2020 JUSTICE MARVIC LEONEN CASE DIGESTS
JOFREY Q. BOTOR, JR.
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2020 JUSTICE MARVIC LEONEN CASE DIGESTS
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DOCTRINES
DEE HWA LIONG FOUNDATION MEDICAL CENTER vs. ASIAMED SUPPLIES
G.R. No. 205638 / August 23, 2017
A contract need not be contained in a single writing. It may be collected from several
different writings which do not conflict with each other and which, when connected,
show the parties, subject matter, terms and consideration, as in contracts entered
into by correspondence. A contract may be encompassed in several instruments even
though every instrument is not signed by the parties, since it is sufficient if the
unsigned instruments are clearly identified or referred to and made part of the signed
instrument or instruments. Similarly, a written agreement of which there are two
copies, one signed by each of the parties, is binding on both to the same extent as
though there had been only one copy of the agreement and both had signed it.
HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 168616 / January 28, 2015
vs.
LA
SAVOIE
DEVELOPMENT
On the other hand, implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are
deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or which are
superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity,
independently of the particular intention of the parties. In turn, implied trusts are
either resulting or constructive trusts. These two are differentiated from each other
as follows:
Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and
not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to
have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances
of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes
invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit
of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of
equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They
arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence,
obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good
conscience, to hold.
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HEIRS OF AUGUSTO SALAS, JR. vs. MARCIANO CABUNGCAL
G.R. No. 191545 / March 29, 2017
Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law generally covers all public and private
agricultural lands.
The law defines agricultural land as "land devoted to agricultural activity and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." For
agricultural land to be considered devoted to an agricultural activity, there must be
"cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock,
poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm
activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by persons whether natural or juridical."
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs. GLORIA RODRIGUEZ DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 187291 / December 05, 2016
Land registration cases that only resolve the propriety of the results of a resurvey of
Baguio City properties do not bar a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the titles.
Our courts should be more aware of the machinations used by unscrupulous parties
to acquire and title lands in Baguio City. As in this case, parties obtained more land
through a resuryey of property. They filed an action or proceeding to "correct" the
technical descriptions or the supporting survey plans. Trial courts become
participants in this scheme by denying the intervention or opposition of the Solicitor
General and x x x make very loose observations regarding the presumptions of
validity of obviously defective titles already declared null and void by Marcos and
confirmed as such by Presidential Decree No. 1271. Thereafter, in subsequent cases,
as in these cases, the party who gains through a simple resurvey of its property
erroneously raises res judicata as a defense; thus the party secures its spurious titles
against any further legal questions.
These machinations brought about by the clearly erroneous application of doctrine
should stop. Otherwise, genuine property owners in Baguio City will forever be unsure
of possible land grabbing.
HEIRS OF LEONILO P. NUÑEZ, SR. vs. HEIRS OF GABINO T. VILLANOZA
G.R. No. 218666 / April 26, 2017
Under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the landowner may retain a
maximum of five (3) hectares of land, but this land must be compact or contiguous.
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If the area selected for retention is tenanted, the tenant-farmer may choose to
remain in the area or be a beneficiary in a comparable area.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. CARMELITA S. SANTOS
G.R. No. 208293 / December 10, 2014
G.R. No. 208295
The standard of diligence required of banks is higher than the degree of diligence of
a good father of a family.
EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 189516 / June 08, 2016
A writ of execution lies against the pension benefits of a retired officer of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, which is the subject of a deed of assignment drawn by him
granting support to his wife and five (5) children. The benefit of exemption from
execution of pension benefits is a statutory right that may be waived, especially in
order to comply with a husband's duty to provide support under Article XV of the
1987 Constitution and the Family Code.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. STA. INES MELALE FOREST
PRODUCTS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 193068 / February 01, 2017
G.R. No. 193099 / February 1, 2017
A condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its
fulfilment and a debtor loses the right to make use of the period when a condition is
violated, making the obligation immediately demandable.
SIMEON TRINIDAD PIEDAD vs. CANDELARIA LINEHAN BOBILLES
G.R. No. 208614 / November 27, 2017
Courts should take to heart the principle of equity if the strict application of the
statute of limitations or laches would result in manifest wrong or injustice.
CEZAR YATCO REAL ESTATE SERVICES,
ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 211780 / November 21, 2018
INC.
vs.
BEL-AIR
VILLAGE
In contract interpretation, courts must first determine whether a stipulation is
ambiguous or susceptible of multiple interpretations. If no ambiguity is found and the
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terms of the contract clearly reflect the intentions of the contracting parties, the
stipulation will be interpreted as it is written.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL vs. OSCAR ANGLO, SR.
G.R. No. 171804 / August 05, 2015
The Assurance Fund is part of our property registration system covered by
Presidential Decree No. 1529. Its purpose is to protect individuals who rely on a
property's certificate of title as evidence of ownership. A claim from the fund must
meet the strict requirements of Presidential Decree No. 1529:
SEC. 95. Action for compensation from funds. — A person who, without
negligence on his part, sustains loss or damage, or is deprived of land
or any estate or interest therein in consequence of the bringing of the
land under the operation of the Torrens system of arising after original
registration of land, through fraud or in consequence of any error,
omission, mistake or misdescription in any certificate of title or in any
entry or memorandum in the registration book, and who by the
provisions of this Decree is barred or otherwise precluded under the
provision of any law from bringing an action for the recovery of such
land or the estate or interest therein, may bring an action in any court
of competent jurisdiction for the recovery of damages to be paid out of
the Assurance Fund.
Claims will not be allowed when the claimant is negligent.
RHODORA ILUMIN RACHO vs. SEIICHI TANAKA
G.R. No. 199515 / June 25, 2018
Judicial recognition of a foreign divorce requires that the national law of the foreign
spouse and the divorce decree be pleaded and proved as a fact before the Regional
Trial Court. The Filipino spouse may be granted the capacity to remarry once our
courts find that the foreign divorce was validly obtained by the foreign spouse
according to his or her national law, and that the foreign spouse's national law
considers the dissolution of the marital relationship to be absolute.
FRANCISCA TAAR vs. CLAUDIO LAWAN
G.R. No. 190922 / October 11, 2017
A judgment approving the subdivision of a parcel of land does not preclude other
parties with a better right from instituting free patent applications over it. Entitlement
to agricultural lands of the public domain requires a clear showing of compliance with
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the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST
INCORPORATED
G.R. No. 189509 / November 23, 2015
COMPANY
vs.
G&P
BUILDERS,
[W]hen an agreement has been reduced to writing, the parties cannot be permitted
to adduce evidence to prove alleged practices [that], to all purposes, would alter the
terms of the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood
to have been waived and abandoned.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES JOEL
G.R. No. 170316 / September 18, 2017
When an applicant in the registration of property proves his or her open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of a land for the period required by law, he or
she has acquired an imperfect title that may be confirmed by the State. The State
may not, in the absence of controverting evidence and in a pro forma opposition,
indiscriminately take a property without violating due process.
HEIRS OF TEODORA LOYOLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 188658 / January 11, 2017
Fraud and irregularity are presupposed in an action for reconveyance of property. The
party seeking to recover the property must prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
that he or she is entitled to the property, and that the adverse party has committed
fraud in obtaining his or her title. Allegations of fraud are not enough. "Intentional
acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner injure him, must
be specifically alleged and proved." In the absence of any proof, the complaint for
reconveyance cannot be granted.
PEDRO MENDOZA vs. REYNOSA VALTE
G.R. No. 172961 / September 07, 2015
The existence or non-existence of fraud is a legal conclusion based on a finding that
the evidence presented is sufficient to establish facts constituting its
elements. Questions of fact are generally not entertained in a petition for review
before this court. In any event, petitions for a review or reopening of a decree of
registration based on actual fraud must be filed before the proper court within the
one-year period provided under the relevant laws. The party alleging fraud must
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overcome the burden of proving the fraud with clear and convincing evidence. Section
101 of Commonwealth No. 141 allows actions for the reversion of land fraudulently
granted to private individuals filed even after the lapse of the one-year period, but
this must be initiated by the state.
HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO DELFIN vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 193618 / November 28, 2016
Under Commonwealth Act No. 141, a claimant may acquire alienable and disposable
public land upon evidence of exclusive and notorious possession of the land since
June 12, 1945. The period to acquire public land by acquisitive prescription under
Presidential Decree No. 1529 begins to run only after the promulgation of a law or a
proclamation by the President stating that the land is no longer intended for public
use or the development of national wealth.
ERMA INDUSTRIES, INC vs. SECURITY BANK CORPORATION
G.R. No. 191274 / December 06, 2017
The law has authorized the formation of corporations for the purpose of conducting
surety business, and the corporate surety differs significantly from the individual
private surety. First, unlike the private surety, the corporate surety signs for cash
and not for friendship. The private surety is regarded as someone doing a rather
foolish act for praiseworthy motives; the corporate surety, to the contrary, is in
business to make a profit and charges a premium depending upon the amount of
guaranty and the risk involved. Second, the corporate surety, like an insurance
company, prepares the instrument, which is a type of contract of adhesion whereas
the private surety usually does not prepare the note or bond which he signs. Third,
the obligation of the private surety often is assumed simply on the basis of the
debtor's representations and without legal advice, while the corporate surety does
not bind itself until a full investigation has been made. For these reasons, the courts
distinguish between the individual gratuitous surety and the vocational corporate
surety. In the case of the corporate surety, the rule of strictissimi juris is not
applicable, and courts apply the rules of interpretation of appertaining to contracts of
insurance.
ROMEO F. ARA vs. DRA. FELY S. PIZARRO
G.R. No. 187273 / February 15, 2017
For a claim of filiation to succeed, it must be made within the period allowed, and
supported by the evidence required under the Family Code.
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UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES JEROME
G.R. No. 205657 / March 29, 2017
Upon accepting an agency, the agent becomes bound to carry out the agency and
shall be held liable for the damages, which the principal may incur due to the agent's
non-performance.
VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC. vs. EMILIO G. ALFECHE
G.R. No. 209910 / November 29, 2017
An electric distribution company is a public utility presumed to have the necessary
expertise and resources to enable a safe and effective installation of its facilities.
Absent an indication of fault or negligence by other actors, it is exclusively liable for
fires and other damages caused by its haphazardly installed posts and wires.
