European Journal of
Jewish Studies 15 (2021) 201–224
brill.com/ejjs
Wrestling with Spirits: A Medieval Internal
Jewish Debate on the Nature of Biblical Angels
and its Arabic and Latin Sources
Yossef Schwartz
The Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas,
Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
yschwart@tauex.tau.ac.il
Abstract
The article’s point of departure is a debate that took place in about 1290 between
Zeraḥyah b. Isaac Ḥen and Hillel b. Samuel, two Jewish-Italian thinkers, that presents
us with a surprisingly great variety of Arab, Jewish, and Latin-Christian exegetical and
cosmological approaches regarding angelic nature. Zeraḥyah, following the dominant
attitude among Arab, Muslim, and Jewish philosophers, strives to interpret the biblical angel-figure either naturalistically or allegorically. Conversely, Hillel cleaves more
closely to Christian scholastic conceptions, adhering to the biblical narrative in the
literal sense. The struggle between Jacob and the angel (Gen 32) posed one of the most
challenging cases, presenting the interpreter with a situation in which an angel did not
only appear but was also engaged in bodily contact. In the case of Hillel, his dual commitment as a Jewish Maimonidean heavily influenced by Latin Scholasticism led to the
development of a highly unique solution.
Keywords
Zeraḥyah b. Isaac Ḥen – Hillel b. Samuel – Maimonides – Albert the Great – Thomas
Aquinas – Avicenna – angels – medieval philosophy
Throughout the night, about 3200 years ago according to traditional chronologies, based on Genesis 32:25–32, a middle-aged male found himself alone in
the dark on a riverbank, struggling with a mysterious figure. The struggle was
physically intense and caused our protagonist, the patriarch Jacob, significant
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/1872471X-BJA10022
202
Schwartz
bodily damage. It ended with Jacob successfully restraining the stranger who,
when the night ended, was found to be a nocturnal figure, begging to being
released, since “it is daybreak” (Gen 32:27: ‫)כי עלה השחר‬. Jacob insisted on
being blessed by the stranger, and before releasing him he also asked for his
name, receiving the response, “Why do you ask my name?” (Gen 32:30: ‫למה זה‬
‫)תשאל לשמי‬, a rather common divine reply to similar human interrogations.1
Hence it becomes apparent that the person attacking Jacob was in fact God
himself or one of his manifestations/representations/mediated agents, commonly known as ‘angels.’ The wrestling on the Jabbok river bank remains one
of the most physical, and, in terms of its visual imagery, even erotic descriptions of the encounter between humans and the divine.2 For most readers of
this text throughout the generations and up until the present, such a narrative
seems to be easily apprehensible and the narrated event can be effortlessly
integrated into a series of other events where supra-natural mythical figures
intervene with humans and their affairs.
For many medieval thinkers, however, this biblical narrative presents or
even exceeds the boundaries of human experience and understanding. For
those medievals, angels had become a well-defined part of cosmology, an entity
related somehow to the material elemental world but located in the transcendent divine realm. Being the citizens of a parallel, metaphysical, supra-lunar
realm, their physical presence in the elemental sub-lunar realm demanded an
explanation. This explanation, with its inner tensions and their polemical derivations, stands at the core of the present article.3
In all its variations, the scientific explanation relies on an animistic cosmological system, well-rooted in classical theories—originally based on Aristotle’s
De anima and Physics as further developed by the late Hellenistic and medieval commentators4—according to which the soul is not a differential element
unique to humans but a cosmic force, common to all animate bodies, from the
1 See for instance Judg 13:18. The divine revelation to Moses in Exod 3:13–14, might serve as
another example of the same genre.
2 For the erotic aspects, the most prominent example is no doubt Rembrandt’s painting,
“Jacob Wrestling with the Angel,” from about 1659 (Berlin, Gemäldegalerie). In the mosaics
of the Palermo Cappella Palatina, built by Roger II during the 1140s and decorated by his son
William I, Jacob embraces the angel.
3 For general references to medieval angelology, see Isabel Irribarren and Martin Lenz (eds.),
Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2008); Giorgio Agamben and Emanuele Coccia (eds.), Angeli: Ebraismo Cristianesimo Islam
(Vicenza: Neri Pozza, 2009). This volume offers the most comprehensive comparative view
of the matter, including an anthology of sources.
4 Errol G. Katayama, “Soul and Elemental Motion in Aristotle’s Physics VIII 4,” Apeiron 44
(2011): 163–190; István M. Bodnár, “Alexander of Aphrodisias on Celestial Motions,” Phronesis
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Wrestling with Spirits
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most primitive forms of life up to the intrinsic movers of the heavenly bodies and perhaps even to God himself as a world soul. Moreover, defined as a
dynamic force, it is the psyche that is precisely the element capable of crossing
boundaries and connecting different parts of the liminal existence.
I am not pretending to offer an exhaustive overview of the matter. Instead
I would like to draw attention to a micro-historic, largely neglected case study, a
late medieval episode as presented in a local peripheral debate that took place
between two Jewish-Italian philosophers, both physicians as well, that presents us with a surprisingly great variety of Arab, Jewish, and Latin-Christian
exegetical and cosmological approaches to the abovementioned complex set
of questions regarding angelic nature.
1
The Polemical Framework
The debate I would like to describe now took place between Zeraḥyah b.
Isaac b. She’alti’el Ḥen (Gracián) from Rome and Hillel b. Samuel (b. Elazar
of Verona) who dwelled in Ferrara—the two most prominent Jewish-Italian
thinkers of the time5—and is documented in two letters written by Zeraḥyah
in response to (non-preserved) letters written to him by Hillel.6 In this partially
conserved correspondence dated to the year 1289–1290, Zeraḥyah, a physician,
philosopher, and translator of scientific, medical, and philosophic texts from
Arabic into Hebrew, corresponds with Hillel, himself a physician, philosopher,
and translator of scientific, medical, and philosophic texts from Latin into
Hebrew.7 Although we do not possess Hillel’s two letters to Zeraḥyah, signifi42(2) (1997): 190–205; Richard C. Dales, “The De-Animation of the Heavens in the Middle
Ages,” Journal of the History of Ideas 41(4) (1980): 531–550, esp. 531–532.
5 Cf. Isaac Barzilay, Between Reason and Faith: Anti-Rationalism in Italian Jewish Thought 1250–
1650 (1967; repr., De Gruyter, 2020), 33–55.
6 For a general overview, see Yossef Schwartz, “Cultural Identity in Transmission: Language,
Science, and the Medical Profession in Thirteenth-Century Italy,” in Entangled Histories:
Knowledge, Authority, and Transmission in Thirteenth-Century Jewish Cultures, eds. Elisheva
Baumgarten et al. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 181–203. There are
five manuscripts which contain partial or full versions of the letters. The best available version
is the one printed in Itzhak Blumenfeld (ed.), Oṣar Neḥmad, II (Vienna: J. Knöpflmacher’s
Buchhandlung, 1857), 124–142. I am now preparing a new critical edition, based on all extant
manuscripts.
7 On the differences between these two systems of Hebrew translation from Arabic and
from Latin, see Gad Freudenthal, “Arabic and Latin Cultures as Resources for the Hebrew
Translation Movement: Comparative Considerations, Both Quantitative and Qualitative,” in
Science in Medieval Jewish Cultures, ed. idem (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011),
74–105. On the general phenomenon of multiple translations of one and the same text, see
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204
Schwartz
cant parts of them are quoted by Zeraḥyah in his responses, thus enabling us to
reconstruct a whole segment of the dialogue between them.
