Political Economy Study of Rwanda
Learning Journey on Development Effectiveness in the SENAP
Region
Contents
Summary .................................................................................................................................... iv
1.0
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1
1.1
A Word on Method ................................................................................................................. 1
1.2
SDC’s Positioning in Rwanda ................................................................................................... 1
1.3
Structure of the Report ........................................................................................................... 2
2.0
Measures of Authoritarianism in Rwanda .......................................................................... 2
2.1
Standards of Measurement .................................................................................................... 2
2.2
Some Evidence of Authoritarianism ....................................................................................... 2
2.3
Evidence of a Liberal Approach............................................................................................... 4
2.4
The Purpose in Categorising Rwanda?.................................................................................... 6
3.0
Relevant History and the Regional Contest ........................................................................ 6
3.1
A Summary of the History ....................................................................................................... 6
3.2
Regional Contests.................................................................................................................... 7
3.3
Summary of the Pressures upon Rwandan Government ....................................................... 9
4.0
Maintaining Control From Top to Bottom ....................................................................... 9
4.1
Mixing Direct Control with Legitimisation .............................................................................. 9
4.2
Contradictions Between these Strategies ............................................................................. 10
4.3
Establishing Local Control in this Context ............................................................................. 10
4.4
Local Democracy or Local Control? ....................................................................................... 11
5.0
Development of the Economy ......................................................................................... 11
5.1
Some Real, Technical Economic Constraints ........................................................................ 12
5.2
Facilitating Measures and General Results ........................................................................... 12
5.3
Core Businesses..................................................................................................................... 13
5.4
Debt....................................................................................................................................... 14
5.5
Development Vs Control Contradictions .............................................................................. 14
5.6
Performance Challenges ....................................................................................................... 15
5.7
Imperatives to Improve Economic Policy Implementation .................................................. 15
6.0
Implications for Approaches in Rwanda ........................................................................... 16
6.1
Summary of DP Approaches and Sectors.............................................................................. 16
6.2
SDC in the Great Lakes Region .............................................................................................. 19
6.3
Implications of this paper for the Means of Delivery ........................................................... 20
6.3.1
Direct or Indirect Support? ........................................................................................... 20
6.3.2
Bi-Lateral and Multi-Lateral Agencies ........................................................................... 21
6.3.3
Normative or Solution-Driven Vs Demand-Driven Approaches ................................... 21
6.4
Possible Approach Evolution in Specific Project Cases ......................................................... 23
6.5
Indirect Vs Direct Advocacy .................................................................................................. 25
6.6
Governance Dependence on a Class-Based Society? ........................................................... 26
i
6.7
Managing the Risks of Working in Rwanda .......................................................................... 27
6.7.1
The Threat of Violence .................................................................................................. 27
6.7.2
Reputational Risk .......................................................................................................... 28
7.0
Conclusion and Recommendations .................................................................................. 28
List of Annexes
Annex 1
Annex 2
Annex 3
Annex 4
Annex 5
Annex 6
Delivery Against the Terms of Reference
Bibliography
History and Regional Contests
Control from Top to Bottom
Growth and Control
A Guide to Issues Based or Problem Driven Working Approaches
List of Box Titles
Box 1
Box 2
Box 3
Box 4
Box 5
Box 6
Box 7
Box 8
Box 9
Box 10
Box 11
Box 12
Box 13
Swedish Embassy in Rwanda Summary
DFID in Rwanda Summary
USAID in Rwanda Summary
World Bank in Rwanda Summary
One-UN in Rwanda Summary
PROMOST T-VET programme summary
Civil Society and Ikiraro Programme Summary
Citizen Participation Programme Summary
BRICKS Programme Summary
PROMOST Programme Future Development Options
Civil Society and Advocacy Programme Future Development Options
Citizen Participation Programme Future Development Options
BRICKS Programme Future Development Options
Abbreviations
AfDB
AFDL
APTC
CBHI
CBS
CPCP
CSO
CoK
DFID
DPs
DPCG
DRC
EDPRS
FDU-Inkingi
FOJO
GDP
GoR
HRW
IBRD
IDA
IMF
IOB
African Development Bank
Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo
Agro Processing Trust Corporation Ltd.
Community Based Health Insurance Scheme
Community Based Socio-Psychotherapy
Citizen Participation and Conflict Prevention
Civil Society Organisation
City of Kigali
Department for International Development (UKAID)
Development Partners
Development Partner Coordination Group
Democratic Republic of Congo
the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
United Democratic Forces of Rwanda
Fojo Media Institute, Sweden
Gross Domestic Product
Government of the Republic of Rwanda
Human Rights Watch
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
International Development Association - WB
International Monetary Fund
Institute of Development Policy, Antwerpen
ii
JADF
MINAGRI
MINALOC
MINICOM
MRND
NST
NURC
OCP Africa
ODI
PEA
PFM
PROMOST
PS
PSTA
RAB
RGB
RMCD
RPF
RRA
SDC
SENAP
SMEs
SSA
TWP
UN
USAID
V-DEM
VUP
Joint Action Development Forum
Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Local Government
Ministry of Trade and Industry
Movement Republicain National pour la Democratie et le Developpment
National Strategy for Transformation
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
Office Chérifien des Phosphates Africa Ltd.
Overseas Development Institute
Political Economic Analysis
Public Financial Management
Promoting Market Oriented Skills Training and Employment
Permanent Secretary
Strategic Plan for the Agriculture Sector
Rwanda Agriculture Board
Rwanda Governance Board
Rwandan Movement for Democratic Change
Rwanda Patriotic Front
Rwanda Revenue Authority
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
Southern, Eastern and Northern Africa and Occupied Palestine Territories
Small and Medium Scale Enterprises
Sub-Saharan Africa
Thinking and Working Politically
United Nations
US AID
Varieties of Democracy
Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme
Disclaimer
The contents of this report in no way reflect the views of SDC.
iii
Summary
The Task at Hand and General Conclusion
SDC currently focusses its efforts in Rwanda on Diplomacy and dialogue, which includes
governance, civil society and media; Employment and Income Generation; Health and GBV,
including Psycho-Social support in the realm of reconciliation; and Civil protection.
It does not provide direct support to GoR.
Rwanda is “classified” as a liberal autocracy. What are the implications of this for how SDC may
effectively engage so as to promote governance improvements and prevent any backslide
towards more authoritarian governance?
This study is intended to answer this key question. It does so by presenting a political economic
analysis of Rwanda’s progress. By understanding the contradictions faced by the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) Government, in maintaining post Genocide control while delivering a broadbased development dividend, it helps to reveal why some Western standards of democratic
governance are resisted, and why sometimes the State turns to violence.
This shows that “backsliding” towards authoritarianism is not evident. On the contrary it tends
to indicate that there are avenues and means through which SDC may expect to have a positive
impact on public inclusion, though not on all topics.
The Analysis
Understanding the Political Economy of Rwanda requires that we understand the key reasons
behind the
“Genocide against the Tutsi”, because these have a profound impact on the
strategy for growth and stability adopted by the RPF.1
Major causes of the Genocide included the loss of some elements of control within the Hutu
elite, and fear of RPF invasion, while pressure from DPs to democratise as they sought to assist
an economy in crisis in the early 1990s provided a fertile platform for the spread of radical
politics. These threats are no longer present, but the need to keep them at bay preoccupies
Rwandan society.
Related conflict across the borders with DRC, Burundi and Uganda, in which Rwanda is involved,
continue to provide external threats to stability.
The RPF is patently aware of these threats, and is desperate (some might say to the point of
paranoia) to make sure it does not lose control. In order to do this it adopts a dual strategy.
The first element is to sustain a close observe-and-control network down through the levels of
the government, backed up to-some-extent by home-grown systems that build on Rwandan topdown culture. The second is to ensure that loyalty is rewarded with access to resources, though
rarely to the point of grand corruption, which in turn helps to sustain a commitment to relatively
high levels of performance (output).
The Party also seeks (allegedly) to influence or “capture” businesses that exhibit success, partly
as a fund-raising mechanism, but also to ensure that such success does not give life to
potentially destabilising, political movements. In some cases where this fails, internally or
externally, the Government is accused of resorting to violence. In some limited theatres the RPF
has lost control over some armed groups, but otherwise violence is allegedly quite carefully
targeted.
Of equal importance to this strategy is the combined desire to develop the economy with a
modern world vision, not just for the benefit of loyal elites, but also for the wider population.
1
Note that it is a legal requirement in Rwanda to refer to the Genocide as, “The Genocide against the Tutsi”. Certainly
the majority of the estimated
,
who died were Tutsi’s, but of course Tutsis also killed Hutus, not least during the
RPF’s invasion, and by Hutus against Hutus as some refused to partake in the killings. In this report we refer to the
genocide merely as, “the Genocide”.
iv
The majority of poor rural dwellers are Hutu, and the RPF recognises that this group must be led
to appreciate that they are better off under the current Government than they were or would be
under the pre-1994 version.
Material results are broadly positive, and generally speaking the evidence suggests that
distribution is not ethnically biased. Indeed both on the ground and at the centre, some
deliberate selections of key positions go to Hutus, and these people benefit and are seen to
benefit. In some cases where improvements have slowed down, it may be that efforts are made
to present a brighter picture than the truth would sustain.
There remain challenges in developing the economy effectively. One is the contradiction
between “industrial” growth and the need to improve service delivery. Another is a by-product
of the centralised control system that operatives are reluctant to step out of line and provide
criticism. The lack of consultation and inclusion is as much for this reason as it is about control,
and can lead to policy mistakes.
Some of these weaknesses are, however, being recognised, and there are examples now,
especially in key economic sectors that affect the poor, of ways in which government is actively
seeking better citizen engagement in policy development and implementation. These cases
seem to offer good examples of positive, and relatively risk free entry points, where both
technical and governance improvements can be realised.
Implications for SDC Engagement and Risk Management
There is no reason to suppose that better results might be obtained if SDC commenced budget
support. Continuing with similar delivery methods as now is reasonable.
There is evidence though from some of SDC’s joint donor programming that engagement on
technical issues, if these are chosen in a way that is informed by political understanding, can also
produce positive governance results.
In these cases it may make sense for SDC to join forces with other donors if the approaches are
deemed to be sufficiently similar. This can add weight to SDC’s programme impact because its
programme remains relatively small roughly one percent of total aid assistance to Rwanda.
Generally the potential for this seems best in sectors related to economic growth, and to some
extent service delivery, as the government needs to see improved results in these areas. There is
a growing realisation that public inclusion is required in order for further poverty-reducing
advances to be made. This is in contrast with many other SSA countries where legitimisation
through policy delivery is of little importance.
Such an approach may be especially effective where research findings and dialogue are
conducted initially behind closed doors. This improves the sense of security amongst public
servants who are under pressure not to make mistakes.
There are opportunities for SDC to make connections between some lines of its current work, for
example between vocational training and building sustainable futures through support to SME
growth policy at MINICOM. It appears that opportunities like this may currently be being missed.
Finally the risk of violence interfering with SDC’s work in Rwanda is currently minimal, though
regional tensions remain significant. But the chances of another major, genocide event are
judged to be close to zero, because the conditions that pertained in 1994 are almost completely
absent.
However, there is reputational risk of being involved with a Government that should yet be
expected to engage in violence where potential opposition movements are seen to present a
threat to ethnic reconciliation. This reputational risk may be best managed by sustaining an
approach that avoids direct support, maintains involvement in Multi-Donor Forums (DPCG)
where objections to government actions can be discussed, but which focusses providing support
local actors to bring their own collaborative contribution to GoR efforts to make positive policy
changes.
v
1.0 Introduction
For SDC, Rwanda is classified as a “Liberalised Autocracy”, and the number of such (authoritarian)
governments in the Southern, Eastern and Northern Africa and Occupied Palestine Territories
(SENAP) region is presumed to be on the increase. What does this mean for the way in which SDC,
and in the SENAP region in particular, should engage in such countries? Specifically how may SDC
engage in a strategic way in these kinds of countries in order to reduce the perceived drift towards
increased authoritarianism, and thence have a positive impact on improving governance in these
difficult environments?
The task of thinking and learning about this challenge is being undertaken via four country-specific
political economy studies: Rwanda, Tanzania, Burundi and Egypt. This study is about Rwanda.
