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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Understanding Space
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Through a Cybersecurity Lens
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Presenter and Facilitators
✦ Dr.
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Jerry Sellers, Ph.D., University of Surrey, UK (jsellers@tsti.net)
‣ Partner and President, TSTI with over 30 years of aerospace engineering experience, including Space Shuttle Mission Controller, NASA/JSC, and Chief
of Astronautics for the European Office of Aerospace Research and Development, London, UK
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‣ Former Director of the Space Systems Research Center, USAF Academy. Responsible for designing, building, testing and operating small, scientific
satellites.
‣ Author of the text Understanding Space: An Introduction to Astronautics, Editor and contributing author of the text Applied Space Systems Engineering
‣ Adjunct Professor, Stevens Institute of Technology. Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University
‣ Certified Agile/Scrum Master, Certified Scaled Agile Framework (SAFe) Program Consultant (SPC5)
‣ Corresponding Member - International Academy of Astronautics
✦ Terri
Johnson, M.Sc. Cybersecurity and Information Assurance (terri.akse@gmail.com)
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‣ Department Chair of the Computer Networking and Cybersecurity Department at Pikes Peak Community College
‣ Over 20 years of experience in Information Technology, specializing in building and securing computer networks. Terri started out working for two of the
world’s largest tax and audit firms, after which she transitioned to serving several educational institutions as both IT faculty and IT staff support
‣ Lead faculty of the NSA-DHS designated Center of Academic Excellence program at PPCC
‣ Member of the Colorado Springs chapter of ISSA (Information Systems Security Association), PPCC Cyber Club Advisor, and Coach to PPCC's
nationally recognized Cyber Competition Team
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‣ Industry certifications include: Cisco's CCNA Routing / Switching and CCNA Security and EC-Council’s CEH (Certified Ethical Hacker)
✦ Jason
Sellers
‣ Summer intern supporting SPEC Innovations analyzing applications of model-based systems engineering simulation tools and techniques
‣ Member of Nationally-ranked FRC Robotics Team
‣ Dungeon Master
‣ Eagle Scout
Course Introduction
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
About TSTI
A respected name in systems engineering workforce development for over 25 years.
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✦Teaching
Science and Technology, Inc. (TSTI) is a veteran-owned small business that assists companies and
organizations who wish to improve their systems engineering skills as they relate to the space and other domains.
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We present quality short courses and workshops in space systems engineering and program management to customers around the
world. Our teaching style is highly interactive with emphasis on learning-by-doing and practical real-world examples and applications.
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Our systems engineering courses provide the processes, tools, and information necessary to “jump-start” new-hires to the space
business or improve the performance of mid- to senior-level engineers, systems engineers, and technical program managers.
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In addition, we provide focused systems engineering support to organizations as they approach critical events in the development
process and work as red team support.
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We wrote the books that describe SE in the space domain, and we’ve all had practical SE and PM experience in the development
world.
✦Since
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2010, TSTI has taught more than 500 courses to more than 20,000 students for NASA, ESA, DoD and
industry around the world
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✦What
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Sets Our Courses Apart:
CREDIBILITY: We wrote the books. We’ve been there, done that. We bring extensive systems engineering experience.
COMPETENCE: We’re professional teachers. This is our day job. We take the complex and make it simple. We’re explainers and
motivators. Hands-on exercises ensure that you learn space by doing space. No death by PowerPoint.
CURRICULUM: We take you from new hire to seasoned space professional. Our on-line learning portal enables continuity through
your increasing levels of expertise.
COST: We’re small, with low overhead, and come to you. Your cost is 50% less – you can train twice the people for the same price.
CONTRACTING: You can get on contract in minutes! We’re only a credit card purchase away.
Learn more at: www.tsti.net
Course Introduction
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
About TSTI
ONSITE TRAINING
VIRTUAL TRAINING
TSTI is a premier provider of
onsite space systems
engineering training to NASA,
DoD and Industry.
Since Covid, TSTI has pivoted to
providing 100% virtual training.
Self-paced online courses also
available.
Starting a new project?
Struggling with an existing
one? Need integrated work
force development tailored to
your project?
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PROJECT COACHING AND
INTEGRATED PROGRAMS
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SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
CONSULTING SERVICES
Project start ups. Red Team
proposal review. Expertise in
Model-Based Systems
Engineering (MBSE).
Learn more at: www.tsti.net
Course Introduction
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Course Trajectory
✦ Course
Threats—Natural & Human
Introduction
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✦ Context
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The Space Mission
Architecture
✦ Opportunities
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Understanding Orbits
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Space Mission Operations
✦ Threats
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The Space Environment
‣
The Human Environment
✦ Vulnerabilities
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RF Systems
‣
Space Data Architectures
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Understanding Space
Through a Cyber Lens
Vulnerabilities—RF Systems &
Data Architectures
Opportunities—Orbits &
Operations
Context
Course Introduction
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
Course Reference
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‣ The Primary Course Reference is:
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• Understanding Space: An Introduction to Astronautics (US), 4th
edition, by Jerry Jon Sellers with contributions by William Astore,
Robert B. Giffen and Wiley J. Larson. Published by Coyote
Enterprises on the Inkling platform.
‣ Other References include:
• Applied Space Systems Engineering (ASSE), by Larson, Kirkpatrick,
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Sellers, Thomas and Verma, McGraw-Hill
• Human Spaceflight: Mission Analysis and Design (HSF), by Larson,
Pranke, Giffen, and Connolly
• Other sources as noted
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• Inputs from over 20,000 space professionals who have taken our
courses
This book and over 20 others are
part of the Space Technology Series,
a government and industry
sponsored project managed out of
the USAF Academy
Available at: www.spacetechnologyseries.com
Course Introduction
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Course Objectives
✦At
the end of this course you should be able to…
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‣ Gain Core Space Knowledge
Apply Space Concepts
• Describe the Space Mission Architecture, the context for all
space activities
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Understand Threats
Comprehend Capabilities
and Limitations
‣ Comprehend space mission Capabilities, Trade-offs and
Limitations specific to the cyber-security domain
• Explain how orbital mechanics and operational architectures
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constrain access to space systems
‣ Discuss natural and human-made threats to space systems
Gain Core Space Knowledge
Learning Trajectory. Throughout the course we’ll
build your core space knowledge so you tackle
ever more challenging space problems in the
cyber-security domain.
• Describe potential vulnerabilities to space systems through
communications links and data architectures
‣ Apply Cyber/Space Concepts to real-world scenarios
Course Introduction
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
Course Schedule (all times PDT)
✦Day
1 Morning Session
✦Day
1000-1030: Course Introduction and Context
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0900-0930: Course Introduction and Context
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1030-1045: Progress Check/Break
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0930-0945: Progress Check/Break
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1045-1115: Opportunities (Orbits and Ops)
1115-1130: Progress Check/Break
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0945-1015: Opportunities (Orbits and Ops)
1015-1030: Progress Check/Break
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1130-1200: Threats (Space and Human)
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1030-1100: Threats (Space and Human)
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1200-1215: Progress Check/Break
‣
1100-1115: Progress Check/Break
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1215-1245: Vulnerabilities (RF and Data)
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1115-1145: Vulnerabilities (RF and Data)
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1245-1315: Progress Check and Application Challenge
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1145-1215: Progress Check and Application Challenge
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1315-1330: Wrap-up and Close
✦Day
1 Afternoon Session
‣
1430-1500: Course Introduction and Context
‣
‣
1500-1515: Progress Check/Break
1515-1545: Opportunities (Orbits and Ops)
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1545-1600: Progress Check/Break
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1600-1630: Threats (Space and Human)
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1630-1645: Progress Check/Break
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1645-1715: Vulnerabilities (RF and Data)
1715-1745: Progress Check and Application Challenge
1745-1800: Wrap-up and Close
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1215-1230: Wrap-up and Close
✦Day
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Course Introduction
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
2 Afternoon Session
‣
1330-1400: Course Introduction and Context
‣
‣
1400-1415: Progress Check/Break
1415-1445: Opportunities (Orbits and Ops)
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1445-1500: Progress Check/Break
‣
1500-1530: Threats (Space and Human)
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1530-1545: Progress Check/Break
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1545-1615: Vulnerabilities (RF and Data)
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1615-1645: Progress Check and Application Challenge
1645-1700: Wrap-up and Close
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2/3 Morning Sessions
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Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Space in Context
‣ Learning Objectives - By the end of
this lesson you should be able to...
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• List and describe the unique
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advantages of space
• Describe the basic types of space
missions that leverage these
advantages
• Identify and describe the elements
common to all space missions - the
space mission architecture - and
how they work together to achieve a
successful mission
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‣ References
Using Space:
Space in Context
‣Why Space?
