Article 15 – Nationality Theory
Van Dorn v. Romillo (1985)
Facts:
• Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States. They were married in Hongkong and established their residence in the
Philippines where they had 2 children.
• They got divorced in Nevada, United States on the ground of incompatibility of
understanding. The divorce agreement included the following:
o That there is no community property to be adjudicated by court
o That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by court
• Private respondent contends that petitioner's business (The Galleon Shop) is
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property
o In the first trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the private
respondent. • Hence, this petition contesting the previous judgment rendered in
favor of the private respondent.
o Petitioner contends that the private respondent is estopped from laying
claims on any of her property since the divorce is binding on him.
o Private respondent contends that the divorce decree obtained in Nevada
cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and that acts and
declarations made by a foreign Court cannot divest Philippine Courts of
Jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
Issues:
• What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines?
Rulings:
• Petition is granted.
o Pursuant to the Private Respondent’s foreign law, the divorce is valid and
binding, thus he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. Private
respondent, therefore, has no standing to sue the petitioner to exercise
control over the alleged conjugal assets.
o Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. To wit,
the alien is bound by the divorce decree he obtained from the foreign
country. He could not assert any claim over the petitioner’s property.
Application:
• My interpretation:
o Although divorce obtained by a Philippine national abroad is not valid in
the Philippines owing to the fact she is covered by the Nationality Principle,
said divorce is binding on the private respondent, the ALIEN, as he is covered
by the laws of the foreign country to which is a citizen.
o To assert that the petitioner should still be considered married and be
obliged to fulfill her marital duties would be a discrimination against her in
her own country.
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera (1989)
Facts:
• Petitioner, a Filipino citizen, married the private respondent, a German National, in
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for
some time in Malate, Manila with their only child.
• Marital discord set in, and after 3 and a half years of marriage, the private respondent
initiated a divorce proceeding (on 1983) against petitioner in Germany on the grounds of
Failure of Marriage. The Republic of Germany subsequently promulgated a decree of
divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was
granted to petitioner.
• Petitioner also filed an action for legal separation, support, and separation of property.
• A few months after the issuance of the divorce degree from Germany, the private
respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery and alleged that while still married to said
respondent, the petitioner had affairs with 2 men, William Chia and Jesus Chua.
Issues:
• WON it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the
marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be existing at the time of
institution of the action of the former in filing the adultery case?
Rulings:
• Yes. The status of the offended party vis-à-vis the accused must be determined as of the
time the complaint has been filed. Therefore, the offended spouse who initiates the
adultery case must be currently married to the accused spouse at the time of filing the
complaint. (ART 344 OF RPC)
o In view of the Nationality Principle, the divorce decree and its legal effects may
be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned.
o Thus, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no
legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
o The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from
each other.
o American Jurisprudence provides: “…after a divorce has been decreed, the offended party
no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders xxx
When proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted
can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.”
o
Recio v. Recio (2001)
Facts:
• Respondent was first married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal.
They lived together as husband and wife in Australia and on 1989, a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
• A few years after the alleged dissolution of his 1st marriage, respondent became an
Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the
Australian government. He then got married to the petitioner, Grace Garcia-Recio, in
Cabanatuan City.
• A few years after their marriage, petitioner and respondent lived separately without
prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
• Petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy. She claimed that she learned of respondent's first marriage after their
wedding.
• Respondent averred that he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had
been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia thus, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner.
• RULING OF RTC: The first marriage was declared dissolved on the ground that the
divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. The Australian
divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or
annual.
• Hence, this petition. Issues are to be enumerated in the next section.
Issues:
• WON the divorce between the respondent and his Australian wife was
proven.
• WON the respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner.
Rulings
• Issue #1: Yes.
o Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity
to the foreign law allowing it. Since the divorce was a defense raised by
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it
falls squarely upon him.
o A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal
of a foreign country. The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.
However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned
rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
o Divorce decree of first marriage was duly submitted and was admitted in
evidence. Petitioner failed to properly object.
o Moreover, petitioner contends that before a divorce decree can be admitted
in evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements under
Articles 11, 13, and 52 of the Family Code.
