg 1963, 7-13).
The most innovative part of the neofunctionalist model relates to the third
precondition set out by Lindberg, i.e. to 'inherently expansive tasks.' This refers to
the concept of so-called spill-over, also originally developed by Haas. In his
formulation of the term, Haas defined it as a situation where the creation and
deepening of integration in one economic sector would create pressures for further
economic integration in other sectors of the economy (Haas 1968, 283-317).
Lindberg tried to define the concept even more generally but in a more compact
form:
Spill-over refers to a situation in which a given
action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation
in which the original goal can be assured only by
taking further actions, which in turn create a
further condition and a need for more action, and
so forth (Lindberg, 1963:10).
These two definitions reveal the main themes of the model. First of all, in Haas's
definition spill-over was seen as the decisive moment of the integration process. It
was the moment when the actual deepening of integration occurred. Lindberg held
this view but added perhaps a slightly stronger emphasis on the nature of
integration as a process, but especially he seemed to believe that there was some
47
sort of in-built logic in the process, which would automatically lead to further
integration, once the process was set in motion.
The spill-over hypothesis as a linear and progressive phenomenon was slightly
redefined later. The automaticity of functional spill-over could not be trusted
completely, and sometimes it could be 'guided' in the right direction. This is what
Nye has called 'cultivated spill-over' (Nye 1971, 202).
2.2.1 Weaknesses of the Theory
The neo-functionalist theory might have given us the theoretical foundation, upon
which this study is established, however, the theory, like any theory in social
sciences is not sacrosanct. It is not without its own weaknesses. According to Nye,
this type of spill-over identified by the neofunctionalists takes place when some
sort of driving forces behind the integration (for example, politicians or
technocrats) form coalitions, which deliberately promote increased integration. For
example, in Haas's analysis of the ECSC, the High Authority could have had this
potential and possibility, but according to Haas the High Authority was not using
this possibility to its full potential (Haas 1968, 484-485).
Furthermore, it was not self-evident that the process of integration would takeoff
and produce spill-overs in all cases, because some sectors were seen to have more
spill-over potential than others (Haas 1961, 372). This eventually led
48
neofunctionalists to think that spill-over was not the only possible option in the
process of integration, but the process could also lead to, for example, a spill-back
situation, where the process of integration takes one step back or even returns to
the state of affairs that existed before the integration scheme was initiated
(Schmitter 1971, 242).
Neofunctionalism established its position during the 1960s and became the leading
paradigm of integration research, but by the beginning of the next decade it was
already facing serious challenges. This was due to the model's evident
incompatibility with the empirical reality of the European integration process. But
it was also because of attempts by neofunctionalist scholars to give their model
more theoretical rigor in order to make it conform to the standards that the
discipline of the social sciences was placing for itself at this time.
The self-criticism of neofunctionalism was most clearly articulated by Lindberg
and Scheingold (1971), which included contributions from nearly all the relevant
integration scholars of the time. They began with an article by Ernst Haas in which
he tried to describe the state of the integration theory, and neofunctionalism in
particular. He noted several theoretical limitations of neofunctionalism, but two of
them clearly stood out. First, it could be called the transferability problem, i.e. the
theory's applicability (or inapplicability) to conditions outside Europe. The other, is
49
the so-called dependent variable problem related to the fact that the theory was not
able to state what a successful social prediction might be.
Mainly because of these two reasons, Haas relegated neofunctionalism, alongside
with federalism and transactionalism, to the status of pre-theory, because 'they do
not now provide an explanation of a recurring series of events made up of
dimensions of activity causally linked to one another.' (Haas 1971).
Haas's criticism of neofunctionalism is worth more detailed analysis. Although
neofunctionalism had started as an attempt to theoretically describe and explain the
process of European integration, it soon attempted to gain features of a more
general theory, which could be applied to any regional scheme. This was quite
natural, because otherwise neofunctionalism could not have become a general
theory, but would have remained only a sophisticated description of the European
integration process. Ernst Haas started to examine this problem already in the
beginning of the 1960s when he identified three background conditions that were
preconditions for successful integration: pluralistic social structures, substantial
economic and industrial development and common ideological patterns among the
participating units (Haas 1961, 374-375).
The problem was that the whole theory and its assumptions were embedded in the
assumption that the integration occurred in a modern pluralistic-industrial
50
democratic polity, where, for example, strong pressure groups could enhance
cultivated spill-overs. Therefore, Haas concluded that “countries dominated by a
non-pluralistic social structure are poor candidates for participation in the
integration process” (Haas 1961, 375). Later Haas also concluded specifically that
the transferability of the neofunctionalist approach to a developing world setting
would be very low. This was precisely, because they lacked the features of
pluralistic-industrial societies (Haas 1971, 24).
Hoffmann, particularly did not agree that integration of the economy could lead to
political integration as he saw economics and politics as relatively independent
from each other. He made the distinction between high and low politics. Low
politics would be the more technocratic issues which did not involve too much
sovereignty transfer from the member state and therefore in such case integration
would be possible. High politics would be a different issue – this concept refers to
key policies of member states such as defence, taxation, macroeconomic strategies.
Hoffmann argues that in these areas the nation state would not accept sovereignty
transfers in favour of a high authority. Of course, more recent events in the
European Union (EU) such as the creation of Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) could challenge his
argument (Rosamond, 2001).
51
Fairly on the same line of argument is Hansen. In his view neofunctionalists made
three critical errors: not making a high/low politics distinction, not placing the
European project in an international context, and refusing to accept that mutual
economic gains can exist and can be obtained without a supranational high
authority.
2.2.2 Relevance of the Theory
The relevance of neofunctionalist theory to this study, in spite of its defects, is that
it provides the basis for an enhanced integration of the West African sub-region
through the instrumentality of ECOWAS. The formation of ECOWAS serve as a
complicating external variable the impact of which needs to be investigated in
terms of how it help to enhance or hinder integration among the nations in the
region. The theoretical concept of neofunctionalism is still important for all
integration schemes. The spill-over effect of interconnectivity and interdependence
describes the situation when the actual deepening of regional integration process
occurs in West Africa. The neofunctionalist assumption that there is some sort of
in-built logic in the process, which continuously leads to new spill-overs, will be
tested in this research. Integration goes beyond agreement, it also involve an
understanding between two hitherto different entities that decided to draw
strengths from their differences to enhance their relationships.
52
The spill-over effect of interconnectivity and interdependence describes the
situation when the actual deepening of regional integration process occurs in West
Africa. This has taken place on a regular basis in the European context as well as
taken turns with the enlargement of the integrating regime, ECOWAS as an
economic group can also take a cue from the theoretical foundations set by the
neofunctional school of integration. The neofunctionalist assumption that there is
some sort of in-built logic in the process, which continuously leads to new spillover, might be far-fetched. Nevertheless, it seems that, for example, West African
integration process seems to run into trouble every time deepening and
enlargement of the process does not follow each other on a regular basis.
Decisive moments of West African integration have nevertheless been closely
connected to certain key figures - the process does not reach its next stage by itself.
On the other hand, neofunctionalism has also shown that integration is relatively
tightly woven into the societies into which it is embedded. It has not been possible
to carbon copy the European integration process and applies it to other regions,
because they have lacked the features that could have enabled the whole process to
take place in the wholeheartedly within the West African sub-region.
These explain why Nigeria took a frontline in the formation of the Organization of
African Unity on 25thMay 1963.Moreso, Nigeria stocked her neck to the formation
of ECOMOG by contributing the largest financial need in its establishment,
53
Nigeria inherently kicked against exploitation of man by man, and in term of peace
support operations and conflict resolution, we took front sit, as it is visible in our
struggle for the liberation in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan among others. All these
benevolent gesture are obligatory because no one impose or enforce them on us.
The continental demonstration is as a result of the fact that our leaders claimed
Nigeria to be the natural leader of Africa and fulfilling a manifest destiny becomes
a child of necessity.
54
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHOD
The quality of any research is determined by the quality of the procedures
used in data collection and analysis of data (Ofo, 1994:92)-Hence, conscious and
rigorous effort must be made in determining the type of data, method of data
collection and analysis to be employed in any research work especially in
systematic and empirical research such as this.
It is pertinent to note that this consciousness for systematic and empirical
research in Political Science, especially the quest to attain scientific status has led
to the proliferation of various methods of data collection and analysis in the field;
this has in turn engendered endless, but needless controversies. However, all these
methods are not mutually exclusive but are legitimate stages in empirical enquiry,
and any method which achieves its purpose is valid for that purpose (Ifesinachi,
1999:28), our methods should therefore change to adapt to the different stages of
development of the field of Political Science.
In the light of the foregoing, this study will be based on secondary data.
Secondary data are simply any form of information originally collected for the
purpose other than the present one. The advantage of such data is that it saves time
55
and money, and it allows us the opportunity of using the work of others to broaden
the base from which scientific generalizations can be made (Ifesinachi, 1999:29;
Asika, 1991: 27; Ofo 1994:7). Again, as it is not always possible to get first hand
information, the secondary source of data contributes immensely to valid and
reliable research that deals with past events such as this (Ofo, 1994).
Essentially, our secondary data will be sourced from text books, journal
articles, newspapers, magazines and internet materials on formation of
international
organizations
and
regional
integration
in
West
Africa.
Furthermore, the study employed the technique of observation to collect the
secondary data. This is because the researcher observes the information already
collected and documented, and proceeds to make empirical and systematic
analysis.