Based on their own assertions as well as on their literary products, it is clear
that both authors saw themselves as great authorities on matters related to the
interpretation of Maimonides’s philosophic writings, upon which they both
commented.8
The debate itself seems to have had three main foci (two of which are relevant for my present discussion9). These, at first glance, appear to be rather
idiosyncratic, yet, when organized around basic principles of Maimonidean
hermeneutics, they begin to become much more coherent. The first issue is
clearly exegetical: namely, a dispute over the question of how much space
Maimonides assigns in his hermeneutics of biblical esotericism as allegorical
philosophy [sitre torah] to the traditional reading of its literal sense. Hillel takes
a position reminiscent of Christian scholastic theology. Unwilling to relinquish
the literal meaning of Scripture, Hillel adamantly asserts that the mysteries
of the Mosaic scriptures cannot be reduced to scientific truisms of profane
knowledge that would be apparent to any of his contemporary university
scholars.10 Zeraḥyah positions himself here in opposition to this unexpected
8
9
10
Jean-Pierre Rothschild, “Traductions refaites et traductions révisées,” in Latin-IntoHebrew—Studies and Texts, vol. 1, Studies, eds. Resianne Fontaine and Gad Freudenthal
(Leiden: Brill, 2013), 391–420. Rothschild mentions the parallel translations by Hillel
and Zeraḥyah of the Book of Causes but does not stress the fact that they were done
simultaneously, nor does he provide any account of the fact that the two authors
translated parallel medical texts as well.
Hillel claimed for himself the status of an expert on Maimonides’s Guide in his letter
to his Roman friend Maestro Gaio. Hillel, “First letter to Maestro Gaio (Itzhak ben
Mordechai ha-Rofe),” in Ḥemda Genuza, ed. Zvi Hirsch Edelmann (Königsberg, 1856),
20a. Zeraḥyah asserted the same in his response to Hillel’s first letter, placing it within a
broader correspondence in which people sought his guidance regarding Maimonides’s
ideas. It seems reasonable that Zeraḥyah interpreted Hillel’s first letter precisely in this
light: as a request for authoritative guidance, to which the former responded in a firm but
polite tone. However, Hillel’s second letter made it clear that he was not writing as a pupil
addressing his master but that he viewed himself as a participant in a critical dialogue
between two independent scholars of equal standing. In that sense Zeraḥyah’s aggressive
response was intended to clarify their appropriate standing. On Zerahyah’s commentary,
see Moritz Steinschneider, Die hebraeischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden
als Dolmetscher (1893; repr., Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1956), 113.
The third relates to the nature of human language and the existence or non-existence of
natural or divine language. Evidence in newly discovered manuscripts sheds much light
on this discussion and I hope to publish a study of this soon.
Blumenfeld, Oṣar Neḥmad, 133: “And although the sage, our Rabbi blessed be his memory,
has called those things ‘secrets,’ it is clear from his words that his intention was aimed
at other, more noble things, since these [ideas], and their interpretations are not at
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Wrestling with Spirits
205
claim as a radical Maimonidean/Averroist, who is acutely aware that the ‘mystery’ of the Torah refers only to the fact that, beyond its apparent mythical
vocabulary, there is hidden reference to scientific truth.11
The second point of the polemic, which can be taken as a specific case of
the general exegetical debate, involves angelology as discussed in this article, i.e., the interpretation of the biblical description of the earthly appearance of celestial spiritual entities. Again, Zeraḥyah, as a radical Maimonidean
staunchly oriented toward Averroes, denies the possibility of the angels having
any corporeal embodiment. Any biblical description of angels in human shape
and with bodily organs requires this depiction to be systematically interpreted
as a dream, vision, or parabolic speech. Hillel, on his part, seems to make great
intellectual efforts in order to retain the literal meaning of the biblical narrative without getting too far from basic Maimonidean principles. At first glance,
his explanation sounds rather nonsensical. The angel, in and of himself, cannot be a creature equipped with bodily organs, hence his appearance in front
of Jacob must be the result of a human projection, i.e., of Jacob’s own vision.
And yet, there was a real angel actively involved in the situation and this angel,
essentially a purely spiritual entity, was able to miraculously affect the air surrounding Jacob, creating a physical phantom that included bodily effects.
11
all secrets, and since all of them are clearly known among us, it is in vain that he has
concealed them. Which is why I wonder about his true intention and I am even more
puzzled why he made those issues into secrets since they were all commented upon in
[Aristotle’s] Book of Meteorology [Otot ha-Shamayim], and it is indeed well-known among
all scholars that the four tractates of the book of meteorology entail no divine secrets.”
[‫ נראה מדבריו שכיון לעניינים‬,‫ולולי שהחמיר הגאון רזצ״ל בדברים הללו כל כך וקראם סודות‬
‫אחרים יותר נכבדים כי אילו אינם סודות וגם לא הפירושים הסובבים עליהם ועם היות אלו‬
,‫ ולכן אני שואל אל אן נטתה כוונתו‬.‫העניינים מבוארים אצלנו השיבם נסתרים ללא תועלת‬
‫ והנה ידוע אצל כל‬.‫ויותר אני נפלא על שעשאם סודות הואיל ונתבארו בספר אותות השמים‬
‫]התלמידים כי הארבעה מאמרות אשר לספר אותות השמים אין בהם שום סוד אלהי‬.
Ibid.: “Now open your eyes and see your dullness and how little you understand the
intention of our sage, our master blessed be his memory, and his secrets. Since the
matters of the books of nature, where referred to by our master in regard of some matter
or an idea of the prophets, were called by him ‘secrets’ not because of the way they are
formulated in the natural books, but as of their being the true meaning hidden within the
words of the prophets, and these are the secrets which our master has said that even the
sages of Israel have failed to recognize.” [‫ועתה פקח עיניך וראה שוממותיך ומיעוט היותך‬
‫ כי הדברים אשר בספרים הטבעיים בהיות הגאון‬.‫מבין כוונת הגאון רבינו זצ״ל וסודותיו‬
‫רבינו זצ״ל רומז עליהם שום ענין או שום דבר מדברי הנביאים הם הם אשר קראם סודות לא‬
‫מצד היותם כתובים בספרי הטבעים אבל מצד היותם רמוזים בדברי הנביאים ע״ה ואלה הם‬
‫]הסודות אשר אמר בהם הגאון ז״ל כי אפי׳ חכמי ישראל לא ירגישו בהם‬.
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Schwartz
Without any doubt the wrestling must be interpreted literally, i.e., that
Jacob wrestled or was attacked by angelic force, and the contact was
physical and the above-mentioned push was not in the form of prophetic
vision but in its literal meaning. But that the angel was a body equipped
with organs and hands, in that I do not believe, but what happened was
that the angel, through separate divine power, created, in the air surrounding Jacob, wrestling and jostling motions, while the parts of the air
in accord with the six positions of the body or his three dimensions were
strongly in motion and with their movement they pulled Jacob’s body
surrounded by them and adjusted to them (in motions of) conduction
and bringing and butting and stopping in wrestling moves. Hence the fall
and the injury happened either intentionally or as an accident caused
by the pressure and the jostling. And besides all that there was the angel
who was truly revealed to him in the prophetic vision throughout the
struggle. And according to such explanation the real event becomes true
in the literal sense of the Scripture, as a true physical event conjoined
with prophetic vision.12
The very same mechanism is also attributed by Hillel to the angel who manipulated Balaam’s she-ass (Num 22:22–33). In this case, his influence created vocal
sounds in the air in front of the she-ass. Zeraḥyah’s astonished and aggressive
reaction to such an explanation is very easy to understand. As a Maimonidean
who is following his master’s instruction to the letter, as quoted above, he
indeed cannot accept such a hypothesis.