Specific tasks and deliverables from the ToR for the study are reproduced in annex 1. Included there
is a reference to where text on each deliverable can be found in this report.
1.1
A Word on Method
The approach follows quite closely that set out in DFID’s “How to Note” on Political Economy,2 but
with some nuances. In particular “structures” are understood as historically created social
relationships, not just physical conditions as the How to Note presumes. 3
The study draws upon existing written material, but also draws upon a series of informal interviews
and meetings with various actors in Rwanda from Civil Society, the Private Sector, Government, DPs,
and academic or think-tank organisations. In order to protect their integrity, these interviewees are
not listed. A bibliography is included as annex 2.
1.2
SDC’s Positioning in Rwanda
SDC’s position and programming in Rwanda are currently at least up until two years ago founded
upon a presumption that direct efforts on achieving governance improvements may not be
productive. The Rwandan Government is perceived to be reluctant to engage with such
progamming.
In addition, primarily for reasons of perceived risk concerning elite capture, but also the knowledge
that GoR and Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF the Ruling Party) resources may be used in repressive
political and human rights actions (see 2.2 below for some details), SDC does not provide direct
budget support to Government. This is in contrast for example with DFID and the UN, but consistent
with the position taken by USAID. The Swedish Embassy does provide direct support, but it is
channelled through the Government’s VUP programme, and therefore (we may presume) goes
directly to the poor.
Accordingly SDC supports programmes that work alongside government. There is a focus on
humanitarian assistance, cross-border peace facilitation, civil society engagement, and on vocational
training. (Section 6.2 of this report looks at SDC’s current programme in Rwanda in more detail.)
2
3
DFID, 2009, “Political Economy Analysis How to Note”.
Bhaskar, Roy, 2008: A Realist Theory of Science, Routledge; and Sayer, Andrew, 1992: Method in Social Science: A
Realist Approach, Routledge.
1
However, questions remain, and the current PEA study is intended to inform further thinking about
where and how SDC might modify its engagement so as to improve results whilst also managing risk.
In particular:
Should SDC consider funding directly through government;
Should it provide programming that has direct governance improvement objectives; and
How is it possible to raise the level of inclusion in government decision-making, and would
this help to achieve poverty-reducing policy improvements?
1.3
Structure of the Report
The study is structured through the following sections:
Section 2:
Section 3:
Section 4:
Section 5:
Section 6:
Section 7:
Presents some evidence concerning Rwanda’s liberal autocracy categorisation.
Provides a very brief introduction to the history of ethnic conflict, plus an assessment of
contemporary regional contests.
Examines what this means for contradictions between political control and
legitimisation tasks.
Looks at the economy and the contradiction between needs of the elite and the poor.
Review’s SDC’s programme in Rwanda in this context, and draws out recommendations.
Briefly summarises the conclusions, and the main recommendations for SDC future
strategising.
2.0 Measures of Authoritarianism in Rwanda
2.1
Standards of Measurement
SDC has developed a position on measurements of Authoritarianism in governance, together with a
range of related categories: Authoritarian; Liberalised Authoritarian; Limited Political Democracies;
and Political Democracies.4 SDC’s paper on this subject extracts data from the V-Dem dataset5 to
classify countries in the SENAP region. The V-Dem is one of many governance measurement
frameworks, which can be taken to include the World Bank’s Kaufman Indicators.6
It is implied that there is a logical, progression along a continuum through these categories or types
of State, with political democracy being the desired destination. Also, it is implied that there may be
common strategies applicable in each type which could be more effective than others.
The extracted data from V-Dem is used to categorise Rwanda as being a liberal autocracy. This
implies that the space for strategic influence is limited. The current study is intended to explore the
extent to which this may be true, and to use PEA to identify alternative approaches or points of
effective entry, as well as risks involved in such programming.
2.2
Some Evidence of Authoritarianism
The classification “liberalised autocracy” suggests that there are significant authoritarian
characteristics, but that there are also indications of liberalisation. What is not implied is the current
4
5
6
This categorisation is based upon propositions by O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe Schmitter; 1986; Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies; Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press.
See https://www.v-dem.net/en/
Kaufman, Daniel, Kraay, Aart, and Mastruzzi, Massimo. 2007. “Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for
1996
.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280. http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2007/07/10/000016406_20070710125923/Rendere
d/PDF/wps4280.pdf Google Scholar
2
direction of change along the continuum, but SDC is obviously concerned if there is evidence of what
is termed “backsliding”, and if so how a reversal might be influenced. Let us take a look at some of
the evidence.
The RPF Government has been accused over the past 20 years or so (it came to power through the
post-genocide liberation in 1994, and Paul Kagame became the National President in 2000) of
committing a range of human rights offences. This includes alleged war crimes directed against
hundreds of thousands of fleeing Hutu genocide perpetrators (genocidaires) across the border in
DRC in the years following the genocide. Reputedly some 2 million Hutus fled Rwanda to the
Rutshuru area of North East DRC following the RPF liberation, which brought an end to the
genocide.7 Many of these were taken to be remnants of the Interahamwe,8 and were later pursued.
In 1996 Hutu settlers in Rutshuru were attacked by the Rwandan-backed Alliance of Democratic
Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), and conflict has continued. In ensuing years a range of
different rebel groups emerged, some reputedly supported by the Governments in Rwanda and
Uganda, though both denied such allegations.9 In fact these conflicts have not just been about
retribution against Hutu perpetrators, but also about control of both territory and the rare metals
mined in these areas, and about the balance of regional interest and support for or opposition to the
RPF government in Kigali. The last of these is largely what lies behind recent incursions across the
southern border with Burundi. For the moment (though this conclusion is debated later on) we can
say that, whatever the cause, the alleged actions do not appear to represent the actions of a
government bent on democratisation.
There are also allegations of HR abuses in a variety of prisons, for example at the Gikondo Transit
Centre in Kigali. According to the Government this centre receives individuals who disturb public
order and security. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports that these include, “sex workers, street
hawkers, homeless people, suspected petty criminals, and others… with … detainees held in
deplorable and degrading conditions and beaten by police or other detainees, with the assent or on
the orders of the police.” 10 The HRW report also says that three men were convicted of criminal
conspiracy in 2015, but were actually being held for working with opposition political movements
abroad. There are also the now notorious cases of those held for attempted, or accused of
successful, assassinations, mainly in South Africa. It is evident that these events are illustrative of a
government in Rwanda that will go to some lengths to prevent political opposition organising itself.
These are hardly indications of positive democratic practices, but what about the electoral system?
The Presidential elections at least are founded on universal suffrage. But again, HRW expresses a
dim view, stating that, “Kagame’s landslide win (98.79 percent in the 2017 election) came as no
surprise in a context in which Rwandans who have dared raise their voices or challenge the status
quo have been arrested, forcibly disappeared, or killed, independent media have been muzzled, and
intimidation has silenced groups working on civil rights or free speech.”11
7
8
9
10
11
See “Rwandan Genocide: Domino Effect in DR Congo”: news report, April
. This report and other articles caused
considerable tension between Rwanda and the UK at the time. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-26946982
Meaning in Kinyarwanda is “those who stick together”. The Interahamwe, founded in 1990, was the militia of the
Movement Revolutionaire National pour le Developpment, a Hutu youth organisation connected to the Movement
Republicain National pour la Democratie et le Developpment (MRND). It played a leading role in the massacre, torture
and mistreatment of Tutsis during the 1994 Genocide. See the Genocide Archive of Rwanda:
http://www.genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php/Topic:Interahamwe_militia
See, “DR Congo claims defeat of M rebels,” BBC November
. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa24815241
See Human Rights Watch, Rwanda Events of 2015: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/rwanda
See Human Rights Watch, Rwanda: Politically Closed Elections: A Chronology of Violations, 2017:
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/18/rwanda-politically-closed-elections
3
Is there a slightly different picture when it comes to parliamentary elections? There are 80 seats in
the house of deputies, of which 53 are elected by universal suffrage (proportional representation)
with the remaining 27 reserved to be chosen by local and national councils. However, while the
President and the Chamber of Deputies are (largely) directly elected, the Senate is not, and nor are
District Councillors (the latter involve nominations by community leaders, and are therefore
considered to be less than democratic according to Western definitions). The press is now formally
more “free” than it was, with establishment of a self-regulatory system, though self-censorship is
commonly practiced.
Meanwhile a series of home-grown systems, such as Imihigo and Ubudehe, are seen by some as topdown mechanisms for control, as much as they are intended for consultation and development.
(Section 4 below looks in more detail at the form of local “democracy” and the part played by these
home-grown systems.) Writers such as Gokgur and Reyntjens argue that close relationships between
business and ruling elites demonstrate the purpose of “development” as being the accumulation of
resources in the hands of a few.12 (We also consider some of these matters in more detail below.)
Yet of the 53 elected seats in the House of Deputies, only 40 were won by the RPF (including 4 by socalled RPF affiliates). For the first time there were 13 seats won by supposedly bona-fide opposition
groups, including the Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Green Party.13 Victoire Ingabire,
the leader of the FDU-Inkingi Party (which did not win any seats) was arrested on treason charges in
2012, but was released in 2018.
On the face of it these events might seem to indicate a gentle “improvement” since the Presidential
election. There may be some logic to this, seeing as the President was successful in obtaining a
change to the constitution in 2015 allowing him to run for a third 7 year term. Since then there have
been other indications of a softening of approach to governance, for example through a greater
readiness to consider policy change evidence from Civil Society. There remains counter evidence
however, for example with the very recent killing of the vice-Chairman of Ingabire’s Party, which she
claims was intended as political intimidation, but which the President has dismissed as a fabricated
accusation spread by the self-righteous “West”.14
2.3
Evidence of a Liberal Approach
The softening mentioned above is evident in other ways. Some writers indeed take a fundamentally
different position on Rwanda from the likes of Gokgur and Reyntjens, though the direction of change
remains open to question.
Booth, Golooba-Muttebi, and Kelsall, all describe Rwanda as a “developmental state”, owing to its
rapid growth since the Genocide against the Tutsi, and the palpable policy of economic investment,
forms of industrialisation, and poverty reduction (though doubt has been cast upon the validity of
recent poverty reduction data).15 They assert that this developmental policy is born from the critical
12
13
14
15
Gokgur, N.,
, “Rwanda’s ruling-party owned enterprises: Do they enhance or impede Development?”, Discussion
Paper: Antwerp: Institute of Development Policy and Management, and Reyntjens, F.,
, “Constructing the Truth,
Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in Post Genocide Rwanda”, African Affairs, 110, 438, pp 134.
See, “Rwanda’s Opposition Wins Parliamentary Seats for the First Time,” in Africa News, September
:
https://www.africanews.com/2018/09/06/nothing-will-change-rwanda-s-opposition-wins-parliamentary-seats-forfirst-time//
See “Rwanda Opposition Leader says ally’s killing was act of Intimidation”, in The Guardian, th September 2019:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/25/rwanda-opposition-leader-victoire-ingabire-ally-killing-actintimidation
Booth, D., and F. Golooba-Mutebi,
, “Developmental Patrimonialism: The case of Rwanda”, in African Affairs,
,
444: pp 379 40 , and Kelsall, T.,
, “Business, Politics and the State of Africa: Challenging the Orthodoxies on
Growth and Transformation”, London, Zed Books.
4
need for the GoR, and the RPF in particular, to legitimise itself with a broad constituency. Also
backing-up this argument are the numerous cases where policy has been changed in response to
observed problems in the field and on the basis of advocacy by non-state actors. We know this to be
the case for example concerning changes in taxation law aimed at assisting the growth of SMEs, the
majority of which are, as it happens, Hutu-owned. While there is evidence of corruption it is nothing
like as bad as in many other African countries (Rwanda ranks 48th in TI’s
corruption index, the
highest ranked in sub-Saharan Africa bar Cape Verdi . On the World Bank’s ease of doing business
index it ranks 29th out of 190 countries, an improvement from 143rd since 2008. While media was
heavily controlled in the past, it is now largely self-regulated (which in a Country where the media
was used in the past to stir up inter-racial hatred is no small achievement).16 Other studies
demonstrate that through Imihigo and other mechanisms, such as RGB’s Citizens Report Card, there
are high degrees of accountability amongst government staff. (This last assertion is questioned
however in the analysis in section 4 below.)
Rwanda also has one of the best evidenced records of improvements in Women’s participation.
