Ruling:
Case No. 1
Kuroda vs Jalandoni
G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949
Yes. Kuroda must be held for trial. Although Philippines
was not a signatory to the Hague and Geneva
Conventions, international jurisprudence is automatically
incorporated in Philippine law pursuant Article 2 Section 2
of the Philippine Constitution thus making war crimes
punishable.
Facts:
Case No. 2
Shigenori Kuroda was formerly a Lieutenant-General of
the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of
the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines (19431944). He was charged before a Military Commission
convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines for the atrocities committed by Japanese
Forces against civilians and other conduct during the war.
Kuroda contends that Military Commission has no
jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in violation of the
Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because
the Philippines is not a signatory thereto at the time of the
commission of the acts.
Issue:
Whether or not Kuroda shall be held for trial for the acts he
committed in violation of the convention of which
Philippines is not a signatory.
Yamashita vs. Styer
G.R. No. L-129, December 19, 1945
Facts:
Tomoyuki Yamashita is a commanding general in the
Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines. From being a
prisoner of war after his surrender, his status was changed
to that of an accused war criminal and was charged before
an American Military Commission for having allowed
members under his command to commit massacre of
thousands of unarmed non-combatant civilians.
Yamashita argued that the Military Commission has no
jurisdiction to try him because the commission was not
duly constituted and that the Philippines is not a US
occupied territory, hence does not have jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not Yamashita shall be held for trial in a US
Military commission even if the Philippines is not a colony
thereof.
Ruling:
Yes. The American Forces have occupied the Philippines
for the purpose of liberating the Filipino people from the
shackles of Japanese tyranny, and the creation of a
military commission for the trial and punishment of
Japanese war criminals is an incident of such war of
liberation. The Commission was duly constituted in
accordance with the authority of General MacArthur as
commander of US Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Pursuant to the Articles of War, a military commander has
an implied power to convene a Military Commission for the
purpose of trying offenders or offenses against the laws of
war in appropriate cases as it is an aspect of waging war.
Jurisdiction over Yamashita was acquired by virtue of his
capture by US forces and the charges against him – brutal
atrocities against unarmed civilians and other high crimes,
among others – are offenses against the laws of war over
which the Commission has jurisdiction.
Case No. 3
Borovsky vs Commissioner of Immigration
GR No. L-4362 (1951)
Facts:
A warrant of deportation was issued against Victor
Borovsky on the grounds that he was found to be an
undesirable alien, a vagrant and habitual drunkard. He
claims to be a stateless citizen, born in China of Russian
parentage. Borovsky was first attempted to be deported to
China however it was unsuccessful due to the latter’s
refusal to issue a visa. On the second attempt, he was
brought to Cebu for the purpose of placing him on board
of Russian Vessel. However, the captain refused to take
him due to lack of permission from Russian Government.
Since then, the government still has not found any country
that would take him. After two years under detention, the
Government has not found ways and means of removing
the petitioner out of the country.
Issue:
2. Whether the Philippine Government can continuously
detain petitioner, who is a stateless citizen for an
unreasonably long period of time
Ruling:
No. Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right
to asylum therein, even if they are stateless. However,
foreign nationals, not enemy, against whom no criminal
charges have been formally made or judicial order issued,
may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The protection
against deprivation of liberty without due process of law
and except for crimes committed against the laws of the
land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all
residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
Moreover, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of Nation.
And in a resolution entitled “Universal Declaration of
Human Rights” and approved by the General Assembly of
the UN of which Philippines is a member, the right to life
and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to
all human beings were proclaimed.
respondent Mark Jimenez. Pending evaluation of
extradition, petitioner requested for the official extradition
request made by US and other pertinent documents
attached therewith in accordance with his right to due
process. Department of Justice denied private
respondents request pursuant to Extradition treaty
between Philippines and US. It is to be noted that the
extradition process may result in the deprivation of liberty
of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be
effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the
prospective extraditee pending the submission of the
request. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective
extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition
in court.
Case No. 4
Because of these possible consequences, the court
concludes that the evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative
proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially
criminal since such technical assessment sets off or
commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the
deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. In
essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the
nature of a criminal investigation. True to the mandate of
the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and
hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings,
but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance
of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals
Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion
GR No. 139465, January 18, 2000
Facts: Pursuant to PD No. 1609 prescribing the procedure
for extradition of person who have committed a crime in a
foreign country, Department of Justice received from
Department of Foreign Affairs a US Note Verbale
containing a request for the extradition of private
are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting
their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right
to appear therein and present their side and to refute the
position of the opposing parties.
Issue: W/N treaty stipulations must take precedence over
an individual’s constitutional right to due process rights
particularly to notice and hearing.
Ruling: NO.The doctrine of incorporation is applied
whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a
conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to
give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal
law was enacted with proper regard for the generally
accepted principles of international law in observance of
the Incorporation Clause in Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution. In a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule
of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts for the reason that such courts are organs
of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances. The fact that international law has been
made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply
the primacy of international law over national or municipal
law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation,
as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly,
the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect—a
treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a
treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law
of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both
statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the constitution.