‣Space Missions
‣Mission Elements
Space Mission Architecture. The space mission
architecture is the collection of space elements that
make any mission possible. US Fig. 1-23.
• US Chapter 1, HSF Chapter 15
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
Why Space?
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‣ Getting into space is dangerous and expensive.
•
So why bother?
‣ Space offers a number of compelling
advantages that makes its exploitation
advantageous and (sometimes) profitable - the
Space Imperatives
•
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Global Perspective
Clear View of the Heavens
Free Fall Environment
Resources
The Final Frontier!
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The single most important reason we go to
space is to gain a global perspective
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Using Space:
Space in Context
‣Why Space?
‣Space Missions
‣Mission Elements
A Global Perspective. Space is the ultimate
high ground. From orbital altitudes we can view
large parts of the Earth all at once. US Fig. 1-4.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Global Perspective - Communications
‣ Humans have been using the high ground to relay messages for
centuries (using mirrors, flags, etc.)
‣ In October 1945, scientist and science-fiction writer Arthur C.
Clarke (author of classics, such as 2001: A Space Odyssey)
proposed a fantastic idea - do this from space! Put satellites into
geostationary orbits (“geo”) to relay communications around the
globe
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Satellite communication is
the single most important
application of space today !
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Using Space:
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Space in Context
‣Why Space?
‣Space Missions
‣Mission Elements
The Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO) Belt. Today about
300 satellites in geo link civil and military users
around the world. Examples include: WGS, MilStar, XM
Radio, Intelsat and many, many more.
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Global Perspective - Navigation
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‣ From their positions in space, Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites provide world-wide
position, navigation and timing (PNT) 24/7/365
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GLONASS, owned/operated by the Russian Federation, provides similar service
• Europeans recently began providing equivalent services with their partially deployed Galileo constellation
• The Chinese BeiDou Navigation Satellite System provides a similar, but more limited capability from
geostationary orbit
Originally conceived for
its military applications,
GPS is now critical to
the world economy!
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Using Space:
Space in Context
‣Why Space?
‣Space Missions
‣Mission Elements
Space Navigation. By using a method of trilateration a groundbased user can get a “fix” on their position by contacting four or
more satellites at the same time. US Fig. 1-12.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Global Perspective - Remote Sensing
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‣ Space missions take advantage of the
Global Perspective for remote sensing
‣ Satellite remote sensing of the Earth is
used for:
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Earth’s environment monitoring
Weather monitoring, prediction
City & agricultural planning
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Using Space:
Space in Context
‣Why Space?
‣Space Missions
‣Mission Elements
Landsat Images of Flooding in Colorado. These Landsat 8
images are from Aug 16 (left) and Sep 17 (right) 2013.
Some parts of Colorado received nearly a year’s worth of rain
in one week in September. When the second image was
taken, the South Platte River was about 1.8 m (~6 ft) above
flood stage. The river is shown here on the right as it flows by
Greeley, CO. (Courtesy of US Geological Survey (USGS)) US
Fig. 12-18.
Military applications—spy satellites
Once the exclusive domain of the military,
space-based remote sensing is fast
becoming a major market for commercial
space missions
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Space Mission Elements
‣ The Mission
‣ Orbits & Trajectories
‣ Spacecraft
‣ Launch Vehicles
‣ Mission Operations
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Using Space:
Space in Context
‣Why Space?
‣Space Missions
‣Mission Elements
Space Mission Architecture. The space mission architecture is
the collection of space elements that make any mission possible.
US Fig. 1-23.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
The Mission
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‣ At the heart of the space mission
architecture is the mission itself. Its
scope tells us:
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• The need that is being fulfilled by the
capability being delivered
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Using Space:
Space in Context
• The goals and objectives of the stakeholders
• The concept of operations that captures
how systems and users and other
stakeholders will interact
‣Why Space?
‣Space Missions
‣Mission Elements
The Mission! President Kennedy laid out the
mission objectives for the Apollo program in
1961.
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
The Spacecraft
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‣ The Spacecraft is divided into the payload and
spacecraft bus
•
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The payload performs the mission, it’s the reason
we’re going into space at all!
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It gathers data or relays communication for users
and investors back on Earth
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The subject is the object the payload is focused on
The Spacecraft bus provides support for the
payload, e.g. Pointing, Thermal Control, Structure,
Propulsion, Power, etc.
The Bus. Like a school bus, the
spacecraft bus includes all of the
necessary support functions to
keep the payload healthy and
happy. US Fig. 11-22.
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Space Payload. Mars Reconnaissance
Orbiter using its Climate Sounder payload to
probe Mars’ atmosphere. Courtesy NASA.
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Using Space:
Space in Context
‣Why Space?
‣Space Missions
‣Mission Elements
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Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Trajectories and Orbits
‣ A trajectory is the path an object follows
through space
• The size of the racetrack depends on the energy
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of the object in orbit
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‣ An orbit can be thought of as a fixed
racetrack around a planet
Using Space:
Space in Context
‣Why Space?
Orbit Racetrack. US Fig. 1-27.
‣Space Missions
‣Mission Elements
• Orbit altitude and field of regard of the
spacecraft dictate the swath width or coverage
on the ground
Swath. The higher the orbit the greater
the swath generated by the field of
regard. US Fig. 1-28.
Launch Vehicles
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‣ A launch vehicle provides
the necessary velocity
change to get a spacecraft
into orbit.
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• Launch vehicles are divided
into stages, providing a
portion of the total velocity
change, before being
discarded
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Bring Home Some Asteroid! Atlas V rocket carrying NASA's OSIRIS-REx
Asteroid Sample Return Mission, Sept. 2016.
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Using Space:
Space in Context
‣Why Space?
‣Space Missions
‣Mission Elements
• An upper stage may also be
needed to transfer the
spacecraft from a parking
orbit to its final mission orbit
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Mission Operations
‣ The mission operations systems include all of the ground
and space-based infrastructure needed to coordinate
other elements of the space mission architecture—the
“glue” that holds the mission together. These include:
• Manufacturing and test facilities such as clean rooms and
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test chambers to build systems and ensure they’ll work in
space
• Launch facilities to prepare the launch vehicle and get it
safely off the ground, and...
• Communication networks and operations centers used by
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Using Space:
Space in Context
the flight-control team to coordinate activities once it’s in
space.
Communication Architecture. A complex ‣Why Space?
infrastructure of control centers, tracking
sites, satellites, and relay satellites maintains ‣Space Missions
contact between spacecraft and users. US Fig.
‣Mission Elements
1-34.
‣ Mission management and operations encompasses all of
the activities needed to take a mission from a blank
sheet of paper to on-orbit reality
• Mission management team—Defines the mission statement,
lays out a workable mission architecture to make it happen
• Mission operations team—Monitors the spacecraft’s health
and status to ensure users get uninterrupted service
Apollo Mission Control Center after the
triumphant return of Apollo 13. US Fig. 1-35.
Systems Engineering and Project Management
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‣ People are the most important part of any
space mission. Without people handling
various jobs and services, all the expensive
hardware is useless.
‣ These experts handle all of the systems
engineering, project management, and
mission support functions needed to go from
“cradle to grave,” from a blank sheet of paper
to on-orbit reality.
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Systems engineering is the art and science of
designing and building systems that deliver
capabilities to meet the user’s needs.
•
Project management is the discipline of
planning, organizing, monitoring, and controlling
all resources needed to achieve the mission’s
intended purpose.
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
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Systems Engineering. The process for balancing
cost, schedule, performance and along with risk to
deliver the needed capability to users
Using Space:
Space in Context
‣Why Space?
‣Space Missions
‣Mission Elements
Project Management. Leads the team to
deliver on time, on budget
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Space ISAC
‣ Mission: Collaborating to Protect Our Space Assets
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‣ Announced in April 2019 during classified session at the 35th Space Symposium,
headquartered in Colorado Springs and co-located with the National Cyber Security Center
(NCC).
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‣ An Information Sharing and Analysis Ecosystem
• Space ISAC Members – including Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, etc
• Partner Agencies – including NASA, DHS, US Space Force, etc.