3.1 Research Design
In order to avoid attributing an effect to wrong cause(s), to adequately
manipulate the variables (dependent and independent) of a research problem, and
to ensure the reliability and validity of the research, any empirical study must
identify and apply suitable research design which must also be specified in the
course of the study. Planning for the specification and manipulation of variables is
therefore the logic of a research design, as logic, each research design is like a
56
blueprint that tells us how to reach plausible answers to research problems (Leege
& Francis, 1974:67).
Therefore, the research design to be employed in this study is the ex-postfacto research design. The term ex-post-facto research is a Latin word which
means “after the fact” or “retrospectively”. In ex-post-facto research, the effect and
the alleged cause have already occurred, but both conditions are studied
retrospectively (Obasi, 1999:63). In fact, Kerlinger, cited in Ofo, (1994:18),
defined ex-post-facto research as:
That in which independent variable or variables have
already occurred and in which the researcher starts
with the observation of dependent variable or
variables.. The researcher is thus examining
retrospectively the effects of a naturally occurring
event on a subsequent outcome with a view to
establishing a casual link between them.
To this end, we shall adopt the ex-post-facto research design by observing,
albeit retrospectively, and analyzing the role of Nigeria in the formation and
development of international organizations with special attention on the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Again, formation of international
organizations shall be dealt with as the independent variable in the study, we shall
examine how, as an independent variable, formation of international organizations
impacts on regionalism (the dependent variable) in West Africa using ECOWAS
57
as a case study. Thus, a casual relationship would be established between the two
variables (independent and dependent).
Again, using the ex-post-facto research design enables us to identify and
manage the threats to validity and reliability of our research. As noted by Leege &
Francis, (1974:70), the threat to the validity and reliability of this type of research
design (also known as one-short case study) is that no matter how laboriously and
insightfully done, it is likely to lead to “misplaced precision” because it provides
for virtually no controls over plausible rival substantive hypotheses or method
effects. Even from the standpoint of discovery it is of limited utility because it
provides no control within itself for the possible falsification of a finding.
However, in other to manage this threat to validity and reliability using this design,
they suggest that useful intellectual resources be spent on limited sampling of
variables utilizing either a pre-measure on the dependent variable or a postmeasure on a control group (not expose to X), or both (Legee and Francis,
1974:70). Base on this we shall manage the threat to validity and reliability of our
study by spending intellectual time in utilizing and explicating the three aspects of
formation and development of international organizations (the independent
variable) which impact on the dependent variable (regional integration) and also
make reference (i.e. take a pre-measure) of ECOWAS’s efforts at regional
integration in West Africa prior.
58
The ex post facto or single-case design assumes the form of an experimental
design where an existing case is observed for sometimes in order to study or
evaluate it.
3.2 Methods of Data Analysis
Again, descriptive analysis will be used as the method of data analysis.
Based on this, we shall describe collected information using tables, charts and
simple percentages where necessary. This method is therefore suitable for our
study because it enables us to collect information such as West African trade and
investment statistics and analytically describe them in order to investigate the
hypotheses contained in this study. If we succeed in doing this, then the method
has sewed its purpose and is considered valid for this research.
59
CHAPTER FOUR
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF NIGERIA AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
4.1 Foundation of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy
Nigeria foreign policy commence on a moderate level at independence. This is
inevitably expected since the country obtained its independence on a platter of
gold. Much of the foundation of what we known as Nigeria’s foreign policy since
independence in 1960 is directly owned to the vision of Alhaji Sir Abubakar
Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria’s first prime minister and head of government from
October 1960 to January 1966. It was from that moment on that all successive
government have had the opportunity to steer the ship of state and determined what
Nigeria foreign policy should looks like-vis a vis world politics.
4.2 Principles of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy
Since independence in 1960, ten different regime have emerged in Nigeria and in
spite of their different orientations and diplomatic styles, the conduct of Nigeria’s
foreign has been publicly proclaimed by them to be guided by the same principles
which are also in conformity with well established principles of traditional law as
well as the charter of the African Union (A.U).
60
The principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy include.
i.
Sovereign equality of all states.
ii.
Respect of territorial integrity and independence of other states.
iii.
Non interference in the internal affairs of other states.
iv.
Commitment to self determination and independence of other states.
v.
Commitment to functional approach as a means of promoting cooperation
and peaceful coexistence in African.
vi.
Non- alignment to any geo-political power blocs.
It is worthy to note that these principles is supposed to underpin, not dictate
foreign policy. The point here therefore is, no matter how laudable these might
have been at the time if its enunciation, they were mere percepts whose operation
are subject to the vagaries and dynamics of domestic circumstance and world
politics.
4.3 Objectives of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy
The objective of Nigeria’s foreign policy have since the country’s attainment of
nationhood been broadly spelt out by successive administrations. Abubakar
Tafawa Balewa identified certain fundamental objectives of Nigeria’s foreign
policy; the most important and which others are anchored being “the promotion of
National interest of the federation and its citizens”. For the purposes of this study,
61
we shall adopt the objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy by the Adedeji
Commission that was set up by General Murtala Mohammed to examine Nigeria’s
foreign policy in all its ramifications made a number of recommendations that had
far-reaching effects on Nigeria’s external relations.
Based on the commission’s report, General Olusegun Obasanjo in June 1976
identified the elements of the national interest which so constitute the objectives of
the country’s foreign policy as follows.
i.
The defense of our sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.
ii.
The creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in
African and the rest of the world which will facilitate the defense of the
independence and territorial integrity of African countries while at the
same time foster national self-reliance and rapid economic development.
iii.
Promotion of equality and self-reliance in Africa and rest of the developing
world.
iv.
The promotion and the defense of justice and respect human dignity
especially the dignity of the Blackman.
v.
The defense and promoting of world peace.
62
4.4 Instruments for Conducting Nigeria’s Foreign Policy
The instrument for conducting foreign policy generally refers to the means or
mechanisms used by states in conducting their relations with other states. They
include diplomacy, propaganda, militarism, economic devices and cultural
mechanisms.
Diplomacy: Of all the means of conducting inter-state relation, diplomacy is the
most peaceful and effective. Thus diplomacy occupies a position of primary
importance in contemporary international relations. Crudely put it is the conduct
of inter-state relations by negotiations.
Propaganda: This is another instrument for conducting inter-state relations. In its
simplest term, propaganda refers to the manipulation and distortion of information
in order to achieve ones interest and defeat the interest of an opponent. In involves
extensive use of mass media. Past and present government in Nigeria have often
resorted to this means whenever they wanted to justify their actions on certain
sensitive issue that have ramifying effects on other states or the international
community.
Militarism: This is a major weapon for conducting inter-state relations. It involves
the use of force, terrorist attack and military coercion in conducting foreign policy
objectives of states. Because of its violent nature, it is often used as a last resort
63
when for instance, diplomacy and other mechanisms of achieving peaceful settling
of disputes failed. For instance, Nigeria in 1983 went to war with Chad when the
issue at stake defied resolution through negotiation.
Economic Weapon: This constitutes another instrument for conducting inter-state
relations. Rather than resorting to war in order to resolve a conflict situation,
certain economic devices could be used. These include trade boycott situation,
certain economic sanction and even withdrawal of aids for instance, there existed
economic sanction against Nigeria by the European Union, common-wealth of
nation and the united states following the country’s poor human right record,
particularly the killing of the activist playwright-ken Saro Wiwa and his eight other
kinsmen
Cultural Instrument: This becomes increasingly useful in conducting inter-state
relations. It is often used as a major political weapon in sports and other cultural
activities for instance, in 1976; Nigeria led other members of OAU to boycott the
Montreal Olympic Games to protest the four of apartheid South Africa by New
Zealand Rugby players and the refusal of the international Olympic committee
(IOC) to exclude New Zealand. Most recently, Nigeria in 1996 boycott the African
Nations cup competition held in south Africa to protest that country’s hard-line
posture towards the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his eight other kinsmen.
64
4.5 Historical Overview of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy
Since independence, Nigeria’s foreign policy has been characterized by a focus on
Africa. During the first republic, Africa was the centre piece of Nigeria’s foreign
policy. This was demonstrated in the words of the prime minister who was also
doubling as the minister of external affairs.“Nigeria belonged to Africa and Africa
must claim first attention in our external relations”. Sir Abubakar. Balewa. (1962).
During the Balewa’s administration, Nigeria was instrument to the formulation of
the organization of African unity now know as African union (AU). In fact, the
prime minister played an excellent role in the search for continental unity. It is
efforts and those of other patriotic African leaders Such as late Emperor Haile
Selassie of Ethiopia led to the formation of OAU in 25 th May 1963. In addition, the
Balewa administration spearheaded the expulsion of the racist South Africa from
the commonwealth and the world Olympic Games. More importantly, Balewa’s
administration believe in functional and gradual approach to pan Africanism
because it felt African countries were too young to involve in a union.
One point that must be noted is the fact that such domestic factors like the
personality of Balewa, the economic condition of the political dynamics involving
much of tribal, ethnic and regional chauvinism informed Balewa foreign policy
during the first republic. By and large Balewa’s foreign policy could be described
65
as being conservative, docile and pro-west. Its pro-British to the nation on October
1, 1960. He was quoted as saying:
We are grateful to the British whom we have known first as
masters, then as leaders and finally as partners but always as
friends.
