EN BANC [G.R. No. L-10126. October 22, 1957.]
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA,
ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian,
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. MARIANO
MEDINA, defendant appellant.
DOCTRINE: PROXIMATE CAUSE: That cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. ( see below for long version ) o When through the negligence of the
driver a vehicle turn turtles and causes injuries to its passengers and then subsequently the bus
catches fire, the driver’s negligence may still be considered the proximate cause of the
consequences of that fire.
FACTS: Shortly after midnight, Juan Bataclan (deceased) was on a bus owned by Medina
Transportation (owned by: Mariano Medina, defendant ) travelling from Cavite to Pasay. While
on its way, the driver of the bus was speeding through and when he applied the brakes ( after the
tires burst) it cause the bus to be overturned. The driver, the conductor, and some passengers
were able to free themselves from the bus except Bataclan (deceased) and 3 others. The 4
stranded passengers called for help. Help arrived soon thereafter and as it was dark, the villagers
brought torch with them. The driver and the conductor failed to warn the would-be helpers of the
fact that gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge fire ensued which engulfed the
bus thereby killing the 4 passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in trial that the tires of
the bus were old.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by
reason of the torches which ignited the gasoline (or was it the fire’s?).
HELD: The driver’s negligence was the proximate cause. The proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus which was caused by the negligence of the driver because he was
speeding and also he was already advised by Medina to change the tires yet he did not. Such
negligence resulted to the overturning of the bus. The torches carried by the wouldbe helpers are
not to be blamed. It is just but natural for the villagers to respond to the call for help from the
passengers and since it is a rural area which did not have flashlights, torches are the natural
source of lighting. Further, the smell of gas could have been all over the place yet the driver and
the conductor failed to provide warning about said fact to the villagers.
RAKES v ATLANTIC [G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907.] M. H., RAKES, plaintiffappellee, vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant, was at
work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in
Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The defendant has proved
that there were two immediately following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven
rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills
secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off.
According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its
sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a
certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or
upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated
at about the knee.
ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable
RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it existed in fact
and what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards,
either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight
depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his
recovery under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not
only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman
to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that there was a
general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car,
and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load.
On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's
contention to the extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the
disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury
as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.
Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which
there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent
of it, but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to
replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking of the track
and the sliding of the iron rails.
1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability of an employer for
injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action be first prosecuted against the
employer or his representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal proceeding
having been taken, the civil action may proceed to judgment.
2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of an employer to his
employee of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the "Fellowservant rule," exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred through the negligence of
a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
AIR FRANCE V CARRASCOSO September 28, 1966 AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in
the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged,
had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to
be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead
body. After some commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI – Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of
moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare
between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome, these various
amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus
P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to
P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against
petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first
class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the
issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such
would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?
RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat;
worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the
humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another
passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of
course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad
faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect
or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for
damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature"
nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The stress of Carrascoso's
action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty
by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.