Case No. 5
Ichong vs Hernandez
101 Phil 115
Facts:
In light of the Chinese monopoly in the local market,
Congress enacted RA 1180 otherwise known as the Retail
Trade Nationalization Act. The purpose of this law is to
reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail
business. Petitioner Ichong, a Chinese merchant, then
filed an action questioning the constitutionality of the law,
which he contends, among others, that the law denies
Chinese businessmen equal protection of law since the
disputed law exempts U.S. citizens from the prohibition.
He further states that the act violates International treaty
obligations of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the Treaty of Amity and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights can prevail over RA 1180.
Ruling:
No. The said Act prevails over the Treaty of Amity with
China and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
because the law was passed in the exercise of the police
power of the State, and police power cannot be bargained
away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. In
addition, the aforementioned Treaty guarantees equality of
treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms
as the nationals of any other country". In this case, the
nationals of China are not discriminated against because
nationals of all other countries, except those of the United
States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution,
are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade.
Case No. 6
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969)
Facts:
Two
Special
Agreements
concluded
between
Netherlands-Germany and Denmark-Germany. The
Parties submitted to the Court certain differences
concerning “the delimitation as between the Parties of
certain areas of the continental shelf in the North Sea
which appertain to them”. The Court was asked to decide
the applicable “principles and rules of international law” in
the delimitation of the disputed areas. The Court was not
asked to actually delimit the boundaries as the task was
reserved to the Parties. Most of the North Sea had already
been delimited between the Parties. However, they have
been unable to agree on the prolongation of the partial
boundaries mainly because Denmark and Netherlands
wanted it to be based on the Equidistance Principle, while
Germany believed that it would lessen what it believed to
be its proper share of the area based on the proportionality
to the length of its North Sea coastline. Denmark and
Netherlands, during the oral hearing, further contends that
the Geneva Convention was merely a declaratory of an
existing rules. The Equidistance principle as such has
already been regarded as a rule of customary law.
Germany therefore is obliged to uphold.
Issue:
Whether the equidistant principle contained in the 1958
Geneva convention on the Continental Shelf (1) was a
prior existing custom and/or (2) had already become
customs after convention.
was unnecessary (i.e. duration) for the formation of
a customary law.
Ruling:
(1) No. The Court held that the principle of
equidistance, as contained in Article 6 did not form
a part of existing or emerging customary
international law at the time of drafting the
Convention. The Court supported this finding
based on (1) the hesitation expressed by the
drafters of the Convention, the International Law
Commission, on the inclusion of Article 6 into the
Convention and (2) the fact that reservations to
Article 6 was permissible under the Convention.
(2) The Court held that Article 6 of the Convention had
not attained a customary law status. For a
customary rule to emerge the Court held that it
needed: (1) very widespread and representative
participation in the Convention, including States
whose interests were specially affected (in this
case, they were coastal States) (i.e. generality);
and (2) virtually uniform practice (i.e. consistent and
uniform usage) undertaken in a manner that
demonstrates (3) a general recognition of the rule
of law or legal obligation (i.e. opinio juries). In the
North Sea Continental Shelf cases the court held
that the passage of a considerable period of time
Case No. 7
The Paquete Habana
U.S. January 8, 1900
Facts:
Two fishing smacks were regularly engaged in fishing on
the coast of Cuba, sailing under the Spanish flag, and each
owned by a Spanish subject, residing in Havana. The
fishing vessels left Havana for a fishing voyage and sailed
along the coast of Cuba. The vessels fished there for 25
days in the territorial waters of Spain. Upon return of the
vessels, they were each captured by one of the United
States blockading squadron. Neither fishing vessels had
any arms or ammunition on board, had any knowledge of
the blockage, or even of the war, until they were stopped
by a blockading vessel. The fishermen argues that
international law exempts coastal fishermen from capture
as prizes of war.
Issue:
Whether the rule of international law that coast fishing
vessels, pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing
in fresh fish, were exempt, with their cargoes and crews,
from capture as prize of war, should be given effect by the
Court even if no treaty or judicial decision were held to give
effect thereof.
Ruling:
Yes. International law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction. When there is no treaty and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists
and commentators, not fo the speculations of their authors
concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy
evidence of what the really is.
Case No. 8
The Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear
General Principle of Law; Estoppel (Preclusion in
International Law)
FACTS: The Temple of Preah Vihear is an ancient shrine
situated on the borders of Thailand and Cambodia. The
temple and the grounds are of considerable artistic and
archaeological interest, and are potentially important
militarily. The natural boundary between the two countries
in this region is formed by the high Dangrek Range, which,
in the area of Preah Vihear, rises abruptly out of the
Cambodian Plain forming a cliff-like escarpment from
which the land then descends to the north into Thailand.