These were your words on Jacob’s wrestling and also on the she-ass’s
uttering; you made similar assertions as I shall quote to you at length
while demonstrating their impossibility and contradictions. And it seems
to me that in those mixtures of yours and in the divisions you make in
the one single prophetic vision of Jacob’s wrestling you contradict the
12
Blumenfeld, Oṣar Neḥmad, 128: ‫בודאי בלא שום ספק היה האבקות יעקב אבינו ע״ה עם‬
‫ כלומר שנאבק יעקב ע״ה או נדחק בכח מלאכי והיתה הנגיעה‬,‫המלאך או נדחק כפשוטו‬
‫ אמנם שהיה המלאך‬.‫במוחש ואותה הדחיקה לא היתה בצורת נבואה אלא דחיקה כפשוטה‬
‫ אבל כך היה המעשה שהמלאך חדש בכח אלהי‬,‫גוף בעל אברים ידים וזרועות זה לא אאמין‬
‫נבדל באויר המקיף את יעקב ע״ה תנועות הולמות ודוחקות עם שחלקי האויר שהיו מתאימים‬
‫על הששה צדדין שיש לגוף או על שלושת רחקיו התנועעו בחוזק ועם התנועעם הניעו את גוף‬
‫יעקב המוקף מהם והמותאם עמהם הולכה והובאה ודחיקה ועצירה בדחיקת התאבקות ולכן‬
‫נעשית ההשמטה והנקיעה או בכונת מכוין או במקרה הלחץ והדוחק והמלאך שנראה אליו‬
‫ אמת כפשוטו‬,‫במראה הנבואה באמת עד משלם ההאבקות ובזה הענין יהיה הספור המעשי‬
.‫בהצטרף המעשה בפועל עם מראה הנבואה‬
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intention of the great sage, blessed be his memory, according to what
he asserted in his great book. […] So that it is clear to me that every true
scholar who will hear those things of yours will laugh about them and
mock them as if they were a parody, […]. You claimed that Jacob was
fighting and struggling with an angelic force and that it included physical
contact in the literal sense, and whatever else you have said which is not
deserving of being written down, and even less of being believed in. See
now how far you have misunderstood the matter. You have mentioned an
angelic force that was jostling and pressing Jacob, and you have said that
the same angel was not a body and at the same time regarding the same
matter you have claimed that it included physical contact and that the
jostling was not in the form of prophetic vision but of its simple meaning.
Hence according to these claims of yours you described Jacob’s reception as conjoining two different contradictory matters. So tell me please,
you wise man who contemplates and knows all the secrets of Torah and
wisdom, in what place have you found one prophecy which entails two
separate matters, one of which is actual and physical and the other truly a
prophetic vision? Indeed, such a great equivocation and strange mixture
as you read into the vision of Jacob, who was one of the greatest philosophers, will never be recognized by anybody, even if only a beginner in
these studies.13
As Zeraḥyah correctly asserts, the process proposed by Hillel is a unique, perfect conjunction of a dual projection originating in different ontological levels.
The man-like angel is a projection of Jacob’s prophetic imagination, while the
13
Ibid., 128–129: ‫ וגם על פי האתון אמרת‬.‫עד כאן דבריך שאמרת על התאבקות יעקב ע״ה‬
‫כדברים האלה בשוה כמו שאני עתיד לזכרם כזכרי לך סתירתם ומניעתם וכמדומה לי שבאלו‬
‫ ובאלו החלקים שאתה מחלק מראה הנבואה הזה האחד בהאבקות‬,‫הערובין שאתה מערב‬
‫ אתה סותר כונת הגאון רבינו הרב מורה צדק זצ״ל לפי מה שזכר בזה במאמרו‬,‫יעקב ע״ה‬
‫הנכבד […] עד שאני רואה כי כל חכם אמתי שישמע אותם ישחק מהם וילעג עליהם כעל‬
‫אחד ממיני השחוק […] אתה אמרת בתחלת דבריך כי יעקב אבינו ע״ה היה נאבק ונדחק‬
‫בכח מלאכיי ושהיתה שם נגיעה במוחש כפשוטה ושאר מה שאמרת שאין ראוי לכותבו כל‬
‫ אתה זכרת בזה הענין כח מלאכי‬.‫ ראה נא כמה הפלגת לטעות בזו הכוונה‬.‫שכן להאמינו‬
‫שהיה דוחק את יעקב ולחץ אותו ואמרת שאותו המלאך לא היה גוף ומצד אחר באותו הענין‬
‫בעצמו אמרת שהיתה שם נגיעה במוחש ושאותה הדחקה לא היתה בצורת נבואה אבל היתה‬
‫כפשוטה א״כ לפי דבריך אלו שמת השגת יעקב ע״ה מחוברת משני ענינים מתחלפים זה הפך‬
‫ אמור נא אתה החכם המעיין והיודע סודות התורה והחכמה באיזה מקום מצאת נבואה‬.‫זה‬
‫ כי זה‬,‫אחת שיהיו בה שני עניינים האחד בפועל ובמגע מוחש והאחר במראה הנבואה באמת‬
‫השתוף הרחוק וזו ההרכבה הזרה אשר מצאת במראה יעקב ע״ה שהיה מן המשיגים הגדולים‬
.‫לא יודה בהם שום אדם ואפילו מן המתחילים ללמוד‬
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Schwartz
physical effects on Jacob’s body are projected by an angel, a real physical agent,
located elsewhere.
Before proceeding with the detailed analysis of the dispute, I would like to
point very briefly to some of the sources for the main strategies here employed
by Zeraḥyah and Hillel. The different strategies a medieval thinker might
employ when dealing with biblical foundational mythologomena were crystallized in the well-known and crucially influential formulation of Maimonides,
who in his hermeneutic approach offers one of the most radical rationalized
readings of biblical angels in all medieval religious cultures and to whose
authority both our protagonists are deeply committed. I will also refer to great
debates Maimonides’s approach has generated, especially within southern
European communities, emphasizing the criticism formulated by Naḥmanides
in his commentary on the Pentateuch. Based on these rival authoritative
approaches, I return to the main positions taken by both sides of the disputation, in order to shed light on Hillel’s main sources in Arabic and Latin scholastic thought.
2
Interpretation of Scriptural Angel Narratives—Main Strategies
In many sources of late antiquity, the corporeal nature of angels as depicted in
so many biblical narratives tends to be interpreted literally. It might be reduced
to the essential physical nature of those heavenly creatures or to some secondary adjustment that enables them to carry out their mundane tasks. This
first approach is well reflected in rabbinic interpretations of angelic entities in
the Midrash and assumes, as in some patristic, philosophically more sophisticated theories, a universe which is, in its entirety, both corporeal and material.14
Entities are divided according to their range of condensation or rarefaction.
Angels, according to such a description, as well as souls, are elevated entities,
but not immaterial.15 Their physical appearance in itself poses no problem for
the reader. The second literal approach, widely accepted among Latin schoolmen and some medieval Kabbalists, defines angels as purely spiritual entities,
14
15
See Peter Schäfer, Die Ursprünge der jüdischen Mystik (Berlin: Insel Verlag, 2011), 89, 432,
503n16; on the implication regarding God, see Yair Lorberbaum, Image of God: Halakhah
and Aggadah (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 2004) [Hebrew].
For a somewhat milder interpretation of the sublime corporeality of angels by Saadia
Gaon, see Nabih Bashir, Angelology and Theological Humanism in the Thought and Biblical
Exegesis of Saadia Gaon (PhD diss., Ben Gurion University of the Negev, 2015), esp. 54–70,
262–325.
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209
but at the same time attributes to them an ‘incarnational’ moment of assuming a corporeal body as needed for the fulfillment of their mundane tasks.16
In contrast to this literal and materialistic conception—in philosophical terminology also known as ‘universal hylomorphism’17—stands the
Aristotelian Ptolemaic two-world cosmology, especially in its medieval Arab
version, which draws a sharp distinction between the sub-lunar world of the
four elements with its unique materiality and the specific laws of dynamics
derived from them, and another, supra-lunar world, with its own physics and
its perfect circular and harmonious dynamics. For many late medieval thinkers
who followed this Aristotelian cosmology, angels are identified with separate
substances/intelligences/heavenly souls.18 Alfarabi, Avicenna, Maimonides,
and their followers also regarded them as secondary causes, mediators of God’s
acts of creation. As such, a certain physical influence emanates directly from
them into the elemental world.
On the scientific level the abovementioned tradition presents us with a
more or less unified theory. Nevertheless, when it comes to the exact relation
between scientific and sacral language there are some significant formal and
linguistic variations. A common exegetical praxis relies on the terminological
blur between separate substances/intelligences/unmoved movers and ‘angels.’
Indeed, though the basic identification of Aristotelian spiritual celestial entities with angels among the abovementioned group of Arab thinkers seems
consensual, yet some of them emphasize this identification much more than
others. Here the most striking case is that of Alfarabi’s language in comparison
‫ة‬
‫ة‬
with Avicenna’s. In The Virtuous City [��‫]ا لم�د ي�ن��� ا �ل��ف���ا ض���ل‬, chs. 7–16, Alfarabi provides
a most influential cosmological scheme including a detailed description of the
process of emanation and the shaping of the different parts of the celestial system. The notion of ‘angels’ does not occur even once in those chapters. It does
16
17
18
This topic was thoroughly examined by Elliot Wolfson in a series of studies, see his
“Textual Flesh, Incarnation, and the Imaginal Body: Abraham Abulafia’s Polemic with
Christianity,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish Intellectual and Social History, eds. Elliot
Wolfson et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 189–226. For references to Wolfson’s other relevant
studies see ibid., 190n5 and n6.