SPOUSES RAINIER JOSE M. YULO vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
G.R. No. 217044 / January 16, 2019
When issuing a pre-screened or pre-approved credit card, the credit card provider
must prove that its client read and consented to the terms and conditions governing
the credit card's use. Failure to prove consent means that the client cannot be bound
by the provisions of the terms and conditions, despite admitted use of the credit card.
CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC. vs. ERMILINDA R.
ABEJAR
G.R. No. 170631 / February 10, 2016
The plaintiff may first prove the employer's ownership of the vehicle involved in a
mishap by presenting the vehicle's registration in evidence. Thereafter, a disputable
presumption that the requirements for an employer's liability under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code have been satisfied will arise. The burden of evidence then shifts to
the defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has ensued. This case, thus,
harmonizes the requirements of Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, and the so-called registered-owner rule.
NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 207406 / January 13, 2016
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial
declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage
without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of
the nullity of the first marriage.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MOLDEX REALTY, INC.
G.R. No. 171041 / February 10, 2016
A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, the
conflicting issue that may be resolved by the court ceases to exist. There is no longer
any justiciable controversy that may be resolved by the court. This court refuses to
render advisory opinions and resolve issues that would provide no practical use or
value. Thus, courts generally "decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on
ground of mootness."
PHILIPPINE
ECONOMIC
ZONE
AUTHORITY
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 185765 / September 28, 2016
vs.
PILHINO
SALES
Although the provisions of a contract are legally null and void, the stipulated method
of computing liquidated damages may be accepted as evidence of the intent of the
parties. The provisions, therefore, can be basis for finding a factual anchor for
liquidated damages. The liable party may nevertheless present better evidence to
establish a more accurate basis for awarding damages.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES DANILO GO
G.R. No. 197297 / August 02, 2017
Public land remains inalienable unless it is shown to have been reclassified and
alienated to a private person.
ISMAEL V. CRISOSTOMO vs. MARTIN P. VICTORIA
G.R. No. 175098 / August 26, 2015
As long as the legal possessor of the land constitutes a person as a tenant-farmer by
virtue of an express or implied lease, such an act is binding on the owner of the
property even if he himself may not have given his consent to such an arrangement.
This is settled jurisprudence. The purpose of the law is to protect the tenant-farmer's
security of tenure, which could otherwise be arbitrarily terminated by an owner
simply manifesting his non-conformity to the relationship.
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MAKATI TUSCANY CONDOMINIUM
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 185530 / April 18, 2018
CORPORATION
vs.
MULTI-REALTY
Reformation of an instrument may be allowed if subsequent and contemporaneous
acts of the parties show that their true intention was not accurately reflected in the
written instrument.
SINDOPHIL, INC. vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 204594 / November 07, 2018
The presumption that a holder of a Torrens title is an innocent purchaser for value is
disputable and may be overcome by contrary evidence. Once a prima facie case
disputing this presumption is established, the adverse party cannot simply rely on
the presumption of good faith and must put forward evidence that the property was
acquired without notice of any defect in its title.
INTRAMUROS
ADMINISTRATION
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
G.R. No. 196795 / March 07, 2018
vs.
OFFSHORE
CONSTRUCTION
The sole issue in ejectment proceedings is determining which of the parties has the
better right to physical possession of a piece of property. The defendant's claims and
allegations in its answer or motion to dismiss do not oust a trial court's jurisdiction
to resolve this issue.
PRISCILLA ZAFRA ORBE vs. FILINVEST LAND, INC.
G.R. No. 208185 / September 06, 2017
When Republic Act No. 6552 or the Maceda Law speaks of paying "at least two years
of installments" in order for the benefits under its Section 3 to become available, it
refers to the buyer's payment of two (2) years' worth of the stipulated fractional,
periodic payments due to the seller. When the buyer's payments fall short of the
equivalent of two (2) years' worth of installments, the benefits that the buyer may
avail of are limited to those under Section 4. Should the buyer still fail to make
payments within Section 4's grace period, the seller may cancel the contract. Any
such cancellation is ineffectual, however, unless it is made through a valid notarial
act.
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CE CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. ARANETA CENTER INC.
G.R. No. 192725 / August 09, 2017
A tribunal confronted not only with ambiguous contractual terms but also with the
total absence of an instrument which definitively articulates the contracting parties'
agreement does not act in excess of jurisdiction when it employs aids in
interpretation, such as those articulated in Articles 1370 to 1379 of the Civil Code. In
so doing, a tribunal does not conjure its own contractual terms and force them upon
the parties.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGILIO M. TATLONGHARI
G.R. No. 170458 / November 23, 2015
The notation "in trust for" or "for escrow" that comes with deposited funds indicates
that the deposit is for the benefit of a third party. In this case, Asset Privatization
Trust deposited funds "in trust for" Pantranco North Express, Inc., (Pantranco) a
corporation under the management of Asset Privatization Trust. These funds belong
to Pantranco. Further, in the absence of evidence that Asset Privatization Trust is
authorized to collect Pantranco's indebtedness to Philippine National Bank, the
subject funds can be garnished to satisfy the claims of Pantranco's creditors.
When Pantranco was under sequestration, it remained to be a private corporation,
and its funds also remained to be private. Although the Presidential Commission on
Good Government is a government agency, it does not follow that Pantranco's funds
were converted into public funds by the mere fact that its conservator was a
government agency.
VICTOR S. LIMLINGAN vs. ASIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 220481 / February 17, 2016
When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which
may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn
legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation,
the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169
of the Civil Code.
When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an
interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the
court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
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judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be
so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin
to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained).
The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the
amount finally adjudged.
When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.
ARCO PULP AND PAPER CO., INC. vs. QUALITY PAPERS & PLASTIC
PRODUCTS ENTERPRISES
G.R. No. 206806 / June 25, 2014
Novation must be stated in clear and unequivocal terms to extinguish an obligation.
It cannot be presumed and may be implied only if the old and new contracts are
incompatible on every point.
PABLO M. PADILLA, JR. vs. LEOPOLDO MALICSI
G.R. No. 201354 / September 21, 2016
The owner of the land (in good faith) has three alternative rights: (1) to appropriate
what has been built without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor, or (2) to
demand that the builder remove what he had built, or (3) to compel the-builder to
pay the value of the land. In any case, the landowner is entitled to damages x x x.
SPOUSES ABELLA vs. SPOUSES ABELLA
G.R. No. 195166 / July 08, 2015
The legal rate of interest is the presumptive reasonable compensation for borrowed
money. While parties are free to deviate from this, any deviation must be reasonable
and fair. Any deviation that is far-removed is suspect. Thus, in cases where stipulated
interest is more than twice the prevailing legal rate of interest, it is for the creditor
to prove that this rate is required by prevailing market conditions.
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SPS. ROBERTO ABOITIZ vs. SPS. PETER L. PO
G.R. No. 208450 / June 05, 2017
G.R. No. 208497
The rationale for allowing reconveyance despite the finality of the registration is that
the issuance of a certificate of title does not create or vest ownership to a person
over the property. Registration under the Torrens system "is not a mode of acquiring
ownership." A certificate is only a proof of ownership. Thus, its issuance does not
foreclose the possibility of having a different owner, and it cannot be used against
the true owner as a shield for fraud.
LOLITA BAS CAPABLANCA vs. HEIRS OF PEDRO BAS
G.R. No. 224144 / June 28, 2017
In one case, the right to assert a cause of action as an heir, although he has not been
judicially declared to be so, if duly proven, is well settled in this jurisdiction. This is
upon the theory that the property of a deceased person, both real and personal,
becomes the property of the heir by the mere fact of death of his predecessor in
interest, and as such he can deal with it in precisely the same way in which the
deceased could have dealt, subject only to the limitations which by law or by contract
may be imposed upon the deceased himself. Thus, it has been held that "[t]here is
no legal precept or established rule which imposes the necessity of a previous legal
declaration regarding their status as heirs to an intestate on those who, being of age
and with legal capacity, consider themselves the legal heirs of a person, in order that
they may maintain an action arising out of a right which belonged to their ancestor."
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS
G.R. No. 194190 / January 25, 2017
To be considered a donation, an act of conveyance must necessarily proceed freely
from the donor's own, unrestrained volition. A donation cannot be forced: it cannot
arise from compulsion, be borne by a requirement, or otherwise be impelled by a
mandate imposed upon the donor by forces that are external to him or her. Article
726 of the Civil Code reflects this commonsensical wisdom when it specifically states
that conveyances made in view of a "demandable debt" cannot be considered true or
valid donations.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LORENZO MUSNI
G.R. No. 206343 / February 22, 2017
Banks must show that they exercised the required due diligence before claiming to
be mortgagees in good faith or innocent purchasers for value.
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LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
G.R. No. 181683 / October 07, 2015
G.R. No. 184568
In resolving this case, we have had to sift through the parties' competing claims as
to who exactly is liable and to what extent. Reduced to its fundamentals, however,
this case remains to be about damage sustained by property owned by National
Power Corporation when the MV Lorcon Luzon rammed into it. This damage is
susceptible to financial reckoning. Unfortunately for National Power Corporation, it
failed to establish the precise amount of its pecuniary loss. This vice of precision
notwithstanding, it would be improper to completely turn a blind eye to the loss
suffered by National Power Corporation and to deny it, as Lorenzo Shipping suggests,
of any form of recompense. Under these circumstances, we sustain the Court of
Appeals' award of temperate damages.
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CASE DIGESTS
NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 207406 / January 13, 2016
By: Secia
FACTS: On December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice). Born into
their union were three (3) children. After some time, Alice eventually discovered that
Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17,
1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National Statistics
Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.
Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. He presents
as evidence a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which
states that the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his
favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an essential
requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the prosecution fails to establish the
legality of his first marriage. In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of
the first marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no
record of the marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first
wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from the
bigamy charge.
HELD: No. Petition for Certiorari is DENIED.
The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the
marriage license is suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically prove
that there was no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved
through mere certifications by the civil registrar. For more than seven (7) years
before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his alleged spurious first
marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not present any
decision from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.