Furthermore, Nigeria’s foreign policy under Balewa administration was conducted
with caution, this was demonstrated with regards to the external issues that
confronted the Nation such as the Congo crisis, the Angola Nigeria Defence pact,
the Rhodesia crisis and the Middle East crisis and the inability of the government
of the day to respond positively and adequate to the aforementioned issues. More
so, there were also too many moral and religious undertones in Nigeria’s foreign
policy during the period (Aluko, 1981:24).
Under the Balewa administration Nigeria severed diplomatic relations with France
following the latter’s atomic bomb test in the Sahara Desert. It is also worthy of
note that the personality clout of Balewa reflected in his foreign policy decisions.
According to Bassey (2001) he argued that conciliatory, moderate, calm and
placating attitude of Balewa paved way for such a timid foreign policy. The actions
of opposition parties and public opinion encouraged the abrogation of the bilateral
defence pact with Britain that signed by Balewa.
66
4.5.1 Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975)
General Yakubu Gowon’s regime remains the longest serving military
administration in which Nigeria’s foreign policy took a dramatic turn. The Gowon
administration witnessed the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war which brought t he
nation to a near state of disintegration. This had a serious impact on Nigeria’s
external relation as the country could not play any active role in foreign policy
except that officials were merely junketing round the globe to explain the
circumstances of the fratricidal civil war. The import of this brief historical
excursion is to demonstrate that the regime came to power at a time when ethnic
rivalry and tribal bigotry was at its Zenith. There was political instability and
National uncertainty at the domestic front. The experiences of the civil war
substantially influenced the direction of foreign policy in the early 1970s. It
sharpened Nigeria’s perception of national security and survival, the importance of
good neighbours, the need for diversification of external relations and proper nonalignment, the need for economic integration, African Unity and the seriousness of
the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles on the African continent.
The personality of Gowon was also a major factor that shaped foreign policy
during his regime; Unlike other quintessential military dictator who bulldozed their
way through, Gowon was a more conciliatory leader he was a leader who believed
in carrying all his subordinates in the ruling supreme military council and the
67
federal Executive council along to ensure that policies agreed upon would be
faithfully implemented (Maiden broadcast of 16th January, 1966).
Another domestic factor that informed Nigeria’s foreign policy during this period
is the fact that Nigeria’s economy became buoyant as oil resources boomed and the
price of oil boomeranged. By 1974, the oil sector had accounted for about 90
percent of the total revenue and the country took dynamic steps to assert her
leadership role in Africa.
By and large, in spite of the domestic instabilities that the nation witnessed during
this period, it was also able to pursue a positive and dynamic foreign policy.
4.5.2 Murtala Muhammed (1975-1976).
In July 1975, General Gowon’s government was toppled in a bloodless coup-de-tat
by the late General Murtala Muhammad who brought dynamism, radicalism and
activism into Nigeria’s external relations. In fact, so much pride is often attached to
this era by Nigerians scholars and foreign policy analyst that is still regarded as the
most glorious era in Nigerians foreign policy. Apart from the personality of
Murtala which is often described as being charismatic, it was also the first regime
to inject a lot of young, bright and dynamic military officers and civilians
intellectuals into the conduct of both domestic and externals affairs.
68
The origin of foreign policy radicalism can be located in the most often cited
Nigeria’s dramatic and timely intervention in the Angola-independence crisis in
1976 which remarkably, illustrates the dynamic and action oriented Afro centric
policy of t he administration. The regime, in a dramatic volte-face threw its weight
behind the popular movement (MPLA) for the struggle for the independence of
that Portuguese colony. The country announced its recognition of the one
representing the interest of the Angola people. The administration was able to
successfully challenge the position of the United States over an African issue. In a
powerful address delivered at the Kampala Summit of the OAU in January 1976,
General Murtala Muhammad declared unequivocally “The Nigerian federal
military government has been deeply convinced that the MPLA is the most
dynamic, most nationalist of all the movements representing the interest of the
Angola people and convinced that it possesses the attribute of an effective
government (Fawole, 2003).”
Nigeria also enjoined other African countries to accord it (MPLA) recognition. The
Nigerian government also gave the MPLA huge financial assistance and military
supplies. In the final analysis, during the Murtala administration there was greater
consistency and coherence on foreign policy making and execution.
69
4.5.3 Olusegun Obasanjo (1976-1979)
The assassination of General Murtala Ramat Muhammad in a bloody coup on 13
February 1976 brought General Olusegun Obasanjo who shared similar aspiration
for the country and had worked together as a team in charting a more radical
trajectory for foreign policy.
The turn of events altered his perception and his attitude towards certain issue for
instance Angola-Nigeria relations suffered severe setbacks throughout the tenure of
Obasanjo’s government on account and neglect over the demise of Murtala. In
spite of the unsavoury Nigeria-Angola frosty relations, Nigeria was not deterred in
its pursuit for freedom for other African countries still under colonialism especially
those under racist rule in Zimbabwe and apartheid south Africa. The regime
stepped up its virulent opposition to racism and apartheid and recorded
considerable success in securing real independence for Zimbabwe under majority
African rule by the close of the 1970’s decade.
One of the most outstanding things done by Obasanjo’s regime were the punitive
measures applied to British companies following Britain’s unacceptable policy in
Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. For instance in 1978, the British owned
Barclay Bank was partially nationalized in Nigeria when government took over 80
percent of the company’s shares and it was renamed as union Bank of Nigeria
70
limited. The British petroleum (BP) was also nationalized 1979 by Obasanjo
regime as a mean of hastening the Lancaster’s conference that was to usher in
Zimbabwe independence. The partial nationalization of Barclay’s Bank and the
taking over of British petroleum because of their links with apartheid South Africa
were no doubt practical demonstrations of Nigeria’s Afro-centric and non-aligned
posture. In accordance with the Murtala/Obasanjo regime’s political transition
program me. General Obasanjo successfully handed over power to the civilian
government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari in October 1979.
4.5.4 Shehu Shagari Era (1979-1983)
One October 1, 1979 marked the return to civilian rule. The administration of
Shagari reiterated Nigeria’s commitment to the importance of Africa in Nigeria’s
foreign policy. This was demonstrated in Nigeria’s armed struggle to liberate
Namibia and support liberation fighters on the continent; this was informed by its
leadership role in Africa, its huge population and its resultant large military base.
The government of Shagari took a hardliner position against the United States of
America’s policy of constructive engagement “which tied the independence of
Namibia to South Africa and also the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.
Nigeria sent more troops at the request of the OAU to Chad in 1982.Shagari’s
administration also gave a grant of $10million to Zimbabwe to enable her acquire
71
the Zimbabwe’s herald from its white owners. However the administration’s
commitment to decolonization and eradication of racism deteriorated due to
deepening economic crisis the country faced. The economic crisis caused the
administration to introduce austerity measures which drastically reduced aids to
countries in the sub region and or cut short or stopped completely monetary
contribution to some liberation struggles in Africa. The economic crisis resulted in
the expulsion of illegal aliens in 1983; these illegal aliens were mostly from the
republic of Benin, Togo and Ghana. The Shagari’s expulsion of illegal aliens in
Nigeria provoked spirited attacked and outright hostility towards Nigeria. Nigeria’s
African policy during Shagari’s administration hardly lived up to the standards set
by previous governments (Aluko, 1990).
Thus, limited success attended Shagari’s foreign policy; his freedom to manoeuvre
in foreign policy was constrained by the changing economic and political climate
in Africa and the global system. The oil glut, coupled with the gross
mismanagement of Nigeria’s economy, inefficiency and corruption and the glaring
abuse of office during the administration resulted in the reversal of the dynamic
trend of Nigeria’s foreign policy between 1979 and 1983.Its reduced financial
capability turned Nigeria into a debtor country dependent on foreign loans.
Dependence on foreign loans gives a country little or no room for manoeuvre in
international politics especially where creditors are involved.
72
4.5.5 Muhammadu Buhari (1984-1985)
General Buhari’s administration which replaced Shagari’s government after the
December 31, 1983 coup inherited a very weak economy and therefore was
pressed by this economic situation to become much shrewder in its foreign policy
options.
Politically, the country had become fragile and unstable by late 1983 largely
because of the massive electoral fraud in the country. It was perhaps the
combination of political instability, squander mania and the mindless arrogance of
political office holders in the face of economic depression that prompted the
military to intervene on December 31, 1983.
Economically, the Buhari’s administration resisted the temptation to succumb to
the pressure by the Arab Moslem group of the Organization of Islamic conference
(OIC) which promised Nigeria economic and financial assistance. Buhari’s foreign
minister Ibrahim Gambari, argued against a change in Nigeria’s observer status to
that of full member. When Buhari seized power from Shagari, there had been a
stalemate in the negotiations between Nigeria and the IMF over the former’s
application for a loan of some $2billion.This later led to the withdrawal by western
exports credit guarantee agencies of insurance cover on exports to Nigeria. In spite
of the acute shortage of basic commodities and the attendant spiral inflation and
73
economic hardship experienced by the people, the Buhari administration refused to
accept the tempting promises of aid from the Arab world.
On the continental level, Buhari’s Afro centric policy was less assertive than of
previous administrations, although the administration paid the arrears of the
country’s contribution to the OAU liberation fund, which Shagari’s government
failed to pay. The relationship with immediate neighbours over the closure of
border, sudden change of the national currency and the expulsion of illegal aliens
from Nigeria was strained (Olukoshi, 1990:39-52).
On the global level, relations with great power did not enjoy special cordiality.