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‣ Focused on 3 Core Areas of Threat within the Space Sector
• Supply Chain
• Business Systems
• Missions
https://s-isac.org/
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
Review - Space in Context
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‣ Space offers several unique advantages - The Space Imperative - that make its exploration essential for
modern society
•
•
•
•
•
Global perspective
A clear view of the universe without the adverse effects of the atmosphere
A free-fall environment
Abundant resources
A final frontier
•
•
Communications satellites tie together remote regions of the globe
Remote-sensing satellites observe the Earth from space, providing weather forecasts, essential military information, and valuable
data to help us better manage Earth’s resources
Navigation satellites revolutionize how we travel on Earth
Space observatories peer to the edge of the universe and study the dynamic nature of the sun
Scientific spacecraft explore the Earth and the outer reaches of the solar system and peer to the edge of the universe
Manned missions provide valuable information about living and working in space and experiment with processing important
materials
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‣ Since the beginning of the space age, a wide variety of missions have evolved to take advantage of space
•
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‣ Central to understanding any space mission is the mission itself, its scope tells us
•
•
•
The need describes the capability being delivered,
The goals and objectives lay out the expectations of the stakeholders,
The Concept of Operations or ConOps documents how systems and users will interact
•
The spacecraft—composed of the payload that performs the mission and the bus that provides essential housekeeping and other
support functions
The trajectories and orbits—the path the spacecraft follows through space. This includes the orbit (or racetrack) the spacecraft
follows around the Earth.
Launch vehicles—the rockets which propel the spacecraft into space and maneuver it along its mission orbit
The mission operations systems—the “glue” that holds the mission together. They consist of all the infrastructure needed to get the
mission off the ground, and keep it there, such as manufacturing facilities, launch sites, communications networks, and mission
operations centers.
Mission management and operations—the brains of a space mission. An army of people make a mission successful. From the initial
idea to the end of the mission, individuals doing their jobs well ensure the mission products meet the users’ needs.
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‣ A space mission architecture includes the following elements
•
•
•
•
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
Using Space:
Space in Context
‣Why Space?
‣Space Missions
‣Mission Elements
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Key Take-Aways—Through a CyberSpace Lens
‣ Satellites in space have an enormous impact on daily life. These are some examples of what
could be disrupted if vulnerabilities are exploited within the satellite communication systems:
•
Internet traffic
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Weather forecasting
GPS
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Airline travel
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Financial transactions
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Cell phones
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Power grid
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Health services
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Military operations
Remote sensing
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Using Space:
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Space in Context
‣Why Space?
‣Space Missions
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‣Mission Elements
Agriculture
Military operations
Television signals
‣ Space has become a much larger attack vector – originally satellites were mostly
government-funded initiatives; now private industry has enormous numbers of satellites as
well.
‣ SPACE ISAC – collaborative group across the global space industry
Notes
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Opportunities—Orbits and Operations
Opportunities:
‣ Learning Objectives - By the end of this lesson you
should be able to...
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• Understand and be able to explain what it takes to get an
object into orbit
• Explain the approach used to develop the restricted twobody equation of motion, including coordinate systems and
assumptions
• Define the two constants of orbital motion—specific
mechanical energy and specific angular momentum
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• Apply the concept of conservation of specific angular
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Orbits and Operations
momentum to show an orbital plane remains fixed in space
• Describe the purpose of the Concept of Operations
• Describe the major space operations activities
• Explain and give examples of space mission operations
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
systems currently in use
• Characterize key mission operations trade-offs
‣ References
• US Chapter 4
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Racetracks in Space
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Opportunities:
Orbits and Operations
‣ Orbits can be thought of as big
racetracks on which spacecraft
“drive” around the Earth
‣ More Energy → Bigger
Racetrack!
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‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
Orbits as Racetracks. Orbits are like giant racetracks on which
spacecraft “drive” around Earth. US Fig. 4-1.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Baseballs into Orbit: Basic Motion
Opportunities:
‣ Imagine we could drop a baseball and throw one horizontally from the
same height at exactly the same time. Which one would hit the ground
first?
• They both hit at the same time!
• This is because horizontal and vertical motion are independent
• Gravity is acting on both balls equally, pulling them to the ground with exactly
the same acceleration of 9.798 m/s2 (neglecting drag)
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This high speed video
shows both a
dropped ball and
launched ball hitting
the ground at the
same time
Orbits and Operations
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Both Balls Hit at the Same Time. US Fig.
4-3.
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
Bigger Picture
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Opportunities:
Orbits and Operations
‣ Look at the shape and size of the the
Earth...the Earth curves or drops about 5 m
vertically for every 8 km you go out
horizontally
.
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.
5m
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‣ Imagine we build a tower 5 m tall at some
point on the Earth and attach a “diving board”
8 km long (ignore the natural sag of such a
long cantilever)
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‣ At the edge of the diving board the surface is
10 m below
10 m
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
Earth’s Curvature. Earth’s curvature means
the surface curves down about 5 m for every
8 km. US Fig. 4-4.
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Bigger Picture (cont’d)
‣ Imagine I could throw a baseball 8 km/sec!
Opportunities:
‣ How far would the ball drop due to gravity in 1 sec?
• Gravity at the the Earth’s surface causes objects to fall about 9.798 m/s2
• So in 1 sec an object falls about 5 m (d = 1/2 at2 = 4.905 to be exact)
.
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‣ How far did the Earth curve away in 8 km? 5 m
‣ So how far above the ground is our ball after 1 sec? 5 m!
‣ What happens 1 sec later?
Orbits and Operations
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• How long would it take the ball to reach the end of the diving board? 1 sec!
• The ball goes another 8 km horizontally and falls another 5 m and the Earth curves away another 5 m and the ball is
still 5 m above the surface. We’re in a circular orbit!
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
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5m
5m
5m
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
Trajectories
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Opportunities:
Orbits and Operations
‣ As we throw baseballs faster and faster,
eventually we can reach a speed at which the
Earth curves away as fast as the baseball
falls, placing the ball in orbit.
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‣ At exactly the right speed it will be in a
circular orbit!
•
•
.
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A little faster and it’s in an elliptical orbit.
Even faster and it can escape Earth altogether
on a parabolic or hyperbolic trajectory.
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
Baseballs in Orbit. US Fig. 4-5.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Simulation
Opportunities:
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Orbits and Operations
.
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.
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
Orbital Velocity
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Orbits:
‣ So how fast is fast enough to achieve a circular orbit?
Let’s use some math...
.
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km
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‣ Where,
•
V = circular velocity of a satellite at radius R
•
G = Universal gravitational constant = 6.67 x 10-11 Nm2/kg2
•
M = mass of the Earth = 5.98 x 1024 kg
•
R = radius of the Earth = 6378 km
•
Slower, and you hit the Earth; faster, and you’re in an elliptical orbit
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Understanding Orbits
‣Racetracks in
Space
‣Baseballs into
Orbit
‣Orbital Velocity
‣The Restricted
Two-Body
Problem
‣Constants of
Orbit Motion
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Mechanical Energy in Action
Opportunities:
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Orbits and Operations
.
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t
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.
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
Angular Momentum
‣ Specific angular momentum is the total angular
momentum (H) divided by the mass of the
spacecraft
‣ The specific angular momentum of an orbit gives
us a vector perpendicular to the orbit plane
‣ Angular momentum is constant!
•
Therefore the orbit plane is also constant so it is fixed
in inertial space
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
.
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The Right-hand Rule. We find the direction of
the angular velocity vector, Ω, and the angular
momentum vector, H, using the right-hand
rule. US Fig. 4-15.
.
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US Eqn. 4-28
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Opportunities:
Orbits and Operations
Specific Angular Momentum. The specific
angular momentum vector, h, is
perpendicular to the orbital plane defined
by R and V. US Fig. 4-38.
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Angular Momentum in Action
Opportunities:
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Orbits and Operations
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.
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
Space Mission Geometry
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Opportunities:
Orbits and Operations
.
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‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Satellite Ground Tracks - Introduction
‣ Most satellites are for missions focused on the Earth
•
Orbits:
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Describing & Using
Orbits
Taking pictures, communications, navigation
‣ Need to know what path the satellite traces over the Earth’s surface
‣ As a satellite revolves around the Earth, the Earth rotates under the satellite
•
.
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.
Now, try to imagine what the trace of the satellite looks like on the surface of the
Earth
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Earth and Spacecraft Motion. The
Earth spins on its axis at nearly
1600 km/hr (1000 mph) at the
equator, while a spacecraft orbits
above it. The ground track is the
trace of the satellite’s path over
the surface of the Earth.
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
Building a Ground Track
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Orbits:
‣ Since the Earth rotates underneath the satellite orbit, each
successive ground track shifts to the left and is “scrunched” by the
orbital period times the Earth’s rotation rate (15 deg per hour)
.
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.
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Describing & Using
Orbits
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
A Normal Spacecraft Ground Track. As Earth rotates, successive ground tracks appear to shift to the
west from an Earth-based observer’s viewpoint. US Fig. 5-31.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Examples
Orbits:
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Describing & Using
Orbits
.
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.
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
Orbital Ground Tracks. Orbit A has a period of 2.67 hours. Orbit B has a period of 8 hours. Orbit C has a period of
18 hours. Orbit D has a period of 24 hours. Orbit E has a period of 24 hours. US Fig. 5-33.