“Women hold percent of seats in the lower house of Rwanda’s national legislature, the largest
share of any country. For comparison, only 19 percent of seats in the U.S. House are held
by women.”17 This ranks it number 1 in the world for political participation of women, compared
with 96th for the USA. How contrived is this however? It is not so clear that this involvement has yet
delivered better results for women in poor parts of society. The population in 1994 after the
genocide is estimated to have been over 60 percent female, so it could be said to have been
inevitable that women should take a leading role in the country’s reconstruction, and there is plenty
of evidence that this has both been encouraged, and has happened. While there is still a way to go in
overcoming cultural constraints to female emancipation, it must also be acknowledged that formal
freedoms and rights have improved.18 Attendance at school is higher amongst girls than it is amongst
boys.19
In a more general sense it is undeniable that Rwanda presents a relatively “rules-based governance”,
a term that is often stated in conversation about the Country. This means that once rules or
regulations are made, they are generally implemented, sometimes stringently so. For example there
has been a recent road-side clamp-down on drink-driving, at least in Kigali, with on the spot fines
and immediate 5 day prison sentences for those found to be over the limit, punishment which
cannot be reduced by the offer or use of bribes. Similarly the rules on the use of pesticides are both
quite “up-to-date” and reasonably well enforced.20 These instances could be used to suggest that
Rwanda is an authoritarian state, but in fact they are intended to help it become a modern state,
and to enforce a level playing field, an application of the rule of law that is a key element of
preparing a society for a workable democracy.
These indications at least are hardly those of an authoritarian government.
16
17
18
19
20
See Global Voices: “Rwanda: Building Media Regulation”, May
: https://iwpr.net/global-voices/rwanda-buildingmedia-regulation , but note that we draw no implication that this article provides evidence of improved press freedom,
only evidence that a form of self-regulation has been introduced.
See NPR (National Public Radio, Inc. US), “Rwanda the Number . Country for Women in Politics, but not in daily life,”
July 2016: https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2016/07/29/487360094/invisibilia-no-one-thought-this-allwomans-debate-team-could-crush-it?t=1573474425309
See Abbot, Pamela, and Dixon Malunda, “The Promise and Reality: Women’s Rights in Rwanda”, Oxford Human Rights
Hub, Working Paper No. 5, January 2015. http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/OxHRHWorking-Paper-Series-No-5-Abott-and-Malunda.pdf
See:
: Summary of DFID’s work in Rwanda, 2011
.”
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/412396/RwandaSummary.pdf
See: Louise Whipfler and Mechteld der Horst,
, “Pesticide Management in Rwanda,” Wageningen Environmental
Research: https://library.wur.nl/WebQuery/wurpubs/541629
5
2.4
The Purpose in Categorising Rwanda?
Perhaps on the basis of this brief consideration of the evidence above, it is fair to place Rwanda
under a heading of Liberalised Autocracy. It certainly seems to exhibit some of the characteristics of
the two terms. However, as the terms of reference for the current study point out, this does not tell
us much that is useful for informing a strategy for engagement.
For example, according to the O’Donnell and Schmitter chart on different countries,21 Rwanda falls
into the same bracket as Zambia, Morocco, Uganda and Ethiopia. Yet the governance, politics and
economy in each of these is fundamentally different.22 Developing similar strategies for engagement
in each of these countries, just because they fall within the same category, is unlikely yo prove
effective.
In fact the classification is essentially a description of selected current features that does not help to
inform us much about the causes of what we see. It therefore does not help much in identifying
effective strategies for change, or where effective entry points might be. What we need to do is to
investigate the history, the structural influences, the record of agent behaviour, and the current
course of and incentives for change. Especially, why does the RPF seek to eliminate some of its
opponents, while at the same time it appears to present one of the most forward looking, rulesbased and developmental agendas in Africa?
The remainder of this study seeks to answer these questions, and then to examine the implications
for engagement. It starts with a brief look at the most relevant history.
3.0 Relevant History and the Regional Contests
This section is brief, but it is also important. If we do not understand the history of most countries, it
is hard to appreciate the pressures that are placed upon both governments and citizens. This may be
even more true for Rwanda than most places, owing to both the causes as well as the event of the
Genocide against the Tutsi. In order fully to understand Rwanda, we also need to consider its
position in the east African region, and its relations across the border in DRC.
3.1
A Summary of the History
To save on words, a more detailed outline of this history is included as annex 3. The important points
to pick from this history are as follows.
Ethnic difference between Hutu and Tutsi was largely introduced artificially by the
Colonialists, though there is also a narrative concerning the inward migration of “Tutsi”
cattle herders into the region as much as 500 years ago. They nonetheless became culturally
and linguistically integrated with resident tribes. Prior to colonial division the difference had
become a class distinction, between land owners and cattle owners, the latter forming the
elite “class” and providing the monarchy or “Mwami”, but it was possible to migrate from
one class to another. The Belgians however classified according to physical characteristics
and crystalised the difference by labelling identity cards.
21
22
Based on O’Donnell, G., and P. and Schmitter,
, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about
Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
For example in Zambia: there has been no violence to speak of; there is a range of ethnicities with no stand-out group;
a considerable degree of intermarriage in what is the second most urbanised country in Africa; a solid basis in industry
owing to a growing copper-mining, smelting and support services sector; well-developed commercial agriculture and a
surplus of land space; while politics is appreciably more corrupt and driven by patronage; despite there being universal
suffrage, a multi-party system and a record of five peaceful transitions between presidents in the past 29 years.
Rwanda does not exhibit a single one of these characteristics.
6
As the Belgians prepared to leave in the late 1950s, Hutus felt a need to release themselves
both from colonial repression, and from repression by the Tutsi Monarchy.
A series of “genocidal-like” events against Tutsis happened in ensuing years, particularly
around 1960 and 1973. Amongst other things these led to phases of exodus of Tutsi
Rwandans who harboured the intention for many years to return.
Formation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was supported by Museveni in Uganda,
which led to the commencement of invasion and civil war from 1990.
The commencement of RPF invasion instilled a sense of fear amongst the Hutu population as
to what would happen to them if the invasion was successful, a fear that was extenuated by
substantial Hutu repression in neighbouring Burundi in 1993.
Coupled with this the economic crisis in the late 1980s, characterised especially by a fall in
coffee prices, meant that the means of keeping both elite/business classes and the poor
happy/content was considerably weakened. (Poverty rates increased significantly in the
‘ s. The government had to find new means of control.
They sought to do this through stirring up that fear of the Tutsi enemy, and promoting plans
for the “final solution”, a course which was only exacerbated by the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1990, a move foisted on Rwanda in exchange for Structural Adjustment
loans required to bail out the economy. Political movements seeking to ride to electoral
victory on the back of anti-Tutsi ideology were able to flourish.
The shooting down of the President’s plane as he returned from UN meetings in Arusha,
brandishing a peace accord, was the signal to start the killings, which took the lives of an
estimated 800,000 people in a matter of weeks, brough to an end by the RPF invasion.
The Genocide still lives in the minds of all Rwandans and has a considerable effect on politics and
behaviour. Not least the RPF government recognises the significant minority status of the Tutsi, as
well as the various causes of genocide set out above. But it also recognises that Rwandan society is
not merely split along ethnic lines. Indeed just as significant (and often overlooked) is the degree of
class difference. When the Hutu Government lost its ability to use the economy to sustain
compliance in the late 1980s, it was elements of the Hutu elite who proceeded to prepare and
organise the majority in the country-side to commit genocide.
3.2
Regional Contests
While the main reasons for RPF’s concern to maintain control come from within, there are also
pressures from opposition interests located in neighbouring countries. The Hutu Vs Tutsi contest
spills beyond the borders of Rwanda, at least into Burundi and the Eastern DRC. Both ethnic and
economic contest also characterises the relationships with Uganda. These contests are closely interrelated, and to some extent they have become more intense lately. The following is a brief summary
of the history and causes of contemporary tensions.
With Democratic Republic of Congo: Roughly a quarter of the Hutu population of Rwanda fled to
DRC in 1994, including an estimated 30,000 genocidaires and/or Interahamwe. UN forces could not
deal with them separately, and so the Rwandan forces intervened in 1996. This did not go down well
with the Mabutu government of Zaire at the time, not least because the Rwandans projected part of
their effort through support to Laurent Kabila’s ADFL, which later perpetrated the successful coup
over Mabutu in 1997. In subsequent years a series of militia, some ethnic, some allegedly supported
by Rwanda, some by the Congolese army, and some by Uganda (sometimes in alliance and
sometimes against each other see below under “with Uganda have contested over territory and
especially over control of rare minerals and diamonds around and north of Goma, and as far in to
the DRC as Kisangani. The situation remains unstable, and is a cause of resentment and competition
between the three countries involved, although a recent meeting between Kagame and the newly
elected President in Kinshasa, Felix Tshisekeda, could be both responsible for some agreement
7
between the two over a cessation to fighting on the one hand, but also a contributor to heightened
tensions with Uganda.
With Burundi: In Burundi there is also a Hutu Majority. Figures vary but it may be in the region of 80
to 20 percent, though reduced by recent out-migrations of Tutsi. After Independence the Tutsi there
managed to sustain control over sources of power, especially the military. Over the years up to 1993
they adopted a fluctuating range of conciliatory, developmental, controlling and violent approaches
to sustaining their position. A Hutu revolt in 1972 drew a response from the Tutsi military that
resulted in the deaths of between 100,000 and 200,000 mainly intelligentsia Hutu elites, and
consequent exodus of Hutus mainly to Tanzania. Multi-party elections were held in 1993 resulting in
a Hutu majority Government, but the President, Ndadaye, was assassinated just 4 months after
taking power by a group of Tutsi military officers, instigating a period of civil war. Both these key
events had significant influences in Rwanda, heightening inter-ethnic tensions there, the 1972
massacre of Hutus intensifying anti-Tutsi sentiment in part expressed through Tutsi massacre the
following year, and the assassination in Burundi in 1993 also fuelling Hutu fear of RPF potential
reprisals in the run up to the Genocide. In 2000 agreements were signed in Arusha which ushered in
power-sharing arrangements between Tutsi and Hutu, and a Hutu dominated government was
subsequently elected. These arrangements seemed to be working until 2015 when President
Nkununziza obtained approval to extend his eligibility to a third term (as with Kagame across the
border), but also in 2018 constitutional reforms that undermined the power-sharing principles, and
which provide the President, “chosen by God,”23 to rule until 2034.24 A result has been increasing
violence, mass Tutsi migrations and displacements, including amongst those seeking to up-hold
press freedom, civil society and the rule of law, and the re-invigoration of armed rebel groups, some
of which allegedly receive support from the RPF government in Rwanda.
With Uganda: Relations with Uganda had, for some years, been on a sound footing, owing in part to
the close relationship between Museveni and Kagame, and based on their collaboration over the
formation and funding of the RPF from the late 1980s onwards beyond the 1994 invasion. The Tutsi
organisation in Uganda also assisted Museveni in his successful over-throw of Obote in 1985/6. But
relationships deteriorated, essentially over two matters. The first emerged via the battle for the
control of diamonds around Kisangani in 1999 and 2000, when Kagame and Museveni chose to back
opposing militia.25 The fight led to conflicts between Rwandan and Ugandan troops, which
undermined the relationship of trust between the two men. The second concerns Museveni’s
attitude towards Kagame’s prolongation of his presidential terms (a position born presumably not
from comparison but in an effort to impose his own authority on the region). Kagame has since
accused Museveni of supporting the group of exiled contestants now (reputedly) based in Burundi,
opposed to Kagame’s own third-term constitutional change, and organising periodic raids across the
border in Rwanda, headed by the former Rwandan Chief of Staff, General Kayumba Nyamwasa.26
(The latter also grew up on Uganda and was a close confident both with Kagame and Museveni.)
These allegations led to the closure of the border between Rwanda and Uganda in March 2019, and
it remains closed. There have been related arrests and deportations of Rwandan’s in/from Uganda,
and allegations of people trying to cross the border being harassed and shot by military personnel.
23
24
25
26
See, Paul Mulundwa, December
, “Burundi: A President Chosen by God and those who Disagree,” in African
Arguments: https://africanarguments.org/2019/12/04/burundi-a-president-chosen-by-god-and-those-who-disagree/
See: Stef Vanteginste, January
, “Pathways from Power-Sharing in Burundi,” Manuscript Outline, Working Paper
2017/01, Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp.