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ROMEO F. ARA vs. DRA. FELY S. PIZARRO
G.R. No. 187273 / February 15, 2017
By: Legres Lounge
FACTS: Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia (petitioners), and Dra. Fely S. Pizarro
and Henry A. Rossi (respondents) all claimed to be children of the late Josefa A. Ara,
who died on November 18, 2002. Petitioners assert that Fely S. Pizarro was born to
Josefa and her then husband, Vicente Salgado, who died during World War II. At
some point toward the end of the war, Josefa met and lived with an American soldier
by the name of Darwin Gray. Romeo F. Ara was born from this relationship. Josefa
later met a certain Alfredo Garcia, and, from this relationship, gave birth to sons
Ramon Garcia and William A. Garcia. Josefa and Alfredo married on January 24,
1952.8 After Alfredo passed away, Josefa met an Italian missionary named Frank
Rossi, who allegedly fathered Henry Rossi.
Respondent Pizarro claims that, to her knowledge, she is the only child of Josefa.
Further, petitioner Garcia is recorded as a son of a certain Carmen Bucarin and Pedro
Garcia, as evidenced by a Certificate of Live Birth dated July 19, 1950; and petitioner
Ara is recorded as a son of spouses Jose Ara and Maria Flores, evidenced by his
Certificate of Live Birth.
Petitioners, together with Ramon and herein respondent Rossi, verbally sought
partition of the properties left by the deceased Josefa, which were in the possession
of respondent Pizarr. Plaintiffs a quo filed a Complaint for judicial partition of
properties left by the deceased Josefa, before the Regional Trial Court. In her Answer,
respondent Pizarro averred that, to her knowledge, she was the only legitimate and
only child of Josefa. She denied that any of the plaintiffs a quo were her siblings, for
lack of knowledge or information to form a belief on that matter. Further, the late
Josefa left other properties mostly in the possession of plaintiffs a quo, which were
omitted in the properties to be partitioned by the trial court in Special Civil Action No.
337-03, enumerated in her counterclaim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents can be considered legitimate children of
Josefa A. Ara and are entitled of partition of the properties left by the deceased
Josefa.
HELD: No. The law is very clear. If filiation is sought to be proved under the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, the action must be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent. It is evident that appellants Romeo F. Ara and William
Garcia can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of their open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove their alleged
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filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The
simple reason is that Josefa Ara is already dead and can no longer be heard on the
claim of her alleged sons' illegitimate filiation.
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PABLO M. PADILLA, JR. vs. LEOPOLDO MALICSI
G.R. No. 201354 / September 21, 2016
By: Jon Joshua Falcone
FACTS: Spouses Padilla bought a parcel of land in Magsaysay Norte, Cabanatuan City
in 1984.
Sometime in 1998, Spouses Padilla discovered that Leopoldo Malicsi, Lito Casino, and
Agrifino Guanes (Malicsi, et al.) constructed houses on their lot.
Spouses Padilla made repeated verbal and written demands for Malicsi, et
al. to vacate the premises and pay monthly rentals, but Malicsi, et al. refused to
heed Spouses Padilla's demands.
On August 6, 2007, Spouses Padilla filed a complaint for recovery of possession
against Malicsi, et al., along with three (3) others: Larry Marcelo, Diosdado dela
Cruz, and Rolando Pascua.
Malicsi, et al. alleged that they believed in all honesty and good faith that
the lot belonged to Toribia Vda. De Mossessgeld (De Mossessgeld). They claimed
that they possessed the land and built their houses on the lot only after receiving De
Mossessgeld's permission.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are builders in good faith.
HELD: Undoubtedly, [Malicsi, et al.] cannot claim that they were builders in good
faith because they relied on the promise of De Mossessgeld who will sell the same to
them but such allegations are contrary to the actual circumstances obtaining in this
case.
As builders in bad faith, respondents have no right to recover their expenses over
the improvements they have introduced to petitioners' lot under Article 449 of the
Civil Code, which provides: Article 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on
the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
Under Article 452 of the Civil Code, a builder in bad faith is entitled to recoup the
necessary expenses incurred for the preservation of the land. However, respondents
neither alleged nor presented evidence to show that they introduced improvements
for the preservation of the land. Therefore, petitioners as landowners became the
owners of the improvements on the lot, including the residential buildings constructed
by respondents, if they chose to appropriate the accessions. However, they could
instead choose the demolition of the improvements at respondents' expense or
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compel respondents to pay the price of the land under Article 450 of the Civil Code.
Considering that petitioners pray for the reinstatement of the Regional Trial Court
Decision ordering respondents to vacate the lot and surrender its possession to them,
petitioners are deemed to have chosen to appropriate the improvements built on
their lot without any obligation to pay indemnity to respondents.
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SPOUSES ABELLA vs. SPOUSES ABELLA
G.R. No. 195166 / July 08, 2015
By: kenneth
FACTS: Petitioners Spouses Salvador and Alma Abella filed a Complaint for sum of
money and damages against respondents Spouses Romeo and Annie Abella wherein
it was alleged that respondents obtained a loan from them in the amount of P500K.
The loan was evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt dated March 22, 1999 and
was payable within one (1) year. Petitioners added that respondents were able to
pay a total of P200K—P100K paid on two separate occasions—leaving an unpaid
balance of P300K.
In their Answer, respondents alleged that the amount involved did not pertain to a
loan but was part of the capital for a joint venture involving the lending of money
when respondents that they were approached by petitioners, who proposed that if
respondents were to "undertake the management of whatever money [petitioners]
would give them, [petitioners] would get 2.5% a month with a 2.5% service fee to
[respondents]." Moreover, they claimed that the entire amount of P500,000.00 was
disposed of in accordance with their agreed terms and conditions and that petitioners
terminated the joint venture, prompting them to collect from the joint venture's
borrowers. They were, however, able to collect only to the extent of P200,000.00;
hence, the P300,000.00 balance remained unpaid.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. On respondents' appeal, the Court of Appeals
ruled that while respondents had indeed entered into a simple loan with petitioners,
respondents were no longer liable to pay the outstanding amount of P300,000.00.
ISSUES: 1) What contract was entered into by the parties?
2) Whether interest accrued on respondents' loan from petitioner and if in the
affirmative, at what rate?
HELD: 1) Respondents entered into a simple loan or mutuum, rather than a joint
venture, with petitioners.
Respondents' claims, as articulated in their testimonies before the trial court, cannot
prevail over the clear terms of the document attesting to the relation of the parties.
"If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.”
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2) Guided by the decision in Nacar v. Gallery Frames: In the absence of an express
stipulation as to the rate of interest that would govern the parties, the rate of legal
interest for loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed
in judgments shall no longer be twelve percent (12%) per annum — as reflected in
the case of Eastern Shipping Lines and Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of
Regulations for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of
Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions, before its amendment by BSP-MB
Circular No. 799 — but will now be six percent (6%) per annum effective July 1,
2013.
It should be noted, nonetheless, that the new rate could only be applied prospectively
and not retroactively. Consequently, the twelve percent (12%) per annum legal
interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013. Come July 1, 2013 the new rate of six
percent (6%) per annum shall be the prevailing rate of interest when applicable.
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PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. CARMELITA S. SANTOS
G.R. No. 208293 / December 10, 2014
G.R. No. 208295
By: Angelica Abon
FACTS: Sometime in May 1996, respondents discovered that their father maintained
a premium savings account with Philippine National Bank (PNB), Sta. Elena-Marikina
City Branch.
Respondents went to PNB to withdraw their father's deposit.
However, Aguilar informed them that the deposit had already "been released to a
certain Bernardito Manimbo (Manimbo) on April 1, 1997."
On May 20, 1998, respondents filed before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City
a complaint for sum of money and damages against PNB, Lina B. Aguilar, and a John
Doe.
On May 20, 1998, respondents filed before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City
a complaint for sum of money and damages against PNB, Lina B. Aguilar, and a John
Doe.
ISSUE: Whether Philippine National Bank was negligent in releasing the deposit to
Bernardito Manimbo.
HELD: The default standard of diligence in the performance of obligations is
"diligence of a good father of a family.
Other industries, because of their nature, are bound by law to observe higher
standards of diligence. Common carriers, for example, must observe "extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of [their] passengers"
because it is considered a business affected with public interest. "Extraordinary
diligence" with respect to passenger safety is further qualified as "carrying the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with... a due regard for all the circumstances.
Similar to common carriers, banking is a business that is impressed with public
interest. It affects economies and plays a significant role in businesses and
commerce. The public reposes its faith and confidence upon banks, such that "even
the humble wage-earner has not hesitated to entrust his life's savings to the bank of
his choice, knowing that they will be safe in its custody and will even earn some
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interest for him." This is why we have recognized the fiduciary nature of the banks'
functions, and attached a special standard of diligence for the exercise of their
functions.
Petitioners PNB and Aguilar either have no fixed standards for the release of their
deceased clients' deposits or they have standards that they disregard for
convenience, favor, or upon exercise of discretion. Both are inconsistent with the
required diligence of banks. These threaten the safety of the depositors' accounts as
they provide avenues for fraudulent practices by third persons or by bank officers
themselves.
Petitioner Aguilar was aware that there were other claimants to Angel C. Santos'
deposit. Respondents had already communicated with petitioner Aguilar regarding
Angel C. Santos' account before Manimbo appeared. Petitioner Aguilar even gave
respondents the updated passbook of Angel C. Santos' account. Yet, petitioners PNB
and Aguilar did not think twice before they released the deposit to Manimbo. They
did not doubt why no original death certificate could be submitted. They did not doubt
why Reyme L. Santos would execute an... affidavit of self-adjudication when he,
together with others, had previously asked for the release of Angel C. Santos' deposit.
They also relied on the certificate of time deposit and on Manimbo's representation
that the passbook was lost when the passbook had just been previously presented to
Aguilar for updating.
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DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. STA. INES MELALE FOREST
PRODUCTS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 193068 / February 01, 2017
G.R. No. 193099 / February 1, 2017
By: JURISDOCTOR08
FACTS: On July 21, 1981, President Marcos issued Letter of Instructions addressed
to the NDC, DBP, and the Maritime Industry Authority. To acquire 100% of the
shareholdings of Galleon Shipping Corporation from its present owners. For the
furtherance of the government’s policy to provide a reliable liner service between the
Philippines and its major trading partners.
