2020 AMC Program
Aviation Maintenance Conference
May 11-14
Phoenix, Arizona
An ARINC Document
Prepared by AMC
Published by SAE ITC
16701 Melford Blvd., Suite 120
Bowie, Maryland, 20715 USA
AMC Reference 20-017/MSG-363
February 28, 2020
The AMC is an aviation industry activity organized by ARINC
Industry Activities to assist aviation interests in cooperating to
develop shared technical solutions and to establish technical
standards.
AMC seeks to reduce life-cycle costs for airborne electronics by
promoting reliability and improving maintenance and support
techniques through the exchange of engineering, maintenance, and
associated technical information and the development of voluntary
maintenance-related technical standards.
A primary means of exchanging avionics maintenance information is
the annual Aviation Maintenance Conference conducted under the
auspices of the AMC.
The AMC consists of representatives from the technical leadership of
the air transport avionics maintenance community. The voting
membership of AMC consists of those organization representatives of
commercial air transport operators that agree to pay an annual fee
appropriate to their size and category. These organizations are known
as AMC Member Organizations (AMO). Each organization will have
one vote.
AMC accomplishes its objectives through a number of activities
including the annual AMC conference, AMC Steering Committee
meetings, a quarterly newsletter PLANE TALK®, task group
activities, and liaison with the AEEC and with other aviation or
electronic industry activities.
2020 AMC Program
Welcome to the 2020 AMC in Phoenix, Arizona! We are certain that your attendance at the
AMC will prove enlightening and beneficial to your organization.
The AMC Program is organized into two major sections. The General Information section
contains the information that you will need to get the most benefit from this unique aviation
meeting. It includes the schedule of events and abstracts of the technical symposiums that
are planned. The AMC Questions by Topic – the most important part of the program –
presents the 314 questions submitted by airlines and suppliers that will be discussed at the
AMC.
AMC Reminders
The 2020 AMC officially begins with the Opening Session at 8:30am on Monday,
May 11, 2020. This will be a joint opening with the AEEC General Session.
Bring an up-to-date business card when you register. Your information will be used in the
attendance list in the AMC Report.
The AMC Steering Committee has decided that business casual is the appropriate dress
for all AMC events.
All participants are urged to attend the entire program. Every effort will be made to keep the
discussion on schedule. However, it is not always possible to accurately predict the amount
of time the various subjects will generate.
Joint Opening at the 2019 AMC | AEEC in Prague, Czech Republic
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AEEC | AMC
Tampa, Florida
May 10-13, 2021
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2020 Conference Registration
Attendance Fees
An AEEC | AMC Badge is required for all activities related to the AEEC | AMC to include the
technical meeting, exhibit areas, hospitality suites, etc.
Conference Attendance Fees (cut-off date April 26, 2020)
• Non-Member/Non-Sponsor: $1,000.00
• ARINC IA Corporate Sponsors: Complimentary
• AEEC, AMC, and FSEMC Members: Complimentary
Refund Policy:
• Price Paid: $1,000.00
• Refund: $900.00
• If Cancelled By: Monday, April 20, 2020
* Regardless of the refund amount listed, the amount refunded will never exceed the amount paid.
The reduction of $100.00 covers the charges the credit card companies charge us for processing.
On-Site Registration
If you miss the April 26, 2020, deadline for registration, we will be happy to assist you on site.
On-site registration will be located just outside the Phoenix Ballroom.
Hours of on-site operation:
• Sunday, May 10, 2020, from 4:00pm – 7:00pm
• Monday, May 11, 2020, from 7:00am – 3:00pm
• Tuesday, May 12, 2020, from 7:00am – 3:00pm and 5:00pm – 8:00pm
• Wednesday, May 13, 2020, from 7:00am – 3:00pm
• Thursday, May 14, 2020, from 8:00am – 10:30am
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Transportation Fact Sheet
The Airport
The Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport (PHX) has three terminals connected by walkways
and Sky Train service. Each terminal has a separate arrivals hall for baggage retrieval. Ground
transportation and rental car shuttles all have stops outside the terminals.
You are going to the Sheraton Phoenix Downtown hotel
340 North 3rd Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
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AMC GENERAL INFORMATION
WELCOME TO THE 2020 AMC
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AEEC | AMC KEYNOTE SPEAKER
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AMC SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
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AMC OPENING SESSION
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AMC INDUSTRY SESSION
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AMC SYMPOSIUMS
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AMC ELECTIONS
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AMC STEERING GROUP
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AMC GUIDELINES
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AMC SOCIAL EVENTS
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AMC FOLLOW-UP ITEMS
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AMC QUESTIONS BY TOPIC
See Next Page
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2020 AMC Questions by Topic
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
1
TEST SYSTEMS
17
ELECTRICAL POWER
24
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROL
38
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
63
GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT & SPECIAL TOOLING
91
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
93
SOFTWARE
106
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS
107
INDICATING SYSTEMS
122
ENGINE SYSTEMS
128
IFE SYSTEMS
139
LIGHTING
142
FUEL SYSTEMS
150
LANDING GEAR
160
FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMS
170
EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING
172
PNEUMATIC
182
NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS
190
OXYGEN
197
DOORS
199
WATER & WASTE
200
OTHERS
210
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Welcome to Phoenix!
Anand Moorthy
AMC Chairman
American Airlines
It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to the 2020
Aviation Maintenance Conference (AMC) | Airlines
Electronic Engineering Committee (AEEC) General
Session in the vibrant city of Phoenix, where Lord Darrell
Duppa, one of the original settlers, suggested the city be
named as one born from the ruins of a former civilization.
The capital of the southwestern state of Arizona in the
United States, Phoenix is renowned for its year-round
sun, warm temperatures, five-star resorts, world class golf courses, myriad of culinary
choices, shopping centers, beautiful hiking, and business acumen that is sure to treat all
visitors.
As the previous AMC vice chair serving under chairman Marijan Jozic, who stepped
down after seven great years, my hope is to follow in his footsteps and continue to lead
a strong Steering Committee that delivers successful and enjoyable conferences year
after year. American Airlines is pleased to host this year’s AMC, and as an employee of
the largest airline in the world, I’m excited to have you here with us.
Having attended numerous AMC conferences, I have learned much and have built
many strong relationships over the years. Many of you who have attended past
conferences can relate to the benefits of this professional gathering. This year will be no
different. I expect to build on existing relationships and to make new connections so that
we can share our thoughts, ideas, and arrive at common solutions.
Our goal is to always improve maintenance and to lower costs without compromising
safety, compliance, and reliability. For 71 years, we have organized AMC conferences
and maintained our purpose. We ask ourselves what repairs can be developed to
increase our operational reliability and reduce cost. Throughout the years we have
successfully saved millions of dollars for our airline members, setting standards not only
for our members, but for the entire aviation community.
The inaugural Mechanical Maintenance Conference (MMC) was a huge success in
Cleveland, Ohio during the Fall of 2017, which prompted our Steering Committee to
expand to mechanical team members. The first AMC andMMC conference took place
last year in Prague. As a result of our extended ATAs and growing participation, this
year we have even more discussion items in Phoenix.
I look forward to this year’s AMC. I am eager to hear from our conference speakers as
well as your insights as we explore solutions to the 314 discussion items. Our goal
every year is to have more success stories than previous years. Let’s get ready to
collaborate in Phoenix and make this 71st AMC | AEEC conference another successful
year, as we always do. See you in Phoenix and let us have a great conference.
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2020 AMC | AEEC Keynote Speaker
Mark Loyd
Chief Engineer & Managing Director – Engineering
Services
American Airlines
Mark Loyd is the Chief Engineer and Managing Director of
Engineering Services for American Airlines. In this role, Mark
oversees operational and heavy maintenance support
engineering, vendor and internal shop support engineering, new
aircraft certification and factory deliveries, aircraft sales and lease
returns, configuration management, tooling engineering, test
equipment engineering, materials and process engineering, and
PMA approvals.
Mark is a 24-year veteran of American Airlines. He held various engineering and
leadership roles at AA including Maintenance Programs, AD programs, Fleet and
Component Engineering. He was a DER in Structures and an ODA unit member in
conventional and composite structure repairs. He oversaw the introduction of B777-300,
A319/A321 Family and B787 family of aircraft into the AA Fleet. Prior to AA, he worked
in heavy maintenance MRO’s with experience in Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and
Lockheed aircraft. He also worked at McDonnell-Douglas on the MD-11 program in
design and liaison engineering. He is a graduate from Arizona State University’s college
of Engineering and Technology.
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2020 AMC Schedule of Events
This is a preliminary schedule of events. Please see the mobile app for the most recent agenda.
1600
1700
1900
Sunday – May 10
Early Registration
Welcome Reception
Registration Closes
Monday – May 11
Registration Opens
Opening Session
Symposium – My Aircraft is Connected: Now What?
Lunch
AMC Discussion
Recess
Visit Suites
Tuesday – May 12
0700 Registration Opens
0830 Industry Session (at the conclusion of the Industry Session, discussion items will commence)
1200 Lunch
1330 AMC Discussion
1630 Recess
1800 Showcase
2000 Visit Manufacturer Suites
Wednesday – May 13
0700 Registration Opens
0830 AMC Discussion
1200 Lunch
1330 AMC Discussion
1520 Symposium – Shift Away from Hydraulics and Pneumatics to Electrical: How this Impacts
Operators and MROs
1630 Recess
1700 Visit Manufacturer Suites
Thursday – May 14
0800 Registration Opens
0830 AMC Discussion
12:00 Estimated Completion Time of Discussion Items
0700
0830
1030
1200
1330
1630
1700
Event Locations
Sunday
Sunday – Thursday
Monday – Thursday
Monday – Thursday
Tuesday
Coffee Breaks
Welcome Reception
Registration
AMC
Daytime Exhibit
Showcase
Phoenix Foyer
Phoenix Foyer
Phoenix C
Phoenix D & E
Phoenix D & E
Coffee breaks will be provided daily at 1010 and 1500
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2020 AMC Opening Session
Monday, May 11 – 8:30am
Welcome and Introductions
AMC Chairman
AEEC Chairman
Anand Moorthy
Robert Swanson
American Airlines
FedEx
Mark Loyd
Chief Engineer & Managing Director Engineering Services American Airlines
Keynote Speakers
Awards
Volare Awards
Mike Rockwell
ARINC Industry Activities
AMC Awards
Sheila Liddle
AMC Vice Chairperson
Southwest Airlines
AEEC Awards
Jessie Turner
AEEC Chairperson-Elect
The Boeing Company
2020 AMC Industry Session
Tuesday, May 12 – 8:30am
Session Overview
AMC Chairman
Anand Moorthy, American Airlines
Future Concepts for Maintenance Subcommittee
EDS
TPS
AT-ASB
Electronic Distribution of Software
Ted Patmore, Delta Air Lines
Test Program Set
Ted Patmore, Delta Air Lines
Air Transport-Avionics Service Bulletin
Ozgur Arayici, Turkish Airlines Technic
AMC Steering Committee Election Overview
AMC Exec. Secretary
Sam Buckwalter
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2020 AMC Symposiums
Monday, May 11, 2020 – 10:30am
My Aircraft is Connected: Now What?
My Aircraft is Connected, Now What? (or Keeping Up My Connectivity with the Jones’s) at the
AMC in Phoenix. Airlines will discuss their success stories in using aircraft connectivity for
improved operations and/or their strategy for keeping up with communication technology.
Participant airlines will discuss their biggest operational wins with the level of aircraft
connectivity and pitfalls along the way while dealing with the three to five-year useful life of
internet technology and changes in the SATCOM business.
Wednesday, May 13, 2020 – 3:20pm
Shift Away from Hydraulics and Pneumatics to Electrical: How this Impacts Operators and MROs
This symposium will discuss the pros and cons of new age and legacy aircraft components,
including reliability, predictive maintenance technology, tooling and test equipment, OEM
support, and more. Speakers will address new repair challenges as well as reliability and repair
cost benefits for old versus new systems.
The AMC Symposiums are intended to be interactive. Following the conclusion of the
presentations, questions and discussions are strongly encouraged, as time permits.
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2020 AMC Elections
AMC Steering Committee elections will be held for the following positions whose terms
end in 2020:
Africa/Middle East Region
Caribbean, Central & South American (CAR-AC-AS)
Member at large
El Al Israel Airlines
Azul
Lufthansa
FedEx
If you are an AMC Member Organization (AMO) and you are interested in standing for election
to the AMC Steering Committee, please contact Sam Buckwalter, AMC Executive Secretary:
sam.buckwalter@sae-itc.org.
The AMC Steering Committee plans, organizes, and directs AMC activities
including the annual AMC conference, publication of PLANE TALK®,
establishing and monitoring standard setting activities, and acting on behalf of
AMC in matters related to AMC activities or to industry interests in avionics
maintenance. The AMC Steering Committee will authorize the AMC technical
work program and rule on the adoption of proposed ARINC Standards and
supplements to existing ARINC Standards.
The AMC Steering Committee shall be comprised of 11 voting representatives
of the AMOs elected to the AMC Steering Committee and a non-voting
secretariat provided by ARINC IA. AMOs represented on the AMC Steering
Committee shall be elected by the AMOs.
To ensure global representation, the AMOs elected to the AMC Steering
Committee should include at least one AMO from each of the following regions:
North America; Caribbean, Central, and South America; Europe; Africa and
Middle East; and Asia Pacific. AMOs will be attached to a specific geographical
region according to the ICAO definitions.
For more information, contact Sam Buckwalter, AMC Executive Secretary.
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2020 AMC Steering Committee
AMC STEERING COMMITTEE ROSTER
Anand Moorthy
AMC Chair
Sheila Liddle
AMC Vice Chair
American Airlines
Southwest Airlines
Quentin Souleau
Air France/KLM
Johann Espinosa
Air France/KLM
Ricardo de Azevedo e Souza
Azul Linhas Aereas
Joe Falkenbach
Delta Air Lines
Rick Dupree
Delta Air Lines
Dan Ganor
El Al Israel Airlines
Ted McFann
FedEx
Kazuyoshi Kanno
Japan Airlines
Karsten Montebaur
Lufthansa Technik
Juergen Peschutter
Lufthansa Technik
Jacque Mallard
Southwest
Ozgur Arayici
Turkish Airlines
Dean Conner
United Airlines
Sharon Gradwohl
United Airlines
Sam Buckwalter
SAE ITC, ARINC Industry Activities
*Each airline organization on the AMC Steering Committee receives one vote.
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2020 AMC Guidelines
Agenda – This program is the main document for the AMC. It is provided on the AMC
websites several weeks in advance of the meeting. Please bring a copy with you to the meeting.
Seating – Airlines and other avionics users are seated in the center section of the meeting
room. Manufacturers, suppliers, and others who are involved in responding to discussion items
are seated in the wings of the meeting room.
The 2019 AMC & MMC was
held in Prague, Czech
Republic. The 70th annual
meeting was attended by 32
airlines, and six airframe
manufacturers.
The
total
registered
attendance
was
629
attendees from 28 countries.
Delegates seated at the 2019 AMC & MMC in Prague, Czech Republic
AMC Conference Room Layout
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2020 AMC Guidelines
Promptness and Courtesy
•
Please be prompt for the start of each session. Pay careful attention to the
start times published in the AMC Schedule of Events.
•
Persons arriving late for the AMC Opening Session are asked to refrain from entering the
ballroom during keynote remarks.
•
Persons with cellular phones are requested to turn off the ringers for these
devices during the meeting sessions. Use of these devices is not permitted in
the meeting rooms.
Meeting Conduct – Anyone wishing to comment on a discussion item or raise
a question during the discussion, please observe the following procedure:
1. Hold up the place marker to obtain the
microphone. Wait to be recognized by the
moderator.
120o
2. When recognized by the moderator, state
your name and organization.
3. Speak clearly and distinctly into the
microphone.
The Conference Microphone System is activated by pressing the button on the base of the
microphone unit. The microphone will illuminate a red ring on the “stalk” when activated. The
person speaking should be 8 to 20 inches away from the microphone stalk and within the shaded
area in the diagram. When finished speaking, pressing the button on the base will deactivate the
microphone, and the red ring light will extinguish. The microphones on the floor stands are similar,
except the button is on the actual microphone.
If a microphone is left open (red light illuminated) without a person speaking into it, please press
the button to turn off the microphone unit. This will prevent unwanted sounds in the audio system
and allow other speakers to be heard clearly.
Manufacturers are requested to follow the agenda when a discussion item they are planning to
answer is being introduced and to move to a microphone so
as to be ready to respond. This will significantly help to keep
the meeting flowing smoothly.
Language and Terminology – The AMC is conducted
in the English language. Since English is not the native
language for many AMC participants, please keep the use of
slang, vernacular, or colloquial expressions to a minimum
and speak slowly. If something is said that you do not
understand, please wave your hand and the moderator will
ask the speaker to repeat the comment.
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2020 AMC Guidelines
AMC discussions typically generate a large amount of technical jargon and acronyms. Please
keep the use of acronyms to a minimum. Use only widely accepted acronyms. For example, "INS"
is generally well known as the acronym for the Inertial Navigation System; however, "GBL"
probably is not used to denote "Gyro Bearing Lubricant" in many organizations.
Since the AMC is all about communication and is an international meeting, the AMC Steering
Committee encourages all attendees to participate. The person sitting next to you at the AMC
may have that one bit of magic information that will solve your problem or offer a new perspective.
Take time to meet that person, listen to what they have to say, and thank them for participating.
The moderators take additional care to ensure the use of these guidelines. Participants are
encouraged to inform the moderator if you do not understand the discussion due to a language
barrier.
For cases where the moderator feels that the question or response is not clear, the moderator will
ask the respondent to repeat the response more slowly. In addition, manufacturers should be
willing to restate a question to ensure a clear understanding for everyone.
Discussion Item Procedure
•
•
•
•
•
•
The moderator will direct your attention to each new item number. If the question is
complex, a brief summary may be made.
When it appears that a group of operators have similar problems, the moderator
may ask for a show of hands to avoid redundant comments and to expedite
discussion.
Airlines and suppliers are encouraged to provide concise verbal responses,
preferably not to exceed one minute.
A copy of written responses should be given to the AMC Executive Secretary.
All written responses must be read by the submitter to be included in the report.
If solutions must be worked out after the conference, please send a copy of the
appropriate documentation to the AMC Secretary at ARINC Industry Activities. This
information will be published in PLANE TALK®.
NOTE: For delegates that are not native English speakers, it is
imperative that discussions on the conference floor be spoken
clearly, without colloquialisms, and loudly for all to hear.
Information for Manufacturers – New information related to improvements to existing
equipment or new designs may be of interest to users. Manufacturers who wish to include such
information in AMC discussions are asked to make prior arrangements with the chairman.
Manufacturers are asked to concentrate on technical aspects of the information and refrain from
giving a "sales pitch" during AMC presentations or discussion items. Sales related comments are
appropriate during breaks, at the Exhibit/Reception, or in hospitality suites.
AMC Report – The AMC Report will be prepared following the meeting and will be available at:
https://www.aviation-ia.com/product-categories/amc-meeting-reports-and-presentations
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2020 AMC Social Events
AEEC | AMC Welcome Reception
What a great way to start your evening – even better – what a great way to begin a week’s event.
Meet up with old friends, make new friends, and enjoy the food and entertainment.
The AEEC | AMC Reception is planned for 5:00pm until 7:00pm Sunday evening, leaving you
plenty of time to enjoy the nightlife of the city. The reception will be held in the Phoenix Ballroom
Foyer.
This wonderful social event is sponsored by many companies. You are encouraged to join as a
Reception Sponsor. In recognition of the reception sponsors, each company brand will be
promoted on our website, at the reception, and special thanks given during the conference.
If you would like further information on joining the sponsors of the Welcome Reception, please
contact Vanessa Mastros at vanessa.mastros@sae-itc.org.
Sponsorship
ARINC Industry Activities will be organizing and managing all of the AEEC General Session and
AMC Conference activities (e.g., technical programs, welcome receptions, breakfasts, coffee
breaks, lunches, hospitality suites, award programs, and more).
Coffee Breaks
Refreshments during the morning and afternoon breaks are
provided by break sponsoring organizations. Morning and afternoon
refreshments include regular coffee, decaffeinated coffee, tea,
water, and a small snack.
Break sponsors receive recognition in our Mobile App and on our
web site. Additionally, break sponsors may give a short presentation
or provide a video just before the break release.
Coffee breaks will be provided at 10:10am and 3:00pm.
Lunch
As a convenience to the attendees and to avoid any unnecessary
delays in returning to the conference, a buffet style lunch is possible through lunch sponsoring
organizations.
Lunch sponsors receive recognition on our web site, during the event itself, and during the
conference. Lunch sponsors may also provide a video to be played during the lunch break.
Lunch will be provided at 12:00pm Monday through Wednesday.
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2020 AMC Social Events
Showcase
The Tuesday Evening Showcase will be held on Tuesday, May 12, 2020, at 6:00pm.
AMC Hospitality Suites
All attendees are invited to visit the Hospitality Suites!
The AMC Steering Committee encourages all airline participants to use Monday, Tuesday, and
Wednesday evenings as an opportunity to visit with the industry suppliers that are supporting
the AMC. We ask airline attendees to refrain from accepting invitations for dinners, tours, or
other activities that will take them outside the hotel where the supplier hospitality suites are
located.
A list of hospitality suites is available on the AEEC and AMC event webpages
(https://www.aviation-ia.com/content/hospitality-suites).
AMC blocks several suites at the hotel. Persons desiring a suite should contact:
Vanessa Mastros
Business Manager
Tel
+1 240-334-2575
vanessa.mastros@sae-itc.org
AMC Shipping
AMC has selected Agility Fairs and Events Logistics as the official freight carrier for the handling
of ground and air shipments, as well as storage, delivery, pickup, and reshipment of materials.
For further information, please contact:
Paula Collaco
905-612-7158
pcollaco@agility.com
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AMC Review
AMC Follow-Up Items
The responses to most AMC discussion items result in a solution being accepted and the discussion item
being closed. The following list identifies those discussion items still unresolved at the time of publication
of this AMC Report. Airlines and suppliers are requested to contact the AMC Executive Secretary if an
open item has been satisfactorily closed.
ITEM
SECTION
SUBMITTER
SUPPLIER
1
17-016
Avionics Philosophy
ETD
Boeing
2
19-036
Test Systems
LHT
Lord
3
19-040
Test Systems
AFR/KLM
Ultra-Electronics
4
18-056
Autoflight System
ETD
Thales
5
19-045
Autoflight System
JAL
Moog/Boeing
6
19-047
Autoflight System
KAL
Honeywell
7
19-055
Flight Controls
THY
Airbus
8
19-057
Flight Controls
DAL
Liebherr
9
19-059
Flight Controls
LHT
Collins Aerospace
10
19-062
Flight Controls
LHT
Boeing
11
19-063
Flight Controls
UAL
Boeing
12
19-064
Flight Controls
UAL
Boeing
13
19-071
Flight Controls
UAL
Airbus
14
17-025
Flight Controls
LHT
Parker Hannifin
15
17-026
Flight Controls
LHT
Parker Hannifin
16
19-073
Electrical Power
VIR
Collins Aerospace
17
19-074
Electrical Power
AFR KLM
Collins Aerospace
18
18-040
Electrical Power
ETD
UTAS
19
19-083
Electrical Power
LHT
Collins Aerospace
20
19-090
19-095
Pneumatic
LHT
UAL
Liebherr
21
19-092
Pneumatic
EXS
Parker/Boeing
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ACTION
Boeing to develop an
extraction that prints in pdf.
Lord/Airbus to provide the
updated CMM
Ultra to provide quote on
TSDP.
Reduce the NFF rate on the
ELAC.
Moog to resolve EMCU high
power failure. Boeing to
support fleet replacement.
Honeywell to provide root
cause and countermeasure.
Airbus to root cause of fault
LGCIU.
Airbus and Liebherr to find
cause of water ingress
Collins to provide path for
repair of Electro Hydraulic
Servo Valve.
Boeing to resolve issue with
design responsibility regarding
ballscrew assembly.
Boeing to develop tooling
Boeing to improve lead-time
for replacement parts.
Airbus to provide allowable
Substitutes.
Parker to provide CMM Rudder
PCU.
Parker to provide inspection
criteria for elevator PCUs
Boeing and Collins Aerospace
to report on update to VFSG.
Collins to resolve the problem
with input shaft shear
Resolve the burnt circuit board
on GAPCU.
Collins to resolve issue with
IDG Governor Failures during
cold operation.
Resolve low time HPV
Microswitch failures
Boeing and Jet2 to monitor
Belled Air isolation to see if
this was short-lived issues.
AMC Review
ITEM
SECTION
SUBMITTER
SUPPLIER
22
19-094
Pneumatic
LHT
Collins Aerospace
23
17-041
19-130
Pneumatic
AAL
Jet2
Honeywell
24
17-045
Pneumatic
AFR KLM
Airbus/Collins
25
17-047
Pneumatics
AFR KLM
Whippany
Actuation System
26
19-096
Communications
ANA
Honeywell
Communications
ANA
Rockwell Collins
Communications
KLM/AFR
Boeing
27
27
19-098
18-125
19-101
17-117
18-128
19-102
29
19-104
Communications
KAL
Honeywell
30
19-106
Communications
ANA
Collins Aerospace
31
19-108
Communications
AFR KLM
Collins Aerospace
32
19-113
Communications
VIR
Boeing
33
19-115
Communications
VIR
Boeing
34
18-150
Software
NAX
All
35
19-124
Air Conditioning
ANA
Collins Aerospace
Boeing
36
19-131
Environmental
KLM AFR
Collins Aerospace
Boeing
37
19-132
Environmental
KLM AFR
Collins Aerospace
38
19-134
Environmental
LHT
Collins Aerospace
39
19-135
Environmental
LHT
Collins Aerospace
40
19-138
Fuel System
KAL
Parker/ Spherea
41
19-140
Fuel System
KAL
Ontic
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ACTION
Resolve PRVC Diaphragm
Ruptures
Honeywell to release Service
Bulletin to improve
Temperature Control Valves.
Collins Aerospace and Airbus
to resolve issue with HP
Regulating Valve.
Whippany to provide support
to repair Rotary Actuator.
Honeywell to provide root and
solution to RFM failure and
then associated SB.
Rockwell to provide root cause
and corrective action.
Boeing to speed up SB to
install drip shield over HF
receiver.
Honeywell to provide more
information with regards to
ELT lithium batteries.
Collins to update CMM HPA901 HP Amplifier by June
2019.
Collins to ensure the EFB
Docking Station CMM is
updated with correct CMM it
should not have RITEC CMM.
Boeing to pursue solution for
the existing TCS system or
WWU going forward.
Boeing to improve the AMM
procedures regarding
troubleshooting core network.
Supplier to provide a mean of
electronic distribution of
software…no more floppies.
Collins and Boeing to resolve
FCV Torque motor.
Remove the requirement for
ESS testing at RTS. Should be
part of production testing.
Airlines would prefer a more
cost-effective solution to the air
filter replacement.
Collins to provide detail root
cause analysis
Collins to provide detail root
cause analysis
Spherea to work with Parker
and KLM to resolve issue.
Ontic and KAL to follow up and
see if switch replacement
works reduce delays.
AMC Review
ITEM
SECTION
SUBMITTER
SUPPLIER
42
17-142
Fuel System
DAL
Airbus/Zodiac
43
19-151
Navigation
ETD
Airbus
44
17-079
Navigation
DAL
UTAS/All
45
18-097
Navigation
ETD
Boeing
46
19-169
Navigation
VIR
Collins
Aerospace/Boeing
47
19-171
Navigation
JAL
GE Aviation
48
19-175
Navigation
ANA
Honeywell
Woodward
49
19-178
Navigation
ANA
Collins Aerospace
50
19-181
Navigation
VIR
Collins Aerospace
51
19-182
Navigation
ANA
Collins Aerospace
52
19-183
Navigation
ANA
Collins Aerospace
53
19-188
Landing Gear
AFR KLM
Safran
54
19-190
Landing Gear
AFR KLM
Safran
55
19-204
Engine Systems
ANA
ITT Aerospace
56
17-ULB
Indicating Systems
All Airlines
Boeing
57
18-169
Indicating System
AFR/KLM
Thales
58
19-224
Lighting
KAL
Diehl
59
19-225
Lighting
JAL
Boeing
P-21
ACTION
Airbus to results of
investigation of the Fuel Valve
Single Motor actuator
reliability.
Airbus to research
consideration for retrofit of
probes on the A320.
Provide HMS for Pitot Tubes.
Boeing to certify the -006
Honeywell TCAS computer on
B777.
Continue investigation of Loss
of Mode S and report to
analysis.
GE and Boeing to work on SB
for MCDU.
ANA to work with Honeywell
and Woodward to resolve
DAA-4A Drive Unit issue.
Collins Aerospace to resolve
the nuisance messages on
Weather Radar to reduce NFF.
Collins to investigate
establishing limits for
acceptable amounts of
corrosion and/or developing
repair procedures for corrosion
removal.
Collins and Boeing to complete
root cause analysis.
Collins and Boeing to release
SB to address A3 module
reliability.
Safran to provide updated
CMM
Safran to resolve issue with
water ingress.
ITT and Bombardier to resolve
issue door actuator
Request that the 90-day ULB
requirement be satisfied by
stocking the recorder part
number separate from the ULB
and the recorder
interchangeability be based on
the Form, Fit and Function of
the recorder.
Thales to provide process to
replace photocells.
Diehl and KAL to work
together on EPSU
Boeing and Jamco speed up
design change for lavatory
ECU.
AMC Review
ITEM
SECTION
SUBMITTER
SUPPLIER
60
19-228
Nacelles & Thrust
ANA
Honeywell
61
19-230
Nacelles & Thrust
AFR KLM
Collins Aerospace
62
19-231
Nacelles & Thrust
UAL
Boeing
Collins Aerospace
63
19-232
Nacelles & Thrust
UAL
Collins Aerospace
64
19-238
17-035
14-264
Equipment/Furnishing
ANA
Boeing
Adam Right
65
18-227
Equipment/Furnishing
Dal
Adams Right
66
19-239
Equipment/Furnishing
ANA
Boeing and Ipeco
67
19-247
Equipment/Furnishing
EVA
Lacobucci
Boeing
68
17-147
Equipment/Furnishing
DAL
Collins Aerospace
69
19-258
IFE Systems
KAL
Thales
70
19-259
IFE Systems
KAL
Panasonic
71
19-262
Other
KLM AFR
Boeing
72
19-275
Other
TAP
Meggitt
P-22
ACTION
ANA to send lock brake to
Honeywell and monitor the
situation.
Waiting on CMM to be
updated.
Collins and Boeing to work
with UAL to increase repair.
Collins to provide technical
update to overhaul inlet cowl
system.
Adams Right to provide
solenoid rebuild and/or
replacement.
Airbus to work with Adams
Right to provide technical
manual for the CDLS system.
Boeing and Ipeco to follow up
on possibility of SB.
Lacobucci to issue a notice of
change. Waiting on submittal.
Collins to improve reliability of
plunger in coffee maker.
Thales and Korean to work
together on resolving QSEB.
Panasonic to work with Korean
in discontinuation of minor part
for IFE LRU.
Boeing to improve Installation
drawing.
Meggitt to investigate
corrosion on the hex wrench.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 1
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
1
Component Shop Data
All
All
All
All
UAL
United Airlines is requesting all repair vendors to make shop findings reports available electronically, i.e., Excel or
other electronic format.
United Engineering uses this data specifically for component health analysis, and with many vendors this piece part
data/shop findings are only available via PDF. United is requesting a more accessible means of analyzing this data,
specifically in spreadsheet format, for easier data analysis.
Operators and repair vendors, please comment.
Item
Summary Title
2
ICA for Service Bulletins
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
DAL
Oftentimes OEMs release Service Bulletins (SB) without incorporating the SB in its respective CMM. When the SB is
not incorporated, there can be new PNs (LRUs or subcomponents) listed in the SB that are not listed in the current
CMM revision.
If the post modification is sent for repair, there will be no Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA). OEMs are
often are unwilling to cooperate or provide a very long lead time in incorporating the post modification PNs into the
CMM. This creates operational issues for airliners when post-modification PNs come off the A/C and there is no
manual for the post-modification PNs to maintain.
Can the SB serve as ICA for post modification units until new revision of the CMM has been released?
Operators and vendors, please comment.
Item
Summary Title
3
Predictive Maintenance
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
Airbus
A350
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
AFR/KLM
AFR
This question is related to AMC 2019 item 2 – The NFF Dilemma on Predictive Maintenance.
Some A350 modifications are free of charge only if the component is found failed in shop with particular failure code.
Unfortunately, due to maintenance predictive removals, the failure code never appears on the AiRTHM report and
we are obliged to deal with OEM to prove the reason of removals.
How Airbus can work with the OEM to deal with this issue?
Airbus, OEM, other operators, comments please?
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 2
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
4
Lack of Transparency on Airman-web
Decommissioning
All
Airbus
All
All
ETD
In July 2019, certain operators were provided with an Airbus Webinar session on Skywise Health Monitoring (SHM),
which will replace Airman-web. The new SHM will only run on Skywise Core, meaning that if an operator declines to
get on board Skywise Core, then there will be no chance to access the Airman-web successor.
Over the recent A32X/330/340/350 Airbus Symposium held in Frankfurt in October 2019, several operators
complained about the lack of information on Airman-web’s decommissioning dates and its future replacement, along
with the economic conditions that will apply onwards.
Due to the lack of transparency in the information that Airbus is providing to all operators in regards to the timelines,
availability, and financial conditions in which SHM will be available, we would like Airbus to release an official
Operators Information Transmission (OIT) in order to announce to all operators the timelines and conditions on
which Airman-web will be replaced by SHM.
For more information, refer to Airbusworld FAIR 19.0282.
Operators comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
5
What is Happening to Technical
Publications?
All
Honeywell
All
All
ETD
Thales
Collins Aerospace
The below three cases summarize a chain of events and issues faced by Etihad over the past years, proving that it
is becoming more and more difficult to operators to access the Technical Publications from the OEMs.
HONEYWELL:
Referring to AMC item 17-011 closed during Prague AMC 2019 without solution.
In several occasions, documents are not available for immediate download on Honeywell Technical Publication
website. Instead, the operator has to fill in a form and justify the reason for downloading the document.
Several days after filling the form, the operator receives an e-mail confirming that the publication is available for
download. This is highly inconvenient, as the Publication is required at the exact time that the operator looks for it. It
is absolutely worthless to be granted access to download a Technical Publication several days later, when the issue
is already solved, or the document is no longer required.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 3
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
Figure 1: Example of Honeywell Technical Document Not Available for Download
A recent case happened to Etihad in July 2019 (Figure 1) when we tried to access the Honeywell ATC transponder
model TRA-100B technical documentation, as the Component Maintenance Manual and Maintenance Manual were
not available for immediate download.
After this event, we complained again to Honeywell reps and they advised us to send a complete list of Honeywell
components installed in our fleet to the e-mail pubs@honeywell.com so they could make sure the related
publications to those components were released and available in the website. The list was sent in August 2019 and
in September 2019, Etihad tried unsuccessfully to access the CMM of Wx Radar Transmitter Receiver PN
930-2000-001, so the strategy of sending the e-mail to Tech Pubs was completely unsuccessful.
Since 2017, Honeywell has promised a final fix at the AMC for next year and in AMC 2019, Honeywell stated that a
final solution was expected Q4 2020.
•
Can Honeywell enlighten us with the latest efforts on this subject?
COLLINS:
On the 13th of August, Etihad requested download access to Collins publication #523-0826086, which is the CMM
for FOMAX computer PN 822-3613-100. On the initial reply, Collins stated that it would take weeks for them to grant
this access, as the publication was classified as export controlled.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 4
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
Figure 2: Example of Collins Technical Document Not Available for Download
On the 27th of August, Collins replied: “It has been confirmed that publication # 523-0826086 will remain as export
controlled and as a consequence will not be available to view/download on the portal. We can provide the
publication via hard copy (CD or Paper) at no charge, but will need to file for an export license. In order to start this
process, we will require a no charge PO.”
On the other side, Etihad is perfectly able to download Collins publication #523-0825032, which is the CMM for
FOMAX initial PN 822-3543-100. But now Collins will not allow the download of FOMAX new PN 822-3613-100.
•
Can Collins explain why now the CMM of the latest Part Number of the FOMAX computer cannot be
downloaded?
THALES:
Back on 18 June 2015, Thales published CIL number 77 titled: “Evolution of Technical Publication website on
THALES Customer OnLine.” This CIL communicated among others the following changes:
• Watermarks will be added to every technical documentation downloaded from the Thales website to ensure
traceability of the distribution.
• Download of CMM and SB will be available through a link sent to your email address valid for 1 day.
On the 28th Feb 2019, Thales released Customer Information Letter (CIL) number 93 with the title of “New Technical
Publication Website Functionalities”. The last sentence of this CIL says:
Thales will start deployment on March 20th, 2019 with a new website allowing both Component
Maintenance Manual (CMM) download and CMM viewer access. At the end of the adaptation period the
CMM download option will be disabled and all customers will be switched to a CMM viewer mode only. You
will still have the option to download Service Bulletin’s (SB), Service Information Letters (SIL) and Customer
Information Letters (CIL).
Instead of adding a huge red watermark on every CMM since 2015, Thales has completely restricted the download
of their CMMs. This makes the consultation of a Thales CMM only possible thru a computer with internet access,
making the consultation of this valuable technical documentation off line impossible. In the long term, this makes it
more difficult for third party repair stations to repair Thales components, forcing customers to take the component to
the OEM for repair.
•
•
What are the reasons that made Thales take such an extreme decision, taking into account that currently no
other major avionics supplier puts in practice such measures?
Which are the legalities involved in such practice? If an airline flies an aircraft with a Thales component, it
shall be fully entitled to have OFF LINE access to the technical documentation that describes the
functionality of this components and how to repair it.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 5
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
Question to Airbus and Boeing:
• How do you allow the OEMs that equip your aircraft to carry out and continue with these practices?
Operators comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
6
Technical Documentation
CMM/CMP
All PN
Honeywell
A350
All
AFR/KLM
AFR
Honeywell issues for some A350 P/Ns, two different types of CMPs, a light version and a full version. For example,
for the OVCU P/N 2119332-00, there is a light version CMP 213406 and a full version CMP 213409.
As a result, we found that:
• The referenced CMP in the Airbus documentation is the CMP in its lighter version.
• The CMP used to release component to service is always the full CMP.
• The CMP provided to operators is only the CMP in its lighter version and Honeywell systematically opposes
providing the full version of the CMP.
This situation is very ambiguous from a technical and airworthiness point of view:
• The CMP in its light version is not enough to ensure an effective technical follow-up, to check the relevance
of repairs and costs, as well as the traceability of replaced components;
• Our quality assurance department cannot confirm that the CMP used for equipment re-certification is the
approved CMP in our document base and Airbus documentation, resulting in litigation and a decrease in our
quality of service.
• The OEMs ask us to be very rigorous in document tracking by requiring us to have the latest updates of the
CMM or CMP used for the repair, but they don't give us the means to do so and put us at odds with the
regulations.
More generally, operators intervene in the reiteration circuit to perform a final check before installing equipment on
aircraft and, as such, they need documentation that is as complete as possible; if this condition is not met, the
operator will not be able to fully play its role in airworthiness and flight safety.
Airbus, Honeywell, other operators, comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
7
Obsolescence
All
All
All
All
UAL
OEMs often declare units BER due to obsolescence of parts. This is an ongoing issue and it appears OEMs do not
always make an effort to find replacement parts. Why have the OEMs stopped supplying the actual part number of
common items and just supply their in-house part number?
Boeing, Airbus, operator, and OEM comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 6
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
8
Obsolescence Definition Understanding
Vendor
Aircraft
Thales
Avionics
Airbus
All Airbus
Platforms
ATA
From
DAL
In carryover from discussion around Item 12 from 2019 conference, DL has been informed by Thales that certain
subcomponents are now classified as “strategic parts” and as such are N/A to standards set forth by Airbus SSC. In
doing so, the price for these components are now equal to or greater than the cost associated with sending the
entire LRU into Thales for repair.
Thales has created a new definition for the industry, one that does not exist in any Airbus (or Boeing) support
agreement. The intent to price these “strategic parts” needed for top level assys at costs greater that the
components alone is being interpreted as a thinly veiled effort to reclaim Thales component work that operators (and
MROs) are doing and to further prevent these operators and repair stations from working target platforms of
components.
Have any other operators experienced this with Thales and if so, has it been resolved?
Thales – please advise.
Airbus – please comment on Thales actions.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
9
B717 Obsolescence and On-Going Support
Vendor
Aircraft
Boeing
B717
ATA
From
DAL
Delta, QantasLink, Hawaiian, and Volotea are the only renaming B717 operators. Similar to the MD90/95 platform,
the B717 is experiencing similar obsolescence/supplier reluctance to continue to offer support. Boeing has
previously noted support to ARINC Report 662 for obsolescence management. What is Boeing doing to address?
To what end has Boeing gone to notify their supply base of the need to continue support? Delta continually is going
back to Boeing fleet program managers to press back on suppliers and “remind” them of their commitment to
support. Delta is willing to work directly with suppliers to resolve obsolescence issues; what Delta is finding is that
the first answer from suppliers is “no support/end of life/product obsolescence” and only after having Boeing insert
themselves to get a more positive response.
This question can be applied to all aircraft type – Boeing as well as Airbus. Time and time again the airlines have to
turn to the manufacturers to gently (or harshly) remind the suppliers of their support commitments. One would think
after decades of hearing this request (or similar) that the message would be received loud and clear.
Boeing, other operators (and even Airbus) comment please?
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
10
COTS
Commercially Available Parts
All
All
All
UAL
In the past, OEMs provided part numbers for commercially available parts, but over the last few years, the OEMs
have been removing manufacturers’ part numbers from their CMM-IPL and replacing them with their own part
numbers. When asked for documentation to support purchasing from local sources, the OEMs decline to provide the
manufacturer’s part number. This places an undue burden on the operators in obtaining parts for even the most
generic parts.
Boeing, Airbus, operators and OEMs comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 7
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
11
Repair Capability
All
Liebherr Aerospace
All
All
UAL
Liebherr only has one facility in the US. This facility has no in country service capability and only serves as a liaison
between US-based customers and their European repair facility. All SRUs need to go back to Europe for repair.
Repairs sent to Europe have long turn times (greater than 6 months).
Under the Airbus agreement, suppliers are required to have US-based repair facilities.
Airbus, operators, and Liebherr comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
12
Repair Stations
All
Airbus
All
All
UAL
Under the Airbus agreement, suppliers are required to have US-based repair facilities. Some of these facilities are
only able to do testing and/or replacing of PCB in units. They have no level II or III repair capability. Units that require
more than testing are required to be sent back to Europe, leading to long lead times (90+ days). Examples of
vendors include Liebherr, BAE, Safran, Barfield, and Thales.
Airbus, operators, and OEMs comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
13
Liquid FireExtinguishing Agent
Bromotrifluoromethane
(CBrF3)
All
Extinguishers
Engine and
Cargo
All
All
26
AFR/KLM
AFR
Following regulation (EC) 2037/2000 and (EU) 744/2010, the halon has been prohibited from 2018 in EU on new
installations. While still available and usable, the suppliers are progressively stopping the commercialization. In
2040, all halon exploitation will be stopped. Air France already faces difficulties to procure halon.
On a short-term basis, OEM, airframers, operators, do you have suggestions to keep on buying halon before 2040
despite the low production?
On a long-term basis, how do European airlines plan to operate their fleet when halon stops being procurable? Can
airframers provide a list of certified suppliers?
OEM, airframers, comment please?
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 8
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
Item
Summary Title
14
No PMA Assist Letter to Sell
Parts after OEMs Merge
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
AFR/KLM
AFR
With the merge of OEMs, piece parts are sometimes difficult to obtain. The new group may state that they do not
have the PMA Assist Letter to sell the piece parts, and they are not owners of the Drawings and the Design of the
part. Yet Illustrated Part List states that these parts are procurable, and the NHA can be bought or repaired in their
shop.
Examples:
Collins former UTAS P/N 0871LD2
We do not hold PMA on P/Ns 00871-2106-3700 & 00871-2079-0003 and we are not able to obtain PMA on
these parts. You will need to contact the OEM for procurement of these parts. I am very sorry for the
inconvenience this has caused.
Safran P/N 7700198
In response to this matter, I can advise you that because of a recent FAA ruling regarding the flowdown of PMA
(Parts Manufacturer Authority) from a line replaceable unit (LRU) to its components, I must advise you and all of
our colleagues within WWS and Safran Aerosystems Services that the PN 7800116-series components no
longer have PMA, and we cannot sell them to any customer as a spare part. Further, I must advise you that
WWS does not have any engineering drawings that list alternate products for any of the PN 7800116-series
components for the Pn 7700198 actuator assembly! Because of this, we cannot recommend or promote any
alternate products to our customers!
The only two (2) options that our customers have if they should need to repair their PN 7700198 actuator
assemblies is 1) the can send the concerned unit to WWS for repair, or 2) they can purchase a complete PN
7700198 actuator assembly as a replacement for their failed unit.
Air France expects continuity of service regarding Piece parts and any service described in the PSAA and SPSA
when OEMs are merging under one brand.