See: “Fighting Continues in Congo Diamond Town past latest cease-fire”, June
, CNN.com:
http://edition.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/06/08/congo.fighting.02/index.html
Nicholas Norbrook, Parselelo Kantai and Patrick Smith, “How Kagame and Museveni became best of frenemies,” in The
Africa Report, October 2019: https://www.theafricareport.com/18087/kagame-and-museveni-the-best-of-frenemies/
8
In short, these regional conflicts, which have been ever present but have mainly deteriorated in
recent years, present Rwanda, or at least its RPF government, with an additional threat additional
that is to the perceived threats from within. So while it is possible to analyse and observe the quite
sophisticated control networks used by RPF (and described in section 4 of this report) as being aimed
at preventing and controlling potential destabilising movements amongst Rwandan ethnic and class
groups, they are also required to sustain internal unity in the face of potentially destabilising forces
arranged around, and periodically crossing, its borders with DRC, Burundi, and Uganda.
It is worth considering that if these regional tensions could be eased, then the control imperative
within Rwanda itself might also be lessen. (Section 6.7 briefly considers the potential enhanced risk
of violence in Rwanda that may result from tensions with Uganda, and especially from across the
border in Burundi.) Also, these threats do not just concern security. They also threaten trade and
economic growth, and have led to a slow-down in progress towards productive trade and standards
agreements across the East African Community (Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) of
which Kagame is the current Chairperson.
3.3
Summary of the Pressures upon Rwandan Government
The current Government’s actions can only be understood or appreciated in this context. As the
pages below describe and explain, they are wedded to:
A vision of a modern Rwanda with all its people, Tutsi and Hutu, realising the benefits of
peace, reconciliation and stability; but equally
An acute understanding of the need for control, both of the elite and of the rural poor,
ensuring that de-stabilising opposition forces (inside and outside) are restricted; and
An attendant belief that solutions must be home-grown, and that foreign ideas are generally
born from a failure to understand Rwanda, can be destabilising, and need to be handled
with care.
The difficulty is that these objectives tend to lead to contradictory actions. Sections four and five
explore these contradictions further.
4.0 Maintaining Control From Top to Bottom
4.1
Mixing Direct Control with Legitimisation
How was the post-Genocide Government to control the differing, and severely contesting and wholly
un-trusting sections of society? We may say that there were a number of strategies used, but at
least the following four serve as key illustrations:
The first is (or very largely was) military action to eradicate (only partially successful) the
remnants of the radical Hutu elite and their supporters who had fled to DRC.
The second constitutes efforts to control the Tutsi elite. We may presume that a
combination of reward and fear of exclusion has been used to achieve this result. Those who
are loyal are rewarded with access to key parts of the economy, but those who are not can
be excluded. Violence is used against those considered to pose a threat to unity behind the
RPF. In-so-far as Hutu elites have been included in RPF and in Government (which is at least
formally, if not informally, quite considerable) this combination of tactics can also be used
both with and against them.
The third is an effort to bring Hutu and Tutsi individuals and groups back together, partly
through reconciliation (of which Gacaca was an only semi-successful part), but also
9
especially in key organisations such as the military and the police where there was no option
but to try to achieve this result.
Finally there has been a need to convince the poor, the majority of whom were and remain
Hutu, that there could be a dividend for them if they “buy-in” to a Rwanda lead by the RPF,
which despite Ndi’ Umunyarwanda27 must surely still be seen by many as being Tutsi. Most
particularly this is intended to convince the majority that what they were told pre-1994
would happen to them under a Tutsi government has not happened. Indeed there has been
a critical need to demonstrate that they are better off under the post than the pre-1994
Government.
It may be discerned that, roughly speaking, the first two bullet points represent means of exerting
direct control, while the second two may constitute efforts to purchase a broad social and political
legitimisation, though they also represent a real RPF vision for a prosperous, modern Rwanda.
4.2
Contradictions Between these Strategies
But the challenge for the leadership is that while there are some tactics that can contribute
positively to more than one of these strategies, those required to deal with one challenge also tend
to undermine attempts to deal with another.
For example, efforts to grow the economy which in Rwanda’s land-locked situation is far from easy)
are, undoubtedly, sincere.28 They may help to buy the commitment of wide sections of the
population if they benefit, but at the same time may be used to reward those elites that need to be
kept loyal. However, if the balance between these constituencies is seen to bias towards the elite,
and if those requiring favour have to be bought with degrees of patronage, and especially if these
are seen to be predominantly Tutsi,29 then the general populace may tend to question Ndi’
Umunyarwanda. Examples include the tendency towards control of key economic sectors, including
for example coffee, construction, tourism, textiles and rare minerals, largely through military
companies (see section 5 below).
This control can be argued by some to grow the economy, but at the same time deliver benefits to
loyal elites and purchase a contribution to military allegiance. But is this the most effective way of
developing the economy? Many argue that the political compromises, at the very least, damage
investment effectiveness (again, see section 5 where this question is answered).
4.3
Establishing Local Control in this Context
While controlling elite allegiance is fundamental, the need to sustain control on the ground is also
essential. This is where the greatest potential resentment lies (only moderated by economic gain)
and where any future destabilising movements would inevitably be rooted (though it must be
appreciated that without elite organisation and leadership or “manipulation” it would be unlikely for
this alone to lead to further nation-wide violence). Indeed from time to time inter-racial violence
does still occur.30 These (from the RPF perspective at least) need to be reacted to, suppressed and
27
28
29
30
Ndi’ Umunyarwanda, means “I am Rwandan”. It is a programme initiated to build a national identity based on trust and
dignity. It aims to strengthen unity and reconciliation among Rwandans by providing a forum for people to talk about
the causes and consequences of the genocide as well as what it means to be Rwandan. See The Genocide Archive of
Rwanda: http://genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php/Category:Ndi_Umunyarwanda_Collection
Roughly what some commentators refer to as “The Developmental State”. See for example, Developmental
Patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda, by David Booth and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, in African Affairs, May 2012, pp
379-403 (also Africa Power and Politics Programme working paper Number 16, March 2011.)
For sure there are Hutus that benefit in this way, but this may be neither sufficient in practice, nor sufficient in
appearance, to dissuade those who might be susceptible to a view that is biased one way or the other.
There should be no doubts here that the pre-1994 Genocidaire ideology is very much alive, if not in the minds of many
Hutus living in Rwanda, then in the minds and pockets of those living across the border in DRC and in Burundi. In some
10
kept quiet. In addition, any potential for such events to grow, either by re-intensifying hatred, or by
spurning new local racially oriented movements, has to be seen and countered or undermined.
Rather than going into the detail here, annex 4 presents a description of how security is observed
and enforced, and also the pressure this places on the establishment to deliver, or at least allow, the
providers of that security to benefit economically. We are not talking here about large sums of
money, but probably enough through patronage to help keep the networks loyal, but at the same
time enough to cause some resentment amongst the general population, and in some cases to
restrict economic growth potential being driven by those who are excluded from privilege.
Annex 4 provides some details about the mechanisms used. It also looks into the system of local
“democracy”, as pervaded through local government and through home-grown development
delivery mechanisms such as Imihigo.
It is important to note however that this system of control does not obviously constitute a means of
enforcing ethnic difference. Indeed there are many senses in which it is used to promote the idea and
reality of ethnic integration. Not least, while for example village, cell, sector and district leaders are
chosen with some care, this often means that Hutus are chosen in preference to Tutsis, so as to
retain b h he a ea ance and he eali
f Ndi Um n a anda. Indeed this is quite largely why
local universal suffrage is resisted, lest it become ethnically divisive, as it did in the early 1990s.
4.4
Local Democracy or Local Control?
Although it is not directly the question raised by the current paper, a conclusion we may draw from
this analysis is that the GoR is unlikely to be terribly interested in promoting devolution as a means of
improving inclusion in governance. If an expansion is contemplated in the allocation of funds to be
sent to local authorities (which it is understood may be under consideration) this does not imply an
expansion in devolution,31 because those authorities do not currently constitute devolved bodies.
The current analysis does not perceive any intention to devolve authority. So any question
concerning the control of additional funds sent to Districts and/or Sectors and Cells, must largely
concern its upward, not its local, accountability.
However, this does not mean that the RPF Government does not see value in expanding inclusion. In
fact, in fairly specific sectors or sub-sector topics there is evidence that they consider such
improvements to be absolutely critical. This is examined in relation to the economy in the next
section.
5.0 Development of the Economy
Running the Economy effectively, and achieving an acceptable degree of distribution, is critical on
three counts.
31
instances these movements collaborate with Tutsi elites who have fallen out with the Kagame regime in Kigali. See for
example, Paul Jackson,
, “Legacy of Bitterness: Insurgency in North West Rwanda”, in Small Wars and
Insurgencies, 15 (1), pages 19 37,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233634626_Legacy_of_Bitterness_Insurgency_in_North_West_Rwanda ,
and Clement Uwiringiyimana, “Rwandan Police Dismiss Claim of Rebel Incursions in Southern Border,” World News
Reuters, July 2018: https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-rwanda-security/rwandan-police-dismiss-claim-of-rebelincursions-on-southern-border-idUKKBN1K82NQ which reports claims of connections between insurgent attacks
recently over the southern border and the Rwandan Movement for Democratic Change (RMCD) based in South Africa
and formed out of RPF opposition groups opposed to Kagame’s extended period of power. Note however that this
indicates that contests are not necessarily ethnic based.
Note that “devolution” refers to the sending of both money and control to elected local and legally independent
(suable) local government entities. By contrast deconcentration refers to sending money only, but retaining control
through respective line departments. Together deconcentration and devolution constitute different forms of
“decentralisation”, but it makes a great difference which one is adopted.
11
First it provides potential for legitimisation with the majority of the population, showing
them that they are better off than they were or would have been under the pre1994
government.
Second, it is core to the RPF’s vision of an urbanising economy, lifting people out of poverty
by getting them into “industrial” employment (because of very small farm sizes an economy
based on agriculture for the majority of employment is not a realistic option).
Third it provides a means of holding the elite together, as opportunities can be directed
towards those who are key to maintaining cohesion and allegiance within that class.
Once again, as with the direct means of local control described above, these tasks can be
contradictory. Some of those contradictions are examined in this section. However, we do this
relatively briefly. Annex 5 provides more details.
5.1
Some Real, Technical Economic Constraints
Annex 5 begins by outlining some key economic features. The highlights are:
With 451 people per square kilometre, Rwanda is the most densely populated country on
the mainland of Africa, and is ranked 26th in the World out of 235.32
The urban rural population balance is 70 percent rural, and consequently average landholding size is very small.33
This is why Rwanda introduced its Crop Intensification Programme (CIP) in 2008, which
includes a land consolidation element.
Rwanda is land-locked, and is bordered to the South and West by relatively unstable
countries (Burundi and DRC) (see section 3 on regional politics for more detail).
Poor relations recently with Uganda have led to prolonged closure of the border, restricting
imports and exports.
5.2
Facilitating Measures and General Results
The country’s main policy documents driving growth have been the Economic Development and
Poverty Reduction Strategies 1 and 2 (EDPRS) running from 2008 to 2012, and 2013 to 2018
respectively. They have been superseded by the National Strategy for Transformation 1 (NST1)
which runs from 2019 to 2024. One of the pillars of this strategy is a focus on expanding the role of
the private sector, with a corresponding reduction in the part played by government-owned
business, and by implication a freeing up of markets. However, it must be said that this was included
also in earlier documents, and it hasn’t really happened. Another pillar concerns infrastructure
development, and the country has certainly made huge strides in this regard. Electricity supplies for
example, though prices are high, are reliable compared with some neighbours, though coverage
remains a challenge.
Meanwhile considerable effort has been put into improving the ”Ease of Doing Business”. The World
Bank’s index says Rwanda ranks 38th in the World in 2019 out of 190 economies world-wide, though
this is a reduction from a high of 29th last year.34 It is the highest ranked country on mainland Sub32
33
34
See: https://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?v=21000
It is hazardous to estimate average sizes because this is distorted by the relatively small number of larger owners.