James A. Weisheipl, “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism: Avicebron,”
Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10(3) (1979): 239–260; Robert Pasnau, “Form and
Matter,” in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. idem (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 635–646.
See Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed II, 6, translated with Introduction and
notes by Shlomo Pines (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), 262: “[…] there
is [only] a difference in the terms; for he [Aristotle] speaks of separate intellects [Arab.:
‫ ;עקול מפארקה‬Lat.: intellectus abstractos], and we speak of angels [Heb.: ‫ ;מלאכים‬Lat.:
angelos].”
European Journal of Jewish Studies 15 (2021) 201–224
210
Schwartz
occur in the opening paragraph, within a general description of the book structure and then once again in the title of chapter 25 dedicated to “Revelation and
‫ق ف‬
‫ؤة‬
the Seeing of Angels” [‫ور��ي�� ا لم�ل�ك‬
�‫ ]ا �ل����ول �ي� ا �لو�حي‬but the chapter itself, in spite
of the title, does not include any further angelical allusion.19
A parallel cosmological structure is portrayed by Avicenna in the metaphysical part [Ilahiyat] of his Kitāb al-Shifā, especially in Book 10, ch. 1. Here,
however, the notion of separate substances and celestial intelligences is used
synonymously with the notion of angels. While defining the ranks of emanations from the One, Avicenna mentions “the rank of the spiritual angels
denuded [of matter] that are called ‘intellects,’ then the ranks of the spiritual
angels called ‘souls’—namely, the active angels […].” From this description of
celestial hierarchy, the discussion moves to the ranks of mundane creatures,
described from the lower material entities all the way up to intelligent human
beings and to the highest among them which are the prophets. The prophet,
explains Avicenna, is “the one who, in his psychological powers, has three
distinctive properties which we have mentioned—namely, that he hears the
speech of God, exalted be He, and sees His angels that have been transformed
for him into a form he sees […]. He thus hears it without this being speech from
people and the terrestrial animal.”20 Al-Ghazali in his Maqasid al-Falasifa follows Avicenna’s cosmology without, however, making intensive use of angelic
figures,21 while in his Tahafut al-Falasifa angels are frequently mentioned
as part of the philosophical world-view, though mostly to be criticized and
refuted.22 Maimonides’s position, as we shall see, is very close to Avicenna’s
on this issue.23
19
20
21
22
23
Friedrich Dietrici (ed.), Alfārābīs Abhandlung der Musterstaat (Leiden: Brill, 1895), 1,
l. 9–13, 51, l. 13. See also Ilai Alon, Al-Fārābi’s Philosophical Lexicon (Warminster: E.J.W. Gibb
Memorial Trust, 2002), vol. I [Arabic], 459, vol. II [English], 548.
Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing: A parallel English-Arabic Text translated,
introduced and annotated by Michael E. Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University
Press, 2005), 358–359.
Al-Ghazālī, Maqasid al-Falasifa, II, 4, ed. S. Dunya (Cairo: Dar al-ma’arif, 1965), 271–287,
esp. 281.
See for example Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers. Discussion 5, n35 (the
difference between divine attributes and what is attributed to angels qua separate
substances); discussion 17, n8 (the bestower of forms who is “an angel among the
angels”). A Parallel English-Arabic Text Translated, Introduced and Annotated by Michael E.
Marmura (Provo, UR: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), 95, 4–10; 168, 18–28.
On the general affinity of Maimonides’s metaphysics to Avicenna, see Yair Shifman,
“On Avicenna and Maimonides,” Tarbiz. A Quarterly of Jewish Studies 64 (1995): 523–534
[Hebrew]; Mauro Zonta, “Avicenna in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” in Avicenna and his
Heritage, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 28, eds. Jules Janssens and Daniël De Smet
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 267–279; Warren Zev Harvey, “Maimonides’
European Journal of Jewish Studies 15 (2021) 201–224
Wrestling with Spirits
211
This proximity between Muslim and Jewish thought did not remain unnoticed in scholastic literature. In the Errores philosophorum, a scholastic work
attributed to Aegidius Romanus, composed around 1270 and dedicated to
the refutation of Aristotle and his Arabic followers, this (erroneous) opinion
is attributed to Alfarabi, Avicenna, Al-Ghazali, and Maimonides.24 The most
detailed Arab teaching as reflected in Errores philosophorum is that propounded
in Avicenna’s and Al-Ghazali’s metaphysical works. Articles 6–9 in the chapters dedicated to the errors of Avicenna relate to his theory of emanation.25
Article 10 (repeated in Al-Ghazali, Art. 5) is dedicated to the false conception of
the celestial spheres as animated living entities, being analogous to the human
body-mind system.26 The same mistake is attributed to Maimonides as well.
In his case, however, the author emphasizes that the heavens are not only animated but also must be regarded as rational souls. Moreover, and, as I shall
claim, with significant applicability to the present discussion, Maimonides is
the only author to whom not only an Aristotelian view but also a biblical verse
is connected.27
24
25
26
27
Avicennianism,” Maimonidean Studies 5 (2008): 107–119; Steven Harvey, “Avicenna’s
Influence on Jewish Thought: Some Reflections,” in Avicenna and his Legacy: A Golden Age
of Science and Philosophy, Cultural Encounters in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages 8,
ed. Y. Tzvi Langerman (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), 327–340, esp. 335–338.
For the authenticity of the work, see Koch’s introduction in Aegidius Romanus/Giles
of Rome, Errores philosophorum, ed. Josef Koch, trans. John O. Riedl (Milwaukee, 1944),
xxxiv–xxxvi; for the opposite claim see Görge K. Hasselhoff, Dicit Rabbi Moyses. Studien
zum Bild von Moses Maimonides im lateinischen Westen vom 13. bis zum 15. Jahrhundert
(Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2004), 189–191. Hasselhoff suggests the author
of the work was of Spanish origin.
See esp. Errores philosophorum V, 7; Koch, 28: “[quod] animas caelestes produci ab
intelligentiis sive ab angelis, et unam intelligentiam produci ab alia.”
Against such an assumption the author quotes as a Catholic authority Damascenus,
claiming that the heavens are inanimate and insensible, Errores philosophorum, VI, 10;
Koch, 30: “Ulterius erravit circa animationem caeli. Posuit enim caelum animatum.
Cuius animam non solum dicit motorem appropriatum, secundum quod Philosophus
et Commentator nisi sunt dicere, sed quod fieret unum ex anima caeli et caelo sicut et
anima nostra et corpore nostro. Quod est contra Damascenum, qui dicit II° libro [De fide
orthodoxa] capitulo VI° caelos esse inanimatos et insensibiles”; in relation to Al-Ghazali,
cf. ibid., VIII, 5; Koch, 38.
Cf. ibid., XII [Maimonides], 5; Koch, 60: “Ulterius erravit circa supercaelestias corpora,
ponens ea esse animata et dicens ipsa esse animalia rationalis, adducens pro se illud
Psalmi [Ps 18:2]: ‘Caeli enarrant gloriam Dei’, et illud Iob [Job 38:7]: ‘Cum me laudarent
simul astra matutina’, quae omnia patent IIo libro De expositione legis, cap. V°.”