Anglo-Nigeria disagreement over counter-trade and the IMF loan prepared the way
for a tensed relationship throughout the Buhari’s tenure. It was further soured by
the botched kidnap of Alhaji Umaru Dikko and the subsequent mutual
recrimination. Relation with the United States was not any better, as Buhari
condemned the US for its attempt to link Namibia’s independence with the
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Besides, the US never agreed with
Buhari’s recalcitrance over the IMF negotiations.
In the final analysis, foreign policy during Buhari’s regime reflected the realities of
the global environment. It is also fair to say that the regime is passionately
nationalistic and had a clear vision and sense of purpose; these probably drove it to
74
extremes whereby it forgot that diplomacy is a delicate game with its own esoteric
rules and procedures.
4.5.6 Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida (1985-1993)
The palace coup of August 1985 led to the emergence of Ibrahim Babangida. The
new regime was greeted with a massive stock of goodwill and expectations that the
fortunes of Nigerians will turn around. The immediate major problem which the
Babangida government had to tackle was how to improve Nigeria’s depressed
economy and liquidate the huge foreign and domestic debts.
To this end, the administration redirected its foreign policy with greater emphasis
on economic issues. Thus General Ike Nwachukwu (rtd) the then foreign affairs
minister introduced “economic diplomacy” as a foreign policy strategy that would
attract both foreign investment and other assistance required for achieving the
objectives of the Structural Adjustment programme (SAP).The Babangida
government’s economic policy intended to provide solutions to the worsening
national economy.
At the sub regional level, the Babangida administration tried to make the ideals of
ECOWAS more reliable, in relation to this it launched the Lagos/Abuja campaign
for the establishment of ECOWAS brown card scheme which seeks to protect third
party liabilities. Also, Nigeria relations with her neighbours improved with the re75
opening of her borders. Babangida’s visits to neighbouring countries also
contributed to strengthening good relations between Nigeria and her neighbours.
Besides, Nigeria showed keen interest in finding solutions to the Liberian crisis
and also spearheaded the formation of ECOWAS monitoring group known as
ECOMOG. Additionally General Babangida served as the chairman of ECOWAS
thrice, while the community’s secretariat building project in Abuja was funded
mainly by Nigeria, was completed.
At the continental level, Nigeria under Babangida’s administration wrote off more
than 70million naira expenses which it incurred during the OAU peace-keeping in
Chad. In demonstration to her consistency to liquidation of apartheid, in 1987,
Nigeria gave 50million to the frontline states following the serious attacks on them
by the racists.
At the global scale, during the Babangida administration, Nigeria ties with Israel
were strengthened by the re-opening of diplomatic relations in May 1993.This was
in spite of the fact that Nigeria officially recognized the new state of Palestine
declared in November 1988 as well as Nigeria’s membership of the Organization
Islamic Conference (OIC) in early1986.Under the regime, Nigeria’s image was
further boosted by the appointment of Nigerians to occupy key international posts
such as the elections of Joseph Garba as President of the UN general Assembly and
Emeka Anyaoku as the Secretary-General of the commonwealth.
76
Anglo-Nigerian relations had suffered terrible reverses. At the time Babangida’s
entry into power the usually cordial relations between the former colonial power
and its former possession had been over-stressed and with the dwindling oil
receipts. Nigeria was rendered prostrate and limited its capabilities. Above all, the
Babangida administration placed much emphasis on economic diplomacy whose
objective is to woo foreign investors and investment into Nigeria and enhance the
country’s economic development. Unfortunately, however the Babangida
administration economy diplomacy did not lessen or reduce Nigeria’s external debt
burden. It is essential to note that Nigeria’s foreign policy under the Babangida
administration was characterized by dynamism and realism e.g. the establishment
of the Technical Aid Corps scheme (TAC) in October 1987 for interested countries
in Africa, the pacific and the Caribbean.
4.5.7 Sani Abacha (1993-1998)
The advent of the Abacha regime occurred at a time when military rule had already
lost its attraction in the world. The international community was already
irrevocably committed to the promotion of democracy particularly in Africa.
Following Nigeria’s debilitating political crisis precipated by the annulment of the
June 12, 1993 presidential elections by the Babangida administration. General
Abacha on November 17, 1993 toppled the interim National government (ING)
77
that was hurriedly organized by Babangida to stem the tide and since then, the
nation’s foreign policy has been drifting forward and backward. General Sani
Abacha cannot be said to have articulated any clear policy. What invariably passed
for the country’s foreign policy during his tenure was no more than a series of
tragic domestic policies and actions that unwittingly snowballed into diplomatic
controversies. These issues include the ruthless crackdown on pro-democracy
agitations, gross abuse of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the arrest and
detention of Moshood Abiola in June 1994,the March coup hoax, the November
1995 hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa and the 8 other Ogoni activists and the
controversial coup plot of December 1997.
General Abacha’s inaugural speech seems to have set the tone for what would later
be called his foreign policy. His first nationwide broadcast to announce his
takeover was short but trenchant and he left on one doubt that he would not tolerate
any challenge to his power. He sternly warm foreign powers to leave Nigerians
alone to solve their own internal problems. Rather than the much expected return
to civilian rule, the beginning of another interminable era of praetorian rule
signified the descent of an invisible “iron curtain” around the country.
An
ominous dark cloud thus descended on Nigeria. It was during those nightmarish
years that Nigeria descended into a parish status from which it only emerged after
Abacha’s sudden demise in mid 1998 (Tempo, 1995).
78
The domestic controversies and the reaction of the international community earned
Nigeria’s the status of a parish nation Nigeria was faced with “stiff diplomatic
isolation” the aftermath of this sanctions, the government threw a sledge hammers
by turning her back against Vs, which is the largest buyers of Nigeria’s crude oil,
the European union (EU) and most of Nigerian’s Anglophone parties in the
commonwealth were branded “hostile nations” by the regime.
The policy redirection of Abacha’s government commenced by seeking closer ties
with countries of the eastern hemisphere and the Middle East countries. The afrocentric zeal and vigour manifested itself under the regime recorded tremendous
progress.
In its commitment towards the resolution of Liberian and sierra Leonean crises,
through the instrumentality of ECOWAS monitoring group (ECOMOG). It must
be noted that in the course of ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone, Nigeria
contributed 7,000 troops what should be noted here is that Abacha’s role in peace
making and conflict resolution in the sub-region (both and sierra Leone) was borne
out of the conviction that Nigeria owes her fellow African states. The duty of
ensuring security on account of her leadership potential.
On the general note, it is difficult if not impossible to classify the Abacha’s era
foreign policy as a success story in any meaning full way. No matter what it
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attempted to do and no matter the domestic and international circumstances it had
to contend with, general Abacha left Nigeria’s image and standing in the world
worse than he had met it in November 1993.
The inescapable conclusion is that the Abacha’s regime did not bequeath a healthy
foreign legacy to its successor. It was the succeeding regime of general Abdul
salami Abubakar that began the stow process of lifting the country from the pit of
infamy into which it had fallen in the course of Abacha’s four and half year
dictatorship
4.5.8 Abdulsalam Abubakar (1998-1999)
At the inception of Abubakar’s regime the country was plague by the various
sanctions which had been imposed since the 1995 hanging a ken Saro- Wiwa and
his Ogoni compatriots.
These included withdrawal of economic aid, scholarship grants, cultural
exchanges, suspension of bilateral and multi lateral military cooperation, visa
restrictions slammed on military personnel, members of their families and senior
government officials etc. this was situation which the new regime had to address
itself released within the first two weeks of most of the politicians and activists
whom Abacha had wantonly put out of circulation most notably was general
Olusegun Obasanjo. Not before long the new regime to enjoy some medium of
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goodwill and the world was willing to give it some chance. The appointment of
Mr. Ignatius Olisaemeka as foreign affairs ministers was like a breath of fresh air,
he was able to restore sanity and integrity into the Foreign Service. Furthermore,
the mysterious demise of chief MKO Abiola the undeclared winner of the June 12
1993 election while still in detention, almost threw the spanner in the works of the
regime but in spite of Abiola’s death and its attendant political problems and
uncertainties, the international community however appeared to give the military
junta a chance to nurture the transition program me to successful conclusion.
In the final analysis, general Abubakar can be credited with leaving a relative
healthy foreign policy legacy for his successor, his willingness to terminate
military rule endeared him to the rest of the world that had waited interminably for
this to happen. General Abubakar was able to hand over power to an elected
civilian government headed by president Olusegun Obasanjo on May 29,1999, this
formally ending fifteen years of military regimes of Buhari, Babangida and Abacha
could not.
4.6 Trade Liberalisation And Intra-Regional Trade In West Africa
Regional integration in West Africa is anchored primarily on trade, any process
which impedes both extra and intra-regional trade constitutes an obstacle to
integration in the sub-region (Alaba, 1998:8). In this light, a lot of studies have
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tried to examine the factors that impinge on intra-regional trade in West Africa
especially how trade liberalization, engendered by globalization undermines intraregional trade in West Africa. However, most of the studies only present a vague
analysis without actually establishing a link between trade liberalization and
diminishing intra-regional trade in West Africa.