▪ Courts ruled that compliance with the Family Code is no longer
necessary since the defendant already acquired an Australian
Citizenship.
• Issue #2: No. We cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner.
o To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned.
o Australian divorce decree provides: “A party to a marriage who marries again
before this decree becomes absolute commits the offence of bigamy.”
o Respondent however, merely submitted an interlocutory decree (a conditional
or provisional judgment of divorce). This does not absolutely establish his
legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Quita v. CA
Facts:
• FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines were not =
however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured.
Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. After the
divorce, she remarried Felix Tupaz, got divorced again, and then subsequently married
a Wernimont.
• Arturo Padlan died intestate. Initially, there was an attempt for the issuance of letters of
administration for the settlement of the deceased’s estate. However, Respondent
Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of the deceased and the 6 children
opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba,
which was resolved in favor of the latter.
• Furthermore, Ruperto T. Padlan also claimed to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.
• What transpired in the lower courts?
o The petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent
and the distribution of his estate.
o Private respondent and 6 children & Ruperto T. Padlan failed to appear despite
due notice. The trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the
Padlan children. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents
being submitted.
o Ruling of the Lower Courts:
▪ Declared the divorce decree obtained abroad as null and void in
Philippine Jurisdiction.
▪ On the other hand, the lower courts opined that there was no showing
that marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much
less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been
acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her.
▪ Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo.
• What transpired in the Court of Appeals?
o The rulings of the lower courts were dismissed.
o The lower courts erred because the case was decided without a hearing. Rule of
Courts provide that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
• Hence, the present petition.
Issues:
• Petitioner contends that there is no need to remand the case back to the lower
courts for further proceedings to ascertain whether or not she is indeed a surviving
spouse.
Rulings:
• Issue #1: DENIED.
o If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
o There is no doubt that the children of the deceased, except for 1 whose last
name was Padlan, are the lawful heirs of the deceased. The issue now is
whether or not the petitioner is indeed the surviving spouse of the deceased.
o Why is there a need to prove if whether or not the petitioner is the
surviving spouse? ▪ This is because there is an ongoing dispute as to her
nationality. The private respondent contended that if it would be proven
that the petitioner has already relinquished her Filipino Citizenship, the
divorce decree obtained abroad would now be validated, following the
Nationality Principle.
▪ Currently, the doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino
citizen when their divorce was decreed. Once proved that she was
no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn
would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her
right to inherit from Arturo.
▪ It has already been concluded that the private respondent will never
inherit since the alleged marriage she contracted with the deceased
took place prior to the divorce decree obtained abroad.
Elmar Perez v. CA
Facts:
• Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice – once in
Manila and the other in Quezon City. Their had 4 children. They encountered
marital problems and they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican
Republic.
o What happened in the RTC-Makati?
▪ The private respondents filed a joint petition for dissolution of conjugal
partnership with the Regional Trial Court of Makati and such RTC affirmed.
• Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
States and both lived as husband and wife and such union produced 1
offspring.
• During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the
court in the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan
and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan
was deemed void under Philippine law. Tristan assured her that he would legalize
their union after he obtains an annulment of his marriage with Lily
o What happened in RTC-Quezon City?
▪ Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Lily. ▪ Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention with
and claimed that she has a legal interest in the matter in litigation.
The courts affirmed.
o What happened in the Court of Appeals?
▪ Tristan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals seeking to annul the RTC’s decision of allowing petitioner to
intervene.
▪ Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared as null and void the
motion for leave to file an intervention.
• Hence, this petition.
Issues:
• Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals should have allowed her to
intervene she alleges that she has a legal interest in the annulment case
between Tristan and Lily.
Rulings:
• DISMISSED.
o Firstly, the Courts said that legal interest which entitles a person to intervene
must be direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain
or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Interest must
be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and expectant.
▪ The petitioner claims that she has legal interest owing to the fact that
she is the present wife of Tristan.