The Shareholders filed a complaint stating that NDC, “without paying a single
centavo, took over the complete, total, and absolute ownership, management,
control, and operation of defendant [Galleon] and all its assets, even prior to the
formality of signing a share purchase agreement, which was held in abeyance
because the defendant NDC was verifying and confirming the amounts paid by
plaintiffs to Galleon, and certain liabilities of Galleon to plaintiffs[.]”
The Regional Trial Court upheld the validity of Letter of Instructions No. 1155 and
the Memorandum of Agreement executed by NDC and Galleon’s stockholders,
pursuant to Letter of Instructions No. 1155.
NDC argues that Sta. Ines, Cuenca, Tinio, Cuenca Investment, and Universal Holdings
had no basis to compel it to pay Galleon’s shares of stocks because no share purchase
agreement was executed.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement between NDC and
Galleon was perfected;
2) Whether the execution of a share purchase agreement is needed to effect the
transfer of Galleon’s shareholdings to NDC;
HELD: 1) Yes. The Supreme Court held that there exists a perfected contract as it
reflects the intention of the parties.
When the “terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.”
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It is not disputed that NDC and respondents Sta. Ines, Cuenca, Tinio, Cuenca
Investment, and Universal Holdings executed a Memorandum of Agreement pursuant
to the directives of Letter of Instructions No. 1155.
In Fernandez v. Court of Appeals further emphasizes that ” the important task in
contract interpretation is always the ascertainment of the intention of the contracting
parties and that task is of course to be discharged by looking to the words they used
to project that intention in their contract, all the words not just a particular word or
two, and words in context not words standing alone.” The Court of Appeals found
that the Memorandum of Agreement between NDC and Galleon was a perfected
contract for NDC to purchase 100% of Galleon’s shareholdings.
2) Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative but quickly pointed on the fact that
NDC voluntarily caused delay of the execution of the share purchase agreement.
The Court of Appeals found that the Memorandum of Agreement between NDC and
Galleon was a perfected contract for NDC to purchase 100% of Galleon’s
shareholdings. However, a careful reading of the Memorandum of Agreement shows
that what the parties agreed to was the execution of a share purchase agreement to
effect the transfer of 100% of Galleon’s shareholdings to NDC, as seen in clauses of
the Letter of Instructions.
The execution of a share purchase agreement was a condition precedent to the
transfer of Galleon’s shares to NDC.
We uphold the Court of Appeals’ finding that the failure to execute the share purchase
agreement was brought about by NDC’s delay in reviewing the financial accounts
submitted by Galleon’s stockholders. The Memorandum of Agreement was executed
on August 10, 1981, giving the parties no more than sixty days or up to October 9,
1981, to prepare and sign the share purchase agreement. However, it was only on
April 26, 1982, or more than eight months after the Memorandum of Agreement was
signed, did NDC’s General Director submit his recommendation on Galleon’s
outstanding account. Even then, there was no clear intention to execute a share
purchase agreement as compliance with the Memorandum of Agreement. Article
1186 of the Civil Code is categorical that a “condition shall be deemed fulfilled when
the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfilment.” Considering NDC’s delay, the
execution of the share purchase agreement should be considered fulfilled with NDC
as the new owner of 100% of Galleon’s shares of stocks.
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SPS. ROBERTO ABOITIZ vs. SPS. PETER L. PO
G.R. No. 208450 / June 05, 2017
G.R. No. 208497
By: LegRes Lounge
FACTS: This case involves a parcel of land located in Cabancalan, Mandaue City,
initially registered as Original Certificate of Title No. 0-887, and titled under the name
of Roberto Aboitiz (Roberto). The land is referred to as Lot No. 2835. This parcel of
land originally belonged to the late Mariano Seno. On July 31, 1973, Mariano executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno (Ciriaco), over a 1.0120hectare land in Cebu covered by Tax Declaration No. 43358. This property included
two (2) lots: Lot No. 2807 and the land subject of this case, Lot No. 2835. In 1990,
Peter Po (Peter) discovered that Ciriaco "had executed a quitclaim dated August 7,
1989 renouncing [his] interest over Lot [No.] 2807 in favor of [petitioner] Roberto."
In the quitclaim, Ciriaco stated that he was "the declared owner of Lot [Nos.] 2835
and 2807." The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco. By way of remedy, Ciriaco and the
Spouses Po executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 28, 1990 in which
Ciriaco agreed to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by the Spouses
Po as consideration for the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses Po
were left with after the quitclaim. In its Decision dated October 28, 1993, the trial
court granted the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-887 in the name of
Roberto. The lot was immediately subdivided with portions sold to Ernesto and Jose.
The trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses Po in its Decision dated November 23,
2009. The Spouses Aboitiz appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals,
in its Decision dated October 31, 2012, partially affirmed the trial court decision,
declaring the Spouses Po as the rightful owner of the land. However, it ruled that the
titles issued to respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel should be respected. The Court
of Appeals discussed the inapplicability of the rules on double sale and the doctrine
of buyer in good faith since the land was not yet registered when it was sold to the
Spouses Po. However, it ruled in favor of the Spouses Po on the premise that
registered property may be reconveyed to the "rightful or legal owner or to the one
with a better right if the title [was] wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person's name." The Court of Appeals held that the Mariano Heirs were no longer the
owners of the lot at the time they sold it to Roberto in 1990 because Mariano, during
his lifetime, already sold this to Ciriaco in 1973. However, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the certificates of title of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel were valid as they were
innocent buyers in good faith. The Spouses Aboitiz thus filed their Petition for Review,
which was docketed as G.R. No. 208450. They argue that the Decision of Branch 55,
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City granting the complaint of the Spouses Po is void
for lack of jurisdiction over the matter. They claim that a branch of the Regional Trial
Court has no jurisdiction to nullify a final and executory decision of a co-equal branch;
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it is the Court of Appeals that has this jurisdiction. The Spouses Po also filed a Petition
for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 208497. They claim that respondents
Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel are not "innocent purchasers for value." They allegedly
knew of the defective title of Roberto because his tax declaration had the following
annotation: "This tax declaration is also declared in the name of Mrs. VICTORIA LEE
PO, married to PETER PO under tax dec. No. 0634-A so that one may be considered
a duplicate to the other.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
Spouses Peter and Victoria Po's complaint;
2) Whether the action is barred by prescription;
3) Whether the doctrines of estoppel and laches apply;
4) Whether the land registration court's finding that Ciriaco Seno only held the
property in trust for the Mariano Heirs is binding as res judicata in this case;
5) Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco Seno and the Spouses Peter
and Victoria Po should be considered as evidence of their entitlement to the
property;
6) Whether the Mariano Heirs, as sellers in a deed of conveyance of realty, are
indispensable parties; and
7) Whether the respondents Jose Maria Moraza, Ernesto Aboitiz, and Isabel Aboitiz
are innocent purchasers in good faith.
HELD: 1) Except for actions falling within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Courts, the Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over actions
involving "title to, or possession of, real property." Section 19 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 provides: Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (2) In all civil actions which involve the title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which
is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts. The Spouses Aboitiz claim that it is the Court of Appeals that has
jurisdiction over the annulment of Regional Trial Court judgments. The jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals is provided in Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129: Section 9.
Jurisdiction. - The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise: (2) Exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts. While
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to annul judgments of the Regional Trial Courts,
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the case at bar is not for the annulment of a judgment of a Regional Trial Court. It is
for reconveyance and the annulment of title. Considering the Spouses Aboitiz's
fraudulent registration without the Spouses Po's knowledge and the latter's assertion
of their ownership of the land, their right to recover the property and to cancel the
Spouses Aboitiz's title, the action is for reconveyance and annulment of title and not
for annulment of judgment. Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear
this case.
2) "An action for reconveyance prescribes in ten [10] years from the issuance of the
Torrens title over the property." The basis for this is Section 53, Paragraph 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 in relation to Articles 1456 and 1144(2) of the Civil
Code. Under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), the owner
of a property may avail of legal remedies against a registration procured by fraud:
SECTION 53. Presentation of Owner's Duplicate Upon Entry of New Certificate. – In
all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and
equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to
the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title ... CIVIL CODE, Art.
1456 provides: Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property comes. CIVIL CODE, Art. 1144(2)
provides: Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from
the time the right of action accrues: (2) Upon an obligation created by law. In an
action for reconveyance, the right of action accrues from the time the property is
registered. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title does not seek to
question the contract which allowed the adverse party to obtain the title to t h e
property. What is put on issue in an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title
is the ownership of the property and its registration. It does not question any
fraudulent contract. Should that be the case, the applicable provisions are Articles
1390 and 1391 of the Civil Code. Thus, an action for reconveyance and cancellation
of title prescribes in 10 years from the time of the issuance of the Torrens title over
the property. Considering that the Spouses Po's complaint was filed on November 19,
1996, less than three (3) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the
property on April 6, 1994, it is well within the 10-year prescriptive period imposed
on an action for reconveyance.
3) There is laches when a party was negligent or has failed "to assert a right within
a reasonable time," thus giving rise to the presumption that he or she has abandoned
it. Laches has set in when it is already inequitable or unfair to allow the party to
assert the right. The elements of laches were enumerated in Ignacio v. Basilio: There
is laches when: (1) the conduct of the defendant or one under whom he claims, gave
rise to the situation complained of; (2) there was delay in asserting a right after
knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after an opportunity to sue; (3) defendant
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had no knowledge or notice that the complainant would assert his right; (4) there is
injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant.
"Laches is different from prescription." Prescription deals with delay itself and thus is
an issue of how much time has passed. The time period when prescription is deemed
to have set in is fixed by law. Laches, on the other hand, concerns itself with the
effect of delay and not the period of time that has lapsed. When they discovered that
the property was registered in the name of the Spouses Aboitiz in 1993, the Spouses
Po then filed the instant complaint to recover the property sold to them by Ciriaco,
alleging that it was done without their knowledge, through evident bad faith and
fraud. The Spouses Po filed this case in less than three (3) years from the time of
registration. Based on these circumstances, the elements of laches are clearly lacking
in this case. There was no delay in asserting their right over the property, and the
Spouses Aboitiz had knowledge that the Spouses Po would assert their right. Thus, it
cannot be said that they are barred by laches.