World Bank (2006) argued that trade among West African countries is only a small
fraction of their total external trade. In 2004 alone, the total amount of merchandise
exported by member countries to other member countries was about 8.6 percent of
their total exports and 9.1 percent of their total imports. It argued that even at that,
the figure for total exports from West African countries is heavily based on the
importance of Nigeria’s total exports of which oil represents close to 98%. Thus,
Nigeria’s oil exports to other West African countries accounts for large part of
intra-regional trade. They argued that eliminating oil trade from total imports by
member countries would reduce the ratio of intra-regional trade to total imports to
a low 5.7 percent. Page and Bilal (2001) opposed this view, using ECOWAS as an
institutional framework. They opined that there has been an increase in intraregional trade within ECOWAS as several members of UEMOA have increased
their trade with the rest of ECOWAS, and the non UEMOA members of ECOWAS
also show an increase in trade within ECOWAS. They argued that this increase in
ECOWAS trade, however, may also be explained by shifts from unrecorded to
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recorded trade. These studies only examined the rate of intra-regional trade without
examining factors that affect increase or decrease of intra-regional trade in West
Africa.
Abdoulahi (2005) examined trade liberalization vis-â-vis intra-regional trade in
West Africa and argued that trade liberalization is a reform measure adumbrated in
the Structural Adjustment Programmes financed by Bretton Woods institutions
under which countries pursue trade reform measures relating to the liberalization of
imports and currency regimes as well as the reduction of tariff and non-tariff
barriers. He argued that although, African countries have liberalized trade, intraECOWAS trade is still low consisting of only 10% of total exports. He further
argued that despite the importance attached to bolstering intra-regional trade and
the many institutional mechanisms put in place with a view to improving intraregional trade, the share of intra-regional trade has remained modest with export
mostly targeted to the European, Asian and North American markets.
In the same vein, Oyejide (2004) examined trade liberalization and regional
integration in Africa and argued that an assessment of the performance of most
African regional integration reveals, inter alia, that intra-regional trade as a
proportion of total trade is quite low and that trade performance (measured by
changes in trade/GDP ratio) of the “integrated” areas worsened significantly. He
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saw trade liberalization as a policy objective of structural adjustment programme
which is an outward-oriented trade policy that brings about closer integration of
African countries into the world economy. Based on this, he argued that the
unilateral trade liberalization measures taken by individual countries under SAP
effectively reduces the degree of preferences enjoyed by her regional partners
because these measures do not take cognizance of any obligation to regional
partners. WAMA (1998) corroborates this view and argued that trade liberalization
as pursued under SAP objectives orient the economies of West Africa countries
toward the major world economies thereby making the developed capitalist
countries the major trading partners of countries of the sub-region. These scholars
see trade liberalization only as a policy objective of structural adjustment
programme implemented by African countries. However, they fail to understand
the contemporary trade liberalization as an inevitable aspect of globalization
implemented by all countries and not necessarily only countries carrying out
structural adjustment.
Some recent studies have tried to examine trade liberalization agreement between
Africa and other developed capitalist countries, and its implication for African
trade. In this light, Alaba (2006) examined the trade liberalization agreement
established between the EU and the 77 Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
countries under the Yaunde and the Lome IV conventions in which EU offered
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market access to West African exports. He posits that despite this arrangement, the
magnitude of intra-ECOWAS trade compared with the rest of the world remains
very minimal as intra-community trade with the West African sub-region remains
far less than 15 percent. He went further to show that intra-community trade in
West Africa in terms of exports and imports within the sub-region shows dismal
performance between 1996 — 2001, and on the average, intra-community trade is
only about 11 percent of total trade of the sub-region. He advocated the need for
West African countries to acquire the necessary capacity and competitive clout
before facing the competition with EU countries under the trade liberalization
agreement.
Similarly, Hebebrand (2007) examined the trade liberalization between EU and
ACP as facilitated by the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 and the various Economic
Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations. He argued that trade liberalization
under these agreements grant market access to ACP countries into the EU market
as around 98% of ACP exports to the EU already come in duty free. He recognized
that intraregional trade in Africa have been very low, but argued that the trade
liberalization between ACP and EU would increase and foster intra-regional trade
in Africa because the EPAs are being negotiated between EU and regional
groupings of the ACP countries. Conversely, Ndirangu (2007), opposing this view,
argued that the broad liberalization of trade with the EU has an adverse effect on
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intra-regional trade of ACP countries (especially West Africa). According to him,
the entry of EU goods into ACP countries on more favourable terms has raised
concerns that the more efficient EU firms and subsidized agricultural goods will
out-compete local enterprises involved in value-added production, thus limiting the
benefits of regional integration to individual countries. Again, the isolation of
members of the same regional trading blocs forced to negotiate under different
EPA configurations creates the risk of members of one regional bloc committing to
different tariffs and trade liberalization measures from those agreed upon under
regional blocs. This situation according to him is replicated in West Africa, where
the ECA estimates that ECOWAS countries could lose trade worth 365 million
dollars to EU competitors.
These scholars merely analyze trade liberalization as facilitated by the EU-ACP
Agreements and not as one of the major thrusts of globalization. More so, their
analysis were confined to the trade relations between EU and ACP countries and
not the global free trade brought about by trade liberalization. Thus, such analysis
cannot give detailed understanding of the implications of trade liberalization as an
aspect of globalization for intra-regional trade.
A number of other studies have tried to situate trade liberalization within the
context of contemporary globalization and its implications for intra-regional trade.
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In view of this, Okolie (2007) posits that trade liberalization suggests unfettered
movement of goods across global boundaries. It involves dismantling territorial
boundaries and removal of tariffs for free movement of goods and for trade to take
place under the regulatory framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Ouya (2003) recognized trade liberalization as one of the major thrusts of
globalization which engenders international specialization. Using West and Central
Africa as examples, she argued that regional integration in the context of trade
liberalization has suffered many set-backs, one of which is the fact that noncomplementary nature of production structures hinders tariff reduction among
member countries. Again, the vertical integration of African economies into the
Northern Hemisphere via globalization makes African countries dependent and
devoted to the export of raw materials, this hinders industrialization and thereby
impedes exchange of goods within the region. Accordingly, Ozor (2006) avers that
trade liberalization has brought about decline in Africa’s volume and terms of trade
in the world market because of the specialization of the region in primary
commodities.
According to Iglesias (1997), multilateral trade liberalization is one of the key
thrusts of globalization. Trade liberalization in the framework of the WTO permits
countries easy access to the global market for its export. Based on this, he argued
that liberalization of trade has brought about an accelerated increase in
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international trade. The question he posed is whether regionalism is detrimental to
globalization. He therefore, sees intra-regional trade as a vehicle that enhances
global trade. Despite his effort, he failed to examine how trade liberalization
undermines intra-regional trade through the specialization and vertical integration
it engenders, he rather sees intraregional trade as a factor that stimulates global
trade.
In his view, Oyejide (1998) posits that trade liberalization has intensified the
international specialization of Africa in production of primary commodities and
has also led to the drastic decline in the demand of these commodities because of
the competition from new and relatively more efficient producers in Asia and Latin
America. In the same vein, Sandrey, Matlanyane & Maleleka (2006) examined the
impacts of trade liberalization on Southern African Customs Unions (SACU) and
argued that trade liberalization greatly reduce the tariff revenue accruable to
countries of a region. Though these scholars were able to explain how trade
liberalization engenders international specialization and reduces revenue derivable
from tariff, they failed to show how these impediments impinge on regional
integration.
ECA (1997) sees trade liberalization as a policy option of structural adjustment
programme which impinges on the degree to which member states adhere to rules
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of intra-regional trade liberalization within the West African sub-region.
Apparently, there are corpus of literature dealing with trade liberalization and
intraregional trade. However, despite contributions from scholars such as Alaba,
(2006); Maleleka, (2006); Ozor, (2006); Onyejide, (1998); Ouya, (2003) among
others, the literature have not been able to systematically explain how trade
liberalization as a thrust of contemporary globalization impedes intra-regional
trade in West Africa. Thus, the question on whether trade liberalization undermines
intraregional trade in West Africa still remains unanswered in the existing
literature.
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CHAPTER FIVE
NIGERIA’S ROLE IN THE FORMATION OF ECOWAS
5.1 The Birth of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional
economic and political union of fifteen (15) states in the West African sub-region.
Collectively, these countries comprise an area of 5,114,162 km2 (1,974,589 sq mi),
and in 2015 had an estimated population of over 349 million.
The union was established on 28 May 1975, with the signing of the Treaty of
Lagos, with its stated mission to promote economic and political integration across
the region. A revised version of the treaty was agreed and signed on 24 July 1993
in Cotonou. Considered one of the pillar regional blocs of the continent-wide
African Economic Community (AEC), the states goal of ECOWAS is to achieve
"collective self-sufficiency" for its member states by creating a single large trading
bloc by building a full economic and trading union.
Although the ECOWAS region was founded on the 18th of May 1975, its roots go
back to the early 1960’s. The ex-president of Liberia, William Tubman, took the
first step towards a West African community. This was in 1964, when the first
agreement was signed. The countries involved in this agreement were Cote d’
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Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Unfortunately, this agreement did not
achieve any of the goals it should have.
Seven years later, in April 1972, two generals, Gowon from Nigeria and Eyadema
from Togo, picked up the concept again and restructured it. They started
differently and went on a trip to 12 different countries to present their idea to the
then governments. In December 1973 the representatives of these countries
gathered together for a discussion in Lomé. The ideas and concepts were
discussed, evaluated and changed by lawyers and experts in this field in January
1974. In addition, a conference with the actual governments was held in Monrovia
in January 1975.
After all these meetings and conferences the 15 countries involved finally signed a
corporate contract and created the Economic Community of West African States.
This happened on 28th May 1975. During these years some of the countries left the
ECOWAS region, such as Mauritania in 2002. Others, such as Cape Verde,
became part of the Community in 1977.