Other operators, have you been facing similar issues?
Airbus, Boeing, comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 9
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
15
EFB Docking Station
Documentation
822-2773-201
Collins
Aerospace
A350
46
AFR/KLM
AFR
This question is related to AMC 2019 item 108.
The Docking Station provided by Collins is not repaired and recertified by Collins with CMM 462001 (as per Airbus
IPD information) but by RITEC with its own CMM ref 100702, which is not available to operators.
AFR received a letter from Collins issued in April 2018 stating that the approved document is CMM 100702 REV D
dated March 28, 2018; however, FAA Form part 145 issued by RITEC end 2019 mentions that the DS are now
recertified with RITEC CMM 100702 dated January 11, 2019.
We note that no revision of the CMM is mentioned on the ARC while a REV D has been mentioned in Collins'
approval letter.
Knowing that RITEC CMM is not available, we consider that operators should know which RITEC CMM revision is
currently approved by Collins and should be informed of the purpose of these revisions through Collins CMM
462001.
AFR, as an operator, is requesting to have the RITEC CMM available.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 10
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
Collins, Airbus, other operators comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
16
Lightning Strikes Significant Increase
in the Number of Events
N/A
Boeing
B787
XX
ETD
Etihad operates a mix fleet of Airbus A32X/330/380 and Boeing B777/787.
Out of the abovementioned fleets, the B787 with currently 36 units in operation is the aircraft accounting the higher
number of lightning strikes per Flight hour in comparison with the rest of Etihad operated fleets.
Just in the period from January until March 2019, Etihad B787 fleet suffered six lighting strikes, causing considerable
damages and AOGs. This was all communicated to Boeing via Service Request # 4-4413722829.
Has Boeing received similar amount of lightning strikes events on B787 fleet from other operators?
According to Boeing records, is the B787 aircraft suffering more lightning strikes than other Boeing aircraft
(B737/747/777…)?
Has Boeing an explanation for the high number of lightning strikes events suffered on Etihad B787 fleet?
Operators comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 11
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
17
Request for Collins
Communication System
N/A
Collins
Aerospace
B787
All
KLM/AFR
KLM
Over the year, probably like many other operators, KLM Engineering has several technical questions and issues with
OEM Collins. Most are initiated and handled by e-mail through the local rep. Often it takes a long time for Collins to
reply, with ‘reminders’ as a result. This is undesirable and time consuming.
Boeing has its “Service Request” system, which has a clear, traceable item reference number and includes hard
response dates and updates.
KLM would like to have a similar communication system with Collins.
Note: this was also a topic during the Madrid 2019 conference.
•
Did Collins ever consider such a ‘SR’ system, or is planning other to do so in the (near) future?
Collins and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
18
Consistent Understanding of
Design Deficiency
Divers
All
All
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
LHT
DLH
In reference to Item 207 from 2019: It remains unclear when to consider a specific phenomenon of a component as
“Design Deficiency” if it is fixed through the introduction of a new configuration and the simultaneous declaration of
the old one as “obsolete.”
LHT would like to know if there is a consistent understanding for the term “Design Fault” between OEMs and aircraft
manufacturers within the framework of the applicable Product Support Agreement. How relevant are TFUs/FTDs
describing the field problem and the final fix for the classification as design faults?
Other operator and supplier comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 12
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
19
Airbus Storage
Information
(iSpec 2200)
All, e.g.,
25002A010001
Airbus and all
OEMs (e.g.,
Liebherr for
25002A010001)
Airbus
All
LHT
DLH
Storage limits were missing in the CMM, but on the certificate from the OEM there were storage limits mentioned.
According to Lufthansa Technik knowledge all storage limitations should be listed in the CMM.
After back-and-forth discussions, Airbus agreed that according to ATA iSpec 2200, the storage life limitation
information is now again possible to be shared in the CMM. However, Airbus states “This new rule is not applicable
to previously published CMMs and no retrofit will be launched by AIRBUS.”
This is not understood and not accepted by Lufthansa Technik. All relevant storage data should be available in one
source, which is the approved data for this component and its maintenance and handling incl. storage (CMM).
Years ago, when Airbus launched the MSD document, this was not accepted in the industry and the iSpec 2200
steering group decided in Ballot CR-2016-03 that all storage data should be in the CMM.
Other airlines, please share your opinion if you think that storage data should be available in one source or not
(CMM)?
Airbus, please comment, why no retrofit of the CMM was done yet and if a retrofit can be expected in the future?
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
20
Component Obsolescence Road Map
All
All
All
All
UAL
United Airlines recently learned of a component going obsolete at the end of this year, due to piece part availability.
Although the notice for obsolescence had been published over a decade ago, the current engineering team nor the
direct OEM team working support with United, were unaware of the component’s obsolescence this year.
United is asking all OEMs and repair shops to strategically develop road maps for component obsolescence with a
target date. Obsolescence is driven for a certain reason, e.g., piece part availability, repair support, etc., so United is
asking for a clear timeline on when a component is expected to be obsolete based on the factors that initiated the
obsolescence of the part.
Other airline operators, OEMs, and repair vendors please comment.
Item
Summary Title
21
Obsolete Part Reliability Management
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Airbus
Boeing
All
All
UAL
In due course of operation, certain components become obsolete by different OEMs. From Airbus’s and Boeing’s
standpoint, how do airlines maintain the reliability of these components? What is the process to be followed if
reliability of certain components which are obsolete, is going down? Also, what is the process to be followed for
rogue obsolete components?
Airbus, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 13
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
22
Airbus Parity Pin Depiction
Various
Airbus
A319
A320
Various
UAL
UAL would like to request that Airbus accurately depict the parity wire configuration on AWM drawings that involve
program pins with a parity wire.
The current drawings show the parity wire both open and connected, with a note to refer to the wire list for the
specific connection. This is misleading and may cause the AMT to fix a parity error just by changing the parity wire to
the other configuration, since both versions are shown on the drawing. There is only one correct parity configuration
for the program pins shown on the drawing, and that is the parity that should be depicted.
Other aircraft OEMs show the correct parity configuration on the WDs and UAL believes that Airbus should be able
to do the same.
UAL would like to know the views of other operators on this issue.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
23
Repair vs. Overhaul (Component
Reliability Improvement)
All
Honeywell
All
All
UAL
Collins Aerospace
Eaton Aerospace
Lufthansa Technik
United Airlines has been working with many vendors in improving component reliability within pneumatics,
hydraulics, flight controls, engine starting system, and electric power generation systems. A common theme when
working with vendors such as Honeywell, Collins Aerospace, Eaton Aerospace, and Lufthansa Technik is that
overhaul work scopes are generally not defined in the CMM as well as recommended time (in flight hours – TSO) or
cycle thresholds.
In these conversations, the vendors (not limited to the vendors named above) cannot provide consistent repair
versus overhaul decision making criteria. Defined overhaul work scopes as well as when these overhauls need to
occur is a key aspect in improving component reliability; this is especially true for components without much Service
Bulletin activity or are out of production.
United would like to hear why this approach is not well adopted by these repair vendors/OEMs.
Other airline operators, please comment. Honeywell, Collins Aerospace, Eaton Aerospace, Lufthansa Technik,
Airbus and Boeing, please comment. Other OEMs and repair vendors are welcomed to comment.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 14
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
******17-016******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Extract SBs per Configuration
Vendor
Aircraft
Boeing
Any
ATA
From
ETD
When Boeing releases an SB, it contains several configurations to cover differences among all the MSNs covered
by such SB. In many cases, the number of different configurations is too high, making the document too dense and
difficult to evaluate for the affected airline and specific configuration.
To Etihad´s knowledge, Boeing has not yet developed any tool to extract a single pdf covering only a single
configuration per SB. On the contrary, the competitor Airbus makes available to operators a tool called SB+, which
allows to extract a pdf containing a single configuration out of a several configuration SB.
As example, mandatory Airbus SB A320-32-1346 is composed of 681 pages and 15 configurations. When
configuration 002 is extracted in a single pdf using the SB+ tool it results on a 118-page document, significantly
reducing the operator workload during SB evaluation.
Does Boeing have any plans to implement such SB configuration tool in the near future?
Other operators’ comments and experiences in case of being affected, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
24
POC Requested
All LRU’s with S/W or firmware
ALL/ATE
Vendors
B757
ATA
From
FDX
B767
B777
MD10
A300
FedEx seeks to understand the potential cyber risks associated with the maintenance and R-T-S of various aircraft
LRU’s having S/W or firmware. FedEx’s aircraft cyber security focal would like to inquire with automated test
equipment and 145 component maintenance vendors to discuss any LRU maintenance/repair platforms running
COTS software, having IP connectivity, or utilizing removeable digital media.
This includes platforms that service both traditional aircraft LRU’s (e.g. avionics, systems, engine, etc.) as well as
eEnabled systems such as ONS, FOMAX, CoreNet etc.
FedEx is seeking points of contact for 145 component repair facilities and automated test equipment suppliers.
Other airline operators, OEMs, and repair vendors please comment.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 15
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
25
Data Dictionary Publishing
Data Dictionary
Airbus
Canada
A220Fam
31 or 46
DAL
The need to access aircraft sensor data is critical for airlines to maintain their equipment under regulations such as
14 CFR §121 Subpart L Maintenance, Preventative Maintenance, and Alterations. Components on aircraft generate
significant amounts of data, but the ability for operators to access the data, decoded and in a readable format, is
sometimes inhibited by component manufacturers and aircraft manufacturers from the operators. This is contrary to
the operator’s belief that data transmitted from their aircraft is owned by the operator.
•
Delta Air Lines realizes the benefit that the A220 (Health Management Unit) HMU provides operators. With
nearly 48,000 lines of parameters listed in the FlightLink Data Dictionary, the aircraft is well positioned to
provide operators sufficient access to our data being generated by the aircraft. Delta Air Lines has noticed
that the contents of the Data Dictionary are not being updated at the same cadence as the contents of the
reports being generated by the Aircraft, therefore leading to the Data Dictionary containing outdated and
inaccurate information.
•
Delta Air Lines requests that rigor, with full operator acceptance, should be in place whenever a parameter
is added to a report, removed from a report, when a new report is added, and when a report is removed
from transmission. As the operator of the aircraft and the owner of the produced data, we rely on the data to
be produced in standard and repeatable formats for our maintenance of the aircraft.
•
Delta Air Lines requests that the Data Dictionary be a controlled revised document, with the same level of
rigor as described for the data in Reports above. The Data Dictionary should be updated whenever a
parameter is added to a report, removed from a report, when a new report is added, and when a report is
removed from transmission.
Airbus Canada, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
26
Data Dictionary Publishing
Data Dictionary
Airbus
A320/330
Fam
31 or 46
DAL
The need to aircraft sensor data access is critical for airlines to maintain their equipment under regulations such as
14 CFR §121 Subpart L Maintenance, Preventative Maintenance, and Alterations. Components on aircraft generate
significant amounts of data, but the ability for operators to access that data, decoded and in a readable format, is
sometimes inhibited by component manufacturers and aircraft manufacturers from the operators. This is contrary to
the operator’s belief that data transmitted from their aircraft is owned by the operator.
•
Delta Air Lines realizes the benefits of the airline operator data which will be available when the ADC
channel is available between the FDIMU and FOMAX hardware. Delta Air Lines requests that Airbus
provide a Data Dictionary of the airline operator data which will be transmitted, and will be available to the
airline in Skywise, for the A320CEO Family of aircraft, the A320NEO family of aircraft, the A330CEO Family
of aircraft, and the A330NEO Family of aircraft. The Data Dictionary would inform the operator of all
parameters being transferred on the ADC data channel and available to the operator for analysis. If a
solution similar to FOMAX is being developed for the A220 and A350, Delta Air Lines requests a Data
Dictionary for that product as well.
•
Delta Air Lines operates the A220-100, A220-300, A319-114, A320-211, A320-212, A321-211, A321271NX, A330-223, A330-302, A330-323, A330-941, and A350-941 series of aircraft.
Airbus, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 16
MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
27
Data Dictionary Publishing
Data Dictionary
Boeing
B717
B737NG
B757/67
B777
31 or 46
DAL
The need to access aircraft sensor data is critical for airlines to maintain their equipment under regulations such as
14 CFR §121 Subpart L Maintenance, Preventative Maintenance, and Alterations. Components on aircraft generate
significant amounts of data, but the ability for operators to access the data, decoded and in a readable format, is
sometimes inhibited by component manufacturers and aircraft manufacturers from the operators. This is contrary to
the operator’s belief that data transmitted from their aircraft is owned by the operator.
Delta Air Lines requests that The Boeing Company provide all Interface Connection Documents (ICD) and or
specifications for components on Boeing aircraft for to enable the operator the ability to analyze data produced by
those components and systems on the aircraft.
Furthermore, Delta Air Lines requests that The Boeing Company provide operators with a document describing the
data available as inputs to the primary aircraft data acquisition device e.g. DFDAU, DMU, and or FDAM. This
document request is consistent with documents made available to operators from other aircraft manufacturers.
Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 17
TEST SYSTEMS (LINE AND SHOP)
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
28
ATEC Support
Several
Spherea
Thales
All
All
TAP
Since the introduction of the ATEC as an Automatic Test Equipment used among operators and OEMs for testing
several avionics equipment, all the support, including updates, general support and contracts, has been provided
by the test equipment manufacturer and negotiated directly by both parties (operators and Spherea).
We were informed that from last year, and for Thales units, the negotiation for Test Program Sets (TPS) had to be
performed directly with them.
This new policy means the introduction of a new player in the procurement process, and to our surprise,
represents a huge difference in the expected price, which affects the business case developed for this equipment.
In what concerns current update support contracts, we fear that the renegotiation conditions with different
companies will change the way we have evaluated the purchase of the equipment many years ago. Furthermore,
as this is an equipment used by several vendors, it brings us some questions of how, and if, this service will work.
Being an operator, we are mainly concerned that these new conditions take out all our chances of checking the
airworthiness (testing) of a unit.
Comments from all parties would be appreciated.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
29
Tooling and
Testing
PN 321000M02, 321000M03
Side Stick Transducer Unit
Lord (Fly by Wire)
A320 Fam
27-92-13
LHT
A330
A340
This is a reminder to item 19-036 discussed at AMC 2019.
The 2019 AMC Follow-Up item no. 2 mentioned that Lord/Airbus would provide an updated CMM.
Note: The OEM Lord had deleted in its CMM 27-92-13, revision 9 from 15 May 2017 all information to test these
components.
Question: We are currently waiting for the new CMM, which mentions all the necessary tool tolerances and
measurement values. When will the new CMM be available?
Lord and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 18
TEST SYSTEMS (LINE AND SHOP)
******19-036******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Tooling
321000M02, 321000M03
Side Stick Transducer Units
Lord (Fly by Wire)
A320 Fam
27-92-13
LHT
A330
A340
Content:
• The OEM Lord deleted in the latest CMM revision 9 from 15 May 2017 the usage of alternate tools.
• LHT in the past has bought original tools and original software according prior CMM revision.
• The OEM ignored all tries from LHT to clarify tool tolerances, so that we can use our prior original tools
again.
• The OEM Lord constrains all MRO to buy new test tools “T11” and “T12”.
• The OEM Lord did not name the measurement value tolerances.
Question:
• -What is the reason to withdraw detailed test data and tool and limit specification (retreat access to Level 3
Documentation)?
LHT requests Lord to disclose that information in further CMM revisions!
Please any comments from other MROs.
******19-040******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
No TSDP and
Tool Quote Wing
Ice Protection
Control Unit
(WIPCU)
003CM00-0x00
Ultra
Electronics
B787
CMM
30-11-X0
AFR/KLM
AFR
Despite multiple requests, since October 2017, Air France has not received from Ultra-Electronics TSDP and/or
any quotation for tooling for those cited in CMM 30-11-30/40/50/60 for allowing to maintain WIPCU system P/N
003CM00-0100/-0200/-0300/-0400.
Air France requests Ultra Electronics provide Air France with TSDP and quotations of the tools cited in the CMM.
Ultra-Electronics, Boeing, and other operators please comment.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 19
TEST SYSTEMS (LINE AND SHOP)
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
30
TSDP Water Level Sensor
– Absolute Pressure
77000-016
Safran
B787
38
AFR/KLM
AFR
Zodiac
Air France already received the CMM 38-37-15.
In this CMM, as shown below, page 1005 the TSDP Technical Support Data Package is quoted and could be
ordered.
According to the PSSA D6-81852 Rev C 12/09/2013 chapter 2.4 and 8.1.6, the TSDP should be provided.
Air France has been asking this TSDP since 22/10/19. When will this TSDP be available?
Other operator, OEM, Boeing please comment.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
31
TSDP MD20016 Rev B
PDU
Collins
Aerospace
B787
50
AFR/KLM
AFR
May 2019 new revision of CMM PDU 787 with TSDP 50-21-91 rev 01:
The last Collins communication was: “The original TSDP submission was rejected by Boeing, the revision is
expected to be delivered to Boeing mid-January 2020.”
To date, we have still not received the update of this TSDP. When will the Rev B of TSDP be available?
Collins, Boeing comment please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 20
TEST SYSTEMS (LINE AND SHOP)
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
32
No Timely Revision
of Remote Data
Concentrator TSDP
182594-001
GE
Aviation
B787
42-40-01
KLM/AFR
KLM
Reference: AMC 2019 item 34.
QUOTES from AMC 2019:
KLM: “Revise the current TSDP and specify everything that is needed to build 1P3434TE1 and put it in
operation.”
LEACH/GE AVIATION: “In order to support both KLM and other B787 operators, GE will update TSDP
SSP37206-4
to include the details of the Special Ground Support Equipment P/N 1P3434TE1, which was recently added to
the
CMM as an alternate test solution. This is in addition to the TSDP for the original RDC test set, 1P3358TE1,
which is
already detailed in the RDC CMM. It should be available within 90 days.”
UNQUOTE
After the AMC 2019, the weekly and later bi-weekly calls with GE continued as they had been continued before.
KLM was kept in expectation of the revised TSDP for many months. Only in January 2020 did GE inform KLM that
the revised TSDP was sent to Boeing for review,
This is to inform Boeing and other operators that GE has failed to revise their TSDP for the Remote Data
Concentrator within the earlier mentioned timeframe of 90 days and to request GE Aviation to improve on
possible future revisions of TSDPs that they are responsible for.
This is also to kindly request Boeing to support KLM by performing a timely and detailed review of GE RDC TDP
SSP37206 on conformity with the specification set forth in ARINC 625.
Boeing, GE, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
33
TSDP SB MD20017
PDU
43115-xx
Collins
Aerospace
B777F
50
AFR/KLM
AFR
Since January 2019, Air France reported to Collins (CRC CAS-96097-Q8K8F8) that TSDP « SB MD20017 » has
data missing or erroneous. On April 2019, Collins answered the TSDP will be released Q4 2019.
To date, we have still not received the update of this TSDP. When will the Rev B of TSDP be available?
Collins, Boeing comment please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 21
TEST SYSTEMS (LINE AND SHOP)
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
34
Tester for
Electronic Clock
35000-00-01
Electronic Clock
Meggitt
B737NG
31-25
ELY
I.A.W CMM 31-25-01 dated 09Sep2015 Rev: 007 TESTING paragraph 'J'
We need from Meggitt: Lighting Test Box, calibration table, the spec, and TSTP of Lighting Test Box (18-20350).
I.A.W CMM 31-25-01 ASSEMBLY paragraph 'E'
We need the Electronic Clock Programming Lead (18-20369) and Electronic Clock Download Software
(94-0564-12-VA) and Electronic Clock Calibration Control (94-0262-12-VA05).
We contacted the vendor through our engineering and below is the answer we got:
Hello XXXX,
I apologize for being unclear with the previous information given.
Our tech support team have advised ‘The lighting test box, contains Meggitt proprietary information which
cannot be distributed or sold to a customer.’
I hope this clears things up.
Kind Regards
Meggitt and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
35
Lightning Test
Multi
Boeing
Airbus
Collins Aerospace
Multi
Multi
ANA
Recently, lightning test was added to Collins Aerospace CMM per revision.
ANA already discussed necessity of lightning test for return-to-service of component in case of operator's shop
maintenance with Collins Aerospace. Response of Collins Aerospace was that lightning test is needed for return-toservice of component which is both aircraft platform of Boeing and Airbus.
In case of Airbus, lightning test is required per Airbus ABD0100. In case of Boeing, ANA is not sure which document
mentions necessity of lightning test for return-to-service of component.
Test equipment of lightning test is very high cost and needs a long period approximately one year of lead time. It
means that ANA is not able to introduce lightning test easily.
Based on above explanation, ANA has the following inquiry.
1. Why is lightning test needed for return-to-service in case of operator’s shop maintenance? Was the lightning
test requirement added to document recently? ANA would like to know the reason because lightning test is
not required to return-to-service of component till now.
2. ANA would like to know trend of the future of lightning test. Is lightning test added to CMM for every
component?
Boeing, Airbus, Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 22
TEST SYSTEMS (LINE AND SHOP)
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
36
Calibration
N/A
Honeywell
N/A
ATA
From
DAL
Honeywell requires calibration of some items to be returned to Honeywell through the use of Engineering Bulletins
(EB). Turn times have become unreliable and causing major work stoppage problems. Units are taking over five
months to be returned, are not being tracked on the Honeywell website or will show incorrect status. We receive no
feedback when inquiries are submitted online. The onsite Honeywell reps are not receiving needed info after asked
to help. We need Honeywell to fix the TAT problems or remove the requirements for the use of the EBs and allowed
generic calibration procedures that can be accomplished at our own cal lab or a third-party lab.
Honeywell and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
37
Return to Service
Tests
7036340-xxx /
Flight Display
Honeywell
ERJ175
31-61
SKW
When looking through the CMM for the return to service portion for the ERJ 175 flight display, the CMM references
using a software program to perform the return to service test. There are no listed test steps for the return to service
test. When purchase of the software for the return to service test, Skywest Airlines was informed that software was
not sold to anyone outside of Honeywell.
What do we need to do to gain access to the return to service test for Honeywell Flight Displays?
Honeywell and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
38
Defective Software
HG1050AD15
HG1050AE15
HG1050BD10
HG1050BD11
HG1150BD02
Honeywell
Spherea
B757
A300
A310
MD11
34
FDX
MEM AVSH purchased hardware and software to upgrade the Series 6 ATE for IRU and ADIRU testing. The
software for all the part numbers listed above table under the category of LRU part number/name was delivered
inoperative. A brief description of the software failures is listed below. Please address the lack of quality control for
test equipment software.
1.
2.
3.
4.
HG1150BD02 software was delivered with an IR BUS 4 negative failure.
HG1050AX software had check sum failures for all units that had mod 10 installed.
HG2050AC11, and HG2050BC04 software would not allow the rebiasing of any ADIRU.
HG1050BD10, and HG1050BD11 software was delivered with failures related to the automatic table turning
the program would lose communication with either the commander 3500 tower and or tumble table or turn
table.
Honeywell, Spherea, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 23
TEST SYSTEMS (LINE AND SHOP)
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
39
ACP 2100 RTS
Protocols
866-0077-101
Collins
Aerospace
B787
23-51
KLM/AFR
KLM
CMM 23-51-01 revision 3 dated April 29th, 2015 refers to the Technical Support and Data Package (TSDP) with part
number 091-9857-003 Rev- and Test Specifications part number 5772-4001 Rev-.
The Return-to-Service test related receiving and transmitting commands and the protocols are missing in the test
specification. We cannot implement our own Return-to-Service test solution. To date, Collins Aerospace Avionics
has not updated the test specification to include the missing information. We need assistance in acquiring the
missing data.
Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
40
Cabin Pressure Control
System Outflow Valve
Testing
21230-10BA
Nord-Micro (Collins
Aerospace)
B737
21
AAL
21230-03AC
21230-02AC
4063-19972-XXXX
Outflow Valve
American Airlines is seeking to test the above listed part numbers from their own fleet and has requested that Collins
Aerospace and Nord-Micro provide a way to procure or manufacturer the necessary tooling and test equipment
specified in CMM’s 21-33-30, 21-33-32, and 21-33-33. The CMM claims to provide the specifications for the
mechanical test fixtures, but this information is completely missing from the CMM. The original request was
submitted on December 11, 2019. Collins Aerospace has created reference case number CAS-103720 for this
request but with no satisfactory response to date.
The following list is the equipment in question:
• OFV Support Fixture Nord Micro P/N 21860-01 (CMM 21-33-33 pg. 1003)
• Gear Fixture Nord Micro P/N 23964-01 (CMM 21-33-33 pg. 1003)
• Field Tester 1 Nord Micro P/N 0645-18100-8 (CMM 21-33-32 pg. 1003)
• Field Tester 2 Nord Micro P/N 0645-19991-xxyy (CMM 21-33-32 pg. 1003)
Will Nord-Micro or Collins Aerospace please provide an update on where they are at with resolving this request?
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
41
CTS Support
CTS ATE
Teradyne
Boeing
34
DAL
Teradyne has notified Delta of their intent to cease support in the repair and maintenance of the CTS ATE in the
near future.
Delta would like to know if other CTS operators would be interested in a shared pool of assets and resources to
maintain the future operation of the CTS.
Teradyne and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 24
ELECTRICAL POWER
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
42
ARINC 668
Requirement in
CMMs
1023382 / Wiring Harness as
Example
Collins Aerospace
Various
24
DAL
A majority of legacy UTAS CMMs have the following statement in the Special Tools, Fixtures, and Equipment
section of the CMM:
“Equivalent tools, fixtures, and equipment can be used if they agree with the requirements of ARINC Report 668.”
This statement leads the user to believe ARINC 668 is a requirement, and this is being misinterpreted by the user of
the CMM. ARINC 668 is written to be used as guidance as quoted from the Forward section of ARINC 668-1,
“ARINC Reports – Provide guidelines or general information found by the airlines to be good practices, often related
to avionics maintenance and support.” Additionally, under Delta’s CAMP, we have established procedures using
some but not all of ARINC 668-1 to determine tooling substitutions and equivalency.
Delta Air Lines request that Collins/UTAS to strike the word “requirement” from this statement or remove the
statement completely from its CMMs. Delta recommends a more appropriate statement of “Equivalent tools, fixtures
and equipment can be used. Refer to ARINC 668 for guidance as needed.”
Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.
******19-073******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
VFSG 2.5
7001330H03/H04/H05
Collins Aerospace
B787
24
VIR
VAA continues to have removals of the VFSG and is currently completing the H04 retrofit on the fleet. VAA is very
concerned that as more and more aircraft come out of warranty, the VFSG repair bills are not sustainable.
Why did UTAS not develop the VFSG to behave more like an IDG when it can operate for a limited time
disconnected without driving a large repair bill in the shop? The technology is not new. Several years since EIS,
Collins is still working on a mod to the input seal similar to that of an IDG. Operators continue to pick up the cost.
Additionally, VAA understood the longer the unit operated disconnected under MEL, the more damaged the VFSG
would be. But VAA has removed a unit disconnected in descent and operated disconnected for 40 mins, yet the
damage was similar to a VFSG that had remained on-wing for three days on MEL. VAA engaged with Collins to be
told that no analysis has been done to compare time on-wing disconnected versus level of damage/repair required.
VAA would like other operators to share their experiences and Boeing/Collins comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 25
ELECTRICAL POWER
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
43
VFSG
Disconnect
7001330H03/H04/H05
Collins Aerospace
B787
24
SR
Technics
As established in previous communication at the AMC (items 18-036 and 19-073), the VFSG overheats when
operating with the disconnect mechanism activated within the permitted MEL period of three days. In most cases,
this leads to damage of a major sub-assembly (Rotor Balance Assembly), resulting in material waste, significant cost
of repair and restricts fault-finding investigations.
The origin of this specific type of overheating is a failure of the disconnect carbon journal bearing. This is caused by
inadequate cooling from the oil circuit, when the disconnect mechanism is active, because the VFSG oil pump has
no drive in this mode. SR Technics expects that this type of damage could be avoided if an IDG type disconnect
mechanism is implemented, providing increased robustness and an allowance of reconnects.
It is understood that the H03/H04 disconnect mechanism met the specification requirements during design
qualification between Collins and Boeing. However, it does not meet SR Technics expectations in terms of an
economically sustainable product.
A new VFSG (H05/V2.5) is anticipated to be released with an IDG type ball bearing design. Please can a realistic
date of when the H05/V2.5 VFSG will be released, it was originally expected for Q2 2019 (ref. UTAS 787 Technical
Symposium 16-May-2018), and can affected customers be compensated until it is available and implemented?
Collins, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
44
Variable Frequency Starter
Generator – High Rate of
Disconnected Units
7001330H03
Collins Aerospace
B787
24-11-92
LHT
7001330H04
The Variable Frequency Starter Generator (VFSG) shows a high removal rate due to disconnected operation. For
the majority of all units, no technical issue was found, which could explain the need to disconnect it. The Variable
Frequency Starter Generator fulfills all requirements of the requested specification published by Boeing.
Please explain the root cause for the high disconnect rate of the Variable Frequency Stater Generator. If it is an
aircraft system issue, please provide further details how this issue can be solved.
What is recommended in order to prevent an “unjustified” disconnect of the Variable Frequency Starter Generator
during operation?
Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 26
ELECTRICAL POWER
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
45
Variable Frequency Starter
Generator High Repair Costs
after Disconnected Operation
7001330H03
Collins Aerospace
B787
24-11-92
LHT
7001330H04
Several Variable Frequency Starter Generator shows signs of an overheat damage on the Balanced Rotor
Assembly (P/N7001337) after a performed disconnect while operation. In some cases, the Balanced Rotor
Assembly has to be removed and needs an overhaul (replacement of the Balanced Rotor Shaft).
Why does this kind of unusual damage occur in case of a successful disconnect? It seems that the disconnect
mechanism does not fulfill the requirements to prevent the Variable Frequency Stater Generator against internal
damage.
Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
46
Variable Speed Constant
Frequency Generator
1701768
Collins
Aerospace
B777
24
AFR/KLM
AFR
This question is related to AMC 2019 item 74 and AMC 2018 item 48.
Despite the explanation provided last year by both UTC and GE, AFR is still facing a high rate of shaft shearing on
its B777-200ER fleet (not on B777-300ER fleet with the same VSCFG). Following 777-FTD-80-16001, this issue
was supposed to be solved with GE90 Service Bulletin 80-0046 R0 but it is only a one-time inspection of the Starter
Air Valve P/N 3290976-X and does not modify the SAV opening time. AFR also follows the GE90-90 WSPG
recommendation for SAV soft-time overhaul: 5,000 cycles; furthermore, the last revision of this FTD is May 18. Since
that date, no improvement have been presented by Boeing.
What other actions are Boeing, GE, Collins, and/or Honeywell going to implement in order to solve this very old
issue?
Collins, Boeing and other operators, please comments
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 27
ELECTRICAL POWER
******19-074******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Variable Speed Constant
Frequency Generator
1701768
UTC
B777
24
AFR/KLM
AFR
This question is related to AMC 2018 item 48.
Despite the explanation provided last year by both UTC and GE, AFR is still facing a high rate of shaft shearing on
its B777-200ER fleet (not on B777-300ER fleet with the same VSCFG).
Following 777-FTD-80-16001, this issue was supposed to be solved with GE90 Service Bulletin 80-0046 R0 but it is
only a one-time inspection of the Starter Air Valve P/N 3290976-X and does not modify the SAV opening time.
AFR also follows the GE90-90 WSPG recommendation for SAV soft-time overhaul: 5,000 cycles.
What other actions are Boeing, GE, UTC, and/or Honeywell going to implement in order to solve this very old issue?
Boeing, GE, UTC, Honeywell, and operators comment please.
******18-040******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Broken Promises on GAPCU Final Fix Release
1700667D
Airbus
UTAS
A32X
A330
A340
24
ETD
This is a tribute on the broken promises on the following AMC items: 63-2014 (AFR/KLM), 60-2015 (AFR/KLM), 612015 (USA), 53-2016 (AFR/KLM), and 54-2016 (DLH). Since 2014, the AMC has been demanding to UTAS a
solution on the worldwide problem suffered by GAPCU PN 1700667D, due to the burn of capacitors in the printed
circuit board.
In the particular case of Etihad, we suffered a Customer Induced Damage on GAPCU PN 1700667D SN 1411
removed from A330 MSN 0724 in 2016 for a total of, lets say big bucks, on which the capacitors in printed circuit
board A6 were found burnt (Figure 1). The shop report concluded that the cause of failure was outside the GAPCU,
in this case, the GPU likely provided out of specs power.
An additional case took place in July 2017 on A340 MSN 933 on GAPCU PN 1700667D SN AADU001957. In this
case, several diodes (D1, D2, D3, D6, D7, D8, and D9) were damaged on printed circuit board A5 and the origin of
the burnt was due to external power out of specifications (Figure 2). In this case VSB 90EGS31AP-24-14 was
embodied.
In AMC 2015 UTAS committed to release the Vendor Service Bulleting by end of 2015. Then in AMC 2016 UTAS
stated that the VSB 90EGS31/33AP-24-13 will be released in Q2 2016. According to our UTAS Field Representative
(Ron Pang): “VSB 90EGS31/33AP-24-13 was released in November 2016, but shortly after canceled as ineffective,
i.e., did not demonstrate the ability to consistently prevent external overvoltage damage”. Finally, this issue was
neither raised nor discussed in AMC 2017.
Questions:
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 28
ELECTRICAL POWER
1. What has UTAS to say to operators when it takes 2 to 3 years to develop a VSB that simply replaces the
capacitors for new ones that have a greater tolerance and the solution is unsuccessful?
2. How can UTAS ensure that VSB 90EGS31/33AP-24-13 or subsequent will be the final fix for the continuous
capacitor burn problem?
3. When will UTAS expects to release a final solution to this problem?
4. Does UTAS manufacture other GAPCU Part Numbers? If so, do they suffer this problem?
5. What can Airbus say to an OEM that has failed to deliver an on-time solution year after year?
Figure 1: On the Left, Affected Capacitor as Shown on VSB 90EGS31AP-24-13 / On the Right, GAPCU Capacitors
Burnt on SN 1411
Figure 2: Diodes Burnt on GAPCU PN 1700667D SN AADU001957
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 29
ELECTRICAL POWER
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
47
In-Seat Power Supply
1191-46 / In-Seat Power Supply
Astronics
B737NG
2450
WJA
WJA has noticed numerous failures of the In-Seat Power Supply (ISPS). Our investigation shows problems with the
DC control circuit. The resolution is to incorporate several Astronics SBs (SB 1191-46-25-001/002/003…).
Is Astronics confident their numerous service bulletins will resolve the issues?
The B737NG has had numerous problems with regard to power spikes generated during power transfer. Is Boeing
doing anything to minimize power surges on the B737 platform?
Boeing, Astronics, and other operator comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
48
ISPS Grounding Stud
1191-46/In-Seat Power Supply
Astronics
B737NG
2450
WJA
WestJet has had numerous failures of the In-Seat Power Supply (ISPS). In many cases, the repair order stated
broken grounding stud as a point of failure. We have questioned Astronics and their reply stated “the grounding stud
is a swaged in stud and not welded. It is susceptible to side forces so care should be taken when installing and
removing the retaining nut.” In their explanation, they recommended using specific tools and avoiding others. They
also give torque settings for the stud (max torque is 25 in/lbs). They recommended the ground stud nut be installed
before the unit is installed onto the mounting bracket.
This information does not line up with the AMM and in some cases, contradicts information in the AMM. Is Astronics
going to update the AMM to give torque values and recommended tools? Also, will Astronics revisit the order of
events in the AMM installation instructions?
Extracted from AMM 25-25-29 SYSTEM INSTALLATION
In-Seat Power Supply (ISPS) Installation
(1) Verify that the 115 VAC, 3 Phase circuit breaker located on the P36 panel, labeled LAPTOP POWER is open.
(2) Install the termination plugs retained from the removal procedure on the J20 and J21 connectors.
(3) Position the ISPS onto the seat bracket.
(4) Secure the ISPS to the seat bracket using the four 1/4 turn fasteners.
(5) Install hardware on the ISPS ground stud.
(6) Connect all connectors to J1, J2, J6, J7, and J9 on the ISPS.
(7) Remove the DO NOT CLOSE tag and close the LAPTOP POWER circuit breaker.
Astronics and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 30
ELECTRICAL POWER
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate Airline
49
RPDU Chassis
7000281x
7004379x
Boeing
Collins Aerospace
(UTAS)
B787
24
KLM/AFR
KLM
RPDU position 41-42-74.
Fixes:
787-FTD-24-17009 RPDU 41/42 (apply felt on drip shields)
787-FTD-24-17002 RPDU 74 (apply tape "moist barriers" on back cover)
• KLM/AFR has implemented interim action to RDPU 41/42, which is to apply felt on the overlaying drip
shields in order to guide possible fluid away from the RPDU.
• KLM/AFR has implemented interim action to RPDU 74, which is to apply tape over the perforated back
cover (moist barrier) in order to prevent liquid from entering.
Before performing the required action, we suffered the subject problem and we were repairing RPDUs. 94% of all
identified faults are related to the A1 PWB. The reason given: liquid ingress/corrosion.
Operational and maintenance experiences:
• Fluid ingress on the internal electrical components leads to a large variety or multi-combination of
maintenance messages.
• Troubleshooting difficult due to variety of maintenance messages that may occur.
• Troubleshooting difficulty results in large delays.
• Replacement of the RPDU chassis in itself is not difficult, but the in case of RPDU position 74, the AMM
includes the application and removal of tape for the installation/removal tasks.
• Collins Aerospace returns the units (liquid ingress) under Customer Induced Damage (CID).
• Water ingress warranty: Collins points to Boeing, Boeing rejects and points back.
Since a lot of costs were generated due to a design problem in the B787, we feel that we can issue and send the
warranty claims to Boeing for all repairs prior to publication and implementation of the fix. Please make sure that the
warranty department is aware of this and that they will not reject our warranty claims.
Collins, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 31
ELECTRICAL POWER
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate Airline
50
RPDU – Power
Modules Cards and
Micro Processor
Cards
7001964H0x
Boeing
B787
24
KLM/AFR
KLM
7000240H0x
Collins
Aerospace
(UTAS)
7000276H0x
7000278H0x
RPDU position 41-42-74.
Fixes:
787-FTD-24-17009 RPDU 41/42 (apply felt on drip shields)
787-FTD-24-17002 RPDU 74 (apply tape "moist barriers" on back cover)
•
•
•
•
•
•
KLM/AFR has implemented interim action to RDPU 41/42, which is to apply felt on the overlaying drip
shields in order to guide possible fluid away from the RPDU.
KLM/AFR has implemented interim action to RPDU 74, which is to apply tape over the perforated back
cover (moist barrier) in order to prevent liquid from entering.
Fluid ingress on electrical components leads to a large variety or multi-combination of maintenance
messages, which makes troubleshooting difficult and consequently causes delays. Fixes:
o Apply felt on drip shields.
o Apply tape "moist barrier" on the back cover.
o Add application of "moist barrier" to removal/installation tasks.
We had a lot of removals of the RPDU LRMs from the aircraft and a lot of repairs in the shop.
Collins Aerospace rejects the claims for the units (liquid ingress) under Customer Induced Damage (CID).
Collins points to Boeing, Boeing rejects and points back.
Since a lot of costs were generated due to a design problem in the B787, we feel that KLM can issue and send the
warranty claims to Boeing for all repairs prior to publication and implementation of the fix. Please make sure that the
warranty department is aware of this and that they will not reject our warranty claims.
Boeing, Collins Aerospace, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 32
ELECTRICAL POWER
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
51
Poor Reliability – ACW
20032-2/ACW Generator
Thales
ATR72
24
EVA
UNI
UNI experienced Amendment K reliability improved ACW generator failure seven times within three months since
August 2019. Shop report revealed that the Diode holder plate crack leads the poor reliability, inoperative generator
resulting in flight dispatch problem or air turn back due to strict MEL limitations (runway width, limited payload).
According to UNI’s experience, the Diode holder plate crack occurs between TSN: 8,500FH ~ 11,000FH, Approx.
second to third overhaul period. The average TSO of ACW generator in UNI ATR fleet is 2000 FH, which is the half
of ATR MPD ACW generator overhaul requirement, 4000 FH.
Refer to CMM 24‐22‐61: overhaul includes inspection of diode holder plate which is carried out by visual inspection
with a magnifier only. UNI suspects the insufficient overhaul inspection is the reason of low TSO (The lowest TSO in
UNI ATR fleet is 27 FH). UNI had recommended Thales to revise CMM 24‐22‐61 by NDI instead of present
measure.
UNI would like to keep this item open until the root cause is revealed and corrective action is provided.
ATR, Thales, and other operator comments, please.
ATR, please evaluate the restrictive reduced MEL.
Thales, please provide timeframe for availability of investigation report and permanent solution.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
52
Static Inverter
1-002-0102-2090
Avionic Instrument
B757
B767
B777
24
UAL
The OEM declared transistor part number 1-001-0413-0017 as obsolete and states we need to upgrade the -2090
Static Inverter to the new Static Inverter part number (1-002-0102-2170) the -2170 also includes the same
1-001-0413-0017 transistor so upgrading does not really solve the issue of replacing due to obsolete parts.
We were informed that a replacement IGBT is now in process but no timeframe on when it would be solved.
United would like the OEM to provide the actual part number of the transistor so that United can look for their own
replacement solutions. If no, why not, as this looks to be a standard piece part?
Boeing, operator, and vendor comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
53
Emergency Power Supply
D717-02-001
Page Aerospace Ltd.
B737
B777
24-35
AAL
Page Aerospace released Service Bulletin No. D71702-24-01, dated Nov. 09/12, with MOD AR1994, to replace
Panel “A” Printed Circuit Board, P/N D717-02-020, with P/N D717-02-120.
The CMM has not been updated to reflect the modification. AAL needs the schematic and IPL for the new Printed
Circuit Board P/N D717-02-120, to successfully troubleshoot and repair the Emergency Power Supply.
Does the OEM have plans to release the schematic and IPL to the Printed Circuit Board P/N D717-02-120?
Airline and OEM, please comment.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 33
ELECTRICAL POWER
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
54
SPDA Microprocessor
Module
1713878A
Collins
Aerospace
E170
24
JALEC
JAL
1707789F
1720897B
E190
Japan Airlines has experienced 27 removals of SPDA Microprocessor Module due to CAS MSG "SPDA FAIL" and
CMC MM “SPDA X LRM YY FAULT” (X=1 or 2, YY=8 or 12) in the last 2 years. Almost of those shop findings were
No Fault Found except only one case.
The percentage of CMC Maintenance Message occurrence is below:
• SPDA1 LRM8 FAULT: 22%
• SPDA1 LRM12 FAULT: 0%
• SPDA2 LRM8 FAULT: 33%
• SPDA2 LRM12 FAULT: 45%
JAL is considering this is nuisance failure that easily occur in SPDA2.
The occurrence phase of the message is random, but when the failure occurs in taxiing phase, it causes Ground
Turn Back event. So, this is one of most concerned issue for JAL.
Question
1. Are other Operators seeing similar issues?
2. Are Embraer and Collins Aerospace currently working on a solution to this issue?
Comments from other operators, Embraer, Collins Aerospace and other airframers are highly appreciated.
Item
Summary
Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
55
SPCU
11519526/8/9/10/11/13/14/16/18/19
Honeywell
B737-800
24-33
KLM/AFR
KLM
Standby Control Power Unit (SPCU) P/N: 1151952-6/8/9/10/11/13/14/16/18/19
The standby power control unit (SPCU) gives manual and automatic power source selection control of the battery
and standby buses. The SPCU supplies DC system failure data to the P5-13 electrical meters, battery and galley
power module. The SPCU also controls some power distribution relays in the electrical system.
SPCUs in KLM’s B737 NG fleet have caused many delays and cancellations lately.
Questions:
1. Are operators experiencing illumination of P5-13 ELECT LIGHT on their fleet, which results in unnecessary
removals of SPCU?
2. What is the amount of SPCU removals of the operators in last 12 months?
3. What is the NFF percentage for the SPCU after shop visit?
4. What are operators doing to avoid ELEC faults caused by SPCUs?
5. Do operators have any reference that removals of the SPCU’s are caused due to electrical stressing of the
K1 and K8 relays?
Honeywell and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 34
ELECTRICAL POWER
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
56
IDG Oil Filter Clog
Faults
755017B / Integrated
Drive Generator
752168B / Integrated
Drive Generator
752168C / Integrated
Drive Generator
Collins
Aerospace
A330 TRENT
Motor
A330 CF6
Motor
A330 PW
Motor
24
TKT
THY
THY A330 fleet has three types of engines (PW, TRENT, CF6) and until 2019, Mobile Jet Oil II has been used.
As of 2019, oil changes from Mobile Jet Oil 2 to Eastman Turbo Oil 2197 are made in our fleet. After changing to
Eastman Turbo Oil use on A330 aircrafts, “IDG OIL STSTEM FAULT” failures from “IDG OIL FILTER CLOG” have
increased significantly. After filter replacement and oil filling, the fault was fixed for a short time, but after a while it
was re-observed on all these three engine types of aircraft. We sent it to Collins Aerospace to analyze the oil
samples from the defective IDGs (Analysis results have not been received yet).
In the current situation, there is a serious decrease in the fault trend, but we have not been able to reach the root
cause of the problem.