4) This Court rules that this cannot be binding in this action for reconveyance. Res
judicata embraces two (2) concepts: (i) bar by prior judgment and (ii) conclusiveness
of judgment, respectively covered under Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court,
paragraphs (b) and (c): Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect
of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: (b) In other cases, the
judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any
other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of
the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same
title and in the same capacity; and (c) In any other litigation between the same
parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in
a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
Thereto. An exception to this rule is if the party claiming ownership has already had
the opportunity to prove his or her claim in the land registration case. In such a case,
res judicata will then apply. When an issue of ownership has been raised in the land
registration proceedings where the adverse party was given full opportunity to
present his or her claim, the findings in the land registration case will constitute a
bar from any other claim of the adverse party on the property. However, this is not
the circumstance in the case at bar. The Spouses Po were not able to prove their
claim in the registration proceedings. Thus, res judicata cannot apply to their action
for reconveyance.
5) The Spouses Aboitiz posit that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the
Spouses Po is fake and fraudulent. 181 They argue that this is evidenced by
certifications of the document's non-existence in the notarial books and the Spouses
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Po's failure to enforce their rights over the property until 18 years later. They also
claim that the Deed of Absolute Sale is inadmissible as no documentary stamp was
paid and affixed. The Spouses Aboitiz failed to prove that these exceptions exist in
the case at bar. The Regional Trial Court lent credence to documents presented by
the Spouses Po, Peter's testimony about Mariano's sale of the property to Ciriaco,
Ciriaco's sale of the property to the Spouses Po, and the issuance of a Tax Declaration
in the name of Victoria. The Regional Trial Court thus held: In this case, the Court
believes that defendant Roberto Aboitiz is aware of the proprietary rights of the
plaintiffs considering the land was already declared for taxation purposes in plaintiffs'
names after the tax declaration of said land, first in the name of Mariano Seno was
cancelled and another one issued in the name of Ciriaco Seno when the latter bought
the said land from his father Mariano Seno, and after the said tax declaration in the
name of Ciriaco Seno was cancelled and another one issued in the name of plaintiffs
herein. So, defendant Roberto Aboitiz purchased the subject land from the Heirs of
Mariano Seno who are no longer the owners thereof and the tax declaration of subject
land was no longer in the name of Mariano Seno nor in the name of Heirs of Mariano
Seno. The City Assessor of Mandaue City even issued a Certification (Exh. X) to the
effect that Tax Declaration No. 0634-A in the name of Mrs. Victoria Lee Po married
to Peter Po was issued prior to the issuance of T.D. No. 1100 in the name of Roberto
Aboitiz married to Maria Cristina Cabarruz. Buyers of any untitled parcel of land for
that matter, to protect their interest, will first verify from the Assessor's Office that
status of said land whether it has clean title or not. The Spouses Aboitiz failed to
present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption. The notarized
Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po is, thus, presumed regular
and authentic. Consequently, this Court can affirm the finding that the property was
sold to Ciriaco in 1973, and that Ciriaco, as the owner of the property, had the right
to sell it to the Spouses Po. Hence, the lot did not form part of the estate of Mariano,
and the Mariano Heirs did not have the capacity to sell the property to the Spouses
Aboitiz later on.
6) The Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. Rule 3, Section 7 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides: Section 7. Compulsory Joinder of Indispensable Parties. Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall
be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. An indispensable party is the party whose
legal presence in the proceeding is so necessary that "the action cannot be finally
determined" without him or her because his or her interest in the matter and in the
relief "are so bound up with that of the other parties. The Mariano Heirs, as the
alleged sellers of the property, are not indispensable parties. They are at best
necessary parties, which are covered by Rule 3, Section 8 of the Rules of Court:
Section 8. Necessary Party. - A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but
who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those
already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of
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the action. It is clear that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. They have
already sold all their interests in the property to the Spouses Aboitiz. They will no
longer be affected, benefited, or injured by any ruling of this Court on the matter,
whether it grants or denies the complaint for reconveyance. The ruling of this Court
as to whether the Spouses Po are entitled to reconveyance will not affect their rights.
Their interest has, thus, become separable from that of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel.
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Mariano Heirs are not
indispensable parties.
7) An innocent purchaser for value refers to the buyer of the property who pays for
its full and fair price without or before notice of another person's right or interest in
it. He or she buys the property believing that "the seller is the owner and could
transfer the title to the property." If a property is registered, the buyer of a parcel of
land is not obliged to look beyond the transfer certificate of title to be considered a
purchaser in good faith for value. Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
Section 44. Statutory liens affecting title. - Every registered owner receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent
purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith,
shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted in said certificate
and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely: First. Liens,
claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the Philippines
which are not by law required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in order
to be valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of record. Second.
Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately preceding
the acquisition of any right over the land by an innocent purchaser for value, without
prejudice to the right of the government to collect taxes payable before that period
from the delinquent taxpayer alone. Third. Any public highway or private way
established or recognized by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral
thereof, if the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway
or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been determined. Fourth. Any disposition
of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to,
Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other law or regulations on agrarian reform. In
Leong v. See: The Torrens system was adopted to "obviate possible conflicts of title
by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to
dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further." One need not inquire
beyond the four comers of the certificate of title when dealing with registered
property... The protection of innocent purchasers in good faith for value grounds on
the social interest embedded in the legal concept granting indefeasibility of titles.
Between the third party and the owner, the latter would be more familiar with the
history and status of the titled property. Consequently, an owner would incur less
costs to discover alleged invalidities relating to the property compared to a third
party. Such costs are, thus, better borne by the owner to mitigate costs for the
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economy, lessen delays in transactions, and achieve a less optimal welfare level for
the entire society. Thus, respondents were not obliged to look beyond the title before
they purchased the property. They may rely solely on the face of the title. The only
exception to the rule is when the purchaser has actual knowledge of any defect or
other circumstance that would cause "a reasonably cautious man" to inquire into the
title of the seller. If there is anything which arouses suspicion, the vendee is obliged
to investigate beyond the face of the title. Otherwise, the vendee cannot be deemed
a purchaser in good faith entitled to protection under the law.
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UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES JEROME
G.R. No. 205657 / March 29, 2017
By: JURISDOCTOR08
FACTS: Spouses Briones took out a loan which was executed though a promissory
note which appointed the bank as attorney-in-fact of the spouse with the obligation
among others to file an insurance claim in case of loss or damage to the vehicle of
the car.
The vehicle was subsequently carnapped. iBank instead of filing for insurance filed in
behalf of Spouses it collected from former. Now respondents was forced to claim for
insurance.
ISSUES: 1) Whether an agency relationship existed between the parties.
2)Whether the agency relationship was revoked or terminated when Spouses Briones
themselves claimed for insurance.
3) Whether petitioner is entitled to the return of the mortgaged vehicle or, in the
alternative, payment of the outstanding balance of the loan taken out for the
mortgaged vehicle.
HELD: 1) The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. All the elements of agency exist
in this case. Under the promissory note with chattel mortgage, Spouses Briones
appointed iBank as their attorney-in-fact, authorizing it to file a claim with the
insurance company if the mortgaged vehicle was lost or damaged. Petitioner was also
authorized to collect the insurance proceeds as the beneficiary of the insurance policy.
Sections 6 and 22 of the promissory note state:
The MORTGAGOR agrees that he will cause the mortgaged property/ies to be insured
against loss or damage by accident, theft and fire with an insurance company/ies
acceptable to the MORTGAGEE; that he will make all loss, if any, under such policy/ies
payable to the MORTGAGEE or its assigns [w]ith the proceeds thereon in case of loss,
payable to the said MORTGAGEE or its assigns shall be added to the principal
indebtedness hereby secured [M]ortgagor hereby further constitutes the
MORTGAGEE to be its/his/her Attorney-in-Fact for the purpose of filing claims with
insurance company including but not limited to apply, sign, follow-up and secure any
documents, deeds that may be required by the insurance company to process the
insurance claim.
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In case of loss or damage, the MORTGAGOR hereby irrevocably appoints the
MORTGAGEE or its assigns as his attorney-in-fact with full power and authority to
file, follow-up, prosecute, compromise or settle insurance claims; to sign, execute
and deliver the corresponding papers, receipt and documents to the insurance
company as may be necessary to prove the claim, and to collect from the latter the
proceeds of insurance to the extent of its interest. (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted).
Article 1370 of the Civil Code is categorical that when “the terms of a contract are
clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulations shall control.”
The determination of agency is ultimately factual in nature and this Court sees no
reason to reverse the findings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
They both found the existence of an agency relationship between the Spouses Briones
and iBank, based on the clear wording of Sections 6 and 22 of the promissory note
with chattel mortgage, which petitioner prepared and respondents signed.
2) The Court ruled that the agency was not revoked. In the promissory note with
chattel mortgage, the Spouses Briones authorized petitioner to claim, collect, and
apply· the insurance proceeds towards the full satisfaction of their loan if the
mortgaged vehicle were lost or damaged. Clearly, a bilateral contract existed
between the parties, making the agency irrevocable. Petitioner was also aware of the
bilateral contract; thus, it included the designation of an irrevocable agency in the
promissory note with chattel mortgage that it prepared for the Spouses Briones to
sign.
3) The Court ruled that it was as the agent, petitioner was mandated to look after
the interests of the Spouses Briones. However, instead of going after the insurance
proceeds, as expected of it as the agent, petitioner opted to claim the full amount
from the Spouses Briones, disregard the established principal-agency relationship,
and put its own interests before those of its principal.
The facts show that the insurance policy was valid when the vehicle was lost, and
that the insurance claim was only denied because of the belated filing. Having been
negligent in its duties as the duly constituted agent, petitioner must be held liable for
the damages suffered by the Spouses Briones because of non-performance of its
obligation as the agent, and because it prioritized its interests over that of its
principal.
Furthermore, petitioner’s bad faith was evident when it advised the Spouses Briones
to continue paying three (3) monthly installments after the loss, purportedly to show
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their good faith. A principal and an agent enjoy a fiduciary relationship marked with
trust and confidence, therefore, the agent has the duty “to act in good faith [to
advance] the interests of [its] principal.”
If petitioner was indeed acting in good faith, it could have timely informed the
Spouses Briones that it was terminating the agency and its right to file an insurance
claim, and could have advised them to facilitate the insurance proceeds themselves.