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
Standard Orbits: Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
‣ A satellite in LEO,
like the ISS
shown here,
completes
‣ 1 orbit about
every 90 min or
‣ about 15 orbits
per day
‣ A give ground
station on Earth
may only “see”
the satellite for
up to 10 min at
a time a few
times per day
depending on
where it is the
exact orbit
parameters
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Opportunities:
Orbits and Operations
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‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Standard Orbits: Geostationary Orbit (GEO)
Opportunities:
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Orbits and Operations
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‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
Review - Understanding Orbits
‣ Combining Newton’s Second Law and his Law of Universal Gravitation, we form the restricted twobody equation of motion
‣ The coordinate system used to derive the two-body equation of motion is the geocentric-equatorial
system
•
Origin—Earth’s center
•
Fundamental plane—equatorial plane
•
Direction perpendicular to the plane in the North Pole direction
•
Principal direction—vernal equinox direction
‣ In deriving the 2-body Equation of Motion, we assume
•
•
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.
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Drag force is negligible; Spacecraft is not thrusting
Gravitational pull of third bodies and all other forces are negligible; mEarth >> mspacecraft
•
Earth is spherically symmetrical and of uniform density and we can treat it mathematically as a
point mass; Spacecraft mass is constant, so ∆m = 0
•
The geocentric-equatorial coordinate system is sufficiently inertial for Newton’s laws to apply
Opportunities:
Orbits and Operations
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
‣ Solving the restricted two-body equation of motion results in the polar equation for a conic section
•
This tells us that all objects moving under the influence of gravity must follow one of four paths:
circle, ellipse, parabola or hyperbola
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Mission Operations Systems
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‣ The ConOps is driven by the availability
and access to operations systems
‣ Mission operations systems include any
facilities or infrastructure needed to
design, assemble, integrate, test, launch,
or operate a space mission
‣ Some critical operations systems function
during the three basic phases of a
spacecraft’s life—building, launching, and
operating:
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•
Spacecraft Manufacturing — the systems that
support design, assembly, integration, and
testing
•
Launch — the systems that bring the
spacecraft and launch vehicle together and
get them safely off the pad
•
Operations — mainly communication systems,
such as the web of radio links that track and
relay data to and from the spacecraft
Launch Complex. Launch
vehicles such as the Atlas V
shown here require pads
and processing equipment
to operate. Courtesy ULA.
Opportunities:
Spacecraft Manufacturing.
Specialized equipment and
facilities are needed to
assemble and test space
systems
Orbits and Operations
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
Mission Control. Operators
control all aspects of a mission
from the control center
(Courtesy ESA)
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
Communication Architecture
‣ The communication architecture
is the configuration of satellites
and ground stations in a space
system and the network that links
them together.
• Ground stations—Earth-based
antennas, transmitters, and
receivers
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• Control center—Controls the
spacecraft and all other elements
in the network
• Relay satellites—additional
spacecraft that link the primary
spacecraft with ground stations
.
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• Spacecraft—the in-space element
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Opportunities:
Orbits and Operations
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
Communication Architecture. A communication architecture for
space missions consists of ground- and space-based elements tied
together through different communication paths or links. US Fig. 1524.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Critical Mission Ops Systems - AFSCN, DSN, TDRS
‣ To manage 450+ contacts per day with 140+
operational satellites the USAF relies on the Air
Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN), a series of
tracking sites around the world.
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‣ To link with spacecraft beyond Earth orbit, NASA
relies on the Deep Space Network (DSN) consisting
of three complexes controlled and monitored by the
Network Operations Control Team (NOCT) at the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, CA
•
.
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.
Complexes are spaced evenly around the globe to ensure
continuous coverage of satellites anywhere in the solar
system
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Opportunities:
Orbits and Operations
World-wide AFSCN Locations.
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
TDRS
‣ Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) is a type of
relay satellite, that forms part of the Tracking and
Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS)
•
A network of 8 satellites in geostationary orbit used by
NASA and other US government agencies as a spacebased communication architecture
•
Relays data from space systems in low-Earth orbit such
as the Space Shuttle and the ISS to operations centers
‣ There are multiple commercial networks as well
World-wide DSN Locations.
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
Space Operations Activities
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‣ Operations Planning
.
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‣ Flight Control
‣ Mission Data
Receipt/Delivery
.
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‣ Tracking and Navigation
‣ Spacecraft Support and
Analysis
‣ Maintenance and Support
‣ Training
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‣ Mission Data Processing and
Archiving
‣ Customer/User Support
Opportunities:
Orbits and Operations
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
US Fig. 15-32.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Mission Data Receipt and Delivery/Data Processing/
User and Customer Support
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‣ The only reason we fly space missions is to generate
data or otherwise serve the users who pay the bills!
‣ Collect, analyze and distribute mission data to users
‣ Analyzing and archiving spacecraft engineering data
.
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‣ Space missions exist to support users and customers.
• Principal investigators are the scientists designated
to analyze and publish the results of data collected by
science payloads.
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Opportunities:
Orbits and Operations
Data Generators. NASA’s Aqua satellite is part of
the “A-Train,” which consists of a coordinated group
of satellites flying in formation around the globe.
Aqua and its sister satellites generate many
hundreds of megabits of data each day that needs
to find its way to operators and users. (Courtesy of
NASA). US Fig 15-40.
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
Engineering Data. Analysis
of engineering data provides
insight into the health and
status of the spacecraft.
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
Key Space Operations Trade-offs
.
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‣ Ground station staffing
‣ Anomaly response
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‣ State-of-health monitoring
‣ New or existing
hardware/software
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‣ Spacecraft autonomy
‣ Ground station automation
Spacecraft Autonomy.
Due to its great distance
from Earth real-time
control wasn’t possible so
the Cassini spacecraft at
Saturn required a high
degree of autonomy.
(Courtesy NASA)
Ground Staffing. People
are expensive. Maintaining
a large staff of operators
24/7/365 represents a
large mission investment.
The fewer operators
needed, the less expensive
the mission. (Courtesy
USAF)
Opportunities:
Orbits and Operations
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Review - Space Operations
‣ The Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes how we plan to use the system to fulfill the mission.
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‣ Mission operations systems include the facilities and infrastructure to design, assemble, integrate, test,
launch, and operate a space mission
Opportunities:
Orbits and Operations
‣ The AFSCN, DSN and other assets represent key mission operations systems that drive the mission ConOps
‣ Space operations tasks include:
• Operations Planning
• Flight Control, Training
• Mission Data Receipt/Delivery
• Tracking and Navigation
• Spacecraft Support and Analysis
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• Maintenance and Support
.
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.
• Mission Data Processing and Archiving, Customer/User Support
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
‣ Key mission operations trade-offs include:
• Spacecraft autonomy
• Ground station automation
• Ground station staffing
• Anomaly response
• State-of-health monitoring
• New or existing hardware/software
US Fig. 15-32.
Key Take-Aways—Through a CyberSpace Lens
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
.
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‣ Orbital mechanics inherently limit access to space
systems from specific geographical locations
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‣ Getting into orbit is hard
‣ Ground-based mission operations activities provide
multiple attack surfaces (equipment and people)
‣Getting to Orbit
‣Standard Orbits
and Ground
Tracks
‣Mission
Operations
Systems
‣Mission
Operations
Activities
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Notes
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Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
Notes
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Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Threats—Natural and Human
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‣ Objectives - At the end of this lesson you
should be able to...
•
•
•
•
.
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.
Know where space is and how it’s defined
List and describe the major hazards of the
space environment and describe their
effects on spacecraft
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Discuss potential malicious threats to
spacecraft and ground infrastructure
‣ References
US Chapter 3
Threats:
Natural and Human
‣Background
‣Cosmic
Perspective
‣Space
Environment
Threats
‣Human Threats
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
Motivation: Why Worry about the Space Environment?
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‣ Approximately 25% of all spacecraft anomalies are related to the space
environment. Famous examples include:
• 2014: The radiation storm on Sep. 1 is likely responsible for the star tracker
•
reset on both STEREO A and STEREO B* (within 16 minutes of each other), IMU
was triggered to power on (normally off).
2014: X1.6 flare and accompanying CME is likely the cause for the Dawn
anomaly on 2014-09-11 – delayed the start of the first science orbit at Ceres by
about a month.
.
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• 2010: Control of Galaxy 15 lost due to electrostatic discharge cause by solar
•
Threats:
Natural and Human
flare. Satellite drifted through crowded GEO belt in full send and receive mode
2009: Iridium satellite destroyed when it collided with the dead Cosmos 2251
satellite (space debris)
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Warning- Traffic Hazard!. Iridium
Collision with Cosmos 2251
• 2000: Boeing 702 satellite (Anik F-1): degraded solar array performance due to
•
outgassing induced fogging
2000: Stardust comet flyby spacecraft blinded and sent into safe mode by a
solar flare
Caution - Solar Flare.