▪ To this, the Courts said that she was never the legal wife of Tristan,
hence she has no legal interest.
▪ When petitioner and Tristan married, Tristan was still lawfully
married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained
from the Dominican
Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them.
▪ Application of the Nationality Principle. It is basic that laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married
here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce
from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute
divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.
ARTICLE 16. LEX SITUS
Ruling:
Orion vs. Suzuki (GR. No. 205487; 2014)
Facts:
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Petitioner – Savings bank
Respondent – buyer of Condominium and parking lot in Mandaluyong;
Japanese National
Yung Sam Kang – seller; Korean National
Timeline:
o Aug 26, 2003 – Suzuki and Kang executed Deed of Absolute
Sale, soon after Suzuki took possession of the properties
o Kang failed to deliver the title of the properties which are in
possession of Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer, and Kang left the
country
o Sept. 8, 2003 – Suzuki executed Affidavit of Adverse Claim
(AAC) to Registry of Deeds and demanded delivery of the titles
o Orion refused delivery
o Oct. 14, 2003 – Orion claimed Kang executed Dacion en Pago
in favor of Orion dated Feb 2, 2003 for failure to pay loan of
P1,800,000
o Oct. 15, 2003 – Orion notarized the said Dacion en Pago
o Jan. 27, 2004 – Suzuki filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against Kang and Orion
o RTC and CA ruling in favor of SUZUKI
o Orion filed a petition for review on certiorari
Issue:

W/N the Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki null and void
under the Korean Law since consent of Kang and his spouse was not
obtained when said sale was executed.

Deed of Absolute Sale is VALID. Philippine Law governs transfer of
real property (Art. 16 of Civil Code) because the property is located in
Mandaluyong, Philippines. It is a universal principle that real or
immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or
state where it is located.
o Reason – nature of immovable property – its immobility.
Immovables are part of the country and that all rights over them
have their natural center of gravity there.
o All matters concerning the title and disposition of real property
are determined by lex loci rei sitai ("law of the place where the
property is situated")
o This principle governs the capacity of the person making a deed
relating to immovable property, no matter what its nature be.
o Petitioner failed to prove as a fact that Korean law must govern.
Certification from Embassy of Korea to prove existence of such
Korean Law was insufficient for there is no authenticated seal in
the said document. Moreover, Kang is the only registered owner
of the said property. Thus, processual presumption comes into
play.
[G.R. No. 133743]
[Edgar San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis]
[G.R. No. 134029]
[Rodolfo San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis]
[February 6, 2007]
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[YNARES-SANTIAGO, J]
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FACTS
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Felicisimo contracted three marriages.
 First Marriage 1942-1963: Virgina Sulit- were born six children,
namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. (Virgina died
August 11, 1963)
 Second Marriage 1968-1971: Merry Lee Corwin- was born a son
named Tobias. Merry Lee Corwin is an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce on October 15-1971. Divorce was granted in
1973.
 Third Marriage 1974: Felicidad San Luis: married in Los Angeles
California: No children
Felicisimo lived with respondent for 18 years from the time of their marriage until
his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters
of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
Rodolfo San Luis filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure
to state a cause of action
Petitioner’s Allegations
 Petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior
to his death
 Respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was
only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was
still legally married to Merry Lee
Respondent’s Defense
 Although Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna,
he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang
 She presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved
RTC Ruling- in favor of Petitioner
trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration
It held that the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and
not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.
Court of Appeals Ruling-in favor of respondent
 reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court
 of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceeding.
Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorar
ISSUES
1. Whether or Not venue was properly laid
2. Whether or Not a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry
under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on
June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
3. Whether or Not respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration
RULINGS
1) Whether or Not venue was properly laid
SC HELD: We find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate
DOCTRINE: This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which
it is employed. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make
it one’s domicile. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence
or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may
have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
2. Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the
Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974,
or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
SC HELD: The Van Dorn ruling applies. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino
spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. Therefore, this case should be
remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo
DOCTRINE: Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released
from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served
3) Whether the respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration
SC HELD: We find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for
letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition
for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and
must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct,
and not merely indirect or contingent
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Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation thus, she may be considered as a co-owner
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
[G.R. No. 171914]
[Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna]
[July 23, 2014]
[YNARES-SANTIAGO, J]
FACTS

Atty Luna’s First Marriage- Eugenia Zaballero-Luna. They had 7 children.