Petitioner’s failure to do so only compounds its negligence and underscores its bad
faith. Thus, it will be inequitable now to compel the Spouses Briones to pay the full
amount of the lost property.
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THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL vs. OSCAR ANGLO, SR.
G.R. No. 171804 / August 05, 2015
By: It's a Ping Thing
FACTS: Subject property: two parcels of prime sugar land in Negros Occidental.
On June 29, 1960, Alfredo de Ocampo filed an application for registration of the two
parcels of land.
This was contested by the Republic of the Philippines Bureau of Education. The reason
is according to the Republic, the lots were bequeathed to the Bureau of Education by
Esteban Jalandoni on September 21, 1926. And by virtue of the donation, they have
a TCT.
In 1965, the CFI ordered the registration of the lot in favor of de Ocampo. In the
same year, an OCT was issued in his name.
On January 6, 1966, de Ocampo sold one whole lot and a portion of the other lot to
Anglo Sr. The deed of absolute sale was registered and annotated at the back of the
OCTs.
The Republic caused the annotations of notice of lis pendens in Anglo Sr.’s TCT.
Despite the notice of lis pendens, Anglo Sr., conveyed the lots to Anglo Agricultural
Corporation in exchange for shares of stock.
The CA ruled against de Ocampo and ordered his OCT and TCT to be declared null.
De Ocampo passed away during the pendency of the litigation and left no property
to his heirs. The only available remedy for Anglo Sr., and Anglo Agricultural
Corporation was to recover the value of the lots from the Assurance Fund as provided
under Act No. 496 and PD 1529.
During trial, Anglo Sr. And Anglo Agricultural Corporation presented Atty. David
Lozada, the then Registrar of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
He confirmed that ta the time of the sale between de Ocampo and Anglo Sr., there
were no annotations of notices of lis pendens in de Ocampo’s OCT.
The RTC ruled that Anglo Sr., and Anglo Agricultural Corporation were entitled to
Php6,623,617 as damages payable under the Assurance Fund.
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But they did not implead de Ocampo in their claim for damages.
RP opposed this, saying that Anglo Sr., is a purchaser in bad faith because he did not
ascertain the legal condition of the title he was buying.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Anglo Sr., and Anglo Agricultural Corporation are entitled
to an award of damages from the Assurance fund.
2. Whether or not Anglo Sr., and Anglo Agricultural Corporation should have
impleaded de Ocampo in their complain for recovery of damages from the Assurance
Fund.
HELD: 1. No. Respondents do not meet the criteria set to recover damages from the
Assurance Fund.
In the sale to Anglo Sr., by de Ocampo, the former was in good faith. Individuals who
rely on a clean certificate of title in making the decision to purchase the real property
are often referred to as innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.
However, Anglo Sr. no longer had an interest over the lots after he had transferred
these to Anglo Agricultural Corporation in exchange for shares of stock. Hence, he no
longer has a claim from the Assurance Fund.
Anglo Agricultural Corporation cannot be considered as a transferee in good faith
because it was already aware of the title’s notices of lis pendens. Thus, it also has no
right to claim damages from the Assurance Fund.
The governing law at the time of the transactions in this case is Presidential Decree
No. 1529. Based solely on Section 95 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the following
conditions must be met:
1. the individual must sustain loss or damage, or the individual is deprived of land or
any estate or interest.
2. the individual must not be negligent.
3. the loss, damage, or deprivation is the consequence of either.
(a) fraudulent registration under the Torrens system after the land’s original
registration, or
(b) any error, omission, mistake, or misdescription in any certificate of title or in any
entry or memorandum in the registration book.
4. the individual must be barred or otherwise precluded under the provision of any
law from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or the estate or interest
therein.
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Anglo Agricultural Corporation does not meet the first requisite. It no longer suffered
a loss due to respondent Anglo Sr.’s undertaking to assume all liability in the
agreement
2. The respondents complied with the procedural requirement under PD 1529.
The law says (Section 96 in relation to Section 97) that it is required to implead the
person causing the fraud, in this case, de Ocampo, in the claim for damages.
However, in the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court, respondents Anglo, Sr.
and Anglo Agricultural Corporation presented evidence with respect to the death of
de Ocampo and the absence of properties that could constitute his estate.
RP did not present countervailing evidence to show that de Ocampo or his estate was
still a viable party. Using preponderance of evidence, the Regional Trial Court could
reasonably conclude that de Ocampo can no longer be impleaded.
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FRANCISCA TAAR vs. CLAUDIO LAWAN
G.R. No. 190922 / October 11, 2017
By: Dan Cagnan
FACTS: The present case involves two (2) free patent applications over a 71,014
square-meter parcel of land (the Property) located in Barangay Parsolingan, Genova,
Tarlac.
Narcisa Taar (Narcisa), Alipio Duenas (Alipio), Fortunata Duena (Fortunata), and
Pantaleon Taar (Pantaleon) inherited two (2) vast tracts of land situated in Tarlac.
One (1) parcel of land was adjudicated exclusively in favor of Pantaleon while the
other parcel of land was given to Pantaleon, Narcisa, Alipio, and Fortunata.
Narcisa sold her share to Spouses Primitivo T. Adaoag and Pilar Tandoc (the Adaoag
Spouses) and to Spouses Ignacio Gragasin and Genoveva Adaoag (the Gragasin
Spouses).
Later, Pantaleon, and others executed an agreement to partition the second parcel
of land. This agreement was approved by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
Pantaleon, Alipio, and Fortunata were the predecessors-in-interest of Francisca,
Joaquina, Lucia, and Oscar L. Galo. Based on the February 18, 1948 Decision,
petitioners prepared a subdivision plan over the Property in 2000. The subdivision
plan, denominated as Subdivision Plan No. Ccs-03-000964-D, was approved on
February 6, 2001.
Petitioners then applied for free patents over the Property.
Sometime 2001, Claudio, Marcelino, Artemio, Augusto, and Adolfo (herein private
respondents) filed a verifed protest alleging that their predecessors-ininterest had
been in "actual, physical, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
land since 1948.
Petitioners countered that private respondents occupied the property as tenants.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for
certiorari filed by Francisca Taar, Joaquina Taar, Lucia Taar, and the Heirs of Oscar
L. Galo.
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2. Whether or not the free patents and certificates of title issued in favor of Claudio
Lawan, Marcelino L. Galo, Artemio Abarquez, Augusto B. Lawan, and Adolfo L. Galo
are valid and were secured through fraud and misrepresentation.
3. Whether or not free patents and certificates of title issued in favor of respondents
are valid and were secured through fraud and misrepresentation.
HELD: 1. Anent the first issue: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is an extraordinary remedy. Its scope of review is narrow, limited only to errors
of jurisdiction. Errors of judgment can only be reviewed through an appeal.
2. As to the second issue: Res Judicata states that a final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights
of the parties or their privies, in all other subsequent actions or suits and on all points
and matters determined in the first suit.
3. As to the third issue: Lastly, Section 91 of the Public Land Act provides the
automatic cancellation of the applications filed on the ground of fraud and
misrepresentation. Only extrinsic fraud may be raised as a ground to "review or
reopen a decree of registration.
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LOLITA BAS CAPABLANCA vs. HEIRS OF PEDRO BAS
G.R. No. 224144 / June 28, 2017
By: Noob Case Digest
FACTS: Pedro acquired a lot. He sold this to Faustina. After the death of
Faustina, her heirs executed a notarized Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs and Deed
of Absolute Sale of the subject lot and it was conveyed to Alejandra. Alejandra sold
the land Deen, who in turn sold it to Atty. Deen. Upon Atty. Deen's death, an extrajudicial settlement of estate, which did not include subject lot, was executed by his
heirs. Later they executed an Additional ExtraJudicial Settlement with Absolute Deed
of Sale, which sold the land to Norberto who took possession of and built a house on
it. Norberto died without a will and was succeeded by Lolita.
Josefina, who represented the Heirs Pedro, filed a complaint for Clarification of
Ownership of the subject lot against Lolita. Later, Lolita sought to register her
portion in subject lot but was denied by the Register of Deeds, citing the need for a
court order. Lolita then learned that TCT No. T-96676 had been partially cancelled
and TCT Nos. T-100181, T-100182, T-100183, and T-100185 had been issued in the
name of the Heirs of Pedro Bas, represented by Josefina. Lolita filed a complaint
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for the cancellation of the titles.
RTC ruled in favor of Lolita. Heirs of Pedro appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the
RTC Decision and dismissed the complaint. According to the CA, Lolita must first be
declared as the sole heir to the estate of Norberto in a proper special proceeding
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not petitioner should first be declared an heir of Norberto in
order to proceed with this case.
2) Whether or not it was proper for the CA to dismiss the case based on a ground
that has not been raised.
HELD: 1) No. The dispute in this case is not about the heirship of petitioner to
Norberto but the validity of the sale of the property from Pedro to Faustina, from
which followed a series of transfer transactions that culminated in the sale of the
property to Norberto. For with Pedro's sale of the property, it follows that there would
be no more ownership or right to property that would have been transmitted to his
heirs.
Furthermore, no judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may
assert his or her right to the property of the deceased. This is upon the theory that
the property of a deceased person, both real and personal, becomes the property of
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the heir by the mere fact of death of his predecessor in interest. There is no legal
precept or established rule which imposes the necessity of a previous legal
declaration regarding their status as heirs to an intestate on those who, being of age
and with legal capacity, consider themselves the legal heirs of a person, in order that
they may maintain an action arising out of a right which belonged to their ancestor.
Moreover, the pronouncement in the Heirs of Yaptinchay that a declaration of
heirship must be made only in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary civil action
for reconveyance of property is not applicable in this case. Such ruling is only
applicable if the adverse parties were putative heirs to a decedent's estate or parties
to the special proceedings for an estate's settlement. Here, the main issue is
the annulment of title to property, which ultimately hinges on the validity of the sale
from Pedro to Faustina. Petitioner does not claim any filiation with Pedro or seek to
establish her right as his heir as against the respondents. Rather, petitioner seeks to
enforce her right over the property which has been allegedly violated by the
fraudulent acts of respondents.