European Journal of Jewish Studies 15 (2021) 201–224
212
3
Schwartz
Maimonides’s Radical Hermeneutic Position and its Opponents
I would now like to analyze in more detail Maimonides’s approach and that of
his opponents within Jewish tradition. The Maimonidean cosmology includes
an explanation of physical mechanisms that permit physical causality from
a distance, providing an explanation both for the powers emanating from
the heavenly bodies onto the sub-lunar world and the possibility for spiritual
forces to affect corporeal entities. In the words of Maimonides: “It has been
made clear in natural science that every body that acts in some manner upon
another body does this only through encountering it or through encountering
something that encounters it, if this agent acts through intermediaries.”28 In
contrast to such bodily interaction, Maimonides points out the production of
forms by the separate intellects:
Hence the action of the separate intellect is always designated as an overflow (Arab. fayḍ, Lat. emanatio), being likened to a source of water that
overflows in all directions and does not have one particular direction
from which it draws while giving its bounty to others.29
This general physical assertion is followed by an important observation regarding the limitation and scope of human imagination, when striving to grasp
immaterial substances and the mental representations it produces in the
process:
For the mental representation of the action of one who is separate from
matter is very difficult, in a way similar to the difficulty of the mental representation of the existence of one who is separate from matter. For just
as imagination cannot represent to itself an existent other than a body
or a force in a body, the imagination cannot represent to itself an action
taking place otherwise than through the immediate contact of an agent
or at a certain distance and from one particular direction. Accordingly,
when it was established as true among some belonging to the multitude
that the deity is not a body or that He does not draw near to that which
He does, they imagined that He gives commands to the angels and they
accomplish the action in question through immediate contact and the
drawing near of one body to another, as we do in regard to what we act
upon. They also imagine that the angels have bodies. […] All this follows
28
29
Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed II, 12; Pines: 277.
Ibid., 279.
European Journal of Jewish Studies 15 (2021) 201–224
Wrestling with Spirits
213
imagination, which is also in true reality the evil impulse. For every deficiency of reason or character is due to the action of the imagination or
consequent upon its action.30
Maimonides is very precise in preventing such mechanisms from being used
for the explanation of mythical biblical events. In the following chapters of the
second part of the Guide, discussing prophetic visions, he explicitly asserts:
We have explained that wherever is mentioned that an angel was seen or
had spoken, this has happened only in a vision of prophecy or in a dream
whether this is explicitly stated or not. […] I say likewise also of the story
about Jacob in regard to its saying, and there wrestled a man with him,
that it is in conformity with the form of prophetic revelation, inasmuch
as it is finally made clear that he who was there was an angel.31 […] All
the wrestling and the conversation in question happened in a vision of
prophecy. And likewise the whole story of Balaam on the way and the
she-ass speaking.32
If we get back to the combination of angelology and prophecy in Avicenna’s
metaphysics it is interesting to note that the structure of the second part of the
Guide is based on a similar juxtaposition of the two topics; it deals with prophecy in chapters 32 to 48, after discussing previous metaphysical issues like the
existence of God (II, 1), the nature of angels (II, 2–12), and the problem of creation (II, 13–30). In fact, from the highest entities to the lowest sub-lunar elemental entities, Maimonides provides his reader with a unified cosmological
system, in which all levels are dynamically inter-related.33 This emanational
hierarchy provides us with the physical explanation of physical non-material
causality, but in the case of carnal human beings—again in agreement with
Arab philosophic tradition—it just as well opens the door to the possibility
of the ascension of human intellect into the supra-lunar sphere.34 As much
30
31
32
33
34
Ibid., 279–280.
Ibid., II, 42; Pines: 388.
Ibid.; Pines: 389.
Alexander Altmann, “Maimonides on the Intellect and the Scope of Metaphysics,” in Von
der mittelalterlichen zum modernen Aufklärung, ed. idem (Tübingen: Mohr, 1987), 60–129;
Gad Freudenthal, “Maimonides on the Scope of Metaphysics alias Ma‘aseh Merkavah:
The Evolution of his Views,” in Maimónides y su época, eds. Carlos del Valle et al. (Madrid:
Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales, 2007), 221–230.
Adam Afterman, Devequt: Mystical Intimacy in Medieval Jewish Thought (Los Angeles:
Cherub Press, 2011), 134–168 [Hebrew]; idem, “And They Shall Be One Flesh”: On the
Language of Mystical Union in Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 102–129; David R. Blumenthal,
European Journal of Jewish Studies 15 (2021) 201–224
214
Schwartz
as such anthropology can provide an explanation of biblical miracles,35 the
exceptional divine intervention in and distortion of the natural order must be
reduced, according to Maimonides, either to nomological natural powers, wellrepresented by angels/secondary powers, or to the unique moment of freedom
reserved for God and man alone in the cosmic hierarchy, due to the capacity
of the human soul to travel between the worlds in all kinds of ecstatic states.36
When Maimonides died in 1204, Samuel ibn Tibbon was completing the first
version of his Hebrew translation of the Guide.37 Throughout the thirteenth
century, the philosophical work of Maimonides, and the public activities of his
followers, evoked criticism and polemic from the side of the more conservative parties.38 Much of this critique was aimed against philosophic allegorism
and the way it repudiates the historical, literal meaning of Scripture. The most
aggressive tone was preserved for the popularizers of these methods in Jewish
communities but part of it targeted directly the teaching of Maimonides himself. It is certainly not a coincidence that one of the most influential formulations of such a critique regarding Maimonides’s interpretation of biblical angels
is to be found in a Bible commentary, composed by one of the greatest religious authorities of the time, Naḥmanides (Moses ben Naḥman, 1194–ca. 1270).
In his commentary on the Pentateuch with respect to Genesis 18:1, “and God
appeared to him […] and behold three men stood by him,” Naḥmanides writes
35
36
37
38
Philosophic Mysticism: Studies in Rational Religion (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press,
2006), 73–95.
Aviezer Ravitzky, “The Anthropological Theory of Miracles in Jewish Philosophy,” in
Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1984), 231–272.
See Blumenthal, Philosophic Mysticism, 120–126.
Carlos Fraenkel, From Maimonides to Samuel ibn Tibbon: The Transformation of the Dalālat
al-Ḥā’irīn into the Moreh ha-Nevukhim, (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2007) [Hebrew];
Carlos Fraenkel, “From Maimonides to Samuel ibn Tibbon: Interpreting Judaism as a
Philosophical Religion,” in Traditions of Maimonideanism, ed. idem (Leiden: Brill, 2009),
177–212; James T. Robinson, “The Ibn Tibbon Family: A Dynasty of Translators in Medieval
‘Provence,’” in Be’erot Yitzhak: Studies in Memory of Isadore Twersky, ed. J.M. Harris
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 193–224, here 193–195.
Joseph Sarachek, Faith and Reason: The Conflict over the Rationalism of Maimonides
(Williamsport, PA: Bayard Press, 1935); Gad Freudenthal, “Holiness and Defilement:
The Ambivalent Perception of Philosophy by its Opponents in the Early Fourteenth
Century,” Micrologus 9 (2001): 169–193; Gregg Stern, “Philosophy in southern France:
Controversy over philosophic study and the influence of Averroes upon Jewish thought,”
in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, eds. D.H. Frank and O.
Leaman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 281–303; Yossef Schwartz, “Final
Phases of Medieval Hebraism: Jews and Christians between Bible Exegesis, Talmud and
Maimonidean Philosophy,” in 1308, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 35, eds. Andreas Speer and
David Wirmer (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2010), 269–285.
European Journal of Jewish Studies 15 (2021) 201–224
Wrestling with Spirits
215
that Maimonides in the Guide (II, 42) “stated that God appeared [to Abraham]
in a prophetic vision.” Naḥmanides rejected such a method of interpretation
since it strips from the reader all the “dense” biblical-historical narrative that
becomes irrelevant, once its meaning is reduced to a few basic spiritual elements. After discussing the figures of Abraham and Sarah, Naḥmanides moves
on to Jacob’s wrestling: “And similarly he [Maimonides] says regarding the story
of a man who wrestled with him, namely, that it was all through a prophetic
vision. If this is so, I do not know why he was limping on his thigh when he
was awake.” Naḥmanides sums up that “these words contradict Scripture. It is
forbidden even to hear them, and it is certainly forbidden to believe in them.”39
In the following exposition, Naḥmanides explains that not every appearance of
angels to human senses necessitates a prophetic vision. In fact, many humans
who happened to engage with angels were not prophets and had no capacities
for prophetic vision.40 On the other hand, not every appearance of an angel
must be reduced to vision or illusion, be it prophetic or not. In cases where
Scripture refers to angels employing the term “man” [ish, pl. anashim], as in
the case of Abraham, Lot, Jacob, and many similar figures, “This is a kind of
glory created for the angels, which is called a garb by those who have mystical knowledge, and which can be perceived with human eyes by people of
purified soul.”41
I shall return to this last assertion in the following sections. As we shall see,
Naḥmanides’s criticism had its impact on the controversy at stake here.
