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www.emeraldinsight.com/0951-3574.htm
Management accounting in less
developed countries: what is
known and needs knowing
Trevor Hopper
Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
Mathew Tsamenyi
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Management
accounting
469
Received 27 January 2008
Revised 3 July 2008
Accepted 11 September
2008
Shahzad Uddin
University of Essex, Colchester, UK, and
Danture Wickramasinghe
Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to evaluate management accounting research in developing
countries and formulate suggestions for its progression.
Design/methodology/approach – This is a desk based study of existing literature analysed
through a framework of management control transformation in developing countries derived from the
authors’ research.
Findings – Research is growing, especially on accounting in state-owned and privatised enterprises
but more is needed on small and micro enterprises, agriculture, non-governmental organisations, and
transnational institutions.
Originality/value – This is the first review of this area and thus should help intending and existing
scholars.
Keywords Management accounting, Developing countries, Poverty, Privatization
Paper type Literature review
Introduction
Research on accounting in less developed countries (LDCs) has grown over the past
20 years. This is welcome for its previous neglect rendered the accounting needs of
poor people who constitute most of the world’s population as marginal and esoteric
despite their concerns being as pressing – if not more so – as in rich countries.
Moreover, LDCs form part of the mosaic of world trade and rich countries can learn
from them, e.g. on poverty reduction and reconciling ethnic tensions. The growth of
LDC research may be attributable to increased globalization of capital markets and
competition; structural adjustment programmes of development finance institutions;
newer less Western-centric accounting journals; the diaspora of accounting scholars
from LDCs to rich countries; and Western PhD programs that encourage candidates to
The authors wish to thank the Research Foundation of the Chartered Institute of Management
Accountants for funding that made this paper possible.
Accounting, Auditing &
Accountability Journal
Vol. 22 No. 3, 2009
pp. 469-514
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0951-3574
DOI 10.1108/09513570910945697
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conduct indigenous research. However, most research is on financial accounting. This
is unfortunate as management accounting systems (MAS) play an important role
within development:, e.g. central planning requires iterative budgeting between state
organs and enterprises, and current market-based policies are predicated upon private
interests fostering more efficient controls. Moreover, MASs bear directly on
development issues like governance, planning, employment and quality of life but
their enactment is problematic: local politics and cultures can transform them into tools
of coercion or external legitimacy rather than rational control and democratic
accountability.
Apart from editorial introductions summarising special editions of journals
(Alawattage et al., 2007; Hopper and Hoque, 2004) no review of MAS research in LDCs
exists. Previous reviews, notably Jaggi (1973), Samuels (1990), Wallace (1990), Needles
(1994, 1997), and Rahaman et al. (1997) focus on financial accounting but touch on MAS
issues[1]. This leaves potential MAS researchers ignorant of previous empirical
conclusions, and debates over policy, practice and theory. Hence the motivation for this
paper, which endeavours to voice to LDC concerns, stimulate interest in the area, and
debate how MASs might better serve humanitarian development.
The paper has three broad aims. First, it categorises MAS research by country,
stage of development, topic, methods and theory to track its themes to date. Second,
based on the authors’ work mainly in Bangladesh, Ghana and Sri Lanka, it outlines a
framework of MAS transition from colonial times to today. Third, this is used to
analyse discoveries to date and future research needs. The paper ends with
conclusions.
MAS research by country, stage of development, topic, theory and research
methods
Our definition of MAS embraces processes, structures and information for
organisational decisions, governance, control and accountability. ;It is deliberately
broad – too narrow and technical definitions deflect attention from historical, social,
political and economic factors, and their unanticipated consequences. Rigid boundaries
are dangerous as development issues need open, imaginative, problem-based
approaches that transgress disciplines and forms of accounting. We excluded
financial accounting papers on LDCs, including social and environmental accounting
ones (see Gray and Kouhy, 1993) but in retrospect such demarcations may be
dangerous, as will be discussed.
The journals searched covered Abacus; Accounting, Auditing, and Accountability
Journal; Accounting and Business Research; Accounting, Organizations, and Society;
Accounting Review; Advances in International Accounting; British Accounting Review;
Critical Perspectives on Accounting; Journal of Accounting Research; Journal of
Business Finance and Accounting; International Journal of Accounting; Journal of
International Financial Management; Journal of Accounting and Organisational
Change; Journal of Management Accounting Research; Management Accounting
Research; Qualitative Research in Accounting and Management; and Research in Third
World Accounting (now Research in Accounting in Emerging Economies). Other known
relevant papers were included. However, much MAS research lies untapped in
non-Western and non-English research outlets, especially reports by national and
transnational governmental bodies and aid agencies[2], and journals in development
studies, public administration, and management.
Defining a LDC is fraught and problematic: poverty may not universal within a
country and development rates vary, can be discontinuous, and poverty is not unique
to LDCs. Nevertheless, a LDC is characterised by low rates of per capita income, capital
formation and value added. Development is not merely an economic phenomenon but
includes environmental degradation, child welfare, quality of life, citizen
empowerment, and governance. Despite debates on what constitutes development
(Rao, 1991; Munck and O’Hearn, 1999), the United Nations’ and World Bank indices
have particular currency. This review examines research on countries within the
World Bank lower to upper middle income bands[3]. This covers a wide span of
incomes but enabled us to cover a broad range of LDCs, including ones that have
moved into higher income bands. World Bank indices are cruder than UN ones but our
categorisation included all countries in categories (a) and (b) of the UN HPI[4].
However, ex-communist countries in transition were excluded [see special issue of
Management Accounting Research (2002, Vol. 13 No. 4) and Research on Accounting in
Emerging Economies (supplement 2, 2004)] as they are often relatively affluent, may lie
within Western political and economic systems, and have a legacy of Western
institutions under revival. Had papers from poorer, ex-communist countries like
Albania or Kazakhstan been found they would have been included. However, we
included China (excluding Hong Kong) as it still contains considerable poverty, has
grown from a low economic base, is non-Western, and has material apposite to other
LDCs. Nevertheless, MAS issues in LDCs and transitional economies bear similarities,
so this review may contain insights for the latter.
In total 75 empirical papers from 29 countries (11 African, eight Asian, two Pacific,
six Latin American/Caribbean, and two Middle-East) fell within our remit. Appendix 1
details their extensive geographical spread across countries though only China has
sustained research. Papers on countries within World Bank low and lower-middle
income bands were more prevalent than on upper-middle income countries (see Table I).
Appendix 2 classifies these papers by research topic. It reveals a preoccupation with
control in SOEs and privatisation (full or partial). Papers were not classified between
SOEs and privatised companies because often they overlapped both. This is
understandable given the initial dominance of state led development based on
industrialisation through SOEs, and subsequent turns to market oriented policies
involving privatisations. However, the few papers on multi-national organisations
(MNOs) and large indigenous companies were a surprise. Whether this was due to the
journal search parameters or negligible MAS problems (unlikely given our review
later) is unknown. More papers on MAS in central and local government may have
WB GNI bands for all countries (234)
Low income (53)
Lower-middle income (55)
Upper-middle income (41)
High-income (85)
Unclassified – global
Countries with MAS
research papers (29)
Papers per
income band (75)
10
10
7
0
n/a
25
36
9
0
3
Management
accounting
471
Table I.
MAS papers across
World Bank gross
national income bands
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materialised had public administration and development studies journals been
searched. The small number of papers on agriculture; non governmental organisations
(NGOs); indigenous companies, especially small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs);
and micro-organisations including households, domestic industry, sole traders, and
peasant agriculture was disappointing though work is emerging.
Classifying papers by research methods (see Appendix 3) revealed a strong
preference for case studies (47) rather than quantitative statistical work (19). Of the
latter, 8 incorporated fieldwork, normally interviews, usually to inductively derive key
variables for testing rather than relying on research instruments derived from
developed countries. Such studies have identified distinctive sources of uncertainty in
LDCs and their effects (see Alam, 1997; Hoque (1995); Hoque and Hopper (1994); Kattan
et al., 2007; O’Connor et al., 2006). The 47 case studies were not differentiated further as
they frequently triangulated data and methods. Interviews and documentary analysis
were the most common methods. Observational, participation observation, and action
studies were scarce: only one experiential study was found – significantly from a
World Bank consultant researcher. This reflects the poor dialogue between accounting
researchers and development practitioners, unlike that in development studies. Case
studies have been innovative, e.g. Davie’s (n.d.) ethnography of accounting in Fiji, and
Kim (n.d.) on contemporary feminist and postcolonial writings criticising oral history.
The desk and documentary studies category contains 10 heterogeneous papers
ranging from literature reviews to studies of documentation and reports, normally
from government and aid agencies (vital but neglected information sources despite
their practice or policy hue).
Appendix 4 shows many papers (19) had no explicit central theory, being
problem-based, pragmatic or reviews. Only 3 were based in economics and 2 in
development economics/studies, and then only loosely so. There was a smattering of
social psychology papers with little commonality: 12 followed accounting and
performance measurement (RAPM) and contingency theory research, and another 6
combined these with institutional theory. Two followed public administration
traditions. Grounded/ethnographic/hermeneutic studies (26) of cultures and MASs
predominated, perhaps because of desires to accord indigenous beliefs and social
structures due respect in the face of the agendas and rationalities of political reformers.
Some researchers treat the latter as objects of study using Bourdieu, Foucault or
structuration theory to examine whether ideologies of accountability in official
documents match the legitimate interests of locals. This gives an indigenous voice,
challenges the hegemony of powerful external institutions, and scrutinises their policy
documents. However, research exclusively based on discourse and texts can fail to
connect this to practices and resistance (hence the need for grounded studies), and may
downplay the effects of socio-economic structures. Hence the preference for some
researchers (including the authors) for political economy approaches that combine
grounded and institutional data, employ iterative theorising, and emphasise the
dialectical interplay of the objective and subjective.
A cultural political economy framework
Like Wallace (1990) the authors’ have not found different accounting techniques in rich
and poor countries, or that LDCs import grossly inappropriate practices. No MASs
unique to LDCs been found, though they may exist, especially in traditional sectors.
Most problems lie in the interplay of MASs and their cultural, economic and political
context. Poverty brings distinctive uncertainties, e.g. exposure to the elements,
undiversified economies, and a dominant (but not necessarily effective) state. Rich
countries have shaped politics and policies in LDCs from colonialism, and today
international aid institutions’ prescriptions often include (or presume) MASs framed in
institutional contexts and rationalities not invariably found within LDCs. But many
LDCs depend on external finance and cannot ignore its providers’ strictures. Thus
when Western MASs are applied they often assume unanticipated roles or are ignored.
Hence the framework for evaluating MAS research in Table II relates a dialectic
explanation of MAS transformation to social, economic, and political factors in both
ideational and institutional domains. Its breadth permits analysis of the theoretically
and empirically diverse papers under scrutiny, whilst being in sympathy with
dominant theoretical approaches, including our own. We do not claim it is conclusive,
definitive or unique to LDCs – it is for analysis, understanding, and promoting
dialogue, especially amongst targeted beneficiaries, not theoretical closure[5]. But it is
difficult to avoid ethnocentricity or a normative stance for development entails changes
from the status quo and humanitarian ideals that supersede cultural relativism.
For exposition purposes the framework is presumed to embrace all LDCs (it was
derived mainly in African and Asian ex-British colonies). It draws from the labour
process approach in Uddin and Hopper (2001) and the “cultural political economy” in
Wickramasinghe and Hopper (2005) and Wickramasinghe et al. (2004). It identifies five
regimes: colonial despotism, state capitalism, politicised state capitalism, market
capitalism, and politicised market capitalism (see Table II). Each epoch is brought
about by force, manipulation, persuasion, and authority in political and economic
struggles framed by interplays between key dimensions of each epoch – modes of
production (MOP), culture, ethnicity and race, the state, regulation and the law,
political parties, industrial relations, and international finance. These are defined
below.
The economic activities and social relations when people transform objects into
useful things constitute a MOP. They range from feudalism to contemporary
capitalism. Their effects extend beyond work relationships to cultural beliefs and
politics (Taylor, 1979). However, behaviour is governed not just by economics but also
a mix of knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, and custom known as culture – the “state
or habit of mind” that underpins a “way of life” of a group or community, their outlook
on the world, and their “general reaction to a general and major change in the
conditions of our common life” (Williams, 1958). Ethnic groups often claim cultural
distinctiveness due to divergent languages, religions, occupations, politics, and
geographical demarcations (Haralambos, 1974). Sometimes this has overtones of race
(classifying people by physical appearance, e.g. facial characteristics, skin colour).