If any, can other operators share their experiences on this issue?
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
57
P5-13 ELEC Light
Illumination
1151952-14 through
19 / SPCU
1-002-0102-2090 and
2170 / Static Inverter
8-930-03 / Battery
Charger
BA35-01 and
024147-000 / Battery
SPCU –
Honeywell
SI – Avionic
Instruments
Crane
Aerospace
B737NG
24
TKT
THY
B737MAX
ELEC light illumination is a chronic issue that has been continuing on B737NG/MAX airplanes over a decade.
ELEC light illuminates when Standby Power Control Unit (SPCU), Static Inverter, Battery/Battery chargers, P5-13
module, and/or interface wiring fail. The root cause of these faults is still unknown and it is still one of the top issues
affecting B737 fleet.
Like other B737NG/MAX operators, Turkish Airlines experiences numerous ELEC LIGHT fault related delays and
gate returns. Most of the Turkish fleet use Standby Power Control Unit (SPCU) Post Mod P/N 1151952-19 but there
are also -16 and -18 SPCUs. In addition, SPCU Tray Modification (SPCU Tray brace and strengthener) was applied
related aircraft. Also, most of the fleet use Static Inverter Post Mod P/N 1-002-0102-2090 but newer aircraft have
P/N 1-002-0102-2170.
The last 12 months UR and MTBUR values are as follows:
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 35
ELECTRICAL POWER
Component
P/N
Unscheduled
Removals
MTBUR
Standby Power Control Unit
1151952-19
16
19778
Static Inverter
1-002-0102-2090
8
43838
Battery
024147-000
13
70773
Battery Charger
8-930-03
10
97297
NOTES:
• Turkish Airlines only
use post mod SPCU
P/Ns, but the reliability
data shows that SPCU
failures are still on top.
• Newly design SI P/N 1002-0102-2170
components have no
UR data and provide a
tremendous reliability.
1. Can the component OEMs inform operators regularly to provide activity updates on this matter?
2. Can other operators share their UR and MTBUR data and experiences on this matter?
3. Can the SPCU supplier – Honeywell provide reliability data for the recently introduced SPCU P/N
51090412-001?
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
58
DOM “Date of Manufacture”
Indication Problem on the Label
of ISFD DBC and Storage
ISFD Dedicated
Battery/Charger
(DBC) 312BS101-1
Boeing Spec. No.
S282T005-1
ACME
Aerospace
B-NG,
MAX
24
THY
UTAS
B747-8
CMM 24-31-05, page 705, Section 4.B states that “The battery pack assembly can be stored up to 3 years (with
annual top charges) in a fully charged condition from the date of manufacture located on the ID label.”
However, the “DOM” date of manufacture is not stated in 4.A when the battery pack assembly is installed to the
whole unit! Only installation date is recorded on the label.
Per CMM page 705 Section 4.A.2:
(2) The DBC can be stored up to 3 years (with annual top charges) in a full-charge condition. After three years
storage as indicated by the “Battery Pack Maintenance” label located on the exterior of the DBC, install DBC on
aircraft to begin the 3 year service life or replace the battery pack assembly and return to storage.
So, after storing Battery Pack Assembly in two years period with proper charging, when we install such Battery Pack
Assembly into the unit, CMM Section 4.A states to replace the label and record the installation then. So, DOM
seems not to be important. A new life of three years of storage period seems to start again.
However, per Section 4.B, we have to take care to the DOM. Therefore, a new label has to be used for indicating the
DOM of Battery Pack Assembly of the on the outside of the DBC, the whole unit for following the storage life.
Would ACME Aerospace state the above case in the CMM and evaluate using additional label on the DBC to inform
the DOM of Battery Pack Assembly?
Other MRO and airlines comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 36
ELECTRICAL POWER
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 37
ELECTRICAL POWER
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
59
Erroneous Under Voltage
Fault During Initial Power UP
976J862
Collins Aerospace
MD11
24
FDX
In troubleshooting an MD11 that had nine repeat write-ups of the EPGS fault for a fault caused by the APU GCU
Generator Control Relay tripping. To reset this fault requires the performance of the RTS of the EGPS and a setauto-reset function from the CFDS. During the trouble shooting the FDX AVI Bench discovered a potential design
flaw in the Underspeed lockout circuitry in the GCU. The current design works as intended if ground power is
maintained to the aircraft between flight legs. When powering up a dead aircraft, turning the ground service switch
or battery switch, the Undervoltage circuit trips the GCR “Generator Control Relay approximately 4 seconds after
power is applied. The bench found that if you can ground an Underspeed Inhibit Circuit for 1 second on power up,
you can prevent the GCU control relay from tripping. FDX has a power point presentation that provides the details
of this issue and a potential solution and is available upon request.
Any LRU sent to a shop with a similar write up would have been tested per the CMM and returned “No fault Found”.
This is the first time this fault has ever been discussed. Any other tripping of the GCR would be an actual internal
fault that would intentionally trip the GCR.
FedEx would like Collins to review and consider developing a S/B to fix this issue? Have other MD11 operators
experienced this problem?
******19-083******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
IDG Governor Failure
761574B
Collins
B737NG/MAX
24-11-85
LHT
LHT frequently receives integrated drive generators with damages caused by stuck governor assemblies during
winter periods. This failure is well known and identified as a design deficiency of the governor assembly caused by
cold starting temperatures.
Collins (former Hamilton Sundstrand) was informed about this problem but has not provided corrective actions yet.
•
•
Collins and Boeing, please comment if corrective actions will be provided.
Other MROs and operators, please comment if you experienced similar cases.
Collins Aerospace, Boeing, and other operator and MRO comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 38
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
60
Need Piece Part Availability
115370-0106
Litef
Airbus
A319
A320
27
DAL
Litef is refusing to sell Delta piece parts for this component. However, part of their response is “if you ship the
NHA to us, we can repair it”. If parts are available to Litef, they should be available to Delta. It should be irrelevant
who performs the repairs.
Per the Airbus SSC, Delta can perform repairs at their own facility if we chose. If some items are truly “obsolete”,
then we ask Litef to provide us with part specifications so that we may determine suitable substitutes on our own.
Litef and Airbus comments please.
******18-056******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
ELAC High No Fault Found (NFF) Rate
3945128215
3945129100
Airbus
Thales
A32X
27
ETD
Etihad’s A32X fleet has suffered a high No Fault Found (NFF) rate over the past years on a fleet of 37 aircrafts for
both Non-Downloadable ELAC PN 3945128215 (std L97+) and Downloadable ELAC PN 3945129100 (std L97+).
Below Table 1 shows that the Non Downloadable ELAC PN 3945128215 (std L97+) removed on Etihad fleet over
2017 suffered a 52% NFF rate.
2017 Removals Analysis
ELAC Non-Downloadable
ELAC Downloadable
Confirmed Fault
10 removals / 48%
7 removals / 70%
Not Fault Found
11 removals / 52%
3 removals / 30%
Table 1: Distribution of ELAC Confirmed and NFF Rates over 2017
In the majority of the cases, the ELAC or related Flight Control fault occurs during push back and causes a return
to stand with a consequent delay. In such situations, the lack of time and limited capability to perform
troubleshooting ends up in an ELAC replacement, but apparently the fault does not reproduce in shop during
ELAC testing.
During 2017, Etihad’s fleet has suffered a total of 13 hours and 12 minutes of delays due to ELAC faults that were
cleared after either ELAC replacement or by applying MEL. Refer to Table 2 for the detailed list of delays.
Table 2: List of Delays Suffered in Etihad A32X Fleet during 2017 due to ELAC Faults
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 39
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
In order to tackle such a high rate of NFF and delays, Etihad has actively embodied Thales VSBs
394512B-27-021/2/7 on ELAC computers; nonetheless, these actions does not seem to have improved the unit’s
reliability.
For additional information, refer to Airbusworld FAIR 16.0051 (ELAC reliability). Furthermore, up to Etihad´s
knowledge, two major A32X operators flying more than 100 aircraft have suffered a NFF rate higher than 50%
during 2017.
Thales:
• Provide details about the worldwide NFF rate of ELAC PN 394512821x and 3945129100 for 2017. If the
NFF is 50% or higher, is that an acceptable figure?
• Aside from the Thales VSBs 394512B-27-021/2/7, what can operators do to improve the ELAC reliability?
• If the root cause of this high NFF rate resides in the design of the ELAC computer, what are Thales’s
plans to improve the unit?
Airbus:
• Is Airbus aware of such a high NFF rate on the ELAC? If so, what are Airbus’s recommendations?
• What is Airbus doing to avoid such a high NFF rate on a component installed on their manufactured
aircraft?
Operator comments please.
******19-045******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
EMCU
CA72711-006
MOOG
B787
27
ANA
We often experience the failure of EMCU due to the issue “High Power Failure,” especially spoiler’s position.
The total number of the discrepancy was eight cases within a year due to this failure mode and 50% of these
eight cases led to flight delay/cancellation. As there are four positions regarding spoiler’s EMCU per an airplane
and we have around 65 airplanes, we are always facing the possibility of delay/cancellation due to this failure
mode for about 300 units. That is why this issue is the biggest concern in the B787 flight control system for us.
Although we understand that the plan of EMCU GEN 3 is suspended and the investigation has been progressing
between Boeing and MOOG, we cannot clearly identify how this thing has been going. As the issue is related with
Boeing SRP (Service Related Problem), we would like Boeing and MOOG to have more initiative for the
investigation to proceed.
Operators, please comment and share your experiences.
Boeing and MOOG, please provide us with the timeline when the investigation is completed. In addition, we would
like Boeing and MOOG to take this SRP issue into CRB (Component Review Board) or CRC (Component
Reliability Collaboration) to facilitate this issue to be resolved effectively by Supplier Management and Boeing and
Supplier Executive leadership. Please consider it. We would like to get Boeing/MOOG’s feedback.
Operators, Boeing, and MOOG comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 40
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
******19-047******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Mode Control Panel
4082260-939
Honeywell
B737
22
KAL
Recently, KAL frequently experienced the failure of LCDs which were installed on the front panel of mode control
panel. Even if KAL replaced it with new LCD or Honeywell repaired the MCP, their reliability of LCD is lower than
expected.
Because the replaced LCD and/or repaired MCP is showing a defect of light leakage from LCD, with having low
accumulated operating hours.
In the past, LCD’s reliability was satisfactory but recently, LCD defect occurs with very high frequency.
KAL kindly requests Honeywell the following:
1. KAL kindly requests Honeywell verify the root cause of this issue and provide us any measure to reduce
LCD defect rate.
2. Honeywell should improve the LCD quality of the front panel.
Other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 41
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
******19-057******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Flap Position Pickoff Unit
Moisture Ingress
9028A0005-01
Liebherr
A330
27-55
DAL
HAL
Hawaiian Airlines replaced three position pickoff units in 2018 and another in January of this year in FIN positions
29CV and 30CV due to flaps locked ECAM warnings. Moisture has been noted inside of the removed units. The
three units removed in 2018 were original installs on lower time recent delivery aircraft, but the most recent failure
occurred on an aircraft that was delivered in 2010 and had accumulated over 38,000 hours.
The mitigation procedure of checking the position differences via the MCDU is covered by AMM
27-51-00-820-801 but allows for adjustment if found to be out of limits. Is Airbus suggesting that the APPU be
replaced if found out of AMM limits or is further visual inspection for water contamination required prior to
replacement?
We understand Airbus is investigating the root cause of failure but would like to know if Leibherr is also
performing an investigation? What are the expected completion dates of the investigations?
Airbus, Leibherr, and other operator comments, please.
******19-059******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Repair of Electro
Hydraulic Servo Valve
51200-x
Goodrich
Aerospace Canada
Ltd.
CRJ
27
LHT
DLH
Follow up to MMC 2017 item “Flight Controls item 24.”
Failure of the Electrohydraulic Servo Valve (EHSV) is still one of the main failure reasons for the CRJ MultiFunction Spoiler Power Control Unit (MFS PCU). Manufacturer of the EHSV is Zodiac Aerospace (Safran). Zodiac
is also an EASA/FAA Repair Station (FR.145.290).
Until 2013, LHT sent all EHSVs directly to Zodiac and got the valves back in repaired condition with EASA Form 1
(Dual Release). Later repair orders were rejected and LHT was advised by Zodiac to send the valves directly to
Goodrich Aerospace (UTAS).
Following repair orders for the EHSV directly sent to Goodrich were rejected with the statement Goodrich has no
capability for the EHSV and LHT should send the CRJ Multi-Function Spoiler Power Control Unit (MFS PCU) for
repair.
LHT has capability for the MFS PCU and still needs a repair station or maintenance documentation for the EHSV.
(CMM 27-64-00 from Zodiac just includes testing; parts list, etc., is missing)
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 42
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Multi-Function Spoiler Power Control Unit (MFS PCU)
Part number 51200-7,-9,-11,-13,-15
Zodiac and Goodrich (UTAS) please comment.
Bombardier, please comment on the fact that no repair capability is offered for the EHSV, but only for the NHA
(MFS PCU).
Other operators, please share your experience with this issue.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 43
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
******19-062******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Design
Responsibility
734-06485-x
Boeing
B747-8
27-51-22
LHT
DLH
Boeing PN
S256U500-4100
Shimadzu
Umbra
The ballscrew assembly is manufactured by Umbra Group, with the design responsibility by Shimadzu Corp.
Repair facility for these units is Umbra Group.
In the past, we had several units removed from DLH B747-8 and sent to Umbra for repair during the warranty
period. Umbra claims that the units had seen forces beyond the designed limit. No abnormalities during the flights
had been reported.
While Shimadzu acknowledges that there is a dispute between Boeing and Shimadzu, the issue has not been
resolved yet and the operator is left with the entire cost for the repair (ongoing since 04/2018). This has already
resulted in multiple AOG orders.
•
•
Who is responsible for the design of the unit?
How can we streamline the process of warranty case handling (and who covers the cost for the time
being) so that the repair process is not slowed down for everyone involved (Umbra cannot continue work
without the cost approval, operator does not give approval for units under warranty, etc.)?
Boeing, suppliers, and other operator comments, please.
******19-063******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
B737 Slat Wedge Replacement
114A5010
114A5020
114A5030
114A5040
Boeing
B737
57-00
UAL
CMM 57-43-01, CMM 57-43-02, CMM 57-43-03, and CMM 57-43-04 do not provide necessary information
regarding the trailing edge wedge assembly replacement, distance between slat trailing edge to auxiliary arm
roller, and rigging tolerance.
Boeing stated that replacement of trailing edge wedge to drawing requirements is difficult to achieve without
tooling similar to assembly jigs. However, no Boeing tooling or process for B737NG slat wedge replacement has
been developed as of now.
Is this something Boeing is looking to develop and incorporate to the CMMs?
Boeing and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 44
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
******19-064******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Replacement Part Lead Time
113A2100-x
113A3100-x
Boeing
B737
57-00
UAL
Multiple replacement parts for B737NG IB Main Flap and OB Main Flap are posted with extremely long lead time.
This includes but not limited to lower panel P/N 654A0004-1138 with EST 12/2/19, wedge assy P/N 113A3511-3
with EST 10/18 and pushed to 2/19, fitting P/N 113A3135U1 EST 9/19.
Can Boeing comment on this issue? Can this lead time be improved upon?
Boeing and other operator comments, please.
******19-071******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Epoxy Carbon Prepreg – Plain
Weave 193 gsm 120 ⁰C
Interchangeability
A320 Elevators and
More General
Applications
Airbus
All
51-30
UAL
Airbus CML contains two (2) Appli Codes for Epoxy Carbon Prepreg - Plain Weave - 193 gsm - 120C cure as
follows:
• 13LDC1 - Plain Weave - 193 gsm – 120 oC
• 13LDC9 - Plain Weave - 193 gsm – 120 oC Legacy
A review of the CML Introduction indicates that the difference between the two (2) Appli Codes is the location
used on the aircraft as designated by the 1 and 9.
Could Airbus evaluate allowing materials listed under Appli Code 13LDC1 as allowable substitutes for materials
listed under Appli Code 13LDC9 on components such as A320 Elevators?
Airbus and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 45
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
61
RTLU Failures and no Final Solution
DV8456701-5
Airbus
A33X
27
ETD
This is another tribute to closed AMC items 14-212 and 18-055 and closed Airbus FAIR items 14.0060 and
17.0179.
In AMC 18-055, Etihad described the delays and removals of the Rudder Travel Limit Unit (RTLU) PN
DV8456701-5 suffered during 2015, 2016, and 2017 in A32X fleet. During that AMC, Airbus replied that a final
solution to this problem would be the release of new Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC) standards FAC B625
(SB A320-22-1644) and CAA09 (SB A320-22-1629).
Figure 1: List of Delays Suffered by Etihad A32X Fleet during 2018 and 2019
Etihad performed the embodiment of FAC B625 in Q3 2019 (18 aircraft) and FAC CAA09 in Q2 2019 (11 aircraft).
Unfortunately, the Etihad A32X fleet embodied with the mentioned upgrades still suffered RTLU failures and
“AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM 1(2) FAULT” messages.
This was communicated via TechRequest 80275011 and Airbus confirmed the release of new TFU 27.23.00.008
issued in Dec 2019 to communicate operators the “AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM 1 (2) FAULT” message suffered on
aircraft embodied with FAC B625 and CAA09.
We would appreciate Airbus to provide some background on the subject, an update on the reasons why the latest
FAC updates did not actually fix the issue, and what are supposed to be the next FAC upgrades.
Operator comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 46
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
******17-025*****
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Rudder PCU
390500-1009
390500-1011
Parker Hannifin
Q400
27
LHT
CMM 27-21-04 is missing maintenance instructions for the attached servo valve, PN 74160-01 (390599-1003).
Please provide maintenance details, such as an individual CMM including acceptance test procedure, spare parts
list, and maintenance, to allow maintenance on the servo valve.
Other MROs and Parker Hannifin please comment.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
62
Elevator PCU
390600-1009
Parker
DHC-8-402Q
27
LHT
Various
Follow up to MMC 2017 item 26
LHT still experiences many cases where the anti-rotation lugs of the tailstock of the Elevator PCU show some
wear marks. Tailstocks need to be replaced on approximately 70% of the Elevator PCU´s seen at LHT in 2019.
In most cases just one lug was damaged.
CMM 27-31-02 gives design dimension of the lugs but wear limits are not available.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 47
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Question to the OEM (Parker):
• When can we expect to have a final solution for this problem?
• Is there an interim approval to use a minimum limit of 0,527 inches (or less) as an in-service wear limit, is
there any kind of allowable damage to the tailstock?
• Is Parker working on a repair solution (laser weld, cold metal spray, etc.)?
Additional Question
Some of the tailstock anti rotation lug are severely worn (see picture below). Tailstock shown on the left side was
removed from an Elevator PCU after 2919 FH / 4031 FC. The Anti Rotation Lug on one side was worn nearly
down to base material of the Rod End.
Parker/Bombardier, please comment
• What is the root cause for such damages after short time period (installation)?
• Reason for removal was leaking. What happens to the unit if not removed due to leakage?
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 48
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
******17-026******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Elevator PCU
390600-1009
Parker
DHC-8-402Q
27
LHT
LHT experienced several cases where the anti-rotation lugs of the tailstock show some wear marks. Total Time of
most of the Elevator PCUs was below 20,000 FH
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 49
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Since there is no specific inspection criteria in the CMM, LHT contacted Parker about the omissions.
Parker came up with following instructions:
1. Perform visual inspection of anti-rotation lugs for scuffing, damage and measure 0.542 +/- 0.005
2. Replace tail stock P/N 390643-101 if the above anti rotation lugs dimension is below 0.537 inches.
Following these instructions (basically, Parker provided manufacturing dimension), LHT stated that most of the
tailstocks were beyond these limits and had to be replaced. Actual wear exceeds the minimum limit of 0.537
inches by 0.01 inches Parker stated they consider evaluating the possibility of an in-service wear limit, but this will
be a “longer term project.”
Question to other MROs:
Have you experienced similar findings on the Elevator PCUs?
Question to the OEM (Parker):
When can we expect to have a final solution for this problem? Is there an interim approval to use a minimum limit
of 0.527 inches as an in-service wear limit?
Parker and other MRO comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 50
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
63
Flight Augmentation
Computer (FAC)
B397BAM0624
Thales AVS
France SAS
A320 Fam
22
SR Technics
Within the last 24 months, 50 removals were noticed, whereof 24 removals were NFF in shop. Average age of SR
Technics’ pool units is 10 years.
Thales you please provide an explanation for such a high rate of NFF units? Is it related to intermittent faults of
the FAC itself or possibly caused by external inputs?
Thales and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
64
Autoland System Check
NIL
Boeing
Boeing
Airbus
Airbus
B777
B787
A330
A321
22
EVA
Quote from FAA AC 120‐28D Section 9.2 Item 15: “Typically at least one satisfactory low visibility system
operational use, or a satisfactory systems ground check, should be accomplished within 30 days, for an aircraft to
remain in Category III status”. FAA requests operator to do Autoland Practice or Autoland System Ground Check
every 30 days to remain CAT III status.
To comply with this FAA requirement, currently EVA does Autoland Practice every 28 days. EVA would like to
change the method by executing Autoland System Ground Check, but CAT III AMM test procedure does not exist
in any specific AMM task code which can do full Autoland system ground test to fully comply with the requirement
in FAA AC 120‐28D mentioned above.
EVA has asked Boeing and Airbus if this Autoland CAT III AMM test task can be created, but the answer was
negative.
Questions/Requested Actions:
1. Please comment if any operator has to comply with FAA AC 120‐28D continuously remaining CAT III
capability and share your compliance method.
2. Boeing, Airbus comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 51
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
65
Flight Control Unit
Reliability
C12850AC03 /
Flight Control Unit
Thales
A320
Fam
22
AFR/KLM
AFR
This problem is described in item FAIR 19.0321 and linked to the ISI 22.81.00009.
The FCU fitted on A320 family is subject to fault messages similar to the Long-Range counterpart, but contrary to
the Long-Range P/N, Thales does not plan to publish a modification to solve this issue. More details below:
Recent Reliability analysis conducted by AAY on ATA 22 has shown that “Spurious Auto Flight Flt FCU 1 Fault”
messages are a large contributor to the decline of performance for the system in question. Of the total 609
defects reviewed in the last year, 135 recorded discrepancies were driven by the aforementioned faults. ISI
22.81.00009 discusses this issue and has identified the root cause of this fault to be associated to the push and
pull action on ALT selector knob. Per the ISI, when the selector is engaged, a click might be detected by only one
channel of the FCU thus resulting in this fault message. An interim mitigation plan has been developed to curtail
unwarranted FCU replacements as well as consequential delays. The ISI however does not provide a permanent
solution to this issue at this moment; it states that an FCU modification in Alt Selector monitoring function is
needed to address these faults however there is no foreseeable schedule for this mod.
Air France shares Allegiant Air’s concerns and also notes that the global reliability of this P/N is gradually
decreasing:
Average MTBUR (Flight Hours)
2017
2018
2019
9291
7152
6260
Operators, can you relate to this problem?
Thales, Airbus, comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
66
Spoiler Servocontrol
414800
Nabtesco
Parker
E170
E190
27
AFR/KLM
AFR
Ruptures of bolts 1-205 from the CMM 27-65-02 occurred at least twice since 2017 causing loose of hydraulic
circuit. As this event is related to flight security issue, recommendations are wanted.
Investigations between Parker/Nabtesco/Embraer were supposed to be released last June.
What is the result of the investigations to prevent the issue?
When will corrective measures be released by OEM and Embraer?
In the meantime, what are the recommendation from OEM and Embraer?
Parker, Nabtesco, Embraer, and operators please, comment.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 52
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
67
Low Reliability of P-ACE
7028273-802
7028273-822
Honeywell
E170
E190
27
JALEC
JAL
JAL experienced many P-ACE (Primary Actuator Control Electronics) removal due to “FLT CONT NO
DISPATCH” MSG appeared.
Major Shop Findings are CAN BUS Failure (35%) and NFF (25%). In both situations, resoldering U84, U85 and
Y1 of A1 and A4 and U82, U83 and Y1 of A2 and A3 have been performed as precaution maintenance for CAN
BUS Failure. However, the same problem has been recurred on P-ACE which this work was performed.
Since this problem has a high risk of Ground Turn Back event, further reliability improvement is a pressing issue.
1. Other operators’ comments would be appreciated.
2. Honeywell, is the root cause found or any further inspection performed about this problem?
3. Embraer and Honeywell, please advise if there is a plan for improvement.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraf
t
ATA
From
68
Final Technical Solution
to Improve the SSTU as
a Replacement for the
SIL FB4F2-27-002
321000M03 / SSTU – Side
Stick X-Ducer Unit
Lord
(Fly-By-Wire
Systems)
A320
Series
27-92-13
LHT
A330
Series
A340
Series
In Jan 2014, the SIL FB4F2-27-002 had been initially released. The technical background was and currently is:
(…Technical investigations have been conducted on A330 and A340 Flight Control Systems on repeated F/CTL
SENSOR FAULT Warnings. Even though the component shop testing of FCPCs and SSTUs is very often No
Fault Found (NFF), no re – occurrences of the fault messages have been observed after replacement of the
potentiometers and associated wiring within the SSTUs…..)
The SIL is based on a technical investigation that Airbus had launched in the past. The current status will be
regularly updated and published in TFU 27.92.41.002 SSTU.
From the first issue of the SIL to its today's revision, the OEM has promised FOC support for its application as a
mitigation until a permanent fix of the root cause is available. In the last Rev. 09 (dated 10th of Jan. 2020), OEM
Lord announces end of March 2020 as an expiry date of FOC – Support. In the latest issue of TFU 27.92.41.002
SSTU, released on December 19, 2020, Airbus announced the official stop of the FOC support policy at the end
of the first quarter of 2020, although SSTUs are still in-flight operation with suspect potentiometers installed. This
leads to the assumption that AIRBUS has already developed a final technical solution to improve the SSTU,
maybe as a replacement for the SIL FB4F2-27-002.
Question: What final technical solution for improving the reliability and NFF Issue will Airbus offer their customers
as a replacement for the SIL FB4F2-27-002?
Lord, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 53
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraf
t
ATA
From
69
Extend Effectivity to
A320 Fleet for SIL
FB4F2-27-002
321000M03 / SSTU – Side
Stick X-Ducer Unit
Lord
(Fly-By-Wire
Systems)
A320
Series
27-92-13
LHT
A330
Series
A340
Series
In Jan 2014, the SIL FB4F2-27-002 had been initially released. The technical background was and currently is:
(…Technical investigations have been conducted on A330 and A340 Flight Control Systems on repeated F/CTL
SENSOR FAULT Warnings. Even though the component shop testing of FCPCs and SSTUs is very often No
Fault Found (NFF), no re – occurrences of the fault messages have been observed after replacement of the
potentiometers and associated wiring within the SSTUs…..)
The SIL is based on a technical investigation that Airbus had launched in the past. The current status will be
regularly updated and published in TFU 27.92.41.002 SSTU.
The A320 – Flight – Control – System seems is very similar to A340 – Flight – Control – System. The same SSTU
PN 321000M0x is effective for installation in A320 and A330/A340 Aircraft. So, the conclusion can be, that also
A320 Fleet is affected.
Question: Why did Airbus not include the A320 – Fleet into Aircraft – Effectivity for SIL FB4F2-27-002, until all
SSTUs that are equipped with potentiometers and thus could be affected by the "abnormal tear and wear"
findings named in the AIRBUS TFU are modified?
Airbus, Lord, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
70
Spoiler Faults Not
Always Reported
407475-04-01 / Spoiler
Electronic Control Unit (SECU)
BAE
Systems
Boeing
B717
27-61
HAL
1. Spoiler faults displayed to crew but mechanics report finding no codes from the central fault display
system.
2. Boeing unable to supply criteria that trigger faults; therefore, hard to impossible to develop predictive
tests.
BAE, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 54
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
71
Burnt EMI Filter
Boards
Slat/Flap Electronic
Control Unit 766389x
1716470A (CRJ)
1700064F (ERJ)
Collins
Aerospace
CRJ
27-51
LHT
DLH
ERJ
This item was already placed in 2019 with reference 19-053. A technical solution was promised by Collins
Aerospace until Q3 2019. But nothing happened so far.
LHT observes a frequent and extremely critical burning of the capacitors located on the SFECU EMI filter boards
A10/A11. In each year of 2017 and 2018 we had five units with such damage. The EMI filter board consists of
27ea capacitors and 3ea inductors. It provides filter function for the three-phase input power of the SFECU. There
are two filter boards installed per unit. Due to the extensive burnings, other SFECU subassemblies will often be
damaged seriously as well, e.g., motherboard A1, which is located very close the EMI filter board (see pictures
below). This leads to a total loss of the SFECU.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 55
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Unfortunately, LHT is not able to determine any correlation neither to a specific batch of unit serial numbers, batch
of capacitors nor any aging problems of the used capacitors.
An investigation has been addressed to Collins Aerospace in October 2018 already. Two burnt units have been
provided to Collins Aerospace for the investigation. Despite repeated requests, no results provided so far (Jan
2019). A technical solution is urgently demanded.
Please any comments from other operators.
Collins Aerospace, what is the current status of your investigation? What will happen next?
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
72
ARINC 625 Compliant
CMM/TSDP
C99142 (ref. C99143)
MOOG
B787
27-61-11
LHT
Mid of 2015, LHT started to check the documents of B787 Flight-Controls to build up test capabilities. During the
review, it became apparent that the data contained in the documents is not sufficient to test these components
with third party test systems. The documents do not meet the requirements of the ARINC 625, as well as the
World Airline and Supplier Guide (WASAG).
A re-check of the CMM in 2019 showed that test procedures are not described in the CMM. Mostly there is a
reference to an automatic test software. The procedures and the test limits for the RTS tests are not described.
The TSDP does not contain any information on these tests. This is not compliant to ARINC 625. Affected Tests
are Servovalve subassembly tests. LHT asked for the missing data in the beginning of December 2019. We only
got an information, that Moog will check that inquiry. No data or delivery date until were given.
Inquiry:
• Delivery of an ARINC 625 conform documentation within 90 days, like specified in ARINC 625. Please
give reasons if this is not possible.
• Provide a schedule for update process if providing ARINC compliant documentation according to ARINC
625 regulation is not possible.
• Point out the problems/reasons for such a long update process.
• LHT is continuing willing to support the process of updating documentation, if possible and LHT is
involved into the process.
MOOG and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
73
ARINC 625 Compliant
CMM/TSDP
C99143 (ref. C99142)
MOOG
B787
27-61-11
LHT
Mid of 2015, LHT started to check the documents of B787 Flight-Controls to build up test capabilities. During the
review, it became apparent that the data contained in the documents is not sufficient to test these components
with third party test systems. The documents don’t meet the requirements of the ARINC 625, as well as the World
Airline and Supplier Guide (WASAG).
A re-check of the CMM in 2019 showed that test procedures are not described in the CMM. Mostly there is a
reference to an automatic test software. The procedures and the test limits for the RTS tests are not described.
The TSDP does not contain any information on these tests. This is not compliant to ARINC 625. Affected Tests
are Servovalve subassembly tests. LHT asked for the missing data in the beginning of December 2019. We only
got an information that Moog will check that inquiry. No data or delivery date until were given.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 56
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Inquiry:
• Delivery of an ARINC 625 conform documentation within 90 days, like specified in ARINC 625. Please
give reasons if this is not possible.
• Provide a schedule for update process if providing ARINC compliant documentation according to ARINC
625 regulation is not possible.
• Point out the problems/reasons for such a long update process.
• LHT is continuing willing to support the process of updating documentation, if possible and LHT is
involved into the process.
MOOG and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
74
ARINC 625 Compliant TSDP
C99160 (ref. C99163,
C11962, C99257)
MOOG
B787
27-11-10
LHT
Follow up to MMC 2019 ITEM 61
Mid of 2015, LHT started to check the documents of 787 Flight-Controls to build up test capabilities. During the
review it became apparent that the data contained in the documents is not sufficient to test these components
with third party test systems. The documents don’t meet the requirements of the ARINC 625, as well as the World
Airline and Supplier Guide (WASAG). The Test Specification (TS), which is part of the TSDP and the CMM was
not containing the necessary data to realize the data bus communication during the return to service test.
In 2019, this topic was discussed on the MMC. After the MMC, in May 2019, LHT got one of four TSDPs as
revised DRAFT Version (P/N C99163) from the discussed. LHT checked this draft Version (it was significant
improved). LHT asked for a similar revised version of TSDP for the C99160. LHT has not yet received any answer
to this request, although LHT asked several times. Topic unfortunately still not solved.
Additionally, to the missing data for the bus communication, a check of the CMM in 2019 showed that most test
procedures without data bus communication are not described in the CMM. Mostly there is a reference to an
automatic test software. The procedures and the test limits for the RTS tests are not described. The TSDP does
not contain any information on these tests. This is not compliant to ARINC 625. Tests that are affected are e.g.
electric, hydraulic and subassembly tests. LHT asked for the missing data in early December 2019. We only got
an information, that Moog will check that inquiry. No data or delivery date until now.
One fact in particular is strange about the missing data: In an old (superseded) CMM (revision 2) of this P/N, the
missing tests were completely described. These descriptions have been removed and replaced by automatic tests
in newer revisions.
Inquiry:
• Please provide a reason for removing the data from the CMM from revision 2 to revision 3.
• Delivery of an ARINC 625 conform documentation within 90 days, like specified in ARINC 625. Please
give reasons, if this is not possible.
• Provide a schedule for update process, if providing ARINC compliant documentation according to ARINC
625 regulation is not possible.
• Point out the problems/reasons for such a long update process.
• LHT is continuing willing to support the process of updating documentation, if possible and LHT is
involved into the process.
MOOG and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 57
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
75
ARINC 625 Compliant TSDP
C99162 (ref. C99163,
C99160, C99257)
MOOG
B787
27-31-03
LHT
Follow up to MMC 2019 ITEM 61
Mid 2015, LHT started to check the documents of 787 Flight-Controls to build up test capabilities. During the
review it became apparent that the data contained in the documents is not sufficient to test these components
with third party test systems. The documents don’t meet the requirements of the ARINC 625, as well as the World
Airline and Supplier Guide (WASAG). The Test Specification (TS), which is part of the TSDP and the CMM was
not containing the necessary data to realize the data bus communication during the return to service test.
In 2019, this topic was discussed on the MMC. After the MMC, in May 2019, LHT got one of four TSDP’s as
revised DRAFT Version (P/N C99163) from the discussed. LHT checked this draft Version (it was significant
improved). LHT asked for a similar revised version of TSDP for the C99162. LHT has not yet received any answer
to this request, although LHT asked several times. Topic unfortunately still not solved.
Additionally, to the missing data for the bus communication, a check of the CMM in 2019 showed, that most test
procedures without data bus communication are not described in the CMM. Mostly there is a reference to an
automatic test software. The procedures and the test limits for the RTS tests are not described. The TSDP does
not contain any information on these tests. This is not compliant to ARINC 625. Tests that are affected are e.g.
electric, hydraulic and subassembly tests. LHT asked for the missing data in early December 2019. We only got
an information, that Moog will check that inquiry. No data or delivery date until now.
One fact in particular is strange about the missing data: In an old (superseded) CMM (revision 2) of another P/N
(C99160 Aileron), which is quite similar to the here discussed Rudder-PCU, the missing tests were completely
described. These descriptions have been removed and replaced by automatic tests in newer revisions. We
cannot proof the fact, that earlier CMM of this P/N also had this data included, but anyway, the missing data have
to be included into the CMM and TSDP.
Inquiry:
• Delivery of an ARINC 625 conform documentation within 90 days, like specified in ARINC 625. Please
give reasons, if this is not possible.
• Provide a schedule for update process, if providing ARINC compliant documentation according to ARINC
625 regulation is not possible.
• Point out the problems/reasons for such a long update process.
• LHT is continuing willing to support the process of updating documentation, if possible and LHT is
involved into the process.
MOOG and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 58
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
76
ARINC 625 Compliant TSDP
C99163 (ref. C99160,
C99162, C99257)
MOOG
B787
27-21-02
LHT
Follow up to MMC 2019 ITEM 61
Mid 2015, LHT started to check the documents of 787 Flight-Controls to build up test capabilities. During the
review it became apparent that the data contained in the documents is not sufficient to test these components
with third party test systems. The documents don’t meet the requirements of the ARINC 625, as well as the World
Airline and Supplier Guide (WASAG). The Test Specification (TS), which is part of the TSDP and the CMM was
not containing the necessary data to realize the data bus communication during the return to service test.
In 2019, this topic was discussed on the MMC. After the MMC, in May 2019, LHT got a revised DRAFT Version of
the TSDP of P/N C99163. LHT checked this draft Version (it was significant improved) and send some additional
questions to Moog for clarification and ordered the released version of the TSDP. LHT has not yet received any
answer to this request, although LHT asked several times. Topic unfortunately still not solved.
Additionally, to the missing data for the bus communication, a check of the CMM in 2019 showed, that most test
procedures without data bus communication are not described in the CMM. Mostly there is a reference to an
automatic test software. The procedures and the test limits for the RTS tests are not described. The TSDP does
not contain any information on these tests. This is not compliant to ARINC 625. Tests that are affected are, e.g.,
electric, hydraulic and subassembly tests. LHT asked for the missing data in early December 2019. We only got
an information, that Moog will check that inquiry. No data or delivery date until now.
One fact in particular is strange about the missing data: In an old (superseded) CMM (revision 2) of another P/N
(C99160 Aileron), which is quite similar to the here discussed Rudder-PCU, the missing tests were completely
described. These descriptions have been removed and replaced by automatic tests in newer revisions. We
cannot proof the fact, that earlier CMM of this P/N also had this data included, but anyway, the missing data have
to be included into the CMM and TSDP.
Inquiry:
• Delivery of an ARINC 625 conform documentation within 90 days, like specified in ARINC 625. Please
give reasons, if this is not possible.
• Provide a schedule for update process, if providing ARINC compliant documentation according to ARINC
625 regulation is not possible.
• Point out the problems/reasons for such a long update process.
• LHT is continuing willing to support the process of updating documentation, if possible and LHT is
involved into the process
MOOG and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 59
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
77
ARINC 625 Compliant TSDP
C99257 (ref. C9963,
C99160, C99162)
MOOG
B787
27-12-03
LHT
Follow up to MMC 2019 ITEM 61
Mid 2015, LHT started to check the documents of 787 Flight-Controls to build up test capabilities. During the
review it became apparent that the data contained in the documents is not sufficient to test these components
with third party test systems. The documents don’t meet the requirements of the ARINC 625, as well as the World
Airline and Supplier Guide (WASAG). The Test Specification (TS), which is part of the TSDP and the CMM was
not containing the necessary data to realize the data bus communication during the return to service test. The TS
only contained the hydraulic test without REU. No information on the testing with data bus.
In 2019, this topic was discussed on the MMC. After the MMC, in May 2019, LHT got one of four TSDP’s as
revised DRAFT Version (P/N C99163) from the discussed. LHT checked this draft version (it was significant
improved). LHT asked for a similar revised version of TSDP for the C99257. LHT has not yet received any answer
to this request, although LHT asked several times. Topic unfortunately still not solved.
Additionally, to the missing data for the bus communication, a check of the CMM in 2019 showed, that some test
procedures without data bus communication are not described in the CMM. Mostly there is a reference to an
automatic test software. The procedures and the test limits for these RTS tests are not described. The TSDP
does not contain any information on these tests. This is not compliant to ARINC 625. Tests that are affected are,
e.g., electric, test with REU and subassembly tests. LHT asked for the missing data in early December 2019. We
only got an information, that Moog will check that inquiry. No data or delivery date until now.
One fact in particular is strange: three of four Test specifications contained information on the test with REU, apart
from the fact that they were incomplete. The TS of this unit only contain data on the hydraulic test without REU.
There is no data about the test with REU in the TS. So sometimes data about the data bus is missing, sometimes
on the classic hydraulic tests. But no documentation is complete.
Inquiry:
• Delivery of an ARINC 625 conform documentation within 90 days, like specified in ARINC 625. Please
give reasons, if this is not possible.
• Provide a schedule for update process, if providing ARINC compliant documentation according to ARINC
625 regulation is not possible.
• Point out the problems/reasons for such a long update process.
• LHT is continuing willing to support the process of updating documentation, if possible and LHT is
involved into the process
MOOG and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 60
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
78
Additional TSDP
Document
HG2291AD01
Honeywell
B787
27
AFR/KLM
AFR
CMM 27-20-04 refers to ATP 2046-02 which has been provided by Honeywell.
The ATP is incomplete and refers to other applicable documents listed step 2.1 below.
Following several previous discussions with Boeing to clarify such topics, it was confirmed that TSDP should be
complete, and all documents listed in TSDP should be provided.
Could Honeywell revise its position and provide the five listed documents?
Operators, Boeing please comment.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
79
Technical Solution for
Solder Issues on Cards
PN
DV8456701-5
Artus
A320
27-23-51
LHT
DLH
Pacific
Scientific
Meggitt
With reference to 2019 AMC item 60
For the Travel Limitation Unit (TLU) PNR DV8456701-5, both control-boards have to be exchanged during each
repair since it is not possible to determine faulty boards from good ones due to soldering issues on the boards.
@Meggitt: The current process increases the cost/FH and is not a permanent long-term solution. Please provide
information on the development of a permanent solution taking the following points into consideration:
• Re-design of the boards, aiming for the improvement of the soldering points, eradicating these
undetectable solder cracks (different solder technique, analysis of the weak spots and improving those,
etc.)
• Make a repair of the old boards possible and economical feasible and/or
• Improve the test-parameters and conditions, so that solder cracks can be identified (cold soak test,
climate chamber, etc.) and repaired.
Meggitt and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 61
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
80
MRO Capability,
Repair Possibility
PN 3210200-1M00, 321200M02 Speed
Brake Control Transducer Unit
Lord
(Fly by
Wire)
A320
Family
27-92-14
LHT
A330
A340
This is a reminder to item 19-193 discussed at AMC 2019. This item was referenced to item 19-036.
The 2019 AMC Follow-Up item no. 2 mentioned that Lord/Airbus would provide an updated CMM.
Note: The OEM Lord had deleted in its CMM 27-92-14, revision 6 from 15 November 2014 all IPL-data and all
instructions to repair these units.
Question: We are currently waiting for the new CMM, which mentions all piece parts in DPL and MRO instructions to
repair the unit. When will the new CMM be available?
Lord, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
81
CMM Not Available to Operators
U431 Series Power
Supply Block
Thales
319
27
UAL
A320
Thales CMM 27-94-08 for the U431 Power Supply Block refers to CMM 27-94-08A for test procedures for the
power supply alone (not installed in unit). UA has requested this CMM from Thales and have been denied access.
Per Airbus agreement, all documentation required to maintain equipment owned by the operator is be made
available.
Airbus, Thales comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
82
FMGEC EFOB-EFOD
C13200HA03
C13226HA06
Honeywell
A330
22-83
DAL
HAL
HAL has been having issues with the FMGEC P/Ns C13200HA03 and C13226HA06 and the Estimated Fuel On
Board (EFOB)/Estimate Fuel Over Destination (EFOD). This issue has been documented in several Airbus
TechRequests 80695526, 80649781, 80628075, 80622585, 80633081, 80628076 and 80746033.
Data gathering and submission to Airbus and Honeywell continues when faults occur. However, no solution has
been found to prevent this issue.
Airbus, Honeywell, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 62
AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
83
FMGEC Winds
C13200HA03
C13226HA06
Honeywell
A330
22-83
DAL
HAL
HAL has been having issues with the FMGEC P/Ns C13200HA03 and C13226HA06 and the FM winds not being
able to upload. This issue has been documented in Airbus TechRequest 80493817.
Data gathering and submission to Airbus and Honeywell continues when faults occur. However, no solution has
been found to prevent this issue.
Airbus, Honeywell, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 63
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
84
Smart Probe
Corrosion
2015G2H2H-8
Collins
Aerospace
E170
34-10-80
AFR/KLM
AFR
2015G2H2H-8A
2015G2H2H-9
E190
This question is related to AMC 2017 item 80 and AMC 2016 item 088.
The SIL-2018-09/VSIL59885-34-0012 from UTAS indicates the criteria for the smart probe aircraft removal when
the Altitude Split failure is combined with corrosion and a pressure measurement error.
The Altitude Split failure and removals after inspection are due to the corrosion (60% of the 180 removals per
year) which is now monitored but that still have an impact on the smart probe reliability, the removal rate and
OEM warranty period.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 64
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Are there any improvements planned to eliminate corrosion on the surface of this smart probe?
Collins, Embraer, other operators comments please.
******19-151******
Item
Summary Title
A32X Pitot Probe Retrofit Policy
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Airbus
UTAS
A32X
34
ETD
In October 2018, Airbus released SB A320-34-1678 (Navigation – Sensors, Power Supply and Switching – Replace
UTAS Pitot Probe 0851HL by Pitot Probe 0851MC). The reason was that new icing requirements (CS25 Appendix P
and Appendix O) have been defined by EASA with an increased maximum ice crystal concentration and UTAS has
developed new Pitot Probes that comply with these requirements.