Stardust spacecraft
was blinded by a solar
flare
‣Background
‣Cosmic
Perspective
‣Space
Environment
Threats
‣Human Threats
• 1994: Telsat Canada’s Anik E-1 and E-2 suddenly began to spin out of control due
to spacecraft charging
• 1990: High energy charged particles caused bit flips in HST fine guidance
system electronics (FGS) passing through the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA)
causing guide star acquisition failures. Subsequently, FGS use was suspended in
the SAA.
• 1979: Increased solar activity heated the outer layers of the Earth's atmosphere
and thereby increased drag on Skylab, leading to an early reentry.
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
Beware - Outgassing.
Anik F-1 degraded
performance due to
outgassing
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Space is Hard
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Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
Cosmic Perspective
Where is Space? For awarding astronaut wings, NASA defines
space at an altitude of 80 km (50 mi). The Karman Line is placed
at an altitude of 100 km (60 mi) and is recognized by the
Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (FAI) as the beginning of
space. For our purposes, space begins where satellites can
maintain orbit—about 130 km (81 mi). US Fig. 3-2.
.
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Perspective. Imagine if
Earth were the size of
a peach—then the ISS
orbit would be just
above the fuzz. US Fig.
3-3.
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The Solar System in Perspective. If Earth were the size of a baseball, about 100 cm (~4 in) in
diameter, the Moon would be only 28 mm (1 in) in diameter and about 3 m (10 ft) away. At the
same scale the Sun would be a ball 10.9 m (~36 ft) in diameter (about the size and volume of a
small house); it would be more than 1.2 km (about 0.75 mi) away. Again, keeping the same
scale, the dwarf planet Pluto would be about the same size as Earth’sMoon, 19 mm (~0.75 in),
and 46 km (~28.5 mi) away from the house-sized Sun. US Fig. 3-9.
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
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Threats:
Natural and Human
‣Background
‣Cosmic
Perspective
‣Space
Environment
Threats
‣Human Threats
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Effects of the Space Environment
‣ The gravitational environment causes some physiological and fluid management
problems, but provides opportunities for manufacturing
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Threats:
Natural and Human
‣ Earth’s atmosphere affects a spacecraft, even in orbit—primarily through drag
‣ The vacuum in space above the atmosphere gives spacecraft other challenges
‣ Natural and man-made debris in space pose collision hazards
.
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.
‣ Radiation and charged particles can severely damage unprotected spacecraft
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Factors Affecting Spacecraft in the
Space Environment. There are six
challenges unique to the space
environment we deal with—gravity,
the
atmosphere,
vacuum,
micrometeoroids
and
debris,
radiation, and charged particles. US
Fig. 3-13.
‣Background
‣Cosmic
Perspective
‣Space
Environment
Threats
‣Human Threats
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
Atmosphere - Drag and Atomic Oxygen
‣ Earth’s atmosphere affects a spacecraft below about
600 km, in two primary ways:
Structure of Earth’s
Atmosphere. The
density of Earth’s
atmosphere
decreases
exponentially as we go
higher. Even in lowEarth orbit, however,
spacecraft can still
receive the effects of
the atmosphere in the
form of drag. US Fig.
3-16.
• Drag—shortens orbital lifetimes, changes their attitude
• Interaction with atmospheric neutrals—primarily tomic
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• Atmospheric density highly dependent on solar activity and
thus very difficult to model and predict
• Changes order of magnitude from solar minimum to solar
maximum at altitudes from 400 km to 700 km
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oxygen—that degrade spacecraft surfaces and interfere with
sensors
Threats:
Natural and Human
‣Background
‣Cosmic
Perspective
‣Space
Environment
Threats
‣Human Threats
‣ Radiation in the upper atmosphere causes O2 to
dissociate into free oxygen atoms, atomic oxygen or AO
• AO is VERY reactive and potentially damaging to spacecraft
surfaces
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
Solar Cycle. The sun experiences an 11-year cycle
that affects drag in LEO.
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Vacuum Effects
Threats:
‣ Outgassing - the release of trapped gasses and volatiles from
materials over time when exposed to a vacuum or low pressure.
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• Called off-gassing inside a crew compartment.
Natural and Human
• Outgassing products can re-condense on sensitive spacecraft surfaces
.
i
t
s
t
.
‣ Cold-welding - metals fusing together in vacuum
‣ “Tin Whiskers” - crystalline structures of tin that sometimes
grow from surfaces where tin is used as a final finish. Can lead
to short circuits and system failures.
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‣ Heat Transfer - complicated in a vacuum. There are three ways
to move heat:
Vacuum Testing. Spacecraft in a
thermal-vacuum
chamber
to
simulate the effects of the space
environment. US Fig. 3-21.
‣Background
‣Cosmic
Perspective
‣Space
Environment
Threats
‣Human Threats
• Convection - transfer of heat from a liquid or gas medium
• Conduction - transfer of heat through a solid medium
• Radiation - transfer of heat energy through direct Electromagnetic
radiation (infrared, IR)
- Radiation is the primary way heat gets in or out of a spacecraft in a vacuum
Radiators. The massive radiators on
the ISS eject heat from the crew
modules by radiating it into space.
Courtesy NASA.
Micrometeroids and Space Junk: History
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
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Threats:
Natural and Human
.
i
t
s
t
.
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‣Background
‣Cosmic
Perspective
‣Space
Environment
Threats
‣Human Threats
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Micro-meteoroids and Space Junk: How bad is it?
‣ The Air Force Space Control Center tracks about
20,000 man-made objects, baseball sized and
larger, in Earth orbit
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• There are an estimated 40,000 golf-ball sized
.
i
t
s
t
.
objects too small to track, plus millions of smaller
objects
• Chinese Fengyun-1C intercept test created over
1900 debris fragments alone!
‣ In space, chances of getting hit by something big
are small, but chances of getting hit by
something small are bigger and growing
‣ Numerous satellites have been damaged—
CERISE, Space Shuttle, Iridium—or had to
maneuver to dodge debris
‣ National efforts are aimed at decreasing the
amount of debris generated—but no international
laws exist
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Threats:
Natural and Human
‣Background
‣Cosmic
Perspective
‣Space
Environment
Threats
‣Human Threats
Orbital Debris “Box Score.” The Orbital
Debris Quarterly News, Volume 24, Issue 2
April 2020
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EM Radiation Environment
‣ Radiation from the Sun can cause
•
Heating on exposed surfaces—due to
infrared or thermal radiation
•
Prolonged exposure to ultraviolet
radiation can begin to degrade
spacecraft surfaces
•
•
Bursts of radio frequency interference
- Photons impart momentum, ~ 5 N of
force per km 2 of surface
Copyright ©2020 Teaching Science and Technology Inc.
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Threats:
Natural and Human
.
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s
t
.
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Solar pressure, which can change a
spacecraft’s orientation
Solar
Radiation.
The Sun
emits
electromagn
etic energy
over a wide
range of the
spectrum.
‣Background
‣Cosmic
Solar
Perspective
Prominence.
‣Space
NASA’s STEREO
Environment
(Ahead)
Threats
spacecraft
‣Human Threats
captured this
view of the Sun
on Aug. 25,
2010 showing
the action in an
extreme UV
wavelength.The
video clip covers
about 30 hours
of activity
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Charged Particle Sources
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‣ Three primary sources for these
particles are:
.
i
t
s
t
.
• The solar wind and solar particle events
(SPE)
• Galactic cosmic rays (GCRs)
• The Van Allen radiation belts
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The Atom. The nucleus of an atom contains positively
charged protons and neutral neutrons. Around the
nucleus are negatively charged electrons. US Fig. 3-6.
‣ There are two separate effects to
worry about
• Low energy (plasma)
• High energy
Threats:
Natural and Human
Massive Eruptions. SOHO images of the
“Halloween Storm” 2003.
‣Background
‣Cosmic
Perspective
‣Space
Environment
Threats
‣Human Threats
Low Energy (Plasma) Effects
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
t
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Threats:
Natural and Human
‣ Low-energy particles can cause:
•
•
.
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s
t
.
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Arcing (the dominant concern)
Electrostatic Discharge (point-to-point arcing) –
caused by large potential differences
•
•
Dielectric Breakdown (arcing through a material)
•
Re-attraction of contamination: may be significant
in degrading surfaces.
Coronal Mass Ejection (CME).