Ethnic claims may or not be empirically justifiable, whereas racial claims are not
(Richardson and Lambert, 1985) but both can be sources of social identity and political
mobilisation to influence the state (Efferin and Hopper, 2007). States include the armed
forces, civil service, judiciary, and local and national elected bodies but boundaries are
difficult to draw (e.g. they can co-opt religious organisations and trade unions). States
have the authority to establish rules that govern a geographically determined
population (Faulks, 1999). They control the means of violence in society. They may use
force and coercion but normally seek consensus, exerting power through laws – often
Management
accounting
473
Divisions
heightened
Ethnicity partly
basis of party
and political
organisation
Legal-rational
structures of
regulation
maintained but
captured or
ignored by
politicians
State patronage,
often for party
advantage
Weak
enforcement
State extraction of surplus
Hegemony of political criteria in
commercial and production
decisions
Power with political elite linked
to trade unions
Distribution follows power and
patronage
Politicised
state
capitalism
(Actual
regime)
Cultural
fragmentation
and diversity
More open and
less stable
sub-cultures
Increased
urbanisation
alongside strong
traditional
cultures
Economic
Bureaucratic
Nationalism
Growth of
development based
emphasised not state central
modernistic,
on industrialisation
planning
ethnicity
urban cultures
Legal-rational
incorporating
authority
rational progress,
Intervention and
science and
welfare oriented
education,
Strong regulation
meritocracy,
and
individualism
account-ability to
and nuclear
Parliament
family
Industrialisation
Capitalist accumulation by
SOEs
Fair distribution
Continuation of small
merchants and traditional
agricultural production
Closed economy
State
capitalism
(Ideal
regime)
Factional and
volatile
Often
charismatic/dynastic
leaders of parties
rather than
ideological
Sometimes
non-democratic
Production and state
politics often
converge
Imperialism
Divide and rule Company states
Mainly
tactics based on Minimal state
traditional,
regulation
ethnicity
ethnocentric
Closed and stable
communities
Non-capitalist agricultural and
domestic production. Small
capitalist merchant/and owner
class
Colonial capitalist enterprises in
primary sector
Politics
Colonial
despotism
(Actual
regime)
Table II.
Regimes of control in
ex-colonial LDCs:
contextual factors and
MASs
Culture
State, regulation
and law
Powerful
political party
unions
Multi-unionism
Top down
leadership
Leaders from
political elite
TU membership
and power in
public
enterprises
TUs illegal and
weak
Weak labour
markets
Nascent
unionism and
state regulation
of industrial
relations
TUs recognised
Growth of
collective
bargaining on
industry basis
TU and labour
markets
Weak politicised,
and poorly
regulated capital
markets
Bank failures
Fiscal crises of
state lead to aid
dependency and
reliance on
IMF/WB
External
financing often
for Cold War
reasons
State banking
Central bank
regulation
Emerging but
weak capital
market
Deficit financing
for development
Colonial capital.
Otherwise
minimal capital
No capital market
International
finance and
capital market
474
Mode of production
Ethnicity and
race
(continued)
Coercive control
based on racial
and ethnic
differences
involving
physical violence
Accounting for
HQ regulations
and control
Bureaucratic
rational-legal
accounting
Enterprise
budgeting within
national central
state planning
Creation of
formal wage
bargaining and
internal labour
markets
Accounting for
external
legitimacy
Ritual ceremonial
practices only
MAS irrelevant
for internal
controls
Decisions for
day-to-day
activities
captured by
political players
MASs
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Often the basis
of political and
social decisions
Greater
individualism
and individual
economic
self-betterment
Consumerism
and materialistic
choice
Mediation of
“modern” market
cultures with
traditional and
political
Domination of capital over
labour
Wider income differentials
Fractions of capital, ownership
diffuse/financial
institutions/multinationals/local
families
Crony capitalism
Politicised
market
capitalism
(Actual
regime)
Reduced state
power, supply
side economic
role
Oriented to
attract
multinational and
international
capital
Stronger capital
market and
regulation,
especially of
utilities
Regulatory
capture by
political-economic
elites
Weak
enforcement
Decisions
politicised
Considered
irrelevant.
Culture
Mode of production
Market-based exchange
relations and distribution
Private ownership of
enterprises
New public sector management
Market
capitalism
(Ideal
regime)
State, regulation
and law
Ethnicity and
race
Democratic parties
based on
charismatic leaders
from socio-economic
elites
Faction-alism based
on regions, religion
and ethnicity
Democratic and
transparent
government
Politics
Market based
controls
Contemporary
Western best
practice
Tight production
targets
Economic
performance
measurement
External
reporting for
capital markets
Private accounts,
top-down
physical budgets
Return of
coercive control
but no physical
violence
Weak compliance
of external
regulations –
financial and
non-financial
Toothless trade
unions with low
bargaining power
Internal
sub-contracting
External
financial agents
especially
IMF/WB strong
influences on
policy
Family/crony
capitalism
alongside more
multinational
capital
Politicised
regulation and
privatisation.
Segmented
labour markets
between core
and periphery
Trade unions
co-opted into
political parties
Lower labour
protection a
power
MASs
Globalised
capital
Export zones
Stronger capital
markets
Greater financial
regulation and
enforcement
Lessened political
intervention
International
finance and
capital market
Strong external
labour markets
Weakened Trade
Unions
Decline in
industry-wide
collective
bargaining
Lowered
employee
protection
TU and labour
markets
Management
accounting
475
Table II.
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delegated to regulatory institutions. State policies vary: usually they are instruments of
dominant elites but their interests and preferences may vary (Jessop, 1982). Access to
government resides in politics, be it in a legal-rational democracy, kingdom, or
dictatorship. In purportedly democratic systems (but not exclusively so) competing
political parties pursue interests and ideologies, though often LDCs have single and/or
dominant party systems that are not exclusively class-based and may represent a
shifting mix of ideology, race and ethnicity, regionalism, and religion, and be vehicles
for charismatic leadership. Often they are linked to trade unions – associations of
workers united in a single, representative entity seeking to improve workers’ economic
status and employment conditions by substituting individual bargaining within labour
markets with collective bargaining and workplace relations governed by rules and
regulations, i.e. an internal state. However, political and trade union action is
constrained by external capital markets (domestic capital markets being weak and
small). Development policies rely on finance from MNOs, international aid agencies,
foreign governments, and external financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF
who often influence domestic policies.
Each regime is rendered unstable by contradictions and conflicts that fuel political
struggles nationally and within production and lay the basis for new regimes.
Pre-colonial eras had indigenous MASs but subsequent MASs stem from external
interventions beginning with colonialism and, after independence, policy advice from
Western institutions promulgating state and then market capitalism. However, such
idealised regimes of control often presumed contextual factors at odds with actuality,
and ensuing contradictions and conflicts brought politicised state and market
capitalist regimes with unanticipated MASs. Thus MAS transformations are
contextually encircled, evolve historically, and are socially constructed. Figure 1
summarises this dynamic but contingent evolution: each epoch is illustrated with
examples from the authors’ research below. The expanded framework in Table II
provides the diagnostic tool used to analyse MAS research in LDCs.
MAS under colonialism
Colonial legacies are crucial for understanding accounting in most LDCs. Before
colonialism MOPs were largely feudal and based on the local community (village) and
families: productivity and income were governed by their needs, diligence, and the
elements. Lords or chieftains often held land though producers normally owned the
simple technology. There was no separation between work and the family, and little
production of commodities for exchange with other communities or institutions
(Taylor, 1979). Traditional societies did not necessarily lack accounting: An early Qing
dynasty period novel details how Chinese household MASs incorporated traditional
family and cultural values – they segregated financial duties and used cash controls
and budgets but power distance stifled flexibility, professionalism and effectiveness
(Chan et al., 2001). Traditional systems may persist today, e.g. Asechemie (1997)
claimed that African accounting systems in informal economic sectors still
accommodate traditional values, which provoked a sharp rejoinder from Wallace
(1997) who questioned Asechemie’s account of pre- and post-colonial MOPs in Nigeria,
the existence of African maintenance accounting, his oral history evidence, and
whether pre-colonial Nigerian cash accounting and master-servant relations were
impervious to agency problems. Nevertheless, non-colonial societies are dynamic and
Management
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477
Figure 1.
Stages in transition
accounting helps shape cultural identities. In Siam[6] apparently neutral and technical
accounts gave an economic base to Siamese national unity in the Bangkok period,
projected a Siamese national culture and political identity, and integrated regions into
the new nation-state (Constable and Kuasirikun, 2007).
However, colonialism was the norm. The colonial state assimilated traditional and
capitalist MOPs, initially through merchants’ capital, then commodity exports, and
finally through imperialism (Hindess and Hirst, 1977). Colonial rulers did not impose
capitalism generally but sought capital accumulation in the most profitable sectors –
often exports of primary products from plantations, estates, and mines. Nor did they
pursue industrialisation, e.g. jute manufacturing resided in Britain not Bangladesh
(Sobhan and Ahmad, 1980). Important segments like rural agriculture and cottage
industries were only reformed if attractive to finance capital. For instance, the East
India Company forced farmers to grow raw materials such as jute for export rather
than traditional produce. In Sri Lanka the British administration introduced a
plantation economy for tea, coconut, and rubber. But MOPs were not invariably
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capitalistic, e.g. in Ghana manual techniques predominated in cocoa production and
gold mining (Crisp, 1984; Robotham, 1989). Hence, particularly in rural areas with
feudal social relations, traditional cultures and pre-capitalist MOPs predominated in
sectors like agriculture, merchanting, and domestic manufacture, e.g. in Sri Lanka,
Sinhalese life centred on villages following a traditional Buddhist culture
(Jayawardena, 2000); in Ghana village life was based on tribes and subsistence
agriculture (Bryceson, 1999).
The colonial state had separate jurisdiction from companies. Formally, the imperial
centre was unique, unquestionable, and autocratic: it was the basis of politics and local
inhabitants could not question it despite being subject to taxes and rules. In rural areas
feudal politics often remained, albeit acquiescent to the colonial power. Accounting
was integral to subjectification. It promoted slavery in the British Empire and the USA,
especially on plantations (Oldroyd, n.d.; Tyson et al., 2004; Fleischman and Tyson,
2004); enabled absentee West Indian sugar plantation landlords to exert control from a
distance (Cowton and O’Shaughnessy, 1991), and helped imperial governments control
indigenous, slave and settler populations (Annisette and Neu, 2004). However,
subjectification was not invariably successful, e.g. taxation in British West Africa
failed to inculcate calculative and cultural values or gain consent to governance due to
local resistance (Bush and Maltby, 2004).
Research on indigenous people in developed countries gives insight on accounting
under colonialism (especially on Maoris, Aborigines, and first nation Americans – see
Auditing, Accountability & Accounting Journal, 2000, No. 3). For example, alien and
punitive accounting legitimated government confiscations of Maori wealth in New
Zealand (Hooper and Kearins, n.d.); colonialism and professional accounting firms
affected Maori women accountants’ experiences with deleterious impacts upon
individuals and communities (McNicholas et al., 2004); financial techniques and force
maintained colonial domination of indigenous Canadians and Mexicans (Neu and
Heincke, 2004); accounting discourses institutionalised and rationalised relations,
especially in land disputes, between the government and First Nations’ peoples during
Canada’s “birth” (Neu, 2000; Neu and Graham, 2006); and US government reports in the
1930s on overgrazing contained numeric tables, accounts and notional family budgets
constructed the Navajo as economic subjects and consumption units. Enacting the
recommendations brought economic and social disaster (Preston and Oakes, 2001;
Preston, 2006).
Colonial states relied on self-regulation by finance from international capital
markets operating within “company states” to control many economic activities
(Burawoy, 1984). Public administration concentrated on imposing capitalist
monopolies in selected sectors, and creating an infrastructure to procure raw
materials and labour, and shift commodities (Brewer, 1984). International cartels and
banks co-ordinated capital flows within territorial trade divisions agreed with the
imperial power, which produced a dual economy: traditional agricultural, merchant,
and domestic; and modern export. A small merchant and landowner class exercised
domestic capitalism but local capital accumulation was small, hence the limited
development of local capital markets, e.g. the Colombo Stock Market founded in 1896
confined its operations to MNOs.