The temple is situated on a promontory at the edge of the
escarpment overlooking the Cambodian Plain to the south.
The present boundary is the result of treaties which were
negotiated in 1904-07 and which determined that the line
was generally to follow a specified watershed in this area.
The watershed line at Preah Vihear followed the edge of
the escarpment, with the natural result geographically of
enclosing the temple within Thailand. However, the maps
which were later produced by a French firm, at the request
of the Siamese Government, deviated from the watershed
line at Preah Vihear so that the temple was shown as
being in Cambodia which, until 1953, was a part of French
Indo-China. This deviation apparently went unnoticed by
Thailand. In 1949, the French Government protested on
learning that Thai troops had been stationed at Preah
Vihear. No explanation resulted and Cambodia, having
become independent in 1953, instituted the present
proceeding before the International Court of Justice in
1959, asking that it be declared the sovereign of the area
in question.
ISSUE: W/N the general principle of law of estoppel,
otherwise known in international law as the concept of
preclusion, now prevents Thailand from claiming
sovereignty over the territory.
HELD: YES. "Preclusion" in international law is the
process by which one nation acquires sovereignty over an
area by long possession adverse to the real sovereign. In
this case the basis of preclusion would be the assertion of
sovereignty in the publication of the maps by Cambodia,
and continued acts in relation to the temple amounting to
a continued claim to ownership. Thus, in the view of the
evidence taken by the Court, Cambodia could now claim
the temple even if it be conceded that Thailand could have
properly asserted sovereignty just subsequent to the
events of 1908-9.
rupees per annum, also termed as a jagir or saranjam (a
form of feudal land grant). In the Judgement given by the
court, it found that Portugal had in 1954 a right of passage
and it has sovereignty over the enclaves, subject to the
regulation and control of India, in respect of private
persons, civil officials, and goods in general, but not in
respect of armed forces, armed police and arms and
ammunition. Portugal then asked the Court to declare that
a right of passage was possessed by Portugal and must
be respected by India.
Case No. 9
Issue: Whether or not there exists a local custom
originating from the Treaty of Poona.
Right of Passage over Indian Territory Case (Portugal
vs. India)
Whether or not Portugal has the right to passage over the
Indian Territory.
Facts:
Ruling:
The Portuguese Government filed an application because
India prevented the Portuguese to exercise the right of
passage over their territory in the Indian Peninsula of two
enclaves surrounded by the Territory of India, Dadra and
Nagar-Aveli. Said government asserted that, by virtue of
the Treaty of Poona in 1779 and two sanad issued by the
Maratha ruler in 1783 and 1785, India was under the
obligation to allow Portugal to exercise its sovereignty over
the Daman and the enclaves. However, India argued the
treaty and the two sanad were solely confined upon, with
regards to the villages, a revenue grant worth 12,000
Yes. The Court deemed that there existed a longcontinued practice between the two States which was
recognized by them through the Treaty of Poona of 1779
and that it should result in or form the basis of mutual rights
and obligation between the two states.
Yes. A right of passage for non-military civilians exists as
a rule of regional customary international law between
India and Portugal. During the British and Post-British
periods, only non-militant persons were permitted passage
and followed a uniform practice, which allowed free
passage between Daman and the enclaves. The evidence
of the prevalence of this customary practice is absolute as
it has been followed over a period which extends beyond
a century and a quarter, without changes in post-Indian
independence. However, with regards to the right to
passage of military personnel and arms, the Court
observed that during the British period up to 1878, the
passage of such armed police and arms and ammunition
between the British and Portuguese possessions was
managed not of practice, but of reciprocity.
Case No. 10
Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. Corazon
Aquino
GR 73748, May 22, 1986
Facts:
On February 25, 1986, Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986,
Proclamation No. 3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquino government assumption of power by stating that
the “new government was installed through a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by
units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines”
Issue:
Whether the Aquino government is legitimate.
Ruling:
Yes. The court held that the people have accepted the
Aquino government which is in effective control of the
entire country; It is not merely a de facto government but
in fact and law a de jure government; and The community
of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of
the Republic under her government.
Case No. 11
Banco Nacional de Cuba vs. Sabbatino
376 US 398
Facts:
Farr, Whitlock & Co (“Farr”), an American commodity
broker, contracted to purchase Cuban sugar from a wholly
owned subsidiary of Compania Azucarera VertientesCamaguey de Cuba (“CAV”) whose capital stock was
owned principally by United States residents. Thereafter,
US Government signed Sugar Act of 1948 to deduct the
sugar quote for Cuba. The Cuban Government
expropriated the corporation’s property and rights. Cuba
permitted the ship carrying the sugar to leave Cuban
waters only after Farr had entered into a contract, identical
to those made previously, with Banco Nacional De Cuba.
Another such instrumentality to which the bank had
assigned the bill of lading instituted an action in the US
District Court to recover the proceeds of the bill of lading.
