The Challenger Disaster January 28, 1986 The crew of the Challenger in a 1986 photo. Front L-R: Michael J. Smith, Dick Scobee, and Ronald E. McNair. Rear: Ellison Onizuka, Christa McAuliffe, Gregory Jarvis, Judith Resnik. NASA/AP Photo Team members: Chikheang Bun, Tony Cao, Lauren Cotten, Miguel Guzman, Abel Jauregui The Challenger Disaster January 28, 1986 Resolve: “The disaster was unavoidable and is typical for experimental aircraft. While it was tragic that nonastronauts were aboard, there is no reason to do anything other than mourn the deceased.” Factors Leading to Disaster ● Early Warnings Ignored ● Political Climate/Scheduling History/AP ● Unrealistic Expectations & Overconfidence ● Poor Decision & Ethics Bruce Weaver/AP Major Impacts & Losses ● Loss of 7 crew $3.5 BILLION ● Loss of Challenger ● Mission/Schedule ○ 2.5 year halt to shuttle program ● Environmental ○ Debris, fuel, chemicals in Atlantic ● Client/Contracts ○ Loss of Halley's Comet camera (CHAMP), Loss of SPARTAN-203 satellite for astronomy research. ● Debris recovery, investigation, corrective actions. “Loss of Space Shuttle Challenger”, 2020, ThinkReliability NASA Early Warnings ● Solid Rocket Motor design ○ Thiokol SRM design has remained unchanged since 1977, still displaying the same failures of the tang/clevis interface ● O-rings failed below 50°F during testing ○ “At 100°F, the O-ring maintained contract. At 75°F the O-ring lost contact for 2.4 seconds. At 50°F , the O-ring did not reestablish contact in ten minutes at which the test was terminated.” ● Four shuttle flights between April 12, 1985 and July 29, 1985 all exhibited O-ring erosion NASASPACEFLIGHT ["A Major Malfunction ..." The Story Behind the 1986 NASA Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster (1994]) “Report of the Presidential Commision on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident” (1986) Early Warnings ● July 31, 1985 Roger Boisjoly sent a memo to Robert Lund over concerns of O-ring erosion ● Many engineers were ignored in launch decision Bob Ebeling, Morton Thiokol Rocket Booster Engineer ● October 1985 wrote a memo "Help!" on concerns regarding low temperatures and Orings. ● Challenger Mission 51B, Flight #17 ○ Secondary O-Ring eroded 2/3rds of it’s size ○ Joint rotation “Report of the Presidential Commision on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident” (1986) [“Loss of Space Shuttle Challenger”, 2020, ThinkReliability] Political Climate & Schedule [NASA] ● President Ronald Reagan’s State of the Union Address ○ “His administration wanted the flight to have already taken place so he could praise it during his speech.” ○ The State of the Union Address could not be postponed. ● According to the mission plan, Christa McAuliffe would broadcast a lesson live from orbit on her fourth day in space ○ “Christa McAuliffe would broadcast a lesson live from orbit on her fourth day in space. NASA needed the publicity of her broadcast.” “How the Reagan Administration Contributed to the Challenger Explosion” Gill, M. (2021). "Challenger Explosion: How Groupthink and Other Causes Led to the Tragedy." Teitel, Amy Shira. (2018.) Political Climate & Schedule [NASA] ● Pressure from previous delays, 7 postponement total and 2 in just that week. ○ The mission had already been delayed from mid-1985 to early 1986, and that Tuesday was the only real option NASA had to launch. ● Meeting flight schedules and cutting cost were given a higher priority than flight safety. ○ “In early 1982, the space agency set in motion its citizen-in-space program” ○ “The Carter administration was pressed to send a private citizen into space early in the shuttle program” NASA's Push to Put Citizen in Space Overtook Fully 'Operational' Shuttle.Pincus, W. (1986, March 05). "A major malfunction --": the story behind the space shuttle Challenger disaster. Binghamton, N.Y.: Research Foundation of the State University of New York Maier, M. (1992).. Poor Ethics & Decisions ● NASA used “experience base”, as in no concern is raised if the problem was not worse than previous cases. ● Numerous opportunities following flight 51-C in January, 1985 to have the new minimum temperature, 53 F, criteria established. ● In August 19, 1985 presentation by Thiokol and Marshall Space Flight Center about O-ring erosion, omitted information about Oring low temperature problem. "A Major Malfunction ..." Documentary Investigation of the Challenger Accident: Report of the Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives, Ninety-ninth Congress, Second Session. Critical Issues in the History of Spaceflight. Poor Ethics & Decisions 5:45 p.m. First Teleconference - Concerns regarding temperature effects on the O-rings were discussed. 