Including this cohort the average is about 2.4 hectares per household, but in fact the vast majority try to survive on
much less than this. Bizimana et al., report the average figure operated per household in 1992 as 079 hectares, and it
probably has not grown since then despite the Genocide. Need a more up to date figure. Bizimana, C., W.L. Nieuwoudt
and S.R.D. Ferrer, “Farm Size, Land Fragmentation, and Economic Efficiency in Southern Rwanda,” in Agrekon, Vol. ,
No. 2, June 2004, pp 244 262: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/7062564.pdf
See Trading Economics: https://tradingeconomics.com/rwanda/ease-of-doing-business
12
Saharan Africa. Meanwhile considerable emphasis has also been placed also on achieving service
delivery improvements.
Apparently the strategies have had a major impact. The World Bank reports that between 2001 and
2014 the rate of poverty declined from 59 percent to 39 percent, though since then the reduction
has been stagnant.35 GDP per capita in 2000 was about US $200, whereas by 2018 it was US $773.
Between 2007 and 2008 GDP per capita grew by 24 percent, though this has fallen off considerably
to a rate of just 5 percent in 2017 2018.36 Between
and
, access to the Government’s
Community Based Health Insurance scheme (CBHI) increased from 7 percent to 74 percent, while 97
percent of respondents to a 2013 survey reported reductions in health care costs and 73 percent an
increase in availability of drugs.37
Writers cited above indicate that economic growth has resulted in accumulation in the pockets of a
few (see Gokgur and Reyntjens referenced in section 2.2 above). There is certainly truth in this and
we look at some examples below. However, Gini Coefficient figures fell from 2017 to 2018 by 10
percent, down from 49.4 to 44.3,38 and back in 2006 the rate was as high as 53 percent.39
5.3
Core Businesses
A driver of this pattern of change has been the growth of businesses that are either owned by the
State, or else by RPF itself, by the Army, or by the Reserve Army. Examples are Crystal Ventures, The
Horizon Group, Rwanda Investment Group SA., and Agro Processing Trust Corporation Ltd. (APTC).40
Partnerships are common. For example, APTC is in partnership with OCP Africa from Morocco over
the 100,000 ton fertiliser blending plant being constructed in Bugesera.41
There are also a sizable number of companies that while privately owned are understood to have a
“positive relationship” with the RPF or the Military. Annex 5 describes different routes to this kind of
relationship, and the benefits or detriments that can accrue as a result. This process has some
impact upon the direction and magnitude of economic growth.
Of course beneath this there is the myriad of smaller businesses, some 25,000 legally registered, but
an estimated 72,000 small concerns that are not registered42 and in many cases constitute nothing
much more than back-yard efforts to earn some additional household income, perhaps such as
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
See World Bank: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview There have been very topical,
contemporary questions raised concerning the validity of poverty reduction figures, especially in the run-up to the
constitutional referendum in
which confirmed President Kagame’s right to run for a third term as President. See
Tom Wilson and David Blood, “Rwanda: Where even poverty data must toe Kagame’s Line,” August
, in The
Financial Times: https://www.ft.com/content/683047ac-b857-11e9-96bd-8e884d3ea203 The current paper does not
seek to reach a position on this debate, which has not been satisfactorily concluded. It is only stated here that while
there may have been efforts to present the figures in a particular way for political reasons, nonetheless the RPF’s
commitment to reduce poverty amongst the general population may not be doubted.
See World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=RW
See, “Rwanda Improves Access to Care and Equity through Community-Based Health Insurance,” Management
Sciences for Health: May 2016: https://www.msh.org/news-events/stories/rwanda-improves-access-to-care-andequity-through-community-based-health
See: https://knoema.com/atlas/Rwanda/topics/Poverty/Income-Inequality/GINI-index
See: https://tradingeconomics.com/rwanda/gini-index-wb-data.html
See for example, Nilgün Gökgür, “Rwanda’s Ruling Party-Owned Enterprises: Do they enhance or impede
Development?”, IOB Discussion Papers, 2012.03, Universiteit Antwerpen, Institute of Development Policy (IOB):
https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2143/files/Publications/DP/2012/03-Gokgur.pdf
See, Emmanuel Ntirenganya, “
million Fertiliser Plant to be operational this year”, in The New Times, May
:
https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/38-million-fertiliser-plant-be-operational-year
Ministry of Trade and Industry, Small and Medium Enterprises Policy, 2010:
http://www.minicom.gov.rw/fileadmin/minicom_publications/policies/SME_Devt_policy_V180610.pdf
13
keeping a pig. These businesses are responsible however for over 90 percent of total formal
employment.
5.4
Debt
A bye-product of the Government-driven programme of investment is an increasing level of debt.
External debt rose to just over $3 billion in 2017, up by over $500 million on the previous year.43 This
also means that debt as a percentage of GDP has been on the rise, reaching a little over 40 percent.
However, this is a far better position than in 2004, when the debt to GDP ratio was over 100
percent. By 2008 it had fallen to 20 percent (owing to the high rates of growth) but has risen again
since.44 In terms of debt per capita Rwanda comes 18th out of 186 countries.
This must be of some concern. Although the Country’s record on effectiveness of investment is good
which implies that it should be in a position in the future to use its investments to service its debt
nonetheless the cost of debt servicing is scheduled to become a greater burden. However, the IMF’s
debt sustainability analysis for 2018 remains positive, as the, “debt burden indicators remain below
risk thresholds.” 45
5.5
Development Vs Control Contradictions
Just as there are contradictions between the legitimisation versus control imperatives in the way
local governance is managed, so there are contradictions between development versus control
imperatives in economic growth strategy.
The GoR policy to drive development through government investment makes undeniably reasonable
development sense. In order to deliver any kind of peace dividend the new Government had to take
responsibility for initial structural investments in order to provide an environment in which privatesector-led growth might flourish. But why did GoR find it necessary to use the Party, and the Army,
to drive these investments, rather than the State as such? Part of the answer is certainly the need to
provide patronage to those in the elite who demonstrate their allegiance, and this is superficially
why writers such as Gokgur and Reyntjens (also referred to above in section 2.2) state the purpose
of development as being to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few.
It is however certain that the RPF leadership appreciates a major cause of the Genocide was
Habyarimana’s loss of the financial means of control over the elite in the early 1990s, which
(encouraged by the democratising conditionalities imposed by DPs) gave an impetus to radical
solutions.46 Populist appeals to hatred of the enemy “within” was seen as means of unifying support
despite the failure to provide. Kagame’s primary concern is to avoid this possibility, maybe even to
the point of paranoia. We may not say that this attitude justifies the use of patronage (note that
corruption is quite closely controlled) but it certainly does help us to understand or appreciate why it
is used.
Meanwhile, the “invasion” by RPF of businesses as they become successful (described in annex 5)
may not be simply a means of accumulating revenue for the Party. It must also be a means of
ensuring that the direction of profit flows is observed. RPF knows that the development of an
opposing political movement requires funding, so any profitable business could be a potential
43
44
45
46
See: https://tradingeconomics.com/rwanda/external-debt
See: https://countryeconomy.com/national-debt/rwanda
See: IMF, 2018, Rwanda: Ninth Review Under the Policy Support Instrument: Debt Sustainability Analysis.
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/pdf/2018/dsacr18167.pdf
This interpretation rather presumes that Habyarimana himself did not support the radical genocidaire solution, which it
is reasonable to assume given his signature to the Arusha agreements immediately prior to his demise in the infamous
downing of his plane.
14
platform for political competition. Given the risks that an opposition movement may take on an
ethnic and therefore divisive character, it is logical for them to try to ensure that any major profit
centres are seen and captured. This intrinsic link between politics and economics is not lost on the
RPF.
While state (Party) investment has evidently driven development, the imperative to control tends
also to restrict its effectiveness. Effectively if favour can be bought, then those unable to purchase it
lose out. There is a variety of ways in which this happens, sometimes around restricted access to
inputs or markets, sometimes using the application of regulations to corner certain, maybe
temporary, areas of business. There are illustrative boxes on these mechanisms included in annex 5.
Of course it’s hard to quantify the negative impacts of such restrictions. But they could be very
significant. For example, fertiliser application rates in Rwanda are estimated to be around 34 Kg per
hectare, whereas in neighbouring countries they average between 75 and 150 Kg. One reason why
application rates are thought to be low is because some key purchase prices are controlled, and they
are below what the product might demand in a free market. (Actually only minimum prices are
defined, but they are accompanied by restrictions on the sales outlets to be used, and this artifial
monopoly on market entry allows the purchases to offer the lowest prices. As a result the margins
on production are so low (and the prices of inputs so high despite the subsidies) that it does not
make economic sense to buy more fertiliser. If this challenge was resolved it could boost
productivity in Rwanda’s most important sector by significant percentages. Yet the controlled
marketing, which tends to benefit bigger businesses further down the value chains, discourages such
improvements.
In summary, as with political control through local observation and security mechanisms, there is a
contradiction between the need to use business incentives to help hold the elite together, and the
need to develop the economy. This debate may seem quite academic, but it actually makes a
significant difference to understanding what kinds of development engagement might be more
effective. This is taken up again in section 6 below.
5.6
Performance Challenges
The beginning of this section described certain challenges faced in developing the economy,
especially the population density, its rural concentration, and the country’s land-locked
circumstance. There are other constraints however, and this sub-section considers the level of
organisational and human capacity in government, and especially its influence over the way policy is
made. There are certain performance pressures on many politicians and civil servants that have a
tendency to encourage rash or hurried decisions, but there is also a sense lately that these mistakes
need to be avoided and one means of achieving this is better to engage citizens in policy influencing.
This raises some potential for entry points, which is elaborated in section 6. Annex 5 goes into more
detail on, and provides some examples of, how performance pressure tends to lead to poor
decisions.
5.7
Imperatives to Improve Economic Policy Implementation
Section 5.2 above provides some data on the significant improvements achieved in GDP growth, and
service delivery access since 2000, but it also demonstrated how growth rates and other
improvements have declined recently. It may be noted though that this reduction has also been
reflected in neighbouring countries like Uganda, where the drop off is actually more significant.
While there has been criticism of the government for manipulating poverty numbers (if indeed they
did), there is no doubt that any actual decline in economic improvement and distribution must be of
serious concern to the RPF. This is because the leadership remains critically aware that the job of
15
reconciliation is far from complete, and that livelihoods and other poverty reducing improvements
must continue for its legitimacy to be sustained.
In economic sectors, this realisation is promoting a new desire and willingness to entertain public
inclusion in the evolution of policy. This may also represent a slight softening in approach following
the 2017 presidential elections, with a view to helping to resolve the apparent decline in rates of
growth. This tendency is illustrated in boxes in annex 5.47
In summary therefore there does appear to be an opportunity for improving inclusion and
consultation, representing governance improvements, especially through technical or projectized
entry points in economic growth sectors. The evidence is consistent here with the theoretical
interpretation of current political imperatives.
6.0 Implications for Approaches in Rwanda
This section looks at the implications of the study for development engagement, and answers some
of the questions posed at the beginning. It starts by looking at some different donor approaches in
Rwanda, before considering some parts of SDC’s current programme. It then reviews strategic
options that could improve effectiveness. Finally the section looks at the risks of types of SDC
engagement in Rwanda.
6.1
Summary of DP Approaches and Sectors
Total net Aid Assistance to Rwanda in recent years has averaged between $1 and $1.2 billion per
annum.48 Within this there are many donors, and naturally some provide substantially more
assistance than others. In 2011 the largest bi-lateral contributor was USAID, followed by the UK
(DFID), Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden in that order. Multi-lateral agencies
included World Bank, UN, the Global Fund, EU and AfDF.49 The largest technical recipient at the time
was the Health sector, followed by general budget support, Governance and Security, Infrastructure,
agriculture and food security, and then education.
Boxes below provide more up-to-date renditions of the assistance provided by Sweden, DFID, USAID,
the World Bank and One-UN. For references to the content of these text boxes, see this footnote
below.50 All these five give more money than SDC, and so a pertinent question is whether it makes
47
48
49
50
See, Athanase R Cyamweshi, John Kayumba and Nsharwasi Nabahungu, “Optimizing Fertilizer Use within the Context of
Integrated Soil Fertility Management in Rwanda,” in Africa Soil Health: http://africasoilhealth.cabi.org/wpcms/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/Optimizing-Fertilizer-ISFM-in-Rwanda-Ch-13-high-res.pdf Also World Bank:
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ag.con.fert.zs
See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=RW
See: http://www.devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Investments-to-End-Poverty-Chapter-10-Rwanda.pdf
On Sweden, see, “Strategy for Sweden’s development cooperation with Rwanda,
to
,” Sweden Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. On DFID see,
: Summary of DFID’s work in Rwanda,
.”