(Courtesy SOHO/EIT/LASCO)
Arcing generates electromagnetic interference
(EMI) and damages surfaces (damage to solar
arrays and electronics of greatest concern)
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‣Background
‣Cosmic
Perspective
‣Space
Environment
Threats
‣Human Threats
‣ Significant issues in GEO, less so in LEO
Electrostatic Discharge.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
High Energy Effects
‣ Single Event Phenomena (SEP) – Instantaneous effects due to
a single particle hitting electronics. Examples include:
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• Single Event Upset (SEU): A non-destructive bit flip
• Single Event Latchup (SEL): A potentially destructive high
current
‣ Dose Effects – Long-term, accumulated damage
• Total Ionizing Dose (TID) – Electrostatic changes
- Biological systems: DNA damage
- Semiconductors: Charge trapped in dielectrics alters
performance; eventual circuit failure
- Materials: Darken optics. Loss of mechanical strength (e.g.
embrittle PTFE Teflon)
• Displacement Damage (DD) – Crystalline structure changes
- Decrease minority carrier lifetime in semiconductors
- Decrease efficiency of solar cells, LEDs, and CCDs
- Dark-signal increases in CCDs
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Threats:
.
i
t
s
t
.
Natural and Human
‣ Mitigations
• Spacecraft shielding – offers limited protection
• Use radiation-tolerant electrical components and materials
• Error detection and correction (EDAC) algorithms
Solar Particle Event. This animation depicts the effect of a
solar particle event that arrives at Earth.
Single Event
Upset. High
energy charged
particles
penetrate into
silicon memory
and other
devices causing
immediate
damage.
‣Background
‣Cosmic
Perspective
‣Space
Environment
Threats
‣Human Threats
Teaching Science & Technology Inc.
The Good Old Days….
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ground
010
001
010
link
100
101
010
101
000
011
100
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n
.
i
t
s
t
.
w
downlink
uplink
ground
link
100
011
000
101
0
1
0
101
100
010
001
0
1
0
‣Background
‣Cosmic
Perspective
‣Space
Environment
Threats
‣Human Threats
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
…the New Reality…
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Spoofing
uplink
DDoS = Distributed
Denial of Service.
Examples: Type of
Service (TOS) flood,
Internet of Things
(IoT) botnet attack,
Ping flood
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.
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t
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t
.
ground
link
downlink
Eaves
Dropping
ground
link
‣Background
‣Cosmic
Perspective
‣Space
Environment
Threats
‣Human Threats
0
110
001
100
0
1
0
101
010
010
101
0
0
010
010
001
010
100
101
010
101
000
011
100
Hacking
Denial of Service
Ransomware
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Cyber Security – Space Challenges
‣ Hard to Identify—Some attacks may be indistinguishable from
natural hazards (e.g. Single Event Upsets)
‣ “It can’t happen here” mentality
‣ Conservative, inflexible, slow-changing (non-Agile) culture
- Hardware and software systems in space used to be a ‘walled garden’ –
completely isolated from the internet.
- Procedures and Contracts have slow adoption
• Complacency — Lack of security culture in civilian space
- Commercial Sector
- Science Sector
‣ Security is an after-thought
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.
i
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• Change is measured in years
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‣Background
‣Cosmic
Perspective
‣Space
Environment
Threats
‣Human Threats
• Requirements are identified too late in the SDLC process
• Security is tacked onto the system, not part of the original design
‣ Patching and upgrading existing systems is difficult and expensive
(and some cases impossible) with deployed space systems
Adapted from : José Pizarro – “Back of an envelope of the current civilian space security issues”; June 2019
and
World Global Affairs Council, Colorado Springs, August 2019
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Cyber Security – Space Challenges (cont’d)
‣ The attack surface is increasing at all phases:
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•
Increased reliance on spacecraft autonomy and other software-intense features are requested (= more code required)
•
More stakeholders are involved, e.g. more international missions (= more potential attack vector)
•
Project Managers
•
Software Architects
•
Software Designers
•
Developers
•
Testers
.
i
t
s
t
.
‣ Operating Systems or other integrated software (e.g. database) are outdated
‣Background
‣Cosmic
Perspective
‣Space
Environment
Threats
‣Human Threats
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‣ Removing end-of-life software
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T h is P h o to b y U n kn o w n A u th o r is licen sed u n d er C C B Y -S A
Review - The Space Environment
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‣ For our purposes, space begins at an altitude where a satellite can briefly maintain an orbit.
Thus, space is close. It’s only about 130 km (81 mi) straight up.
.
i
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t
.
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‣ Six major environmental factors affect spacecraft in Earth orbit.
• Gravity - Earth exerts a gravitational pull which keeps spacecraft in orbit. We best
describe the condition of spacecraft and astronauts in orbit as free-fall, because they’re
falling around Earth.
• Atmosphere - Earth’s atmosphere isn’t completely absent in low-Earth orbit. It can cause
drag and exposure to damaging atomic oxygen
• Vacuum - In the vacuum of space, spacecraft can experience: Outgassing, Cold Welding
and Heat Transfer issues
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•
Micrometeoroids and space junk - can damage spacecraft during a high speed impact
•
Radiation - from the Sun, can cause: Heating on exposed surfaces, Damage to electronic
components, disruption in communication, and Solar Pressure causing a change in a
spacecraft’s orientation
•
Charged particles - from solar wind and flares, Galactic cosmic rays (GCRs), and Van Allen
radiation belts cause charging, single event phenomena (SEP) and total dose effects
Threats:
Natural and Human
‣Background
‣Cosmic
Perspective
‣Space
Environment
Threats
‣Human Threats
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Key Take-Aways—Through a CyberSpace Lens
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‣ Space is hard (and it sucks)
‣ The natural environment is a huge threat to space
activities—denying services at random times
.
i
t
s
t
.
‣ Some anomalies due to the natural environment may be
indistinguishable from human attacks
‣Background
‣Cosmic
Perspective
‣Space
Environment
Threats
‣Human Threats
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‣ Relatively minor “hacks” (e.g. causing a spacecraft to
point its sensor at the sun) could have devastating
impacts to operations
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Notes
.
i
t
ts
.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Vulnerabilities—RF and Data Systems
‣ Objectives - At the end of this lesson you should be able to...
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• Describe the inputs, outputs, and fundamental processes within the
spacecraft communication subsystem and how it fits into overall
communication architecture
Vulnerabilities:
RF Systems and
Data Systems
• Explain basic principles of radio frequency (RF) communication and how they
apply to developing link budgets
.
i
t
s
t
.
• Characterize key limitations and trade-offs in communication subsystem
design
• Explain the vital functions performed by the data handling subsystem (DHS)
• Describe how the DHS fits into the overall mission data architecture
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• List and describe the key components of a DHS
‣RF Systems
‣Data Handling
Systems
• Characterize the relative importance of software to each spacecraft
subsystem
• Discuss the challenges and opportunities posed by the increasing reliance on
spacecraft software to perform system functions
• Distinguish the competing design issues faced by the DHS
‣ References
• US Chapter 13.1
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Introduction
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‣ The communication subsystem is the “ears and mouth” of the spacecraft
‣ The communication subsystem sends payload and subsystem information to the ground
station and receives commands in return
.
i
t
ts
‣ It consists of modulators/demodulators (“MODEMs”), transmitters, receivers, and
antennas
• Payload and spacecraft information modulates onto the carrier signal, then is amplified and
broadcast to the ground system through the antenna.
.
w
• The spacecraft collects commands from ground stations (using its antenna), amplifies the signal,
then demodulates it to produce instructions for the rest of the spacecraft.
Communication
Subsystem
Components. The communication
portion of the CDHS consists of
modulators (mod), demodulators
(demod),
transmitters
(TX),
receivers (RX), and antennas. US
Fig. 13-7.
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Vulnerabilities:
RF Systems and
Data Systems
‣RF Systems
‣Data Handling
Systems
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Introduction - Communication Architecture
‣ The communication subsystem works
as part of an overall communication
architecture
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‣ The communication architecture is the
configuration of satellites and ground
station nodes in a space system and
the network that links them together
•
•
•
•
.
i
t
s
t
.
Spacecraft—the in-space element
Ground stations—Earth-based antennas,
transmitters, and receivers
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Vulnerabilities:
RF Systems and
Data Systems
‣RF Systems
‣Data Handling
Systems
Control center—Controls the spacecraft
and all other elements in the network
Relay satellites—additional spacecraft that
link the primary spacecraft with ground
stations
‣ Communication subsystems create all
of the links between these nodes
Communication Architecture. A communication architecture
for space missions consists of ground- and space-based
elements tied together through different communication paths
or links. US Fig. 15-24.
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Delivering the Message - RF Communication Basics
‣ Radio Frequency (RF) Communication is
the process of modulating an information
signal onto a carrier signal and then
retrieving that information at the receiver
•
‣ For RF communication, we “cut the string”
and use a radio frequency carrier signal in
its place
•
•
.
w
Basic Communication. Two cans and a string
provide an example of RF communication with
the string taking the place of the carrier signal.