2) No. Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states, "defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. Here,
respondents never raised their objection to petitioner's capacity to sue either as an
affirmative defense or in a motion to dismiss." Thus, CA should not
have dismissed the case based on such ground since it was deemed waived due to
the fact that it was not pleaded in either a motion to dismiss or answer.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS
G.R. No. 194190 / January 25, 2017
By: LegRes Lounge
FACTS: On April 23, 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways initiated
an action for expropriation for the widening of Dr. A. Santos Ave, which also known
as Sucat Road. This action was brought against 26 defendants, none of whom are
respondents in this case.
On November 2, 1993, the Commissioners appointed by the Regional Trial Court in
the expropriation case submitted a resolution recommending that just compensation
for the expropriated areas be set to P12, 000.00 per square meter.
Llamas spouses filed "Most Urgent and Respectful Motion for Leave to be Allowed
Intervention as Defendants-Intervenors-Oppositors" on January 27, 1994. They also
filed their Answer-in-Intervention on March 21, 1994. After which, on August 2, 1994,
they filed a "Most Urgent Motion for the Issuance of an Order Directing the Immediate
Payment of 40% of Zonal Value of Expropriated Land and Improvements."
After years of not obtaining a favorable ruling, the Llamas Spouses filed a "Motion for
Issuance of an Order to Pay and/or Writ of Execution dated May 14, 2002. In this
Motion, the Llamas Spouses faulted the Department of Public Works and Highways
for what was supposedly its deliberate failure to comply with the Regional Trial Court's
previous Orders and even with its own undertaking to facilitate the payment of just
compensation to the Llamas Spouses.
Department of Public Works and Highways and the Llamas Spouses had an
understanding that the resolution of the latter's claims required the submission of:
(1) certified true copies of the TCTs covering the lots; and (2) certified true copies of
the tax declarations, tax clearances, and tax receipts over the lots. But, due to their
continued failure to comply with their undertaking, the Department of Public Works
and Highways did not pay them.
On October 8, 2007, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order directing the payment
to the Llamas Spouses of just compensation at P12,000.00 per square meter for 41
square meters for the lot covered by TCT No. 217267. It denied payment for areas
covered by TCT No. 179165 and noted that these were subdivision road lots, which
the Llamas Spouses "no longer owned" and which "belonged to the community for
whom they were made." In the Order dated May 19, 2008, the Regional Trial Court
denied the Llamas Spouses' Motion for Reconsideration.
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ISSUE: Whether just compensation must be paid to respondents Francisco and
Carmelita Llamas for the subdivision road lots covered by TCT No. 179165.
HELD: The Department of Public Works and Highways insists that the road lots are
not compensable since they have "already been withdrawn from the commerce of
man." It relies chiefly on this Court's 1991 Decision in White Plains Association, Inc.
v. Legaspi, which pertained to "the widening of the Katipunan Road in the White
Plains Subdivision in Quezon City.” More specifically, in the 1991 White Plains
Decision that shows a compulsion for subdivision owners to set aside open spaces for
public use, such as roads, and for which they need not be compensated by
Subdivision owners are mandated to set aside such open spaces before their
proposed subdivision plans may be approved by the government authorities, and that
such open spaces shall be devoted exclusively for the use of the general public and
the subdivision owner need not be compensated for the same. A subdivision owner
must comply with such requirement before the subdivision plan is approved and the
authority to sell is issued.
On the other hand, in its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the Regional
Trial Court's Orders and required the Department of Public Works and Highways to
similarly compensate the Llamas Spouses for the two (2) road lots at P12, 000.00
per square meter.
The Court of Appeals correctly stated that a "positive act" must first be made by the
"owner-developer before the city or municipality can acquire dominion over the
subdivision roads." As there is no such thing as an automatic cession to government
of subdivision road lots, an actual transfer must first be effected by the subdivision
owner: "subdivision streets belonged to the owner until donated to the government
or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation." Stated otherwise, "the
local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation,
if they are to be utilized as a public road."
Delineated roads and streets, whether part of a subdivision or segregated for public
use, remain private and will remain as such until conveyed to the government by
donation or through expropriation proceedings. An owner may not be forced to
donate his or her property even if it has been delineated as road lots because that
would partake of an illegal taking. He or she may even choose to retain said
properties.
Respondents have not made any positive act enabling the City Government of
Parañaque to acquire dominion over the disputed road lots. Therefore, they retain
their private character. Accordingly, just compensation must be paid to respondents
as the government takes the road lots in the course of a road widening project.
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LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LORENZO MUSNI
G.R. No. 206343 / February 22, 2017
By: LegRes Lounge
FACTS: Respondent Lorenzo Musni (Musni) was the compulsory heir of Jovita Musni
(Jovita), who was the owner of a lot in Comillas, La Paz, Tarlac. Musni filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City a complaint for reconveyance of land and
cancellation of TCT against Spouses Nenita Sonza Santos and Ireneo Santos (Spouses
Santos), Eduardo Sonza (Eduardo), and Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank).
Musni alleged that Nenita falsified a Deed of Sale, and caused the transfer of title of
the lot in her and her brother Eduardo's name. Then the spouses Santos and Eduardo
mortgaged the lot to Land Bank as security for their loan. Musni said that he was
dispossessed of the lot when Land Bank foreclosed the property upon Nenita and
Eduardo's failure to pay their loan. Later, the titles of the lot and another foreclosed
land were consolidated in anothet TCT, under the name of Land Bank. Musni also
claimed that Nenita and Eduardo was convicted for falsification of a public document
which he filed against them before the MTC of Tarlac.
Land Bank filed its Amended Answer to the RTC with Counterclaim and Crossclaim.
It asserted that the transfer of the title in its name was because of a decision rendered
by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Region III. It countered
that its transaction with the Spouses Santos and Eduardo was legitimate, and that it
verified the authenticity of the title with the Register of Deeds. Further, the bank loan
was secured by another lot owned by the Spouses Santos, and not solely by the lot
being claimed by Musni. Land Bank prayed that it be paid the value of the property
and the expenses it incurred, should the trial court order the reconveyance of the
property to Musni.
On June 27, 2008, the trial court rendered a Decision, in favor of Musni. It relied on
the fact that Nenita was convicted of falsification of the Deed of Sale. The trial court
found that Musni did not agree to sell the property to the Spouses Santos and
Eduardo. In addition, the amount of Musni 's indebtedness was an insufficient
consideration for the market value of the property. Lastly, the sale was executed
before the loan's maturity.The trial court also found that Land Bank was not an
"innocent purchaser for value. The institution of the criminal case against Nenita
should have alerted the bank to ascertain the ownership of the lot before it foreclosed
the same. Land Bank and Nenita separately moved for reconsideration, which were
both denied by the trial court in an Omnibus Order. Land Bank and Spouses Santos
separately appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its appeal,25 Land Bank reiterated
that "it has demonstrated, by a preponderance of evidence, that it is a mortgagee in
good faith and a subsequent innocent purchaser for value; as such, its rights as the
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new owner of the subject property must be respected and protected by the courts.
However, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Musni. Land Bank moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioner is a mortgagee in good faith and an innocent
purchaser for value; and
2. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the award of damages.
HELD: 1. No. Petitioner is neither a mortgagee in good faith nor an innocent
purchaser for value. Petitioner's defense that it could not have known the criminal
action since it was not a party to the case and that there was no notice of lis pendens
filed by respondent Musni, is unavailing. Had petitioner exercised the degree of
diligence required of banks, it would have ascertained the ownership of one of the
properties mortgaged to it. Where "the findings of fact of the trial courts are affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, the same are accorded the highest degree of respect and,
generally, will not be disturbed on appeal. Such findings are binding and conclusive
on this Court."
Accordingly, this Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the findings of the trial court, that petitioner is neither a mortgagee
in good faith nor an innocent purchaser for value.
2. No. Petitioner is not entitled to the award of damages. In its Decision, the trial
court ordered respondents Nenita and Eduardo to pay petitioner damages in the
amount equivalent to the appraised value of the property being claimed by
respondent Musni. The Court of Appeals deleted the award. It considered the grant
of award as a partial extinguishment of the real estate mortgage, which is not
allowed. Since the mortgage is indivisible, the Court of Appeals nullified the real
estate mortgage involving the two properties, and deleted the award.
Although the Court of Appeals' basis for deleting the award is erroneous, this Court
affirms the removal on a different ground since petitioner did not seek relief from the
Court with clean hands. Petitioner may have incurred losses when it entered into the
mortgage transaction with respondents Spouses Santos and Eduardo, and the
corresponding foreclosure sale. However, the losses could have been avoided if only
petitioner exercised the required due diligence.
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VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC. vs. EMILIO G. ALFECHE
G.R. No. 209910 / November 29, 2017
By: Baby T. Agcopra
FACTS: Respondent M. Lhuiller has a branch in San Fernando, Pampanga and had
installed its signage free from any obstacle. On the other hand, petitioner Visayan
Electric Company is the only electric distribution company in San Fernando,
Pampanga. When the Municipality of San Fernando, Pampanga commenced its road
widening project, the Municipal engineer asked the petitioner to relocate its post as
this will be affected by the said project. Petitioner relocated its post closer to the
signage of M.Lhuiller with a distance of only inches between them. Because of the
constant rubbing of the sagging wires of the petitioner with M. Lhuiller signage a fire
broke out. As a result, the fire destroyed the properties of respondents Emilio Alfeche,
Gilbert Alfeche, Emmanuel Manugas. When the respondents demands payment of
indemnity for damages, the petitioner refused to pay. It denied its liability, arguing
that the cause of fire was attributable to respondent M.Lhuiller, because by placing
their signage near their pole, it caused abrasion and the fire.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of fire was attributable to the negligence
of the petitioner and not by the respondent M.Lhuiller?
HELD: Yes. The proximate cause of fire was attributable to the negligence of the
petitioner and not by the respondent M.Lhuiller.
Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that VECO's negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury suffered by respondents Emilio, Gilbert, and Manugas.
All the elements for liability for a quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Codehave
been shown to be attendant on VECO's part. The elements of a quasi-delict are:
1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant
or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause
and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.
On the first element, it is undisputed that the Alfeches and Manugas suffered damage
because of the fire. What has hitherto remained unresolved is which between VECO
and M. Lhuillier is liable to indemnify them.
Fault is "a voluntary act or omission which causes damage to the right of another
giving rise to an obligation on the part of [another]."On the other hand, "[n]egligence
is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. "
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Between VECO and M. Lhuillier, it is VECO which this Court finds to have been
negligent.