Issue:
Does the courts of the United States have the authority to
examine the validity of taking a property within its own
territory by a foreign sovereign even if the taking violated
international law?
Ruling:
No. The Act of State Doctrine precluded the courts of the
US from inquiring into the validity of the public acts that a
recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its
own territory. Even in a situation whereby international law
has been violated, the clear implication of past cases is
that the Act of State Doctrine is applicable because the
Doctrine does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction.
Case No. 12
Oetjen vs. Central Leather Co.
246 US 297
State Immunity is Retroactive
FACTS: General Francisco Villa, while conducting
independent operations as a duly commissioned military
commander of the Carranza government, which had then
made much progress in its revolution in Mexico, levied a
military contribution, and, in enforcing it, seized and sold
some hides then owned and possessed by a citizen of
Mexico. They were paid for in Mexico and were thereafter
shipped into the US and were replevied. Moreover, the
plaintiff in error argues that under the Hague Convention
of 1907 (a treaty between US and Mexico), it forbid such
seizure and sale of property and that no title passed by the
sale made by General Villa, and the property may be
recovered by the Mexican owner when found in the US.
ISSUE: W/N the military act of levying possessions of
Mexican citizens which were shipped to the US by the
revolutionary government of Mexico is covered by the
doctrine of state immunity.
HELD: YES. The act could not be reexamined and modified by
a US court in replevin. The court notices judicially that the
government of the United States recognized the government of
Carranza as the de jure government and such recognition is
retroactive in effect, and validates all the actions and conduct of
the government so recognized from the commencement of its
existence.
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason
of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
The principle that the conduct of one independent government
cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another is as
applicable to a case involving the title to property brought within
the custody of a court, such as we have here, for it rests at last
upon the highest considerations of international comity and
expediency. To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign
state to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the courts
of another would very certainly "imperil the amicable relations
between governments and vex the peace of nations."
Moreover, the Hague Conventions, in view of their terms and
international character, do not apply to a civil war, and that the
regulations annexed to the Convention of 1907 do not forbid
such a military seizure and sale of private property as is involved
in this case. The remedy of the former owner, or of the
purchaser from him, of the property in controversy, if either has
any remedy, must be found in the courts of Mexico or through
the diplomatic agencies of the political department of our
government.
Case No. 13 People v Perfecto
No. 18463. October 4, 1922
FACTS: The newspaper La, Nacion, edited by Mr.
Gregorio Perfecto, published an article reading as follows:
"How many of the present Senators can say without
remorse in their conscience and with serenity of mind, that
they do not owe their victory to electoral robbery? How
many?
"The author or authors of the robbery of the records from
the said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but
followed the example of certain Senators who secured
their election through fraud and robbery."
As a result, an information was filed in the municipal court
of the City of Manila by an assistant city fiscal, in which the
editorial in question was set out and in which it was alleged
that the same constituted a violation of article 256 of the
Penal Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found
guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
ISSUE: W/N article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is still
in force.
RULING: NO. By virtue of the change from Spanish to
American sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, said law
is no longer in force. It is a general principle of the public
law that on acquisition of territory the previous political
relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. Every
nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold
it subject to the constitution and laws of its own
government, and not according to those of the government
ceding it. Moreover, Article 256 of the Penal Code is
contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the
American character and system of government as written
defamation is not punishable under American laws.
Case No. 14
ISSUE: W/N the present municipality is liable for the
obligations of the city incurred prior to the cession to the
United States and reincorporation.
RULING: YES. The contention that the liability of the city
upon such obligations was destroyed by a mere change of
sovereignty is obviously one which is without a shadow of
moral force, and, if true, must result from settled principles
of rigid law.
U.S. Supreme Court
Vilas v. Manila, 220 U.S. 345 (1911)
(Perfecto case v Vilas case: Under the principle of state
continuity, the consequence of a succession of state is the
abrogation of political laws while municipal laws remain in
force.)
FACTS: The plaintiffs in error, who were plaintiffs below,
are creditors of the City of Manila as it existed before the
cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States by
the Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898. Upon the theory
that the city, under its present charter from the government
of the Philippine Islands, is the same juristic person and
liable upon the obligations of the old city, these actions
were brought against it. The Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands denied relief, holding that the present
municipality is a totally different corporate entity, and in no
way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality.
The inhabitants of the old city are the incorporators of the
new. There is substantially identity of area. There are
some changes in the form of government and some
changes in corporate powers and methods of
administration. The new corporation is endowed with all of
the property and property rights of the old. It has the same
power to sue and be sued which the former corporation
had. There is not the slightest suggestion that the new
corporation shall not succeed to the contracts and
obligations of the old corporation. Laying out of view any
question of the constitutional guaranty against impairment
of the obligation of contracts, there is, in the absence of
express legislative declaration of a contrary purpose, no
reason for supposing that the reincorporation of an old
municipality is intended to permit an escape from the
obligations of the old, to whose property and rights it has
succeeded. The juristic identity of the corporation has
been in no wise affected, and, in law, the present city is, in
every legal sense, the successor of the old.