Colonial politics divided people into white imperialists and local inhabitants. The
formers’ domination was justified through notions of racial superiority. Trade unions
were initially illegal. Rudimentary labour markets existed but many indigenous
workers had access to subsistence agriculture, so colonial firms often imported
contract labour from rural areas or other colonies. The colonial power’s “divide and
rule” tactics compounded racial and ethnic divisions (Burawoy, 1985), e.g. Tamils
brought from India to work on Sri Lankan plantations had inferior prospects than
indigenous people; suffered discrimination; and subsequent Sinhalese and Tamil
worker conflicts produced ethnically driven MASs on tea estates (Alawattage and
Wickramasinghe, 2008). In Bangladesh the colonial state divided tasks according to
peoples’ religion, sending Hindu personnel to Muslim areas and vice versa to collect
rents and rates (Sobhan and Ahmad, 1980). In Ghana, labourers brought forcefully
from the predominantly Moslem north to work in mines in the predominantly Christian
south were accorded lower status by Southerners who considered mining as dirty and
preferred managing (Crisp, 1984; Ayensu, 1997; Robotham, 1989). These ethnic
divisions still impact how MASs function in LDCs today.
Colonialism often brought despotic control regimes based on physical measures,
reinforced by sanctions like fines in large commercial companies[7]. Colonial
organisations had few concerns about securing consent as employees could not
question or resist colonial bosses and organised worker resistance was illegal.
Controllers were unregulated in the company state and had arbitrary powers that
extended beyond work, e.g. in Zambian mines, racial, physical and rudimentary rules
prevailed; physical violence was the rule despite native supervisors; workers’ wages
required completed “tickets” allocated at the whim of white bosses; and no job
structures or formal recruitment, promotion, and training rules existed (Burawoy,
1985). However, not all labour was “captive”: harsh controls fostered resistance
(Taylor, 1979), e.g. Sri Lanka plantation workers rioted against “white bosses” and
colonialism (Jayawardena, 1972). Disorganised resistance brought nascent trade
unions that linked with independence movements led by foreign-educated, left-minded,
local leaders and religious groups. Late colonial politics remained imperialistic but
political realities forced the state to recognise unions and rudimentary collective
bargaining (Kearney, 1971, 1973). Nevertheless, direct, coercive controls over labour
during colonialism meant abstract bureaucratic controls such as MASs probably had
little role. The emphasis of internal control lay upon production. Local costs were not
critical for profitability compared to international commodity prices and preferential
trading agreements. Imperial firms may have used MAS for planning and setting
targets for overseas operations but the emphasis lay on financial reporting for
stewardship and tracking remittances. However, these observations are tentative as
our search parameters omitted accounting history journals – in retrospect a
misjudgement.
State capitalism
Colonialism often bequeathed a relatively effective central state bureaucracy and legal
systems: elsewhere regulation was weak and underdeveloped. Many economies now
had capitalist and non-capitalist MOPs. However, agriculture and primary production,
and non-capitalist MOPs and cultures predominated, which left LDCs vulnerable to
commodity price shifts and the elements, and heightened their dependence on
international finance. Capital markets were small and weak: a small indigenous
capitalist class existed but large foreign firms were often dominant, e.g. Bangladesh’s
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small local capitalist class had little capital, concentrated on merchanting, and being
politically and economically marginal supported an expanded state sector (Sobhan,
1991, p.164). Within state capitalism the state dominates finance and capital markets as
it controls much of the Gross Domestic Product (and hence employment opportunities);
funds most industrial activities (often through international aid); and allocates
resources to public enterprises. Mobilising finance through capital markets was
deemed unnecessary – banking was concentrated in state banks and in Bangladesh
the Stock Exchange ceased activity. Similarly, in Sri Lanka and Ghana capital markets
remained inactive as most large companies were nationalised and state financed and
remaining large foreign owned enterprises raised capital abroad (Moss, 2003).
Influential, educated elites – often former employees of colonial organisations
and/or from privileged classes – held more modern Western beliefs. They supplied
many post independence leaders who embraced the politics of state capitalism[8]. This
advocated industrialisation, urbanisation, modern values, and nationalism. MOPs
based on central state planning of major commercial enterprises were introduced,
consistent with Western advice, socialist independence movements’ ideologies, and
pragmatic necessities. Building nationalism through state-led development sought to
counter subjects’ allegiances to families, regions, or ethnic groups that colonialism had
exacerbated. Issues of traditional culture were recognized but relegated to arts and
religious spheres in a purportedly secular state. Initially politics resided in
democratically elected governments in multi-party parliaments. The presumption,
reflected in constitutions, was that state executive action lay in a centralised
legal-rational bureaucracy staffed by officials appointed on merit and expertise to
serve the national well-being, reinforced by legal institutions left from colonial
administration.
Large SOEs were created with boards nominated by ministers. The intention was
for ministers and planners to set policy and managers to execute it, with accountability
to the minister-in Parliament. For example, in 1947 Bangladesh (East Pakistan) became
part of Pakistan (Sobhan and Ahmad, 1980). The state created an industrial base with a
capitalist MOP, establishing state monopolies under state regulation in urban areas
(though raw materials and labour came from rural areas). The first Bangladesh
Government nationalised all industrial units but left rural agriculture and cottage
industry untouched. When it was overthrown SOEs held 92 per cent of fixed industrial
assets (Uddin and Hopper, 2001). After independence the Ghanaian government
nationalised foreign companies, consistent with allegiances to the Soviet Union.
Massive state investments in manufacturing SOEs and infrastructure in cities
followed – rural agriculture received little attention – despite employing 60 per cent of
the workforce. However, nationalisation was not total, e.g. some gold mines were
spared following deals between Western businessmen and politicians (Petchenkine,
1993). In Sri Lanka in 1956 a left-wing government nationalised all major public
services and most large industries but ignored agriculture and domestic industries
(Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005).
Ideologically governments were sympathetic to trade unions. Although labour
markets were weak, parties often had a trade union wing: they knew the political
significance of an organised working class, particularly in large organisations in urban
areas. Politicians, oft indebted to union backing during independence struggles,
reconstituted labour conflict into collective bargaining (Reuther, 1958). In Bangladesh
rules and regulations governed electing collective bargaining agents, labour courts,
consultation, and strikes. Workers gained rights to join trade unions but in return
unions had to operate within an internal state that governed internal labour markets in
SOEs. For example, the Bangladesh soap company and the jute mills had detailed job
classifications; rules on wages, promotions, recruitment, and training; and permanent
employment (Uddin and Hopper, 2001). In Ghana, upon independence the Convention
People’s Party (CPP) government’s 1958 Industrial Relations Act recognised trade
unions and made collective bargaining binding but political rights for trade unions
were conditional upon registering within the CPP (Mihyo and Schiphorst, 1995).
Similarly, in Sri Lanka labour gained significant social and political status within
SOEs.
Nationalisation legislation gave the state considerable power over SOEs and
accounting was accorded crucial roles. The assumption was that central state planning
would act as a legal rational bureaucracy and some state intervention in management
control was expected. Audited financial accounts of enterprises, fed back through
Ministries to Parliament, formed the backbone of accountability and regulation.
Iterative budgeting that coordinated central plans with SOE activities formed the basis
of enterprise planning and control. Resource allocation decisions would be made
centrally according to relative returns and development priorities. For example, the
initial Bangladesh government formulated a two-year plan aimed at agricultural
self-sufficiency, import substitution, and industrialisation. Regulations, Financial
Control Directives, and Presidential Orders made enterprises accountable to state
institutions, especially the Ministries of Industries and Finance and Planning. Rigid
rules and regulations governed the preparation and approval of accounts. Each SOE
must submit annual accounts to the government under the Bangladesh Industrial
Enterprises Act. The Comptroller and Auditor-General through the Office of the
Director of Commercial Audit audited these, and the Public Accounts Committee
reviewed their reports on behalf of Parliament (Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Uddin and
Hopper, 1999, 2001). In Ghana the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning became
responsible for budget allocations in each SOE, which needed ministerial approval.
The Auditor General’s Department with the Comptroller and the Accountant General’s
Department annually audited accounts (Killick, 1978). In Sri Lanka, Parliament
established financial regulations and establishment codes for ministries to regulate
SOEs. The Auditor General audited public sector accounts, financial procedures,
budgets, and related reports and the parliamentary Public Accounts Committee could
investigate them (Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005).
Initial MAS and development research reflected beliefs in central state planning,
public ownership, and industrialization: it accorded accounting a central role. Ndzinge
and Briston (1999), and Seidler (1967) claimed timely and reliable accounting
information for investment decisions and national economic planning would promote
growth. Seiler (1966) claimed accounting systems supply important financial data to
business and the state but accountants were marginal and provided inadequate data,
hence the need for accounting education and professional development within a
self-governed accounting profession. Needles (1976) argued that institutions that
transfer accounting technology (education bodies; international organisations;
government agencies; MNOs; international accounting firms; and local companies
and accounting firms) should create a sub-plan within the overall economic plan to this
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end. Budgets were seen as cornerstones of planning and monitoring; accounting
information crucial to rational central resource allocation; and financial accounts to
accountability. Enthoven (1982) saw MAS as the most important as it, “assists
development programming in determining and improving efficiency and productivity”
(Enthoven, 1982, p. 109) and he sought an international, interdisciplinary MAS theory
serving socio-economic aims.
In retrospect these early writers identified the neglect of accounting in development
practice, policy and research. Their contributions were admirable if Utopian. They
subscribed to the idealised state capitalist development model and promoted Western
techniques and institutions. Their contributions were ambitious, deductive and
normative but light on empirics, application, or theory of any ilk. Some later papers
dissented. Needles (1976) emphasized that accounting choices required greater
understanding of LDCs’ social, cultural, political and legal environments. Mirghani
(1982) advocated broader MASs incorporating indigenous not Western development
models to reduce uncertainty in development planning. Ghartey (1985) expressed
pessimism, claiming that in most African countries, governments’ monopoly of power,
bureaucracy, conflicting policies, ineffective institutional structures, and cronyism
rendered MASs marginal and ineffective; poverty and dominant elites’ lack of
motivation stymied adoption of technologically advanced systems; cultures based on
extended families led to corruption, malpractice, and everyday life characterised by
fear, tension, insecurity; and the attendant uncertainty produced recurring managerial
crises. In short, he counselled that effective MASs require good governance. This paper
picks up these themes, arguing that when idealised state capitalist systems hit
actualities they often became vehicles for political factionalism[9] resulting in MASs
assuming unanticipated roles.
From state capitalism to political factionalism
State capitalism presumes employees habituated to a capitalist culture and MOP but
frequently this is not so. Dichotomising cultures between traditional and modern is
dangerous as LDCs contain elements of both and cultures change. Consequently local
leaders faced conflicting expectations – traditional, modern or hybrid. For example,
workers in a SOE in a Sinhalese Buddhist village did not seek modernity (but sought
many of its benefits). Unaccustomed to a non-capitalist MOP, including factory time
and discipline, they prioritised village rituals and institutions above mill duties,
expecting managers to exhibit “kingship”. Their village culture and religious
obligations superseded bureaucratic rationality and fused with local political agendas.
Managers reciprocated, with political support from parties and trade unions, leading to
padded budgets, modest performance targets, and losses (Wickramasinghe and
Hopper, 2005). Similarly, traditional culture permeated activities in a Ghana gold mine.
Sacrifices to pacify gods were undertaken and accidents attributed to superstitions,
and new executives (whether expatriate or indigenous) were introduced to the chief and
elders, and necessary prayers said. Miners were used to agricultural patterns of work
and time, and managers modified work practices and budgets accordingly – not doing
so would compound political interventions (Tsamenyi and Hopper, 2003). Ethnicity
can compound cultural issues. State capitalism emphasises meritocracy: race and
ethnicity should be irrelevant but often underpinned the reproduction of national
politics within firms. In Sri Lanka ethnic tensions between Sinhalese and Tamil have
fuelled a long running civil war, and shape controls on tea estates (Alawattage and
Wickramasinghe, 2008). In Africa ethnicity cannot be downplayed (Doornbos, 1991, p.
54). Ghanaian politics follow ethnic lines and in the gold mine they influenced
appointments, investments, and promotions, provoking shop floor disputes that
reinforced tribal stereotypes, e.g. managers from the Moslem north had problems
establishing authority over subordinates from other regions (Silver, 1978; Robotham,
1989).
State capitalism assumes a populace and state committed to nationalism,
modernisation, legal rational governance, and secularism but in variegated ethnic,
religious, or cultural environments political survival is fraught and bureaucratic
rationality difficult to maintain. Educated elites, politicians, and senior civil servants
are inter-linked, powerful, and can reap large benefits from office, sometimes illicitly.