ECOWAS also serves as a peacekeeping force in the region, with member states
occasionally sending joint military forces to intervene in the bloc's member
countries at times of political instability and unrest. In recent years these included
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interventions in Sierra Leone in 1998, Ivory Coast in 2003, Liberia in 2003,
Guinea-Bissau in 2012, Mali in 2013, and Gambia in 2017.
ECOWAS includes two sub-regional blocs:
i.
The West African Economic and Monetary Union (also known by its
French-language acronym UEMOA) is an organization of eight, mainly
French-speaking, states within the ECOWAS which share a customs union
and currency union. Established in 1994 and intended to counterbalance the
dominance of English-speaking economies in the bloc (such as Nigeria and
Ghana), members of UEMOA are mostly former territories of French West
Africa. The currency they all use is the CFA franc, which is pegged to the
euro.
ii.
The West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), established in 2000, comprises
six mainly English-speaking countries within ECOWAS which plan to work
towards adopting their own common currency, the eco.
ECOWAS operates in three co-official languages of French, English, and
Portuguese, and consists of two institutions to implement policies: the ECOWAS
Commission and the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID),
formerly known as the Fund for Cooperation until it was renamed in 2001. A few
members of the organization have come and gone over the years. In 1976 Cape
Verde joined ECOWAS, and in December 2000 Mauritania withdrew, having
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announced its intention to do so in December 1999. The actual member states are:
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali,
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Cape Verde, Guinea, and Niger.
5.2 Objectives of ECOWAS
The aims of the Community are to promote cooperation and integration, leading to
the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living
standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster
relations among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of
the African Continent.
In order to achieve the aims set out in the paragraph above, and in accordance with
the relevant provisions of the ECOWAS revised Treaty, the Community will, by
stages, ensure:
a) the harmonization and coordination of national policies and the promotion of
integration programmes, projects and activities, particularly in food,
agriculture and natural resources, industry, transport and communications,
energy, trade, money and finance, taxation, economic reform policies,
human resources, education, information, culture, science, technology,
services, health, tourism, legal matters;
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b) the harmonization and coordination of policies for the protection of the
environment;
c) the promotion of the establishment of joint production enterprises;
d) the establishment of a common market through:
i.
the liberalization of trade by the abolition, among Member States, of
customs duties levied on imports and exports, and the abolition among
Member States, of non-tariff barriers in order to establish a free trade
area at the Community level;
ii.
the adoption of a common external tariff and, a common trade policy
vis-à-vis third countries;
iii.
the removal, between Member States, of obstacles to the free
movement of persons, goods, service and capital, and to the right of
residence and establishment.
e) the establishment of an economic union through the adoption of common
policies in the economic, financial social and cultural sectors, and the
creation of a monetary union;
f) the promotion of joint ventures by private sectors enterprises and other
economic operators, in particular through the adoption of a regional
agreement on cross-border investments;
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g) the adoption of measures for the integration of the private sectors,
particularly the creation of an enabling environment to promote small and
medium scale enterprises;
h) the establishment of an enabling legal environment;
i) the harmonization of national investment codes leading to the adoption of a
single Community investment code;
j) the harmonization of standards and measures;
k) the promotion of balanced development of the region, paying attention to the
special problems of each Member State, particularly those of land-locked
and small island Member States;
l) the encouragement and strengthening of relations and the promotion of the
flow of information, particularly among rural populations, women and youth
organizations and socio professional organizations such as associations of
the media, business men and women, workers, and trade unions;
m) the adoption of a Community population policy which takes into account the
need for a balance between demographic factors and socio economic
development;
n) the establishment of a fund for cooperation, compensation and development;
and
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o) any other activity that Member States may decide to undertake jointly with a
view to attaining Community objectives.
5.3 Structure and Organs of ECOWAS
5.3.1 Structure of ECOWAS
ECOWAS comprises three branches of power; the Executive branch, the
Legislature and the Judiciary. There is a fourth institution - the ECOWAS Bank for
Investment and Development (EBID), which deals with some economic affairs of
the community in addition to communities outside the bank.
The head of the organization is the Chairman of Authority of Heads of State and
Government who is appointed by other Heads of State to oversee the affairs for a
period of one year. The Authority is responsible for general direction and control
of the community and meets at least once a year.
The institution of the executive branch is the Commission of ECOWAS. Its head is
the President of ECOWAS Commission appointed by the authority for a nonrenewable period of 4 years. The Vice President and the following 7
Commissioners assist him:
i.
Administration and Finance
ii.
Agriculture and Water Resources
iii.
Human Development and Gender
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iv.
Infrastructure
v.
Macroeconomic Policy
vi.
Political Affairs, Peace and Security
vii.
Trade, Customs and Free Movement
Until 2006 the ECOWAS Commission was named ECOWAS secretariat. The
differences between these two institutions are the change of name and an increase
in the number of officers at the management level. One of the main features of
restructuring the commission is that there is a smaller and more clearly defined
sector for each Commissioner so that the work can be done and controlled more
accurately. This restructuring process brought a lot of advantages with it. One of
them is the improvement of the community spirit.
Another Institution is the Community Parliament, which belongs to the legislative
branch. The Speaker of the Parliament chairs it. Below him is the Secretary
General, who is responsible for the administrative functions of the institution.
Taking this Institution as an example, the reorganization of the commission was
carried out to improve its efficiency. This works because of strong management
support.
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The parliament has 115 seats, which represent the 15 member states. Each of them
has at least 5 seats; the rest is shared in correspondence to the population. The
following table shows the seats of each member state:
Allocation of Seats in ECOWAS Parliament per states
Member States
Parliament Seats
Nigeria
35
Ghana
8
Ivory Coast
7
Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and 6 each
Senegal
Benin, Cape Verde, Togo, The 5 each
Gambia,
Guinea
Bissau,
Sierra
Leone and Liberia
Source: ECOWAS (2017)
The last of the four main institutions is the Community Court of Justice, which
represents the judicial branch. A president also chairs it. The Court Registrar, who
handles the administrative functions with the support of other professionals, assists
him. The Court ensures the interpretation and application of Community laws,
protocols and conventions.
The two main institutions of these four are the ECOWAS Commission and the
ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), which were created to
implement policies, pursue a number of programs, and carry out development
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projects in Member States. The vision of EBID is to become the leading regional
investment and development Bank in West Africa, an effective tool for poverty
alleviation, wealth creation and job promotion for the well-being of people in the
region. The changes can only be realized if everyone in the community gets
involved.
5.3.2 Major Organs of ECOWAS and their Functions
The major organs of the community are:
i.
the Authority of Heads of State and Government;
ii.
the Council of Ministers; (bb) the Community Parliament;
iii.
the Economic and Social Council;
iv.
the Community Court of Justice;
v.
the Executive Secretariat;
vi.
the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development;
vii.
Specialised Technical Commissions; and
viii.
Any other institutions that may be established by the Authority.
The organs of the Community perform their functions and act within the limits of
the powers conferred on them by the ECOWAS Treaty and by the Protocols
relating thereto.
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5.3.3 Functions of ECOWAS Organs
The community has several organs that perform different but interrelated and
interconnected functions. These organs and their different functions are essential
and fundamental to the smooth, efficient and effective running of the community
and its secretariat based in Abuja, Nigeria. The Authority of Heads of State and
Government is the highest body of the community. The compositions and
functions of these organs are examined below.
Authority of Heads of State and Government
The Authority of Heads of State and Government of Member States is the supreme
institution of the Community and composed of Heads of State and/or Government
of Member States.
The Authority is responsible for the general direction and control of the
Community and also takes all measures to ensure its progressive development and
the realization of its objectives. Pursuant to the provisions of the treaty establishing
ECOWAS, the Authority has the following function:
i.
determine the general policy and major guidelines of the Community, give
directives, harmonize and coordinate the economic, scientific, technical,
cultural and social policies of Member States;
ii.
oversee the functioning of Community institutions and follow-up
implementation of Community objectives;
iii.
prepare and adopt its Rules of Procedure;
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iv.
appoint the Executive Secretary in accordance with the provisions of Article
18 of ECOWAS Treaty;
v.
appoint, on the recommendation of Council, the External Auditors;
vi.
delegate to the Council, where necessary, the authority to take such
decisions as are stipulated in Article 9 of ECOWAS Treaty;
vii.
refer where it deems necessary any matter to the Community Court of
Justice when it confirms, that a Member State or institution of the
Community has failed to honour any of its obligations or an institution of the
Community has acted beyond the limits of its authority or has abused the
powers conferred on it by the provisions of ECOWAS Treaty, by a decision
of the Authority or a regulation of the Council;
viii.
request the Community Court of Justice as and when necessary, to give
advisory opinion on any legal questions; and
ix.
exercise any other powers conferred on it under ECOWAS Treaty.
The Council of Ministers:
There is Council of Ministers of the Community. The Council comprises of the
Minister in charge of ECOWAS Affairs and any other Minister of each Member
State.
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The Council of Minister is responsible for the functioning and development of the
Community. To this end, the Council has the following functions:
i.
make recommendations to the Authority on any action aimed at attaining the
objectives of the Community;
ii.
appoint all statutory appointees other than the Executive Secretary;
iii.
by the powers delegated to it by the Authority, issue.
The Court of Justice:
The Court of Justice is empowered to carry out the functions assigned to it
independently of the Member States and the institutions of the Community.
Judgements of the Court of Justice are binding on the Member States, the
Institutions of the Community and on individuals and corporate bodies.