Case No. 15
due in respect of the damage caused (a) to the United
Nations, (b) to the victim or to persons entitled through
him?
Reparation of Injuries Suffered in Service of the U.N.,
Advisory Opinion, 1949
FACTS: As a consequence of the assassination in
September 1948, in Jerusalem, of Count Folke
Bernadotte, the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, and
other members of the United Nations Mission to Palestine,
the question concerning reparation for injuries suffered in
the service of the United Nations, was referred to the Court
by the General Assembly of the United Nations
(Resolution of the General Assembly dated December 3rd.
1948) in the following terms:
ISSUES:
I. In the event of an agent of the United Nations in the
performance of his duties suffers injury in circumstances
involving the responsibility of a State, has the United
Nations, as an Organization, the capacity to bring an
international claim against the responsible de jure or de
facto government with a view to obtaining the reparation
II. In the event of an affirmative reply on point I (b), how is
action by the United Nations to be reconciled with such
rights as may be possessed by the State of which the
victim is a national?
RULING:
I (a). YES. The Court unanimously reaches the conclusion
that the Organization has the capacity to bring an
international claim against a State (whether a Member or
non-member) for damage resulting from a breach by that
State of its obligations towards the Organization. The
Court states that the Charter conferred upon the
Organization rights and obligations which are different
from those of its Members. The Court stresses, further, the
important political tasks of the Organization: the
maintenance of international peace and security.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Organization
possessing as it does rights and obligations, has at the
same time a large measure of international personality and
the capacity to operate upon an international plane,
although it is certainly not a super-state.
I (b). YES. The Court analyses the question of diplomatic
protection of nationals. The Court points out in this
connection that only the Organization has the capacity to
present a claim in the circumstances referred to, inasmuch
as at the basis of any international claim there must be a
breach by the defendant State of an obligation towards the
Organization. In the present case the State of which the
victim is a national could not complain of a breach of an
obligation towards itself. Here the obligation is assumed in
favor of the Organization. However, the Court admits that
the analogy of the traditional rule of diplomatic protection
of nationals abroad does not in itself justify an affirmative
reply. In fact, there exists no link of nationality between the
Organization and its agents. This is a new situation and it
must be analyzed. Do the provisions of the Charter relating
to the functions of the Organization imply that the latter is
empowered to assure its agents limited protection? These
powers, which are essential to the performance of the
functions of the Organization, must be regarded as a
necessary implication Organization may find it necessary
to entrust its agents with important missions to be
performed in disturbed parts of the world. These agents
must be ensured of effective protection. It is only in this
way that the agent will be able to carry out his duties
satisfactorily.
II. The Court does not state here which of these two
categories of protection should have priority and in the
case of Member States it stresses their duty to render
every assistance provided by Article 2 of the Charter. It
adds that the risk of competition between the Organization
and the national State can be reduced or eliminated either
by a general convention or by agreements entered in each
particular case, and it refers further to cases that have
already arisen in which a practical solution has already
been found.
Finally, the Court examines the case in which the agent
bears the nationality of the defendant State. Since the
claim brought by the Organization is not based upon the
nationality of the victim but rather upon his status as an
agent of the Organization, it does not matter whether or
not the State to which the claim is addressed regards him
as its own national. The legal situation is not modified
thereby.
Case No. 16 The Holy See v. Rosario, Jr.
G.R. No. 101949. December 1, 1994
ISSUES: W/N the Department of Foreign Affairs is a
proper party to intervene in the case in behalf of the Holy
See.
FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises
sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.
Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a
domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.
W/N petitioner can invoke the privilege of sovereign
immunity.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land
located in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila and
registered in the name of petitioner which was sold to
Licup and assigned to herein private respondent but later
discovered that petitioner and the PRC, without notice to
private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana. Tropicana
induced petitioner and the PRC to sell the lots to it and
thus enriched itself at the expense of private respondent.
Private respondent filed a complaint praying for the
annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner and the
PRC on the one hand, and Tropicana on the other.
Petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity from suit.
A Motion for Intervention was filed before the court by the
Department of Foreign Affairs, claiming that it has a legal
interest in the outcome of the case.
RULING: YES. In Public International Law, when a state
or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or
diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the
Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the
court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
YES. If petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary
course of a real estate business, surely the said
transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis
(commercial or private act). However, petitioner has
denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot
5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said
property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to
dispute said claim.
The privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was
sufficiently established by the Memorandum and
Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The
determination of the executive arm of government that a
state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or
diplomatic immunity is a political question that is
conclusive upon the courts.
NOTE:
Available recourse for private respondent
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for
the redress of its grievances. Under both Public
International Law and Transnational Law, a person who
feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask
his own government to espouse his cause through
diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government,
through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against
the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine
government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its
claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a
determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations
between the Philippine government and the Holy See.
Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the
claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
Distinction: Holy See vs. Vatican City
In a community of national states, the Vatican City
represents an entity organized not for political but for
ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite
its size and object, the Vatican City has an independent
government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of
the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of
State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of
its mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests
and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in
a sense an “international state”
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations
and enter into transactions as the Holy See and not in the
name of the Vatican City, one can conclude that in the
Pope’s own view, it is the Holy See that is the international
person.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See
the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through
its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic
representations with the Philippine government since
1957. This appears to be the universal practice in
international relations.
Case No. 17 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons
Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996
Pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the
United Nations, to request the International Court of
Justice urgently to render its advisory opinion on the
following question: 'Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons
in any circumstance permitted under international law?'."
In Article 51, the Charter recognizes the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs. A further lawful use of force is envisaged in Article
42, whereby the Security Council may take military
enforcement measures in conformity with Chapter VII of
the Charter. These provisions do not refer to specific
weapons. They apply to any use of force, regardless of the
weapons employed.
The Charter neither expressly prohibits, nor permits, the
use of any specific weapon, including nuclear weapons.
Having dealt with the Charter provisions relating to the
threat or use of force, the Court turns to the law applicable
in situations of armed conflict.
The Court notes by way of introduction that international
customary and treaty law does not contain any specific
prescription authorizing the threat or use of nuclear
weapons or any other weapon in general or in certain
circumstances, in particular those of the exercise of
legitimate self-defense. Nor, however, is there any
principle or rule of international law which would make the
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons or of any
other weapons dependent on a specific authorization.
The pattern until now has been for weapons of mass
destruction to be declared illegal by specific instruments.
But the Court does not find any specific prohibition of
recourse to nuclear weapons in treaties expressly
prohibiting the use of certain weapons of mass
destruction.
Turning to the applicability of the principles and rules of
humanitarian law to a possible threat or use of nuclear
weapons, the Court notes that nuclear weapons were
invented after most of the principles and rules of
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict had already
come into existence. However, in the Court's view, it
cannot be concluded from this that the established
principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in
armed conflict did not apply to nuclear weapons. In this
respect it seems significant that the thesis that the rules of
humanitarian law do not apply to the new weaponry,
because of the newness of the latter, has not been
advocated in the present proceedings.
According to one point of view, the fact that recourse to
nuclear weapons is subject to and regulated by the law of
armed conflict does not necessarily mean that such
recourse is as such prohibited. Another view holds that
recourse to nuclear weapons, in view of the necessarily
indiscriminate consequences of their use, could never be
compatible with the principles and rules of humanitarian
law and is therefore prohibited. A similar view has been
expressed with respect to the effects of the principle of
neutrality. Like the principles and rules of humanitarian
law, that principle has therefore been considered by some
to rule out the use of a weapon the effects of which simply
cannot be contained within the territories of the contending
States.
Accordingly, in view of the present state of international
law viewed as a whole, as examined by the Court, and of
the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court is led to
observe that it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to
the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a
State in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which
its very survival would be at stake.
The Court finally emphasizes that its reply to the question
put to it by the General Assembly rests on the totality of
the legal grounds set forth by the Court, each of which is
to be read in the light of the others.
Case No. 18 Nicaragua v. United States of America
Judgment of 27 June 1986
FACTS: In July 1979, the Government of President
Somoza was replaced by a government installed by Frente
Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN). Supporters of
the former Somoza Government and former members of
the National Guard opposed the new government. The US
– initially supportive of the new government – changed its
attitude when, according to the United States, it found that
Nicaragua was providing logistical support and weapons
to guerrillas in El Salvador. In April 1981 the United States
stopped its aid to Nicaragua and in September 1981,
according to Nicaragua, the United States “decided to plan
and undertake activities directed against Nicaragua”.
Initial US support to the groups fighting against the
Nicaraguan Government (called “contras”) was covert.
Later, the United States officially acknowledged its support
(for example: In 1983 budgetary legislation enacted by the
United States Congress made specific provision for funds
to be used by United States intelligence agencies for
supporting “directly or indirectly military or paramilitary
operations in Nicaragua”).
ISSUES:
1. W/N the US violated its customary international law
obligation:
Of non-intervention in the affairs of another State.
Prohibiting the use of force.
Under the principle of respect for State sovereignty.
W/N the military and paramilitary activities that the US
undertook in and against Nicaragua be justified as
collective self-defense?
RULING:
1.a. YES. The Court finds it clearly established that the
United States intended, by its support of the contras, to
coerce Nicaragua in respect of matters in which each State
is permitted to decide freely, and that the intention of the
contras themselves was to overthrow the present
Government of Nicaragua. This amounts to an intervention
in the internal affairs, whatever the political objective of the
State giving support. It therefore finds that the support
given by the United States to the military and paramilitary
activities of the contras in Nicaragua, by financial support,
training, supply of weapons, intelligence and logistic
support, constitutes a clear breach of the principle of nonintervention.