Well-qualified bureaucrats with legal-rational norms may be scarce which, coupled to
low remuneration, can foster corruption and sway decisions towards family,
community, and ethnic affiliations. Politics did not consist of multiple parties premised
on class relations as in industrial societies. Instead parties often followed regional,
ethnic, or religious lines, or charismatic leaders, and reflected traditional allegiances
not modern ideologies – whether socialist or capitalist – bringing unstable
governments, switches from multi to one party democracy and military dictatorships
(Olowo-Okere, 1999). For example, Ghana had five military governments since
independence. Dr Nkrumah’s government created a one-party state, banned opposition
political activities and imprisoned, exiled, or killed opposition leaders (Petchenkine,
1993). In Sri Lanka, families who led parties used “thug leaders from the under-world”
during power struggles (Wickramasinghe et al., 2004). In 1975 a military coup
overthrew the Bangladesh government, its leader was murdered and despite
democracy being restored politics remained turbulent with governance based on
patronage and expediency. Politicians and officials may wish to modernise but
survival may require satisfying popular non-capitalist cultural expectations through
patronage and illicit means, which may also cement their own interests (Uddin and
Hopper, 2003).
In many LDCs trade unions are conduits to political power. State capitalism tried to
co-opt trade unions through an internal state based on collective bargaining. However
party-based unions with branches in enterprises fuelled inter-union and party rivalries
within factories. Trade unions’ ability to link shop floor resistance to national politics
made them central players and constrained managers operating commercially. For
example, in Bangladesh employees supporting opposition parties had legitimate cases
for promotion refused but government supporters were favoured (Alam and Lawrence,
1994; Hoque and Hopper, 1994). Politicisation of trade unions was prominent in Ghana.
Dr Nkrumah granted employment in SOEs to political loyalists. In 1961 he appointed
the General President of the Ghana Mines Workers Union to the Ghana State Mining
Company board and in 1963 when he became Chairman and Managing Director he
hired and rewarded employees loyal to Nkrumah’s policies and fired those not (Silver,
1978). Popular movements (including the TUC) were annexed to the CPP and union
activities deemed contrary to the government were made illegal. In gold mines strikes
often brought military intervention (Robotham, 1989). In Sri Lanka management
control was also politically sensitive. In the textile mill union leaders determined
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workers’ pay, leave, and promotions not the Human Resources Manager
(Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005).
International finance bodies like the World Bank and IMF supported state led
industrialisation. However, ideological predilections and political vassalage often
secured loans rather than projects’ economic merits or likelihood of execution: “Cold
War” politics forced many LDCs to choose between Soviet bloc and Western donors,
convincing either of their strategic importance. Politicians became nimble in
cultivating external political relations and appearing to meet aid conditions; and
external agencies pursuing political ends were indifferent as to whether leaders with
questionable credentials would use funds as specified or promote democratic,
transparent, and effective governance. For example, in Ghana Dr Nkrumah embraced a
communist ideology to gain financial and technical support from the Soviet Union
(Petchenkine, 1993). In Sri Lanka, governments veered towards their politics and
economics when the socialist-bloc financed industrial ventures (Wickramasinghe and
Hopper, 2005).
This encouraged corruption, economic mismanagement, and patronage politics. In
Ghana ministers and heads of public institutions were prosecuted for “kalabule” (local
term for corruption) and mismanagement – in 1979 six deposed Supreme Military
Council government members were shot for corruption (Hansen and Collins, 1980). In
Bangladesh managers could not resolve matters like industrial relations disputes,
appointments, financing, and pricing as they were the prerogative of ministers and
their political colleagues (Sobhan and Ahmad, 1980). In Sri Lanka families that once
served the imperial government exploited their prominence in post independence
parties to augment their wealth (Jayawardena, 1972). Government regulations to
minimise corruption, e.g. requiring qualified officials, were flouted (Jayawardene,
2000). Workers realised that satisfying their demands lay in political patronage via
party-based unions not managerial decisions.
Thus it is unsurprising that research catalogues a litany of budget problems in
SOEs: state capitalism in action bore little correspondence to its ideals. For example,
accounting in an Algerian state construction enterprise existed but apart from financial
officers at head office few knew of it; production not accounting language permeated
management due to government pressure to complete projects, insufficient materials
and production capacity, and state control of costs and prices (Ouibrahim and Scapens,
1989). An Algerian SOE was similar: employees had accounting skills but accounting
information was marginal to government decisions; annual financial reports were
prepared but not scrutinised; cost accounting was used to calculate subsidies but not
used at operational levels – here production language predominated because
managerial bonuses were tied to physical targets (Jones and Seffiane, 1992). In four
Ghanaian SOEs budgets were centralised, managerial participation was minimal, and
they were ignored due to high inflation, insufficient resources and managerial
accounting knowledge, and slow badly presented reports (Tsamenyi et al., 2002, 2004).
Recent research is similar. An enterprise resource planning customization failed in an
Egyptian SOE due to government agencies insisting on uniform accounting (Kholeif
et al., 2007). World Bank-sponsored MAS reforms in a Ghanaian SOE had little impact
upon accountability: budgeting remained politicised, delayed, directionless and
ineffective (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005).
Accounting unrelated to rewards or actual circumstances becomes irrelevant to
managers, especially when political interventions predominate. For example,
accounting in the Volta River Authority in Ghana became renegotiable in the light
of environmental changes and negotiations with the government (Rahaman and
Lawrence, 2001). Industrial relations, accountability, and accounting in Bangladeshi
SOEs became symbolic and detached from operations. Formal mechanisms remained
intact but became ritualistic, rule-bound, ceremonial, irrelevant rituals, i.e. loosely or
totally decoupled. Politicians did not abandon them for they needed a veneer of legal
rationality to secure legitimacy from external bodies and the populace, but they and
central planners paid little heed to accounting, setting higher but unrealistic budget
targets to demonstrate political prowess. Meaningful accountability often never
occurred – Parliament rarely discussed technically and procedurally sound financial
accounts (Hoque, 1995; Hoque, 1995; Hoque and Hopper, 1994, 1997; Uddin and Hopper,
1999; Alam, 1997). Many dissatisfied managers sought more budget participation and
flexibility (Maunders et al., 1990), and some resisted granting undue deals on ethical
and/or commercial grounds but most recognised their weakness, disregarded budgets,
and struck informal deals with local trade union leaders, workers, and suppliers to
maintain production, and attributed budget shortfalls to unrealistic targets whilst
manipulating budgets to protect their reputations. State capitalism rarely functions as
intended or in a linear rational manner. Legislation making enterprises accountable to
the state gave conduits for political intervention into financial management rendering
legal-rational bureaucracy illusory. This is not merely a venal exercise of power by the
powerful (though this can occur) but a product of socio-economic factors leading to
political factionalism. Thus bureaucratic procedures to control corruption and facilitate
legal rationality became vehicles for the behaviour they sought to eliminate.
However, politicians found space for political manoeuvre increasingly constrained
as SOE losses and large public sector deficits diminished resources. The status quo
was unsustainable without international finance but the cessation of “Cold War”
politics ended benign loans for client states. Increasingly right wing ideologies like
Thatcherism and Reaganism cast scepticism on economic aid unaccompanied by
structural reforms. International financiers, frustrated with state’s corruption,
inefficiency, and failure to deliver services to the poor, turned to market capitalism
and NGOs. The aim was to replace political factionalism and patronage with private
ownership and market exchanges. Aware that fiscal crises precipitate political crises,
LDC governments knew they must (or appear to) comply.
Market capitalism
Market capitalism often emanates from World Bank and IMF structural adjustment
programmes’ (SAP) loan preconditions stipulating free trade, competition, private
capital, limited government intervention, and public sector reforms (Toye, 1994; Cook
and Kirkpatrick, 1995; Hemming and Mansoor, 1988; Cook, 1986). SAPs instruct LDCs
to create conditions conducive for international finance capital and capital markets by
eliminating subsidies, price controls and import barriers; reorganising and lessening
public ownership of domestic banks; promoting private banks and domestic capital
markets; privatising or closing SOEs; and introducing “new public management”
(NPM) in government agencies. They promote legislation that forces trade unions
(especially public sector ones) into collective bargaining, severs their party links, and
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curtails labour rights, especially in export zones. Market mechanisms should
co-ordinate and control, and thence stimulate economic performance – not state
regulation reliant on problematic accounting inputs (Peasnell, 1993). Market capitalism
pays little heed to culture, race and ethnicity assuming a capitalist MOP with modern
management controls will induce worker discipline, effort and co-operation; empower
managers to exploit economic rent opportunities; and engender meritocracy,
individualism, legal rational beliefs, and obligations to employers. The aspiration is
for the state to play a greater supply-side role, follow legal-rational not partisan
decision making, and create infrastructures conducive to market capitalism by
promoting law and order, financial and commercial mobility, education and training
congruent with market needs, and regulatory bodies, especially for privatised utilities
where monopolies prevail; protecting property rights, and for politics to consist of
parties competing to deliver such regimes.
SAPs were enforced in many LDCs confronting fiscal deficits. In Bangladesh the
initial socialist government fell partly because SOEs’ losses consumed 30 per cent of
project aid. Subsequent military governments facing domestic opposition and fiscal
deficits had to accept loan conditions from financial agencies demanding privatisation
of SOEs (whether loss-making or not) (Uddin and Hopper, 2003). In Ghana Dr
Nkrumah’s government (1957 to 1966) fell and the military National Liberation Council
and then the civilian Progress Party (PP) governments implemented IMF/World Bank
economic policies incorporating privatisations in 1970 but Colonel Acheampong’s
military government deferred them after popular backlash. Nevertheless, the Soviet
bloc decline forced Ghana towards Western financial institutions. It became an early
Sub-Saharan African country to adopt SAPs (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005; Tsamenyi
et al., 2002). In 1983 Rawling’s military government accepted IMF/World Bank
recommendations to reduce government market interventions, encourage domestic
savings and foreign investment, privatise SOEs, and improve the balance of payments
(Petchenkine, 1993; Tsamenyi et al., 2004). In Sri Lanka in 1977 a new right-wing
government pursued an “open economy”, and under IMF and World Bank pressure
embarked on privatisations and rolling back the public sector (Wickramasinghe et al.,
2004).
SAPs require effective accounting but development economists and policy makers
often neglect this. They incline to macro-economic solutions presuming that
accounting is technical, unproblematic, and flows automatically from market
relations. Ndzinge and Briston (1999) despair at poor links between accountants and
development specialists, and accounting technology transfers unadapted to local
conditions. Too often non accountants assume that accounting, especially if it follows
international standards, will provide the information and transparency necessary for
financial markets to invest optimally and make enterprises accountable to them. It is
assumed that stronger agency relationships; fears of hostile takeovers and dismissals
of recalcitrant managers; improved technology; and greater competition will improve
controls within and over enterprises. However, this is questionable: SAPs may initiate
new forms of despotic control within reconstituted patronage politics.
SAPs provide macro-economic solutions to fiscal problems. They only indirectly
deal with delivering aid programmes. Here NGOs have assumed a major role[10]. Until
the 1980s they received little attention but they are now numerous: there are possibly
two million in India. They provide emergency relief, health care, education and
training, housing, legal services, and micro-credit. Their growth has been attributed to
government failures to promote and deliver development; NGOs’ superior efficiency,
flexibility, honesty, transparency and accountability, and their reach to disadvantaged
groups, especially the very poor and women. International finance and aid agencies
(often NGOs), and foreign governments have increasingly transferred projects from
LDC governments to NGOs to transcend political factionalism in the belief that NGOs
are more transparent and accountable (especially to beneficiaries) and have more
effective internal controls. However, there is little accounting research on whether this
is so.
Whence market capitalism?
Market capitalism is an “idealised” normative model. It attracts criticism. The World
Bank, IMF and Western donors like USAID are accused of ignoring local resistance to
privatisation; inadequate financial systems for equity sales; local needs; inadequate
regulation; and inconclusive evidence that private enterprises outperform SOEs
(Commander and Killick, 1988; Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995). Stiglitz (2002) argues that
IMF “solutions” worsen (even create) problems by unduly promoting global finance
interests. These debates filter down to accounting. Talaga and Ndubizu (1986) found
tensions between orthodox and political economy development paradigms, and
normative and positive accounting, reinforce political factionalism and/or new forms of
“crony capitalism” and coercion. Thus the question is whether MASs reproduce market
capitalism whilst serving broader development goals or do they foster political
factionalism and coercive controls? This is explored below. First, research on MASs’
operation in private companies in LDCs (private from inception, privatised, and
Chinese enterprises undergoing market reforms) under market conditions is examined.
