1
There are three points that I would like to discuss. Firstly, I will point out the ambiguity
in the conceptualization of development in developmental systems theories (DST). Secondly,
I will pose a question if it is necessary to abandon developmental theories in foundational
periods given the existence of DST. Finally, I would like to note some of my thoughts on the
DST's ability to change our perception of human beings' relationship with the natural
environment.
The first point is that DST lacks a clear conception of development. As Lerner, LewinBizan, and Warren (2011, p. 3) warned, "development is not an empirical concept." The
understanding of researchers on human development determines how they collect, organize,
and interpret observable data. Different perspectives lead to different formulations while
describing and explaining phenomena (Lerner et al., 2011; Miller, 2011). In the evaluation of
developmental theory, uncovering the author's assumptions on development helps us consider
its limitations in capturing human development's nature. Scientists have reached a consensus
on several features of development including systematic, organized, and successive changes
(Lerner et al., 2011). The nature of human development, as DST has asserted, reflects these
characteristics. Specifically, they assume that "basic developmental process as involving
relations – or 'fusions' – among variables from multiple levels of organization that comprise
the ecology of human development" (Lerner et al., 2011, p. 3). However, the question is
whether these properties are adequate to identify when development occurs. For example, how
to distinguish between development and its opposite – or regression in Freud's term? Is every
change in the interaction between a person and his or her ecological context development?
There was no explicit declaration in Lener et al. 's description of DST. However, these authors
claimed that the practical purpose of DST is to promote "positive individual-context relations."
Baltes' life-span developmental theory and Brandtstädter's action theories of human
development concluded that development is the changes stemming from the mutually
interactive relationships between people and their contexts, and aiming towards the adaptation
(Lerner et al., 2011). These arguments imply that what distinguishes development from
systematic, organized, and successive changes, and regression, is the positivity and adaptation.
Yet, what are positivity and adaptation? For instance, are mental disorders positive and
adaptive changes that inform problems existing in the individual-context relation? Or they are
maladaptive and harmful adjustments? Answering these questions continues requiring DST's
scientists to rely on an ideology which may include bias in their research studies in the same
way reductionist and individualistic worldviews did.
2
The second point that I would like to consider is the possibility of leaving out
developmental theories in prior historical periods of this field. Although these theories, which
were biased by their author's worldviews (Cairns & Cairns, 2006; Dixon & Lerner, 1988;
Lerner et al. 2011; Miller, 2011), did not fully explain human development, they did reveal
fragments of it, and we have benefited from those findings. Take Piaget's theory of cognitive
development as an example. It overlooked the influences of sociocultural context on the
emergence of children's intellectual functions. However, its detailed description of that process
has guided our decisions on what we teach, how we teach, and when we teach children. Do we
need to discard these reductionist and individualist theories? Or we can still exploit them as
guidelines for research and intervention practices while being alert of their limitations? These
theories may be alternative choices for scientists while considering DST's complicated and
rigorous research methodology, measurement, design, and analysis (Lerner et al., 2011). Given
limited resources and time, we need the most parsimonious solution to predict and intervene in
developmental phenomena (Miller, 2011). DST sometimes may not be an optimal choice.
Finally, DST's conceptualization of human beings as part of the whole ecological
context removes the inequality between human beings and other natural environment entities.
While Bronfenbrenner's ecological systems theory may illustrate its stance by putting an
individual in the central of the whole ecological context, we may expand our perspective by
looking at these systems and its components as equally coexistent entities. Admitting the
implicitly inherent plasticity or historical potentials to change in the organizations of the
ecological context of which we are a part means that we may be affected by their changes. Any
changes in one of them may impact or even transform the whole context and ourselves. This
implication may encourage research studies on the influence of large-scale environmental
change (e.g., climate change and the extinction of species) on human development.
References
Cairns, R. B., & Cairns, B. D. (2006). The making of developmental psychology. In R. M.
Lerner (Ed.). Handbook of Child Psychology: Vol. 1. Theoretical models of human
development (pp. 89–164). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Dixon, R. A., & Lerner, R. M. (1992). A history of systems in developmental psychology. In
M. H. Bornstein & M. E. Lamb (Eds.), Developmental psychology: An advanced
textbook (4th ed., p. 3–58). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Lerner, R. M., Lewin-Bizan, S., & Warren, A. E. A. (2011). Concepts and theories of human
development. In M. H. Bornstein, & M. E. Lamb, M. E. (Eds.) Developmental Science:
3
An advanced textbook (6th ed., pp.3–43). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Publishers.
Miller, P. H. (2016). Theories of developmental psychology (6th edition). New York, NY:
Publishers.