1.b. YES. Since the plea of collective self-defense
advanced by the United States cannot be upheld, it follows
that the United States has violated the principle prohibiting
recourse to the threat or use of force.
1.c. YES. The principle of territorial sovereignty is directly
infringed by the unauthorized overflight of Nicaraguan
territory. These acts cannot be justified by the activities in
El Salvador attributed to Nicaragua; assuming that such
activities did in fact occur, they do not bring into effect any
right belonging to the United States. The laying of mines
in or near Nicaraguan ports necessarily affects the
sovereignty of the coastal State, and that if the right of
access to ports is hindered by the laying of mines by
another State, it constitutes an infringement to Nicaragua's
detriment of the freedom of communications and of
maritime commerce. The laying of mines in the waters of
another State without any warning or notification is not
only an unlawful act but also a breach of the principles of
humanitarian law.
Secondly, in order to determine whether the United States
was justified in exercising self-defense, the Court has to
ascertain whether the circumstances required for the
exercise of this right of collective self-defense were
present, and therefore considers whether the States in
question believed that they were the victims of an armed
attack by Nicaragua, and requested the assistance of the
United States in the exercise of collective self-defense.
The Court has seen no evidence that the conduct of those
States was consistent with such a situation.
2. NO. The Court would first have to find that Nicaragua
engaged in an armed attack against El Salvador,
Honduras or Costa Rica, since only such an attack could
justify reliance on the right of self-defense. As regards El
Salvador, the Court considers that in customary
international law the provision of arms to the opposition in
another State does not constitute an armed attack on that
State. As regards Honduras and Costa Rica, in the
absence of sufficient information as to the transborder
incursions into the territory of those two States from
Nicaragua, it is difficult to decide whether they amount,
singly or collectively, to an armed attack by Nicaragua. The
Court finds that neither these incursions nor the alleged
supply of arms may be relied on as justifying the exercise
of the right of collective self-defense.
Case No.19. Underhill vs. Hernandez, 168 US 250
Facts:
An engagement took place between a revolutionary army,
headed by General Hernandez, and the government of
Venezuela. After the defeat of the government forces,
Hernandez and his army occupied Bolivar, where the
American petitioner, George F. Underhill was living.
Underhill was contracted by the government to construct
the city’s waterworks system; in addition, he was engaged
in supplying the city with water and ran a machinery repair
business. After the occupation of Bolivar, Underhill
requested from Hernandez, as the officer in command, for
a passport to leave the city consistently but was refused,
until such time when it was finally handed to him. Underhill
then filed an action against Hernandez for allegedly being
civilly liable for Underhill’s detention caused by reason of
the refusal to grant the passport, for the alleged
confinement of Underhill to his own house, and for certain
alleged assaults and affronts by the soldiers of Hernandez'
army. This was filed in the circuit court of Eastern District
of New York where the case was dismissed. It was
appealed to the circuit court of appeals, which was also
dismissed as General Hernandez had acted on behalf of
the government of Venezuela, and as such are not
properly the subject of adjudication in the courts of another
government.
Issues: Whether or not the Supreme Court of the United
States has the jurisdiction and the capacity to try this case.
Held:
No. Applying the state doctrine, the Court held that every
sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained
through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves.
Case No. 20. Republic of the Philippines vs. Marcos,
806 Fd. 344, US Court of Appeals
Facts:
Former president Marcos and his wife were indicted in the
US district court for fraud and racketeering charges. The
charges stemmed from allegedly illegal activities engaged
in while Marcos was still President. The indictment
charged that after they were granted asylum in the US, the
Marcos had violated a federal court order which prohibited
the transfer of assets.
The complaint alleges that the Marcoses allegedly do
business in New York and use agents, representatives,
and nominees in New York to assist in the operation of the
properties that were allegedly purchased for the benefit of
the Marcoses from the proceeds of money and assets
stolen from the Philippine government. Thus, the
complaint asks that the court enjoin and restrain the
defendants from transferring, conveying, encumbering, or
in any way adversely affecting the rights of the PH
government in and to the properties pending determination
as the true ownership of and entitlement to the parcels of
land.
Issue: Whether the Marcoses can use the state doctrine
as a defense before the US Circuit Court
Ruling:
No. The Court held that the alleged illicit activities of
Ferdinand Marcos, such as expropriation of private
property; creating public monopolies; "grant[ing]
government favors, contracts, licenses, loans, and other
public benefits, could only have been undertaken pursuant
to his powers as the, then, President of the Philippines. As
such, herein case could not be adjudicated under the state
doctrine. It further reiterated the decision in Underhill vs.
Hernandez, “...the immunity of individuals from suits
brought in foreign tribunals for acts done within their own
States, in the exercise of governmental authority, whether
as civil officers or as military commanders, must
necessarily extend to the agents of governments ruling by
paramount force as a matter of fact.”