4
Back to the Polemic between Zeraḥyah and Hillel
In keeping with my preliminary sketch of the basic outlines of the debate, and
of the main exegetical strategies underlying the basic positions of the two parties involved, it is clearly Hillel’s complex model that needs to be explained.
As we have seen, Zeraḥyah assumed from the outset, i.e., right after reading
Hillel’s first set of questions, that Hillel was being influenced by Naḥmanides.
However, before adopting this explanation one must account for two important differences between Hillel and Naḥmanides. First, while Naḥmanides’s
39
40
41
The Torah with Ramban’s Commentary, Translated, Annotated and Elucidated (Brooklyn,
NY: Mesorah Publications, 2004–2010), vol. 1, 400–403.
Ibid., 403–406.
Ibid. A similar but more nuanced argument regarding the interpretation of biblical angels
was offered by another of Girona’s Kabbalists, Jacob ben Sheshet in his Sefer Meshiv
Devarim Nekhoḥim. Cf. Ya‘aqov ben Sheshet, Sefer Meshiv Devarim Nekhoḥim, ed. Georges
Vajda (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy, 1965), 97–110, esp. 103, l. 179–190.
European Journal of Jewish Studies 15 (2021) 201–224
216
Schwartz
reading of and acquaintance with Maimonides seems to be rather superficial
(as Zeraḥyah himself rightly points out in the first letter), and while his ideological commitment lies elsewhere, he had no difficulty in directly confronting
the explanation offered by Maimonides. Hillel’s commitment to the teaching
of Maimonides is deep-rooted and it relies on a careful and systematic reading. To state the obvious, at no point does Hillel position himself as “anti-­
Maimonidean.” Second, Hillel’s explanation pretends to provide the reader
with an alternative scientific mechanism, one in which the miraculous intervention of the omnipotent God is retained, as I shall argue at the end, only for
the ultimate layer of justification. In that he deviates from Naḥmanides who
never bothered to provide any such physical explanation.42
Can Hillel provide his dualistic schemata with any kind of metaphysical
substrate? The above quoted passage, where Hillel explains the wrestling on
the banks of the Jabbok, does not provide the reader with any kind of ontological infrastructure that might enable and support the sort of unique parallelism
offered by Hillel. His parallel discussion of Balaam’s she-ass, however, might be
more enlightening in this respect.
In the opening of the she-ass’s mouth as well I say that there is no doubt it
occurred in the literal sense, meaning that the angel in a separate divine
power configured [rasham] forms in the air surrounding the she-ass’s
mouth, that moved it in movements which created the sounds of syllables, letters and vowels conjoined into meaningful words, just as we can
see that, in the movements of the violin, harmonious sounds are shaped
in the air. Otherwise he [the angel, YS] might have created the power
of speech especially in that bodily member which entails the power of
speech, i.e., in the tongue, and provided it with some human voice which
was created for the sake of this concrete moment. Such a miracle must
be included with all other miracles which were done by a separate divine
power […] which were conditioned by God in the six days of creation.43
42
43
Regarding Naḥmanides’s mechanism of natural explanation, see Moshe Halbertal, By
Way of Truth. Nachmanides and the Creation of Tradition (Jerusalem: Shalom Hartman
Institute, 2006), 154–158 [Hebrew].
Blumenfeld, Oṣar Neḥmad, 133: ‫גם בפתיחת פי האתון אני אומר בודאי בלי שום ספק שהיתה‬
‫כפשוטה כלומר שהמלאך בכח אלהי נבדל רשם באויר המקיף פי האתון רישומן הניעוהו‬
‫תנועות משמיעות הברות אותיות ותבות מתחברות מובאות אל מלות מובנות כמו שנראה‬
‫שבתנועות נימי הכינור יתחדשו באויר קולות נעימים או שחדש באותו כח הדבור ובפרט‬
‫באותו האבר שיש בו כח הדבור בפועל כלומר בלשון ונתן לו שום קול אנושי נברא לשעתו‬
]…[ ‫לצורך השעה ויפעול ויכלל זה הפלא בכלל שאר הנפלאות שנעשו בכח אלהי נבדל‬
‫שהתנה השם ית׳ בששת ימי בראשית‬
European Journal of Jewish Studies 15 (2021) 201–224
Wrestling with Spirits
217
At first glance, Hillel is offering two alternative explanatory mechanisms
here. The first is identical with his abovementioned explanation of the angelic
manipulation of physical phenomena in the air surrounding a given body, and,
as we shall see below, is almost word for word the same as the formulation
found in Albert the Great, regarding the ability of demons to create sounds in
the air.44 The second reverted to a less naturalistic position, defining the event
as miraculous, i.e., as deriving from God’s omnipotence. It is no coincidence
that this second method of explanation is mentioned in respect of this specific
event, since the verbal utterance of the she-ass is indeed explicitly mentioned
in the rabbinical source cited by Hillel, m. Avot 5:5. As Hillel and Zeraḥyah both
knew, Maimonides related to this paragraph in his Mishnah commentary ad
locum and he himself combined his local interpretation with his more systematic discussion of the relationship between the Aristotelian natural worldview,
emphasizing the unchangeable laws of nature, and the exceptional status of
self-limited divine omnipotence that, from its constituent beginning (i.e., creation), inserts into nature some moments of freedom, each related to a specific
“state of exception.”45
Maimonides integrated his reading of the Mishnah with his general tendency towards reducing miraculous phenomena to a necessary minimum.
Here, Hillel might take, as we shall see in the following, and as suggested several times by Zeraḥyah, an intermediary position between that of Maimonides
and Naḥmanides, one in which miracles become generalized into a basic element of nature.
In the last part of this article, I would like to turn to some Latin scholastic
formulations in order to try and provide a more nuanced description of the
line of argumentation adopted here by Hillel.
5
The Arabic and Latin Sources of Hillel’s Cosmological Hypothesis
Hillel’s explanation not only preserves the biblical narrative, but it is consistent
with Hillel’s Avicennean reading of Maimonides, as it clearly developed at the
same period in the second part of his systematic work, Rewards of the Soul. In
the context of Hillel’s main topic of discussion in this work—the nature of the
44
45
Albertus Magnus, In quatuor libros sententiarum, II, Dist VIII, A, Art. 3, ed. Borgnet,
171r–172v.
Maimonides refers to his discussion in the introduction to m. Avot, known as “Eight
chapters,” here ch. 8. Later on, he dedicates an even more systematic discussion to this
question in Guide, II, 29.
European Journal of Jewish Studies 15 (2021) 201–224
218
Schwartz
human soul and intellect and their perfection—his general attitude is unique.
Although he was writing during the last decades of the thirteenth century, in
an era totally dominated by Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle, he insists
on remaining faithful to some of Avicenna’s ontological principles. Hence, in
the second part of his work he adheres to an Avicennian definition of the soul
as a separate substance attached to the body. He attributes to Maimonides the
opinion that the perfected human being, after reaching the level of moral and
intellectual perfection “has returned, even in his lifetime to be at the level of
the highest angels and even high above them.”46 Here Hillel goes beyond the
limits of many of the rationalists—certainly beyond those of Maimonides
himself—when he claims that:
While being at that level he can work all the miracles that we find by the
prophets and the sages of the Talmud, that they were raising the dead
back to life through prayer, and bringing a sudden death on the living
as punishment. And they would create human beings and animals, and
make the rain fall or stop it from falling down, and they would have done
all these great miracles while being alive, in one single moment, as a
pure act of their will, without any usage of holy names, simply by arriving at that angelic level of existence […]. And blessed is the one who has
reached that level [of perfection], because the angels and all the heavenly
bodies are standing to his command, without any usage of holy names.47
As the final goal of philosophic contemplation, here Hillel is introducing a perfect act of will that subdues the powers of nature. The closest possible source
for that would be a rather well-known passage in Avicenna’s Kitab al-Nafs [Liber
De anima]48 in which Avicenna defines one of three kinds of prophecy. The
other two lead the prophet to an intuitive grasp [ḥads] of general principles of
46
47
48
Hillel ben Shemu’el of Verona, Sefer Tagmule ha-Nefesh [Book of the Rewards of the Soul],
Critical Edition with Introduction and Commentary by J. Sermoneta (Jerusalem: Israel
Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1981), 116–117, l. 160–166.