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/412396/RwandaSummary.pdf ; On USAID see: https://www.usaid.gov/rwanda/our-work ; On the World Bank see:
https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/projectslist?lang=en&searchTerm=&status_exact=Active^Closed&prodline_exact=GU^PE&countrycode_exact=RW and
https://data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda ; and on One UN see: United Nations Development Assistance Plan, 2018
2023: https://rwanda.un.org/sites/default/files/201904/United%20Nations%20in%20Rwanda%20Development%20Assistance%20Plan%2020182023%20%28UNDAP%20II%29_0_0.pdf and
https://www.rw.undp.org/content/rwanda/en/home/presscenter/articles/2016/06/24/one-un-rwanda-partners-withrgb-to-identify-top-csos-countrywide-boosts-them-with-30k-grant-each.html
16
sense for SDC to align its programme with these donors, and/or whether to provide a form of budget
support. This question is considered in section 6.2.
Box 1: Swedish Embassy
For the four years 2015 2019 the Swedish Embassy gave Krona 900 million, or about US$ 90 million, and
average of US$ 22.5 million per annum. Sweden does not provide budget or direct support owing to the
perceived risks of giving money that could be implicated in the abuse of human rights. Its areas of main
work include: Economic growth and livelihoods; reconciliation and conflict resolution; strengthening
democracy and the roles of women and men; and resilience to climate impact and disasters. The approach
taken to “strengthening democracy” might be described as being quite “normative” that is to say it is
based upon “Western” logic about how things ought to be, rather than upon an understanding of reality
and history in the place where assistance is being offered. For example, they say that, “The limited scope
for expressing critical opinions and dissent risks aggravating social tensions and fomenting conflicts.”
Whereas there must be some truth in this statement, the current study suggests that the opposite may be
at least as true, if not more so. Similarly they state that, “Sweden’s long-standing focus on areas such as
democracy, freedom of expression, human rights including children’s rights and gender equality gives
Sweden added value as a donor.” But it is not made clear quite how this provides Sweden with an
advantage.
Box 2: UKAID DFID
The available on-line information for DFID is rather out of date (referring to the period 2011 2016). For
this five year period they were scheduled to provide £ 357 million, or about US$ 90 million a year. They
state in that document that, “Rwanda uses aid very well, both in terms of its results achieved and
accountability of the funds.” They refer to some of the indicators which are re-produced in this paper
under section 2. While at the beginning of the reported period DFID gave a substantial portion of its
assistance in direct budget support (for these reasons stated) it has wound back from this position. It now
only provides targeted support to specific ministries, which is stringently connected with agreed results
targets. There has been a corresponding increase in the amount of programme aid and support to nonstate actors. (In fact this reflects a world-wide trend in DFID since 2010, when there was a series of
scandals in different countries concerning the mis-appropriation of budget support aid funding. Rwanda is
one of the few countries in which direct assistance is still provided.) Areas of technical focus include:
education and social protection; support for the Governments climate change fund (FONERWA), and
strengthening its PFM, Revenue Collection systems, Audit Office and statistical systems. DFID is also
looking to expand into training for district governments in support of GoR’s stated commitment to send
more funding to District Councils (and possibly below). In summary, DFID places appreciably more faith in
GoR’s developmental and governance systems improvement intentions, and is less voluble though not
necessarily any less committed) about the need to impose human rights and press freedom
improvements.
17
Box 3: USAID
USAID appears to be the largest single unilateral donor, providing $US 269 million in 2016. However, with
the entry of the Trump administration this figure is on the decline with “only” US
million in
and
further reductions “predicted” in its
programme summary document. Agric and food security;
Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (including reconciliation); Economic growth; Education (early
grade literacy); and Health (with a focus on HIV/AIDS). As with the Swedish Embassy, USAID does not give
any direct aid to the Rwandan Government.
Box 4: The World Bank
In 2018 the WB provided IDA and IBRD grants and credits worth $US 325 million. The majority of this was
in the form of credits. Obviously the degree of consistency with stated GoR policy is extremely high, as
most of the loans support government-determined programmes. Projects included: Energy sector
improvement including infrastructure; basic education; a housing finance project; PFM reform;
Transformation of Agriculture under PSDA 4; skills for growth; and social protection system funding. Many
of these are connected with performance targets. For example releases of funds in support of PSTA 4 are
connected with the demonstration of measures for the inclusion of citizens in determining policy change.
Box 5: One UN
One UN comprises 22 UN agencies. The aid budget for Rwanda was 630 million for the 5 years 2018 23,
or an average of $US 125 million a year. Over half of this is classified as humanitarian aid. Naturally all
development aid is provided in direct support to Government, and is focussed on: e-regulation platform;
health survey research and other statistical reporting; dialogue for citizens voice; citizen oversight of
parliamentary committees; developing media capacity; population and housing census; early child
development centres; innovation acceleration centres for seed funding skills and training. For example,
support to improvements in the relationship of consultation between Government and Civil Society is
provided through grant assistance to RGB. Therefore although the UN says all its programmes are strictly
in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is implied by its form of support that this
is principally upheld by GoR.
In summary, the boxes above indicate an annual total aid of about $US 730 million, depending upon
annual fluctuations of different DPs, or representing probably about two thirds of total aid
assistance to Rwanda. By contrast SDC provided about $US 12.5 million assistance, or probably a bit
over one percent of the total. By definition it has a relatively small voice if we assume that the size of
commitment influences the impact of its messages.
It is evident that from these, Sweden and the USA are more stringent than the others in the way
they seek to communicate their own development messages, especially avoiding the delivery of
direct assistance owing to human rights violation concerns, and also communicating what we may
term a “normative” approach to encouraging progress towards democracy. The “validity” of this
position is discussed further in the next sub-section.
18
6.2
SDC in the Great Lakes Region
SDC does not provide budget support or grants to GoR (except through the UN see below). Its total
budget for 2019 to the Great Lakes Region is $41 million CHF, or almost exactly US$ 41 million. Some
projects cover the whole region, others just selected countries within it (Rwanda, Burundi and
Eastern DRC). It is therefore hard to certain of the amount provided to Rwanda, but it is estimated at
about $12.5 million. 51 Its programme in the Great Lakes Region, “helps to strengthen democratic
processes, respect for human rights, social cohesion and employment, especially for young people.
In line with Switzerland’s diplomatic and political efforts, these activities are aimed at strengthening
the capacities of local people to overcome crises and challenges.”52
The programme supports four main “domains” of work:
Diplomacy and dialogue, which includes governance, civil society and media;
Employment and Income Generation;
Health and GBV, including Psycho-Social support in the realm of reconciliation; and
Civil protection.
The last of these is in Burundi and DRC and is not provided in Rwanda. Running across these domains
is a major theme concerning climate change.
This sub-section takes a look at four specific programmes, namely:
Vocational Skills Training through PROMOST;
Support to improvements in civil society influence over Government policy making through
Ikiraro;
A Citizen Participation and Conflict Prevention (CPCP) programme which is being planned;
and
A programme supporting to manufacture of low-carbon bricks, which has been lately
modified to increase the impact on climate change.
The four boxes below provide summary details of these programmes. For references to these boxes
see this footnote. 53
Box 6: T-VET PROMOST
PROMOST is a technical programme (covering the three countries in the Region) which aims to select
vulnerable young people and women in rural areas and provide them with vocational training that will help
them to find employment and in some cases start their own businesses. According to the end of phase two
review, the success of the programme is markedly better in Rwanda than in the other two countries,
especially than in Burundi. Without going into details, the programme’s relative success here is probably a
reflection of the relative commitment of the GoR to this kind of venture, not only therefore is consistency
with stated government policy but also its coincidence which what this study helps to reveal as GoR’s real
objectives. There is no reason to suppose that the programme constitutes any kind of threat, and indeed it
contributes to growth achievement on the ground, which is a pillar of the NST 1. The recommendations
section of the Review report highlights sustainability as the major challenge for the Programme, but it
focusses on the ability of governments to sustain the training provided after the Programme.
51
52
53
See: https://www.eda.admin.ch/deza/en/home/countries/great-lakes-region.html
See: https://www.eda.admin.ch/deza/en/home/countries/great-lakes-region.html
See: Maurits Spoelder, Ulli Hedberg, and Zephirin Selemani, Evaluation Report of the PROMOST Programme, Phase 2,
Swiss Development Corporation, September 2018;
19
Box 7: Civil Society and Ikiraro
Ikiraro was established in 2015 as a challenge function aimed at supporting CSOs to hold government to
account, more or less along normative governance model lines. Initially the programme was a failure
because GoR would not allow it to operate, probably because they were concerned about the potential
threat to stability, but also because it looked like a foreign-donor sponsored effort to help reveal RPF
human rights violations. In later years the approach was altered, in a way that was informed by the kind of
PEA analysis provided in the current paper. The programme began looking for areas where its analysis
indicated government need for non-state actor inclusion in helping improve lines of policy, especially to
bring about better growth and jobs. The implications for SDC programme design are considered below.
Also see annexes 5 and 6.
Box 8: CPCP
The Citizen Participation and Conflict Prevention Programme is being designed to work at community level.
This is against the backdrop of media legislation changes in 2013 which led to the proliferation of new
radio and TV outlets. The aim is to provide media training (and further work on the legal framework) with a
view to these new outlets providing stories that will improve government accountability. There are
constraints here, including the fact that media staff are poorly paid (making them vulnerable to
corruption) and that freedom of information legislation has been passed, but is not being implemented. It
is also intended that the programme will support improvements in local level participation through
community scorecards, Imihigo, CSO involvement in JADF, and community assemblies. The programme
would in part be administered in partnership with UNDP and FOJO (a Swedish partner already supporting
media schools). The discussion below considers the advantages that might accrue if sub-sector issues for
media and community programming were chosen on the basis of political knowledge.
Box 9: Bricks
The thinking behind the Bricks programme was to develop low carbon production. However, it has also
proved a success in providing jobs. The programme has therefore been expanded, with an additional
objective in growth and jobs. If expansion continues beyond what the Programme has funded, it could
save 40 million tons of carbon production per year. However, there remain questions about the financial
competitiveness of the new bricks compared with cheaper ones using wood fuel for burning. There could,
however, be further policy influencing implications.
6.3
Implications of this paper for the Means of Delivery
Why do some other DPs give money direct to GoR, and what are the risks involved? Are there any
reasons why SDC should not do the same?
6.3.1
Direct or Indirect Support?
Direct grants and budget support has the advantage of ensuring consistency with government policy,
and reducing indirect costs. So long as there is confidence that resources are used effectively, this is
commonly regarded as a good means of aid delivery. In many countries it has become discredited
because of high levels of corruption. There are many instances of resources being mis-directed.
However, in Rwanda these risks are relatively low compared with most other SSA countries. The high
TI ranking is one indicator, but the current report also explains why corruption is generally kept
under control in this country.
20
In addition, GoR is very positive about aid coming as direct contributions. This is partly born from the
country’s experience running up to and immediately after the Genocide when (RPF was of the view
that) some western countries had aided the Habyarimana Government, and in some cases the
fleeing Interahamwe. They vet aid programmes and NGOs quite carefully through the Rwanda
Governance Board (RGB) to try to make sure that donor funds channelled outside government are
going to known interests, not to potentially destabilising ones.
However, there are of course disadvantages to channelling through government, including a degree
of lack of strategic control. There are also possible reputational risks if a connection is made
between aid provision and the human rights abuses of which GoR is from time to time accused.
There have been five known alleged political killings within the Country in 2019, and given the
regional differences and in some cases armed political opposition across the borders, it would be
sensible to expect this level of violence to continue. See the sub-section on risk below.
On balance there seems no particular reason why SDC should consider altering its mode of aid
delivery, for example to provide more direct or budget support.
6.3.2
Bi-Lateral and Multi-Lateral Agencies
In a related matter there would be a possibility of SDC contributing more of its support via
contributions to multi-lateral agencies, as it does currently with One-UN. It is also considering
partnering with One-UN in its planned CPCP programme.