Jenny Mighell brought an action against a certain Albert
Baker for breach of promise of marriage. It was later
verified in court that Baker was actually Abu Bakar ibni
Daing Ibrahim, Sultan of Johor. As such, he was granted
“independent sovereignty” immunity from jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not Alber Baker has the immunity from
local jurisdiction.
Held:
Yes. As the recognized ruler of Johor and a foreign
sovereign, the Sultan shall be treated as independent
sovereign and therefore have immunity from local
jurisdiction. The decision was based on a letter from the
Secretary of State for the Colonies stating that “generally
speaking, [the Sultan] exercises without question the usual
attributes of a sovereign ruler.”
Case No. 21. Mighell vs. Sultan of Johore, 1 QB 149
Case No. 22. U.S. vs. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644
Facts:
Facts:
This case is consolidated from five cases all involving the
doctrine of state immunity. In G.R. no. 76607, several
officers of the U.S. Air Force in the Clark Air Base
conducted a bidding for a contract of barber services
which was won by Dizon. Respondents sought to cancel
the award and to conduct a rebidding on the grounds that
Dizon had included in their bid an area which was not
included in the invitation to bid. In G.R. no. 79470, Genove
filed a complaint for damages against Anthony Lamachia,
Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his
dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center
at Camp John Hay Air Station. His dismissal stemmed
from an investigation where it was discovered that Genove
had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the
vegetables served to club customers. In G.R. no. 80018,
a barracks boy in Camp O’Donnel named Bautista was
arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by
petitioners who were USAF officers and special agents of
the Air Force Office. An information was then filed against
Bautista and during the trial, petitioners testified against
him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed
from his employment. He alleges in his complaint that his
dismissal was due to the petitioners’ acts. Finally, in G.R.
no. 80258, private respondents filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners, U.S. military officers, for
injuries allegedly sustained by the former when the
defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed
dogs on them. Petitioners denied this claim, stating that
respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest,
thus incurring the injuries.
Issues: Whether or not petitioners are immune from suit
under the doctrine of state immunity.
Held:
In G.R. no. 76607, petitioners cannot plead immunity
because barber shops are ]commercial enterprises
operated by private persons, as such, this was operated
for profit and not a government activity. Similarly, in G.R.
no. 79470, petitioners cannot plead immunity because
restaurants are commercial enterprises operated by
private persons; however, the claim of damages by
Genove cannot be allowed on the strength of the
evidence. In G.R. no. 80018, petitioners are immune under
the doctrine of state immunity because they were acting in
the exercise of their official functions. Lastly, in G.R. no.
80258, the record is too meager to indicate if the
defendants were really discharging their official duties or
had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in
question occurred. Lacking this information, the Court
cannot directly decide this case.
Issues: Whether or not private respondents are immune
under the doctrine of diplomatic immunity.
Case No. 23. Lasco vs. UN Revolving Fund for Natural
Resources Exploration, 241 S 681
Held:
Facts:
Private respondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for
Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), is a special
fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations which is
involved in a joint project of the Philippine government and
the United Nations mineral exploration work in Dinagat
Island. Petitioners were dismissed from their employment
with private respondent. On the other hand, UNRFNRE
alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction
over its personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity
pursuant to the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations. In support thereof,
private respondent attached a letter from the Department
of Foreign Affairs dated August 26, 1991, which
acknowledged its immunity from suit. The letter confirmed
that private respondent, being a special fund administered
by the United Nations, was covered by the 1946
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations of which the Philippine Government was an
original signatory
Yes. The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was
sufficiently established by the letter of the Department of
Foreign Affairs, recognizing and confirming the immunity
of UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946 Convention on
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations where the
Philippine Government was a party. The issue on whether
an international organization is entitled to diplomatic
immunity is a "political question" and such determination
by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and
quasi-judicial agencies.
Case No.24. Ernesto Callado vs. IRRI, G.R. No. 106483,
May 22, 1995
Facts:
Ernesto Callado, a driver for International Rice Research
Institute (IRRI), drove an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI
and was figured in an accident. Petitioner was informed,
through a memorandum, of the findings of a preliminary
investigation conducted by the IRRI’s Human Resource
Development Department Manager which stated that
Callado was found to have committed the following: driving
on official duty under the influence of liquor, serious
misconduct consisting of your failure to report to his
supervisors the failure of his vehicle to start because of a
problem with the car battery and lastly, gross habitual
neglect of duties. Petitioner then submitted a
memorandum stating his answer and defenses to the
charges against him. After evaluating petitioner’s answer,
explanations and other evidence, IRRI issued a Notice of
Termination to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal,
illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. IRRI alleges that
the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue
of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, and that it
invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an
international organization in the instant case filed by
petitioner, not having waived the same.
Issues: Whether or not IRRI enjoys diplomatic immunity in
this case.
Held:
YES. IRRI’s immunity from suit is undisputed. Presidential
Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides that the Institute shall
enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative
proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been
expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute
or his authorized representatives. The grant of immunity to
IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its
Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish
or abandon this immunity.