Ibid., 167–168, l. 167–176: ‫ בה יעשה כל הנפלאות שמצאנו לנביאים‬,‫ובזאת המדרגה שהוא בה‬
‫ וממיתים את החיים פתאום‬,‫ולחכמי התלמוד שהיו מחיים את המתים בהתפללם עליהם‬
‫ וכל הדומה לזה‬,‫ ובוראים אנשים ובעלי חיים ומורידים המטר ועוצרים אותו‬.‫בהענישם אותם‬
‫ בלי שום השבעת‬,‫מאלה המופתים הגדולים היו עושים אותם פתאום בחייהם ברצונם לבד‬
‫ כי המלאכים‬,‫ ומי שהגיע לכך אשריו‬.]…[ ‫ בהגיעם לזו המדרגה שהיא מדרגה מלאכית‬,‫שם‬
.‫ בלי שום השבעת שם קודש‬,‫וצבא מרום נשמעים לו פתאום‬
See Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), 118–122; Dag Nikolas Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West:
The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160–1300 (London: Warburg Institute,
2000), 154–165.
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thought and especially of the middle terms of syllogism and through it to the
knowledge of future contingent events;49 the current kind of prophecy leads
the prophet’s will to reach out beyond the subjective realm of the individual
and gives him power over material objects.50 The implementation of the same
principle for angelic activity upon humans is fairly coherent, whereas the
vehement denial of such causal interaction in both directions by Zeraḥyah is
perfectly in line with mainstream rationalistic Maimonideanism of the time.
If Hillel’s basic ideas can be traced back to Avicenna, Alkindi, and Arabic
hermeneutic tradition, his direct sources lie in Latin Scholasticism both in its
cosmology and in its relation to the interpretation of biblical angelic narratives. Elsewhere I have dealt with the scholastic denial of Arabic cosmology
in order to claim that one of the basic motivations of Latin theologians to
reject the cosmologies of Arab thinkers such as Alkindi, Alfarabi, Avicenna,
and Maimonides, was precisely their implication for Bible exegesis, whereas
scholastic theologians were much too indebted to the literal sense of biblical angelology.51 The Scholastics were very much aware of Maimonides’s hermeneutic strategy and generally rejected it.52 At the same time, Albert the
Great and Thomas Aquinas both introduced the basic principles of natural
philosophy into their interpretation of angels in general and biblical narratives about angels in particular. Aquinas’s position in his newly formulated
49
50
51
52
Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Nafs [=Kitāb al-Shifā, al-Tabi’yyāt, VI], book V, ch. 6; Fazlur Rahman
(ed.), Avicenna’s De Anima (Arabic Text): Being the Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā
(London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 248, l. 9–250, l. 4 [Arabic].
Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Nafs, book IV, ch. 4; Rahman, Avicenna’s De Anima, 200, l. 11–201, l. 9;
Hasse, Avicennas’s De Anima in the Latin West, 156. For a scholastic depiction of these three
prophetic powers, see Thomas Aquinas, De veritate 12, l. 3: “Praeterea ad prophetiam non
requiruntur nisi tria, scilicet claritas intelligentiae et perfectio virtutis imaginativae et
potestas animae ut ei materia exterior oboediat ut Avicenna ponit in .iv. de naturalibus”;
Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect, 123: “In addition to intellectual
prophecy and imaginative prophecy, both of which are cognitive phenomena, Avicenna
recognizes the possibility of man’s effecting changes in the physical world through an act
of sheer will, and he calls that phenomenon prophecy as well.”
Yossef Schwartz, “Divine Space and the Space of the Divine: On the Scholastic Rejection
of Arab Cosmology,” in Représentations et conceptions de l’espace dans la culture medieval,
eds. Tiziana Suarez Nani and Martin Rohde (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2011), 89–119. Idem,
“Celestial Motion, Immaterial Causality and the Latin Encounter with Arabic Aristotelian
Cosmology,” in Albertus Magnus und der Ursprung der Universitätsidee, ed. Ludger
Honnefelder (Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2011), 277–298, 500–511.
Albertus Magnus, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, I, 4, 8; ed. Colon, 17, l. 2;
58, l. 19–29: “Ordines autem inrelligentiarum, quas nos determinavimus, Quidam dicunt
esse ordines angelorum et intelligentias vocant angelos. Et hoc quidem dicunt Isaac et
Rabbi Moyses et ceteri philosophi Iudaeorum. Sed nos hoc verum esse non credimus.”
Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, I, Q. 50, Art. 3.
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discussion of angels as part of natural sciences53 is relevant for many of the
issues discussed above.
Within the long series of topics discussed in the Summa, Thomas does not
have any problem admitting that, generally, angels control and manipulate
earthly matters, or in his words: “Therefore, as the inferior angels who have the
less universal forms, are ruled by the superior, so are all corporeal things ruled
by the angels. This is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all
philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal substances.”54
In Question 111, Thomas then raises the question of the possibility of direct
action of angels on man, dividing his discussion between different levels of
human perception and different interfaces between human body and mind.
The discussion moves from human intellect, which is not exposed to direct
manipulations by external entities (Art. 1) to man’s will, which retains its autonomy and freedom thanks to its subjugation to the intellect (Art. 2). Matters are
different when it comes to man’s imagination (Art. 3) and finally to the human
senses (Art. 4), since both faculties can be easily manipulated and deceived.
Such a line of argumentation places Thomas in a position very close to that formulated by Hillel. There is, however, a clear difference between Thomas’s and
Hillel’s solutions. First, Thomas does not doubt at all the existence of the actual
angel as a real substance occupying a place in the world, even if this place is a
direct derivation of his concrete earthly mission and does not truly represent
his divine essence. In that aspect, Naḥmanides’s abovementioned assertion
regarding the garment or garb [malbush] is much closer to a normal scholastic
explanation than the complicated explanatory mechanism offered by Hillel.55
The second point is an indirect consequence of the first. In the encounter
between human and angelic nature, no role is preserved for a human projection of the angelic appearance. The only effort is invested in the preservation
of an autonomous realm of human agency which cannot be directly manipulated by external forces such as angels and demons. This is the realm of free
will secured and defined by the intellective capacity. It is, though, rather fragile because external powers might easily manipulate not only extra-mental
physical elements but also the human body and its animative parts like sense
53
54
55
The bulk of this discussion in its most mature form is to be found in ST I, Q. 53–64, 106–117,
while different relevant topics are discussed throughout his work from De ente et essentia
(early 1250) all the way to his later composition De substantiis separatis (about 1268).
ST I, Q. 110, Art. 1 (“Utrum creatura corporalis administretur per Angelos”), Solutio: “Et ideo
sicut inferiores Angeli, qui habent formas minus universales, reguntur per superiores; ita
omnia corporalia reguntur per Angelos et hoc non solum a sanctis doctoribus ponitur, sed
etiam ab omnibus philosophis qui incorporeas substantias posuerunt.”
Cf. Elliot R. Wolfson, “The Secret of the Garment in Naḥmanides,” Daat 24 (1990): xxv–lxix.
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perception and imagination.56 This, however, brings us to the third point: for
Aquinas there is no problem in assuming an external intervention of angelic
or daemonic forces within human bodily organs and mental capacities.57 This
stands in contrast to Hillel, who, while directing the external manipulation to
the air surrounding Jacob, presents him as a fully autonomous agent, retaining
his inner mental powers intact.