Arbitration Tribunal:
The community established an Arbitration Tribunal. The status, composition,
powers, procedure and other issues concerning the Arbitration Tribunal is as set
out in a Protocol relating thereto.
The Executive Secretariat:
There is established an Executive Secretariat of the Community. The Secretariat is
headed by the Executive Secretary assisted by Deputy Executive Secretaries and
such other staff as may be required for the smooth functioning of the Community.
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Executive Secretary: Appointments and Functions
The Executive Secretary is appointed by the Authority for a four-year term
renewable only once for another four-year period. He can only be removed from
office by the Authority upon its own initiative or on the recommendation of the
Council of Ministers.
The Ministerial Committee on the Selection and Evaluation of the Performance of
Statutory Appointees evaluate the three (3) candidates nominated by the Member
State to which the statutory post has been allocated and make recommendations to
the Council of Ministers. Council then make proposition to the Authority on the
appointment of the candidate adjudged the best.
The Executive Secretary must be a person of proven competence and integrity,
with a global vision of political and economic problems and regional integration.
a) The Deputy Executive Secretaries and other Statutory Appointees are
appointed by the Council of Ministers on the proposal of the Ministerial
Committee on the Selection and Evaluation of the Performance of Statutory
Appointees following the evaluation of the three (3) candidates nominated
by their respective Member States to whom the posts have been allocated.
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They are appointed for a period of four years renewable only once for a
further four-year term.
b) Vacancies are advertised in all Member States to which statutory posts have
been allocated.
In appointing professional staff of the community, due regard are made, subject to
ensuring the highest standards of efficiency and technical competence, to
maintaining equitable geographical distribution of posts among nationals of all
Member States. Unless otherwise provided in the Treaty or in a Protocol, the
Executive Secretary is the chief executive officer of the Community and all its
institutions.
The Executive Secretary directs the activities of the Executive Secretariat and
shall, unless otherwise provided in a Protocol, be the legal representative of the
Institutions of the Community in their totality. Without prejudice to the general
scope of his responsibilities, the duties of the Executive Secretary include:
a) execution of decisions taken by the Authority and application of the
regulations of the Council;
b) promotion of Community development programmes and projects as well as
multinational enterprises of the region;
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c) convening as and when necessary meetings of sectoral Ministers to examine
sectoral issues which promote the achievement of the objectives of the
Community;
d) preparation of draft budgets and programmes of activity of the Community
and supervision of their execution upon their approval by Council;
e) submission of reports on Community activities to all meetings of the
Authority and Council;
f) preparation of meetings of the Authority and Council as well as meetings of
experts and technical commissions and provision of necessary technical
services;
g) recruitment of staff of the Community and appointment to posts other than
statutory appointees in accordance with the Staff Rules and Regulations;
h) submission of proposals and preparation of such studies as may assist in the
efficient and harmonious functioning and development of the Community;
i) initiation of draft texts for adoption by the Authority or Council.
5.4 ECOWAS as a Sub-Regional Non-State Actor
Since the creation of ECOWAS in 1975, it has steadily played an important role as
a non-state actor in the community, especially in strengthening diplomatic ties both
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at bilateral and multilateral levels, using diplomacy to prevent and resolve conflicts
and using diplomacy to promoting peace and stability in the sub-region.
The global call for regionalism, especially in under developed regions and the
example and model of the European Union has made regional organizations like
ECOWAS become an important non-state actor in the sub-region and the continent
at large. In fact the successes and achievements of the European Union has made
ECOWAS to strive to do more and copy the European Union model.
The performance of these importance roles coupled with substantial level of
successes it has achieved have been made more prominent diplomatically in the
region. The role it played by using political and military diplomacy to restore
peace and stability in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and The Gambia has received
accolades within and outside the continent and also made a model for others in the
continent.
The creation of ECOMOG in 1990 to help in enforcing peace in Liberia and
subsequent participation of ECOMOG in restoring peace and stability to other
conflict zones in the region has made ECOMOG a formidable organ of ECOWAS
and ECOWAS a formidable non-state actor in the sub-region.
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The introduction of ECOWAS passport is another way of strengthening ECOWAS
as a non-state actor. The passport allows free movement of nationals throughout
the sub-region and it is equally recognized worldwide as an acceptable travel
document. The moves channelled towards a common central bank and currency if
actualized will further strengthen ECOWAS and diplomatic relations between
member states.
The introduction of ECOWAS parliament and especially ECOWAS court, has
watered down the sovereignty of member states. This is because they have to obey
and abide by the decision of the court and compel compliance. Lots of nationals
have approached the court since its creation for adjudication on matters involving
them and their government. The court has made ECOWAS a prominent and
important non-state actor.
Despite the challenges facing the community, it has continued to grow in
prominence as a non-state actor by using diplomacy to strengthen and ensure
peace, stability, development and economic prosperity in the region. In fact it has
helped through diplomacy both at bilateral and multilateral levels to reduce
wrangling between Anglophone and Francophone countries.
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5.5 Achievements of ECOWAS as Pressed by Nigeria
The regional body since its creation in 1975 has achieved substantial successes in
important areas. The body has been proactive in ensuring stability, preventing
conflicts and resolving conflicts in the West African sub region over the years.
These efforts have been acknowledged by global powers like the United States and
global and regional unions like United Nations, African Union and the European
Union. Major among these achievements are as follows:
i.
ECOWAS has achieved substantially in the area of ensuring peace and
stability in the region, especially by preventing and resolving conflicts in the
region. Typical examples are the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast,
Mali and the Gambia.
ii.
The decision by the Authority during its summit of May 1990 in Banjul to
establish an ECOWAS standing mediation committee to look into disputes
and conflicts among member states was a landmark decision in the life of the
community.
iii.
ECOWAS has also achieved some infrastructure developments within the
sub-region. In the last two decades, road transport sector enjoyed major
growth. New roads have been constructed linking member states. Some of
these roads include among others- trans-coastal highway from LagosNouakchott which is up to 4,767km and run through Nigeria, Benin, Togo,
108
Ghana, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Senegal and Mauritania.
The trans-Sahara highway from Dakar-Ndjamena which covers up to
4,630km and runs through Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria and
Chad (ECOWAS, 1998).
iv.
The creation of the Economic Community of West African States
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as a West African multi-lateral armed force
established by the ECOWAS in 1990 remains one of the major achievements
of ECOWAS in peace and security. ECOMOG is a formal arrangement for
separate armies to work together in the region. It is largely supported by
personnel and resources of the Nigerian Armed Forces with sub-battalion
strength units contributed by other ECOWAS members including Guinea,
Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Liberia, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and others.
ECOMOG has intervened in several states in the region since its creation in
1990, like in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mali.
v.
The approval of a common passport for the region is also another landmark
achievement in the history of the community. The passport is accepted by
member states and other countries of the world as a valid travel document.
This has helped easy movement of persons and goods within the region. Plan
is also in place to create a common central bank and currency for the region.
109
vi.
More so, the regional body has successfully established a protocol as early
as 1979 that allows the free movement of its 340 million citizens across the
sub-region. The legendary women traders of West Africa have taken
advantage and acted as motors of regional integration, while 68% of West
Africa's international migrants remain in the sub-region, enjoying one of the
world's most impressive mobility rates.
vii.
Furthermore, ECOWAS under the leadership of Guinea's Lassana Kouyaté
established the continent's first sub-regional security mechanism in 1999.
The mechanism built on the lessons of the Nigeria-led ECOWAS Ceasefire
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping interventions in Liberia and
Sierra Leone in the 1990s in which over 2,500 West African peacekeepers
died so that both countries could live. Sub-regional peacekeepers have
subsequently been deployed to Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau.
viii.
Another main achievement was the creation of a governance protocol under
the leadership of Ghana's Mohammed Chambas in 2001, which helped with
some of the difficult democratisation challenges in Guinea, Niger, and Togo.
Contrary to the autocratic days of sub-regional "big men" who sought to
cling to power with iron fists, after the end of the Cold War, alternance —
the change of regime from one ruling party to another — has occurred in
Benin, Ghana, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gambia and most recently, in Nigeria.
110
The organisation has also played an important role in Burkina Faso's current
democratic transition following the toppling of the 27-year old autocracy of
Blaise Compaoré last October.
ix.
Another important achievement of ECOWAS is the creation of an
innovative community levy in 2000 to help fund the organisation. Although
the levy is irregularly paid, other African regional bodies could learn lessons
from this scheme to reduce their dependence on the vagaries of external
funding.
5.6
Challenges of ECOWAS
Despite the successes of ECOWAS, especially in ensuring stability and security in
the West African region, easing access to free movement of persons and goods
among others, the regional body is faced with myriad of challenges that are
militate against it in delivering on its objectives in the region. Major among them
are:
i.
One of the major challenges of the regional body is the lack of political
commitment which basically revolves around incompetent leadership among
respective West African States. A high number of member-states hardly pay
their statutory financial contributions to the body. This seriously hampers the
organisation’s ability to pursue political and economic programmes with the
needed zeal.
111
ii.
Many member-states are also poor, making it hard and sometimes
impossible for them to ensure their statutory financial contributions to the
body. This has placed the financial burden on Nigeria which is regarded as
the hegemon in the region.
iii.
There is equally external interference in the political and other diplomatic
deliberations and negotiations in the region. Most times such interference
comes from France through their erstwhile colonized states (Francophone
states) who are the majority in the regional body. It is believed that Nigeria
will control and dominate the small and poor Francophone states. This
notion has influenced France relations with Francophone states and Nigeria.
iv.
