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Provisional Remedies
5
Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
8. Novecio v Li, 754 SCRA 111
R-57: Preliminary Attachment 5
12
9. Liberty Broadcasting Network v Atlocom, 760 SCRA 625
12
1. Lim v Lazaro, 700 SCRA (2013)
5
2. Ligon v RTC of Makati Br. 56 717 SCRA (2014)
5
3. Torres v Satsatin, 605 SCRA
5
4. Mangila v CA, 387 SCRA
6
1. Larrobis JR v Phil Veterans Bank, 440 SCRA
14
5. Chuidian v Sandiganbayan, 349 SCRA
6
2. Chavez v CA, 610 SCRA
14
6. Luzon Dev. Bank v Krishman, 755 SCRA (2015)
7
3. Tantano v Espina - Caboverde, 702 SCRA 508
15
7. Northern Luzon Island Co. v Garcia, 753 SCRA 603
7
4. Koruga v Arcenas, 509 SCRA
15
10. Republic v Cortez, 769 SCRA 267
R - 59: Receivership
R - 60: Replevin
13
14
16
8. Excellent Quality Apparel v Visayan Surety, 761 SCRA 464
7
1. Orosa v CA, 329 SCRA
16
9. Watercraft Venture Corp v Wolfe, 770 SCRA 179
2. Smart Communications v Astorga, 542 SCRA
16
10. Phil Airconditioning Center v RCJ Lines, 775 SCRA 265 8
3. Hao v Andres, 555 SCRA
16
11. Alejandro Ng Wee v Tankiansee, 545 SCRA
4. Navarros v Escobedo, 606 SCRA
17
5. Agner v BPI Family Savings Bank, 697 SCRA (2013)
17
R - 58: Preliminary Injuction
7
9
9
1. Idolor v CA, 351 SCRA
9
R - 61: Support
17
2. Gustilo v Real, 353 SCRA
10
1. De Asis v CA, 303 SCRA
17
3. Lagrosas v Bristo-Myers, 565 SCRA
10
2. People v Manahan, 315 SCRA
17
4. Jenosa v Delarlarte, 630 SCRA
10
3. Lim v Lim, 604 SCRA
18
5. Solid Builders Inc v China Bank, 695 SCRA (2013)
11
4. Gotardo v Buling, 678 SCRA
18
6. Plaza v Lustiva, 718 SCRA (2014)
11
5. Lim - Lua v Lua, 697 SCRA
19
7. Office of the Ombudsman v De Chavez, 700 SCRA
11
6. Republic v Yahon, 726 SCRA 438
19
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.
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7. Salas v Matusalem, 705 SCRA 560
19
8. Del Socorro v Van Wilsem, 744 SCRA 516
20
Special Civil Actions
R - 62: Interpleader
Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy v COMELEC, 705
SCRA 340 (2013)
26
R-65: Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus 27
20
S-1: Certiorari
20
1. Wack - Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc v Won, 70 SCRA
165, (1976)
20
2. Eternal Gardens v IAC, 165 SCRA 438 (1988)
21
27
1. Ampil v Ombudsman, 703 SCRA 1 (2013)
27
2. A.L. Ang Netwrok, Inc. v Mondejar, 714 SCRA 514 (2014)
28
3. Pasricha v Don Luis Dizon Realty, 548 SCRA 273, (2008)
21
3. Maglalang v PAGCOR, 712 SCRA 472 (2013)
28
4. People v Castañeda, 712 SCRA 800 (2013)
29
4. Bank of Commerce v Planters Development Bank, 681
SCRA 521, (2012)
21
5. UP Board of Regents v Ligot-Teylan, 227 SCRA 342
(1993)
30
6. Tuazon v RD of Caloocan, 157 SCRA 613 (1988)
30
R - 63: Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies
22
1. Almeda v Bathala Marketing Ind., 542 SCRA 470 (2008)
22
7. Province of Leyte v Energy Development Corp, 760 SCRA
149 (2015)
30
2. Republic v Orbecido, 472 SCRA 114 (2005)
23
3. Malana v Tappa, 600 SCRA 189 (2009)
23
4. Chavez v Judicial Bar Council, 676 SCRA 579 (2012)
24
1. Vivas v Monetary Board of BSP, 703 SCRA 290 (2013) 31
5. Sabitsana v Muertegui, 703 SCRA 145 (2013)
24
2. Corales v Republic, 703 SCRA 623 (2013)
32
6. Republic v Roque, 706 SCRA 273 (2013) in relation to
Southern Hemisphere Case, 630 SCRA 146 (2010)
24
3. Tan v CA, 524 SCRA 306 (2007)
32
7. Department of Finance v De la Cruz JR, 768 SCRA 73
(2015)
1. Hipos SR v Bay, 581 SCRA 674 (2009)
33
2. Sanchez v Lastimosa, 534 SCRA 84 (2007)
33
R-64: Review of Judgements and Final Orders of the
COMELEC and COA 26
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.