M. Lhuillier was not negligent in installing its signage. It installed its signage in 1995
well before the road-widening and drainage projects commenced and ahead of
VECO's relocation of its posts. Solon and Camuta both emphasized that the signage
was installed free of any obstacle. Other than VECO's evasive accusations, there is
no proof to the contrary.
It was VECO that was negligent. It is apparent that it transferred its posts and wires
without regard for the hazards that the transfer entailed, particularly with respect to
the installations which had previously been distant from the wires and posts but which
had since come into close proximity.
VECO is a public utility tasked with distributing electricity to consumers. It is its duty
to ensure that its posts are properly and safely installed. As the holder of a public
franchise, it is to be presumed that it has the necessary resources and expertise to
enable a safe and effective installation of its facilities. By installing its posts and wires
haphazardly, without regard to how its wires could come in contact with a previously
installed signage, VECO failed to act in keeping with the diligence required of it.
Proximate cause is defined as "that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which
the result would not have occurred."
VECO' s negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by the Alfeches
and Manugas. It is settled that the confluence of proximity, abrasion, and shortcircuiting led to the fire. The first of these-proximityarose because of VECO's
relocation of posts and wires. Installed in such a manner that its wires constantly
touched M. Lhuillier' s signage, this "led to the failure of the insulation thereby causing
a short circuit which eventuallyled to the breaking and burning of the wire."It was
this burning wire that fell on the Alfeches' residence's roof and burned down their
house and store, as well as Manugas' adjacent shop.
VECO would have this Court sustain a flimsy excuse for evading liability. Attempting
to break the all too apparent causal connection between its negligence and the injury
suffered by the plaintiffs, it would insist on absurdities that strain common sense and
vainly attempt to discredit even its own witness. This Court finds no merit in VECO's
pretenses and sustains the Court of Appeals decision.
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MAKATI TUSCANY CONDOMINIUM
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 185530 / April 18, 2018
CORPORATION
vs.
MULTI-REALTY
By: Nomercykilling
FACTS: By virtue of RA 4726 or the Condominium Act, Multi-Realty Incorporated
(MDC) Makati Tuscany (MATUSCO) to hold over title and manage its
condominium, the Makati Tuscany. To enable it to perform its function, MDC and
MATUSCO executed a Master Deed and a Deed of Assignment transferring to
MATUSCO the common areas, including the 98 parking lots. Despite the deeds,
MDC exercised ownership over the parking lots such that it sold some of it in
several occasions to unit owners.
Subsequently, MDC filed a complaint against MATUSCO for reformation of
contract with damages. MDC alleged that the deed did not reflect the true
intent of the parties. Considering that it was new to the industry and Makati
Tuscany was its first condominium, it is inexperienced in handling these
matters. MDC asserted that the true intent of the parties was not to include
the 98 parking lots to be transferred to MATUSCO.
For its part, MATUSCO averred that the deeds were prepared by MDC itself.
Thus, it was very unlikely that it would commit a mistake in preparing it. It
likewise stated that the MDC is estopped from impugning the content of the
contract as it recognized its existence and did not object to it for more than 10
years.
Affirming the defense of MATUSCO, the RTC denied the complaint. On appeal to the
CA, the decision was reversed and set aside. CA gave more credence into
the position of MDC that the instrument did not contain the intent of the
parties. Thus, MATUSCO elevated this case on appeal by certiorari.
ISSUE: Is the reformation of instrument proper?
HELD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
Is DENIED.
Reformation has the following elements: 1) there was a meeting of the minds in a
contract; 2) the instrument does not reflect the true intent of the parties; and 3) the
failure to reflect such intent is due to mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident.
However, what is more difficult to ascertain is the real intent of the parties. How is
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the real intent determined? Intent, being a state of mind is determined by the acts
before, during or after the execution of the instrument.
In this case, it is evident that the MDC exercised dominion over the 98
parking lots even after the execution of the deed. In fact, for two instances, MDC
even sold some of the lots to unit owners without any opposition from
MATUSCO. These acts of the parties are indicative of their true intent that
the 98 parking lots are not included in the Deed of Transfer.
Moreover, the mistake in the instrument is apparent. The court here gave
more weight in the position of the MDC that it was new to the industry. Its
inexperience in these situations made it vulnerable to mistakes. Considering their
true intent, it leads only to the lone conclusion that the inclusion of the parking
lots in the instrument is only by mistake.
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ARCO PULP AND PAPER CO., INC. vs. QUALITY PAPERS & PLASTIC
PRODUCTS ENTERPRISES
G.R. No. 206806 / June 25, 2014
By: VDOKUMENTS
FACTS: Dan T. Lim works in the business of supplying scrap papers, cartons, and
other raw materials, under the name Quality Paper and Plastic Products, Enterprises,
to factories engaged in the paper mill business. From February 2007 to March 2007,
he delivered scrap papers worth P7,220,968.31 to Arco Pulp and Paper Company,
Inc. (Arco Pulp and Paper) through its Chief Executive Officer and President, Candida
A. Santos. The parties allegedly agreed that Arco Pulp and Paper would either pay
Dan T. Lim the value of the raw materials or deliver to him their finished products of
equivalent value.
Dan T. Lim alleged that when he delivered the raw materials, Arco Pulp and Paper
issued a post-dated check dated April 18, 2007 in the amount of P1,487,766.68 as
partial payment, with the assurance that the check would not bounce. When he
deposited the check on April 18, 2007, it was dishonored for being drawn against a
closed account.
On the same day, Arco Pulp and Paper and a certain Eric Sy executed a memorandum
of agreement where Arco Pulp and Paper bound themselves to deliver their finished
products to Megapack Container Corporation, owned by Eric Sy, for his account.
According to the memorandum, the raw materials would be supplied by Dan T. Lim,
through his company, Quality Paper and Plastic Products. The memorandum of
agreement reads as follows:
Per meeting held at ARCO, April 18, 2007, it has been mutually agreed between Mrs.
Candida A. Santos and Mr. Eric Sy that ARCO will deliver 600 tons Test Liner 150/175
GSM, full width 76 inches at the price of P18.50 per kg. to Megapack Container for
Mr. Eric Sy’s account.
It has been agreed further that the Local OCC materials to be used for the production
of the above Test Liners will be supplied by Quality Paper & Plastic Products Ent.,
total of 600 Metric Tons at P6.50 per kg. (price subject to change per advance notice).
Quantity of Local OCC delivery will be based on the quantity of Test Liner delivered
to Megapack Container Corp. based on the above production schedule.
On May 5, 2007, Dan T. Lim sent a letter to Arco Pulp and Paper demanding payment
of the amount of P7,220,968.31, but no payment was made to him.
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ISSUE: Whether or not there was novation.
HELD: Novation is a mode of extinguishing an obligation by changing its objects or
principal obligations, by substituting a new debtor in place of the old one, or by
subrogating a third person to the rights of the creditor. Article 1293 of the Civil Code
defines novation as follows:
"Art. 1293. Novation which consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the
original one, may be made even without the knowledge or against the will of the
latter, but not without the consent of the creditor. Payment by the new debtor gives
him rights mentioned in Articles 1236 and 1237."
In general, there are two modes of substituting the person of the debtor: (1)
expromision and (2) delegacion. In expromision, the initiative for the change does
not come from — and may even be made without the knowledge of — the debtor,
since it consists of a third person’s assumption of the obligation. As such, it logically
requires the consent of the third person and the creditor. In delegacion, the debtor
offers, and the creditor accepts, a third person who consents to the substitution and
assumes the obligation; thus, the consent of these three persons are necessary. Both
modes of substitution by the debtor require the consent of the creditor.
Novation may also be extinctive or modificatory. It is extinctive when an old
obligation is terminated by the creation of a new one that takes the place of the
former. It is merely modificatory when the old obligation subsists to the extent that
it remains compatible with the amendatory agreement. Whether extinctive or
modificatory, novation is made either by changing the object or the principal
conditions, referred to as objective or real novation; or by substituting the person of
the debtor or subrogating a third person to the rights of the creditor, an act known
as subjective or personal novation. For novation to take place, the following requisites
must concur:
1)
2)
3)
4)
There must be a previous valid obligation.
The parties concerned must agree to a new contract.
The old contract must be extinguished.
There must be a valid new contract.
Novation may also be express or implied. It is express when the new obligation
declares in unequivocal terms that the old obligation is extinguished. It is implied
when the new obligation is incompatible with the old one on every point. The test of
incompatibility is whether the two obligations can stand together, each one with its
own independent existence.
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Because novation requires that it be clear and unequivocal, it is never presumed,
thus: In the civil law setting, novation is literally construed as to make new. So it is
deeply rooted in the Roman Law jurisprudence, the principle — novation non
praesumitur —that novation is never presumed. At bottom, for novation tobe a jural
reality, its animus must be ever present, debitum pro debito — basically extinguishing
the old obligation for the new one. There is nothing in the memorandum of agreement
that states that with its execution, the obligation of petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper to
respondent would be extinguished. It also does not state that Eric Sy somehow
substituted petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper as respondent’s debtor. It merely shows
that petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper opted to deliver the finished products to a third
person instead.
The consent of the creditor must also be secured for the novation to be valid:
Novation must be expressly consented to. Moreover, the conflicting intention and
acts of the parties underscore the absence of any express disclosure or circumstances
with which to deduce a clear and unequivocal intent by the parties to novate the old
agreement.
In this case, respondent was not privy to the memorandum of agreement, thus, his
conformity to the contract need not be secured. If the memorandum of agreement
was intended to novate the original agreement between the parties, respondent must
have first agreed to the substitution of Eric Sy as his new debtor. The memorandum
of agreement must also state in clear and unequivocal terms that it has replaced the
original obligation of petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper to respondent. Neither of these
circumstances is present in this case.
Petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper’s act of tendering partial payment to respondent also
conflicts with their alleged intent to pass on their obligation to Eric Sy. When
respondent sent his letter of demand to petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper, and not to
Eric Sy, it showed that the former neither acknowledged nor consented to the latter
as his new debtor. These acts, when taken together, clearly show that novation did
not take place. Since there was no novation, petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper’s
obligation to respondent remains valid and existing.
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Case Digests for Bar Exams
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