US Fig. 13-4.
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For example, by laying the message signal
(00101100) onto the carrier frequency, we
can see a crude representation of pulse
amplitude modulation in the figure shown here
By changing, the pulse width (like Morse code),
frequency, and other parameters of the
carrier frequency, we have a wide variety of
coding techniques available in addition to
simple AM
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.
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Like 2 cans and a string
Vulnerabilities:
RF Systems and
Data Systems
‣RF Systems
‣Data Handling
Systems
Amplitude Modulation. This example provides a crude
representation of pulse amplitude modulation. US Fig.
13-21.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Key Issues
‣ In every day communication, to be heard and
understood we must focus on five key issues:
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‣ Distance
• It takes more energy to communicate over
longer distances
‣ Speed
.
i
t
s
t
.
• Receiver must be able to process the information
as fast as it’s being sent
• This is defined by the data rate
‣ Carrier Frequency
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• Sound must be within the range of human
hearing
• The “Mosquito” ringtone on cell phones cannot be
heard by most adults
‣ Language
Vulnerabilities:
RF Systems and
Data Systems
‣RF Systems
Can You Hear Me Now? For a listener to hear and understand
you, five things are important: language, distance, carrier ‣Data Handling
frequency, data rate and environment. US Fig. 13-3.
Systems
• Transmitter (speaker) and Receiver (listener)
must find a common language
‣ Environment
In an analog sense, to be heard and understood, your
signal, S, must be greater than the noise, N
• Too much background noise can swamp the
signal being sent (loud room)
S/N > 1
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Delivering the Message - Link Budgets
‣ The link budget accounts for the data rate and other factors that
contribute to the basic ability for the spacecraft and ground system
to communicate effectively.
‣ The five key issues are still as important:
• Distance - Characterized as Space Losses
• Language - Characterized by Modulation method (e.g. AM or FM)
• Speed - Defined to be the Data Rate
• Environment - Which produces Noise
• Carrier Frequency - Regulated and controlled at the national and
international level
‣ Since we’re dealing with binary rather than analog communication,
the primary figure-of-merit for a digital data link is:
• Eb/No (“eb-no”) = the ratio of the received energy per bit (Eb) to noise
density (No) ratio
• Where a given minimum Eb/No is required for effective communication
depending on modulation method used (“language”)
‣ Eb/No can be found using Friis’ Equation shown here derived in
1945 by Danish-American radio engineer Harald T. Friis at Bell Labs.
‣ Link Budget analysis helps us determine if there is enough energy in
each bit we send so that the receiver can distinguish between a “1”
and a “0” in the presence of background noise
.
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Can You Hear Me Now? For effective RF communication, five
things are still important: distance (space losses), language
(modulation), speed (data rate), environment (noise), and
carrier frequency. US Fig. 13-11.
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n
.
i
t
ts
Where:
Pt = transmitter power
Gt = transmit antenna gain
Ll = transmitter-to-antenna line loss
Ls = space loss
La = atmospheric loss
Gr = receive antenna gain
k = Boltzmann's constant
Ts = receiver system noise temperature
R = data rate
[EIRP] = P Ll Gt = Effective Isotropic Radiated Power
= transmitter figure-of-merit
Gr / Ts= receiver figure-of-merit
Vulnerabilities:
RF Systems and
Data Systems
‣RF Systems
‣Data Handling
Systems
All space links are encrypted by various means
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Design Issues - Limitations
‣ Physical Limits—Atmospheric windows
place physical limitations on which
frequencies can pass through the
atmosphere.
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.
i
t
s
t
.
‣ Technical Limits—such as antenna size,
available power, data transmission rate,
available technology and other
spacecraft and ground system
specifications constrain the range of
frequencies that we can use for a given
mission.
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Vulnerabilities:
RF Systems and
Data Systems
Crippled Antenna. When the high gain antenna on NASA’s
Galileo spacecraft bound for Jupiter failed to open, they had to
conduct the entire mission using the low gain antenna at a
much lower data rate. Courtesy NASA.
‣RF Systems
‣ Legal Limits—National and international
licensing of spacecraft frequencies by the
International Telecommunications Union
(ITU) and the World Administrative Radio
Conference (WARC) regulate what
frequencies can be used.
‣Data Handling
Systems
Atmospheric Windows. Earth’s atmosphere is selectively
transparent to different wavelengths of EM radiation. To
communicate through the atmosphere you need to use a
wavelength that will get through. US Fig. 12-7.
Trade-offs
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‣ Communication subsystem designers have a range of options for increasing the chance
of being heard (greater Eb/No) but each option comes with its own constraints.
.
i
t
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‣ These trade-offs are summarized here
To increase the chance of being heard you
could...
But You’re Constrained by...
Talk Louder - Increase Transmitter Power (Pt)
⇆
Use a “Megaphone” - Increase Transmitter Gain (Gt)
⇆
Get Closer - Decrease Space Losses (Ls)
⇆
.
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Available Spacecraft Power
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Limit for Onboard Antenna Size
Required Mission Orbit
Listen with “Bigger Ears” - Increase Receiver Gain (Gr)
⇆
Talk Slower - Reduce the Data Rate
⇆
Technology, Time Available to Transmit All Data
⇆
Technology, Existing Ground Stations
⇆
Technology, Frequency Allocation
SHUT UP! - Reduce Environmental Noise
Use higher carrier frequencies
Size of Existing Ground Stations
Vulnerabilities:
RF Systems and
Data Systems
‣RF Systems
‣Data Handling
Systems
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Review - Communications
‣ The communication subsystem is the “ears and mouth” of the spacecraft
• Sends payload and subsystem information to the ground station and receives commands in return
Vulnerabilities:
• Consists of modulators/demodulators (“MODEMs”), transmitters, receivers, and antennas
RF Systems and
‣ The communication subsystem works as part of an overall communication architecture
Data Systems
• The communication architecture is the configuration of satellites and ground station nodes in a space system and the
network that links them together
• Communication subsystems create all of the links between these nodes
‣ Radio Frequency (RF) Communication is the process of modulating an information signal onto a carrier signal and then
retrieving that information at the receiver
‣ The link budget accounts for the data rate and other factors that contribute to the basic ability for the spacecraft and
ground system to communicate effectively. Five key issues are important:
• Distance - Characterized as Space Losses
‣RF Systems
• Language - Characterized by Modulation method (e.g. AM or FM)
• Speed - Defined to be the Data Rate
‣Data Handling
• Environment - Which produces Noise
Systems
• Carrier Frequency - Regulated and controlled at the national and international level
‣ Link Budget analysis helps us determine if there is enough energy in each bit we send so that the receiver can
distinguish between a “1” and a “0” in the presence of background noise
‣ Key limitations in communication subsystem design include:
• Physical limits
• Technical limits
• Legal limits
‣ System design must manage a variety of trade-offs to best ensure the message gets through
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.
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t
.
Introduction - Purpose
‣ The data handling subsystem (DHS) acts as the “brains” of
the spacecraft
‣ Its purpose is to manage, store and control all ground
commands, payload data and telemetry during every phase of
the mission
‣ The DHS “to-do” list reads like this:
telemetry for transmission to the ground in real and near-real time
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• Receive and process all payload data
• Autonomously Boot up and Self-test
• Detect & correct errors (inherent or environmentally induced), and
go into a safe mode if necessary
.
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• Respond to ground commands
• Collect, process, store and format subsystem health & status
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Data Handling. The data handling
portion of the CDHS is the “brains” of
the spacecraft with a long “to-do” list.
Vulnerabilities:
RF Systems and
Data Systems
‣RF Systems
‣Data Handling
Systems
• Control attitude, orbit, temperature, power and every other process
onboard the spacecraft
• Allow for on-orbit corrections, updates and upgrades to functionality
‣ And do all of this while operating in the harsh space
environment
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Data Architecture
‣ The DHS is one part of an integrated mission data architecture that involves both ground
and space data systems
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‣ Recall, the whole purpose of virtually all space missions is to generate or transfer data.
We’re in the data business!
Vulnerabilities:
RF Systems and
Data Systems
.
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t
.
‣ DHS interface to the ground data architecture is via the communication subsystem
• These two systems are so tightly coupled that they are sometimes lumped together as the
Communication and Data Handling Subsystem (CDHS) which together act as the spacecraft’s
“ears,” “brain,” and “mouth.”
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Data Architecture. The Data
Handing Subsystem is the key
link in the complex “data chain”
that ultimately delivers payload
data to users, processes
onboard commands, and sends
health and status telemetry
(TLM) to operators. US Fig. 132.