In parallel, Airbus also released in October 2018 SB A330-34-3367 (Navigation – Sensors Power Supply and
Switching – Install UTAS Pitot Probes PN 0851MC Compatible with new Icing regulation) and RIL LR34M18001408
R00 (Install UTAS Pitot Probes 0851MC compatible with new icing regulation). This RIL makes the provision of the
new UTAS Pitot Probes 0851MC FOC for A330 fleet until 31-OCT-2020, but no RIL was released for A32X.
These unequal conditions were discussed with Airbus under TechRequest 80553264, but the answer provided by
Airbus was unsatisfactory.
Questions:
1. UTAS pitot probes PN 0851HL are prone to blockage due to icing conditions regardless of the aircraft type
they are installed in. Nonetheless, Airbus makes the retrofit FOC for A330 and not for A32X, being indirectly
responsible of the unsafe operation of thousands of aircraft worldwide. Under which technical reasons has
Airbus taken this decision?
2. How many cases of unreliable airspeed has Airbus received from operators on A32X and A330 fleets due to
ice crystal blockage?
3. Aside from UTAS Pitot Probes, which other new icing requirement-compliant Pitot Probes are Airbus going
to certify on A32X and A330 fleets?
Operator comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 65
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
******17-079******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Heaters, Pitot, TAT
Varies by Aircraft
Boeing
Airbus
Rosemount
All
34-00
DAL
Failure of pitot/static/TAT heaters usually results in flight cancellations, delays and air turnback/diversions due to
flight restrictions for weather. If there is a way to determine the health of pitot heaters by on wing monitoring
electrical current, voltage drop, resistance, etc., to the probe, operators may be able to avoid the Operational
Difficultly Index (ODI)s and move probe heaters from a hard time maintenance program to a managed on
condition program.
What is being developed or added to aircraft to be able to detect degradation of the various heaters prior to an
actual failure?
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
85
Support for
Product
WL102AMS3
Altimeter/Airspeed Indicator
GE Aviation
B737
3416
DAL
Ontic
Ontic, in acquiring this product line from GE, has had difficulty supporting for parts, notably vibrator 601EMA8
(which at the time had a 500-day lead time from Aviall‐Boeing). Of note, this is not the first time a product line has
been acquired/assumed by Ontic and had similar issues. It appears there is a disconnect between the acquiring
company eager to shed a product line and the ability of Ontic to support.
Does the Boeing PSA not require Ontic/Boeing to fully support without excessive lead times/issues?
Other operator and Boeing comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
86
Altimeter
64141-582-1
Thales
A340
34-21-22
TAP
The Altimeter P/N: 64141-582-1 has its scale adjusted according to a table present in the CMM that ranges from
-1000 ft to 50000 ft. This table specifies several test points where the unit should be verified. We sent a unit to
Thales with the specific complaint of out of values at 37000 ft (the CMM has the 35000 ft and 40000ft test points).
This unit was tested under a chronic unit process to be tested at this specific test value and Thales confirmed the
fault.
Even accepting that this failure was very specific and that this test point is not on the CMM, we consider that after
our specific complaint, the unit should have been tested at that flight level without the need for a chargeable
Chronic Unit Process as a standby altimeter should be inside tolerances in all its useful range and not just at the
test points that were considered when the CMM was written.
1. Have other operators also experienced this problem with standby altimeters from Thales?
2. Is Thales considering any other test procedures to avoid cases like this?
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 66
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
87
Lack of TSDP
HG2030BExx
Honeywell
Airbus
A321
A330
34
DAL
Honeywell is refusing to provide a full TSDP to Delta for testing of the HG2030BExx ADIRU per the requirements in
the Airbus SSC. Likewise, the TSDP listing which is currently “view only” on the Honeywell publication website stops
at HG2030BE02, and Delta operates the newer version HG2030BE03 and HG2030BE04. Honeywell advises that
they provide the TSDP to Airbus, not Delta. Airbus advises they will not provide TSDP directly to Delta. Honeywell is
testing all of these MPNs at their FAR145 repair station, so there must be a valid TSDP available somewhere.
Delta requests two actions:
1. Honeywell, please update the TSDP to add testing for HG2030BE03 and HG2030BE04.
2. Honeywell and Airbus, please work together to resolve your differences and provide the updated TSDP to
Delta.
Honeywell, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
88
Lack of Fault Dump Data and
Health Data
HG2050BC04
Honeywell
B737NG
34
DAL
Boeing
Delta has discovered that the HG2050BC04 ADIRU lacks the ability to view segments of the fault dump that show
laser health data such as LIM and RIM values as well as stored flight legs. This data exists in the HG2050ACxx
ADIRU and it is an important part of Delta’s maintenance program for maintaining our B737 ADIRU.
It appears this functionality was not designed into the testing software of HG2050BC04. Honeywell has advised that
this functionality was not required by Boeing, so they did not add it.
Delta is asking for Boeing to require this data be made available in the test specification and for Honeywell to add
back this important functionality. Without it, we are unable to determine weak laser gyros or units with excessive
drift. This will lead to overall lower reliability and reduced dispatch rate for our B737NG fleet.
Honeywell, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
89
ERT Kit Modification
9599-607-19996 /
ERT-550
Thales
Airbus
34
AFR/KLM
AFR
Air France ordered kit modification for VSB ERT-550-34-10 and VSB ERT-550-34-00-07 since December 2017.
These kits have not been received and Thales is not communicating a due date. Air France cannot apply the VSB
and is forced to subcontract the modification.
Operators, are you facing similar issues for VSB kits from Thales?
Thales, Airbus, comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 67
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
90
ATEC Series 6/7 is not
Specified in the CMMs
ALA 52B Radio
Altimeter
066-50007-0101
066-50007-0111
066-50007-0531
066-50007-0631
Honeywell
Boeing NG
34
THY
ALA-52B CMM 34-42-35 still mentions old test systems such as JCAir (old brand name), as displayed below.
Although we know that ATEC Series 6 is used as the test bench, this is still not stated in the related CMM.
Thanks to Honeywell and Spherea Test & Services for working together and publishing the ATEC Series 6 TPS
SBs. However, there is no official document such as a SIL, TNL, or SB that can be used as a reference during
EASA/FAA audits stating that ATEC Series 6/7 and its related TPSs can be used.
There are a lot of CMMs that need to be revised to state that ATEC Series 6/7 should be used instead of STS2000,
STS1000, and such other RF testers. Therefore, can Honeywell publish such a TNL, SIL, or SB so that even if a
CMM does not refer to ATEC Series 6/7, it can be used as test bench with its TPS as far as the Honeywell TPS SB
exists?
Honeywell, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 68
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
91
Long TAT and Lack of
Organization on Repair of
Honeywell ATC Transponder
TRA-100B
066-01212-0102
Honeywell
A32X
34
ETD
Leonardo
A330
Etihad installed the Honeywell ATC Transponder TRA-100B PN 066-01212-0102 on the A32X and A330 fleets as
part of the ADS-B OUT DO-260B mandated campaign. After installation we suffered the following two removals:
1. ATC PN 066-01212-0102 SN S18319376 (RO 1000588398) was removed from A320 MSN 2167 on 22 Dec
2019, four weeks after installation. Shop report resulted in the unit being Not Fault Found.
2. ATC PN 066-01212-0102 SN S19029924 (RO 1000586747) was removed from A321 MSN 5836 on 3 Dec
2019, six weeks after installation. The unit was tested in Honeywell Olathe facilities (Kansas, USA) around
24 December 2019, the result of the incoming test was unit declared faulty. Unfortunately, Olathe facilities
can only perform repair level I (go/no go test) on PN 066-01212-0102, so the unit had to be sent to
Leonardo (original manufacturer of the unit) in Italy in order to undergo repair and testing.
On 12 January 2020, Etihad demanded an update on the repair status of SN S19029924 and was told that expected
shipping date was 24 January 2020. Furthermore, we were told that Honeywell TAT for this unit was 30 days.
On 22 January 2020, Honeywell stated that SN S19029924 unit was still under repair but Leonardo could not
release an EASA certificate form 1 or FAA certificate form 8130 on the unit, meaning that the unit had to be sent
back to Olathe (Kansas, USA) in order to perform the final test and release the required certificates.
On 30 January 2020, Honeywell provided an update stating that the unit was at Olathe (Kansas, USA) site and
expected ESD was 24 February 2020, which would mean 2 months since the unit was originally tested and found
faulty.
1. Does Honeywell have any plans to enable Olathe facility to perform level II repairs on ATC
PN 066-01212-0102?
2. Does Leonardo have any plans to enable their facilities to be able to release EASA and FAA certificates in
order to release to service the ATC PN 066-01212-0102?
3. How can Honeywell state that standard TAT for PN 066-01212-0102 is 30 days when all major OEMs offer
10 days TAT?
4. How many units of ATC Transponder TRA-100B PN 066-01212-0102 has Honeywell manufactured to date?
Operators comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 69
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
92
ADS-B Out
Upgrade
822-1338-XXX /
ATC Transponder
Collins
Aerospace
All
34
LHT
DLH
ATA 34-50-99, Collins Aerospace TPR-901 ATC Transponder, SB TPR-901-34-504/-505, DO-260B ADS-B out
Upgrade
Background: SBs TPR-901-34-504 and -505 describe the upgrade of TPR-901 ATC Transponder to DO-260B
functionality by doing a software upgrade and some hardware changes. These SBs have been revised several times
up to Revision 04 (for SB -504) and Revision 05 (for SB -505). With the latest revision of these SBs, the replacement
of the A3 Receiver SRU to the newest version became mandatory.
Before release of the latest revision, LHT modified several units according the previous Revisions of these SBs,
keeping the old A3 Receiver Board. These units passed all RTS Tests and work normal on board the aircraft.
Question: What is the experience of other MRO/operators with modifying the Transponders according the ‘old’
revisions of the SBs (without A3 Receiver Replacement)?
Any functional anomalies or failure occurrence during RTS Test or operation in aircraft, which can be traced back to
the DO-260B Transponder modification without A3 Receiver Replacement?
Collins and other operator comments, please.
******19-169******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Loss of Mode S/Poor
Performance Reported by ATC
822-2120-102
Collins Aerospace
B787-9
34-42
VIR
Boeing
VAA has received several reports by different ATC agencies of loss of mode S/poor Mode S performance on its
B789 fleet.
So far VAA has replaced six ISSPUs [All NFF] and one Bottom Mode S/TCAS antenna for this issue.
The ongoing investigation with Boeing/Collins Aerospace is taking considerable time and effort to support.
1. Have any other operators had similar events?
2. What findings/defects have other operators confirmed?
3. Please can Boeing/Collins Aerospace provide the latest update on their investigation and the next planned
steps?
Collins Aerospace, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 70
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
93
Effectivity Update
TPA-100
Obsolescence SBs
TPA-100 TCAS
Computer PN:
940-0351-005/-006
Honeywell
Airbus
34-45
LHT
DLH
Honeywell has introduced new dash-numbers to TPA-100 TCAS Computer PN: 940-0351-xxx.
More than two years ago, dash -005 and in the last year dash -006. Unfortunately, several most relevant
obsolescence SBs, e.g., 940-0300/0400-34-13, 940-03XX-04XX-34-13 and 940-03XX-04XX-34-14 are not updated
for years (see pictures below) and do not cover these latest PNs 940-0351-005/-006.
Honeywell already embodies and quotes these SBs for repair of the new dash-numbers although SBs do not official
cover them.
For almost two years, we try to push and clarify. We had several discussions about it (email, phone, discrepancy
reports, etc.) and received just the information that this will be updated by next revision, but there is still no progress
nor new or temporary revisions.
We know there is no technical issue behind missing applicability, since units are from hardware point-of-view the
same like dash -001 and change was just software driven. It is just a formal issue, but customers complaining that
the SBs are not applicable. Without any kind of proof, they/we have to scrap units, because they are formally not
repairable without performing the SB.
Questions to Honeywell:
1. Please provide final release date for SB updates to reflect latest PN effectivity
2. As interim solution please provide official statement that the SBs are also applicable to dash -005 and -006
units
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 71
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
94
TCAS Failures
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Boeing
B787
34-42
THY
THY is badly suffering from TCAS failures on its whole B787 fleet which caused flight delays and AOG situations in
outstations.
Currently there are six ea. B787 aircraft in THY’s fleet which were delivered in 2019.
After the TCAS failures, inspection of the TCAS Top Antenna area was made and a serious amount of water drops
found, for the moment it is not confirmed that whether these water drops are resulted from leakage or condensation
of the Moisture in the aircraft. However, after the drying of the related are faults were cleared and aircraft were
released to service, wrap application was made to prevent TCAS Top Antenna in accordance with 787 MT-34-002.
After a couple of weeks, TCAS failures was received again and at that time TCAS Top Antenna Harness (P/N
668Z301800-18) was needed to be replaced to clear the failure. Most probably harness had been affected from the
moisture in that area.
In the previous years, Boeing made some improvements on harness design for those failures however THY has
already the latest available Harness PN: 668Z301800-18.
Boeing and THY closely working on this issue to find a solution and understand the root cause of the water/moisture
in that area.
THY would like to hear other operators’ experiences on this issue.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 72
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
******18-097******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Certification of TCAS PN 940-0351-005
on Boeing Fleet
940-0351-005
Boeing
B777 Fleet
34
ETD
Etihad A32X/330/340 and B777 fleets were equipped with Honeywell TCAS P/N 940-0351-001.
In May 2017, EASA released AD 2017-0091 due to false TCAS traffic alerts making mandatory the upgrade of
Honeywell TCAS from P/N 940-0351-001 to P/N 940-0351-005 only on Airbus fleets. Apparently, the problem
suffered by TCAS P/N 940-0351-001 was only affecting the Airbus fleet and not the Boeing fleet due to the different
way the GPS signal is feed into the TCAS on both platforms.
As Etihad operates both Airbus and Boeing fleets, it meant that Airbus fleet needed to be upgraded to P/N 9400351-005 while Boeing fleet remained at P/N 940-0351-001. From the logistics point of view this creates a costly
spare segregation (P/N 940-0351-005 for Airbus and P/N 940-0351-001 for Boeing) that was not there before the
mandate.
For this reason, Etihad contacted Boeing thru message ETI-ETI-17-0284-02B in order to hope for Boeing to certify
P/N 940-0351-005 on B777 fleet and again reach the lost commonality on the TCAS computer, but Boeing replied
that there is no intention to do so.
Why Boeing does not certify P/N 940-0351-005 on B777 fleet?
Other operator’s comments and experience in case of being affected, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 73
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
95
Poor Reliability on ACSS ATC PN
9008000-10000 and Lack of Customer
Support
9008000-10000
Boeing
B777
34
ETD
ACSS
L3Harris
Thales
In September 2019, Etihad started the installation of ACSS ATC transponder P/N 9008000-10000 on the B777 fleet
in order to comply with the ADS-B OUT DO-260B mandate.
To our surprise, we started to see the failure and removal of ACSS ATC transponder just a few days after the units
were installed, see below Table 1. Furthermore, the removed units confirmed fault in shop and most of them showed
a common fault on the A3 Transceiver Circuit Card Assembly (CCA) that either required repair or replacement.
Table 1: ACSS ATC Transponder Removals on Etihad B777 Fleet up to 1 January 2020
Due to the high number of removals, Etihad fell into a shortage-of-spares situation and was unable to continue the
retrofit on some aircraft as the units reserved for the retrofit were used as operational spares.
Etihad highlighted the issue to Thales (who sold us the units), but they referred us to contact ACSS in order to obtain
technical support. No specific support and proactive attention were provided from ACSS other than trying to expedite
the repair of the units, so they could be returned to Etihad and be used to continue the retrofit.
Finally, in November 2019, Etihad got in contact with the right people at ACSS and demanded two EAs of the ATC
transponder were to be loaned FOC in order to cope with the retrofit and support the operational removals. The units
arrived in December 2019 and we were able to complete the retrofit and cover the operation.
1. Why did the brand new ACSS ATC transponder P/N 9008000-10000 fail after installation?
2. Why could the technical issue not have been foreseen and fixed at the manufacturing level?
3. Why did ACSS did not provide proactive support and supply FOC loan units from the moment we started
suffering the failures?
Operator comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 74
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary
Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
96
ISSPU Test
Decal
822-2120-102
Collins Aerospace
B787
34-42
KLM/AFR
KLM
This item was submitted for the 2019 AMC as item 19-172.
Collins Aerospace places a Test Date Marking Plate (Test Label) on ISS-2100 repaired units (ISSPU). Refer to
lower decal in picture attached. The maintenance regulations do not require to install the Test Label.
2019 RESPONSE – ANDERSON/COLLINS AEROSPACE: After investigating the origin of this requirement and
discussing with Boeing, Collins agrees that this label should be removed. Collins is processing the design change to
remove it from the Engineering drawings, which will in turn remove it from the CMM.
Collins should have removed the Test Date plate instructions from CMM 34-42-10. However, the current CMM rev
42 (25 May 2018) is still the unchanged version. Refer to the Note in par 3.A.(3) on page 1003, the Note in
Procedure/Description step number 1.28 on page 1036, and Fig-Item 1 – 35 and - 35A on page 10213/10214.
Request Collins for an update on this action item.
Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 75
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
97
ADS-B Out
Multiple
Multiple
Multiple
34
AAL
Now that ADS-B Out is fully implemented across the industry, could we hear about the experience of operators
using SA Aware or SA On GPS under FAA exception letter 12555? Are you seeing poor performance? Or are your
installations meeting the necessary performance?
Please state which GPS you are currently operating when providing a response.
Item
Summary Title
98
DO-260B ADS-B Out
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
UAL
Now that DO-260B ADS-B Out is installed on all of United’s fleet, and DO-260B ATC transponders trigger a FAIL for
a missing GPS input, GPS interference issues are now causing service interruptions to United.
•
•
Have other operators seen an increase in service interruptions due to GPS interference?
If so, how have other operators been handling this problem?
Other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
99
B787 TAWS TDB Release Schedule
ISSPU
Collins Aerospace
B787
34-42
UAL
UAL would again like to request that the Collins Aerospace TAWS database for the B787 ISSPU be issued at the
same 56-day interval as the Honeywell EGPWS TDB updates.
In response to the previous request at the 2019 AMC, Collins estimated that a nuisance alert due to a mismatch
between the B787 FMS nav database and the TAWS database would be minimal. However, the TAWS functionality
provides an additional level of safety beyond what can be provided by the FMS. If a new obstacle appears (a cell
tower, for example), it could take as long as 12-14 months for that data to be implemented into TAWS. The
consequence can be more severe than a nuisance alert, since there could be a new potential obstacle for which no
warning will be given.
UAL would like to know the views of other operators on this issue.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 76
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
100
Receiver Transmitter Module
(RTM-2100)
822-2127-002, -003
Collins
Aerospace
B787
34
ANA
ANA has experienced failure of test step 6.8 Fiber Optic Transmit when performing automatic testing by using
RFT-1000 test station.
This test step failure solved by replacing O/E converter Tektronix P6703B with ANA spare, but ANA does not
understand root cause of O/E converter failure.
ANA already informed Collins Aerospace of this issue and requested Collins Aerospace to perform engineering
evaluation by using ANA non-working O/E converter and ANA RTM-2100 to find root cause of O/E converter failure.
The root cause of failure at test step 6.8 Fiber Optic Transmit is wrong conversion gain value of O/E converter.
Conversion gain value of ANA non-working O/E converter is 1.11 V/mW @ 1550nm. Conversion gain value of
working O/E converter is 1.12 V/mW @ 1550nm or greater. On the other hand, specification of conversion gain
value of O/E converter Tektronix P6703B is 1 V/mW ± 8% at DC, 1310nm.
ANA could understand that failure of test step 6.8 Fiber Optic Transmit happens due to wrong conversion gain value
but there is contradiction between specification of conversion gain value of O/E converter Tektronix P6703B and
Collins Aerospace response of conversion gain value.
ANA thinks that Collins Aerospace response of conversion gain value is out of tolerance of O/E converter’s
specification.
Currently, ANA is requesting Collins Aerospace to explain contradiction of conversion gain value of O/E converter
but Collins Aerospace has not respond to ANA yet.
Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
101
DAA-4A Drive Unit
2041444-04XX
Honeywell
Woodward MPC (WMPC)
A320
B767
B777
34
ANA
This is an additional input related with AMC item 19-175. (Follow-up item)
Honeywell submitted a letter to Woodward MPC to provide required parts, tools and material for ANA to perform
repair and overhaul of drive motor, but Woodward MPC has not responded to Honeywell and ANA yet. Meanwhile,
Honeywell released SIL D201911000111 to deactivate drive motor CMM 31-09-82 revision 1. There is no way of
repair and overhaul of drive motor by the operator due to SIL release.
ANA is not able to accept this situation as the following reason.
1. ANA believes that operator is able to reduce maintenance cost and TAT of drive motor.
2. ANA knows that New Hampshire Ball Bearings, who is the manufacturer of the drive motor bearing, are
manufacturing drive motor bearing of DAA-4A Drive Unit P/N 2041444-0422 and are delivering to
Woodward MPC, but New Hampshire Ball Bearings informed ANA that ANA has to purchase the drive
motor bearing by Woodward MPC.
Woodward MPC, please advise why Woodward MPC is not able to provide required tool, material and parts for
operator. Is there any good way to perform repair and overhaul of drive motor by the operator?
Honeywell, Woodward MPC (WMPC) and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 77
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
******19-175******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
DAA-4A Drive Unit
2041444-04XX
Honeywell
Woodward MPC (WMPC)
A320
B767
B777
34
ANA
This is an additional input related with AMC item 18-091 (Follow-up item).
Honeywell’s response to this drive unit motor's repair and overhaul issue is as follows at AMC 2018 in Dallas:
“Honeywell plans to create drawing, as well as update the two CMMs 31-09-81 (3001-81) and 31-09-82 (3001-82)
by the end of Q3 2018.”
ANA communicated with Honeywell periodically to confirm progress of drive motor CMM revision and Honeywell
informed ANA that Honeywell is not able to revise these CMM for the following reason: “Woodward-MPC is not
willing to support other entities in the repair and overhaul of these units, consequently Honeywell will not be able to
update the CMM with orderable parts as ANA has requested.”
On the other hand, ANA communicated with Woodward MPC about this issue and Woodward MPC's response is as
follows: “Woodward does not have PMA, or any license, so we cannot sell parts. In addition, we are restricted from
selling parts directly to airlines.”
ANA thinks that there are different opinions between Honeywell and Woodward MPC and Honeywell should take the
lead to solve this issue.
ANA believes that operator is able to perform drive motor’s repair and overhaul in accordance with DAA-4A CMM
and drive motor CMM.
Honeywell, please take the lead in resolving this issue and provide a solution to ANA.
Other operators, please comment if you are performing drive motor repair and overhaul by yourselves.
Honeywell, Woodward MPC (WMPC), and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 78
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
******19-178******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
WXR Transceiver (WRT-2100)
822-1710-002
Collins Aerospace
Boeing
B777
34
ANA
This is an additional input related with AMC item 18-088 (Follow-up item).
Boeing proposed wiring change for B777 single installation of Collins Aerospace WXR concerning TERRAIN/WXR
relays at AMC 2018 in Dallas. ANA performed jumper wire implementation at TERRAIN/WXR relays and monitored
whether weather nuisance message will be reduced or not but it was unsuccessful. Jumper wire implementation at
TERRAIN/WXR relays could not reduce weather nuisance message.
On the other hand, ANA found that Boeing has created FTD 777-FTD-34-18005 concerning weather nuisance
message. FTD 777-FTD-34-18005 mentions the following contents: “Supplier Rockwell Collins has identified the root
cause and is performing regression testing on the proposed solution to address this nuisance fault.”
ANA asked Collins Aerospace whether this FTD is for the single weather installation or not and ANA understood that
this FTD is for the dual weather installation from Collins Aerospace’s response.
Currently Boeing, Collins Aerospace, and ANA are searching the next additional leads.
Boeing, is there the other possible cause of this weather nuisance message at aircraft side? Please provide the
corrective action for this issue.
Boeing, Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 79
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
102
WRT-2100 ReceiverTransmitter
822-1710-002, -312, -411
Collins Aerospace
B737NG
34
ANA
B777
A320Neo
ANA has experienced failure of Audio Gain Test at WRT-2100 P/N 822-1710-002 with Mod 10 and
822-1710-312, -411. These WRT-2100 are using different test software part number but they have the same
phenomenon as the following snapshot.
Ground level is shifted up from ground to +5 VAC. Hence sine wave is shifted to positive side.
WRT-2100 Test bench which ANA has cannot measure LO signal correctly and then voice of windshear alert
becomes faint voice. It means that ANA shop technician cannot hear windshear alert correctly.
ANA already informed this issue to Collins Aerospace and understands that ANA shop and Collins Aerospace
service center use different software part number as follows.
ANA shop uses the following test software part number.
• P/N 831-4265-815 (PROG number 832-2601-815) for WRT-2100 P/N 822-1710-002.
• P/N 831-4265-105 (PROG number 832-2601-105) for WRT-2100 P/N 822-1710-312, -411.
Collins Aerospace service center uses the following test software part number.
• P/N 831-4265-817 (PROG number 832-2601-817) for WRT-2100 P/N 822-1710-002.
• P/N 831-4265-106 (PROG number 832-2601-106) for WRT-2100 P/N 822-1710-312, -411.
ANA purchased same two test software which Collins Aerospace service center uses and confirmed whether audio
gain test failure issue of ANA shop is fixed but it was unsuccessful. The same phenomenon happened again.
Currently, ANA is requesting Collins Aerospace to provide the next corrective action for ANA to solve audio gain test
failure issue.
Other operators, please comment if you have experienced the same issue of ANA at your shop.
Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 80
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
******19-181******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
WXR Radar Antenna Flat Plat
Corrosion
622-5137-601
Collins Aerospace
B787-9
34-42
VIR
VAA has recently had to replace a Weather Radar Antenna flat plate due to excessive corrosion after three years’
service.
This is a high cost item.
1. Have any other operators had similar experiences?
2. Is there any corrosion protection process that Collins recommends?
3. Why does warranty not cover this?
Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 81
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
103
Poor Reliability of Wx Radar RDR4000 Transmitter-Receiver (TR)
930-2000-001
Airbus
A32X
34
ETD
930-2000-020
Honeywell
A330
Etihad A32X/330 fleets are equipped with Honeywell RDR-4000 and the RTU P/N 930-2000-001 is one of the Wx
radar components.
During 2016 and 2017, Etihad suffered poor reliability of the RTU P/N 930-2000-001 and at that time, it was advised
to embody VSB 930-2000-34-4 (MOD 30), which installs a new diode in the Synthesizer CCA, evolving its PN to
722-4411-020. Etihad units sent to Honeywell for MOD 30 embodiment ended up being equipped with a new
Synthesizer CCA PN 722-4411-030 (VSB 930-2000-34-5) at a higher cost.
Since January 2018, Etihad A32X fleet suffered 21 removals of the “modified” RTU PN 930-2000-001 in a fleet of
around 30 aircraft. Out of the 21 removals, only 4 units were declared NFF, the Synthesizer CCA and TRC module
being the main source of failure and replacement in order to repair the units.
In September 2019, Etihad contacted Honeywell, providing all the removal data and shop report due to the
unacceptable reliability of RTU P/N 930-2000-001 and highlighted some cases in which the units suffered TRC
module replacement and a few months later Synthesizer CCA replacement, and on and on.
Honeywell came back, stating that RTU PN 930-2000-001 became obsolete and new RTU PN 930-2000-020 has
been certified in order to improve the RTU reliability and face obsolescence. Nonetheless, Honeywell did not
recommend to Etihad the upgrade of the RTU PN 930-2000-001 into PN 930-2000-020, as according to Honeywell
the new PN 930-2000-020 also suffered significant reliability issues. This was ratified by Airbus on the 13th Dec.
2019, when TFU 34.41.00101 (Honeywell - WXR - RTU P/N 930-2000-020 reliability) was released.
In summary, during 2016 and 2017, Etihad pumped thousands and thousands of dollars in the embodiment of a
modification that was supposed to improve the reliability of the RTU PN 930-2000-001, but during 2018 and 2019,
the unit kept failing and thousands and thousands of dollars were required to repair the units and keep them in
operation.
When is Honeywell supposed to improve the reliability of the RTU PN 930-2000-001 or PN 930-2000-020?
Operator comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 82
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
******19-182******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Radar Drive Assembly
(DRV-2120)
822-2131-003
Collins Aerospace
B787
34
ANA
This is an additional input related with AMC item 18-108 (Follow-up item).
As result of discussion with Collins Aerospace concerning DRV-2120 failure after AMC 2018 in Dallas, ANA
understood that encoder disk failure has intensive tendency.
There are two issue of defacement and scratch concerning encoder disk failure.
Defacement:
Scratch:
Collins Aerospace performed the best practice at all Collins Aerospace service center to avoid scratch of encoder
disk when assembly. Collins Aerospace completed implementation of the best practice at all Collins Aerospace
service center March 2018.
ANA feels that the number of cases of scratch of encoder disk is reduced, but ANA still has experienced defacement
of encoder disk after performing the best practice at all Collins Aerospace service centers.
ANA already informed Collins Aerospace of this issue that defacement of encoder disk still exists, and ANA thinks
defacement of encoder disk happens due to intense temperature change because the encoder disk repeatedly
suffers tough conditions.
Currently, Collins Aerospace is performing the failure trend analysis of encoder failure.
Based on contents mentioned above, ANA would like to raise the following inquiries:
1. Please provide a timeline of encoder disk failure to have corrective action.
2. Did Collins Aerospace already complete the failure trend analysis of encoder failure?
3. What is root cause of encoder disk failure?
Boeing, Collins Aerospace, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 83
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
104
GPS (SBAS) for 2025
N/A
Collins Aerospace
Thales
Honeywell
All
34
AZU
In 2025, USA will require airplanes to have GPS with SBAS features when flying in USA airspace.
We would like to know the manufacturers’ schedules to satisfy this requirement.
Aiframer, supplier, and operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
105
Capacitor No Longer
Available
2041167-370X / DME
Interrogator
Honeywell
A320
34
UAL
A319
Part number 09710384-0003 is no longer available from Honeywell and there is no generic part number. This
capacitor is a high failure item. UA would like for Honeywell to supply a substitute part number.
Airbus, Operators and Honeywell comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
106
Repair Fee Policy
822-1465-001 VOR/ILS/MKR
RCVR
Collins Aerospace
ATR72
34
EVA
UNI
VOR/ILS/MKR RCVR, P/N 822-1465-001, had been sent to Collins for repair.
However, Collins informed us that they would only do an exchange for VOR/ILS/MKR RCVR, P/N 822-1465-001,
instead of repair, and charge an exchange fee. If EVA insists on having the original serial number back due to NFF,
Collins would still charge with same price as the exchange fee.
The repair policy is not reasonable to the operator; therefore, EVA would like Collins to adjust NFF charge, and
advise your repair charge policy.
Operator, ATR, and Collins comment please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 84
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
107
LRRA RCVR/TXMR
822-0334-003
Collins Aerospace
B737NG
34
ANA
ANA experienced diversion due to a loss of FD command bars and NO AUTOLAND message appeared on
B737NG airplane. MMSG 22-11052 and 22-11054 were also confirmed during troubleshooting. Boeing has issued
737NG-FTD-34-15002 and informed that this condition could be caused by an intermittent LRRA coax
cable/antenna attachment. They also recommended that operators inspect LRRA coax cable connection as an
interim action in the FTD.
ANA investigated our maintenance record to see the number of occurrences of MMSG 22-11052 and 22-11054
(MMSG 22-11051 and 22-11053) recorded since 2017 and found that MMSGs have been recorded randomly
throughout ANA’s B737NG fleet, but we have not seen the MMSGs chronically on one airplane. If there is an issue
in LRRA coax cable connection, ANA thinks that we should see these MMSGs more often repeatedly in one
airplane.
ANA thinks that the problem on this issue is that NO AUTOLAND Message will be latched once this condition is
detected and it will not be reset until power to the LRRA is cycled via its circuit breaker or by cycling aircraft power.
Depending on weather condition, we have to divert if under CAT lllb operation.
ANA would like to request Boeing and Collins Aerospace to consider a solution so a latched NO AUTOLAND
message can be reset automatically or manually by pilot if it happened by an intermittent failure.
ANA would appreciate other operator’s comments and best practices if experienced a similar issue.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
108
757/767 MCP Reliability
Improvement
PN 622-4717-003/004
Collins
Aerospace
B757
ATA
From
UAL
B767
Premature failure of knobs and backlights are one of the main reasons which degrades reliability of MCPs. What has
Collins done to improve reliability of these units?
As this problem is faced by all airlines, are Boeing/Collins collaborating to create a better solution to this problem?
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 85
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
109
Seal Panel 827-2861-001
Obsolete
622-8001-350
Collins
Aerospace
B737
34-22-66
LTH
Background:
Seal Gasket Panel 827-2861-001 of EFIS Control Panel 622-8001-xxx (ATA 34-22-66) became obsolete in mid2019. OEM Collins Aerospace does not provide an alternate solution and refers to Boeing.
Boeing’s answer:
After Boeing supply chain conference call with Collins, Collins has confirmed that Service Information Letter SIL
19-1, publication number 523-0829195 to be released Mid-October 2020 will address and confirm the
obsolescence of the top assembly part number EFIS panel (622-8001-352). Collins also confirmed that, after
engineering analysis, there is no compatible replacement for the sub assembly Seal Panel P/N 827-2861-001,
since the top assembly part number is obsolete.
Collins has advised that operators can purchase the top-level assembly aftermarket unit to acquire any spare
parts that are needed. Collins was able to confirm through their INTERTRADE aftermarket support system that
"there are available aftermarket units, both removed as is and tagged serviceable" for the top-level assembly
part.
Question:
LHT is not satisfied with the solution Boeing gives. Seal Gasket Panel 827-2861-001 in nominal. A serviceable LRU
costs thousands of dollars. LHT asks Collins to provide a replacement part for 827-2861-001.
Boeing, Collins, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
110
ADF Receiver (DFA-75B)
066-50014-1101
Honeywell
B787
34
ANA
ANA experienced delay due to system anomaly (No R ADF POINTER identification and No ID tone) on B787-9
airplane. ADF receiver removed and sent to repair and found to have bad IC U8015 (Antenna Power Switch on
Receiver Module).
Bad U8015 is known issue (as 2015 AMC), and baking process change had been implemented as corrective action
in accordance with Honeywell letter; S/N cut-in DF75B-09231. However, the bad U8015 has been implemented new
baking process change. According to ANA’s experience, repair report from 2016 indicates nine (9) U8015, which
had been implemented NEW baking process, failed again.
ANA would like Honeywell to investigate the U8015 failures which have implemented new baking process.
Other operator and Honeywell comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 86
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
111
DME Transceiver (DME-2100)
822-2325-001
Collins Aerospace
B777
34
ANA
The first B777 with DME-2100 was delivered to ANA in July 2019.
ANA has experienced several “DME Flag” events on B777 with DME-2100 at London Heathrow Airport (LHR) since
last August. Our pilots reported that DME Flag appeared on Both PFDs during LHR approach and DME Flag
disappeared after block in. Our mechanic also confirmed that there was no related Maintenance Message in CMC
(PLF, Existing Fault, Present Fault) and GND TEST was passed with NO Fault.
Since ANA has never experienced this issue except LHR, then ANA believes that peculiarity of LHR affects the DME
Flag event.
• Peculiarity of LHR : Terminal DME reads 0.0 at runway threshold (Airplanes fly over D0.0 point just before
landing)
Fig. 1 – DME Flag Appeared During LHR Approach
D 0.0
Fig. 2 – Terminal Chart of LHR Airport
ANA operates both B777s with DME-900 and B777s with DME-2100 in HND-LHR route, but DME Flag has never
appeared on DME-900 during approach at LHR. To study the different behaviors of DME-2100 and DME-900, ANA
did the simulation of “over the DME station” by using IFR-6000 on the ground. We confirmed that DME Flag
appeared on the DME-2100 during over the station, but DME Flag did not appear on the DME-900.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 87
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Over the Station of B777 with DME-2100
DME indication shows “0.0” and DME Flag.
Over the Station of B777 with DME-900
DME indication shows “---” and No DME Flag.
Fig. 3 – Behaviors of DME-2100 and DME-900 During over the Station
Boeing recognized this issue and confirmed that this flag is nuisance. However, ANA was informed that Boeing
would not fix this issue.
ANA concerns about possible flight diversions due to this nuisance DME Flag, especially in foggy situation because
CAT II/III approach procedures require the DME readout. ANA would like Boeing to correct the appropriate software
to prevent nuisance DME Flag.
Other operator, Collins and Boeing comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
112
Degradation of
MCDU Keyboard
174101-xx-02
GE Aviation
B737NG
34-60
KLM/AFR
KLM
174101-xx-03
Referring to AMC 14-070 item 118; 17-077 item 105; 18-081 item 103; 19-013 item 171:
During several years, remarks have been made about the degradation of the MCDU Keyboards. Several Service
Bulletins (SBs) are created to fix this issue promising increase durability and reliability with increasing costs. So far,
no SB’s has significantly increase the MTBUR of the MCDU keypad. High flow of MCDU’s is traced back to
keyboards failing. During the last AMC, GE Aviation committed on releasing a Service Bulletin about counteracting
the degradation of the MCDU Keyboards. Today, we are in the end of the 1st quarter of 2020 and we are still waiting
for the publication.
Could GE Aviation let us know when the proposed Service Bulletin will be ready?
Could Boeing accelerate evaluating this Service Bulletin for GE Aviation?
Comments from other operators (or OEM, OAM) are highly appreciated.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 88
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
******19-171******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Degradation of
MCDU Keypad
174101-02-01
GE Aviation
B787-800
34
JAL
174101-03-01
174101-02-02
174101-02-03
This item is the continuation from the last AMC 17-103 and 104.
For the wear resistance improvement of existing rubber type keypads, JAL has been exchanging to the hard type
keypads since last year, and the numbers have been reached to 12 of the units. The conditions of keypads are
going well as expected at this time.
However, still the hard type keypads have only been assigned for 174101-02-01.
JAL understands GE Aviation is in the process of expanding target units and will be released the SB for PN:
1741010-03-01, 174101-02-02 and 174101-02-03. JAL is awaiting the SB to be released and would like to hear
about its target date.
Comments from GE Aviation would be appreciated.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
113
MCDU
4077880-902
Honeywell
B767
34
ANA
Request:
ANA would like to know the target schedule when Honeywell become able to perform the BM-5A color correlation.
If Honeywell cannot show the schedule, please provide the alternative equipment except PR-1980A as soon as
possible.
Background:
ANA has been waiting for the color correlation completion of MCDU test equipment (BM-5A) since last September.
Honeywell said Honeywell cannot perform the color correlation due to the defective of their standard equipment
(display unit) and there is no target date when it will get back to normal.
Even if it is difficult to procure new/used standard display unit, ANA believe Honeywell should show the solution to
the customer since Honeywell is the only company to perform the color correlation. Please note that if this situation
is expected to remain unchanged, airline become unable to support B767 Fleet.
Honeywell and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 89
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
114
757/767 Peg 2 FMC
Implementation
Flight Management
Computer
Honeywell
B757
34-61
UAL
B767
UAL would like to know if other operators are installing the Peg 2 FMC on their 757 or 767 fleets. If so, have they
developed any solutions for loading the NDB every 28 days, other than installing new Ethernet wiring from the E&E
compartment to the cockpit?
UAL would like to know if Honeywell would consider certifying a version of the Peg 2 FMC with an Ethernet
connector on the front of the box to allow a plug-and-play installation without taking the airplane out of service for an
extended period to install new wiring for software loading.
UAL would appreciate other operators’ views on this.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
115
GE FMS U14 OPS Mandate
Multiple
Boeing
GE
Honeywell
Collins Aerospace
BAE
B737NG
B737MAX
31
34
AAL
SWA
Our understanding is that Boeing is advocating to have U14 OPS mandated across NG and MAX airframes. This will
present several issues that include incompatibility with BAE HUD 2020 and Collins HGS-2350. The HUD
incompatibility exists because U12 and above require DEU BP15 software. Another issue is an understanding that
U14 is also not compatible with the GE 2907A4 FMC LRU (MPN 171497-05-01).
For AAL, this would potentially push into a full HUD swap and Dual FMC swap impacting 76 aircraft representing
25% of our 737 fleet. In turn, this would most likely put AAL in the position of not being able to comply with an
anticipated 12-month compliance date. This is not just a simple software load. The BAE HUD incompatibility is
documented in the Boeing SBs for U12 and U13.
SWA operates close to 200 aircraft with the HGS-2350 system, more than half of those also have the older A4 flight
management computers. We have maintained these airplanes at CDS Block Point 6 software to avoid the display
blanking issue. We have previous guidance from Boeing that the display blanking is considered an incompatibility
issue, and we agree. However, now Boeing is saying that the combination of new BP software with older HGS is
approved and works correctly “except for the blanking” which is now advertised as “not that bad”. We cannot have
Boeing recommending (and the regulator mandating) a configuration that the manufacturer has already deemed
incompatible.
We welcome comments of support and/or experience from other airlines. We also would like to hear from Boeing
and the four vendors involved indicating that they are already or willing to coordinate for a better outcome.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 90
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
116
Delay in the Release of AIMS-2 BP V17B
N/A
Boeing
Honeywell
B777
34
ETD
Within the frame of the Performance Based Communication and Surveillance (PBCS) over oceanic areas, operators
were required to meet the Required Communication Performance (RCP) of 240 seconds and Required Surveillance
Performance (RSP) of 180 seconds. This requirement became effective from the 29th March 2018 over North
Atlantic and Asia Pacific Flight Information Regions (FIR).
According to Boeing Fleet Team Digest 777-FTD-34-17001, the B777 fleet equipped with Airplane Information
Management System 2 (AIMS-2) shall be upgraded to Blockpoint (BP) V17B software version in order to comply
with the required RCP240 and RSP180.
In March 2018, Boeing communicated to Etihad (Service Request #3-4153161993) the availability of BP V17B
software by Q1 2019. Later on, in May 2019 (Service Request #4-4480393063), it was communicated that the
release of BP V17B software will be delayed till Q1 2020.
Can Boeing and Honeywell explain the reasons on the continuous delay of B777 AIMS-2 BP V17B, which is
required to comply with the PBCS RCP240 and RSP180 effective since March 2018?
Operators comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 91
GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT & SPECIAL TOOLING
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
117
Piece Part &
Tooling Quotation
E2144x000-1 /
TPIS A350
Safran
Electronic
and Defense
A350
32
AFR/KLM
AFR
Air France has requested a quotation for three parts of the Static TPIS also considered as Tools for Rotating
TPIS. The initial demand was made in July 2019. Safran has stated that they are facing internal difficulties to
answer this request.
Kit Antenna P/N 262204957 (CMM 32-49-24) / Kit Antenna P/N 261729033-0201 (CMM 32-49-22) / Kit Antenna
P/N 261729020-0201 (CMM 32-49-25)
Piece parts quotation should not take so long to be issued as many operators now fly the aircraft and the CMM
clearly lists these parts as procurable.
Safran, could you commit to a date to fulfill our request?
Safran and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
118
Tooling Quote
2100-1227-02 /
FA2100 CVR
L3Harris
A350
23
AFR/KLM
AFR
Air France has requested from L3 a quote for tools and software of the Cockpit Voice Recorder of the A350. The
first request has been made in September 2018 and discussed at the AMC in 2019, then during the UK MRO in
October 2019. We still have not received an answer on this request.
L3, could you please answer this request with a firm commitment?
Airbus, comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
119
Tooling Quotation
and TSDP
8730Bx-1 /
SCIU
Collins
Aerospace /
Rosemount
B787
23
AFR/KLM
AFR
Air France has requested from Collins (Rosemount) a quote for tools and software of the Security Camera
Interface Unit (SCIU). The first request has been made in June 2018 and discussed at the AMC in 2019. Collins
had planned to answer by August 2019, then delayed to December 2019. We still have not received an answer.
Collins please, could you answer this long due request with a firm commitment?
Collins and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 92
GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT & SPECIAL TOOLING
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
120
A350 Test
Equipment
CIDS
Airbus Cabin
Electronics
A350
23
AFR/KLM
AFR
Air France has been asking for a quotation of the Test Equipment and TSDP of the A350 CIDS from Airbus Cabin
Electronics. The initial request has been made in Q2 2017. Despite several meetings and emails, Airbus Cabin
Electronics has not answered with a clear proposal.
Airbus Cabin Electronics, Airbus, comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 93
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary
Title
121
HF
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Collins Aerospace
Boeing
B787
23
KLM/AFR
KLM
Reference is made to questions: 19-101, 17-117, 18-128, and 19-102.
AMC, Prague 2019, Boeing’s attitude was very promising with statement that we can redirect warranty claims
from Collins to Boeing.
Some background:
We are sure that the whole B787 community knows KLM’s issue regarding moisture ingression is not an isolated
case. We detected the problem five years ago and reported it to Boeing and Collins. We also submitted the AMC
question. Based on the KLM AMC question, other airlines checked their situation and found that they also had a
problem. In the first place, everybody was submitting warranty claims to Collins because the HF Transceiver was
damaged by moisture ingression. Collins announced that they would reject every warranty claim because it was
not a problem of the HF Transceiver. The HF is built by Collins, according to the Boeing Specification, and we
should go to Boeing with our claims.