26
8. Cawad v Abad, 764 SCRA 1 (2015)
S-2: Prohibition
S-3: Mandamus
31
31
33
3. Social Justice Society v Atienza, 517 SCRA 657 (2007) 34
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4. Funa v Manila Economic and Cultural Office, 715 SCRA
247 (2014)
34
5. Cudia v Superintendent of PMA, 751 SCRA 469 (2015) 35
6. Villanueva v JBC, 755 SCRA 182 (2015)
Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
2. Marquez v Alindog, 714 SCRA 460 (2014)
46
3. LZK Holdings v Planters Development Bank, 714 SCRA
294 (2014)
47
35
4. Goldenway Merchandising Corp. v Equitable PCI Bank,
693 SCRA 439 (2013)
48
1. Mendoza v Allas, 302 SCRA 623 (1999)
36
5. Allied Bank v Mateo 588 SCRA 538 (2009)
48
2. Calleja v Panday, 483 SCRA 680 (2006)
37
6. Robles v Yapcinco, 739 SCRA 75 (2014)
49
3. Lokin JR v COMELEC, 621 SCRA 385 (2010)
38
4. Aratea v COMELEC, 683 SCRA 105 (2012)
39
7. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v CPR Promotions and
Marketing Inc, 760 SCRA 59 (2015)
49
5. De Castro v Carlos, 696 SCRA 400 (2013)
39
6. Velasco v Belmonte, 780 SCRA 81 (2016)
39
R-66: Quo Warranto
R -67: Expropriation
36
40
1. City of Manila v Serrano, 359 SCRA 231 , 20 JUNE 2001
40
2. NAPOCOR v CA, GR No. 106804, 12 August 2004
41
3. Republic v Andaya, 524 SCRA 671, 15 JUNE 2007
43
4. Asia’s Emerging Dragon v DOTC, 552 SCRA 59 (2008) 43
5. Abad v Fil-homes Realty, 636 SCRA 247 (2010)
44
6. NPC v YCLA Sugar Development Corporation, GR No.
193936, 11 December 2013
45
R-68 Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
46
1. Ramirez v Manila Banking Corp., GR No. 198800, 11
December 2013
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.
46
R-69: Partition
50
1. Vda. de Figuración v Figuracion - Gerilla, 690 SCRA 495
(2013)
50
2. Balus v Balus, 610 SCRA 178 (2010)
50
3. Feliciano v Canosa, 629 SCRA 550 (2010)
50
4. Mangahas v Brobio, 634 SCRA 351 (2010)
51
R-70: Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
51
1. Suarez v Emboy JR, 718 SCRA 677 (2014)
51
2. Alconera v Pallanan, 714 SCRA 204 (2014)
51
3. Teodoro v Espino, 715 SCRA 435 (2014)
52
4. Ferrer v Rabaca, 632 SCRA 204 (2010)
52
5. CGR Corp., v Treyes, 522 SCRA 765 (2007)
53
6. Abad v Fil-homes Realty, 636 SCRA 247 (2010)
54
7. Zacarias v Anacay, 736 SCRA 508 (2014)
54
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8. Manalang v Bacani, 745 SCRA 27 (2015)