‣RF Systems
‣Data Handling
Systems
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What’s in the DHS?
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‣ The data handling subsystem (DHS) consists of:
• Central Processing Unit (CPU) - Where the “thinking” takes place
- Based on terrestrial computers, but constrained by the radiation
.
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ts
environment
- Usually several generations behind ground computers in capability
• Memory - RAM, ROM and other solid state memory devices store
.
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the operating system, application programs, health and status
telemetry data as well as payload data
- Data storage has become basically “free” as terabits can now be
readily stored onboard even small satellites.
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• Input/Output - Data lines that interface to sensors and other
subsystems
- Typically based on some standard (e.g. MilStd-1553 or Space Wire)
• Other Components
- Transducers to sense temperature, pressure, etc.
- Field-programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs)
- Application-specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs)
• Software - To execute all key functions
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Data Handling. The data handling
subsystem components. US Fig. 13-13.
Vulnerabilities:
RF Systems and
Data Systems
‣RF Systems
‣Data Handling
Systems
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Spacecraft Software
Flying Software. Spacecraft
have become “flying software”
in the sense that every single
subsystem depends, at least
to some extent, on software
to perform its functions. US
Fig. 13-15.
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Vulnerabilities:
RF Systems and
Data Systems
‣RF Systems
‣Data Handling
Systems
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Software Growth
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‣ The amount of software in space and every-day systems has exploded over the last decade!
‣ Spacecraft software development essentially never ends throughout the mission life
• A 2x growth in software from launch to end of mission is common
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‣ Even your car probably has nearly 100 million lines of code!
‣ The more we depend on software for every conceivable spacecraft function, the more likely we’ll experience
software-related failures
‣ As space system software reaches millions of lines of code, it becomes practically impossible to fully test before
launch (or ever) - a sobering thought
Software Explosion. This graph shows the
exponential increase in software for NASA
planetary missions, from Mariner-6 in 1969
to the Mars Science Lab in 2013. Note the
scale is logarithmic. (Adapted from NASA
Study
Flight
Software
Complexity,
10/09/2008). US Fig. 13-16.
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Vulnerabilities:
RF Systems and
Data Systems
‣RF Systems
‣Data Handling
Systems
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Software Failures
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‣ What Happened?
• Upon arrival at Mars in September 1999, the Mars
Climate Orbiter (MCO) began a scheduled 16-minute Mars
orbit insertion (MOI) maneuver to achieve orbit
Vulnerabilities:
RF Systems and
Data Systems
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• Approximately 49 seconds before the anticipated
occultation by Mars, communication was lost and never
reestablished
• The cumulative effect of these small impulses led to a 169
km navigation error, which was catastrophic to the mission
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‣ Root Causes:
‣RF Systems
• Root cause of mission loss was an error in the “Sm_forces”
program output files, which were delivered to the navigation ‣Data Handling
team in English units (pounds-force seconds) instead of the
Systems
specified metric units (Newton-seconds).
• The "Sm_forces" software was misclassified as non-mission
critical, which reduced the rigor of the review program.
Death Dive. Did You Mean Pounds or Newtons?
Courtesy AGI.
• The Software Management and Development Plan (SMDP)
was not followed in the walkthroughs of the "Sm_forces"
software
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Design Issues
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‣ Mission needs
• How smart does the satellite need to be? - Level of autonomy
‣ Spacecraft needs
• What needs to get done? - Number and type of data handling
tasks
• Where will it get done? - Overall complexity and distribution of
data handling tasks
- Implement Onboard vs. On the Ground
- Implement in Hardware vs. Software
- Implement in Software vs. Firmware
single event phenomena
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• How tough? - Level of radiation tolerance needed to survive
‣ Developer Needs
• How to build it? - Language, development environment and
tools
• How to test it? - Integrated hardware-in-the-loop test beds
‣ Operational Needs - “-ilities,” e.g. flexibility, maintainability
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Vulnerabilities:
RF Systems and
Data Systems
‣RF Systems
‣Data Handling
Systems
DHS Design Issues. The design of the data
handling subsystem hinges on how we
address a number of mission, spacecraft,
developer and operator needs.
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Review - Data Handling
‣ The data handling subsystem (DHS) acts as the “brains” of the spacecraft. Its purpose is to manage, store and
control all ground commands, payload data and telemetry during every phase of the mission. It needs to:
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Respond to ground commands
Collect, process, store and format subsystem telemetry and payload data
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Autonomously Boot up and Self-test, Detect & Correct Errors and go into a Safe Mode if necessary
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Control attitude, orbit, temperature, power and every other process onboard the spacecraft
Allow for on-orbit corrections, updates and upgrades to functionality
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Vulnerabilities:
RF Systems and
Data Systems
‣ The DHS is one part of an integrated mission data architecture that involves both ground and space data systems
‣ The DHS consists of:
• Central Processing Unit (CPU) - Where the “thinking” takes place
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Memory - RAM, ROM and other solid state memory devices store the operating system, application programs,
health and status telemetry data as well as payload data
•
Data storage has become basically “free” as terabits can now be readily stored onboard even small satellites
•
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Input/Output - Data lines that interface to sensors and other subsystems
Other Components such as transducers, FPGAs and ASICs
•
Software - To execute all key functions
‣RF Systems
‣Data Handling
Systems
‣ Software drives all data handling functions - Spacecraft have become “flying software”
• The amount and complexity of software in space systems (and terrestrial systems for that matter) is exploding
•
The more we depend on software, the more likely software will contribute to failures
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Key Take-Aways—Through a CyberSpace Lens
‣ RF security still a niche sub-field of cyber-security
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‣ Hardware/software vendors, developments
environments, legacy languages create additional
vulnerabilities
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‣ Access to RF equipment (Rx, Tx) is relatively easy, but
everyone’s links are encrypted
Vulnerabilities:
RF Systems and
Data Systems
‣RF Systems
‣Data Handling
Systems
‣ The more space relies on software, the more
stakeholders are involved, the more people there are
working on the project, the higher the vulnerability
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Cyber Challenge Scenario
‣ Background:
•
YLee Imaging has been operating a high resolution commercial remote sensing satellite for about 2 years.
The U.S. Government is one of their largest customers.
•
The satellite is in a 710 km Sun-syncronous orbit with a 10:33 am southbound nodal crossing time
•
YLee operates their own ground station in Colorado but leases access to ground stations in Norway and
Alaska.
•
The satellite was built by Acme Aerospace in Iowa. Two more satellites are currently in final development for
launch next year.
‣ Issue
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During the last two passes (1 over Norway, 1 over Colorado) YLee operators noticed bad headers on
roughly 10% of the spacecraft health and status telemetry data packets (no problems noted with payload
data downloads). This is about 1000 worse than would normally be expected based on the link budget.
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‣ Challenge Questions
1.How would you determine if this issue was due to natural or man-made causes?
2.What would be potential reasons for natural causes?
3.Assuming the issue is due to malicious causes, what opportunities would a bad actor have?
4.Assuming the issue is due to malicious causes, what vulnerabilities could have been exploited?
5.Given there are two more satellites in development, what design or operational changes could be considered
to prevent future issues of this type?
Course Trajectory Review
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✦ Course
✦ Context
‣
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The Space Mission
Architecture
Understanding Space
✦ Opportunities
‣
Understanding Orbits
‣
Space Mission Operations
✦ Threats
‣
The Space Environment
‣
The Human Environment
✦ Vulnerabilities
‣
RF Systems
‣
Space Data Architectures
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Threats—Natural & Human
Introduction
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Through a Cyber Lens
Vulnerabilities—RF Systems &
Data Architectures
Opportunities—Orbits &
Operations
Course Introduction
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Context
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Course Objectives Review
✦At
the end of this course you should be able to…
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‣ Gain Core Space Knowledge
• Describe the Space Mission Architecture, the context for all
space activities
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‣ Comprehend space mission Capabilities, Trade-offs and
Limitations specific to the cyber-security domain
• Explain how orbital mechanics and operational architectures
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constrain access to space systems
‣ Discuss natural and human-made threats to space systems
Apply Space Concepts
Understand Threats
Comprehend Capabilities
and Limitations
Gain Core Space Knowledge
Learning Trajectory. Throughout the course we’ll
build your core space knowledge so you tackle
ever more challenging space problems in the
cyber-security domain.
• Describe potential vulnerabilities to space systems through
communications links and data architectures
‣ Apply Cyber/Space Concepts to real-world scenarios
Course Introduction
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Thank you for your time and attention!
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Please visit us at: www.tsti.net
Course Introduction
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Understanding Space Through a Cyber-Security Lens
Notes
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Course Introduction
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Notes
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Course Introduction
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