Hillel’s formulation in its strong naturalistic tone lies closer to that of Albert
the Great and Pseudo-Albertus’s magical and natural writings. According to
Caterina Rigo’s analysis of Albert the Great’s encounter with Maimonides58
one can trace a turning point within Albert’s early intellectual development
around the writing of the second part of his commentary on the Sentences
and the second redaction of his De IV coaequaevis around 1246. From then on,
Albert the theologian, in contrast to the former scholar of artes, was not willing to accept the identification between angels and intelligences, rejected the
concept of animated spheres, and rejected the concept of secondary causes.59
And yet, Albert was much more open in his speculations to the integration of
magical elements into his system. In another passage of De animalibus XXII:
5, Albert quotes Hermes, Plato, and Avicenna in order to explain the ability of
the righteous to perform miracles.60 Man, he explains there, occupies a special cosmic place between God and the world. Some unique individuals are
able “to use their mental powers in order to cause transmutations in worldly
entities and are considered therefore to be performers of miracles.” A “human
mind was born to control its body and the world.”61 Things are formulated even
more clearly in a pseudo-Albertian work such as De mirabilibus mundi, where
56
57
58
59
60
61
ST I, Q. 111, Art. 3 (angels manipulating human imagination) and 4 (angels manipulating
human senses). Here Thomas is pointing out Gen 19:11, where the angels in Sodom “struck
the people of Sodom with blindness or aorasia, so that they could not find the door.”
For Thomas’s predecessors in the Dominican order, especially Roland of Cremona, who
applies, on this matter, a synthesis of theological and medical knowledge, see Ayelet Even
Ezra, “Medicine and Religion in Early Dominican Demonology,” Journal of Ecclesiastical
History (2018): 1–18.
Caterina Rigo, “Zur Rezeption des Moses Maimonides im Werk des Albertus Magnus,” in
Albertus Magnus. Zum Gedanken nach 800 Jahren: Neue Zugänge, Aspekte und Perspektiven,
eds. Walter Senner et al. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001), 29–66, here 48–49, 52–53.
Norbert Winkler, “Seele—Engel—Intelligenzen. Ein philosophiegeschichtlicher Einblick,”
in Fragmenta Melanchthoniana 3: Melanchthons Wirkung in der europäischen Bildung­
sgeschichte, eds. Günter Frank and Sebastian Frank (Heidelberg: Verlag Regionalkultur,
2009), 239–264, here 255–261, esp. 258–259.
Albertus Magnus, De animalibus libri XXVI, lib. XXII, tract. 1, cap. 4; Beiträge zur Geschichte
der Philosophie des Mittelalters 16, II, ed. H. Stadler (Münster, 1920): 1353, l. 16–39.
Ibid., l. 20–22: “sicut in optime natis videmus hominibus qui suis animabus agunt ad
corporum mundi transmutationem ita ut miracula facere dicantur.”
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Schwartz
the author expresses his former doubts about the possibility of such miracles,
doubts that were dispelled after he read the passage in Avicenna’s Liber sextus
naturalium. He became even more convinced of the truth of this claim “after
reading other necromantic, talismanic, and magic sources” [Set postquam legi
libros nigromanticos et libros imaginum et magicos].62
The most important point of reference to Hillel’s argument that I was able
to find in Albert’s writings is in his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences,
one of his earliest major theological works, composed in the 1240s. Albert
mentions Maimonides’s interpretation of biblical angels (“quidam Philosophi
Judaeorum”)63 and rejects it in the name of the Catholic teachers [Doctores
autem Catholici]. Albert also mentions, although without concurring, the opinions of those who presume that angels or demons64 can create movements in
the circumferential air surrounding a human body in order to create physical
effects or artificial sounds.65
Like Albert’s, Hillel’s explanation of such phenomena is almost completely
naturalistic. It no longer belongs to the category of prophecy but to the more
general realms of anthropology and psychology.
6
Conclusions: A Remarkable Case of Enforced Ingenuity
How shall we interpret the unique explanatory mechanism suggested by
Hillel? Where does it come from? A major question of modern scholarship
on Hillel relates to his innovativeness or, more precisely, what some modern
scholars define as his lack of any innovative ability. The high estimation he
enjoyed in nineteenth-century scholarship which portrayed him as one of the
most prominent medieval Jewish thinkers was followed by a reversal that was
mostly connected to the discovery of his massive usage of Latin sources. For
many modern scholars, Giuseppe Sermoneta being certainly the most prominent among them, Hillel came to be viewed entirely as an imitator, plagiarizing every single argument or piece of information, and whose originality, if
there were any, rested only on his framing of their inner arrangement within
his own treatise.
62
63
64
65
Ibid.; cf. Lynn Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science (1922; repr., New
York: Columbia University Press, 1943), vol. 2, 720–745.
Albertus Magnus, In II sentent., Dist. VIII, A, Art. 2, Solutio; ed. Borgnet, 170.
Albert states clearly that angels and demons obey the same laws of nature, at least in
relations with the specific issues dealt with in this article. On demonology in the early
Dominican order see Even Ezra, Medicine and Religion in Early Dominican Demonology.
Magnus, In II sentent., Dist. VIII, E, Art. 10.
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I have devoted some effort to ‘rehabilitate’ Hillel as an independent and
original thinker belonging to a category of intellectuals who derive much of
their speculative power from their intermediary position between different
cultures, disciplines, and languages.66 Moreover, I have pointed out the fact
that Hillel himself was very much aware of the question and took the trouble to
differentiate between different levels of originality and to explicitly state this.
Indeed, in some cases, Hillel very openly acknowledges his total dependence on external sources. In these cases, Hillel does not only reveal some of
his own methods of philosophizing but describes them as part of a scholastic
tradition, as a long and continuous chain of transmission.67
In other cases though, Hillel insists on the originality of his claim, with
utterances such as: “until now I never found anyone that explained it the way
I do,”68 or: “And you should know, that those things are not to be found in any
book known among us, and even the wise men of the gentiles have not been
aware of them until I drew their attention, and afterwards they confirmed my
assertions and copied them from my work.”69
And yet, in his dispute with Zeraḥyah, Hillel seems to stretch his innovativeness to a degree elsewhere unknown. I tend to read Zeraḥyah’s helplessness
regarding such a position as an authentic gesture, i.e., to assume that Zeraḥyah
truly cannot grasp the possible origins of such an attitude. It seems that it originated out of a rather unique position of dual commitment. Hillel is driven to
his “post-cartesian” position because he cannot deny the hermeneutic imperatives of Maimonides while, at the same time, both his Ashkenazic sources
and his Christian scholastic background forced him not to discard entirely the
66
67
68
69
Yossef Schwartz, “Imagined Classrooms? Revisiting Hillel of Verona’s Autobiographical
Records,” in Schüler und Meister, Miscellanea mediaevalia 39, eds. Andreas Speer and
Thomas Jeschke (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2016), 483–502.
Hillel, Sefer Tagmule ha-Nefesh I, 5; 72, l. 208–216: “And I shall return now to my main
discussion, which is the interpretation of the three levels of the intellect according to
Averroes and Alexander and Themistius, the commentators of Aristotle’s works. Indeed,
these matters are more understandable for us from the words of this man than from the
original formulation of Aristotle, because they discussed them from all possible angles
and studied them in the most precise manner, and understood exactly the meaning of
his words. And as long as it will seem to me sufficient to repeat their sayings about the
matter letter by letter as one who copies from one book to another, I shall do so, and when
it seems not sufficient to write their words letter by letter I will add to them as much as
necessary so that they would be more and more manifest to the reader until they would
be evidently clear [‫]מחוורים כשלמה‬. And those additions of mine are also taken from the
books of Aristotle or derive from their strict meaning, not from my own heart, and it is not
of my purpose to praise myself for a property that is not mine.”
Sefer Tagmule ha-Nefesh, I, 3; 35, l. 165–168.
Ibid., 45, l. 305–307.
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literal meaning of Scripture. The same Latin tradition also directs him towards
the method of a scientific philosophical solution. It seems that ingenuity too
is liable to become an imposed position, one into which a thinker might be led
by a network of currents and commitments resulting from the unique topography of his surrounding intellectual environment.
In a sense, the true subject of our story is the emerging Hebrew scientificphilosophical vocabulary that is shaping a new public sphere, which can function as a ‘trading zone’ of separate cultures, source-languages, and spiritual
orientations. The basic incommensurability between our two protagonists’
positions does not prevent them from freely communicating with each other
in a common language, very similar in its syntax and style. As I hope I have
demonstrated in this article, the highly personal and rather local polemic
between them cannot be truly approached without a comprehensive study
of the various intellectual traditions that were amalgamated into the Hebrew
vocabulary of their time.
European Journal of Jewish Studies 15 (2021) 201–224