55
9. Supapo v De Jesus, 765 SCRA 211 (2015), GR. No.
198356
56
10. De la Cruz v Hermano, 754 SCRA 231 (2015)
56
11. Erorita v Dumlao, 781 SCRA 551 (2016)
57
R-71: Contempt
Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
57
1. Yasay v Recto, 313 SCRA 739 (1999)
57
2. Sison v Caoibes JR 429 SCRA 258 (2004)
58
3. Español v Formoso, 525 SCRA 216 (2007)
58
4. Marantan v Diokno, 716 SCRA 164 (2014)
59
5. Tormis v Paredes, 749 SCRA 505 (2015)
60
6. Pulumbarit SR v CA, 772 SCRA 244 (2015)
60
7. Balindong v CA, 773 SCRA 27 (2015)
60
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.
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Provisional
Remedies
R-57: Preliminary Attachment
1. Lim v Lazaro, 700 SCRA (2013)
While the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length
of time within which an attachment lien shall continue to
subsist after the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence
dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the
sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or until the
judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated
in the same manner provided by law.
A writ of attachment is not extinguished by the
execution of a compromise agreement between the parties.
2. Ligon v RTC of Makati Br. 56 717
SCRA (2014)
Attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is
against the particular property, enforceable against the whole
world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires a specific
lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently
destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy
itself. Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property
attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to
pay the owner’s debt. The lien continues until the debt is paid,
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.
Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until
the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or
vacated in some manner provided by law. Thus, a prior
registration of an attachment lien creates a preference, such that
when an attachment has been duly levied upon a property, a
purchaser thereof subsequent to the attachment takes the
property subject to the said attachment. As provided under PD
1529, said registration operates as a form of constructive notice
to all persons.
3. Torres v Satsatin, 605 SCRA
At the time the writ was implemented, the trial court has
not acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent
since no summons was yet served upon them. The proper
officer should have previously or simultaneously with the
implementation of the writ of attachment, served a copy of the
summons upon the respondents in order for the trial court to
have acquired jurisdiction upon them and for the writ to have
binding effect. Consequently, even if the writ of attachment was
validly issued, it was improperly or irregularly enforced and,
therefore, cannot bind and affect the respondents.
There are two ways of discharging the attachment. First,
to file a counter-bond in accordance with Section 12 of Rule 57.
Second[,] [t]o quash the attachment on the ground that it was
irregularly or improvidently issued, as provided for in Section
13 of the same rule. Whether the attachment was discharged by
either of the two ways indicated in the law, the attachment
debtor cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the
issuance of the attachment writ by simply availing himself of
one way of discharging the attachment writ, instead of the
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
other. The filing of a counter-bond is merely a speedier way of
discharging the attachment writ instead of the other way.
5. Chuidian v Sandiganbayan, 349
SCRA
4. Mangila v CA, 387 SCRA
Grounds to discharge a writ of attachment: First. To file
a counterbond in accordance with Rule 57, Section 12 or
Second. To quash the attachment on the ground that it was
irregularly or improvidently issued, as provided for in Section
13 of the same Rule.
It would appear that petitioner chose the latter because
the grounds he raised assail the propriety of the issuance of the
writ of attachment. By his own admission, however, he
repeatedly acknowledged that his justifications to warrant the
lifting of the attachment are facts or events that came to light or
took place after the writ of attachment had already been
implemented.
Supervening events which may or may not justify the
discharge of the writ are not within the purview of this
particular rule.
In the instant case, there is no showing that the issuance
of the writ of attachment was attended by impropriety or
irregularity. Apart from seeking a reconsideration of the
resolution granting the application for the writ, petitioner no
longer questioned the writ itself. For four (4) long years he kept
silent and did not exercise any of the remedies available to a
defendant whose property or asset has been attached. It is rather
too late in the day for petitioner to question the propriety of the
issuance of the writ.
The grant of the provisional remedy of attachment
involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting
the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant
to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is
implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained.
However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the
court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for
without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority
to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing
from the Court will not bind the defendant.
The alias summons belatedly served on petitioner
cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the
enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a
coercive process on petitioner without first obtaining
jurisdiction over her person. The preliminary writ of attachment
must be served after or simultaneous with the service of
summons on the defendant whether by personal service,
substituted service or by publication as warranted by the
circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of summons
does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her
person because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a
belated service.