More so, there is a general fear and suspicion of domination by small and
poor states towards rich and big states like Nigeria, Senegal and Ghana. This
has made cooperation and diplomacy rather difficult among member states.
v.
Language barrier between member states has also made cooperation, ties and
diplomacy not as smooth as expected. The region consists of countries that
are colonized by Britain, United States, France and Portugal. This means
that three languages are recognized officially in ECOWAS and these are
English, French and Portuguese. The small difference is deterring
cooperation and smooth diplomatic engagements.
112
vi.
Another challenge is related to constructive sovereignty. In any international
cooperation arrangements, especially in regional integration groupings,
member states have to surrender a measure of their national sovereignty. In
ECOWAS, treaties, protocols and conventions have to be ratified by
member states before they enter definitively into force. It has been an uphill
task getting to legal instruments ratified by member states.
vii.
Furthermore, there is high poverty and hunger rates in the region and low
industrialization that has denied the member states and their citizens the
opportunity to enjoy the benefits of such a union. The regional body created
room for cooperation in trade and other economic matters that is expected to
increase prosperity and development in the region. This has been generally
dormant and low with few investors using the opportunity created by this
union.
viii.
Other challenges are incessant conflicts, hostile environment, inadequate
funding, poorly manned borders as well as inability of the regional body to
implement its resolutions, decisions and acts because of one impediment or
the other.
113
5.7 ECOWAS Operations with Full Supports
ECOWAS mainly concerns itself with the activities within the region. The
community has over the year proven its capacity to undertake successful conflict
prevention, peace-making and conflict resolution under resolution under the
protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management,
resolution, peace keeping and security of 10th December 1999. The institution has
achieved remarkable success in fulfilling its mandate by containing violent conflict
in the region and carrying out conflict preventing, intervention through preventive
diplomacy initiative, fact finding missions, and quiet diplomacy, diplomatic
pressure and mediation.
The intervention of the ECOWAS cease fire monitoring group (ECOWAS) in
Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1997) and the ECOWAS mission in Liberia
(ECOMIC) in 2003 and Cote D’Ivoire (ECOMIC) in 2002 with classic military
operations designed to stop wars or monitor cease fires, thus creating space for
peace negotiations and humanitarian operations indeed, ECOMOG interventions in
West Africa have often created the bridge head for the subsequent deployment of
larger United Nation (UN) peace keeping and international humanitarian missions.
In the process ECOWAS has always acted in concert with the African Union (AU).
In the area of economic integration, countries that use the CFA FRANC as a
common currency, established a monetary union to promote economic integration.
114
Also in 2002, another union made up of five countries within ECOWAS largely
dominated by Nigeria was formed. All members are English Speaking apart from
Guinea which if Franco phone
115
CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Summary
This research work examines the role of Nigeria in the formation and development
of international Organizations with emphasis on the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) from 2007 to 2019. The cost to Nigeria; of
sustaining ECOWAS is greater than the benefits she derives from the community.
Nigeria must remember that the Treaty provisions that established ECOWAS
provided for legal equal membership, which means that members have equal
voting right and presumably equal duties/benefits. What this means is that, her
extravagant spending for the sustenance of ECOWAS will not buy more than one
voting right for her.
There is need to understand that despites the fact that there are violent and
rebellious non-state actors, there are also several business mogul and entrepreneurs
like Michael Adenuga, Aliko Dangote and others that can help boost and
strengthen trade, flow of foreign investments and economic relations in the subregion. Michael Adenuga already has investment in Ghana, Orji Uzo Kalu with
Slok airlines and bank in the Gambia and Aliko Dangote and others could be
encouraged to do similar things. Nigerian banking entrepreneurs also have banks in
different parts of the region, but this should be spread to other sectors, too, like
116
manufacturing, telecommunication, agriculture, education and so on. This should
generate more employment opportunities, better intra-regional trade and
investment, create wealth, etc.
It is pertinent to mention here that apart from prestige which removes instead of
putting food on the table for Nigerians, all other Nigerian interests in joining
ECOWAS have not been fully realized, including the economic interest, in spite of
the increased trading activities between Nigeria and other member states.
However, on a rational level of analysis, it could be argued that no amount of cost
borne by Nigeria to sustain ECOWAS outweighs the future benefits. The
formation of ECOWAS was successful because of the level of diplomacy put into
it by General Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and General Eyadema of Togo.
From available statistics, Nigeria emerged as the leader in intra-ECOWAS exports
between 1976 and 2014. It must be cautioned, however, that this cannot be
attributed to Nigeria‘s level of industrialization and the demand for the country‘s
industrial products. In fact, it is the sub-regional demand for Nigeria‘s oil that
explains the country‘s leading share of inter-regional exports (Trade Year Book,
1997). What is evident is that Nigeria officially occupies a dominant position in
intra-ECOWAS exports, and in this regard, the country may be said to have
benefited from its participation in the community, although, it can be argued that
117
Nigeria could still have exported her oil to her West African neighbours in the
absence of ECOWAS.
The activities of violent non-state actors have become more troubling in the
international arena in recent time, especially since the September 11 attack in the
United States. This has made state actors and their regional, continental and global
bodies pay more attention to issues of terrorism and insurgency. The situation in
the West African region, especially with Boko Haram and Tuareg rebels in Mali,
has resulted into states actors' commitment to insurgency and terrorism. This
diplomatic engagement has even extended to states outside the ECOWAS umbrella
like Chad and Cameroun who engage in military diplomacy in trying to bring to an
end the Boko Haram insurgency and other cross border violence.
Since ECOWAS creation in 1975; its role, importance and influence as a non-state
actor has continued to grow steadily in line with various reforms that have been
made to the body, like the introduction of ECOWAS court and parliament and the
forum of first ladies.
6.2 Conclusion
The notion of regional union establishment in west Africa was first suggested by
Liberian President William Tubman in 1964. Later in 1965, the proposed treaty
was signed by Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire, but unfortunately
did not have a long-lasting effect. The United Nations Economic Commission for
118
Africa (UNECA), which are the acting instrument of the (ECA), played a
tremendous role towards the fulfillment process of the African integration by
acting in the background, especially amidst the pre-phase of the West African
state's agreement towards the establishment, execution as well as the
implementation of the Economic Countries of the West African State (ECOWAS).
Nigeria‘s benefits from participation in ECOWAS since 1985 have not been as
significant as the cost. Tangible economic benefits arising from her participation
are likely to remain low for the foreseeable future, while the cost may continue to
be on the high side. There is hope however of beneficial developments in the years
ahead, such as possible increase in intra-ECOWAS trade. This is as a result of the
application of the trade liberalization policy and the removal of obstacles to trade,
such as, limited transport and communications facilities in member-states, currency
problems, competition from other sub-regional economic unions, etc. Among the
vital essence for the establishment of ECOWAS is to ensure the implementation of
a single currency in the region as a fundamental integrating element, simplifying
people's free movement and equal trade. Unfortunately, the ECOWAS member
states were unable to meet-up with the requirement and reached consensus for this
objective due to lack of political-will and security threat, fear of power from the
stronger nations over weaker country's as well as fear of the loss of revenue
119
through the establishment of the common currency among the ECOWAS
countries.
Nigeria belongs to many international organizations like the United Nations (UN),
Commonwealth of Nations, Organization of African Unity (OAU) later changed to
African Union (AU), United Nations International Children‘s Education Fund
(UNICEF), World Bank etc. Nigeria participates in all these organizations as a
member country, but the activities of the Nigerian government in ECOWAS shows
that Nigeria is bearing most of the burden of keeping the organization alive; in
spite of the fact that the ECOWAS treaty provided for equal right, duties and
benefits. The creation of ECOWAS has helped strengthen diplomatic relations
among states in the sub-region through the various organs of the community, like
the Authority of Heads of States, Council of Ministers, ECOWAS court,
ECOWAS parliament and ECOWAS commission, amongst others.
The fast growing importance of regional integration amidst growing insecurity,
insurgency and dependency has made states to outsource their sovereignty to
regional organization with the desire to harness a common market towards a
common development and prosperity.
120
6.3 Recommendations
After an examination of the various issues relating to the title of this research work
and based on the findings of the research, the following recommendations are
hereby made as a way of proffering workable solutions to the issues identified:
i.
Nigeria should continue to sustain ECOWAS and thereby help to make the
sub-region competitive in international economic relations. This could be
done by encouraging other member states to work hard so that together,
member states can improve the sub-regions international economic relations.
ii.
There is an urgent need to strengthen ECOWAS towards a more robust
economic and political integration. With this, we recommend speedy
actualization of common currency and central bank that will ensure better
regional trade and economic relations among member states and their
nationals. The concept is in the pipeline, but the process is slow and not in
full tandem with the European Union that the community chose as a role
model.
iii.
We also recommend better bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations,
especially through the regional community. This will inevitably strengthen
ties between member states and help address challenges of fear and
suspicion that have stemmed diplomatic ties among member states and
nationals over the years.
121
iv.
Nigeria should stop imposing military solutions to internal affairs of other
member-states of ECOWAS, as it increases the fear of Nigerian hegemony
in the sub-region. Rather, diplomacy as a foreign policy strategy could be
used to help other ECOWAS member states in their internal affairs or
problems and not the imposition of military force.
v.
There is also an urgent need to strengthen diplomatic relations both at
bilateral and multilateral levels among states in the sub-region. This will
help reduce and cater for issues of cross border crimes, proliferation of small
and light weapons, terrorism, and traffic in persons, among others.
122
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