Then MAS research on NGOs is discussed. The turn to market-based policies and
NGOs reflects donors’ frustrations with state organisations. However, this and
associated NPM reforms raise governance issues, not least corruption, and politics,
especially the involvement of civil society. These are discussed in the last section.
MAS within private enterprises
Research on MAS practices in private companies in LDCs is sparse. Only two surveys
were found. The first found MAS use and sophistication in 40 Egyptian private firms
was limited: no advanced accounting techniques were applied, activity-based costing
was largely unknown, and costing was used for pricing not performance measurement,
process improvement or cost reduction (Van Triest and Elshahat, 2007). In contrast,
intellectual capital in 119 Malaysian companies was linked to value-based and mixed
financial and non-financial measures, and “beyond-budgeting” controls rather than
profit and performance oriented systems. Financial capital budgeting measures (but
rarely “real options”) were used but possibly to legitimise decisions (Tales and Sofian,
2007).
Market reforms encourage private firms to adopt conventional MASs. Indian firms’
budgets were perceived as more realistic, meaningful and useful, especially when
forming strategy, following economic reforms in 1991. However, unlike Western firms
but consistent with Indian culture, they sought more supplier partnerships despite
being defenders (Anderson and Lanen, 1999). In Latin America, during social and
economic crises defender and reactor strategies were positively, and prospector and
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analyzer strategies negatively associated. Prospector strategies and budget use were
positively associated (Collins et al., 1997). Seven years of MAS changes during growing
competition were institutionalised in the Banco do Brasil (Guerreiro et al., 2006) and
four South African retailers increasingly used contemporary MASs, especially ABC
and balanced scorecards, following government deregulation and global competition
policies (Waweru et al., 2004). However, uncertainties in LDCs do not derive merely
from market pressures. The only study of a small private company revealed that
during ten years of Palestinian political crises its MAS became more mechanistic under
political stability but more organic when political uncertainty increased (Kattan et al.,
2007).
Some researchers allege Western MASs are alien to many LDC cultures, e.g.
Velayutham and Perera (1996) claim they emphasise contracts between agents and
principals and reflect individualism whereas Asian and African accounting
rationalises collectivism. However, evidence on whether more culturally attuned
indigenous MASs exist in private companies employing capitalist MOPs is sparse. For
example, claims that Asian managers do not value participation are not well
supported. Malaysian companies used budgets for forecasting and control, and though
managers perceived strong budget pressure they sought more budget participation
(Chun, 1996). Thai bank managers’ budget participation was linked to performance
and appropriateness of but not commitment to achieve goals (Virameteekul et al., 1995).
A Chinese MAS reproduced high power-distance values, top-down communication,
pseudo-participative management, and dictatorial leadership but subordinates
complained of inequality (Chan and Lee, 1997). Cultural effects have been studied in
Latin America. Frucot and Shearon (1991) found USA but not Mexican MNO managers
linked satisfaction to the locus of control, and Mexican managers in foreign MNOs
viewed budget participation and the locus of control differently to managers in
Mexican companies. This was attributed to cultural differences. Leach-Lopez
et al.(2007) extended this, finding budget participation and performance of USA
managers in the USA and Mexican managers in USA companies in Mexico were
associated but causal explanations varied, especially for Mexican managers not
bilingual or without US supervisors.
Family ownership is more prevalent in LDCs. This may bring informal and
arbitrary management controls, information restricted to family confines, and rules
and regulations superseded by family or friendship connections (Black et al., 2000). For
example, the MAS of a large Bangladesh listed company enabled the owning family to
maintain control despite being detached from operations, consistent with claims that
familial controls tally with traditional cultures in many LDCs (Uddin, n.d.). Other cases
support these observations. Ansari and Bell (1991) found control in a Pakistan
company run by three brothers was initially based on trust but the introduction of
formal centralised accounting by one brother after a financial crisis precipitated family
disputes. Professional managers resented their reduced discretion, the other brothers
wanted traditional controls restored despite knowing they would impair efficiency, and
eventually the business failed. The importance of “family” was also found in an
Indonesian firm owned by three Chinese Indonesian friends (Efferin and Hopper, 2007).
They introduced rational Western controls including budgets, financial controls,
formal wage scales, and financial rewards for performance, alongside systems based
on Chinese values adapted to local contexts, especially ethnic tensions. In contrast,
social relations, culture and symbolism dominated control in a private family-owned
Indonesian university, rendering the MAS largely irrelevant (Tsamenyi et al., 2008).
Contemporary development policy emphasises: small and micro-organisations –
households, shopkeepers, money lenders, peasant agriculture, and fishing –
substantial economic sectors of many LDCs, especially regarding employment;
building financial infrastructures to sustain micro-finance institutions and programs,
and induce private sector participation. However, MAS research has neglected these
areas (Dixon et al., 2006) thereby reproducing past policy biases by concentrating on
large industrial and commercial organisations. What research exists suggests that
micro-organisations’ MASs are affected by traditional cultures and MOPs. For
example, calculative practices of fishermen in a poor rural Sri Lankan village
reproduced a MOP rooted in traditional village cultures and local power relations
(Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2007). Traditional culture influenced three
Bangladeshi small traders’ accounting: its absence was attributed to social and state
institutions not demanding it, and norms of reciprocity and trust when trading –
though debtor records were sometimes kept once traders became literate (Jacobs and
Kemp, 2002). Asechemie and Ikeri (1999) found Nigerian artisans did not keep
systematic cost records (as reported by Onuoha, 1994; Phillips, 1991; Nwachukwu,
1990; Asechemie, 1996) but used accounting strategically and flexibly – marginal cost
pricing was perceived as fairer and more competitive than profit maximization, and
their labour value was not deducted – consistent with African traditions. MASs, albeit
in different guises, exist in micro-organisations in traditional sectors of LDC society.
Policy makers increasingly see micro-enterprises as important sources of new jobs
but they are financially constrained by banks that use conventional lending methods,
over-estimate risk in loan proposals, and have high transaction costs, e.g. Satta (2006)
found a small Tanzanian cooperative bankhad the best small firm financing schemes
in poor rural areas bereft of financial services. Consequently, development funding is
increasingly channelled to micro-organisations through microfinance providers like
rural banks, cooperatives, and NGOs. More accounting research needs to aid providers
and recipients of micro-finance (Satta, 2004). Micro-finance institutions have often
generated creative, simple and effective systems with minimal transaction costs to
generate, assess, and recoup loans to poor and disadvantaged groups using oral social
controls embedded in traditional cultures. This is an example of where accounting
needs blending with household and village exchange relations, their social structures,
and attendant values and beliefs, to reduce poverty and empower marginal, less
powerful groups. Micro-organisations and micro-finance are neglected but important
areas of MAS research that call for novel methods, often action-based, and a
reconstitution of the MAS domain
Research on privatised enterprises also suggests that market reforms impact MASs,
though Vernon-Wortzel and Wortzel (1989) argue that enhanced SOE performance
could be achieved by improved controls rather than ownership changes. Following
privatisation a Bangladesh soap company computerised management information
systems, and improved market information and production scheduling (Uddin and
Hopper, 2001). The partial privatisation of Sri Lankan telephones renowned for poor
service, inefficiency, and political patronage culminated in a Japanese minority
shareholder undertaking its management. This brought consultative leadership, trade
union co-operation, new management controls, intensive capital investment, younger
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better qualified staff, and some commercial success (Wickramasinghe et al., 2004).
When a Sri Lankan textile mill was privatised its owners invested in new machinery,
maintained existing industrial relations, and improved controls (Wickramasinghe and
Hopper, 2005). Two Ghanaian SOES sold to foreign MNOs improved performance after
major MAS changes (Tsamyeni et al., n.d.). When a Ghanaian gold mine was
corporatised (government equity reduced to 20 per cent) investment revived and MASs
introduced, including an integrated software package for planning and control,
activity-based costing, cost cutting measures, budget based managerial performance
evaluation; and budget training, though gaming and ethnic tensions associated with
budgeting persisted (Tsamenyi and Hopper, 2003).
These reports resonate with research on Chinese enterprises’ MAS practices in the
transition from Maoism to Dengism. This research is interesting being the most
intensive in a single LDC undergoing market reforms. Under Mao ideologies of class
struggle, central planning, and public ownership constructed a class view of
accounting and prohibited Western accounting whereas under Deng, such methods
were encouraged and portrayed as a neutral technology spanning national boundaries
(Ezzamel et al., 2007). Gradually a market ideology based on mixed-ownership;
enterprise autonomy; less mandatory state planning; and greater macro-economic
regulation (Zhou,1988) fostered management planning, budgeting, performance
evaluation, forecasting, and control built on responsibility accounting used since the
1950s (Child and Xu, 1991; Scapens and Yan, 1993; Bromwich and Wang, 1991;
Skousen and Yang, 1988; Scapens and Yan, 1993; Scapens and Ben-Ling, 1995;
Maschmeyer and Ji-Liang, 1990). Lessons were learned from joint ventures, e.g. Chinese
participants’ MASs resembled those of foreign partners more than their Chinese
counterparts (Firth, 1996). However, joint ventures can hit difficulties: Chinese partners
often pursue longer term strategies than USA partners and expect eventually to
assume control (Yan and Gray, 1994); and USA partners use controls to transmit and
protect their knowledge whereas Chinese partners see them as sharing and protecting
investments. Managerial disputes often reflect each partner’s relative knowledge and
investments but MASs reduced negative impacts of partner transaction costs and were
positively associated with performance (Chalos and O’Connor, 2004, 2005). However,
Western ignorance of Chinese MAS practices and their behavioural underpinnings
hindered Chinese managers applying them, bringing calls for more facilitative, process
based assistance (Scapens and Yan, 1993). Nevertheless, MAS change popularised in
academic journals, seminars, and training (Bromwich and Wang, 1991) has produced
debate and experimentation, e.g. in financially restructuring Chinese SOEs (Lee, 2001);
on how employment contracts, joint venture experience, stock exchange listing, and
training affect “Western” MASs (O’Connor et al., 2004); combining responsibility
accounting with target costing, standard costing, performance evaluation, and internal
transfer pricing (Lin and Yu, 2002); implementing ABC in the face of internal resistance
but with top management support and a company culture of “top –down” innovations
(e.g., economic-value added, balanced scorecards and six sigma) (Liu and Pan, 2007);
and effects of political constraints and liberalization measures upon MASs (O’Connor,
Deng and Luo, 2006). China is unique having controlled its development and transition
to market-oriented policies itself but it has insights for other LDCs. It initially retained
uniform accounting – a legacy of an economy marked by strong state-ownership, a
weak accounting profession, and weak equity markets – but subsequently reformed
these and accounting regulation and controls according to China’s cultural, political
and economic history (Davidson et al., 1996; Graham and Li, 1997; Xiao et al., 2004).
Thus there is growing evidence of contemporary MASs being adopted in private
companies in LDCs following market liberalisation, with tantalising but limited detail
on adjustments to cultural, family and local political circumstances. Nevertheless, this
may impede broader development aims. First, increased MNOs’ power is a frequent
concern, e.g. Chand and White (2007) allege that MNOs and large international
accounting firms influenced Fiji to adopt international accounting standards (IASs) for
their own ends contrary to public interests. However, judging MNOs is not clear cut:
Malaysian local companies were less committed to social responsibilities than foreign,
particularly USA and British, companies (Teoh and Thong, 1984). Rivera (1982) found
MNOs faced problems of insufficient experts, poor accounting education, and
malfunctioning public services but often MNOs increase accounting capacity by
providing good training and practice. Nevertheless, MNOs’ use of transfer pricing to
shift its tax burden to favourable jurisdictions is a worry. For example, transfer prices
of MNOs in Bangladesh rendered them less profitable than local firms despite MNOs’
superior market power and resources (Rahman and Scapens, 1986); identical transfer
prices for tax compliance and internal management in an MNO brought a more
coercive MAS (Cools et al., n.d.); and debates on cost and market-based transfer pricing
prevail in China (Chan and Chow, 2001). Some researchers advocate standard global
transfer pricing to prevent MNOs exploiting differences in tax policies, import duties,
transfer pricing regulations, withholding taxes, profit repatriation and currency risks
(Borkowski, 1997). Armstrong (1998) argues that neo-classical economic MAS research
on transfer pricing concentrates on individual state-MNO relations to the neglect of
global capitalism, economic regulation, and calculations by nation states. Whatever,
given its importance in public policy, the sparseness of MAS research on transfer
pricing is surprising, especially as many LDCs and policymakers have ceased vilifying
MNOs in the belief that they provide foreign capital, create employment, and bring
managerial expertise.