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
6. Luzon Dev. Bank v Krishman,
755 SCRA (2015)
8. Excellent Quality Apparel v
Visayan Surety, 761 SCRA 464
Once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only
remedy of the petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash
deposit or the filing of the counter-bond. Thus, the Court holds
that petitioner’s argument that it has the option to deposit real
property instead of depositing cash or filing a counter-bond to
discharge the attachment or stay the implementation thereof is
unmeritorious.
The proximate relation of the word "deposit" and
"amount" is unmistakable in Section 5 of Rule 57. Plainly, in
construing said words, it can be safely concluded that Section 5
requires the deposit of money as the word "amount" commonly
refers to or is regularly associated with a sum of money.
Petitioners should not give a special or technical interpretation
to a word which is otherwise construed in its ordinary sense by
the law and broaden the signification of the term "deposit" to
include that of real properties.
Under Section 20, Rule 57, in relation to Section 4
therein, the surety bond shall answer for all the costs which
may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he
may sustain by reason of the attachment. In other words, the
damages sought to be enforced against the surety bond are
unliquidated. Necessarily, a notice and hearing before the
finality of judgment must be undertaken to properly determine
the amount of damages that was suffered by the defendant due
to the improper attachment. These damages to be imposed
against the attaching party and his sureties are different from
the principal case, and must be included in the judgment.
On the other hand, under Section 17, Rule 57, in
relation to Section 12 therein, the cash deposit or the counterbond shall secure the payment of any judgment that the
attaching party may recover in the action. Stated differently, the
damages sought to be charged against the surety bond are
liquidated. The final judgment had already determined the
amount to be awarded to the winning litigant on the main
action. Thus, there is nothing left to do but to execute the
judgment against the losing party, or in case of insufficiency,
against its sureties.
7. Northern Luzon Island Co. v
Garcia, 753 SCRA 603
The consequence is that where the main action is
appealed, the attachment which may have been issued as an
incident of that action, is also considered appealed and so also
removed from the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The
attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action
independent of the principal action because the attachment was
only an incident of such action.
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.
9. Watercraft Venture Corp v
Wolfe, 770 SCRA 179
The applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must
sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud
because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's
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mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his
obligation. The particulars of such circumstances necessarily
include the time, persons, places and specific acts of fraud
committed. An affidavit which does not contain concrete and
specific grounds is inadequate to sustain the issuance of such
writ. In fact, mere general averments render the writ defective
and the court that ordered its issuance acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
The defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve
the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show
the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff's application
and affidavits on which the writ was based – and consequently
that the writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly
issued – the reason being that the hearing on such a motion for
dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the
merits of the action. In other words, the merits of the action
would be ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at
the regular trial.
Be that as it may, the foregoing rule is not applicable in
this case because when Wolfe filed a motion to dissolve the writ
of preliminary attachment, he did not offer to show the falsity
of the factual averments in Watercraft's application and
affidavit on which the writ was based. Instead, he sought the
discharge of the writ on the ground that Watercraft failed to
particularly allege any circumstance amounting to fraud. No
trial on the merits of the action at a mere hearing of such
motion will be had since only the sufficiency of the factual
averments in the application and affidavit of merit will be
examined in order to find out whether or not Wolfe was guilty
of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon
which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof.
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.
Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
10. Phil Airconditioning Center v
RCJ Lines, 775 SCRA 265
There are various modes of discharging an attachment
under Rule 57, viz.: (1) by depositing cash or posting a counterbond under Section 12; (2) by proving that the attachment bond
was improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or that the
bond is insufficient under Section 13; (3) by showing that the
attachment is excessive under Section 13; and (4) by claiming
that the property is exempt from execution under Section 2.
The discharge under Section 12 takes effect upon
posting of a counter-bond or depositing cash, and after hearing
to determine the sufficiency of the cash deposit or counterbond. On the other hand, the discharge under Section 13 takes
effect only upon showing that the plaintiffs attachment bond
was improperly or irregularly issued, or that the bond is
insufficient. The discharge of the attachment under Section 13
must be made only after hearing.