However, the loss of strategic direction through such programmes can be even greater than when
budget support is provided, partly because there are many points of view that compete when
deciding objectives, and what methods to use in achieving them. Value for money can be
problematic, depending upon the management and monitoring approaches used, and they
commonly adhere to different standards in such programmes.54 Again there has been some question
also about the effectiveness of multi-donor approaches when applied to the management of specific
projects.
In this case it is desirable that SDC satisfies itself that it is following an approach that is consistent
with that taken by its potential partners. As outlined above, the Swedish Embassy and USAID both
take a relatively normative or “supply-driven” approach, guided by “western” views concerning what
democracy should look like and how countries like Rwanda should be “encouraged” to get there.
DFID meanwhile has developed an approach more obviously driven by an appreciation of local
history, politics and what might be termed realistic local demands. Both the WB and One-UN take a
more demand-driven approach simply by dint of their delivery method being through government
agencies. Each of these three (WB, One-UN and DFID) tend to attach their assistance to agreed
milestones, but imposition of western ideals is less pervasive. See also the sub-section on risk below.
6.3.3
Normative or Solution-Driven Vs Demand-Driven Approaches
In this context it is worth considering the debate on these matters, both in the general development
literature and in the debate over support to Rwanda in particular.
What has become generally referred to as, “Thinking and Working Politically approaches” TWP
seek to distance themselves from typologically-driven menus for development assistance. When a
country is classified as being a “failed”, “fragile” or “emerging” state, for example, there has been a
tendency in the past for DPs to design and deliver standard sets of development instruments. TWP
54
See, “Are there points of entry and avenues to be investigated to work differently with multi-lateral organisations, in
order to achieve greater efficiency and scale?”, a paper by the Swiss Development Corporation Great Lakes Region,
undated.
21
approaches on the other hand argue that each place is fundamentally different, even if they may
exhibit similar empirical characteristics. This point is already illustrated in section 2 of this paper. The
O’Donnell and Schmitter categorisation places both Rwanda and Zambia in the same “liberal
autocracy” bracket, yet they are fundamentally different political economies, and deserve quite
distinct treatment. See footnote 22 above.
This consideration also implies that DPs should be less inclined to bring their own agendas to the
table what is sometimes called “solution-driven” aid) and more inclined to understand the
particular situation and demands of the place where they are working. This point is very stringently
and forcefully presented by David Booth (referred to above in the this paper and a well-versed
expert on Rwanda from the developmental state camp in his “valedictory lecture” delivered on the
occasion of his retirement from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) last year. There he argues
that the only way to achieve sustainable change is to go with the flow essentially to identify the
topics or issues over which there is sufficient local interest and power to make the shift possible, or
where there is a sufficient balance of local power to make facilitation of a desired change a realistic
endeavour.55 He says that, “development outcomes in poor countries depend fundamentally on
incentives. The political incentives facing elites and leaders are the key to possible change…” Indeed,
what the current paper does in its early sections is to try to work out what these particular
incentives, and constraints, are that currently face the Rwandan leadership,56 and the remaining subsections aim to help work out what the implications of this might be for SDC programming.
Though Booth focusses on the incentives of leaders, he may not mean to exclude the general
citizens. In many SSA countries they may actually not be that important, in the sense that they are
predominantly powerless in a political economy dominated by patronage forces. However, Rwanda is
not like this. While citizens may yet be relatively powerless it is true, this does not mean that their
needs don’t matter. The sections above have argued that in fact RPF needs to do what it can to
legitimise itself with the broad population, given the history of previous extreme conflict. But in fact
the argument that DPs need to look at local problem priorities is just as pertinent at this level. Yet it
is common for them to come to communities with pre-ordained views on the kinds of questions that
are relevant, and these tend to be about rights and governance. There is no Afro-barometer
exercise conducted in Rwanda, but where this is carried out in other SSA countries the story on
priorities is similar that governance issues do not figure highly on the priorities list of most rural
people. Commonly livelihoods and jobs score are the priorities for over 90 percent of community
members canvassed, whereas governance issues typically score in the single digit percentiles.57
55
56
57
Booth, David,
, “When are we going to stop giving solution-driven aid,” A Valedictory Lecture delivered at the ODI,
April 2018; For a debate on this lecture, see: https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/why-donors-ignore-the-evidence-on-whatworks-and-transparency-and-accountability-projects-are-a-dead-end-david-booths-non-farewell-lecture/ ; See also
“Good Governance Vs Collective Action”, https://differenttakeonafrica.wordpress.com/2012/04/16/good-governancevs-collective-action/ ; and Booth, David, April
; “Working with the Grain and Swimming Against the Tide,” Africa
Power and Politics Programme, Working Paper number 18: http://www.institutions-africa.org/filestream/20110606appp-working-paper-18-working-with-the-grain-and-swimming-against-the-tide-by-david-booth
Note that since Ikiraro started to try to follow this approach, the programme now reports a much stronger relationship
with GoR. It has formal agreements with RGB (through DFID), and with MINICOM, MINALOC, RAB, NURC and the City of
Kigali. On the back of this Ikiraro now provides advice to the Rwanda Civil Society Platform on how its members may
improve their advocacy strategies and means of positive engagement with, and influence over, GoR, but constructively
within the parameters of what is politically realistic.
The following is a quote from a PEA report on Zimbabwe from
: “While the pressures of political influence are a
problem common to NGOs, there is no consensus among actors in Zimbabwe as to how to deal with the government. In
part this is a function of inadequate research and analysis underlying a lack of strategic engagement with issues,
communities and stakeholders. As a result civics often speak out with inadequate evidence and on issues that do not
resonate with citizens and therefore do not mobilise communities to demand change. For example, the issues they
focus on do not score high on the Afro barometer assessed priorities of citizens, who think that livelihoods and jobs are
of considerably greater significance. Similarly, percent of citizens don’t know what NGOs do, while percent think
22
The following sub-section seeks to illustrate what following this approach might mean for SDC’s
programme design in Rwanda, by looking at the four projects briefly described in Boxes 6 to 9 above.
Also, annex provides a summary and illustration of what has been variously termed, “issues-based”
or “problem-driven” working, which is presented as an antidote to, “solution-driven” aid.
6.4
Possible Approach Evolution in Specific Project Cases
This sub-section presents 4 text boxes, each of which consider the possible lines of approach
evolution in the four specific project cases considered above. The central theme is that by working
on quite specific, tangible topics or problems, it is possible to build positive (loose) coalitions for
change that are not seen to be threatening. Not only does this increase the chances of positive
improvement, both in material results and in inclusion, but it does so in the way in which change has
happened historically. It is far easier this way to avoid the dangers of externally imposed agendas,
but to achieve better positive governance improvements anyway.
If SDC can find common ground with the likes of DFID. World Bank or One-UN in these approaches
that aim to work with, rather than challenge, GoR positions on tangible problems, then it could make
sense to partner with these organisations, thus potentially enhancing the scale of impact.
Box 10: T-VET PROMOST
In the project review at the end of the latest phase of PROMOST, it was stated that sustainability was the
major challenge for the Programme, but the review focusses on the ability of governments to sustain the
training provided after the Programme. This is fair enough, but the review might have asked a broader
question about the impact of the training upon SME growth and its contribution to enterprise policy. In
fact this is quite a critical policy issue for Rwanda and one in which there is considerable interest.
Improving labour market supply is one of the key constraints to growth.
Using the language from section 6.3.3 above, labour market supply improvement is an issue or problem
that is of considerable interest to the RPF. This is not just evidenced by GoR statements and policy
documents. It is also backed up by our understanding of the incentives the reasons why the RPF must be
so concerned about this problem. This prompts the questions: how can success cases like PROMOST be
scaled up to have an influence over the development of effective policy; could this be a vehicle for
enhancing the inclusion of the views of vulnerable young people and women in influencing pro-poor
changes; and how effective might such engagements be compared with direct efforts to influence
governance improvement, as say through the use of Citizen’s Scorecards or programmes aimed at
promoting electoral reforms? In fact, the GoR is desperate to improve such tangible matters such as labour
market supply, and is far more ready to entertain improvements in citizen inclusion/consultation that are
aimed at resolving such problems.
Therefore the current study would recommend that a policy advocacy element be built in to PROMOST in
order to enhance both inclusion, and scaling up of the programme’s current, though modest, successes.
they partner with Government.” See Afrobarometer Summary of Results in Zimbabwe, 2014.
https://afrobarometer.org/publications/zimbabwe-round-6-summary-results-2014
23
Box 11: Ikiraro and Problem-Driven Advocacy
As described in box 2, Ikiraro encountered considerable difficulties in establishing a challenge function. But
by changing its approach it gained acceptance and was able to expand its areas of work and spend level.
Section 5 in the main text goes into some detail to explain why it is that Government needs to develop
better economic policies in key growth sectors. It is understood that is this kind of analysis led Ikiraro to
commence engagement over standards in animal meat production, SME growth policy, and concerning the
development of secondary cities (urban growth), amongst others. In each case support has been provided
across different kinds of stakeholders, and concentrating equally upon the technical content of the
exercise, as well as the means of involving citizens in testing ways of achieving improvements. There are
some particular features common to each initiative:
The choice of policy issue is made locally both by local CSOs and by relevant government
departments, not according to donor priorities;
The relevant government department is assured at the outset that the intention is not for the
Programme to publish its findings, at least not until the department has seen the results first;
There is a strong element of collaborative policy development partners being helped to take the
critical step of working out what practical and politically marketable policy might look like; and
Each project emphasises the means by which views of citizens and practitioners on the ground (not
just supposedly representative CSOs) can be involved in influencing the results of the exercise.
In this way projects with seemingly technical, service delivery or growth objectives, also have significant
governance impact potential. Because of the way in which change is approached, the exercise does not
seem to pose a threat to the government. Instead it demonstrates how community involvement on
a ic la ac ical i e ha fi i h he g e nmen g
h and e ice im
emen agenda can be
improved and how it can contribute to poverty-reduction solutions. The approach also informs the
Programme’s decision to detach itself from certain lines of work, if it is discovered that there are
insurmountable political barriers and that money would be better spent elsewhere.
It may be worth SDC exploring means by which phase 3 of its PROMOST programme can be modified so
that the contribution made by T-VET training could also generate lessons that can be integrated with
policy influencing work on SME growth. Ikiraro will shortly come to an end, but here could be other SDC
technical programmes that might yield better governance results by also adopting this approach.
Box 12: CPCP
This project is currently in the design phase. It may be that training for media houses and work to improve
citizen engagement through mechanisms such as JADF, Scorecards and Imihigo could be given greater
tractions by having them focus on specific, local problems. There must be a danger that if the programme
is seen to be mainly about press freedom and community engagement as such, then it could be seen as a
potential threat by GoR. Furthermore it is doubtful whether the project could gain significant traction with
communities, who are more interested in day-to-day matters of service, livelihoods and even survival, than
the more abstract governance issues. Positively worded media stories about: how fertiliser use can be
increased; what standards on animal husbandry might be introduced to help stop the spread of disease,
and tax law changes for SMEs aimed at helping them to grow, could be expected to play to the incentives
both of leaders and of community members, not to mention profit-making businesses. Similarly, using such
issues on the ground to help improve the relevance and performance of JADF is likely to bear some better
results than if general governance issues are used to dominate proceedings. It may be noted that if the
conclusions to section 4 of the current report are accurate, then GoR could be unlikely to promote much in
the way of generalised inclusion and consultation improvements through Imihigo and scorecards, whereas
they would very likely seek to promote the uses of such mechanisms if it can be shown how they could
contribute to more specific and focussed policy improvements.
24
Box 13: Bricks
The Bricks project could prove to be a major plus for building positive relationships with the GoR (if indeed
it isn’t already . Climate change and jobs really are at the top of the government’s agenda, not just at the
forefront of written policy documents. Results such as those emanating from the project may be wellworth scaling up. Is there the potential to deduce policy implications from the success of the project that
could accelerate the adoption of the approach? Could this be a basis for good media story training, and a
subject for discussion at JADFs (all under the planned CPCP)? This is the kind of issue that may bring
governance improvements to life, and bring together a range of civil society, business and government
actors. In summary, can the tangible results of a technical programme like Bricks be a good entry point for
a governance programme like CPCP.