Second, MAS changes accompanying market reforms may weaken protections and
interests of other stakeholders vis à vis owners. Botha (1995) argues that South African
market reforms have made inequalities and injustices created by apartheid more
visible, and MASs should be more conducive to democracy, sustainable growth and
wealth redistribution. In China the simultaneous use of old and new MAS methods
have exaggerated tensions over generating profits and jobs (Skousen and Yang, 1988)
bringing worker unrest, resource misallocation, and demands for more non-financial
measures (Maschmeyer and Ji-Liang, 1990). MAS changes with a commercial rationale
may reduce employee protection gained through trade unions, foster coercive control,
and engender corrupt managerial practices. For example, when a Bangladesh soap
company was privatised financial information became the preserve of the controlling
family who imposed arbitrary, physical budgets reinforced by hiring, firing, and
promoting at whim: they destroyed the internal state and internal labour markets,
sacked workers, and then rehired them at lower wages through subcontractors.
External reports ceased in violation of company law and stock exchange regulations
bringing allegations of irregular financial transactions, exploitation of minority
shareholders, and prosecutions by tax officials and banks (Uddin and Hopper, 2001). A
privatised Sri Lankan textile mill financially collapsed when the owner fled abroad
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having fraudulently removed machinery purchased with state bank loans
(Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005). The only MAS study of a contemporary large
scale agricultural organisation found (a Sri Lankan tea plantation) reported that whilst
accounting was used for financial control and external reporting it also reproduced the
post-colonial political hegemony over labour in everyday practices of “tea-making”
(Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2008). Privatizations in South Africa induced
MASs that brought harsh controls on workers, rationalised redundancies, and reduced
benefits (Catchpowle and Cooper, 1999). MAS market-based reforms do not necessarily
reduce corruption and protect stakeholders against undue managerial actions.
Third, market serving MASs may not eliminate patronage associated with political
factionalism. In the Bangladesh privatized soap company political influence merely
took new forms: ministers used regulatory powers to favour investors, and oust
militant trade unions in return for management recognising a token government party
union and appointing staff recommended by ministers (Uddin and Hopper, 2001). In
the Ghana gold mine the government used its minority shareholding and board
representation to influence management decisions. Political disputes spilled into the
company, e.g. managers were accused of allegiance to the opposition party. When the
Head of State, Jerry Rawlings, inspected the mine by midday he expressed
dissatisfaction with conditions and replaced the Deputy Managing Director (Tsamenyi
and Hopper, 2003). In the Sri Lankan textile mill workers and indigenous managers
allied against the new owners and following the mill’s bankruptcy got political leaders
to restore state control and reopen the mill during a pre-election period only for it to
close shortly after (Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005). In the Sri Lankan
telecommunications firm disgruntled employees habituated to work in a government
department allied with trade union and political leaders frustrated by exclusion from
organisational affairs. They got the CEO removed and formal bureaucracy restored by
exploiting ministerial powers to appoint board members and, above all, their influence
within the regulatory system (Wickramasinghe et al. 2004). Thus MAS changes may
perpetuate coercive controls and political patronage, albeit in new guises using new
conduits, contrary to the claims of sponsors of reform. For example, when Uddin and
Hopper (2003) followed up a World Bank report claiming that a successful batch of
Bangladesh privatisations warranted more, they judged only one of the thirteen a
commercial success: elsewhere contributions to state revenue declined; transparent
external reports required by law failed to materialise; untoward transactions affecting
minority shareholders, creditors, and taxation agencies emerged; and more commercial
internal controls wrought declining employment, wages, quality of working life, and
employee rights. Above all, the paper questioned the narrow criteria of the World Bank
report – namely profit – rather than broader development aims. If MAS research is to
promote development it must incorporate criteria that transcend commercial and
private interests.
MAS within NGOs
Frustrated by governments’ corruption, political patronage and poor delivery of
programmes, many external development providers turned to NGOs[11] – now major
players in LDCs. In 1992 international NGOs handled $7.6 billion of aid to LDCs and
30,000 NGOs handle 15 per cent of total development aid. NGOs vary in aims, scope
and size but they can be large, influential organisations, e.g. BRAC and Grameen Bank
in Bangladesh (Hulme, 2004; Matin et al., 2002). Operational NGOs deliver literacy and
clean water projects, consulting, education and training, and finance for the poor; and
manufacture and sell goods and services. At their best they possess humanitarian
goals; strong grassroots links; field-based development expertise; innovation and
adaptability; process-oriented approaches; participation linked to learning; long-term
commitment; an emphasis on sustainability; cost-effectiveness, and cross cultural
management (Matin et al., 2002). Nevertheless, there are allegations that some NGOs
unfairly compete with private organizations; are corrupt; fail operationally; have
limited financial and management expertise; are too dependent on charismatic leaders;
and their vocal advocacy downplays broader social or economic issues. For example,
advocacy NGOs can be vehicles for ideology not assistance; subject to capture by
politics; and be unelected and unaccountable (Lehman, 2007).
However, whether NGOs’ alleged values of fairness, equity, transparency,
participation, learning, sustainability, and social commitments are reproduced in
MASs attuned to indigenous cultures and MOPs, efficient service delivery, and
minimal political patronage and corruption is unknown. The little research to date
suggests that MASs are not central. For example, three Tanzanian NGOs perceived
accounting as alien (though impending bankruptcy mitigated this) and used it
symbolically to gain legitimacy rather than planning and control, which presented few
problems as stakeholders sought more accessible means of societal scrutiny and
operational transparency (Goddard and Assad, 2006). Similarly, treasurers in local
voluntary organisations in Mauritius used MASs to symbolise rationality to gain
external legitimacy from funders who attached little value to accounting data – they
preferred engendering trust within “emotional” and informal relations (Soobaroyen
and Sannassee, 2007). Thus relationships and accounting concerns within and
surrounding NGOs may differ from commercial organisations. For example, members
of an Irish overseas aid agency were concerned that its social accounting was corporate
rhetoric that downplayed needs to change and stakeholder empowerment in African
projects (O’Dwyer, 2005). Moreover, accounting may render NGO practices
inconsistent with their aims, e.g. a Zambian microfinance NGO found it supplanted
bottom-up accountability and constrained accountability (Dixon et al., 2006); and
Traidcraft found “social bookkeeping” did not augment stakeholder accountability as
intended but made managers interpret religious principles more commercially (Dey,
2007). NGOs are under-researched within accounting despite sometimes deficient
systems for evaluating projects, protecting public deposits, and legal frameworks (see
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 19 No. 3, 2006; and O’Dwyer and
Unerman, 2007). More MAS research is needed, e.g. on whether NGO’s MASs foster
accountability and beneficiaries’ involvement, especially the very poor and women,
promotes employee involvement, and avoids coercive controls? Anecdotal reports,
especially of large, near commercial NGOs suggest that sometimes they may not. And
if they do, then do their MASs reconcile efficient delivery of services and survival with
their broader humanitarian values and goals?
MAS within public sector organisations
LDC states’ and local politics’ roles have been diminished (or altered) by market
reforms favouring private organisations, the rise of NGOs, and NPM reforms of
government accounting. The latter raise several issues. First, demands for more public
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sector performance information can remain unmet due to low institutional capacity and
corruption (Mimba et al., 2007). For example, budget reforms, loan conditions in a
World Bank SAP, overwhelmed the Malawi state’s limited capacity to collect and
process information. This supports claims that rational long-run planning may be less
effective than control using simple, delegated short-run budgets continuously and
flexibly; working within actual short-run data and existing resources; avoiding large
projects and spreading risk; and tying output controls to rewards (Mserembo and
Hopper, 2004). Second, there are change management issues. Diamond (2004) claims
international organizations can usually agree on what reforms of auditing standards
(an important component of NPM) in government departments are necessary. He
commends respecting local audit traditions and implementing changes following his
model. Improved implementation might alleviate MAS reform problems noted
elsewhere, e.g. by mediating political rivalries during Indonesian local government
accounting reforms (Marwata, 2006); overcoming physicians’ resistance in an Egyptian
public hospital (Hassan, 2005); and settling disputes between a Chinese hospital with
decentralised control and a new MAS to improve information and central planners who
set prices below cost (Chu and Rask, 2002). However, problems can transgress change
management issues: MAS reforms can have deleterious material effects. For example,
using balanced scorecards – a World Bank loan condition – encouraged the Fijian
Public Rental Board to sell state housing and charge economic rents, which enhanced
national efficiency and wealth but contradicted its mission to house poor people
(Sharma and Lawrence, 2005); when external financial institutions introduced a profit
oriented MAS in the Fijian Development Bank indigenous Fijians’ protections from
settler exploitation and cheap imported Indian labour were removed and racial
privileges reinforced (Alam et al., 2004); and MAS changes in state organisations
induced by international finance agencies incorporated values, concepts, rationales and
practices alien to Kiribati culture bringing major problems (Dixon, 2004).
Hence NPM accounting reforms may reproduce an alien hegemony and not
increased local autonomy, democracy and accountability, resulting in dubious
development gains. NPM emphasises hierarchy, especially managers reporting to
political masters, rather than “bottom-up” accountability making public service
deliverers responsible to communities served, as in the Ugandan Community-led
HIV/AIDS Initiative (Awio et al., 2007). External agencies benchmarking of LDC’s
MASs against rich countries’ practices may induce reforms incompatible with
indigenous cultures, local democracy, and domestic politics (Rahaman et al., 1997).
Moreover, accounting reforms, not least their discourse and language, may encourage
states to abandon their development role and mask exploitation (Arnold and Cooper,
1999), e.g. accounting language prioritising “profitability” “affordability” and
“accountability” diminished resistance to privatising urban water services in Ghana
(Rahaman et al., 2007); and accounting discourse reinforced institutionalised racial
discrimination during the financial re-structuring of a Fijian SOE (Davie, 2005).
Everett et al. (2007) claim accounting research neglects corruption. Transparency
International’s 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index reveals LDCs are frequently the
most corrupt. Economists attribute low development rates to corruption that erodes
democracy; values of trust and tolerance; the legitimacy and institutional capacity of
government; good governance by reducing legislative accountability, representation in
policymaking; the rule of law; and brings unfair service provision in public
administration. In extremity, corruption represents embezzlement of entrusted funds
and diverts domestic financial capital abroad. If commonplace it can become the norm
when businesses or citizens interact with government officials and it increases
business costs and risks of breached agreements; shields firms with connections from
competition; sustains inefficient firms; diverts public investment into unduly complex
capital projects where bribes and kickbacks are more plentiful; reduces the quality of
government services and infrastructure; increases budgetary pressures on
government; and impedes compliance with construction, environmental, or other
regulations. Anticorruption organizations, especially the World Bank, United Nations,
IMF, OECD, and Transparency International, view accounting’s role in reducing
corruption as relatively unproblematic but radical approaches see accounting as
potentially an enabler and constrainer of accountability and liberal democracy (Everett
et al., 2007). For example, when Malawi local government reforms increasing
managerial autonomy met interference, sabotage and corruption from politicians
managers regained some autonomy by exploiting NPM-based managerial
prerogatives, central government interventions, and corrupt collusions with
councillors (Tambulasi, 2007).
Accounting cannot resolve all poverty, injustice, and corruption problems but it is a
piece in the jigsaw of effective control, regulation, accountability, and the rule of law.
Corruption flourishes under low government transparency, no freedom of information
legislation, contempt for freedom of speech and the press, absent or dysfunctional
democracy, poorly-paid government officials, and illiterate populaces. However, many
LDCs lack financial and technical capacity; strong institutions; opaque, democratic and
effective budget processes and fiscal controls; and public participation opportunities,
which divert resources from social priorities at early budgeting stages, allocation of
resources contrary to budget decisions, and false financial statements to mask leakage
of public funds. Democratic politics can offset corruption and patronage politics
through greater state accountability. This requires state policies, practices and
expenditures open to public and legislative scrutiny so civil society can be involved in
budget formulation, execution and reporting to hold officials accountable and
prosecute irregularities. Such reforms bring results, e.g. the Indian Right to
Information Act 2005 “engendered mass movements. . .bringing the lethargic, often
corrupt bureaucracy to its knees and changing power equations completely”. (Jakarta
Post, 31 August, 2006). Publishing surveys and audit and accountability reports makes
corrupt practices more visible, facilitates public monitoring, and challenges cultures of
impunity, e.g. publishing monthly intergovernmental fund transfers in the Ugandan
local media reduced fund losses by 78 per cent. Information technology has a role, e.g.
submitting internet applications and tax returns for computer processing can reduce
corruption by reducing interactions with officials, speeding up decisions, and reducing
human errors. Thus the design and operation of MASs can strengthen local states and
stakeholders’ influence in domestic politics in contrast to market reforms and use of
NGOs that bypass them.