Boeing promised to fix it (already 4 years ago) but the SB was not issued because Boeing was doing a thorough
investigation to find the root course. The SB was postponed every year for period of a year and there is still no
resolution to the problem. In the meantime, we are patiently repairing the HF’s and sending claims to Boeing. Our
claims were rejected every time. Therefore, we resubmitted the question for AMC 2019 and many airlines
supported us in that discussion. We were quite happy to learn that Boeing at AMC 2019 agreed with us and would
accept the claims.
Nevertheless, Boeing is still rejecting our claims.
Before we hear any answer or explanation from Boeing’s side, we would like to emphasize that:
a. We have purchased the B787 in full faith that the airplanes will work properly.
b. You certified the subject HF transceiver for use on the B787 under B787 TC. The installation should
at least be compliant with Federal requirements:
FAR §25.1301 Function and installation.
(1) Be of a kind and design appropriate to its intended function;
(3) Be installed according to limitations specified for that equipment; and
(4) Function properly when installed.
§25.1309 Equipment, systems, and installations.
(a) The equipment, systems, and installations whose functioning is required by this subchapter, must
be designed to ensure that they perform their intended functions under any foreseeable operating
condition.
Installation of HF Transceiver is definitely not fully compliant with the above FAR. The unit is not
performing the intended function because the operating conditions are not fulfilled. Due to water
intrusion, the unit is damaged during the flight and stops operating. It is foreseeable that the situation
can occur, and Boeing did nothing to prevent it. Also 5 years ago when situation was discovered,
Boeing did not respond adequately to fix the problem. Instead of fixing the problem, Boeing endlessly
investigated the root course and postponed the SB.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 94
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
c.
We understand Collins position. Legally, they might have a case which is: “We built the LRU
according to Boeing Specifications.” Boeing had enough time to change the specification and transfer
the responsibility to Collins and airlines. Nothing was done in that respect.
d. Be aware, the situation that airlines are caught in is very unpleasant. Boeing and Collins are pointing
at each other and in the meantime, airlines are spending cash repairing HF Transceivers knowing
that the water intrusion will occur again and that the costs will come again.
e. I am not trying to speculate, but at certain moment there might occur serious damage (fire) in the
aircraft due to a short in the power supply of the HF Transceiver due to damage by water. That will be
the moment that the whole world will ask, “Boeing! What is going on with HF Transceivers?” At that
moment, we will be able to show the whole paper trail in attempts to urge Boeing to fix the problem
and accept the warranties.
f. There is one more thing that we would like to emphasize. The costs of repairs of HF Transceiver will
stop the moment that the problem in the B787 is solved. Until then, we will keep issuing the warranty
claims.
The present situation, which has continuously been going on for five years now, is not acceptable and we will
keep escalating it until we reach satisfactory resolution. For us, it is not acceptable that airlines are supposed to
assimilate the costs knowing that Boeing specified the LRU and installed it in Boeing manufactured aircraft which
is purchased in good faith by the KLM (and many other operators). Boeing introduced the damage and Boeing
should accept the costs of non-quality.
In view of the above, we strongly request that Boeing accepts our warranty claims and solve the HF Transceiver
problem once and for all.
Boeing and Collins, please comment! Other operators, please comment!
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 95
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
******19-101******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
HFS-900D HF Transceiver
822-0990-120
Collins Aerospace
Boeing
B787
23
ANA
This issue is related to AMC item 17-117.
ANA has experienced that internal boards of some HFS-900Ds have corrosion and short circuit due to moisture
ingress from CMDU wire bundle.
ANA is applying sealant at AFT cargo door cheek dripshield in accordance with Boeing SB
B787-81205-SB250159-00 to avoid this moisture ingress issue, but ANA understands that application of sealant
is interim action and Boeing has plans concerning additional protection of moisture ingress into left HFS-900D by
introducing a new drip shield between the CMDU and the HFS-900D.
This information is provided by FTD 787-FTD-23-18005.
Based on contents mentioned above, ANA would like to raise the following inquiries.
Boeing, please provide milestones of SB release concerning introduction of a new drip shield.
Boeing and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 96
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
******17-117******
Item
Summary
Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
HFS-900D
822-0990-120
Rockwell Collins
Boeing
B787
23
KLM/AFR
KLM
Reference is made to Question 136 from the 2016 AMC and to Boeing’s 787-FTD-38-13006:
KLM still sees many units (HFS-900D) delivered to the shop with moisture damage. Boeing announced during last
year’s AMC: “The issue is now being reviewed by Boeing Equipment Installation Engineering to assess how
effective the drip shield over the electronics rack is in protecting the HF Transceiver from moisture intrusion. At
this time, Boeing is actively discussing the development of an improved protection or modifying the drip shield.”
Changes (i.e., production incorporation) for drip shield/water line shroud installation in Forward EE Bay is
scheduled for Feb 2017. Why does this take such a long time (compared to the Aft EE bay solutions)?
*****18-128*****
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
HF Transceiver Moisture
Ingress
822-0990-120 HFS-900D
Rockwell Collins
B787
23
VIR
Reference is made to Q136 from 2016 AMC and Q117 from 2017 AMC.
VAA has suffered many removals of HF Transceivers from the B787 fleet due to moisture ingress issues (25
removals in total, 21 confirmed due to moisture damage). VAA is embodying SB 787-24-0159 but strongly
believes this is not a final fix for this issue.
The application of tape above the CMDU panel partially addresses one leakage path only. VAA has seen the
same failure mode after the SB has been embodied, albeit the removal rate has slowed.
VAA has discussed this at length with Boeing, but is frustrated with the lack of progress to properly address the
problem. Boeing has suggested that operators should look at engineering their own solution, which is not
acceptable. Warranty is being denied on the removed units, so it is costing a lot of money.
VAA would like to encourage other operators who see this issue, to report to Boeing via a Service Request.
Other operator and Boeing comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 97
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
******19-102******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
HF Transceiver Moisture Ingress
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Boeing
B787
23
VIR
VAA refers to Items 127 and 128 from last year. According to 787-FTD-23-18005, the latest information from
Boeing is:
“Change Committed: November 2018 (target)
Production Incorporation: TBD
Service Bulletin Available: TBD”
Can Boeing please provide an update on when the SB is expected to be released and will kits be available for
Operators to at least target the problem aircraft straight away? Will the SB be FOC?
Is Boeing willing to accept warranty claims for the repairs to the HF transceivers due to moisture ingress to date
since the SB release admits the problem with the original installation design?
Boeing and other operator comments please.
******19-096******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
SDU
7516118-27010
Honeywell
B777
23
ANA
This is an additional input related with AMC item 17-115 (Follow-up item).
Honeywell released SB 7516118-23-0028 May 18, 2018, to introduce new DRFM (Digital Radio Frequency
Module), but this SB does not have effectivity of P/N 7516118-27010, which is installed in ANA B777 fleet.
ANA requested Honeywell to add effectivity of P/N 7516118-27010 to SB 7516118-23-0028, but Honeywell
response is as follows: “We do not have approval from Boeing to utilize the new DRFM for future repairs on the
7516118-27010 (SD-700 for non-Airbus applications). There will not be a Service Bulletin announcing any change
to the SD-700 for using the DRFM.”
Honeywell’s response disappointed ANA because ANA expected that introduction of DRFM would improve SDU
reliability.
Based on contents mentioned above, ANA would like to raise the following inquiries:
1. Please provide the root cause of ARFM failure which is introduced in SB 7516118-23-0021.
2. Please provide other Honeywell proposals to address ARFM failure.
Honeywell and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 98
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
*****18-125*****
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
VHF Frequency Change
822-2211-101
TCP-2100
Rockwell Collins
B787
23
ANA
ANA has been encountering VHF frequency change between “ACTIVE” and “STBY” without XFR switch push on
the TCP. Thirty-one (31) events have been reported for 3 years (Y2015 to Y2017). In most of the cases, flight
crew notes the frequency change when they are called on emergency frequency by ATC. This could be a safety
issue due to lost communication during a critical phase. However, no mitigation action has been given.
Boeing, suppliers, and other operators, please comment.
******19-098******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
VHF Frequency Change
822-2211-101
TCP-2100
Collins Aerospace
B787
23
ANA
This item was discussed at last year’s AMC (Item 18-125).
ANA has experienced over 50 incidents of Uncommanded Frequency Change on the TCP and a few other
operators have had similar experiences. Details of the problem can be found in the referenced FTD.
The issue has been identified as a Safety Service Related Problem and Boeing/Collins Aerospace is developing a
new TCP software to rectify this problem.
Boeing and Collins Aerospace, please provide an update on the development of the software and schedule.
References:
FTD: FTD-23-18006
MOM: MOM-MOM-18-0504-01B
Boeing, Collins Aerospace, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 99
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
122
EVR (Enhanced VHF Radio)
EVR716-11-0350A
De Havilland
Thales
Q400
23
ANA
Flight crew which is receiver side heard voice of transmitter side when using above frequency pairs. It means that
voice of receiver side is blocked by transmitter side. Thales SIL THAV/SIL-1240 mentions that there is a
possibility that squelch circuit would open if two frequencies selected VHF 1 and VHF 2 are separated by less
than 2 MHz but shift of ANA experience is more than 2 MHz.
ANA already informed this radio interference issue to Thales and Thales investigated this radio interference issue.
As result of Thales’s investigation, this radio interference happens due to the following reason.
If harmonic selected frequency (receiver side) of intermediate frequency (21.4 MHz) and harmonic incoming
frequency (transmitter side) of intermediate frequency (21.4 MHz) are matched, squelch circuit could be opened
around -25 dBm. EVR is designed that undesired response is less than -33 dBm in accordance with MOPS
recommendation. Hence, ANA has understood that this radio interference issue happens within EVR specification
and needs EVR design change to address this radio interference issue.
Currently, ANA has been working with De Havilland and Thales to address this radio interference issue. This
radio interference issue is safety issue for flight operation. Hence, ANA thinks that De Havilland and Thales have
to provide a solution for the operator.
Other operators, please comment if you has experienced a same issue like ANA. Share of frequency pair
information would be highly appreciated.
De Havilland, Thales and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
123
ELT – RESCU 406AFN2
51090414-1
Honeywell
B787
23-24-12
ELY
We are looking training for ELT PN: 51090414-1from Honeywell.
Can Honeywell assist in this issue?
Honeywell and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 100
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
******19-104******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Repair Discontinuity of ELT
Fixed: RESCU 406AP,
406AF, 406AFN
Portable: RESCU 406SE
Honeywell
All
23
KAL
Honeywell recently changed the repair policy with Battery replacement for Fixed and Portable ELT.
• Applicable model: all existing ELT models of Fixed RESCU 406AP, 406AF, 406AFN/Portable RESCU
406SE
• Honeywell will discontinue the battery replacement service no later than June 30, 2019.
• Moreover, Honeywell will also discontinue the repair of ELTs no later than the end of year 2021.
The ELT Battery is replaced as per their TRP cycle, so KAL should replace total 374 units (Fixed 160 and
Portable 214). This is so big burden for KAL, because it amounts to 2 million USDs.
We understand that new type ELT installation on the aircraft to be delivered in production line is reasonable.
However, we cannot understand why operators put up with the change of all existing ELT to 406AFN2 and
406SG, because this issue is a product design problem, and this is the one-way change of Honeywell repair
policy.
KAL strongly requests Honeywell to continue to maintain the battery replacement and repair of existing ELTs.
Vendor comments, please.
******19-108******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
EFB Docking
Station
822-2773-201
Rockwell Collins
A350
46
AFR/KLM
AFR
AIRWORTHINESS OF THE DOCKING STATION DS-2200
This Docking Station (DS) is an equipment provided by Rockwell Collins under P/N Rockwell, but this OEM is
neither the manufacturer nor the repair station of the DS. The real manufacturer and repairer is RITEC and the
FAA form part 145 issued by RITEC informs that the DS is a PMA repaired according to CMM RITEC 100737A
(as per FAA form and certificate of conformance in annex); however, this CMM is not procurable and not
approved in the Airbus documentation, it is the CMM 462001 from Rockwell Collins which is approved in the
Airbus documentation.
Air France requests to Airbus and Rockwell Collins to solve this issue and make official the correct CMM
(reference and availability on Airbus World).
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 101
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
Airbus, Rockwell Collins, and FAA comment please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 102
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
******19-113******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
B787 Terminal Cellular System
2250100-01
Boeing
B787
46
VIR
VAA refers to item 173 from last year. VAA understands that Boeing are working on developing a replacement for
the Terminal Cellular Unit, known as the WWU.
As 3G technology is retired around the world, will operators will be forced into upgrading to the WWU to take
advantage of 4G, but operators with TCS have already paid for a system which comes as an option on B787? As
VAA does not have TWLU, VAA is very concerned about future developments of the TCS system.
Other operator and Boeing comments please.
******19-115******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
B787 Core Network Troubleshooting
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Boeing
Collins
B787
46
VIR
VAA has a lot of problems troubleshooting core network defects on B787 aircraft. This is often because more than
one Maintenance Message is generated in AHM and the FIM points in different directions. Some Maintenance
Messages appear to be nuisance. VAA usually has to engage Boeing for help which can be a time-consuming
process if the defect is on MEL. Boeing often request log files to analyze, which takes time to get if the defect
means the aircraft is not connecting to the ground network.
VAA believes some Core Network training would be useful to increase knowledge and understanding to help
troubleshoot the system more effectively. VAA would like to know if other operators has similar issues with the
core network on B787 and would training be useful?
Is this something that Boeing/Collins would be prepared to commit?
Boeing and other operator comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 103
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
124
Cabin Configuration
Management
CIDS
Airbus Cabin
Electronics
Airbus
Airbus
23
AFR/KLM
AFR
On Airbus aircraft family, Airbus Cabin Electronics is the provider of the whole CIDS system, including the Flight
Attendant Panel and the Attendant Indication Panel. These LRUs are visible in the cabin; their color is a choice
operators can make when buying an aircraft. With many different color variations of an LRU technically
interchangeable, it makes the cabin visual management and stock management extremely complicated.
Unfortunately, the A350 has received the same treatment.
Example: according to ISI 23.73.00021, FAP P/N Z133H0xxx:
The Sub panel front can be of four different colors and the Cover coil for hardkey can also be of four different
colors.
As a result, the number of existing configurations is overwhelming, and Part Numbers are not interchangeable
despite being so close in color.
Example of two different colors of Sub panel front on two FAPs:
Air France understands the need for Airbus to offer customization of the cabin. However, other options exist like
having covers or shrouds separate from the LRU itself. This has been done on other aircraft platforms and
considerably alleviates the burden for operators, as well as the total cost of ownership of these LRUs. In a
changing world looking for reasonable consumption, durable utilization, Air France expects more long-term
thinking during the design of this product.
Is this a demand from Airbus in the design phase or a choice from ACE to have an inseparable cover from the
LRU and so many little variations of colors?
Operators, Airbus Cabin Electronics, Airbus, comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 104
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
125
SSD Fail on Fit of FSM-200
822-2244-102
822-2244-151
Collins Aerospace
B787
46
ANA
ANA adopted SB FSM-220046-1 and SB FSM-2200-46-501 to replace HDD to SSD because ANA had
experienced many HDD failures on FMS-2200. Until November 2019, ANA had experienced four “FAIL ON FIT”
because software could not be installed when FSM was replaced due to brand-new SSD failure. In November
2019, ANA raised this SSD failure issue to the meeting agenda with Collins Aerospace and requested them to
investigate the SSD failure and to take corrective actions. After the meeting, Collins evaluated SSDs from some
suppliers and then revised the SBs to use a new part number of SSD.
However, ANA still experiences “FAIL ON FIT” twice with new SSD after revision of the SB.
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
Table: List of “Fail On Fit” FSM-2200 due to SSD failure (Aug 2018 – Jan 2020)
Date of Removal
P/N
S/N
Shop Finding
Comments
27 Aug 2018
822-2244-151
18FYFN
SSD Failure
20 May 2019
822-2244-151
18FYFN
SSD Failure
22 Jul 2019
822-2244-102
42866M
SSD Failure
21 Aug 2019
822-2244-102
42866M
SSD Failure
2 Jan 2020
822-2244-102
4283NY
NFF
After revision of SB
16 Jan 2020
822-2244-102
4784FL
NFF
After revision of SB
ANA would like Collins Aerospace to find out the root cause and to take corrective actions.
Other operators and Collins Aerospace, please comment.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
126
MMU2 In-Flight Reset
MMU2 PN 1616055-10
Honeywell
B767
2315
UAL
United Airlines uses the Honeywell MMU2 (PN 1616-055-10) as a dialer interface for the Cobham Aviator 300D
SBB Satcom. This system and dialer combination is installed on eight 767-300ER aircraft. There have been
sixteen occurrences where the dialer has lost the phonebook directory or factory resets. Most of these events are
noted by the pilots while in flight.
The MMU2 unit has a manual factory and phonebook reset function where the user can press either the star (*) or
pound (#) key during the startup sequence. United has tested these units and can confirm that MMU settings are
reset when the * key is pressed during power on and the Message Set is reset when the # key is pressed during
power on. Honeywell is unaware of any other causes that would lead to a phonebook or factory reset.
United engaged Honeywell in attempt to find a solution.
1. Can Honeywell provide a schedule to provide a proper solution?
2. Are there any other operators considering using the Cobham Aviator 300D SBB Satcom? If so, what are
the dialers that are under consideration?
Honeywell and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 105
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
127
Need Parts Breakdown
285W0114-3
BAE Systems
Boeing
B757
B767
23
DAL
Delta would like a detailed parts breakdown and piece part support in order to repair MPN 362A6411P2 and
362A6411P4 (LCD) as well as MPN 362A6411P1 and 362A6411P3 (Light Block).
Per the Boeing PSAA, we should have the data to repair an item down to the “basic part level”. Since all of these
items can be disassembled and repaired further that the CMM allows, we ask for the additional data and support
be provided down to the “basic part level”, which would include the sub-components of these items.
BAE and Boeing comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 106
SOFTWARE
*****18-150*****
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
EDS
Many
Many
All
ATA
From
NAX
Electronic Distribution of Software (EDS)
This item is for all suppliers of loadable software LRUs.
We are still receiving software on floppy disks from suppliers. For example, Rockwell Collins said at the AMC a few
years ago they would implement EDS in 2016, yet a few months back, we received ACARS software on a floppy
disk.
We have switched to Boeing EDS (BEDS) for B737NG and wonder when the various suppliers will follow suit.
Other supplier, airframer, and operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO,
the
Associate
Airline
128
Wireless EFB Activation
Problem
261690-101
Boeing
B777-300ER
46
TKT
THY
B787-9
THY and Boeing have been working together to activate NFS-2 system for remote, wireless EFB software
installation on 12 B777 and B787 aircraft. Unfortunately, the system has not been able to be activated for quite a
long time. Therefore, EFB software upload on B777 and B787 aircraft equipped with NFS-2 are being performed
manually which cause Line Maintenance man-hour losses. All the relevant software has been sent to Boeing for
testing in lab. THY requests on-site support from Boeing if the issue will not be resolved soon.
Are there any other operators having problems about this issue? If yes, can other operators share their experiences
on this issue?
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 107
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS
******19-124******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
B777 FCV
810204-4
Collins Aerospace
B777
21
ANA
ANA experienced removal of 45 FCVs by FCV STATUS MSG in the last one year.
According to the data from Quick Access Recorder, it was found that the current exceeding FCV torque motor
operating current value is sometimes supplied from ASCPC to the torque motor. Collins Aerospace advised that
torque motor become inoperative intermittently by supplying a current greater than operating current to the torque
motor. We believe that this systematic inconsistency contributes to FCV STATUS MSG.
We hope that the root cause (FCV, ASCPC, SYSTEM DESIGN or other) is identified and the reliability of FCV is
improved.
We would like Boeing to coordinate with component OEM so that an appropriate solution is provided (FCV OEM:
Collins, ASCPC OEM: Honeywell).
Other operator, Boeing, Collins Aerospace, and Honeywell comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
129
Torque Motor is Not in
Commanded Position
810204-4
Collins Aerospace
B777
21
JAL
JAL has been experiencing multiple FCV (Flow Control and shutoff Valve) removal due to the EICAS status
message “PACK FCV UPR/LWR L/R” with the correlated maintenance message “xx Torque Motor is not in
commanded position”.
Some of these cases, FCVs are found no fault. Also, the condition of torque motor and proximity switch were
good. On the other hand, no same trouble is recurred at the airplane after the replacement of FCV as well. For
these FCVs, JAL replaced the torque motor for precaution.
JAL assumes CTC detects the discrepancy between command and the actual flow of the torque motor. We
suspect the monitoring criteria is too severe against the original performance of the FCV.
1. Comments from the other operators who are experiencing similar issue would be appreciated.
2. Boeing and Collins, comments about criteria of the maintenance message would be appreciated.
3.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
130
Temperature Control
Valve (TCV)
398908-5
Honeywell
B737
21
ANA
ANA has experienced 12 unscheduled short time removals (<1000 flight hour) including 5 dispatch interruptions
due to PACK Light ON from January 2017 to December 2019.
• 10 out of 12 unscheduled removals were related to failure after push back.
• 9 out of 12 unscheduled removals (75%) did not fail shop testing.
• 6 out of 9 units which did not fail shop testing (67%) were replaced the limit switch due to switch
resistance fluctuation failure; blinking lamp during CMM test.
If PACK Light turns on after push back, pilot decides to return the airplane to the gate in many cases. It means
this fault has a high probability of causing dispatch interruptions.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 108
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS
In most cases, MEL is applied to continue the flight. Line maintenance representative in ANA who deals with MEL
decides to replace the TCV.
ANA understands that Boeing and Honeywell do not recommend the removal of the TCV without an associated
M/C Recall Light (Ref: FTD 737NG-FTD-21-17002 and two FIM tasks (21-53 Task820, 21-53 Task 821)).
However, it is difficult not to replace the TCV when PACK Light is ON from the operator’s viewpoint.
• [Operation] Pilots return the airplane to the gate when they find the PACK Light is ON.
• [Maintenance] ANA cannot judge whether the event is nuisance or actual TCV failure without any
technical background.
• [Maintenance] Most of TCV stocks in ANA warehouse have a history of short time removals and limit
switch failure.
We would like to provide detail information regarding this event for our pilot to prevent the dispatch interruptions.
Line maintenance representative also needs more information for our correct judgment of aircraft operations and
would like to know if this event is nuisance or not. Therefore, ANA requests Boeing and Honeywell to investigate
the root cause of this issue and would like to know other operators’ experiences.
However, Honeywell and Boeing announced -7 P/N roll to address simultaneous limit switch faults after -6 P/N roll
has been incorporated to resolve AC motor faults. ANA requests Boeing and Honeywell to solve the limit switch
fault as soon as possible.
Requests
1. Please let us know the root cause of PACK Light is ON condition matched with FIM task 21-53 Task820
and 21-53 Task 821.
2. Please put in work to solve the limit switch fault.
Boeing, Honeywell and other operators comment, please.
******19-131******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Vibration Test
Several
UTAS
Boeing
B787
21
KLM/AFR
KLM
KLM/AFR requests to reopen AMC item 18-154.
Reference is made to KLM/AFR question 17-002 at the MMC Conference in Cleveland.
KLM asked UTAS and Boeing to relax the CMM test (CMM 21-54-12 and 21-55-01). KLM suggested
removing the vibration test from the CMM whenever the electronic board is replaced. After a long
discussion, UTAS agreed to accomplish the investigation and report results at AMC conference in April
2018.
The issue is very important for KLM and KLM strongly supports the change in the CMM. 2Q 2018 has
arrived here in Dallas and KLM would like to hear UTAS’s answer.
UTAS and Boeing comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 109
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS
******19-132******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
NGS Pack Air Filter
Replacement
7012013H04
UTAS
B787
47
KLM/AFR
KLM
Nitrogen Generating System – air filter/ozone converter.
Filter costs are high, and they are discarded every 6000 hrs. Considering the 6000-hour replacement interval, the
maintenance cost of this consumable is very high compared to other filters. On B777 or other fleets, there is a
cleaning task which brings the cost down to acceptable levels.
This item has been discussed with Boeing and Collins Aerospace; however, a suitable solution has not been
found so far.
KLM would like to see:
a) A CMM cleaning/regeneration method for the filter/Ozone converter.
b) The possibility to replace its filter element.
c) Another cost-effective solution
Collins Aerospace, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
******19-134******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Condenser Fan –
Missing Information
About Repair Details
4101944G
Triumph Thermal
Systems (Maryland)
A380
21
LHT
DLH
UTC Aerospace
Systems (Goodrich
Corporation Monroe)
The A380 condenser fan PNR 4101944G is repaired by UTC Aerospace Systems but was designed/integrated by
Triumph Thermal Systems. This component is contracted for Lufthansa Technik and we are sending it to Triumph
Thermal Systems Maryland; the repair work and certificate will be done by UTC Aerospace Systems (Goodrich in
Monroe).
For most of the units, the motor drive needs to be changed/repaired due to an internal failure. UTC has set up an
exchange pool of motor drives, which means that the defective motor drive will be removed and a used repaired
one will be used for the repair of the condenser fan.
Lufthansa Technik has already requested to receive detailed findings of the changed core motor drives several
times for years but has never received them. This is needed to understand the failure modes of the condenser fan
and the motor drive and to be able to create more detailed reliability analysis.
Please provide findings overview of previous events and findings for motor drives for future events.
Triumph Thermal Systems (Maryland): Which failure modes appear on the motor drives? What are the measures
to improve reliability?
Triumph, UTAS, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 110
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS
******19-135******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Supplemental Cooling
System Controller – Bad
Reliability/Design Flaws
N052100001
Triumph
Thermal
Systems
(Maryland)
A380
21
LHT
DLH
N052100002
The A380 SCSC is repaired by Triumph Thermal System in Maryland but needs to be sub-contracted to a vendor
in New England for welding of covers/connectors etc. as the inner parts of the housing are hermetically isolated.
1. LHT suffers high price repairs due to unreliable Boost Inductors which is the most common failure reason. In
avg., nearly 3 EA of the Boost Inductors need to be replaced due to “Overheat” (plus labor/Administration, Subcontracting and mandatory new material). Airbus has already dropped a “Request for Work” to improve the
reliability of the SCSC/Boost Inductors, but LHT didn’t receive the result of the investigation.
TTS-M: What are the next steps for increasing the reliability and decrease the removal rate of the Boost
Inductors.
Airbus: Would you be so kind to share the results of your “Request for Work”?
All: Do you have same experiences?
2. Sometimes during the De-Lidding-Process of both covers, the housing suffers cracks at the inside corners near
the welding. This leads into complete replacement of the housing which could not be a failure of an operator. The
replacement of the housing is highly expensive. In LHT’s view, these further damages are risk of the repair-facility
and the costs must also be borne by them.
All: Comments please.
3. The newest Quotes shows burnt contacts (deemed as Customer Induced Damage by TTS-M; for LHT it is
normal wear/tear) which leads either into replacement of the whole housing to meet the TAT or replacement of
the connector for a lower price but with an additional TAT of 8 weeks. An investigation on the connectors of the
affected aircraft were performed without any findings.
All: Does anyone have the same experience with these new findings?
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 111
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS
TTS-M: What are the next steps for increasing the reliability and decrease the removal rate of the Boost
Inductors.
Airbus: Would you be so kind to share the results of your “Request for Work”?
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
131
Reliability of
Potentiometer
2022432-4 / Ram Air
Actuator
Honeywell
B767 ALL
21
ANA
ANA has experienced unscheduled removals of Ram Air Actuator due to potentiometer failure. The failure
induced “PACK OFF” or “PACK TEMP” MSG. The Potentiometer is used to monitor an angle of the Ram Air
Actuator Open/Close operation. Usage time of almost all of the potentiometers were less than 4,000 flight hours.
ANA would like to clarify the root cause of the potentiometer defect; product quality issue or design issue.
ANA believes that the reliability of the potentiometer needs to be increased. In addition, ANA has introduced PMA
potentiometer. As a result, unscheduled removals of less than 4,000 flight hours have been decreased.
ANA would like to know other operators’ experiences about unscheduled removal of Ram Air Actuator due to
potentiometer failure.
Does Honeywell know the occurrence of the potentiometer failure on the other operator? Please let us know the
detail about the failed potentiometer if Honeywell reviewed it.
Potentiometer parts number: 2047136-4
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 112
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS
Other operator and Honeywell comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
132
Humidifier
816086-3 / Humidifier
1003111-4 / Cell Stack
Collins Aerospace
B777
21
ANA
ANA experienced 26 unscheduled removals of Humidifier due to the status message “HUMID FLT DECK” in
recent 3 years. All units (26 unscheduled removals) were repaired by replacing Cell Stack which part number is
1003111-4. So, ANA assumes that the reliability of Humidifier depends on Cell Stack.
ANA has peculiar Maintenance Requirement (MR) that replaces Cell Stack before 6,000 hours for predictive
maintenance. To confirm whether MR (6,000 hours) is appropriate or not, ANA would like to get information
regarding worldwide removal data and failure tendency.
Therefore, please let ANA know the following 4 questions.
1. Is the target Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of cell stack longer than 6,000 hours?
2. Please provide the worldwide MTBF of Cell Stack.
3. Is Cell Stack failure related to operating time? (ANA found that Cell Stack failure is random failure by
Weibull analysis.)
4. Please provide unscheduled removal data including Total Time (TT) and Time Since Conditional
Overhaul (TSCO).
ANA would appreciate other operators, Boeing, and Collins Aerospace comments regarding unscheduled removal
data for Cell Stack.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 113
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
133
Large Galley Control Unit (GCU) Fan
7011005H01
7011005H02
Collins Aerospace
(UTC Aerospace)
B787
21
ANA
ANA experienced a lot of malfunction of B787-8 Large Galley Control Unit (GCU) Fan. When Large GCU Fan is
inoperative, we have a lot of bad influence of aircraft operation for passengers.
1. Results of failure analysis that removed from ANA aircrafts (Data: 2016 – 2019)
a. There is 75 percent of removal from FORWARD (1F and 1A) position.
b. There is 97 percent of removal from B787-8. (3 percent of removal from B787-9)
c. Major defective parts on Large GCU Fan are Bearing (Water Ingress or Grease Seepage) and
Motor Drive (Water Ingress).
2. Worldwide information from Boeing and Collins Aerospace
a. Removal data from the fleet show GCU removal are predominantly from the Fwd galley (Door 1
and 2).
b. Worldwide MTBUR of Large GCU Fan exceeds guarantee MTBUR.
3. ANA Hypothesis
B787-8 ICS Liquid Loop is from AFT Galley Heat Exchanger (HX) to FORWARD Galley HX in order.
So, liquid temperature is raised gradually, and warmer liquid is supplied on FORWARD Large Galley
HX. For this reason, Large Galley Fan will be rotated fast speed because Galley Fan and HX are
maintained galley temperature using warmer liquid. Bearings are worn by max speed rotating and
Motor Drive is defective by water (Condensation due to heat generation). There is a difference of ICS
liquid loop between B787-8 (Serial) and B787-9 (Parallel). Parallel liquid loop can minimize the
difference of liquid temperature between FORWARD galley and AFT galley. So, there are few
malfunctions of Large GCU Fan for B787-9.
4. Desired Action
a. Please provide comments regarding “ANA Hypothesis”
b. Please provide the root causes why a lot of malfunction occurs at the FORWARD position on
B787-8.
c. Please provide technical solution and milestone.
Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
134
Equipment Cooling Fan
4100941C
4100941D
Collins Aerospace
B777
B767
21
JAL
JAL has been experiencing numerous unscheduled failures of the Equipment Cooling Fan for a long time.
Majority failure is bearing problem and there has been observed a few (but tough) issues on impeller broken:
• Regarding bearing issue, it may be concerned degradation by usage time. These population can be
operated over several ten thousand flight hours. But there are numerous population that is having low
lifetime (failing in several thousand flight hours).
• Regarding impeller broken issue, it has been introduced the aluminum impeller for 4100943 series but
there is not for 410941 series.
Is it only the solution to replace degraded parts more often? How we can made longer life Fan?
JAL would like to hear about comments from the operator who are having headache on low lifetime of the bearing
or broken impeller.
JAL also would like to ask Collins’s opinion about the solutions on these two issues.
Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 114
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
135
Overvoltage
Damaging Fans –
Warranty
N/A
Collins
Aerospace
B787
21
KLM/AFR
KLM
On a regular basis, KLM receives invoices/quotes from Collins concerning electric fans, which even are still within
warranty. In most of those cases “Overvoltage” is the main reason for declining warranty. Collins claims the units
are subjected to “CID” Customer Induced Damage, which they say is the overvoltage. KLM's opinion is that
'overvoltage' as root cause should be something of the past after performing 787-SB-24-0063.
It is meanwhile confirmed that all KLM's customers have accomplished 787-SB-24-0063 on their fleet. This
Boeing SB should prevent overvoltage. Also, all of them are using external power supplies on home- and
outstations which adhere to all requirements of the B787 Maintenance Facility and Equipment Planning Document
(D011Z009-100) and so have constant power loading capability. Both the SB and correct external power units
should exclude power ‘rippling’ and unstable voltages. Unfortunately, Collins disagrees.
Boeing was asked by KLM about their opinion, and agrees that it is not possible for the electrical system to cause
damage to the LPS fans after accomplishment of 787-SB-24-0063, and agrees with KLM that "overvoltage"
should not be mentioned as a root cause on ATA 21 Fan-warranty rejections. Boeing also commented that they
initiated SRP -21-0271 to investigate the 787 Low Pressure System, including this Fans “overvoltage” issue.
•
•
KLM likes to know the status of the SRP investigation and…
KLM requests Boeing and Collins to work together and discuss this matter with some urgency, so that in
the end, we as operator know where we are standing, not in the last place in relation to our customers.
Boeing, Collins, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
136
PFCSOV Torque Motor
Problem
820902-6 / PFCSOV
Collins Aerospace
Q400
21
ANA
(Hamilton Sundstrand)
Background:
ANA has experienced several flight interruptions (ATB, RTO, etc.) due to PFCSOV Torque Motor failure. Open
circuit of Torque Motor coil has been confirmed at each of the events. At the most recent event in December
2019, the Torque Motor TT: 4,336 flight hours since brand new.
According to Collins information, Torque Motor coil failures are caused by high temperature operating
environment; expansion of epoxy which encapsulates coil causes coil wire fracture. Collins has been working on
changing potting epoxy with heat resistant type but ANA has been informed that it will take a long time to release
the new design since 2018.
Because of the above situation, ANA started a refurbishment program to replace Torque Motor coil with new one
every 4,000 flight hours. It is very tough to keep repaired Torque Motors in stock.
Request: Please accelerate and fix the schedule of releasing the new design as soon as possible.
De Havilland, Collins and other operators comment, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 115
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
137
PECS Heat Exchanger
7113609
Series
Collins
Aerospace
B787
21
JALEC
JAL
PECS Heat Exchanger still has the issue of “Fluid Leakage” due to the corrosion. Fluid Leakage can result in the
irregular flight (i.e., Air Turned Back to the Airport or Diversion to the alternate airport).
JAL has experienced 15 cases of Fluid Leakage. 10 cases occurred soon after the heavy maintenance, and 5
cases occurred just after the installation.
It is assumed that the corrosion progresses during heavy maintenance. And the leakage from the corroded point
at the first power up of the aircraft, in other word, at the first PECS fluid pressure application.
It was announced by Collins that the improved thickness/coverage of the coating and the new cleaning procedure
were supposed to be developed in 2019, but it has not been completed yet. JAL expects Collins to accelerate the
action.
Comments from the operators who are experiencing similar symptoms would be appreciated.
Comments from Collins about the updated milestone would be appreciated.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
138
ACM – Water
Ingestion
7110121 – Air
Cycle Machine
Collins
Aerospace
B787
21
KLM/AFR
KLM
Despite all available Collins and Boeing water management hard- and software changes incorporated, the LH
ACM’s are continuing to fail in-service. Water is still accumulating in the LH pack.
Boeing will issue PCU software Y201 in the 1st Q of 2020, which will alter some valve controls and HX outlet
temp. The Y201 should improve the MTBUR with a stunning 67% and is advertised to be the final action for this
problem.
KLM is not so confident the software alone will be the final fix for this long dragging water problem and feels it
needs a more, hardware-like modification like a water extractor or similar. That should be somehow technically
feasible. Drilling small holes at certain places is not a solution. KLM feels that if pack designer Collins (together
with Boeing) would be able to solve the water problem, they have solved the whole ACM problem.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 116
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS
•
•
KLM would like to know if Collins ever made a serious study in such ‘hardware’ water–extracting solution,
possibly supported with Boeing software.
KLM requests Collins to continue to work together with Boeing on this, despite the high hopes for Y201.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
139
Low Temperatures in
the Bulk
N/A
N/A
B787
21
KLM/AFR
KLM
KLM has stopped carrying live animals in the bulk because of too low temperatures. Measurements have shown
that at floor level, temperatures near or below freezing is possible.
Meanwhile, Boeing has developed three improvements to improve the situation: Isolation of air supply duct,
Improved air nozzle and an enhanced bulk door curtain. With the new nozzle, the warmest location is now RH
AFT. Also, Boeing rightfully recommends to place the animal/pet kennel on a 6” platform in that area.
All this indeed improved the overall temperature, but especially in winter on longer flights, recent data logging
showed it is still too cold for live animals according IATA regulations. Also blocking of the air inlet nozzle and temp
sensor is often seen. The issue is still open.
•
KLM is wondering how other operators deal with this situation and if they are still carrying live animals in
the bulk.
Operator experience, ideas and comments are welcome.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 117
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
140
CAC Arnon 5
Experience
7010101 / 7110101
Cabin Air
Compressor
Collins
Aerospace
B787
21
KLM/AFR
KLM
KLM is currently modifying their CAC population per SB 7010101-21-3 and 7110101-21-2 to introduce the Arnon
5 stator lamination which should prevent overheating of the stator and significantly increase the reliability of the
CAC.
According to Collins, the new stator should operate 11 to 16 °C cooler. However, recent shop tests reveal no
direct visible, clear temperature decrease during testing per CMM. With the promised significant temperature
reduction, one would expect to also see this during shop testing.
KLM now hopes the expected reliability improvement will be evident on a longer term.
•
•
What is the shop experience at Collins’ and other shops in this respect?
Is it normal that the ± 11-16 °C temperature decrease with the Arnon 5 Rotors is not visible during shop
testing?
Collins and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
141
Dirty/Clogging
Orifices
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Boeing
B787
21
KLM/AFR
KLM
During a maintenance action, Air France found a half-clogged orifice (picture) in the Lav and Galley vent system
on an aircraft which was delivered in 2017. There is no cleaning task in MPD and KLM suspects neglecting these
multi hole orifices could have a negative effect on the ventilation system and perhaps even lavatory smoke
detection on the long term.
Boeing states that contamination is depending on operators environment and recommends a regular inspection
during f.i. C-checks, if desired.
KLM was unable to find a clear Boeing drawing which shows the multi-hole orifices and their location/part number.
On earlier Boeing types (777, 744) these drawings were available).
•
•
KLM likes to know if other operators are cleaning the orifices on a regular basis and/or have experience in
clogging orifices on specific locations.
KLM requests Boeing to provide a clear, for operators accessible drawing which shows locations and
PN’s of all installed ventilation system orifices. This to aid a future preventive cleaning task introduction.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 118
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS
Boeing and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
142
Ozone Converter
Cleaning
7010106 – Ozone
Converter
Collins
Aerospace
B787
21
KLM/AFR
KLM
KLM shop is struggling with the O3 converter cleaning procedure. It seems that the CMM-prescribed ‘mild
alkaline’ (pH 3.5 to 7.5) method is not sufficient to clean the internal converter. During the Collins Madrid
conference in 2019, it was agreed that Collins would review/change the CMM 21-73-06 on this part and allow for
high alkaline cleaning. To date, no CMM change was made.
Meanwhile, KLM did some testing with ‘high alkaline’ (pH12) with positive results and would like this incorporated
in the CMM.
•
•
KLM likes to know how other operators/shops are currently performing O3 converter cleaning and are
yes/no satisfied with it.
KLM requests Collins to incorporate ‘high(er) alkaline’ cleaning into the CMM 21-73-06.
Collins and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
143
B787 QHX Pressure
Cleaning
7113609-x
Collins
Aerospace
B787
21
KLM/AFR
KLM
KLM has started the ‘new’ Pressurized Cleaning method on the B787 Pack HX Assemblies. To date, three aircraft
have been cleaned with positive results. We are planning to use this cleaning ‘on condition’ to allow the QHX on
wing for the full three years. KLM is not separating the PECS and FCAC HXs during cleaning.
•
KLM would like other operators experience with the Pressurized Cleaning. Have they developed any
special tooling? Do they separate the PECS and FCAC HXs? How often are the HX cleaned?
Comments are welcome.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 119
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
144
MC Test
Requirement
(2017 MMC
Item 51)
7110170Hxx /
PECS Pump
Assembly
Collins
Aerospace
B787
21-55-28
KLM/AFR
KLM
7111038Hxx /
ICS Pump
Package
7110615Hxx /
FCAC Pump
Package
21-53-92
21-54-18
During the 2017 MMC, KLM requested Collins to remove the MC test requirement from the G5 PECS/ICS/FCAC
Pump Packages CMMs. Collins was to provide an update at the 2018 AMC. Although there have been ongoing
discussions between AFR/KLM, Boeing, and Collins, an official response has yet to be provided.
Statistics learn that LPMCs are highly reliable LRUs which are rarely removed on wing. This shop requirement,
however, will increase the removals by 2400% compared to the on-wing removals (Based on the 2018 removal
rate). Not having to remove the MCs will save on spare units and logistical costs. And will improve TAT.
The ongoing Collins response is that this requirement cannot be removed from the CMM due to:
• HIRF lightning testing is currently mandatory for every LPMC removal per Boeing (per FAA)
• The G5 pump level testing does not exercise all the control and protective functions of the LPMC, and so
the current testing requirement mitigates the risk of unrecognized failures
NOTE: KLM learned that the HIRF lightning testing will no longer be mandatory after modification of the motor
controllers LVPSs.
@ Collins:
• Does Collins see a high NFF rate on the LPMCs that were sent in for test only?
o If so, what is the Collins policy to diminish the NFF rate?
o If not, are the failures found isolated cases? Or do they have great commonality?
o If the failures have a great commonality, what has been done to solve this problem?
o Were the failures found major or minor issues, i.e., would these failures have greatly jeopardized
the NHA’s functionality?
o Could these failures have been detected by interpreting the aircraft data (i.e., with a predictive
maintenance program)?
• Does Collins still deem the MC test requirement necessary?
o If not, please remove the requirement from the CMMs.
o If so, could these failures be detected by a “stripped-down” LPMC test stand? And which specific
tests need to be performed?
o Will performance of those specific tests be accepted as test substantiation to the MC test
requirement? Incorporate these tests in the G5 PECS/ICS/FCAC Pump Packages CMM’s.
Collins is requested to:
• Provide the NFF rate, of the past three years, on LPMCs sent in for test only.
• Provide, in percentages and in absolute numbers, which, otherwise unrecognized, failures emerged.
• Provide the (specific LPMC) test sections during which the, otherwise unrecognized, failures have
emerged.
@ Boeing:
• What is the Boeing position on NFF?
• Can Boeing confirm that the HIRF lightning testing will no longer be mandatory after modification of the
motor controllers LVPS’s?
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 120
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS
•
Does Boeing support the KLM position that any performance test, on an LRU, should be able to detect
failures on its NLAs?
Other operators and or suppliers please comment.
Item
Summary
Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
145
Test Limits
81253A010001
Liebherr
Aerospace
Toulouse SAS
B747-8
21-51-90
LHT
DLH
CMM-limits of the Air-Pressure Loss Test are not reachable, the measured values are above the permissible
maximum. Even on the production test bench of the OEM repair facility could not be achieved.
Q1: Will the limits change in the next CMM revisions?
Q2: Are other actions taken to make the CMM limits reachable?
Liebherr and other operator comments, please.
******17-041******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Temperature Control Valve
39808-2
398908-3
398908-4
398908-5
Honeywell
B737
21
AAL
The B737 Temp Control Valve has for some time not performed satisfactorily for the needs of the aircraft. Honeywell
issued service bulletins to convert the -3 valve to the -4 valve, without success in increasing the reliability.
Subsequently, additional service bulletins were released to convert the -3 valve to the -5 valve, or the -4 valve to the
-5 valve.
A vital part in the upgrade of these valves is the (actuator) switch, part number 2047168-8. While it seems to operate
better than the old switch, part number 67620694-1, its performance is still lacking. The new switch exhibits signs of
blinking or flickering on the test panel and Honeywell has revised the CMM (21-51-94) to state that this is not a
confirmation of reason for removal or rejection.
AAL has experienced some switches that must be cycled several times before making contact. These are switches
that have not been in service for an extended time. Some failures have occurred within 500 hours. We would like to
see an improvement or a redesign to this switch.