In November 12, 1975, they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership of property
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with
EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the
Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic
Atty Luna’s Second Marriage: SOLEDAD- contracted in Sto. Domigo Dominican
Republic.
in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm called (LUPSICON)
In 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma
Condominium Project
In 1992 LUPSICON was dissolved. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA
over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the
lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z.
Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage
The petitioner alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of
the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since
they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death
of ATTY. LUNA
Rulings of RTC
 SOLEDAD has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit.
 The heirs of Luna are declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris.
Ruling of CA
 The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit adjudged to
defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(first marriage),
 Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other
concept over the condominium unit
 Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia ZaballeroLuna(first marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus
Juris
ISSUES
1. Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had
validly dissolved the first marriage.
2. Whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner
entitled SOLEDAD to any rights in property
3. Who among the contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indiviso share
in the condominium unit; and to the law books?
[G.R. No. 188289; 2014]
[DAVID A. NOVERAS v. LETICIA T. NOVERAS]
RULING OF SC
1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with EUGENIA (FIRST WIFE) subsisted up to the time of his death
RATIONALE: Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by
virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty.
Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage. Thus, the divorce, even if voluntarily
obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia because
DIVORCE is not allowed in the Philippines.
DOCTRINE: NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement was void for lack of court approval
RATIONALE: The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did
not per se dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval
of the Agreement by a competent court was still required under Article 190 and
Article 191 of the Civil Code.
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage
settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the
marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of
property, and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has
been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or
has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void; properties acquired during
their marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership
RATIONALE: In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or
incestuous are void. the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were
governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to
confirm such fact.
As to the 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD
failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property.
1âwphi1
DISPOSITIVE PORTION.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
[PEREZ, J]
FACTS
 David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in
Quezon City, Philippines and they had 2 children.
 They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they eventually acquired
American citizenship
 David and Leticia have different properties located in the Philippines and in the USA.
 David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December 2002, Leticia executed
a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for ₱2.2
Million
 David abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province
 Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California. The California court
granted the divorce and custody of the couple’s properties in the USA.
 Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler,
Aurora
 Respondent’s Demands
 The power to administer all conjugal properties in the Philippines;
 For David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject conjugal
properties;
 The declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children;
 David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the
Sampaloc property;
 The payment of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses
 Petitioner’s Demands
 He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the
USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation, including
attorney’s fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership
 RTC RULING
 The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared DISSOLVED
 net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the Philippines
are hereby ordered to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only
 One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the
preceding paragraph are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two minor children
 One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner
Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 is hereby given to Jerome and
Jena
 CA’s Ruling
 The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the
Philippines are hereby divided equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and respondent David A. Noveras


One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (properties in the
Philippines) shall pertain to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their
presumptive legitimes
Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered
to pay the amount of₱520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their
presumptive legitimes
ISSUES
1. Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved pursuant to the divorce
decree issued by the Superior Court of California
2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper in accordance with the
Family Code.
3. Whether the CA is correct in saying that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over
the California properties of David and Leticia.
RULINGS:
1. Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved pursuant to the divorce
decree issued by the Superior Court of California
SC HELD: Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are
still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to
liquidation. Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts
did with respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely
a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens
in the Philippines.
2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper in accordance with the Family
Code
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4
and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one
year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
SC HELD: Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property
was not tackled in the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the
petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties. However, since the parties
have established that they actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial
separation of properties should be granted.
3. Whether or Not petitioner should get shares from the properties of the couple in the United
States.
SC HELD: We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire
jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil
Code clearly states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine
properties
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
88686 is AFFIRMED.