6.5
Indirect Vs Direct Advocacy
SDC makes contributions to the Development Partner Coordination Group (DPCG). This is composed
of GoR Permanent Secretaries, Heads of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, as well as
representatives of civil society and the private sector. Its objectives are to coordinate development
aid to Rwanda, monitor implementation of EDPRS 2 and now NST 1, and monitor the fulfilment of DP
commitments. As part of this exercise there are a number of Technical Working Groups, each
chaired by the PS of the relevant Ministry, and each with a designated DP lead.58
No doubt this mechanism is essential for ensuring both DP co-ordination, as well as a degree of
consistency with GoR Policy. However, it is also true that the DPs generally see this mechanism as a
means through which to communicate their views to the Government, and through this
communication deliver advocacy pressure to change and improve the government’s development
activities. The DPs also raise matters of management concern, including questions related to
delivery, compliance, governance and human rights. In general the DP position and aid contribution
are used to try to leverage positive change through this mechanism.
The purpose and effectiveness of this mechanism and approach is not questioned in this paper.
However, it does raise the question as to whether direct or indirect advocacy approaches can be
more effective. Probably the answer is that this will vary depending upon the topic. If this is true
however, it is possible that more thought needs to be devoted to how indirect advocacy can be
used.
Indirect advocacy entails aid speaking through local counterparts rather than via direct
communication between DPs and the GoR. In this approach efforts are made to gain a deeper
understanding of the politics involved in reaching agreements or settlements over the resolution to
certain challenges. So for example there may be a technically ideal way to improve pricing
mechanisms around certain agricultural commodities, but the reality will be that in some sectors
current mechanisms are fixed so as to deliver a political result rather than a technical one. There is
evidence that this is applied in the coffee sector for example. Textiles and fertiliser are also subject
to non-economic vested interest.59 Especially in these cases, but more or less in every sector, this
means that policy change becomes a process of political negotiation. (This interpretation is similar to
that posited by Booth above, that change depends especially upon elite incentives for change.)
While DPs certainly have a part to play in these negotiations, their intervention in such matters can
be viewed as an external interference. Also it is common for DPs not fully to understand the nuances
58
59
See: http://www.devpartners.gov.rw/index.php?id=18
In fact this kind of reality is not just restricted to Rwanda, but is the case more or less in every country in the world.
25
of the local vested interests at play. So for example, some DPs focus considerable attention on
promoting improved local governance, with additional measures to enhance citizen involvement and
inclusion in planning and implementation exercises. However, as explained in section 4 of this
current paper, local government is actually part of a quite sophisticated system aimed at ensuring
intense observation and control. While DPs may consider such processes to be anti-democratic,
nonetheless in Rwanda the resulting stability might equally be seen as an essential ingredient in the
delivery of development. Thus placing pressure to improve citizen engagement through this
particular mechanism could even be counter-productive. (A way of resolving this problem
sustaining support for enhanced citizen involvement or inclusion but without it appearing to be a
threat, is outlined in box with respect to SDC’s planning for its CPCP project.
What this means for engagement over improving governance is that there will be some topics
through which it will be easier to achieve progress than others. Indeed the dialogue boxes in annex 5
especially, as well as boxes 10 through 13 above, serve to illustrate how and why the politics of
engagement around some economic growth issues stand a good chance of achieving enhanced
citizen involvement and inclusion. Furthermore, the best way of achieving shifts in these areas is
likely to be via support to local parties and interests who have a stake in achieving the solution. (See
annex 6 for further explanation and illustration.) Support can be managed with a degree of political
sensitivity, often behind closed doors, rather than in the glare of a DP sector working group
meeting.60
This dual approach sometimes direct and sometimes indirect - is informed by the political economy
analysis provided in this paper. Accordingly it is recommended that SDC consider enhancing its use
of political analysis to help identify cases where support for indirect advocacy can contribute to
beneficial results. It is argued in this paper that combining the work on PROMOST could benefit
through a connection with the work on SME growth policy under Ikiraro. There may well be other
examples where technical work can be effectively combined with politically informed advocacy
support that can promote governance improvements in carefully selected topic areas.
6.6
Governance Dependence on a Class-Based Society?
It is worth considering what the most effective route to “better governance” might be, not just in
Rwanda but for Rwandans.
In Western economies this route was not through the receipt of donor assistance. Even before the
Marshall Plan of the 1950s, aimed at re-building Western Europe after the War, well developed
democratic forms of government had emerged from the growth of capitalism and a class-based
society.61 By contrast it is harder to establish democratic forms of governance in political economies
still divided along sectarian (religious or ethnic) lines.62 There is an argument that economic growth
is needed first, to reduce the patronage-driven allegiance to rent-seeking benefactors where life
concerns mainly day-to-day survival, to promote the relevance of policy and longer-term horizons, to
place the libe a ing
e f m ne in indi id al
cke , and to create an accountability founded
upon public taxation rather than extraction.
It seems this message may not be lost on the RPF leadership. There is a strong element of the
development vision in RPF ideology that promotes the view that business and growth must come
60
61
62
This is NOT to say that working groups are dysfunctional. What is implied is that a combination of approaches may be
sensible. Some topics are best dealt with through different means.
See for example Ernest Mandel,
, “Late Capitalism,” London: Verso; or David Harvey,
, “The Limits to Capital”,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
See for example, Zaid Al-Ali,
, “The Struggle for Iraq’s Future: How Corruption, Incompetence and Sectarianism
have undermined Democracy,” New Haven, Yale University Press.
26
first, modernising Rwanda into a capitalist economy. If the ethnic divisions of the previous century
can be blurred by cross-ethnic material benefits, then business or middle and working classes may
energise a politics concerned with social and economic policy, not with an apparent contest
(whether real or manufactured) over ethnically biased sharing of wealth. Taxation is understood in
this model not just as a revenue-raising exercise but also as a means of building accountability
imperatives.
If this progression plan can be accepted, it implies that direct work on achieving governance
improvements against normative frameworks, such as the World Banks Governance Index (Kaufman
Indicators), may be neither particularly necessary nor especially effective. It implies instead that the
best route is to promote changes through sector specific technical work, such as through the
development of value chains illustrated in boxes 4 to 6 above, and through indirect as opposed to
direct influencing efforts.
6.7
Managing the Risks of Working in Rwanda
6.7.1
The Threat of Violence
Since the Genocide against the Tutsi in 1994, Rwanda has been considered to be a risky place to
work. Could there be another genocide, or at least an outbreak of inter-ethnic violence that would
threaten the achievements of aid assistance?
A study by Community Based Socio-Psychotherapy (CBS) reported that results from its survey 23
percent of respondents said they thought genocide could happen again, indicating that they thought
there were still people who would be willing to repeat the acts of 1994. There is no doubt that there
remain those across the border especially in DRC that remain genocidaires. However, for reasons
provided in the current report a repeat of the Genocide must be extremely unlikely:
The causes of the genocide were many, and the event happened only because these came
together at the same time;
These causes included: historical resentment; fear of reprisals if RPF invaded; politicallystirred-up hatred; intensive on-the-ground organisation for mass violence including the
provision of arms; a multi-party electoral environment that permitted the promotion of
radical populist agendas; economic crisis, especially amongst the elite; and specific agent
events promoting the immediate excuse for violent action;
Of these only the historical resentment is currently present the policies of observe and
control, the delivery of generally broad economic dividends, mixture of reward and
punishment used to control the elite, and a carefully crafted and controlled and generally
self-policed ideology of unity and compliance, mean that organisation for anti-state violence,
at least within Rwanda, is not easy.
However, this does not mean that ethnic and political violence will not continue. It almost certainly
will. Conflict across the border in DRC, between a variety of fragmented armed groups, and largely
now over the control of rare metals, persists. There is also the likelihood of continued armed
infringements across the southern border with Burundi and in the SW with DRC, where there are
bases for groups (the main one reputedly led by former RPF Tutsis) opposed to Kagame’s continued
rule. There is also some violence reputedly against those attempting to cross the border one way or
another between Rwanda and Uganda. Internal and external actions against individuals in political
opposition may not be ruled out.63
63
See for example: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/9643356/Rwanda-Hutuopposition-leader-jailed-for-denying-genocide.html
27
Where a more significant danger lies is in the continued tension in Burundi. The conflict there is
more ostensibly ethnic, and while Rwanda engages in support for opposition groups with a
discernible Tutsi identity in Burundi, the conflict can more easily spill across the border. Nevertheless
at present this risk appears manageable.
6.7.2
Reputational Risk
Owing to the likely continuation of moderate to limited violence in specific theatres, some of it
perpetrated by the Rwandan State, there is a reputational risk stemming from engagement.
This may be the strongest argument for retaining SDC’s position of not giving direct assistance or
budget support. By promoting project work, TA, scholarships, and support to CSOs, SDC maintains a
distance from GoR.
The combined direct and indirect approach promoted above may also serve to mitigate reputational
risk. Engagement in the DPCG allows SDC to retain a voice alongside other DPs, though there are of
course other channels through which to express specific concerns over acts of violence and
suppression. Meanwhile, politically informed support for mainly non-government agents should be
expected to deliver positive examples of improvements in government engagement with and
inclusion of citizens in the development and implementation of poverty-alleviating policy. This
combination should permit the publication of positive influencing messages.
7.0 Conclusion and Recommendations
A very brief summary of this report is that the analysis indicates the country may indeed be
described as a liberal autocracy. However, while there is evidence of human rights abuses, these can
be “explained” as part of a control mechanisms designed to enforce stability, and provide the
conditions for economic growth. The top down command system evident in many fields of activity is
widespread, but does not apply to all realms of activity. Because growth and reasonably wide-spread
development are deemed critical for social cohesion, there is an unwavering commitment to find
ways to grow jobs and the economy. It is contradictions between this imperative and the need for
control that tend to push development policy off course.
Recent declines in the rate of growth, combined with a new phase of seven years of Kagame led
government, seem to have engaged a new urgency to find solutions which evaded policy makers
until now. There is a realisation in some quarters that consultation can help to improve economic
results. These tend to be in economic sub-sectors where revenue sources are dispersed and not that
captured by elite interests. By working in such areas it should be possible to achieve growth
improvements, and to progress citizen involvement and accountability around these issues or
problem-related topics. In any case, such an approach may be consistent with achieving the longterm conditions necessary for indigenous growth of democratic characteristics.
This understanding has a series of implications for the design of an effective DP strategy, which are
summarised in the following recommendations.
On balance there seems no particular reason why SDC should consider altering its mode of
aid delivery, for example to provide more direct or budget support.
If combining its aid with other DPs, it is desirable that SDC satisfies itself that it is following
an approach that is consistent with that taken by its potential partners.
If SDC wishes to refine its approach to governance so that it is less solution-driven and more
problem-driven, as the analysis in this paper suggests it should, it may consider
28
strengthening its alignment with DFID as a means of strengthening its own influence in such
matters.
In addition, the recommendations set out in text boxes 9 through 12 in the main text above
might be acted upon for those projects, and ways to extend this to other areas of SDC work
may be worked out.
Specifically these project-level recommendations can be summarised as:
o The current study recommends that a policy advocacy element be built in to PROMOST
in order to enhance both inclusion, and scaling up of the programme’s current, though
modest, successes.
o Similarly, BRICKS is yielding positive results both in job creation and in carbon emission
reductions. The potential for linking these results to policy influencing, and into CPCPplanned media story training and possibly local debates through JADFs, should be
looked into.
o Ikiraro will shortly come to an end, but here could be other SDC technical programmes
that might yield better governance results by also adopting a TWP approach.
o CPCP is at the planning stage, but it would appear that there is potential to connect
media training stories and community level work with citizens to a series of practical,
tangible topics or problems raised by other programmes. Such issues promise to gain
much better traction, both with Government, and with citizens, and other non-state
actors, than the more abstract general governance topics. The latter do not always
speak to the daily challenges of the poor, and can be seen as a legitimate threat by the
Government in Rwanda, preoccupied as it is with stability and control.
If SDC can find common ground with the likes of DFID. World Bank or One-UN in these
approaches that aim to work with, rather than challenge, GoR positions on tangible
problems, then it could make sense to partner with these organisations, thus potentially
enhancing the scale of impact.
SDC should consider enhancing its use of political analysis to help identify cases where
support for indirect advocacy can contribute to beneficial results.
29