Questions:
1. Boeing/other operators – Have you seen the above switch failures as well?
2. Will Honeywell look at a re-design of this switch?
Honeywell, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 121
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS
******17-047******
Item
Summary
Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Rotary
Actuator
R4232M-2/R4232M6-2
Whippany
Actuation
Systems
Hamilton
Sundstrand
A380
21
AFR/KLM
AFR
1380162-7/-8
No quotation and provisioning available from the Rotary Actuator spare parts (CMM 21-52-42 Rev.06 UTC
Aerospace Systems).
Currently, we do not have the possibility to repair this actuator alone. The current solution to repair the NHA (Trim Air
Valve PN 1380221-X/1380224-X) is only by a standard exchange of an actuator assy or sending the NHA to
Hamilton for repair.
Same case for the Rotary Actuator PN 1380155-5 (CMM 21-52-37 Rev.04 UTC Aerospace Systems) with NHA
Temperature Control Valve PN 1380214-X.
AFR/KLM requests to have the possibility to purchase the parts needed to repair the rotary actuators according to
the related CMM.
Whippany and other operator and supplier comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 122
RECORDING/INDICATING SYSTEMS/INSTRUMENTS
****17-ULB****
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
CVR
2100-1X2X-xx
L3
Boeing
31300
DAL
DFDR
2100-4X4X-xx
L3
Boeing
ICAO ANNEX 6 describes that non-deployable flight recorder containers shall have securely attached an
automatically activated underwater locating device operating at a frequency of 37.5 kHz. At the earliest
practicable date, but not later than 1 January 2018, this device shall operate for a minimum of 90 days.
This requirement is being satisfied by the airframe manufactures by certifying the SSFDR and the SSCVR with a
stand-alone part number for recorders with the 90-day ULB installed.
Delta considers the recorder and the ULB two separate LRUs and this should be configured at the Aircraft IPC
level.
Having the recorders identified based on the ULB installed causes a number of problems for the Airline including
the following:
•
•
•
•
ULB is considered hazardous material when shipping and requires special handling of the recorder. This
could delay shipment of the recorder for special reads of the flight recorder data.
Additional inventory of the recorder is required for a recorder with the same Form, Fit, and Function.
If an SB is accomplished on the recorder to install a 90-day ULB, the Recorder cannot be installed on an
aircraft only requiring a 30-day ULB without undoing the SB.
The ULB stays with the aircraft and is transferred to the new recorder being installed. The recorder and
the ULB are stocked separately and the ULB is only changed at battery expiration or failure.
Delta request that the 90-day ULB requirement be satisfied by stocking the recorder part number separate from
the ULB and the recorder interchangeability be based on the Form, Fit and Function of the recorder. The 30 day
and 90-day ULB configuration should be controlled at the aircraft tail number through the AIPC.
Questions:
1. Are other operators seeing similar issues?
2. Airframe manufacturer recommendation.
3. Vendor comment.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 123
RECORDING/INDICATING SYSTEMS/INSTRUMENTS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
146
2100-4945-22 Latch Faults Require SB25
2100-4945-22
L3
Boeing
A320
A330
A319
B737NG
31
DAL
SB025 dated Mar 22, 2016 had listed LRUs 2100-4945-22 as eligible to receive this mod but was subsequently
removed from the current SB rev 4 dated April 13, 2018. As of now, SB 25 cannot be accomplished on
LRU 2100-4945-22. L3 states they cannot do SB25 on the 2100-4945-22 because Boeing never set up SB25 to
be accomplished on these FDRs.
This recorder is the exact same FDR as 2100-4045-22 and 2100-4045-00, with the only difference being the
2100-4945-22 has a 90-day beacon versus a 30-day beacon on the other part numbers. These SBs are currently
complied with on the 2100-4045-22 and 2100-4045-00 FDRs, resulting in a greatly decreased amount of these
recorders pulled for nuisance latch faults. Delta is experiencing a lot of latched faults on the 2100-4945-22 FDRs.
This latched fault cannot be cleared on the aircraft and requires the FDR to be removed and sent to the repair
shop. Many of these latched faults are nuisance faults and can be fixed by SB25, which is a software mod
accomplished at L3.
Delta is requesting Boeing to approve SB25 on 2100-4945-22 so we can begin having this SB accomplished on
our Fleet. We are starting to see more reliability issues due to this nuisance latched fault problem. If Boeing will
not approve SB 25, perhaps L3 would like to initiate a remedy for the latch fault problems on the 2100-4945-22.
Comments from other operators, L3, and Boeing please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 124
RECORDING/INDICATING SYSTEMS/INSTRUMENTS
*****18-169*****
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
LCDU
EDU
PDU68
C19298AF05
C19755BA01
C19596AC04
Thales
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
31
AFR/KLM
AFR
On these products, the LCD module assembly (LAM) contains photocells.
In case of photocell failure, the LAM is declared unrepairable (must be replaced by a new one.) even if the LCD
matrix is in good condition.
Do you have a solution to replace just the photocells or is there a marketing implementation strategy?
LCDU CMM 31-63-30 Figure 1 Item 95
EDU CMM 31-60-02 Figure 2 Item 250
PDU68 CMM 31-64-05 Figure 1 Item 110
Thales and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
147
Missing Piece
Part
822-2152-201 / 101
Collins
Aerospace
Safran
B787
31
AFR/KLM
AFR
CMM 31-61-07 IPL Figure 4 page 10063 shows the Side A of the Touch Glass card PN 565-000861-6. Side B of
the Touch Glass card is missing. This includes the Glass Part number which is also missing.
Thank you for providing the missing PN for the Glass and other components present on the Side B, if any.
Collins Aerospace, Safran, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 125
RECORDING/INDICATING SYSTEMS/INSTRUMENTS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
148
EFIS Control Panel
4082730-911
Honeywell
B737
31-61
DAL
HW MPN# 4082730-911 has replaced MPN# 4082730-901 on Delta’s newer 737-900.
MPN# 4082730-911 is not nearly as reliable as the older model (-901). The “MINS” switch is failing at a high rate
and almost all units we receive in the shop have this switch failing. In the past 12 months, we have received 12
failed switches. The switch is Fig.4 Item 15. PN 3900-7635-05, (CSD: 62002676-5 V58960).
The switch on the older model (-901) does not have anywhere near the fail rate the new unit has. We feel this is a
manufacturing defect to have so many “new” switches fail so early.
Honeywell and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
149
Recording
Auxiliary Tank
Fuel Quantity in
FDR
967-0212-058 /
DFDAU
Boeing
B737-900ER
31
TKT
THY
CFM56
In 10 THY B737-900ER aircraft (from TC-JYA to TC-JYJ) auxiliary fuel tank installed with STC number:
ST01725NY-D by PATS Aircraft, LLC, before the delivery, THY needed a modification for obtain fuel quantity
information of Aux Tanks and record in FDR. When we asked for details of the modification, Boeing listed
required steps as follows:
1. Since this involves an STC, the STC holder needs to add wiring from the AUX fuel tank to the FQPU.
Boeing does not make changes to third party STCs.
2. Wiring from FQPU to DEU are installed.
3. Boeing can provide a DEU OPC change to enable OPC_AUX_FUEL_TANK_G, if you request it.
However, Boeing would responsible for the operation of the OPC and nothing else.
4. Wiring from the DEU to DFDAU are installed
5. The DFDAU is already configured to acquire the AUX tank parameter from the DEU
6. The FDR is already configured to record the AUX tank parameter from the DFDAU
STC holder confirmed that related wiring already exists and the ALOFT AFS does interface with the Fuel Quantity
Processor Unit. Therefore, the only thing that Boeing can provide us a proposal for is the DEU OPC change.
Please find THY’s request from Boeing in the below schematic:
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 126
RECORDING/INDICATING SYSTEMS/INSTRUMENTS
In proposal phase, Boeing replied that they could not deliver a Service Bulletin, but they could provide “not
certified” software to enable OPC_AUX_FUEL_TANK_G. In this case, THY will be responsible for the certification,
which may cause problems for THY in the future. THY requests Boeing's approved SB for the relevant
modification process.
Are there any other operators having problems about this issue? If so, how did they apply the related
modification?
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
150
Curtiss Wright CMM-IPC 31-34-00 rev 07
Missing PN’s that they are using.
D52000-62200
Curtiss
Wright
B737
31
UAL
UAL has OQARS PN D5200-62200 with CPU PEC PN SA108175-3 installed.
Curtiss Wright has informed UA that the -3 CPU is applicable to D5200-62000 and NOT D5200-62200. The OEM
states the -3 board will work in D5200-62200 after a minor modification of removing the LK3 link. The OEM also
states however, that there is no documentation that supports this.
UA believes the NHA were modified from part number D5200-62000 and re-identified as D5200-62200 when the
CPU board had the LK3 link removed. These units can’t be legally put into service in this configuration and UAL
is seeking a remedy from Curtiss Wright.
Boeing, Airbus, Operators and OEMs comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 127
RECORDING/INDICATING SYSTEMS/INSTRUMENTS
Item
Summary
Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
151
Repair Flat
Rate
C19736AA01 / Integrated
Avionics Display
Thales
ATR
31
EVA
UNI
INTEGRATED AVIONICS DISPLY (IAD), PN C19736AA01, was sent to Thales for repair. The order was charged a
flat rate. The corrective action was replacement of a fuse on Power Supply Board. Another case for the same PN:
the corrective action was standard exchange of Graphic Generation Board and replacement of front panel, but there
was an additional fee for the replacement of the Front panel due to the replacement of the SRU being excluded from
the repair flat rate. Thales provides a one-time exception to charge flat rate after negotiating for the second case.
Generally, component repair is under supplier unilateral general agreement. EVA would like to know how OEMs
restrict their suppliers to avoid unreasonable repair charge/policy to operators?
OEM comment please. Thales comment please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
152
DEU I Obsolescence
4081600-930
Honeywell
Boeing
B737
31
DAL
Honeywell SIL, Publication Number D201501000056, details the obsolescence issues with the DEU I, MPN
4081600-930. The only option given is to purchase a brand new DEU II, MPN 4081600-940 at a substantial cost.
Delta requests a list of the obsolete components and detailed technical specifications so that we can determine
suitable substitutes. For example, we were recently told that a type of SRAM IC used in the DEU I is obsolete, but
Delta believes we could identify a replacement if we knew all the technical specifications for the IC.
We also request Boeing support in this request to Honeywell.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
153
DFDAU Ground Tool
967-0212-050
967-0214-001
Honeywell
B757
MD10/11
31-31
FDX
Since Honeywell’s announcement, many years ago, of the end of life of their DFDAU product line their DFDAU
and VADAR SME’s have been re-assigned to other positions within the company with new responsibilities.
FedEx would like to know if there are any SME’s left with the assigned role at Honeywell to answer questions
regarding VADAR programming or the relationship between the DFDAU’s and the VADAR software?
Honeywell comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 128
ENGINE SYSTEMS
******19-204******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Intake Bypass Door
Actuator Poor Reliability
LA11A2104
ITT Aerospace
DHC-8-400
71
ANA
Due to the design of the actuator, the average flight time is remarkably short. The recent MTBUR is around 3000
hr.
The actuator is located at the outside of the airplane. However, it is not sealed and not protected from water
ingress. Main failure reason of the actuator is poor contact of the micro switch.
ANA has repeatedly requested Bombardier and ITT Aerospace to change the design to improve the seal
characteristics and the switch’s water-resistant characteristics over the years. At last, they mentioned that they
have a plan to release an improved actuator. But the detailed schedule has not been disclosed.
Other operator comments please.
Bombardier and ITT Aerospace, please provide the target date of the new actuator release.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
154
Missing Brief Information for
the SBs Listed in the CMM
824972-11-024
Collins
Aerospace
(UTAS,
Hamilton
Sunstrand)
A320
Series
73
THY
824972-XX-XXX
CMM 73-28-02 lists all the SBs, but there is no summary information telling what the related SB stands for.
Could Collins Aerospace add brief information for each SB so that it can be understood what is done with each
SB? Of course, we can reach each SB from the web portal, but this could make it easier to remember and decide.
Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 129
ENGINE SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
155
Missing Brief Information for
the SBs Listed in the CMM
2042M14PXX
FADEC
International
(BAE Systems
CAGE Code: 89954)
A320
Series
73
THY
CMM 73-21-68 lists all the SBs, but there is no summary information that tells what the related SBs stand for.
Could FADEC International (BAE SAFRAN) add brief information for each SB so that it can be understood what is
done with each SB?
This case is same for all FADEC ECU CMMs. Therefore, for FADEC ECUs for 5C, 7B, GE90, and CF6-80E
engines, we request all SBs be summarized or briefly explained so that it is easier to follow.
FADEC International and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 130
ENGINE SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
156
Engine Parts Serial
Number/Checksum
CF6 and CFM56 Parts
and Components
Boeing
B767
7XXX
DAL
GE
Safran
Confusion around the addition of the checksum to the serial number of engine parts continues to present
compliance hazards at Delta Air Lines. We raised the issue with Boeing at the 2017 MMC and opened a service
request with them.
In November 2019, we were informed that CFM would include a clarifying note in the engine IPC explaining the
checksum suffix. Previously, we were informed that Fleet Highlight articles were published regarding checksum in
June 2019 for the CFM56 and Leap models.
Delta considers these corrective actions inadequate as they do not clarify the use of the checksum to field and
warehouse workers who work with the parts. We believe that as long as the checksum remains in the same box
as the serial number, there will continue to be paperwork and computer errors when workers enter the serial
number for these parts.
Boeing and other operator and supplier comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
157
Engine Electronic
Control
T5050ECUF6252
TRW Aeronautical
Systems
Goodrich Control
Systems
Collins Aerospace
A330Neo
73-21-11
TAP
Recently TAP sent an EEC P/N: T5050ECUF6252 to the manufacturer for test/repair under warranty of new. It
was the first removal for this S/N since the aircraft was delivered new to TAP. The warranty was rejected as the
manufactured considered that the unit had a CID on a pipe union and informed TAP that the pipe union was not
replaced/repairable, so all the pressure transducer module had to be replaced. This module has a huge cost,
especially considering the value of a pipe union that was the rejection cause.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 131
ENGINE SYSTEMS
1. Have other operators also experienced this problem?
2. Does the manufactured intend to develop a repair to this problem? Pipe unions can be damaged during
installation or handling of the unit and these damages should not force the operator to replace all the
electronic module for a small external damage.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
158
Fuel Flow
Transmitter
8TJ124ERF1
Ametek
B777
73
AFR/KLM
AFR
8TJ124ERJ1
8TJ124ERG1
8TJ167ERF1
8TJ167ERG1
Many of pieces parts supposed to be procurable according to the CMM 73-31-12 and 73-31-14 are not provided
either by Kellstrom or Ametek. Ametek does not offer any alternate piece parts to solve this issue.
Ametek, via its provider Kellstrom, answered that these pieces parts are out of production and there is no
replacement. Despite unprocurable parts for airlines, Ametek continues to repair this LRU in their shop with this
piece part.
As an example, Piece part like: screw cap 6560W12P004, item 1-200 (CMM 73-31-12)
Can you please make these pieces parts procurable as they are supposed to be, according to the CMMs?
Ametek, Boeing comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
159
Selling Piece Parts in Kits to
Mark Up Price
Ignition Exciters – P/Ns
10-617980-1, 10-631045-X
Unison
A319
74-11
DAL
A320
A321
A330
B737
B767
B777
A warning label, a piece part of the Ignition Exciter 9049861-1.
Previously, this label was available for purchase at a nominal cost. Currently, this warning label is now only
available for purchase in kit form which is disproportionate.
DAL requests that Unison make piece parts available outside of kits packaging.
Other airlines – please comment.
Airbus Boeing – please comment on current policy and plans.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 132
ENGINE SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
160
Customer Departure
Record
Several Engine
Control Units
BAE Systems
Several
73-21
LHT
DLH
During repair of Engine Control units or SRUs from Engine Control units at BAE Systems, if the repair deviates
from the CMM, BAE is issuing a CDR for customer engineering approval, even for known printing errors in CMM.
This process unreasonably delays the processing, because units are kept on hold until approval. I know no other
OEM repair shop, which ask for approval for known CMM errors, if the procedure conforms to design or
engineering specifications.
Is there any possibility to avoid the CDR approval in case of minor deviations covered by engineering
specifications?
BAE Systems and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
161
Chafing on
V2500 EGT
Harness
30558-000/2A4524
EGT Harness
Harco Lab.
A320
Family
77-21-43
LHT
DLH
General explanation:
Over the last couple of years, the V2500 EGT system was part of three service bulletins. The two last SBs
exchanged the whole component (costs of around 10.000 to 18.000 USD per mod). The intention of this service
bulletins was to increase the reliability and reduce on wing problems. Please find the following SB overview
attached:
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 133
ENGINE SYSTEMS
Current standpoint:
Nevertheless, LHT observed that the reliability did not improve. Major chafing problem of this harness never get
solved. Please find the following illustrations for further explanation:
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 134
ENGINE SYSTEMS
These chafing issues are coming up after short operation times (around 12 months). The component OEM
declines any warranty requests due to mishandling cases. IAE itself declared that a chafing between harness and
reverser causes this issue. Therefore, that problem was forwarded to Airbus.
Older Harness versions are out of production; therefore, customers need to purchase the new cost-intensive onepiece-Harness. Even when only one of the older parts (W6 or EGT Harness) is defective the whole new Harness
needed to purchase. Such cases create longer down times due to more complex modifications instead of simple
changes.
Q1: Due to the fact that this damage is known on Harco and IAE, why have there not been any product
improvements been taken to eliminate the chafing problems (better braid material, different clamping, etc.)?
Q2: Why is there not any reverser SB for chafing elimination?
Q3: Who (i.e., AIB/Harco/IAE) should be deemed to be accountable for the chafing and granted the
operators/their nominated MRO service providers the warranty against such chafing condition?
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 135
ENGINE SYSTEMS
Q4: If operators would like to de-mod the engine/aircraft to use the old harness, how AIB/Harco/IAE provides
technical/material support to them?
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
162
Chafing on PW1100
Ignition Cable
1020902-1
Ignition Cable
Collins
Aerospace
PW
A320NEO
74-21-14
LHT
DLH
Several PW1100 ignition cables sent to Collins for maintenance have been found affected by chafing of outer
metallic shell. Findings occur independently of operating hours even below 1.000FH. Dependent on severity of
chafing cables are either repairable or declared BER. Chafing is declared on different positions of cable. Cables
are attached to engine with several metallic clamps.
Q1: Please provide experience of finding on returned ignition cables.
Q2: Metallic to metallic contact is most probable cause for chafing marks. What will be the technical solution for
this issue and when will it be available (i.e., cushioned clamps)?
Q3: Whom to contact in case of warranty clarifications (Collins refers to PW)?
Collins, PW, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 136
ENGINE SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
163
Pitting on PW1100
Ignition Exciter
1020901-2
Ignition Exciter
Collins
Aerospace
PW
A320NEO
47-11-14
LHT
DLH
Several PW1100 ignition exciters sent to Collins for maintenance have been found affected by pitting on channel
outputs. Pitting on channel output leads to BER declaration of ignition exciter. Either only channel B is affected or
both channels are. Lowest number of FH of an exciter has been below 1.000FH. Ignition cable was properly
attached to exciter and connection between exciter and cable was not loosened since installation during engine
assembly at PW.
Pitting is also visible on associated ignition cable.
Q1: Please provide experience of finding on returned ignition exciters and most probable cause.
Q2: What is the action plan in order to rectify this fault (modification, check procedure, installation advise…)?
Q3: Whom to contact in case of warranty clarifications (Collins refers to PW)?
Collins, PW, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 137
ENGINE SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
164
Differential
Pressure Sensor
Fault Due to
Pressure Spikes
2492M60P01 /
P02 / P03
Kulite
A320NEO
73-34-05
LHT
DLH
CFMI
B737MAX
LEAP-1A/-1B
LEAP fuel differential pressure (DP) sensors PN 2492M60P01 and 2492M60P02 can fail due to overpressure
spikes above the DP sensor capability if engine is operated beyond normal conditions. SB LEAP-1A 73-0003 and
LEAP-1B 73-0005 introduced a new DP sensor with PN 2492M60P03 which was designed to withstand
occasional pressure spikes.
Currently removals of post-mod sensors show same failure as pre-mod sensors. According OEM Kulite, SB was
revised to allow for the reuse of pre-mod PN 2492M60P02 which is a snubbed sensor better able to mitigate
pressure spikes.
Q1: Which are “…beyond normal conditions…” of engine operation? Number of failed sensors indicate the engine
is very often operating beyond normal condition regardless of operator.
Q2: What is the percentage of returned DP sensor showing this kind of damage by PN (P01/P02/P03)?
Q3: Which PN is the favored PN showing best withstand in regards to pressure spikes?
Q4: What will be the solution for this issue and when will it be available?
Kulite, CFMI, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 138
ENGINE SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
165
Fuel Lacquering on
Servovalve Inlet
Filter
G4000VSVA01
Collins
Aerospace
A320
74-32-42
LHT
DLH
IAE
V2500
In reference to AMC 2019 item 208:
During shop visit, fuel lacquering on servovalve inlet filter is detected. No cleaning or repair procedure is given
within CMM and therefore costly replacement of servovalve is necessary. Youngest affected unit had
TSN=6500 and due to lacquering defined as CID by UTAS, no new part warranty is granted. There were
several discussions on different Repair Orders (POs) without positive outcome for LHT. UTAS views this as
external contamination that is not covered under warranty.
Answer in 2019:
The first question is regarding the status of the IAE fuel task force on fuel deposits and lacquering. IAE has
currently advised that the investigation is still ongoing. This is all the information Collins has, as this is an
engine level investigation being carried out by IAE, not Collins Aerospace.
The second question is regarding servo valve replacement rather than cleaning and flushing. The servo valve
contained within the G4000 SVA is a purchased subassembly item. There are no defined maintenance
procedures for this item. Collins Aerospace has been working IAE and Rolls Royce to develop an approved
cleaning work scope and expects this will be approved within the next few months.
What is the current investigation status of IAE fuel task force regarding fuel deposits/lacquering? What are the
experiences with the revised cleaning procedure?
Collins, IAE, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
166
Need Piece Part Availability
304640-5
Diehl
Airbus
A319
A320
49
DAL
Diehl is refusing to sell Delta some piece parts for this component. However, part of their response is “if you ship
the NHA or the CCA to us, we can repair it”. If parts are available to Diehl, they should be available to Delta.
It should be irrelevant who performs the repairs. Per the Airbus SSC, Delta can perform repairs at their own
facility if we chose. If some items are truly “obsolete”, then we ask Diehl to provide us with part specifications so
that we may determine suitable substitutes on our own.
Diehl and Airbus comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 139
IFE SYSTEMS
******19-258******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Thales i5000 QSEB Power Board Fails
178861-101 / QSEB
178861-102 / QSEB
Thales
A330
B777
44
KAL
Last March 2018, smoke and burning smells occurred under seat 57E (economy class) after take-off on the
KE647 (ICN-SIN) flight. The aircraft was HL7584 (A330-300) and equipped with Thales i5000 IFE system.
L19 thermal fuse inductors designed to protect the QSEB internally with overcurrent and overheating were the
main causes of smoke and burning odors. According to the Thales investigation report, as of November 2018,
there have been seven confirmed L19 thermal fuse failures related to the QSEB since Thales changed the QSEB
design to replace the L19 inductor with the new L19 thermal fuse inductor. Even if this was not the first time,
Thales has no solution to prevent the QSEB burn because the LRU design has met its safety requirements in
Thales’s perspective.
How can you say it is "safe" when smoke and burning smell occurs during flight?
There are 5,382 QSEBs in 48 aircrafts equipped with the Thales i5000 IFE system at Korean Air. If there were no
solutions to prevent the QSEB burn, it could recur and cause other flight diversions/delays/ATBs that were used
to determine a definitive adverse economic impact to the operators.
Thales and other operator comments, please.
******19-259******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Discontinuation of Minor Part for IFE LRU
10.6” Smart Monitor
RD-FW7805-53
Panasonic
B777
A380
44
KAL
Last year, KAL received a notice about the discontinuation of minor part (R8U4FW7805W). Since KAL could not
repair the IFE monitor, we sent it abroad for repair. During the repair process, KAL operated aircraft with seat
blocked condition. Even though we repeatedly told Panasonic about our difficulties, the situation has not
improved.
Recently, the warranty (four years) for the monitor has been over. The last aircraft equipped with this monitor is
still less than five years. KAL has introduced equipment and authorization from Panasonic for the repair of
monitors but could not fix it because of minor part discontinuation.
This condition causes economic loss to KAL and the bigger problem is that seat blocks still occur. Due to monitor
repair abroad and discontinuation of the minor part, TAT has increased. KAL requested several alternatives
(purchase an additional monitor, reproduce minor part for repair, decrease TAT period, etc.) to prevent seat
blocks, but all were rejected from Panasonic. Because of these circumstances, we do not have any option to
solve this problem.
1. Panasonic informed KAL that discontinued minor parts will increase. Therefore, KAL strongly requests to
Panasonic take measures to prevent seat blocks.
Panasonic and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 140
IFE SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
167
IFE Harnesses/Cables – AOG Requirements
Several
Panasonic
Thales
Several
44
THY
THY Technic receives yearly catalogues with less part numbers of not only harness but also cables. For instance,
in 2020 catalogues, 83 ea. of 3554 ea. is having cable or harness description for Thales and 242 ea. out of 12371
ea. for Panasonic. In order to create any orders, emails should be exchanged that is ending roughly two days to
get any quote which is exactly causing time wasting at the beginning. More harnesses and cables should be
placed in catalogues or any separated catalogues can be created for them only.
Any AOG requests for harness and cables are taking consideration nevertheless AOG shipment cannot be
performed on time and even the exact delivery date can be specified even declared AOG. To meet any AOG
requirement on time, the delivery dates should be defined and can be exactly acquiesced in.
The IFE companies should keep enough safety stock of customized part numbers in order to meet the
requirements of Turkish Technic which also can lead the customer satisfaction on better level.
Panasonic, Thales, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
168
Not Providing IFE Harness Capability
Several
Panasonic
Thales
Several
44
THY
THY Technic encounters a lot of problems in case an IFE Harness without any spares gets defected. Currently,
there is no trend in harness P/Ns in terms of defect frequency. Most of the defects occur from a different part
number. Some the defects are due to that harness’s structural strength. In case a harness gets defected, once
the PO is opened the lead time is generally mentioned as 90 to 120 days, which is unacceptable. The reason of
this long duration is every single harness has to be produced from the beginning. Because the length of the
harness may be set due to the operators’ cabin configuration.
The defects which occur because of these harnesses may cause 3 to 12 seats to be inoperative for a long time
during the operations.
The request is to be able to produce these harnesses by getting the capability in order to be able to address such
issues as fast as possible.
For example:
Panasonic P/N: RD-FM6434-30988
Thales P/N: 185605-0915LN
Thy Technic also receives yearly catalogues with less part numbers of not only harness but also cables. For
instance, in 2020 catalogues, 83 ea. of 3554 ea. is having cable or harness description for Thales and 242 ea. out
of 12371 ea. for Panasonic. In order to create any orders, emails should be exchanged that is ending roughly two
days to get any quote which is exactly causing time wasting at the beginning. More harnesses and cables should
be placed in catalogues or any separated catalogues can be created for them only.
Any AOG requests for harness and cables are taking consideration nevertheless AOG shipment cannot be
performed on time and even the exact delivery date can be specified even declared AOG. To meet any AOG
requirement on time, the delivery dates should be defined and can be exactly acquiesced in.
The IFE companies should keep enough safety stock of customized part numbers in order to meet the
requirements of Turkish Technic which also can lead the customer satisfaction on better level.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 141
IFE SYSTEMS
Being obsolete of some IFE parts cause us to have trouble especially on leased aircrafts’ re-delivery phase. Is
there a procedure for parts obsolescence? How can we take precautions against this issue?
We demand expedition for our orders regarding cord PN: R6Z206XA because we are still ordering the related
cradle PN: RD-KA5612-13 at high quantities.
Panasonic, Thales, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 142
LIGHTING
******19-224******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
EPSU
3214-62
3214-62-10
3214-62-20
Diehl Aerospace GmbH
A330
33
KAL
KAL has experienced several maintenance delays due to EPSU failure on A330 aircrafts. Currently, P/N 3214-62
and 3214-62-20 have been installed on A330 classic aircrafts and P/N 3214-62-10 has been installed on A330
enhanced aircrafts.
If an EPSU is failed in outside stations, a lot of passengers have to be removed as per MEL. If FPEEPMS is failed
due to EPSU, the aircraft cannot be dispatched unless the defective EPSU is replaced.
The main reason to lead this failure is EPSU battery. The best way to prevent this problem is the allocation of
EPSU Battery in all the station or loading as FAK. But since the battery is categorized as Dangerous Goods, it is
almost impossible to load on the aircraft. Also, since the shelf life time is too short, it is not efficient to allocate it.
KAL would like to get other airlines’ experience about EPSU failure and how to operate A330 aircrafts in case of
EPSU failure.
Diehl Aerospace and operator comments, please.
******19-225******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Reliability of Lavatory ECU
AEPC000200A0003
Jamco
B787
33
JAL
ECU – Elec Control Unit part number AEPC000200A0003 is a circuit card for the purpose to generate constant
current into the lavatory interior lighting.
Since 2016, JAL has been observing its increasing number of removals. In 2017, we experienced four times of
departure delay due to inoperative lighting at the departure preparation.
In response to the above situation, JAL has been talking to Jamco, and was advised the almost failure of the
ECUs were caused by blown temperature fuse located close to the FET. According to Jamco analysis, since the
thermos-tolerance is suspected not to be optimized, Jamco and Boeing have been taking their effort for
investigation and planning design change.
However, the progress of planning improvement has been taking long time. And it seems like the target date is
also not set yet.
Especially for the summer season, its failure rate tends to increase in association with outside temperature. JAL
hopes to accelerate the improvement activities in time for this summer.
Could Boeing or Jamco advise operators the target date of the improvement for the ECU?
Comments from other operators would be highly appreciated too.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 143
LIGHTING
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
169
Decrease in Quality
of PAR64 Lamps
Q4559X/Parabolic
Anodized Reflector
Lamp
General
Electric (GE)
B777
33-40
AUA
B767
ERJ190
A320F
DH8
(The Entire
Austrian Fleet)
Austrian Airlines uses parabolic anodized reflector lamp, P/N: Q4559X, on the entire fleet for various outside light
assemblies, for example, the landing light on Austrian’s A32F fleet. Since GE closed its manufacturing plant in the
USA and moved the production to China, an obvious change in design and a massive increase in lamp
replacements was observed.
The change affects both the inside and the outside design:
The lamp had stiffener bars inside, which supported the actual lamp body. The curvature of the cover glass and
the main dimensions differ from the “old” lamp design so that the lamps can hardly be installed in some light
assemblies. The old badge had a little bulge, which contained the base of the standoff for the stiffener bars. The
outside of this bulge has also the function of a support of a holding clamp of some light assemblies. For details,
please refer to the pictures at the end of this item.
Here are some numbers that show the increase in replacements within the LH group:
Lufthansa (A32F Fleet only):
• 2017: 951 replacements
• 2019: 1416 replacements
Swiss
•
•
2017: 636 replacements
2019: 1047 replacements
Austrian
• 2017: 275 replacements
• 2019: 403 replacements
Questions:
1. Are other operators seeing similar issues?
2. Why did the significant change in design not lead to a new part number?
3. Are there plans inside GE to go back to the “old” design in order to improve the quality again?
Additionally, some pictures to visualize the change in the lamp’s design:
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 144
LIGHTING
Actual lamp body with stiffener bars (made in USA, before 2017):
Actual lamp body without stiffener bars (made in PRC, from 2017):
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 145
LIGHTING
Back with bulge (made in USA, before 2017):
Back without bulge (made in PRC, from 2017):
GE and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 146
LIGHTING
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
170
Part Poor Reliability
040004-1 / Socket Retainer
Collins Aerospace
B777
33
EVA
EVA found the consumption rate of socket retainer, PN 040004-1, in 2019 was very high, especially removed
from wing scan L’T (total 50ea replacement in 2019).
Boeing and Collins have provided the following suggestions in mid of 2019:
1. Use lamp PN HLX64621 produced by IPC instructing Vendor.
2. Press the lamp firmly into the holder by pushing against the metallic surface of the lamp and make sure
that the lamp is flush with the holder surface.
EVA confirms that EVA’s lamp replacement procedure and spare lamp PN HLX64621 both had never been
against Boeing and Collins suggestion, but socket retainer, PN 040004-1 still had high consumption rate in 2019.
Questions/Requested Actions:
1. Please comment if any operator has similar reliability problem.
2. Please Collins, comment if there is any explanation for this high consumption rate issue.
3. Please Collins, comment if any improvement change will be applied on socket retainer or any suggested
physical maintenance action to reduce its consumption rate.
Other operator and Collins Aerospace comments, please.
Item
Summary
Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
171
Wire Damage
4319586 / Landing Light Assembly
Zodiac
ATR
33
EVA
UNI
UNI ATR fleet encountered a lot of landing L’T inoperative events, around six cases in 2019, which were caused
by wiring damage or terminal lug arcing in L’T housing as shown in Figures below.
Chafing
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 147
LIGHTING
Chafing & Burnt
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 148
LIGHTING
Burnt
Based on UNI’s research, this issue is caused by the following L’T housing design:
1. Wiring inside L’T housing is free without any fixing clamp and screw on lamp holder is too closed to make
the wiring chafing in L’T housing easily.
2. Lamp is too hot to make terminal lug on lamp holder burnt.
UNI tried to ask Zodiac to improve this bad design, but the result was not enough.
Questions/Requested Actions:
1. Have any ATR operators encountered similar problems? Operator comment, please.
2. Unsecured wires inside the landing light assembly housing is the root cause of wire damage, this is a
design defect. ATR, Zodiac comment please.
3. Please provide the solution.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 149
LIGHTING
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
172
Repair Service
301-3017 / Emer L’T Battery
Cobham
ATR
33
EVA
UNI
UNI ATR fleet installed with EMER L’T battery PN 301-3017 since 2012. UNI has encountered the following
issues with Cobham:
1. The average handling duration of every case between UNI and Cobham is 4~6 months in which UNI
spent the most time waiting for Cobham’s reply after lots reminder letters.
2. Unacceptable CID (Customer Induced Damage) reason without any convincing explanation to reject
battery purchasing warranty.
3. Late Bench test result
Questions/Requested Actions:
1. Please comment if any operators have similar service problems from Cobham.
2. ATR and Cobham comment, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 150
FUEL SYSTEMS
******19-138******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Fuel Quantity Data Concentrator
367-334-002
Parker Hannifin
A380
28
KAL
KAL suffers the failure of LRU’s identification, showing PN, SN, and related software information during FQDC
auto testing.
Even though KAL purchased three types of board for FQDC repair, KAL is unable to use them for the LRU repair
due to this identification issue.
At final stage of the test program set operation, operator cannot identify the PN, SN and software’s information of
LRU of own TPS.
KAL believes a specific tool is required and loaded into the system to achieve successful identification. Despite
several requests, the vendor has not provided it yet.
KAL would like to request Airbus and Parker review this issue to provide the tool.
Airbus, Parker Hannifin, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
173
FQDC – Unavoidable Scratch for
Sealant Removal
30278-0102
Goodrich
B787
28
JAL
30278-0202
Since 2018, JAL has been experiencing 13 cases of CID (Customer Induced Damage) due to the scratch on the
FQDC (Fuel Quantity Data Concentrator) housing/plate caused by sealant removal at the airplane maintenance.
AMM mentions to remove the FQDC carefully with non-metallic scraper. But the sealant is firmly applied to avoid
moisture ingression and even when we use the appropriate tool, the damage is not avoidable. It is not feasible to
remove sealant without any scratch or take longer time for work.
Photo 1: FQDC Installation
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 151
FUEL SYSTEMS
Photo 2: FQDC Sealant
Once the damage is observed on FQDC, the housing cover assembly will have to be replaced. Costs are very
high, and warranty is denied.
How it could be solved? Are there any better maintenance practice to remove sealant without scratch? If possible,
it could be better to change the sealant material.
Comments about a solution from Goodrich and Boeing will be appreciated. Also, comments from operators who
are experiencing similar problems would be appreciated.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
174
Fuel Quantity Indicator
1407KID02-03
Ontic
A320
28
AFR/KLM
AFR
In the Air France shop, we noticed poor reliability of circuit integrated IC4 and/or CPU/PSU board assy. Observed
MTBUR is 9522 FH for IGO fleet, and 4776 FH for CEBU Fleet (GMTBUR: 12000 – MTBUR AIR FRANCE
215000).
Previously, when Air France’s shop observes no presence of ARINC signal, replacement of IC4 circuit or
reworked solders were necessary to troubleshoot the FQI. Now we have to replace the CPU/PSU board due to
tracks internal cut. Is there a frailness on this Microprocessor/Power Supply PCB?
On March 25, 2019, Air France sent 5 PCBs for troubleshooting. Air France has not received any answer about
these PCBs.
On September 25, 2019 Ontic emailed:
“This hasn’t been forgotten. Investigations so far suggest that the problem may lie with the PCB. We do not
believe that the processor or its associated solder joints are root cause. We would like to focus on the PCB
and potential tracking open/shorts, but due to engineering resources being re-directed onto ongoing B777
FQIS issues, we will not be able to pick this up in the near future. Whilst we acknowledge that we see a high
proportion of IC4 related failures, feedback from airlines suggests good reliability with the LRU. This makes it
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 152
FUEL SYSTEMS
more difficult for me to justify resources to continue the investigation, given that we have a priority situation
with the B777 FQIS.
If you are able to help in your shop with any findings relating to the PCB, it would be appreciated.”
Air France requests feedback on the 5 PCBs.
Can Ontic provide a way of reliability improvement?
Other operators, airframers, OEMs comment please.
******19-140******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
IRP (Integrated Refueling Panel)
6026-01/-02/-03
Ontic
B777
28
KAL
KAL has been experiencing numerous maintenance delays by IRP refueling valve control switch failure (S12 to
S14 on IRP).
It is an obvious fact that it is impossible to dispatch the aircraft with no fuel. To mitigate the operational disruption,
KAL is doing an IRP switch refreshment campaign, replacing refuel valve switches (S12 to S14) on the IRP and
applying a new potting method for the entire B777 fleet with OEM "Ontic", despite its being a costly solution.
Furthermore, the IRP that have incorporated SB 6026-28-714/-717 called new potting method also makes failure.
KAL has doubts about the effectiveness of SB 6026-28-714/-717.
KAL found out other operators also suffering from the same switch issue through Fleet Idea eXchange (on MBF)
that KAL has opened (ISE-28-18-22546). But there is no action and no official answer from Boeing and Ontic.
• Recent switch failure removals: 22 removals (Recent three years)
KAL would like to Boeing and Ontic to find the root cause and its solution for frequent switch failure.
Boeing, Ontic, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 153
FUEL SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
175
IRP Corrosion
6026-0X
Ontic
B777
28
AFR/KLM
AFR
Following the issue 2019-140 last year about corrosion:
AF shop is facing 3 cases of connector receptacle 55-way PL9 on IRP with corrosion. In 2 cases, cleaning of
corrosion was not sufficient, and we had to replace this connector, with extreme difficulty to procure it.
Does Ontic foresee an improvement axis concerning the connector’s corrosion?
Other operators, airframers, OEMs comment please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 154
FUEL SYSTEMS
******19-142******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Refuel Control Panel –
Corrosion on Front Panel
(Design Deficiency)
30288-0101
UTC
Aerospace
B787
28
LHT
DLH
The Front Panel of the Refuel Control Panel suffers corrosion around the switches and mounting holes.
According to UTAS, “Mechanical damage to the Front Panel (e.g., nicks, chips) that cuts through the paint layer
and exposes the metal underneath starts the galvanic corrosion process where the copper plating and the
aluminum body meet. To prevent this, UTAS proposed to change the finish of the RCP Front Panel from copper
plating to anodize (except where copper plating is necessary for soldering).”
From LHT’s point of view, this cannot be basically operators guilt as the corrosion often starts next to the switches
installed originally by the OEM. Although the replacement of a corroded Front Panel is covered by the OEMwarranty for the first 5 years, the corrosion had never led to a technical fault of the unit but needed a replacement
of the complete front panel plus additional costs for harness/switch when the corrosion passes attaching parts.
LHT expects a replacement of a corroded front panel FOC as this must be deemed as a Design Deficiency.
UTC Aerospace: LHT considers the front panel corrosion to be a design deficiency issue. Please provide
information regarding the design of the panel and the resulting corrosion issue.
All: Do you see the corrosion issue as well?
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 155
FUEL SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
176
Cavitation Erosion –
Final Fix
Fuel Pump P/N
568-1-28300-103
Eaton
A330
28
AFR/KLM
AFR
A340
As all A330/A340 operators, AFR is impacted by the inspection of fuel pump P/N 568-1-28300-103, due to
cavitation erosion. A new P/N, mentioned as terminating action of inspection mandated by EASA AD 2019-0291,
is scheduled to be issued by end of Q3 2020.
Why does the development of a new P/N of fuel pump take so much time?
As a reminder, initial inspection was introduced end of year 2017 through AOT A28L006-17 and EASA AD
2017-0224.
Indeed, fuel pump P/N 568-1-28300-004 is not affected by this problem and the reliability is very good. No AD
linked to this P/N.
Please Eaton can confirm the issue date of the new P/N?
Eaton and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
177
787 Fuel Inlet Adapter Replacement
25P0001 / Fuel
Adapter Assy
2K97-136 / Inlet
Adapter
Boeing
B787
28-21
AAL
Eaton
AAL experienced fuel inlet adapter damage on both fuel inlet adapters on the left wing of one of our B787s when
a fuel truck drove away from the aircraft while connected to the aircraft. The AMM does not include instructions to
replace the inlet adapter on wing. Instead the operator is driven to replace the next higher assembly – the fuel
adapter assembly. Replacement of the fuel adapter assembly requires fuel tank purging, entry and extensive
down time – driving three days out of service. Other Boeing aircraft allow for the replacement of the fuel inlet
adapter without replacement of the higher assembly or defueling the aircraft. Those aircraft have out of service
events on the order of three hours rather than three days.
Boeing has stated that the CDCCL bonding tests require the use of 1 amp of current to verify the bonding
resistance under current and that this would be unsafe to do on wing.
AAL is asking if other operators have had similar events.
AAL is also asking Boeing or Eaton to provide an alternate test for the bonding tests that uses a current that
would be safe for on wing testing.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 156
FUEL SYSTEMS
Boeing, Eaton, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
178
GEnx Fuel Nozzles
Wear and Tear
6100005E0*
Fuel Nozzle
Advanced
Atomization
Technologies
(AAT)
GE
B747-8
73-10-09
LHT
DLH
73-10-11
Long history on GEnx fuel nozzle deterioration.
Fuel nozzles with low installation times, as low as less than one year in operation, needed damper repair and aft
shroud replacement at shop visit at AAT. Same work scope was performed at former shop visit of fuel nozzle at
AAT or SB 6100005-73-001 was accomplished.
Repetitive damper repair and aft shroud replacement indicates further ongoing technical problems with the
nozzles.
Q1: What are the major findings on GEnx fuel nozzles returned to AAT?
Q2: Please provide data in regards to MTBR of different PNs (E02/E03 vs. E05/E06/E07).
Q3: When can we expect an update regarding a technical solution for this issue and how will this solution look
like?
AAT, GE, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 157
FUEL SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
179
OVH of Fuel
Components if
Contamination at Inlet
Filter is Present
Fuel Components,
Mainly FMUs and
HMUs
Woodward
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
73
LHT
DLH
In reference to AMC 2019 item 144
Several fuel control units such as HMUs and FMUs were sent to Woodward and contamination at inlet screen
was detected. Due to the present contamination, overhaul is the only possible work scope to be performed on
such units according to Woodward, regardless of flight hours of unit. General rule by Woodward: if the
contamination is deemed to be small enough or found to be inconsistent in size to suggest the possible presence
of contamination even smaller than what they have found in the inlet screen, the FMU is deemed to be
contaminated. This leads to increasing costs for the airlines that are difficult to explain on a technical basis.
Answer by Woodward in 2019:
Contamination is a very broad term. When Woodward suspects contamination, the type and source of
contamination is reviewed. If it is determined that the type and size of contamination would have been caught
in the inlet screen, then there would be no further action required. If it is determined that the contaminant
could have passed through the inlet screen and affected other aspects of the FMU and HMU, the only
possible scenario is to disassemble and clean the FMU/HMU of any potential contaminants. During this
process, the unit naturally becomes overhauled based on the disassembly and inspection requirement. The
pure presence of contaminants in the inlet screen does not automatically require an overhaul. In many cases,
Woodward would find large debris and no further action is required.
Q1: Why is test/repair as necessary for units showing contamination in undamaged inlet filter after cleaning not
possible? Filter design should ensure that only contamination not affecting operation and function of unit could
pass the filter. Harmful contamination would be prevented from entering by filter design. Passed test according
CMM would ensure airworthiness of unit.
Q2 of last year is still not answered. Was an analysis conducted on different units in order to determine amount of
contamination inside of unit if inlet screen was found contaminated? If yes, what was the outcome? If not, why
not?