Conclusions
So, “What do we know about MAS in LDCs?” Research is growing, with a broad
geographical spread across LDCs at different development stages but is not extensive
in any country apart from China. However, many contextual factors and issues are not
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unique to LDCs – it is wrong to ghettoise LDC research as exotic and irrelevant to
mainstream accounting research. Nevertheless, LDCs are relatively distinctive as they
have a larger residue of traditional cultures and MOPs; their poverty renders them
more dependent on external finance, ideologies and structural reforms, with lower
institutional capacity to deliver change. This limits locals’ ability to determine political
choices and state mechanisms of governance. A primary MAS research aim must be to
foster understanding to facilitate local choice rather dictating systems from rich
countries premised on possibly alien values, to improve material conditions and
quality of life, especially for the most disadvantaged.
LDCs have shifted from traditional, often feudal MOPs (though some sectors had
MOPs akin to capitalist forms) to socialist state capitalist and then market capitalist.
Each embodies distinctive MASs, broadly conceived. The legacy of transition is MOPs
in tension with each other and local cultures, reinforced by ethnic differences.
Pre-colonial MOPs incorporated traditional cultures, whereas subsequent ones reflect
modern values. Local society often supported transition. However, the means were and
still are premised on Western practices imposed by external agencies. Research reveals
that subsequent MASs in SOEs and government departments often failed to operate as
intended, whereas in private companies, especially under market capitalism, they were
often adopted with alacrity as they helped secure commercial but not invariably
development aims. So how might research progress with regard to the interplay of
MOPs, culture, and ethnicity?
More needs knowing about MAS and cultures. First, historical studies and
ethnographies of traditional sectors (including indigenous peoples in rich countries)
need to identify how local cultural attributes are reproduced in distinctive forms of
accounting and accountability. Only then can MASs be adapted to local circumstances
and preferences. MAS research has much rhetoric on the failure to incorporate local
practices but it is weak on revealing what they are. Research concentrates on large
organisations, often foreign owned, and neglects indigenous small and
micro-organisations where cultures may be more collectivist and inclined to
informal trust. We need to ascertain whether the latters’ MASs incorporate local
cultures, not least regarding familial values, rights and obligations and their effects.
Second, more research is needed on NGOs, especially whether their work with the poor,
often in rural agriculture, domestic industry, and micro-enterprises develops effective
MASs that resonate with traditional cultures and MOPs whilst delivering the
development goals sought. This is almost virgin territory for accounting researchers.
Third, research in private companies suggests that economic liberalisation drives MAS
development but issues of culture, ethnicity, corruption, coercion, and political
patronage still abound. Studies here should assess MASs not merely on economic
performance criteria but also against broader development goals.
Next we turn to state and regulatory issues. LDCs in this review range from
so-called “failed states” with dictators unconcerned with development, sometimes
undergoing long-term civil wars or lacking rule of law, to “newly industrialized
countries” with advanced economies but lacking some developed country attributes.
This makes generalisation difficult but some issues warrant consideration. We need to
know more about the catalogue of indifference to MASs in SOEs and some government
agencies. The bleakness of MAS research here is surprising given that SOEs’
effectiveness compared to private corporations remains contested. Studies of MASs in
effective state organisations might resolve this conundrum. Also, in poor countries
greater consideration might be given to simple MASs for control rather than complex
long run planning systems. LDCs often have weak regulatory structures – three issues
warrant further study. The first concerns labour. State capitalism recognised trade
unions and collective bargaining but fused them with parties and politics to the
detriment of commercial MASs and efficiency. However, market capitalism has
weakened unions and labour, sometimes to the detriment of work conditions,
remuneration and employment. Are commercially effective MASs predicated upon
weakening labour, and if not, then how are labour-capital conflicts reconciled? Second,
MAS deficiencies in local banks and their regulation are major development concerns
unaddressed by researchers. Bank failures and capital provision were problematic
under state capitalism due partly to weak accounting controls and it is not clear
whether market reforms have improved access to credit, especially for the poor. Third,
how capital market and financial accounting changes associated with market reforms
precipitate MAS change is poorly understood. For example, Egyptian accounting
development from 1961 to 1997 was partly related to stock market development and
SOE privatization (HassabElnaby et al., 2003); African countries that modified IASs to
local conditions had higher economic growth than those ignoring IASs (Larson, 1993)
but economic growth, equity market development and IAS adoption were negatively
correlated in 27 LDCs (Larson and Kenny, 1995). Only two studies have examined
whether capital markets affected MASs either directly or via financial accounting. The
first suggested that LDCs with weak capital markets and accounting infrastructure
investment avoided high risk projects at a cost to diversification (Lee, 2001); the second
found listed companies on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange that released timely audited
final annual reports had more modern technology and stronger internal controls
(Owusu-Ansah, 2000). More interchange of capital markets, financial accounting and
MAS research in LDCs is needed to integrate research findings and formulate policy.
Previous MAS research has concentrated on social and critical theories, possibly
because they are open, grounded, process oriented and exploratory; give voice to
neglected constituencies; are sensitive to ethnocentricity, and address dynamic
political issues ranging from ideology and language to class struggle and globalisation.
The scarcity of quantitative work may be attributable to the paucity of published data
on MASs, and difficulties obtaining reliable responses from subjects unused to and
suspicious of surveys. Exploratory bottom-up methods using case studies have yielded
rich pickings and remain apt. However, their preponderance may inadvertently
prioritise cultural and political factors over economic ones. Relating MAS change to
capital markets and financial accounting may require more aggregated economic and
archival work. Larger sample survey studies may identify what Western systems are
inapplicable to LDCs – is it in entirety, degree, or just parts, and when, where and how
(Baydoun and Willett, 1995). The volume of survey and statistical work in
development studies, financial accounting, and finance appertaining to LDCs suggests
this is feasible. However, triangulation and eclecticism over theories and research
methods is required: research on LDCs is too scarce to be discarded on grounds of
methodological predilection.
Lastly, we turn to politics. As our review reveals, many accounting problems in
LDCs are socio-economic and political not technical (Wallace, 1990). We found no MAS
unique to LDCs. Nor does this article prescribe any MAS for LDCs – rather it seeks
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understanding and systems that aid dialogue and choice within local political
processes. Two political issues warrant further research. First, more consideration
should be given to systems that empower civil society. Often LDCs have powerful
governments but weak and corruptible governance. State capitalism encouraged this,
but market reforms, especially NPM, may diminish local politics and civil society’s
influence. In addition, the turn to NGOs may weaken the state, though not the influence
of civil society. The association of MASs with such trends needs investigation: local
democracy may outweigh efficiency considerations, especially in the public sector.
There is a need to design systems that empower citizens, however disadvantaged, that
promote effective governance rather than relying on MASs imported from rich
countries.
Second, more needs knowing on how external institutions frame MAS policy and
practice. Wallace (1990) claims accounting in LDCs is a tale of importation of Western
practices and institutions by transnational accounting firms, Western professional
associations and consultants, MNOs, international projects, and recommendations of
international accounting committees. This raises concern. Hove (1986, 1990) alleges
that standardised accounting will fail LDCs as it favours colonialism, powerful foreign
investors and professional accountancy institutions from the developed world. For
example, MNOs not local companies’ influenced Fiji’s adoption of IASs (Chand, 2005).
Accounting, including MASs, in many LDCs remains influenced by professional
associations from former imperial powers (see Auditing, Accounting and
Accountability Journal, 1999, No. 3), often acting within a constellation of
transnational governance agencies, aid institutions, treaties, professional and
consulting firms, and MNOs. Their lobbies in Europe and the USA create a global
market for accounting and auditing services through World Trade Organization
agreements that negate domestic regulations, licensing and qualification requirements,
and technical standards reduce domestic regulation and democratic economic
governance (Arnold, 2005). Similarly, multinational audits promote globalization and
their commercialization facilitates audit firms’ diversification into advisory services
(Barrett et al., 2005). We know international capital providers influence MAS reforms in
LDCs but not much on how, by whom, on whose behalf, and its consequences within
everyday practices. An exception is Wickramasinghe et al. (2007) who claimed the
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants diffusion of balanced scorecards in
Sri Lanka typified attempts to globalise Western MAS knowledge. It failed in the firm
investigated due to professional rivalries, the rise of alternative fads or techniques, and
the owner’s reluctance to relinquish older financial tools. Also, many MAS reforms
emanate from international financiers like the World Bank, the IMF, and the United
Nations. Studies of Delco in Sierra Leone and a Latin American education project claim
that World Bank practices and discourses promote neo-liberalism, globalize Western
financial practice, and deny local experience (Neu and Ocampo, 2007), and accounting
in loan agreements re-structure governance mechanisms bringing financial
technologies alien to LDCs’ customs whilst reaffirming the World Bank’s expertise,
legitimacy and influence (Neu et al., 2006). Saravanamuthu (2004) alleges that World
Bank accounting cannot reconcile competing stakeholder needs as it emphasises
economic necessities and neglects social and environmental degradation. However,
Annisette (2004) claims this ignores institutional pressures on the Bank to manage the
global economy on private international capital’s behalf. Concern about international
capital providers has provoked calls for greater scrutiny of their knowledge diffusion
role, who they serve and how, and research on the IMF’s accountability and
transparency; how it monitors debtor nations and projects; its links with the finance
industry; and accounting firms’ role in IMF programs (Arnold and Cooper, 1999).
Politics surrounding MAS reforms in LDCs transgress their boundaries and include a
constellation of institutions whose processes and effects remain poorly understood.
The politics of governance is not just a poor country problem: rich countries,
especially Luxembourg, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA are net recipients of capital
inflows from LDCs without resources and institutions to effectively regulate financial
transgressions. Rich countries must make corrupt business practices abroad illegal
and subject to domestic audit with meaningful sanctions for transgressions; and
enforce legislation, often from the United Nations, on capital flows into bank accounts,
reduced bank secrecy, transparent MNO accounts, regulating on-shore and off-shore
tax havens, sharing taxation returns with other countries, international transfer
pricing regulations, and protecting “whistleblowers”. MNOs, especially extractive
ones, have particular responsibilities. The exploitation of societies lacking capitalist
values or institutions, effective regulation, and symmetrical bargaining power raises
major ethical issues for MNOs operating overseas, their managers, governments
hosting MNO headquarters, international capital markets and accountants to fairly,
transparently and accurately assess profits, commissions and taxes due in particular
locales; help LDC governments strike economically sound contracts with MNOs; and
prevent environmental and social degradation. Caveat emptor cannot prevail in
inequitable situations. Professional responsibilities of accountants, businesses, and
MAS researchers transcend borders and should incorporate ethical and humanitarian
dimensions in the public interest. They should actively support NGO campaigns like
“Publish What You Pay” launched in 2002 seeking greater audited, transparent
payments, receipts, and management of revenues from the extractive sector; for
discrepancies to be reconciled; more effective use of resources within LDCs; greater
combating of corruption; and improved corporate social responsibility. MAS research
has a political dimension to prevent market-based regimes reverting to political
patronage and coercive controls.
Notes
1. Needles (1994) classified research on Asia-Pacific countries from 1965 to 1990 by country,
methodology, and subject over five-year periods but just 3 of the 100 papers are MAS.
Needle’s second review (1997) of International Journal of Accounting Research articles from
1965 to 1996 found only 6 of 126 were MAS: five deductive and descriptive, and one
empirical.
2. In LDCs external institutions and governments often commission policy papers from local
academics or consultants – alternative academic research funding is negligible and dividing
academic and practice is an unaffordable luxury.
3. The World Bank uses Gross National Income (GNI) criteria to categorise economies
according to four stages of development: low income ($905 or less); lower middle income
($906-$3,595); upper middle income ($3,596-$11,115); and high income ($11,116 or more).
4. The United Nations (UN) has two widely accepted indices. The human development index
(HDI) measures three dimensions: life expectancy, educational attainment and adjusted real
income ($ per person). The human poverty index (HPI) measures deprivation using four
indices: percentage of people expected to die before age 40; percentage of illiterate adults;
Management
accounting
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5.
500
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
percentage of people without access to health services and safe water; and percentage of
underweight children under five. It classifies economies into four categories: LDCs (50);
developing economies (168); economies in transition (20); and developed economies (42).