8:45 p.m. Recommendations by Thiokol to not launch until launch temperatures reached 53 F. Director and manager at MSFC were appalled by advocacy for delay. 10:30 p.m. 10 engineers voice objections to launch but management agreed that secondary O-ring will seal any blow by. 11 p.m. Morton Thiokol determined that the data on the effects of cold is inconclusive and recommends launching. ● At Thiokol, management agreed with engineers about dangers of launching below 53F. Thiokol Management changed their minds after conference call with NASA Officials. ● Thiokol Engineers pleaded with management but were ignored. “Challenger Disaster: The 24 Hours of Pre-Launch Debate That Could Have Prevented a Tragedy”, (2016), Los Angeles Times "A Major Malfunction ..." Documentary Surmounting Pressure & Unrealistic Expectations ● Finds drying up after Apollo ● Chasing the idea of a reusable, reliable space program ○ Promised to turn space travel to something akin to air travel ○ Promise to Government, “No need for a military space program” ● NASA aimed to complete 60 missions a year, 2 shuttles on standby at all times ○ Only averaged 5 missions a year after five years into the program and many delays ○ Peaked at 9 missions flown between 1983-84 ● Thiokol Management quoted that the risk of a catastrophic accident was 1 in 100,000, engineers estimated 1 in 100. YouTube, "”A Major Malfunction ..." The Story Behind the 1986 NASA Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster (1994)” Jones H.W., “NASA’s Understanding of Risk in Apollo and Shuttle”, NASA Ames Research Center Bell T.E., Esch K. “The Challenger Disaster: A Case of Subjective Engineering,” IEEE Spectrum, 2016. Surmounting Pressure & Unrealistic Expectations 'I felt pressure. . .I felt we were in the position of having to prove it was unsafe instead of the other way around.'' Brian Russell, Thiokol Engineer "I fought like Hell to stop that launch. I'm so torn up inside I can hardly talk about it, even now." Roger Boisjoly, Thiokol Engineer Thiokol Engineers unanimously objected to launch. Met with “very strong comments” from NASA Officials. Buffet P.M., “ROCKET ENGINEERS TELL OF PRESSURE FOR A LAUNCHING”, The New York Times, 1986 Berkes H., Remembering Roger Boisjoly: He Tried To Stop Shuttle Challenger Launch,” NPR, 2012.. [The New York Times] [NPR] Closing Remarks ● O-ring performance ○ Issues from previous flights recorded ● Warnings ○ Multiple red flags known beforehand ● Scheduling/Politics ○ Pressure to get Challenger launched on time ● Communication/Ethics ○ Engineers vs Managers [Arlington Cemetery] "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for Nature cannot be fooled." -Professor Richard Feynman Closing Statement ● The Challenger Disaster could have been avoided ● Unethical to risk the lives of people ● Science should not be influenced by politics “The future is not free: the story of all human progress is one of a struggle against all odds. We learned again that this America, which Abraham Lincoln called the last, best hope of man on Earth, was built on heroism and noble sacrifice. It was built by men and women like our seven star voyagers, who answered a call beyond duty, who gave more than was expected or required and who gave it little thought of worldly reward.” —President Ronald Reagan, January 31, 1986 NASA/AP Timeline November 1981 - O-ring erosion discovered after second shuttle flight, STS-2. O-ring erosion was not discussed in STS-3 Flight Readiness Reviews. January 24, 1985 - Shuttle flight STS51-C, exhibited the worst O-ring blow-by, at 53 F. January 27, 1986 - night teleconference to discuss effects of cold temperature on booster performance. January 28, 1986 - Challenger explodes 72 seconds after liftoff. INVESTIGATION OF THE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT. OCTOBER 29, 1986. Notable Figures Marshall Space Flight Center (M.S.F.C)- in charge of booster rocket development Larry Mulloy - challenged the engineers' decision not to launch Morton Thiokol - Contracted by NASA to build the Solid Rocket Booster Allan McDonald(M.T.) - Director of the Solid Rocket Motors Project Robert Lund(M.T.) - Engineering Vice President Robert Ebeling(M.T.) - Engineer who worked under McDonald Roger Boisjoly(M.T.) - Engineer who worked under McDonald Joe Kilminster(M.T.) - Level 4. Engineer in a management position Lawrence Mulloy(NASA) - Level 3. Manager Jerald Mason - Senior executive who encouraged Lund to reassess his decision not to launch.