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
180
Airworthiness Limitation Task
47-AWL-09 Wrongly Updated
by Boeing
ASM 2180163-101
Boeing
B737NG
47
SR
Technics
Filter 2040025-107
Oxygen Sensor
3522W000-001/002
Boeing updated SCAWL (task 47-AWL-09, Snapshot 1) and consequently, Airliner Task Cards (e.g., Ukraine
Airlines, Snapshot 2) related to Oxygen Sensor life limitations based on the documents that do not support this
action with applicability ALL (see below Snapshot 1, marked in orange).
SB 737-47-1015, FTD-47-19003 as well as Parker’s/Honeywell’s VSBs do not support this life limitation because it is
applicable ONLY in the case that ASM and Filter post mode art numbers are installed or the aircraft delivery date is
after 04 June 2019, Snapshot 3.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 158
FUEL SYSTEMS
Snapshot 1
Snapshot 2
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 159
FUEL SYSTEMS
Snapshot 3
SR Technics experienced at the same time that OEM-Honeywell repaired one Oxygen Sensor unit without asking
about the unit’s history and whether it was repairable or life limited, and thus had to be scrapped. OEM-Honeywell
was not aware of this limit at all.
Many airlines asked SR Technics, as their MRO, to provide them new sensors since the installed one’s life expired
per AWL.
Boeing has been contacted by SR Technics Engineering and admitted mistake that AWL and task cards may be
misleading and will be revised.
SCAWL task 47-AWL-09 still is not revised as Boeing announced!
Operators may continue to ask for certified NEW sensors (with no reason) and thus produce additional costs to
themselves, their MROs, as well as suffer the operational disruptions.
Boeing and other operator and supplier comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 160
LANDING GEAR
******19-188******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Lockstay Actuator
10-452701-000
Safran
A320NEO
32
AFR/KLM
AFR
AFR/KLM observed some lack of information in A320NEO CMM component in the repair chapters. Several repair
procedures available in the CMMs of A320NEO are no longer available in the CMMs of A320NEO components.
For example:
A320NEO Cylinder in CMM 32-11-21 is repairable with refurbishing available for holes; oversize bushes are
allowed, and those repairs are no longer available in CMM 32-31-05 for A320NEO.
AFR/KLM requests a revision of A320NEO CMMs to introduce those repairs again, such as example above.
Airbus, other operator comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
181
Pitch Trimmer
Actuator
Lock Stay
Actuator
Retraction
Actuator
10-359303-001
Safran
A350
32
AFR/KLM
AFR
10-359501-000
10-359703-000
Many pieces parts PN in the IPL of these components (CMM 32-31-94; 32-31-93; 32-31-91) are supposed to be
procurable. However, since the beginning of 2019, it is not possible to get Request For Quotation from the OEM
Safran, either a price or lead time.
•
Safran, can you please fix this issue to allow these piece parts to be procurable?
Safran, Airbus comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 161
LANDING GEAR
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
182
Retraction Actuator Piston
Retainer Nut
201590001,
Retraction
Actuator
Safran Landing
Systems
A320
32-31
DAL
Delta Air Lines (DAL) maintenance has been receiving retraction actuators (P/N 201590001) from the OEM,
Safran Landing Systems, with several piston retainer nuts (P/N 20159091) not torqued to the specified range in
the CMM when performing the breakaway torque to disassemble the unit.
The piston retainer nut is supposed to be torqued to a certain range so that the holes properly align for the
retainer lock bolt. When DAL maintenance torques these units during the assembly process according to the
specified rang, there are no holes aligning for the retainer bolt.
DAL Engineering contacted Safran Landing Systems in July 2019 to discuss the issue of the bolt holes not
aligning given the specified torque. DAL maintenance has made record of units coming in with breakaway torque
less than the CMM requirements that were last overhauled by the OEM as well as whether the torque ranges will
allow for alignment of the bolt holes (October 2019). Safran has noted that they have not seen any torqueing
issues at their overhaul facilities and would check with their MRO customers.
Safran and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
183
MLG Door
Actuator Bearing
114122015
Triumph
Actuation
A320 Series
32
LHT
Various
Summary:
• During the inspection of the MLG Door Keen Beam Hinge and Actuator Fittings (AD Note 2012-118, SB
A320-53-1195 and A320-53-1196), the MLG Door Actuator P/N 114122014 (pre SBC 114122-32-106) will
be removed due to bearing free play and the P/N 114122015 (post SBC 114122-32-106) is removed due
to cracked bearing sealer.
• With the modification of P/N 114122014 into P/N 114122015 (SBC 114122-32-106) the issue with the
extremely high free play was reduced, but a new removal reason was created. The outer race of the
bearing, P/N P336621, starts to rotate in the lug of the Cylinder and End Fitting. The sealer around the
bearing starts to crack. This is the major removal reason of the actuator P/N 114122015.
NHA
SBC Status
any P/N
pre SBC 114122-32-105
Bearing
P336621
114122014
post SBC 114122-32-105 pre SBC 114122-32-106
114122695SC
114122015
post SBC 114122-32-106
P336621
Problem
cracked bearing
sealer
bearing free play
cracked bearing
sealer
Requested action
• Do other operators or MROs see the same finding of a rotating bearing (cracked sealer) after
implementation of SBC 114122-32-106?
• Is the modification from P/N 114122014 into P/N 114122015 (installation of the bearing P336621 which
was already pre-SBC 114122-32-105 version) the final solution?
• Does Triumph work on a new bearing design to reduce the new existing problem of the rotating bearing?
Triumph and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 162
LANDING GEAR
******19-190******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Electrical Box
D23119000
Safran Landing
System
A320 Fam
32
AFR/KLM
AFR
In 2017, AFR fleet has experienced three late departures incriminating Landing Gear Electric Box, later confirmed
in shop. Like every year, AFR-KLM is observing peak in removals during rainy periods. Placed on the landing
gear, the electrical box is subject to many water splashes. Its design should take this parameter into account.
Water stays trapped into the box. As a result, 85% of the failures are due to oxidation. GMTBUR (7940 FH) is
hardly met during rainy periods (8000 FH).
In 2018, this item was submitted and closed with the promise of Safran to take actions in the year. As of today,
Safran has not made or shared progress on the water ingress.
This item was submitted in 2011 by TAP Portugal, mentioning that the SB 580-32-3159 does not correct the
defect.
Other operators, airframers, OEMs comment please.
******19-055******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Control Lever (6GA)
Reliability
215TS07Y00
Zodiac ECE
A320 Fam
32
THY
TKT
Turkish Airlines’ fleet has been experiencing serious issues related with the PN: 215TS07Y00 LG CONTROL
LEVER both on A320 FAM and A330 aircrafts. There were total of 32 PN 215TS07Y00 replacements made with
11 replacements were made only in last 12 months. Most of those units were found with faulty PN 367UN01
switch assy, which is almost expensive as the new whole unit. Therefore, almost all switch-related units are being
scrapped at the THY shop. A total of 45 PN 367UN01 replacements have been done in the last five years.
THY fleet has experienced eight different "CTL LEVER" status message occurrences rooted from 6GA issues
since 2014. Additionally, a total of 25 different L/G Ctrl Lever caused LGCIU status messages appeared since
2013.
The root cause for switch failure could not be clearly identified by any document or procedure. Contrary to TFU
32.31.00.029, THY shop procedures do not include any partial/stopped lever operation or inconsistent up and
down inputs, and we believe that related switches are needed to be investigated deeper.
THY would kindly asks other operators if they also experience such issues.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 163
LANDING GEAR
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
184
A330 Wheels Assy
3-1546
3-1596
Safran
Airbus
A330
32
TAP
TAP Uses in its Fleet both TPIS systems available for the A330 Fleet, Classic and NEO.
Both systems manufactured by Safran and Crane, are incompatible in terms of aircraft connection and reading
system.
The TPIS system is mentioned on the Wheel assembly CMM, including details applicable to the assembly on the
wheel, like the applicable torque as an example, but there are no references on the CMM and aircraft AMM/IPC
about the configuration identification impact.
Both types of wheel assemblies can be stored and managed without any identification different (dash number,
amendment, etc.) which creates a technical and logistics constraints resulting in operational problems.
It is requested Safran and Airbus to analyze an identification or operational procedure to avoid delays resulting in
an incorrectly identified/non-fully interchangeable wheels.
The wheels have a relatively high rotational cycle between shop/warehouse/aircraft, so it is a very exposed and
impactful item, in the airline maintenance operations.
NOTE: Crane TPIS (P/N 83-294-01)/Safran TPIS (4305990071)
Safran, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
185
Landing Gear Repairs
Various
Safran
All
32
TAP
Considering the significant number of repairs submitted via “repair concession” by all the MROs around the world,
it would be interesting to understand the volume of repair concessions issued and approved per part number, to
provide to the operators an indicator of potential repairability of candidate components.
Based on this information, the costly and time-consuming concession requests may be more efficiently analyzed
before application by the applicant.
This transparently provided data, may demonstrate that some of the repair requests are recurrent and should be
analyzed as a permanent repair, published on the CMMs repair sections, providing an efficient and economically
more effective procedure to the operators and MROs.
Example of a commonly submitted unit (components) Retraction actuator P/N 201590001.
Safran and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 164
LANDING GEAR
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
186
Crack on the
Bolt Hole
P/N: C20674700
Main Wheel
Assembly
Safran
Landing
System
A350-900
32
AFR/KLM
AFR
Over a period of six months (June 2019 – January 2020), we detected in the workshop four wheels with cracks
located on the tie bolt holes. These wheels did not fly as much (less than 1000 cycles). These defects can cause
a deflation of the wheel with all the consequences.
Are you going to develop a repair or new design to avoid such defects? Indeed, these defects arrived too early in
the life of this equipment.
OEM, OAM, other operators in the same situation, please comment.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
187
Identification
Part/Number
Airbus (Wheel
and Tire)
V3245001900000
Airbus
A350-900
32
AFR/KLM
AFR
V3245501800000
WL203SBAAAAD
WL203SBAAAAF
And so on.
A350-1000
Airbus has introduced new P/N evolving according to the P/N of the rim (Goodrich or Safran), to the retread level
of the tire and to the sensor installed on the wheel. These new P/Ns allow us to know the configuration of the
wheel.
Basically, a wheel could arrive in the shop with a specific P/N and leave with another (for example, if the retread
level has changed). On the CMM Airbus wheel and tire assembly, there is no information to identify and mark the
P/N Airbus on the wheel. Could you give us a proposition in collaboration with OEM in order to identify/mark the
P/N Airbus (V32... or WL...) on the wheel?
Operator and OEM please comment.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 165
LANDING GEAR
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
188
LGCL A350
Spare Parts
166TS11Y00 /
Landing Gear
Control Lever
Zodiac
A350
32
AFR/KLM
AFR
Zodiac has not fulfilled the numerous requests of Air France to provide a quotation for piece parts of the LGCL
P/N 166TS11Y00. The initial request was made in March 2019. Zodiac states that the AF request is still being
studied by Zodiac. Piece parts quotation should not take so long to be issued as many operators now fly the
aircraft and the CMM clearly lists these parts as procurable.
Zodiac, could you commit to a date to fulfill our request?
Zodiac and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
189
Freefall Extension
of Landing Gear on
Airbus Aircraft
210TS07Y01 /
Landing Gear
Control Lever
Airbus
Airbus
32
AFR/KLM
AFR
Zodiac
This has been a recurring subject since 2013. Recently, see AMC question AMC 2018-197 renewed in 2019.
In 2019, three new incidents of a Freefall extension of the Landing gear occurred once again. In 2018, Airbus
stated that they had found the defect which would be corrected by SB 32-1450 and SB 32-1451 on A320 fleet
FOC. Despite incorporation of the SB, Air France has not seen any improvements. Airbus also stated that
investigation with Zodiac was ongoing, associated with regular TFU updates. Air France has not been able to get
any information on these investigations.
On top of the former information provided by Air France, new defects have been identified:
• Burnt flex circuit probably because of the short in S1 switch.
o Never observed before by AF.
o Has been discovered in shop after a freefall extension landing during normal operations.
o Zodiac says not to be aware of this failure.
•
Broken spring causing an FOD.
o The spring breaking used to be retained by a nylon thread inside the spring in case of break.
o With SB 215TS07Y-32-005, Zodiac removed the thread because it was breaking and causing an
FOD.
o Now the spring does it, more severely. Two cases since Oct 2019. AF questions the usefulness
of this SB.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 166
LANDING GEAR
On Airbus A350, the design of the Switch is identical. Air France expects future events related to it.
Airbus stated that this type of event is not critical for operations. However, with recurring events occurring in Air
France, concerns are ever growing.
Operators, Airbus, Zodiac, comment please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
190
Additional Test
Procedure
42-907-4
Crane / Hydro
Aire
B777
32
AFR/KLM
AFR
CMM 32-43-41 Rev 08 adds a new procedure page 1017, 1018. Pull up and pull-down resistor test
Task 32-43-41-99A-832-A01.
We have performed this procedure on two SERV units certified by Crane and none of them could reach the
requirements specified for Range 40 to 60 K Ohms (Step 1, 2, 4, 12, 13, 24 to 26, 31, 32). Measured values are
about 400 K Ohms.
Please confirm Range value for Step 1, 2, 4, 12, 13, 24 to 26, 31, 32.
Crane/Hydro Aire, comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
191
Brake Accumulator
088256-04644
Parker
A320
32
ANA
ANA has experienced a lot of brake pressure accumulator removal and eight flight delays in 2019. “BRAKE
ACCUM LO PR” is added by EWC software modification and old A320 model is not displayed. So, eight flight
delays occurred with the new A320 model.
• MTBUR is between 4000 and 8000.
• Most units were removed due to “ECAM Warning “BRAKE ACCUM LO PR”” and “PRSS Drop Rate Hi.”
• Most units were early removal and around 30% units was removed below 1000(FH).
Airbus released SB A320-32-1470 to increase pre charge pressure in April 2019. But it is not effective because
the removal reason of ECAM warning and pressure low do not decrease in ANA’s fleet.
Therefore, ANA accomplishes this check every month as a mitigate action from October 2019 instead of every
four months, which is required by MPD. As a result of this inspection, pressure low condition was confirmed on 19
aircraft in November 2019, four aircraft in December 2019, and six aircraft in January 2020.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 167
LANDING GEAR
According to the repair report, some of units were found bladder damage (Blister, Crack, and Wear); however,
most of units are no fault found.
ANA requests Airbus/Parker to investigate the root cause of this issue and would like to know other operators’
experiences. In addition, we would like to know how often N2 pressure charge to brake accumulator.
MTBUR and Removal Q'ty
10000
15
8000
10
6000
4000
5
2000
0
2015
2016
2017
Removal Qty
2018
2019
0
MTBUR
Reason for removal
3%
5%
33%
59%
ECAM Warn "BRAKE ACCUM LO PR"
PRESS Drop HI
PRESS Low
Unknown
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 168
LANDING GEAR
Fligh Hours of Removed Unit
400015%
0-1000
28%
3000-4000
16%
1000-2000
18%
2000-3000
23%
Flight Cycle of Removed Unit
3000-4000
8%
400015%
0-1000
31%
2000-3000
18%
1000-2000
28%
Airbus, Parker, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 169
LANDING GEAR
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
192
Incorrect Function of
Uplock
C24730001-x /
Uplock Assy
Safran Landing
Systems
A320 Series
32-37-08
LHT
LHT got two units from Lufthansa Airline, which did not lock after gear retraction. The units were tested on
the test bench and failed the test due to unable to lock or due to extremely high locking force. The
disassembly of the units show swelled Hytrel Stops. Swelled Hytrel Stops were identified at nearly each
unit, which was repaired at LHT.
This problem is well known at Safran since March 2007 (item of ISE Nr.02, A320 Family Landing Gear
Uplocks) without any action or change.
Do other airlines or MROs have equal findings?
When does Safran will solve the Hytrel Stop swelling problem?
Do Airbus or Safran plan to implement an MPD task for uplocks which have this kind of Hytrel Stop?
Safran, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 170
LANDING GEAR
Item
Summary Title
193
NLG Bypass Valve
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
Airbus
A319
A320
ATA
From
UAL
During analysis of Bypass valves in the Airbus fleet, we found that NLG Bypass (PN: 114087006,
114087007, 114087009) valves are failing more frequently than MLG Bypass valves with the same part
number.
We would like to know Airbus’s comments on the reliability of these valves and why NLG valves fail more
frequently due leaks. Is this an Airbus known issue? If yes, what are the measures that need to be taken
to eliminate this trend?
Airbus and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 170
FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
194
TAT Improvement
FR3123 / Smoke Detector
L’Hottellier
ATR
26
EVA
UNI
According to smoke detector manufacturer’s document (CMM 26-15-04 and 26-15-05) test procedure, the test
bench (P/N:117-2) should be used and sent the bench to manufacturer (L’Hottellier) for calibration. But the Turn
Around Time (TAT) is too long (about five months).
UNI had placed a calibration order on January 18, 2019, to L’Hottellier for periodic calibration. But the unit was
considered an unprocessed entity and status shows the quote was withheld for two months. The calibration was
accomplished on the unit and it was shipped back on May 20, 2019.
Please advise the why it takes so long for a test bench calibration?
L’Hottellier comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
195
Tool Equivalent
33600005-3 / Fire Extinguisher
Meggitt
A330
26
EVA
CMM 26-20-03 published by Meggitt. The previous revision of CMM (R.09) allows equivalent items use on
Special Tools, Fixtures, Equipment and Materials. The latest CMM version (R.10) only mentions equivalent items
are available on Standard Tools and Test Equipment.
All CMMs revised by Meggitt have the same problem.
This seems to have been missed in some of the statements in the current CMM. EVA e-mailed Meggitt to allow
EVA to use tools available in the previous CMM. However, Meggitt replied that we can only use the tools
mentioned in the manual.
In order to meet CMM requirements, EVA no longer can use tools that were previously available. Therefore, EVA
hopes Meggitt considers revising the CMM and re-note equivalent tools are available on Special Tools, Fixtures,
Equipment and Materials.
EVA would like to know if there are any technical concerns for cancelling the equivalent tools for Special Tools,
Fixtures, Equipment and Materials.
Do any other operators have similar experiences in this situation?
Meggitt comment please.
REFERENCE 17-110/MSG-338 - Page 171
FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
196
Fire Extinguisher
Containers
473474
Collins Aerospace
(Kidde)
B777
26
AFR
AFR/KLM
473854
473876
473475
This item refers to AMC 19-243, which was closed last year but one item not closed.
CMM: 26-21-44 / 26-21-53 / 26-21-54/26-21-45.
SUBTASK NITROGEN CHARGE.
Torque the fill-and-safety fitting (80) part number 446354-4 to 85 to 110 lbf-in (9.6 to 12.4 Nm). Then we perform
the leak test on the fill fitting. Often, the test results result in rejection and need to be scrapped. An NTO was
rescinded in 2019 that covered this problem with an extended range of torque.
Air France does not understand why the NTO was revoked and why the given range in NTO was not included in
the CMM. Air France asks Collins to include the NTO range in CMM or emit a temporary Revision that permits to
cover this case known by Kidde.
Collins, please comment.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 172
EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING
******19-238******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Door Striker
AR4726-5
Adams Rite
Boeing
B777
25
ANA
In the item No. 35 of latest 2017 MMC, ANA had commented and requested to encourage improvement of the
striker assembly to avoid frequent replacement. We hear that Boeing and Adams Rite have made an effort to
incorporate modified switch into the striker assembly.
Could Boeing and Adams Rite introduce their modification plan and schedule in the MMC?
Boeing, Adams Rite, and other operator comments, please.
******17-035******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Door Strike
AR4704-2/-6
AR4726-1/-5
Adams Rite
B747
B777
25
DAL
The Boeing widebody Door Strikes have a 9-year discard requirement, due to the CMRs. Delta has requested the
discard requirement be changed to an overhaul requirement.
Delta requests that Boeing and Adams Rite work together to certify that an overhauled unit passes the
requirements.
Additionally, the 9-year requirement does not take into account the actual usage of the components, which is what
would lead to the failure of the internal solenoid.
Boeing, Adams Rite, and other operator comments, please.
******14-264******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Cockpit Door Strike Assembly
AR4726-1/-5
AR4704-2/-6
Adams Rite
B747
B767
B777
25-00
DAL
Adams Rite has provided Boeing with a requirement that the cockpit door strike assemblies must be discarded
within 9 years. This requirement is tied to the solenoid. Research has shown that the solenoid can be rebuilt,
removing the necessity of maintenance discarding the unit.
Other operator, vendor comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 173
EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING
*****18-227*****
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Cockpit Door Lock Controller Tester
AR4709-25-03
Adams Rite
Aerospace
A320
25-20-26
DAL
A330
In order to troubleshoot intermittent errors, we need to troubleshoot the Cockpit Door Locking System (CDLS)
Control Unit Programmer P/N AR4737-1.
We need the schematics for the following parts included in the Adams Rite Aerospace (ARA) CDLS Control Unit
Programmer package:
*Bench Test Unit (BTU)
`
*DCU Signal Cable
*RS232 Computer Communications Cable
73155-1
73146-1
73147-1
There was no technical manual provided with this tester. We do not accept that technical information regarding
the testing of LRUs should be withheld from operators and MROs.
Other operator comments welcome.
******19-239******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Flight Crew Seat
3A380-0007-01-X
3A380-0008-01-X
Ipeco
Boeing
B787
25
ANA
ANA has often experienced that Flight Crew Seat on B787 was replaced because the seat did not move
electrically. After the seat removed from aircraft, the mechanic replaced the subject component such as ECU
(P/N:EC0602A00P71100A), Vertical actuator (P/N:2A380-0825), Horizontal actuator (P/N:2A380-0827) and sent
them to Ipeco for the repair. However, most of all shop finding reports showed no fault found functionally.
On the other hand, the installed seat on the aircraft is functioning properly after being replaced with new one. This
shows that the removed components or seat electrical system seem to have something wrong functionally.
In recent three years, 59 seats were replaced, 17 ECUs were replaced, 63 V-actuators were replaced, and 63
H-actuators were replaced.
Based on contents mentioned above, ANA would like to raise the following request: to maintain more reliability as
a seat electrical system, an investigation more detailed than existing one for finding the root cause is needed.
Ipeco, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 174
EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
197
Seat SRU Reliability-Cockpit Seat
3A380-0007-01-7 /
IPECO
B787
25
EVA
Boeing 787 Pilot seat lumbar up‐down adjust knob is easily broken.
EVA has replaced 3ea hand wheel, lumbar (up/down), PN: 2A380‐0645 with TSN 708 FH, 788 FH and 817 FH,
respectively.
EVA requests OEM IPECO to provide a solution to improve the reliability of hand wheel, lumbar.
OEM and other operator comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
198
CMM Update Request
Cockpit Seat
3A258-0041-01-2
IPECO
B777-300ER
25
EVA
3A258-0041-01-2 /
Pilot seat, PN: 3A258-0041-01-1 and P/N: 3A258-0041-01-2 is installed on Boeing 777. EVA is encountering
FWD/AFT manual function inoperative due to horizontal/vertical cable assembly damage (chafed, bent or broken).
EVA has replaced 12ea horizontal cable assembly, PN: 2A258-0449, and 9ea Vertical cable assembly, PN:
2A097-0629, in Q3, Q4 2019.
Refer to CMM 25-11-38: there is no clear instruction or illustration to install or adjust the cable assemblies. Please
update the manual to provide a clear instruction for cable assembly installation.
Supplier, OEM comments please.
******19-247******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Poor Reliability Espresso Maker
HFE2005-01
Iacobucci
B777
25
EVA
EVA has experienced many removals of Espresso Maker PN: HFE2005-01 due to continuous leaking of water to
the drain tube. The problem, per Iacobucci, is due to failure of the manifold. They advised EVA to replace the
manifold every time failure is found.
The cost of replacing the manifolds (there are about seven manifolds or solenoids in each espresso maker) is
high. However, the main reason for failure of the manifolds was never corrected until now: the spring inside the
manifold tends to stick to the solenoid’s plunger in open position, which could be due to inadequate dimension
clearance.
In addition, maintenance found a compound inside the water supply system.
EVA requests Iacobucci investigate the reason why this compound was found inside the water supply system,
provide corrective action to the manifold with less cost to the operator, and clarify the main failure reason for the
manifold.
After disassembly, EVA found water inlet main fold contaminated, which caused the solenoid water leak.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 175
EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING
Iacobucci, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
199
Reliability ImproveBeverage Maker
4651-2811-00
BE Aerospace
B787
25
EVA
Beverage maker PN 4651-2811-00 has a high removal rate due to defective control assembly, PN: 3520-0925-01.
EVA has replaced 24ea control assemblies within seven months (from August 2018 to February 2019). The
beverage maker TBI is between 200 Hours to 761Hours (Removal reason: TEA POT LIGHT NOT ILLUMINATE)
control assembly has low reliability. Reliability improvement of control assembly, PN: 3520-0925-01, is needed.
BE Aerospace, comments please.
******17-147******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate Airline
Coffee Maker
Reliability
4510-22UF00
BE
Aerospace
Airbus
A330
25-36
DAL
HAL
Coffee makers have been #1 on the HAL component performance index for years. In the last 12 months, they
have had 109 confirmed failures with an experienced MTBUR 7517. Most of the failures are for the liquid level
sensors and/or ventilation valves.
What is being done to improve reliability of this highly used, but often deferred, necessary flight equipment?
BE Aerospace, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 176
EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
200
Trash Compactor Stops
Working During the Flight
3230005WV300
Safran
B787-9
25-32
ELY
EL-AL currently operates 36 units P/N: 3230005WV300 installed on 12 B787-9 airplanes. In the last 24 months,
the trash compactors have a high failure rate in service.
A total of 497 events are reported by Crew and Line Maintenance.
Line Maintenance
Faults are
Trash Compactors Confirmed by
Shop
Faults Total Count
TOTAL
497
Faults are
Not
Confirmed
by Shop
12
Totally Not
confirmed
Failures by
LINE
Maitanence
and Shop
17
480
All NFF events happen when the aircraft is in the air. We found that the Trash Compactor stops operating when
the power source is switched from APU to another source. This phenomenon exists in all B787-9 airplanes.
Can Boeing and the vendor can find a solution to this problem?
Do any other operators have the same problems?
Do any other operators have any procedures to reduce this problem?
Safran, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
201
Trash Compactor
Interchangeability
3230005WV300
Safran
B787-9
25-32
ELY
3230005WV600
B787-8
EL-AL currently operates 36 units P/N: 3230005WV300 on 12 B787-9 airplanes and nine units
P/N: 3230005WV600 on three B787-8 airplanes.
The P/N: 3230005WV300 is approved for installation (by Boeing) only on B787-9 airplanes.
The P/N: 3230005WV600 is approved for installation (by Boeing) only on B787-8 airplanes.
According to the manufacturer (Safran) and Boeing, P/N: 3230005WV300 and P/N: 3230005WV600 are
interchangeable and can be installed on B787-9 and B787-8 aircraft. But this is not approved by Boeing and
requires payment from airlines.
Can Boeing implement the Certification of both LRUs into two different airplane -8/-9 models as interchangeable
and intermixable in the IPC to assist all airlines?
Boeing, Safran, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 177
EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
202
Air Chiller Reliability
7000-2 /
Safran
B777-300ER
25
EVA
Wheel assembly, PN 36050-1 and PN 36050-2, is a sub-assembly of Air Chiller, PN 7000-2. EVA has replaced
more than 70 wheels in past 2 years; they are high consumption units. EVA reported to Zodiac in 2017, after
Safran took control of Zodiac Aerospace in 2018, but the solution has not been provided yet.
Wheel assembly improvement is in process. EVA would like Safran to provide a timeframe for service bulletin
publication.
Safran, comment please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
203
CMM Update
Request-- Air Chiller
7000-2
Safran
B777
25
EVA
Compressor assembly is sub-assembly of Air Chiller, PN: 7000-2.
Due to obsolescence, compressor PN: 33366-1 is replaced by PN 33711-201. Zodiac recommends the operator
return Air Chiller for compressor replacement in case of compressor PN: 33366-1 failure. Our shop has repair
capability for the Air Chiller in order to save maintenance cost and shorten the TAT. EVA would like Zodiac to
provide service procedures for the compressor assembly, PN 33711-201, and update the CMM accordingly.
Zodiac comment, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 178
EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
204
Soap Dispenser
CBS154-002
Carsten Daus
Airbus
A321Neo
25
TAP
TAP detected on the newest A321 Neos, due to a reported fault, some soap dispensers were removed as having
the IPC indicated P/N, the DCIN154-002. After removal, it was detected that the units have a different Part
Number and different manufacturer. The manufacturer indicated is Carsten Daus and the P/N is CBS154-002.
Airbus was contacted to provide information about the manufacturer and the Part Number, since there was no
indication on the Aircraft AMM and IPC, and we were informed by Airbus that this Part Number is completely
unknown on their system.
We would like to understand how this manufacturer appears installed in new aircraft without any indication.
Carsten Daus, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 179
EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
205
787 Interior CMM Support
Multiple Interior Compartments
Boeing
B787
25
AAL
For the Boeing 787 interior components installed, Boeing has not released any CMMs to support. This includes
overhead stowage bins, ceiling panels, overhead crew rest/entry modules, closets, doghouses. It is noted that for
SFE design components that were designed by design partners that CMMs were released. These CMMs
released includes galleys, lavatories, main entry door linings, sidewall panels and flight deck bulkhead. This is an
issue as Boeing directs operators to the AMM for repairs, but these instructions are not specific and too general.
When will Boeing release these CMMs for interior components installed?
Boeing, OEMs, other operators, please comment.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
206
B737NG/MAX Escape
Slides / Typical Slide
Girt Damages
5A3307-7
Collins
Aerospace
B737NG
25-60-37
LHT
SAS
5A3307-9
B737MAX
TVS
AFL
ESR
The slide girt P/N 5A3312-50 is part of the B737NG/MAX escape slide and is the connection between the aircraft
and the escape slide in case of an emergency.
Lufthansa Technik AG receives many B737NG/MAX escape slides that have typical damages on the edges of the
slide girt, that are caused by the interference of the slide girt edges with the J-hooks of the slide packboard and
the aircraft door. This leads to fraying and abrasion of the slide girt material and requires the replacement of the
part. The OEM confirmed to be aware of this problem but does not plan to improve/modify the design of the slide
girt or introduce any protection item against it.
Questions:
1. Are other operators or MRO companies experiencing the same issues on the B737NG/MAX escape
slides?
2. Since the slides are installed for 3ea years, and the newer P/N for even 5ea years on aircraft, this
damage over time can lead to a significant decrease of the structural strength of the slide girt, that might
not be noticed by the crew or line maintenance. Does the OEM consider this, when deciding to not
improve/modify the design?
3. Is Boeing aware of this issue with the B737NG escape slide girts?
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 180
EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
207
Suspect Quality and
Piece Part Provisioning
Heater (for Crew
Rest Compartments)
Diehl (AOA)
A330
25-75-01
LHT
A340
In 2016/2017, we had some smoke and smell events on A330/A340 crew rest compartments, caused by burnt
heating sub-assy. The thermos-sensors and switches of the heater have no effect and the controller is not able to
detect overheating and smell of these burnings too. Until now, we have the unsatisfied situation that the OEM is
not able to deliver new and enough heating sub assembly in good quality and we currently have to visually
inspect these heaters every 1000 flight hours to avoid further events. The OEM is also not able to repair these
units and due to parts obsolescence, the same problem maybe will occur in other units of the same crew rest
heating system, e.g., the controllers. Sometimes we have to reserve several business seats for the flight crew,
because we could not operate the crew rest compartment, because no serviceable heater has been available.
Currently some heating sub assy have been delivered, but the quality is suspect again.
Question:
What is the planning of the OEM to make sure that this crew rest heating system can be operated and maintained
in future again without any smoke and smell events and without any unserviceable controllers?
Photo:
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 181
EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING
Please any other comments from other MRO or aircraft operators.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 182
PNEUMATIC
******19-090******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Overpressure
Isolation Valve
Hi Pressure
Regulating Valve
6740F010000/6740G010000
Liebherr
A319
36-11-12
LHT
6773E/6774 Series
A320
HP Bleed Valve
6713D/6714D Series
6773B030000/6774B030000
A321
A330
36-1105/06/27/28/4
5/46/48/49/51
The indication microswitch 16HM4 has an early failure, mainly abnormal level of electrical resistance. Liebherr
issued SIL LS6740-36-01 on Jan 2018 (only 6740F/G) for additional testing to detect the early failure of the
microswitch and introduce a switch with new manufacturing process (overpressure isolation valve SN 6740-15001 or
higher, microswitch date code SN 1744 or higher). This microswitch is also installed on many High Flow valves as
listed above with the same problem. The new microswitch also fails from stock or within a few hundred flight hours of
service.
Other operators, have you seen the same failure with the new switch?
OEM, why SIL does not address all LRUs above? Will OEM look at a re-design of this switch?
OEM and other operator comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
208
Pressure Regulating Valve
PRV Reliability Issue
6774B040000
Liebherr
A330
36
SR
Technics
6764B060000
SR Technics sees a reliability problem on these PN levels:
• B04 has MTBUR 6,796 FH, while the lowest customer’s MTBUR within the SRT pool is 3,700 FH. The total
number of units in SR Technics’ pool is 89 each.
• B06 has even worse reliability although it is measured on the level of only one unit in SR Technics’ pool.
Unit failed after only 2,480 FH.
This bad reliability trend was confirmed on Liebherr RTW 2018:
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 183
PNEUMATIC
Bulletin 6764-36-06 that modifies B04 inti B06 has been put on hold (cancelled) as it has been noticed early
removals of PRV *B04 retrofitted into PRV *B06. Liebherr has discovered that the design is prone to create more
‘Engine Bleed Not Closed’ situation on the aircraft.
Per Liebherr’s words, it is not a design defect, but inadequacy to A330 Single engine taxi operation.
Therefore, to avoid massive in-service removals of PRV with very low time on wing, the OEM has decided to put the
retrofit of B04 into B06 on hold until further notice.
So far, there is no technical supporting material to detail the MRO’s/operator’s understanding of the situation and
announce further steps and/or reliability issue solutions.
Liebherr and other operator comments, please.
******19-095******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Low-Time HPV Microswitch Failures
6713D080000
6773E010000
Liebherr
Honeywell
A319
36
UAL
Honeywell Microswitch P/N 16HM4 is installed on all part number standards of Liebherr High Pressure Valve
assembly in the A319/320 family ATA 36 system. According to the MIL specifications for this microswitch, it is good
until 260 °C. However, during operation, the temperature of the air from the high stage duct can be as hot as 550 °C.
United needs to know the status of alternative design(s) for this switch to ensure proper operation for the
temperature range and/or mitigating actions that can be applied at a shop-level to reduce the failures of these
switches due to over-temperature conditions.
Note that this has been a long-term issue with Liebherr and we would like to hear from Liebherr at the MMC.
Other operators: Comments?
Liebherr, Honeywell, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 184
PNEUMATIC
******19-092******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Bleed Air Isolation Valve Corrosion
2760000-101
Parker
Boeing
B737
36
EXS
Jet2.com is suffering numerous failures of Parker Bleed Air Isolation Valve on our recently delivered aircraft. This is
not an issue we see on our established fleet, despite the valve being the same.
Parker has performed an investigation and cited nickel based contaminate as the root cause. They have also cited
that this contaminate does not come from their valve.
Jet2.com is seeking other operators’ experience with this valve, and for Boeing to assist in determining the source of
this contamination.
Other operators, Boeing, and Parker comments please.
******19-094******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
PRVC Diaphragm Ruptures
792755-15/-16
UTC Aerospace Systems
B747
B767
36
LHT
The Pressure Regulating Valve Controller (PRVC) PN 792755 has been a known driver of issues in ATA 36
(removals, delays, etc.) for many years. Several approaches were taken to improve the reliability of the unit and the
situation. The diaphragm inside the component and its surrounding parts was identified as a key factor for the
performance/failure reason. Several SBCs were developed to improve calibration stability of the PRVC and to
prevent a fail (break/rupture) of the diaphragm:
• 36-190 (B747) Jun 9/11 / 36-2181 (B767) – Diaphragm PN 792801-3, Spring Seat PN 818789-1, Code L19
• 36-191 (B747) Sep 20/12 / 36-2182 (B767) – Diaphragm PN 792801-5, Spring Seat PN 818789-2, Code
L20
• 36-194 (B747) Feb 28/17 / 36-2185 (B767) – Diaphragm PN 792801-5, Spring Seat PN 818789-3, Code
L21
The last modification code L21 introducing an improved Spring Seat was developed specially to prevent the failure
of a torn/broken diaphragm (as a part of Boeing ATA 36 Tiger Team activities). The analysis of the shop findings
during the last few years shows that torn/broken diaphragms are still a main failure mode with the L21 configuration
and improvement measures (e.g., enhanced more resistant diaphragm design) are still urgently needed. Please
refer to att. diagrams of reference operator.
Do other operators observe the same behavior?
What will be done to improve these LRUs?
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 185
PNEUMATIC
Figure 1: Cases of Ripped Diaphragms per Modification Code and Year
Figure 2: Cases of Ripped Diaphragms (All Modification Codes) per Year as Percentage of Event Total and in Sum
Figure 3: Example of Ripped Diaphragm Partially Disassembled
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 186
PNEUMATIC
Figure 4 and 5: Intact and Ripped Diaphragm
Operator, supplier, and airframer comments, please.
******19-130******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
TCV-5 Unreliability
398908-5
Honeywell
B737-800
21-61
EXS
Jet2.com is seeing an unacceptable level of reliability with the -5 TCV. Numerous warranty returns are from our
factory new aircraft under warranty, where most are NFF; however, we often have a number of leaking capacitors
as an incidental finding. Other issues include position switch issues. Honeywell has implied that there will be
another part number roll. This TCV started life as a -2 and we are now at a -5. Will these part number rolls be the
final part number rolls that correct the issues with the TCV?
Does Honeywell have an update on when these reliability improvements will be available to the operators?
Honeywell and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 187
PNEUMATIC
******17-045******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
HP Regulating
Valve
Anti-Ice Pneumatic
Shutoff Valve
6763C080000
Liebherr
A330
36
AFR/KLM
AFR
FYLB-52145-1
UTAS
30-21-15
FYLB-52145-2
FYLB-52145-3
Problems of vibration on engine CF6-80E1, which causes heavy damages on HP REGULATING VALVE and ANTI
ICE PNEUMATIC SHUTOFF VALVE. The vibrations seem to continue despite the modification by addition of links
(VSB GE CF6-80E1 72-0472 and AIB A330-71-3029).
1. MTBUR of the HP regulating valve (20 000 for MAY 2016 and 6925 for MAY 2017) decreases since end of
2015 after realization of modification. The main removal reasons (not open/HPV fault/not closed) are due to
many important damages (actuator repair/heavy damage) declared per OEM, 12 heavy damages for 20152016 for AF-KLM fleet.
2. Regarding FYLB-52145, the heavy vibration level of CF80 engine has a real impact on the reliability of the
valve. A VSB FYLB-52145-30-177 (upgrade from PN FYLB-52145-2 into -3) was implemented with no
positive results on the reliability (on A330 fleet). The same valve installed on A340 fleet has a MTBUR 3x
higher than the one installed on A330 fleet.
Will AIB, GE or LBH, and UTAS provide a new solution to improve the reliability of both components?
Please airlines, comment.
Examples of damages due to the vibration of engine, caused by the wear of the link on HP regulating valve:
Piston
Actuator housing
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 188
PNEUMATIC
Link damaged
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
209
IP Sensor
1151474-2
Honeywell
B777
36
AFR/KLM
AFR
AFR has faced for years very poor reliability on B777 IP Sensor P/N 1151474-2 with a high rate of NFF (80%). Fleet
Time Digest 777-FTD-36-18001 has been open since August 2018: Boeing investigation determined that thermal
degradation of the Sensor was the root cause (impacting protective coating, solder and epoxy).
Boeing’s conclusion is that they are unable to accurately quantify the expected reliability improvement for design
changes to the sensor itself or sensor installation; therefore, an industrial support plan will be implemented.
Can Boeing explain what is the meaning of an “Industrial support plan? And when this plan will be released?
Honeywell, Boeing and other operators, please comment.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 189
PNEUMATIC
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
210
FAV Duct Pylon
Broken
70649A010001
Liebherr
36
AFR/KLM
AFR
70649A010002
Airbus
A320
Neo
Airbus released late 2018 two RILs (SA54M18006038 and SA54M18000940) with SB A320-54-1043 in order to
reinforce the design of the 3 FAV Brackets directly on the Aircraft for certain batch of Aircraft S/N. Unfortunately, this
modification is not efficient as AFR noticed again failure on the Fan Air Valve brackets on modified Aircraft (11
removals). However, we never noticed any failure on aircraft modified on production.
TFU 36.11.00104 has been released on Nov. 19, and we are waiting for the corrective action.
Airbus, Liebherr, and other operators, please comment.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
211
V2500 Pneumatic
AirFlow Test Cart
IAE6F10029IAE6P16353
Pratt and Whitney
Airbus
36
UAL
The specification for these testers indicates that the manufacturer will supply operating and maintenance manuals
including calibration and maintenance instructions. United contacted the manufacturer several months ago to obtain
copies of these manuals. We have yet to receive them and would like to again request copies of these manuals.
Airbus, Operators and OEM comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 190
NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS
******19-228******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Lock Brake Sticking
3283086-3
Honeywell
B767
78
ANA
ANA has replaced 128 Lock Brakes between 2006 and 2018 as suspected cause of the damage of Short Flex
Shaft. Our line mechanics mostly suspect that the Lock Brake “sticking” causes the damage. However, only seven
of 128 Lock Brakes were confirmed to be the cause of the Short Flex Shaft damage at ANA's shop inspection.
ANA would like to know the mechanism of short flex shaft damage to reduce the removal of Lock Brake without
any fail.
We have the following questions and requests regarding this situation to Honeywell and Boeing:
1. We believe that the major cause of the short flex shaft damage such as shearing is sudden stuck of lock
brake. Honeywell and Boeing comments please.
2. Is there a possibility that the stuck Lock Brake return to normal condition suddenly for some reason?
3. If the sticking is enough to break the shaft, what kind of sticking marks appear? Which part of the Lock
Brake does the mark appear at?
4. What is the reason why Lock Brake suddenly sticks?
Other operator comments please.
******19-230******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Fan Cowl Actuator
725Z3191-31
Goodrich
Aerostructures
B787
71
AFR/KLM
AFR
The hydraulic female “quick disconnect coupling” to connect actuator to the test bench is not referenced in
documentation such as CMM.
Goodrich has already informed AFR-KLM that Parker is the vendor of the item that connect Actuator on aircraft.
Parker has noted they are not the PMA holder and the part can only to be sold to Boeing.
AFR-KLM requests the correct reference of female coupling to be ordered. Who is the authorized vendor?
Boeing, Goodrich comments please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 191
NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS
******19-231******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Fan Cowl
721Z2300-303NC
Boeing
UTAS
B787-200
GENX-1B
71-10
UAL
UAL has experienced two damaged fan cowls which exceed the repair scope of SRM
B787-A-54-21-01-01B-664A-A. The SRM covers wet lay-up repairs which is applicable to only 25% of the fan
cowl surface (SRM example shown as Fig. 1). One fan cowl was covered by UTAS one off repair, and the other
was traded in for exchange after Boeing/UTAS could not provide one off repair.
UAL would like to request Boeing/UTAS to provide pre-preg repairs to expand the SRM to cover no size limit
permanent repair as with other Boeing SRMs (777 SRM 54-20-01 Repair 1 as an example shown as Fig. 2). It is
frustrating while all other Boeing fleets operated by UAL has SRMs that list no size limit 350 °F pre-preg repairs;
but for the 787, 75% of the fan cowl is in the un-reparable zone.
UAL is open to new repair materials such as M20 or other pre-pregs.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 192
NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS
Boeing, please comment.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 193
NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS
******19-232******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
B767 GE Inlet Cowl Component
Overhaul Instructions
224-2101-573
Collins
Aerospace
Goodrich
Aerostructures
B767
71-11-16
UAL
UAL has been working on the subject Inlet Cowl and has noticed that the CMM does not contain sufficient data in
order to perform a complete overhaul of the Inlet cowl. For example, the check section contains information on
what TAI items to check on previous configurations of the nose cowl where a spray tube is used for the TAI,
where on the newest configuration a TAI spray tube does not exist and is a D-Duct style TAI system. Repairs for
the newest configurations are also not common and therefore the manual does not actually cover a full overhaul
and requires a newer revision.
Other operators: How are you performing repair/overhaul for the GE Inlet Cowl?
UAL requests a manual revision to include repair and overhaul instructions for the latest/newest configuration.
Can Collins Aerospace comment on this issue and provide a timeline for this manual revision to be released?
Collins Aerospace and other operator comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
212
PW4168 TR Support
70M000-51X
Pratt & Whitney
Airbus
A330
78
DAL
Pratt & Whitney (P&W) is the IP holder for this Thrust Reverser system. Middle River Aerostructures Systems
(MRAS) is the actual OEM. Delta has to submit repair design requests to P&W. The repairs then follow a
convoluted path:
• P&W to MRAS
• MRAS to P&W
• P&W to Airbus
• Airbus to P&W
• P&W to Delta
This system results in repairs taking 2+ months to receive. Similar repair requests for the CF6-80C2 TR system
(very similar design) go directly to MRAS and take approximately a week.