Two similar frameworks were found. Gray (1989) identifies how global factors, culture and
politics, history, religion, professional associations, capital markets, and legal systems
influence national and international accounting. These broadly correspond with factors in
our framework. However, Gray’s model is oriented to financial accounting (but touches on
MNO controls and transfer pricing), only tangentially addresses LDCs, is oriented to
statistical testing of dubious validity (e.g. Hofstede’s (1980) measures of national cultures),
and neglects transformation. Olowo-Okere and Tomkins (1998) identify three evolutionary
stages of government financial controls in the UK and Nigeria, and attribute ineffective
financial changes in Nigeria to external pressures from the World Bank and IMF, internal
political instability, political ideology, the economic climate, and financial stress. Their
model is confined to Nigeria and government accounting but its dynamic, evolutionary and
contingent stages resonate with our own.
Now Thailand, one of few non-Western countries to escape colonialism.
Ensuing regimes of control are labelled “colonial” because one racial group dominated
through political, legal and economic rights denied to others (Spearpoint, 1937), and
“despotic” because management controls tended to be arbitrary, racial, physical, and
coercive. Despotic controls are also hegemonic as they secure consent by legitimizing
capitalism and downplay other stakeholders’ influence (see Ezzamel et al., 2008).
Defined as “the fusion of monopoly forces with the bourgeois state to form a single
mechanism of economic exploitation and political domination” (Jessop, 1982, p.32).
This is when a particular group assumes power and advances their positions through goals
and agendas not shared by other sectors of society, i.e. they pursue self interest at the
expense of the common good. Leadership is often personality based and power maintained
through exploiting offices and patronage.
NGOs form social movements within civil society, providing services and advocacy.
Defining them is problematic: Anheier (1992) identifies five features: formal, private,
non-profit distributing, self-governing and voluntary.
The World Bank defines NGOs as “private organizations that pursue activities to relieve
suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social
services, or undertake community development” (Operational Directive 14.70).
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Appendix 1. Papers on management accounting research in LDCs by countries (75)
Africa (22)
Algeria (2)
Jones and Sefiane, 1992; Ouibrahim and Scapens, 1989.
Egypt (3)
Hassan, 2005; Kholeif et al., 2007; Van-Triest and Elshahat, 2007.
Ghana (5)
Rahaman and Lawrence, 2001; Tsamenyi et al., 2002; 2004, n.d.; Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005.
Malawi (2)
Mserembo and Hopper, 2004; Tambulasi, 2007.
Mauritius (1)
Soobaroyen and Sannassee, 2007.
Nigeria (3)
Asechemie and Ikeri, 1999; Olowo-Okere, 1999; Olowo-Okere and Tomkins, 1998).
Management
accounting
South Africa (1)
Waweru et al., 2004.
Tanzania (2)
Goddard and Assad, 2006; Satta, 2006.
Uganda (1)
Awio et al., 2007.
Zambia (1)
Dixon et al., 2006.
Africa general (1)
Asechemie, 1997.
Asia (38)
Bangladesh (8)
Alam, 1997; Alam and Lawrence, 1994; Hoque, 1995; Hoque and Hopper, 1994, 1997; Rahman,
and Scapens, 1986; Uddin, n.d.; Uddin and Hopper, 2001.
China (17)
Bromwich and Wang, 1991; Chalos and O’Connor, 2004, 2005; Chan and Chow, 2001; Chan and
Lee, 1997; Chan et al., 2001; Chu and Rask, 2002; Lin and Yu, 2002; Firth, 1996; Liu and Pan, 2007;
Maschmeyer and Ji-Liang, 1990; O’Connor et al., 2004, 2006; Scapens and Ben-Ling, 1995;
Scapens and Yan,1993; Skousen and Yang, 1988; Yan and Gray,1994.
India (1)
Anderson and Lanen, 1999.
Indonesia (3)
Efferin and Hopper, 2007; Marwata, 2006; Tsamenyi et al., 2008.
Malaysia (2)
Chun, 1996; Tales and Sofian, 2007.
Pakistan (1)
Ansari and Bell, 1991.
Sri Lanka (5)
Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2008; Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2007;
Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005; Wickramasinghe et al., 2004, 2007.
Thailand (1)
Virameteekul et al., 1995.
Pacific (3)
Fiji (2)
Alam et al., 2004; Sharma and Lawrence, 2005.
511
AAAJ
22,3
Kiribati (1)
Dixon, 2004.
Latin America (7)
Brasil (1)
Guerreiro et al., 2006.
512
México (2)
Frucot and Shearon, 1991; Leach-Lopez et al., 2007.
Unspecified or various (2)
Collins et al., 1997; Neu et al., 2006.
Venezuela (1)
Rivera, 1982.
West Indies (1)
Cowton and O’Shaughnessy, 1991.
Middle East (2)
Palestine (1)
Kattan et al., 2007.
Syria (1)
Abdeen, 1980).
Global (3)
Borkowski, 1997; Cools et al., n.d.; Satta, 2004.
Appendix 2. Papers on management accounting in LDCs by topic (75)
Management accounting and control in SOEs and privatisations (29)
Alam, 1997; Alam and Lawrence, 1994; Alam et al., 2004; Bromwich and Wang, 1991; Hoque,
1995; Hoque and Hopper, 1994, 1997; Jones and Sefiane, 1992; Kholeif et al., 2007; Lin and Yu,
2002; Maschmeyer and Ji-Liang, 1990; O’Connor et al., 2004, 2006; Olowo-Okere, 1999; Ouibrahim
and Scapens, 1989; Rahaman and Lawrence, 2001; Scapens and Ben-Ling, 1995; Scapens and
Yan, 1993; Sharma and Lawrence, 2005; Skousen and Yang, 1988; Tsamenyi et al., 2002, 2004,
n.d.; Uddin and Hopper, 2001; Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005; Van-Triest and Elshahat, 2007;
Waweru et al., 2004; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005; Wickramasinghe et al., 2004.
Large private companies and MNOs (10)
Anderson and Lanen, 1999; Chan and Lee, 1997; Chun, 1996; Collins et al., 1997; Frucot and
Shearon, 1991; Guerreiro et al., 2006; Leach-Lopez et al., 2007; Liu and Pan, 2007; Rivera, 1982;
Tales and Sofian, 2007.
MNOs – transfer pricing (5)
Borkowski, 1997; Chan and Chow, 2001; Cools et al., n.d.; Rahman and Scapens, 1986;
Virameteekul et al., 1995;
Joint ventures (with foreign companies) (4)
Chalos and O’Connor, 2004, 2005; Firth, 1996; Yan and Gray, 1994.
Indigenous SMEs (6)
Ansari and Bell, 1991; Efferin and Hopper, 2007; Kattan et al., 2007; Tsamenyi et al., 2008; Uddin,
n.d.; Wickramasinghe et al., 2007.
Management
accounting
Plantations and agriculture (3)
Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2008; Asechemie, 1997; Cowton and O’Shaughnessy, 1991.
Microfinance (4)
Dixon et al., 2006; Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2007; Satta, 2004, 2006.
Household accounting (2)
Asechmie and Ikiri, 1999; Chan et al., 2001.
Governmental accounting (10)
Abdeen, 1980; Awio et al., 2007; Chu and Rask, 2002; Dixon, 2004; Hassan, 2005; Marwata, 2006;
Mserembo and Hopper, 2004; Neu et al., 2006; Olowo-Okere and Tomkins, 1998; Tambulasi,
2007).
NGOs (2)
Goddard and Assad, 2006; Soobaroyen and Sannassee, 2007.
Appendix 3. Research methods used in management accounting in LDCs (75)
Case studies – from observations through interviews to documentary analysis (47)
Abdeen, 1980; Alam, 1997; Alam and Lawrence, 1994; Alam et al., 2004; Alawattage and
Wickramasinghe, 2008; Ansari and Bell, 1991; Asechemie, 1997; Awio et al., 2007; Chan and Lee,
1997; Chan et al., 2001; Chu and Rask, 2002; Cools et al., n.d.; Dixon, 2004; Dixon et al., 2006;
Efferin and Hopper, 2007; Goddard and Assad, 2006; Guerreiro et al., 2006; Hassan, 2005; Hoque
and Hopper, 1997; Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2007; Jones and Sefiane, 1992; Kattan et al.,
2007; Kholeif et al., 2007; Lin and Yu, 2002; Liu and Pan, 2007; Marwata, 2006; Neu et al., 2006;
Olowo-Okere, 1999; Olowo-Okere and Tomkins, 1998; Ouibrahim and Scapens, 1989; Rahaman
and Lawrence, 2001; Rahman and Scapens, 1986; Satta, 2006; Sharma and Lawrence, 2005;
Tambulasi, 2007; Tsamenyi et al., 2002, 2004, 2008, n.d.; Uddin, n.d.; Uddin and Hopper, 2001;
Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005; Waweru et al., 2004; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005;
Wickramasinghe et al., 2004, 2007; Yan and Gray,1994.
Field study and questionnaires (8)
Anderson and Lanen, 1999; Chalos and O’Connor, 2004, 2005; Chan and Chow, 2001; Hoque, 1995;
Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Soobaroyen and Sannassee, 2007; Tales and Sofian, 2007.
Questionnaires (10)
Borkowski, 1997; Chun, 1996; Collins et al., 1997; Firth, 1996; Frucot and Shearon, 1991;
Leach-Lopez et al., 2007; O’Connor et al., 2004, 2006; Van-Triest and Elshahat, 2007; Virameteekul
et al., 1995.
Desk study and documentary analysis (10)
Asechemie and Ikiri, 1999; Bromwich and Wang, 1991; Cowton and O’Shaughnessy, 1991;
Maschmeyer and Ji-Liang, 1990; Mserembo and Hopper, 2004; Rivera, 1982; Satta, 2004; Scapens
and Ben-Ling, 1995; Scapens and Yan, 1993; Skousen and Yang, 1988.
513
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22,3
Appendix 4. Theorising management accounting in LDCs (75)
Economics (3)
Chan and Chow, 2001; Maschmeyer and Ji-Liang, 1990; Rahman and Scapens, 1986.
Development economics (2)
Satta, 2004, 2006.
514
Ethnography/grounded theory/action/hermeneutics (11)
Ansari and Bell, 1991; Awio et al., 2007; Dixon, 2004; Efferin and Hopper, 2007; Goddard and
Assad, 2006; Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2007; Liu and Pan, 2007; Marwata, 2006;
Rahaman and Lawrence, 2001; Tsamenyi et al., 2008; Wickramasinghe et al., 2007).
Governmentality (Foucault/Bourdieu/structuration theory/accountability) (5)
Dixon et al., 2006; Jones and Sefiane, 1992; Neu et al., 2006; Ouibrahim and Scapens, 1989; Uddin
and Tsamenyi, 2005.
Labour process/political economy/Gramscian (10)
Alam et al., 2004; Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2008; Asechemie, 1997; Hoque and Hopper,
1994; Olowo-Okere, 1999; Olowo-Okere and Tomkins, 1998; Uddin, n.d.; Uddin and Hopper, 2001;
Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005; Wickramasinghe et al., 2004.
Institutional theory (4)
Firth, 1996; Hassan, 2005; Kholeif et al., 2007; Soobaroyen and Sannassee, 2007.
Institutional theory and contingency theory (6)
Alam, 1997; Alam and Lawrence, 1994; Cools et al., n.d.; Guerreiro et al., 2006; Hoque and Hopper,
1997; Sharma and Lawrence, 2005).
Contingency theory/RAPM/statistical (12)
Anderson and Lanen, 1999; Chalos and O’Connor, 2004, 2005; Chun, 1996; Collins et al., 1997;
Frucot and Shearon, 1991; Hoque, 1995; Kattan et al., 2007; Leach-Lopez et al., 2007; O’Connor
et al., 2004, 2006; Waweru et al., 2004.
Public administration (2)
Mserembo and Hopper, 2004; Tambulasi, 2007.
GST/social psychology (1)
Yan and Gray, 1994.
No explicit theory (19)
Abdeen, 1980; Asechemie and Ikiri, 1999; Borkowski, 1997; Bromwich and Wang, 1991; Chan
and Lee, 1997; Chan et al., 2001; Chu and Rask, 2002; Cowton and O’Shaughnessy, 1991; Lin and
Yu, 2002; Rivera,1982; Scapens and Ben-Ling, 1995; Scapens and Yan, 1993; Skousen and Yang,
1988; Tales and Sofian, 2007; Tsamenyi et al., 2002, 2004, n.d.; Van-Triest and Elshahat, 2007;
Virameteekul et al., 1995.
Corresponding author
Trevor Hopper can be contacted at: trevor.hopper@manchester.ac.uk
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