Delta needs the delays to be simplified.
Pratt & Whitney and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 194
NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
213
Thrust Reverser
Actuator
D23090000-8
Collins
Aerospace
A320
78
AFR/KLM
AFR
It is mentioned in the check chapter of the CMM 78-31-41 that “small amounts of corrosion in non-critical areas
that do not require the parts to be scrapped can be removed.”
As a corrective action proposal:
• As this comment is not suitable to evaluate/remove the pitting corrosion, this comment has to be detailed
in the check section/repair section of the CMM or in Standard Practice Manual, can you please take this
action?
As a preventive action proposal:
• Can a primary layer can be made up and added into the repair section of the CMM to prevent from
corrosion on the body actuator?
Collins, Airbus other MRO comment, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 195
NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
214
Incomplete CMM
612C3001
Feedback Locking
Actuator
Safran
Nacelles
A320NEO
78
LHT
DLH
The respective CMM 78-30-49 to the component in question does only provide procedures to verify if the unit is
serviceable or not, plus the replacement of minor external parts (nameplates, screws, etc., ref. to figure below). It
does not list any procedures for the replacement of any internal parts (valves, seals, etc.) or external electrical
parts (e.g., LVDT). Therefore, it does match the definition of an Abbreviated CMM only but not a CMM.
Proper maintenance incl. repair and replacement of piece parts is not possible with this level of information. LHT
considers the current situation highly unsatisfactory for a high selling product like A320neo family.
LHT requests that maintenance documentation will made public that allows a proper maintenance of the
component.
Other MROs please comment on this issue regarding similar experience.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 196
NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
215
Incomplete CMM
612C3501 Isolation
Control Unit
Safran
Nacelles
A320NEO
78
LHT
DLH
The respective CMM 78-30-41 to the component in question only provide procedures to verify if the unit is
serviceable or not, plus the replacement of minor external parts (nameplates, screws, etc.; ref. to figure below). It
does not list any procedures for the replacement of any internal parts (valves, seals, etc.) or external electrical
parts (e.g., solenoid). Therefore, it matches the definition of an Abbreviated CMM.
Proper maintenance incl. repair and replacement of piece parts is not possible with this level of information. LHT
considers the current situation highly unsatisfactory for a high selling product like A320neo family.
LHT requests that maintenance documentation will made public that allows a proper maintenance of the
component.
Other MROs please comment on this issue regarding similar experience.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 197
OXYGEN
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
216
Crew O2 Mask
MF20, MF40, and
MC10 Series
Safran/Zodiac
B737NG and MAX
35
AAL
B757
B767
B777
B787
A320F
A330
As previously discussed, AA uses the Zodiac MF20, MF40, and MC10 series masks cross fleet and between legacy
AA and US Air fleets. In the past few years, increasing reports of supply hose failure at the mask attachment have
been reported. This failure rate is still increasing and now also includes the MC10 and new MF40 series masks.
Zodiac has informed AAL and Airbus of an improvement to the supply line but there is no improvement proposed
for the Boeing fleets.
AAL has the following questions:
1. Have other operators seen failures on the MF40 and MC10 series masks O2 supply lines as well?
2. Can Zodiac and Boeing work together so that the same improvement on the Airbus fleet supply lines are
brought to the Boeing fleets as well?
Zodiac, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
217
Full Face Quick
Donning Mask
Regulator
MF40-45-002
Safran
B787
35
JAL
Full Face Quick Donning Mask Regulator has the issue of “Loosen Mask Lock Screw”. This issue can result in the
Separation of Mask and Regulator during flight.
Since 2019, JAL has experienced 6 times of Mask Lock Screw issues in zero or short flight hours.
1. Incorrect screw installation as same as Fig.7002, CMM 35-13-77 (been floated the inner part of the screw
and washer) despite these were brand new (3 cases)
2. The red colored lock vanish has not been applied (2 cases)
3. Mask and Regulator had been separated completely during flight due to loosen screw (1 case)
This may be considered both a repair and production issue and should be solved as soon as possible. But no
corrective action has been taken at this time.
Please be aware that the issue of oxygen system could cause to obstruct safe flight and induce irregular flight (i.e.,
Air Turned Back to the Airport or Diversion to the alternate airport).
JAL still expects Safran to accelerate the root cause analysis and process improvement on this issue.
Comments from the other operators and Safran would be appreciated.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 198
OXYGEN
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
218
Lavatory O2 Cylinder
807894 Series
Safran/Zodiac
B737NG
B767
35
AAL
These Lavatory O2 cylinders are sealed, with no gauge attached. To verify during internal shop visits, AA has been
weighing the cylinder to ensure no leakage has occurred. Safran has provided minimum weight information to AAL
and has committed to add this information to the CMM so that that it can be readily checked.
AAL has the following concerns:
1. Other than the above weighing, the only means to check that the cylinder is full is to observe that the striker
pin is protruding. After actuation of the cylinder, a cotter pin can be re-inserted until a cylinder is nearly
empty. If this is done, an empty cylinder will appear full. This aspect of the design is concerning.
2. We have concerns that the cylinders may leak during their 15-year life limit. We internally tested a cylinder
and the weight was below what we typically see but still above the minimum set by Zodiac. When we tested
it, we measured a weight loss of 74g, when it should be closer to 86g for the full O2 volume.
Safran and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
219
Torque of Valve Cylinder
804044-15
Safran
B777
35
AFR/KLM
AFR
December 2018:
“The locknut between oxygen cylinder and valve torque indicated in CMM (240 in.lbs) damage the valve thread.
As consequence: the valve can't be installed. AFI can't hear another 'have you respected the torque value?’
We thought repaired valve was the problem, so we bought new valve and test the torque value indicated in
CMM (240 in.lbs) -> Same results: damage on the valve thread.
There was a meeting with Zodiac Aerospace on 27th September 2018 and no answer was brought to us about
this topic. No other costumers complains about the torque of valve cylinder.”
December 2019: This case is not resolved. Safran tells us there is only one solution that is PMA (Part Manufacturing
Approval).
Air France politic does not allow PMA on oxygen equipment for safety reasons.
Will Safran give us other solutions?
Safran and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 199
DOORS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
220
Battery Maintenance
BPAS10-5
Radiant Power Corp.
B777
52-11
AAL
For aircraft battery maintenance, AAL is currently using the practice of stocking batteries in a freezer to preserve
the battery charge while in storage.
Radiant’s battery maintenance requires charging the battery twice a month or provide continuously trickle charge
to the battery while in storage. AAL is in the process of implementing a program to continuously trickle charge this
battery while in storage.
Please comment on your airline’s maintenance program with this battery or aircraft batteries in general?
Airline, vendor, OEM, please comment.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 200
WATER & WASTE
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
221
Non-Procurable
Parts
77001-040 /
7700-600 Water
Pump
Safran
(Zodiac
W&W)
Boeing
B787
38
AFR/KLM
AFR
In CMM 38-17-14:
• Ball item 1-90 PN: D7-1-14 is listed and should be procurable.
o Identification tag item 1A-20 PN: B4-482-1 is listed and should be procurable.
Safran, could you please provide a quotation and lead time for these parts?
Safran, please comment.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
222
Software: Toilet
VSB
38000-150-20X
Safran
(Zodiac
Monogram)
A380
38
AFR/KLM
AFR
VSB 38000-150-38-006 REV03 dated DEC2019
One of the VSB’s objectives is to update the toilet MPI by a new revision of software. To do so, AF needs MPI
Download Software Tool (MST), PNR 38100-475SW3, and the software which needs to upload in the unit
referenced as 38201-364SW2.00.hex.
Safran does not want to furnish this software, which is essential to perform this VSB, because capability is
available in their shop.
All necessary parts or software included in the VSB should be procurable to apply it.
The software should be provided by Safran: could you provide them?
Safran, please comment?
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 201
WATER & WASTE
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
223
Toilet Assy.
[1]
AOA
Apparatebau Gauting
A330
38-31
DAL
[1]
COMPONENT
A – TOILET ASSY. (P/N)
TA9115-00
TA9125-00
TA9116-00
TA9126-00
SUB-COMPONENT
A1 – WATER VALVE ASSY (P/N)
A2 – FLUSH CONTROL MODULE (P/N)
WV9135-01
FCM9130-01
B – TOILET ASSY. (P/N)
J540AI1-700
J540AI2-700
J540AI1-701
J540AI2-701
B1 – WATER VALVE ASSY (P/N)
B2 – FLUSH CONTROL MODULE (P/N)
WV9135-00
FCM9130-01
Delta has toilets that come off wing at very short intervals, some that fail on installation. A lot of the removals are
for the toilets not flushing. Some toilets may cycle but there is no water flow into the bowl. Sometimes toilets are
removed for continual flushing.
Attachment 1 shows all closed alerts since July 2019 on the A330 toilets. These alerts provide the reasons for
their removal, as well as, the respective corrective actions. This information is only for the low time alert toilets we
received in the shop.
During the repair process, Delta is experiencing problems with them passing test due to error coded during the bit
check. Most of the time they appear to function properly, i.e., good water flow, flushes good but throws a code: 20
on the 4th or 5th cycle on the test stand. Per the CMM (38-31-61) this could indicate either a water valve or FCM
depending the test. We have these issues on both the TA9115-00/TA9125-00 and the J580AIXX toilets.
OTHER SIGNIFICANT ISSUES:
1. High level of calcification on the spray ring assembly P/N 9110-02-0000-00 (Ref Attachment 2)
2. Corrosion on the water valve solenoid housing due to water and other fluids splashing through the vent
holes on the upper back section of the toilet bowl (Ref. Attachment 3)
3. Unrealistic lead times for the procurements of spare parts.
Are other carriers/repair stations seeing low time removals on repaired units? Excessive failures with the water
valves (WV9135-01 or -00)? Excessive failures with the Flush Control Modules (FCM9130-01)? Other issues in
service or with repair processes?
ATTACHMENT 1 – 2019 ALERTS
ALERT COMPLETED 7/23/19
ALERT 59296
FTN 2G0104
P/N TA9115-00
S/N 01450366
COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: 2L LAVATORY
LOUD AIR NOISE IN CRUISE. SHOP FOUND WASTE GATE STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION (FAULTY CONTROL
MODULE). CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER OEM CMM 38-31-61 OEM REV. 2 DTD (12/5/2014).
REPAIRED THE FLUSH CONTROL MODULE AND ASSOCIATED PACKINGS AND HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD.
TIME SINCE REPAIR: 94DAYS, 21 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 129.29 HOURS. REMOVED ON 6/22/19, RETURNED TO
SERVICE 7/15/19.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 202
WATER & WASTE
PREVIOUS FINDINGS:
NO DATA AVAILABLE. PART PREVIOUSLY REPAIRED AT PERFORM AIR.
ALERT COMPLETED 9/26/19
ALERT 60162
FTN 4Q1700
P/N TA9115-00
S/N 11455546
COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: TOILET KEEPS
FLUSHING. UNIT WILL BE ROUTED TO OUTSIDE VENDOR FOR REPAIR AS IT HAS BEEN REPIRED THREE TIMES THIS
YEAR. THIS TOILET WAS LAST REPAIRED IN DEPT 390 ON 9/14/19. CORRECTIVE ACTION CLEANED INSPECTED
REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 006 DTD 09/06/2019, OEM REV 00212/052/2014 PUB 36975.
REPLACED ASSOCIATED PACKINGS AND HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 181 DAYS, 16
CYCLES, FLYING TIME 136.36 HOURS. REMOVED ON 8/30/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 9/14/19. THIS UNIT HAS
BEEN REPAIRED TWO TIMES PREVIOUSLY IN 2019 BY PERFORM AIR, THE SECOND TIME WAS FOR WARRANTY
FROM A FEBRUARY REPAIR.
ALERT COMPLETED 10/7/19
ALERT 60108
FTN 4T9360
P/N TA9115-00
S/N 11455817
COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: LAV A
INOP LEAKING FROM WATER SUPPLY LINE. SHOP FOUND TOILET DIRTY / LEAKING. CORRECTIVE
ACTION CLEANED INSPECTED, REPAIRED, AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 006 DTD
09/06/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014. REPLACED BAD PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE;
UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 122.0 DAYS, 5 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 48.00 HOURS.
REMOVED ON 9/17/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 9/30/19.
PREVIOUS FINDINGS:
TOILET REMOVED FOR WATER LEAK. SHOP FOUND WATER LEAK AND WATER. CORRECTIVE ACTION CLEANED
INSPECTED REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM OEM CMM 38-31-61 OEM REV. 2 DTD (12/5/2014). REPLACED
FLUSH CONTROL MODULE, TOILET BOWL, AND ACCOCIATED PACKINGS AND HARDWARE. REMOVED ON 5/20/19,
RETURNED TO SERVICE 7/15/19. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 100 DAYS, 17 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 123.23 HOURS.
ALERT COMPLETED 10/7/19
ALERT 60313
FTN 65B0VY
P/N TA9115-00
S/N 11454470
COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: TOILET IS INOP,
WILL NOT FLUSH. SHOP FOUND BAD RINSE VALVE AND DIRRTY. CORRECTIVE ACTION CLEANED INSPECTED,
REPAIRED, AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 007DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA
580187-14 PUB. 36975. REPLACED RINSE VALVE, PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD.
TIME SINCE REPAIR: 12.0 DAYS, 0 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 0 HOURS. REMOVED ON 10/10/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE
10/29/19.
PREVIOUS FINDINGS:
TOILET REMOVED FOR TOILET WILL NOT FLUSH. CORRECTIVE ACTION CLEANED, INSPECTED, AND TESTED PER
CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 006 DTD 09/06/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 PUB 36975. NO MATERIALS
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 203
WATER & WASTE
REPLACED, UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 82.0 DAYS, 2.0 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 21.24 HOURS. REMOVED
ON 10/19/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 10/5/19.
ALERT COMPLETED 11/7/19
ALERT 60438
FTN 2F9935
P/N J540AI2-701
S/N 30314
COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: DIRTY AND BROKE
ELBOW. SHOP FOUND BROKEN ELBOW. CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-58 DAL
REV 005 DTD 10/07/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 05/10/2005 ERA 580187-14 PUB. 31331. REPLACED ELBOW,
PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 12.0 DAYS, 0 CYCLES, FLYING
TIME 0 HOURS. REMOVED ON 10/10/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 10/28/19.
PREVIOUS FINDINGS:
TOILET REMOVED FOR AIRLEAK AT FLAPPER VALVE IN TOILET. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS DAMAGED ELBOW
LEAKS. RCVD AS REPAIRED FROM VC:10007207 , DTD:15/AUG/2019 , TN:PAI258255 , WO/PO:4800086277 , GVI.
NOT N WRNTY,SENT-OUTSIDE,REPAIRED. TECHNICIAN D.NADZAM, I, 889412 08/15/2019
ALERT COMPLETED 11/13/19
ALERT COMPLETED 11/13/19
ALERT 60438
FTN 2F9989
P/N TA9125-00
S/N 01461430
COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: COMPONENT
TROUBLE
LAV E 205 BOTTLE STUCK INSIDE TOILET. SHOP FOUND DIRTY, JAMMED. CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED,
INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 007 DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD
12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14 PUB.36975. REMOVED JAM, REPLACED PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE;
UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 98.0 DAYS, 4.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 27.00 HOURS. REMOVED ON
11/1/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 11/9/19.
PREVIOUS FINDINGS:
RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: SHUT OFF WATER SUPPLY IN MAIN DECK LAV F" INDICATION ON FAP
INOPERATIVE. SHOP FOUND DIRTY, BROKE W/V HOUSING, BAD FCM. CORRECTIVE ACTION CLEANED INSPECTED,
REPAIRED, AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 007DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA
580187-14 PUB. 36975. REPLACED WATER SHUTOFF VALVE FITTING, FLUSH CONTROL MODULE, PACKINGS AND
ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 803.0 DAYS, 1238.0 CYCLES, FLYING TIME
9816.49 HOURS. REMOVED ON 7/30/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 10/28/19.
ALERT COMPLETED 11/25/19
ALERT 60110
FTN 4E4820
P/N TA9115-00
S/N 54816
COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: LAV INOP,
REPORTED BY PILOT. SHOP FOUND BAD FCM, BAD WATER VALVE, BAD BOWL AND DIRTY. CORRECTIVE ACTION:
CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER 38-31-61 DAL REV 007DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD
12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14 PUB. 36975. REPLACED FCM, WATER SHUT OFF VALVE, TOILET BOWL, PACKINGS AND
ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 103.0 DAYS, 17 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 105.18
HOURS. REMOVED ON 9/18/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 11/20/19.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 204
WATER & WASTE
PREVIOUS FINDINGS:
RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: RINSE WATER WILL NOT SHUT OFF. SHOP FOUND CONTINUOUS WATER FLOW.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 OEM REV. 2 DTD
(12/5/2014). REPLACED CONNECTING TUBE, TOILET RING, AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD.
TIME SINCE REPAIR: 79.0 DAYS, 19.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 122.41 HOURS. REMOVED ON 4/16/19, RETURNED TO
SERVICE 8/28/19.
ALERT COMPLETED 12/10/19
ALERT 60426 LEVEL 3
FTN 4Q1696
P/N TA9115-00
S/N 54729
COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: LAV A
CONTINUALLY FLUSHES. SHOP FOUND: TOILET DIRTY, FLUSH CONTROL MODULE AND WATER VALVE
INOPERATIVE. CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61. DAL REV
007 DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14. REPLACED FLUSH CONTROL MODULE,
WATER VALVE, PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 36.00 DAYS,
6.0 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 33.24 HOURS. REMOVED ON 10/19/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 11/27/19.
PREVIOUS FINDINGS:
RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: TOILET WILL NOT FLUSH. SHOP FOUND FLUSHES CONTINUALLY. CORRECTIVE
ACTION: REPAIRED AND INSPECTED PER CMM. 38-31-61 DAL REV 006 DTD 09/06/2019 OEM REV 002DTD
12/05/2014 REMOVED PAGES CONTAINING OOPP PARTS PER MDCR 2020882. REPLACED TOILET BOWL,
PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 133.00 DAYS, 10.00 CYCLES,
FLYING TIME 85.09 HOURS. REMOVED ON 9/15/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 10/01/19.
ALERT COMPLETED 12/10/19
ALERT 60426
FTN 3V2812
P/N TA9125-00
S/N 01462889
COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: WATER SEWAGE.
LEAKING INTO AFT GALLEY FROM AFT LEFT LUA. SHOP FOUND LEAKING AT ELBOW/ ORBITAL VALVE; INCORRECT
HARDWARE INSTALLED; VALVE CLOGGED/DAMAGED. CORRECTIVE ACTION: REPAIRED BY PERFORM AIR
INTERNATIONAL INC DTD 27/NOV/2019; TNPAI 263004; WO/PO 4800088165; GVI-RTS. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 93.00
DAYS, 7.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 37.29 HOURS. REMOVED ON 10/20/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 11/27/19.
PREVIOUS FINDINGS:
RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: CLASS II FAULT {{PREVIOUS LOG 1134595 CLOSED IN ERROR, FAULT STILL
PRESENT}}. SHOP FOUND CLASS II FAULT CLOSED IN ERROR. CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED,
REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 004DTD 06/12/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 EO
3810-01129 PUB. 36975. REPLACED PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE
REPAIR: 1126.00 DAYS, 24.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 147.50 HOURS. REMOVED ON 7/20/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE
8/12/19.
ALERT COMPLETED 12/20/19
ALERT 60718
FTN 2F9958
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 205
WATER & WASTE
P/N TA9125-00
S/N 60337
COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: LAV HAS A
CONTINUOUS VACUUM PUMP REPRESSURIZATION. SHOP FOUND LAV HAS A CONTINUOUS VACUUM PUMP
REPRESSURIZATION. CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61
DAL REV 007 DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14 PUB. 36975. SEALS, PACKINGS, AND
ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 133.00 DAYS, 3 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 28.10
HOURS. REMOVED ON 11/23/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 12/17/19.
PREVIOUS FINDINGS:
RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: RM COMPONENT TROUBLE FAP MSG LAV D. SHOP FOUND BAD FCM AND BAD
OR WORN BOWL. CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL
REV 007DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14 PUB. 36975. REPLACED TOILET BOWL,
FLUSH CONTROL MODULE, WATERHOSE, TOILET RING, PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED
GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 534.00 DAYS, 842.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 6646.23 HOURS. REMOVED ON 7/15/19,
RETURNED TO SERVICE 10/30/19.
ALERT COMPLETED 1/7/20
ALERT 60718
FTN 2F9958
P/N TA9125-00
S/N 60337
COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: 4L DOOR LAV HAS
A CONTINUOUS VACUUM PUMP REPRESSURIZATION CYCLE EVERY 30 SEC. LOUD SOUND. SHOP FOUND DIRTY /
TIME LIMITED PARTS. CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61
DAL REV 007 DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14 PUB. 36975. REPLACED SEALS,
PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 133.00 DAYS, 3.00 CYCLES,
FLYING TIME 28.10 HOURS. REMOVED ON 11/23/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 12/17/19.
PREVIOUS FINDINGS:
RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: FAP MSG LAV D. SHOP FOUND BAD FCM AND WORN BOWL. CORRECTIVE
ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 007DTD 10/08/2019 OEM
REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14 PUB. 36975. REPLACED BOWL, FLUSH CONTROL MODULE, TOILET RING,
HOSE, MOUNTING BRACKET, TUBE, FILTER, PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME
SINCE REPAIR: 534.00 DAYS, 842.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 6646.23 HOURS. REMOVED ON 7/15/19, RETURNED TO
SERVICE 10/30/19.
ALERT COMPLETED 1/27/20
ALERT 60573
FTN 4A4569
P/N TA9115-00
S/N 11454250
COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: CFS TECH REP CLASS 2 MSG REPETITIVE ITEM 38-31-41 LAV53(3L). SHOP FOUND TOILET DIRTY, BOWL WORN, WATER VALVE
INOPERATIVE. CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM38-31-61 DAL REV 007 DTD10/08/2019 OEM
REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14. REPLACED TOILET BOWL, WATER VALVE, PACKINGS, AND ASSOCIATED
HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 151.00 DAYS, 92.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 543.07 HOURS.
REMOVED ON 1/14/20, RETURNED TO SERVICE 1/17/20.
PREVIOUS FINDINGS:
RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: CLASS 2 FAULT - LAV 54 (LAV D). SHOP FOUND FAULTY RINSE VALVE (LEAKING RINSE
RING). CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 OEM REV. 2 DTD
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 206
WATER & WASTE
(12/5/2014). REPLACED WATER SHUTOFF VALVE FITTING, PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED
GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 90 DAYS, 40.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 320.05 HOURS REMOVED ON 6/8/19, RETURNED
TO SERVICE 7/17/19.
ALERT COMPLETED 1/28/20
ALERT 60951
FTN 3V2812
P/N TA9125-00
S/N 01462889
COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: PER STEP 9 OF
AMDS 3810-1001, REMOVE LAV C TOILET ASSY P/N: TA9125-00, S/N:01462889 AND INSTALL NEW TOILET ASSY. SHOP
FOUND TOILET DIRTY. CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61. DAL REV 007 DTD
10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14. REPLACED WATER SHUTOFF VALVE, PACKINGS, AND
ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 61.00 DAYS, 2.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 15.38
HOURS. REMOVED ON 12/20/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 1/21/20.
PREVIOUS FINDINGS:
RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: WATER SEWAGE. LEAKING INTO AFT GALLEY FROM AFT LEFT LUA, LOC WATER
SEWAGE. LEAKING INTO AFT GALLEY FROM AFT LEFT LUA, LOCKED LAV. FNDS: LEAKING AT ELBOW/ ORBITAL VALVE;
INCORRECT HARDWARE INSTALLED; VALVE CLOGGED/DAMAGED. CORRECTIVE ACTION: TOILET REPAIRED BY 10007207
PERFORM AIR INTERNATIONAL INC DTD 27/NOV/2019; TNPAI 263004; WO/PO 4800088165; GVI-RTS. TIME SINCE
REPAIR: 93.00 DAYS, 7.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 37.29 HOURS. REMOVED ON 12/20/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE
11/27/19.
ALERT COMPLETED 1/29/20
ALERT 60459
FTN 2F9980
P/N TA9125-00
S/N 60928
COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: LAV NOT FLUSHING.
SHOP FOUND DIRTY, BAD WATER VALVE, AND BAD FCM. CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 3831-61 DAL REV 007 DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 PUB. 42855. REPLACED FLUSH CONTROL MODULE,
WATER VALVE, PACKINGS, AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 76.00 DAYS,
6.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 30.46 HOURS. REMOVED ON 10/23/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 1/29/20.
PREVIOUS FINDINGS:
RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: LAV 3R DOES NOT FLUSH. SHOP FOUND BOWL COATING WORN/ DIRTY. CLEANED,
INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 006 DTD 09/06/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014
REMOVED PAGES CONTAINING OOPP PARTS PER MDCR 2020882. REPLACED TOILET BOWL, PACKINGS, AND ASSOCIATED
HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 14.00 DAYS, 24.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 137.56 HOURS.
REMOVED ON 8/10/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 9/25/19.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 207
WATER & WASTE
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 208
WATER & WASTE
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
224
Water Pump and 2
and 4 Port Motor
Operated Valve
Training
77001-040 /
7700-600
Safran
(Zodiac
W&W)
B787
38
AFR/KLM
AFR
77000-685 /
77000-695
This item refers to AMC 19-255, which was closed last year but Safran’s commitment has not been fulfilled since
then.
AFR has requested training on the following components:
• 77000-600/77001-040 – Potable Water Pump
• 77000-695 – 2 port Motor Operated Drain Valve
• 7700-685 – 4 port Motor Operated Drain Valve
OEM does not have the ability to provide the trainings (repair is done by subcontractors, repair is done by other
Business units, or Zodiac does not have PMA certificate to sub-assy and piece parts).
We request Zodiac (Safran Aerosystems) to propose a solution and provide training as contracted with airframer.
Safran, please comment?
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
225
Vacuum Generator
77000-003
77000-003-201
Safran
Zodiac
B787
38
AFR/KLM
AFR
Air France has been waiting for the quotation of the bench/tools and software fort the B787 vacuum generator P/N
77000-003 and P/N: 77000-003-201, CMM 38-37-20 for more than one year and half.
In fact, a quotation was provided last June, before placing an order. Air France has requested if the software
mentioned in the CMM for the card test was also included. The OEM has answered a CMM was in progress and it
could not confirm. A new CMM update was issued last October but no new quotation has been received yet.
Air France requests the quotation of the complete bench/tools/software described in the CMM for recertified this
vacuum generator.
Safran/Zodiac Water & Waste, Boeing please comment.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 209
WATER & WASTE
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
226
Piece Parts
Provisioning
PN 14330-375 Vacuum
Generator Assembly
Safran
A320
Family
A340
EJET
38-31-81
LHT
Zodiac
In 2019, we had a lot of problems to perform the MRO of the mentioned vacuum generators, because piece parts
like the second stage housing (DPL, figure 1, item 160A, PN 67410353-1) could not be delivered by the OEM for
some months. In the meantime, the OEM was not able to repair these units as well due to same reasons. This
already has affected flight operation.
Question: What is the planning of the OEM to make sure that all necessary piece parts can be delivered in an
acceptably time?
Please any comments from other MROs.
Photo of a second stage housing (CMM 38-31-81, DPL, figure 1, item 160A, PN 67410353-1):
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 210
OTHERS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
227
Time to Answer one AOG
Request
Any
Airbus
A320
Any
AZU
A330
Some time ago, AZU made an AOG request to Airbus (#80732538) around 03AM through TechRequest, that was
delayed approximately 2h30min beyond the scheduled time for one AOG request (4h) to be answered.
When the form was filled out, it was selected “AOG”, because we needed a fast answer.
After this time, a call was made to France asking an answer, because the scheduled time for one AOG answer
was over. When the final answer was sent, we asked Airbus why they were delayed, and they answered that we
should have modified the automatic hour that appeared in the form (23h59min) as they follow this time as the
reference.
If an operator is requesting one AOG answer and this information was written in the form, this time “23h59” should
be modified automatically for 04h beyond the time that the request is being done, not the end of the day.
Other operators, comments please.
Airbus, please give your comments.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
228
OEM Code Numbers in CMM
Any
Any
All
Any
KLM/AFR
KLM
Some OEMs are using own created part numbers for commercially available materials in their CMMs. This makes
it difficult to understand what material the OEM means. Requesting a “translation” list takes time and effort.
1. Are other operators having the same issues? Please comment.
2. What is Boeing and Airbus policy on OEMs using own created part numbers for commercially available
materials in OEM CMMs?
Item
Summary Title
229
PC Applications on W10
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
Teledyne
GE
Boeing
Panasonic
All Fleets
ATA
From
SWA
Airline IT departments are cutting support for XP and Windows 7, and engineering departments are being
company mandated to 64-bit operating systems software applications. Southwest Airlines has software
applications that are not Windows 10 compatible such as: Remote Data Station application by GE, Boeing’s UMD,
CSCT (Configuration Item Signer Crater Tool) QAR Utility (Quick Access Recorder), and CF Card Maker by
Panasonic.
A potential solution I see is what Teledyne is offering with Teledyne AGS95, which is not 64 bit, that the airlines
can access the software through the Teledyne Cloud.
Other operator and supplier comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 211
OTHERS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
230
Aircraft Fuselage Damaged
at Airport Stopover
N/A
All
All
N/A
Safran
Context:
During ground operations at an airport stopover, aircraft fuselages (composite and aluminum) may be potentially
damaged by the tools and/or machines providing their ground services (passengers, Luggage loading, Catering,
Refueling, etc.); these shocks could potentially serious damage the aircraft fuselage structure and in some cases
it is not visible by the crew (the pictures below show different shocks and their impact on aircraft fuselage).
•
•
•
Is the airframer and/or airlines aware of this issue?
Are other operators seeing similar issues?
How do the airlines proceed in case of damages to the aircraft structure during airport stopover? What
are the procedures? Do you use a special instrument to detect the damages or you only perform a simple
visual inspection?
Safran is working on a solution to detect shocks and is looking to discuss with potential users.
For further information, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 212
OTHERS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
231
B787 Goldcare Repair
Order Visibility
Goldcare Components
Boeing
B787
N/A
UAL
Background:
United Airlines is currently subscribed to the Goldcare program; as components are removed from the aircraft and
returned to the Goldcare pool for repair/re-certification, the operator doesn’t have traceability on the issue(s)
found and corrected by the repair facility, so that the operator can bridge the gap between the removal reason(s)
and manufacturer correction(s) and ensure that the diagnostics approach utilized by the operator was the most
effective.
United Airlines needs full component traceability, i.e., from “birth” to “death”, so we can accurately track the
maintenance lifecycle operating cost (MLOC) of a subcomponent and a key input for tracking this metric is via the
shop findings report. However, for an operator to attain a copy of the shop findings report for Goldcare
components is very arduous; UAL either sends numerous emails to established contacts at Boeing or we submit
service requests to attain a copy of the repair findings.
Please note, we often reach out to the supplier of the component to provide us a copy of the shop findings report,
but we are often redirected to Boeing as we are told that the component is part of the Goldcare program and the
airline operator is not the owner of the part.
Question 1: UAL is requesting Boeing to create a central portal via My Boeing Fleet where operators who are
subscribed to the Goldcare program can view the component history of all Goldcare components, especially as
these components are a part of a shared pool so we all have the right to know the history of the components we
install on our aircraft.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 213
OTHERS
******19-262******
Item
Summary Title
Finding System Parts in the
B787 Fuselage
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Boeing
B787
53
KLM/AFR
KLM
KLM recently completed the first three C-checks of KLM 787-9s. An issue that created multiple maintenance
disturbances was the lack of access to fasteners for replacement due to lightning strike damage.
Example 1: ref A shows a picture of a lightning strike on a fastener on PH-BHD (ZB236). After removal of the
interior lining from the forward cargo compartment, a duct was found to cover the fastener location, see ref B. This
duct is part of the ECS. There was no more time left in the C-check to remove, re-install and test this duct.
KLM engineering analyzed why the presence of this duct was missed during the work preparation phase. We
found that:
1. The fastener is common to a stringer that is NOT shown in the 787-9 SRM structure identification,
2. The duct/ECS system is not referenced or shown in the frame drawing.
Ref. A
Conclusion: the inability to see in Boeing SRM and fuselage frame drawing that the ECS system is located
directly behind the frame makes the engineer miss important access information.
Example 2: PH-BHD (ZB236) had a lightning strike at a fastener at STA569, between STR38L and 39L. During
access, KLM found that the fastener is behind the ref C Refrigeration Unit. This unit cannot be removed easily.
Since the C-check ground time was limited, the fastener could not be replaced. KLM also found that this fastener
is common to an intercostal that is not shown in the 787 SRM, nor in the frame drawings.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 214
OTHERS
Conclusion: again, KLM engineering missed important access information here, resulting in a maintenance
disturbance and postponement of the task.
General:
To prevent future work stoppage and postponement of repairs, KLM engineering needs more insight into the
presence of system parts adjacent to 787 structure, as noted in the two examples above. The structure LWG
drawing typically does NOT show the surrounding system parts, NOR are they referenced. The system drawings
ARE generally accessible for KLM in the Bill of Materials Data Search, but you do need a system drawing number
to start.
Please note that it is often not practical to have a look inside a 787 during A-checks: KLM mechanics have a high
workload and have little time to assist engineering with removing and re-installing lining, parts, systems. The
cockpit is a busy area with mechanics doing checks, there not much space for system/cabinet removal. Also,
787s are not frequently hangered due to the high A-check interval.
This item was sent to Boeing as a SR. Until now, Boeing indicates that a composite drawing that combines the
structural, electrical, and systems installation for a specific section of the airplane does not exist and has not been
produced by Engineering. However, in each of the systems installation drawings, there will be a reference to a
structure, electrical harnesses, or system as a reference for orientation purposes.
In other words: you will have to review the separate system installation drawings, which remains a labor intense
way.
DESIRED ACTION:
KLM Engineering needs a B787 (LWG) drawing that shows all of the airplane systems that are located between
fuselage frames, or immediately behind fuselage frames. The drawing should show (1) if there is a system
present adjacent to the structure, and (2) show a reference drawing number of that particular system.
KLM needs such a drawing to engineer lightning strikes for the B787-9 and B787-10 fuselages. Separate
drawings for each B787 section will also do.
Boeing and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 215
OTHERS
******19-275******
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Fire Extinguisher – Press. Switch
33600005-3
34600028-1
Meggitt
A320 Fam
26
TAP
The Halon 1301 fire extinguishers have installed a welded pressure switch. This pressure switch is designed to
permit the functional test with a hex-wrench, during aircraft maintenance or in the shop, during overhaul and
repair.
We noted that this hex adapter in the pressure switch is showing more frequently a strong corrosion.
Due to manufacturing material used, with the addition of a weak design, the hex wrench adapter fractures very
frequently. This component is not repairable, and the cost associated with the replacement makes the unit
normally beyond economical and technical repair.
The conclusion is that the design of the hex adapter and materials used in this fire extinguisher should be
reanalyzed by the manufacturer to avoid the scrap as a consequence of a test.
The newly manufactured fire extinguishers have also frequently shown corrosion on the container, not acceptable
per DOT regulations.
We would like to know the industry experience on this matter and the manufacturer feedback about this issue.
Considering this issue is a serious problem already reported to the manufacturer, we would like to know, in the
case of a worldwide reported issue, what has been done to improve the reported problem.
Meggitt and other operator comments please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
232
Part Not Procurable
120874 / Differential Pressure Switch
Unison
A330
75
EVA
CMM 75-44-13 is component maintenance manual of Differential Pressure Switch (DPS), P/N 120874. Switch
assembly, PN 230159, is SRU of DPS; CMM has replacement procedure of switch assembly, PN 230159.
However, switch assembly, PN 230159, is not procurable resulting in the operator having to replace the NHA
DSP, PN 120874.
Why can the switch assembly, PN 230159, not be procured? Why did Unison provide a replacement procedure to
an unprocurable part in the CMM?
Unison comment, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 216
OTHERS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
233
Remote Data Concentrator
(RDC)
182594-001
GE Aviation Systems
B787
42
SR
Technics
Over the last 24 months, 33 removals were noticed, whereof 17 removals were NFF in shop. Several of the
Boeing FIM’s were amended as they wrongly indicated the RDC as the faulty component, but NFF rate remains
high. Could you please provide explanation for such a high rate of NFF units?
Boeing, GE, and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
234
Printers Reliability
C31007AA01
C31007AA02
Thales
A330-900
45
TAP
TAP is experiencing low reliability on printers PN C31007AA01 and C31007AA02 which are installed on the
recently phased-in A330neo fleet. Since the beginning of 2019, there have been 21 unscheduled removals, of
which 4 are repetitive units, of a total of 22 units currently on TAP fleet. Thales has been made aware of this issue
and informed that the root cause was already identified and that a production improvement has been introduced
on the faulty components. In TAP’s experience, even after this improvement, the overall reliability remains low
and the number of unscheduled removals remains unacceptable. Thales has been supporting TAP on this issue
but up until now there has not been a definite solution provided.
TAP is expecting a solution soon and would like to know when Thales will be releasing a new standard for this
component. TAP would like to know if other operators are experiencing a similar issue and the approach taken to
mitigate it.
Other operator and Thales comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 217
OTHERS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
235
APU Shipping
Installation
70720041-00
Honeywell
A350
49
AFR/KLM
AFR
Airbus
AFR faced 2 cases were APU mounts to cradle arms were found loose after transportation, one to the shop and
the other one from the shop, despite the installation of correct nuts and lock-washers.
Airbus answers provided through TR 80712994 are already applied and do not meet with the AFR expectation
(Refer to the below pictures):
Before shipment
After shipment
Is Honeywell going to take any further actions?
Does Lufthansa Technik notice some similar cases?
Honeywell, Airbus, Lufthansa Technik, and other operators, please comment.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
236
Tools and Pieces Parts
Quote
0877B1
Collins
Aerospace
UTAS
Rosemount
B787
30
AFR/KLM
AFR
0877B2
Air France has requested since June 2018 tools and pieces part quote. Despite several reminders, Air France has
no answer to date.
Piece parts and tools quotation should not take so long to be issued as many operators now fly the aircraft and the
CMM clearly lists these parts as procurable.
Collins, UTAS, Rosemount, could you commit to a date to fulfill our request?
Collins, UTAS, Rosemount, Boeing please comment.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 218
OTHERS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
237
Wiper Motor Converter
2313M-347-X
2313M-348-X
Collins Aerospace
B737
30
ANA
ANA would like to repair B737 WMC (CMM30-40-14) in ANA’s shop because increase removal rate temporarily
depends on the season. Therefore, ANA has been requesting Collins to provide the drawing and quotation of the
tools/equipment listed in the CMM since 2018/11, but there is no response from Collins.
Please verify and provide test equipment drawing of the following 6 equipment (REFER Table 1001) immediately:
1. Control Switch
2. Mounting Fixture
3. Restraint
4. Wet-glass Test Panel (Windscreen - Opt)
5. B737 Wiper Test Box
6. Test Glass Panel
If Collins cannot provide the drawing, please provide the quotation of the following tools/equipment as soon as
possible.
Collins and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 219
OTHERS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
238
Shrinking
Windshield Wipers
7001749H02 /
Wiper Blade
Collins
Aerospace
Zodiac
B787
21
KLM/AFR
KLM
During three C-checks in a row, KLM found ‘shrunken’ wiper blades that in two cases caused nasty scratches on
cockpit windshields. The missing rubber varied from 15 to 20 mm. According vendor Collins/Zodiac, the shrinking
is caused due to extended wear of the wiper blade.
Ref: UTAS SIL733 that states: “in a limited number of cases the blades may shrink.”
KLM finds it hard to believe that a wiper blade is allowed to ‘shrink’ 2 centimeters in just a few years, and
suspects it being a manufacturing quality problem.
•
•
Do other operators see this same ‘shrinking wiper’ phenomenon?
Can Collins/Zodiac explain how and why the wipers blades are shrinking that much during normal
service?
Collins, Zodiac, and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 220
OTHERS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
239
Windshield Wiper
Motor Converter
Assembly with
Brushless Motor
2313M347-4
Rosemount
(Collins)
B737NG
30-40
KLM/AFR
KLM
2313M348-4
Related to last year’s AMC 19-013 item 276:
KLM E&M is repairing a lot of Wiper Motor Convertors and found the main cost driver to be the BDCM Driver (p/n:
02316-0191-0001), which is installed on the Brushless Motor Amplifier CCA (p/n: 02316-0181-0002). Over 80% of
repairs are done by replacing the BDCM Driver.
Last year, Rosemount design engineering proposed an update to this Wiper Motor Convertor, model
2313M-347-4/348-4 that would eliminate the power module such that it is replaced with discrete components.
KLM E&M considers this a useful update since the power CCA is an expensive component.
Could Rosemount let us know when the proposed Service Bulletin will be ready?
Could Boeing accelerate evaluating this Service Bulletin for Rosemount?
Comments from other operators (or OEM, OAM) are highly appreciated.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
240
No Test Capability on
Heater Mats
28969-x
GKN
Aerospace
B787
30-11-01
DLH
ACA
With reference to AMC 2019 item 270 the following statement is still true: “Although they can technically test the
units, they cannot issue any release to service certificates.”
Lufthansa Technik still has not received one heater mat back tested from GKN.
When will the test capability including certification capability be set up?
GKN Aerospace and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 221
OTHERS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
241
NGS Heat Exchanger
Repair Request
7012011 –
NGS Heat
Exchanger
Collins
Aerospace
B787
47
KLM/AFR
KLM
When performing the leakage test on the NGS HX per CMM 47-11-04, the KLM shop sometimes finds the core
leaking. No repair is available in CMM.
In 2019, KLM requested Collins to look into a proposed repair action that consisted of:
• Cutting a section in HX manifold to get access
• Locally displacing a limited amount of fins
• Applying epoxy mixture at the leaking area
• Welding the cutted manifold section in place and do a penetrant inspection and coating.
• Proof/ leak and pressure drop tests per CMM.
Above procedure is a standard repair described in similar B777 and B787 Heat Exchangers CMMs.
Mid-2019, KLM requested Collins to review the above repair to be considered as a structurally acceptable
permanent repair and put it in the CMM. And if that is not possible, Collins is to provide an alternative repair.
To date, the repair has not been approved, but recent communications reveal that a similar repair has now been
developed and is in the administrative approval process.
•
KLM requests Collins to expedite this repair to be included in the CMM and/or to approve it as a
structurally acceptable permanent repair.
Collins and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
242
Integrated Wide Display Unit
(IWDU) – Processor and Graphic
Board (PGB) – Replacement of
MPC 8610
101301M00040500
Thales
Aircraft
ATA
From
31
TAP
Diehl Aerospace
According to SB 101301M0004-31-003, units produced before March 2015 have experienced PGB failure rate in
service rate than the ones produced after this date. This PGB failures were mainly driven by the combination of
two factors:
• Weak thermal stack design;
• Application of high vibration levels during Environmental Stress Screening Test (ESS) in production.
SB has various conditions in which its application is not F.O.C. As this is a design problem, TAP thinks that it
should be always F.O.C.
Thales, Diehl Aerospace, Airbus and other operator comments, please.
REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 222
OTHERS
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
243
CRJ700-900 EDP
Poor Reliability
66190-02, -03, -04,
-05, -06, -07
Parker
CRJ
29
LHT
CLH
IBX
4GU
ADR
EST
UGD
Summary:
• The EDPs of CRJ aircraft sticks out with poor reliability: MTBUR 4500 to 7000 FH (depending on the
operator)
• Several Service Bulletins were implemented without successfully improving the situation (see below
summary).
• There is no positive MTBUR trend with post modification part numbers (66190-04,-05,-06 and -07).
• Main issues remain shaft seal leakage and parting line leakage between Front Housing and Port Cap.
Requested action:
• Other operators to confirm that there is no determinable improvement with any of the post modification
P/N.
• OEM Parker & Bombardier to address this issue and provide measures to improve EDP reliability.
• OEM Parker & Bombardier please provide your reliability analysis.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
244
A320 Hydraulic Pump / PTU Installation
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
Airbus
A319
A320
29
UAL
Priming of pumps and PTUs during installation is defined as one of the solutions to avoid Hydraulic problems as
stated by Airbus.
Is this process followed by any airline? If yes, did you find any percentage of reduction in hydraulic issues?
Are there any new practices in the hydraulic line to eliminate problems related to hydraulics in the Airbus fleet?
Airbus and other operator comments, please.
Item
Summary Title
LRU PN
Vendor
Aircraft
ATA
From
245
Grommet Seal Blistering
849589
Hydraulic Pump
Eaton Aerospace
B737NG
29-10
DAL
Delta Air Lines Hydraulic shop has been experiencing sealing ring (P/N 329282) blistering issues and low time
failures of Hydraulic Pump (P/N 849589). Units repaired or coming in new from Eaton are experiencing the
failures and DAL repaired units are not experiencing this same failure mode. August 2019, DAL informed OEM of
the issue and they notified DAL they are conducting high temperature testing and Fluid Compatibility testing being
done in coordination with CFMI and Boeing (November 2019).
Eaton and other operator comments, please.