The dissolution of the preliminary attachment upon
security given [Section 12], or a showing of its irregular or
improper issuance [Section 13], does not of course operate to
discharge the sureties on plaintiffs own attachment bond. The
reason is simple. That bond is executed to the adverse party,. . .
conditioned that the ... (applicant) will pay all the costs which
may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he
may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall
finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto."
Hence, until that determination is made, as to the applicant's
entitlement to the attachment, his bond must stand and cannot
be withdrawn.
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11. Alejandro Ng Wee v Tankiansee,
545 SCRA
For a writ of attachment to issue under this rule, the
applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of
the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred
from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to
comply with his obligation. The applicant must then be able to
demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud the creditor.
The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ, must
contain such particulars as to how the fraud imputed to
respondent was committed for the court to decide whether or
not to issue the writ. In the application for the writ under the
said ground, compelling is the need to give a hint about what
constituted the fraud and how it was perpetrated because
established is the rule that fraud is never presumed.
The merits of the main action are not triable in a motion
to discharge an attachment otherwise an applicant for the
dissolution could force a trial of the merits of the case on his
motion. However, the principle finds no application here
because petitioner has not yet fulfilled the requirements set by
the Rules of Court for the issuance of the writ against the
properties of respondent. The evil sought to be prevented by the
said ruling will not arise, because the propriety or impropriety
of the issuance of the writ in this case can be determined by
simply reading the complaint and the affidavit in support of the
application.
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.
Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
R - 58: Preliminary Injuction
1. Idolor v CA, 351 SCRA
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting
substantive rights and interests. Before an injunction can be
issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1)
there must be aright in esse or the existence of a right to be
protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be
directed is a violation of such right. Hence the existence of a
right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction.
Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights.
Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive
right which should be judicially protected through the writ of
injunction or that the defendant has committed or has attempted
to commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger
the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the
injunction. The controlling reason for the existence of the
judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby
prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some
of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated
and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when
there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences
which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.
It is always a ground for denying injunction that the
party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and
no claim to the ultimate relief sought - in other words, that she
shows no equity. The possibility of irreparable damage without
proof of actual existing right is not aground for an injunction.
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2. Gustilo v Real, 353 SCRA
Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides that
whenever an application for a TRO is filed, the court may act
on the application only after all parties have been notified and
heard in a summary hearing. In other words, a summary
hearing may not be dispensed with.
Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential
that the following requisites be present: (1) there must be a
right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and
(2) the act against which injunction to be directed is a
violation of such right. The onus probandi is on movant to
show that there exists a right to be protected, which is directly
threatened by the act sought to be enjoined. Further, there must
be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and
substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity
for the writ to prevent a serious damage.
In this case, complainant had been duly proclaimed as
the winning candidate for punong barangay. He had taken his
oath of office. Unless his election was annulled, he was entitled
to all the rights of said office. We do not see how the
complainant's exercise of such rights would cause an
irreparable injury or violate the right of the losing candidate so
as to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order "to
maintain the status quo." We see no reason to disagree with the
finding of the OCA that the evident purpose of the second TRO
was to prevent complainant from participating in the election of
the Liga ng mga Barangay.
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.
Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
3. Lagrosas v Bristo-Myers, 565
SCRA
The injunction bond is intended as a security for
damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction ought
not to have been granted. Its principal purpose is to protect the
enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of the
injunction, and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly.
The appellate court ruled that Lagrosas had no right to
the monetary awards granted by the labor arbiter and the
NLRC, and that the implementation of the writ of execution
and notices of garnishment was properly enjoined. This in
effect amounted to a finding that Lagrosas did not sustain any
damage by reason of the injunction. To reiterate, the injunction
bond is intended to protect Lagrosas against loss or damage by
reason of the injunction only. Contrary to Lagrosas claim, it is
not a security for the judgment award by the labor arbiter.
4. Jenosa v Delarlarte, 630 SCRA
Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who
must apply for it must come with equity or with clean
hands. This is so because among the maxims of equity are (1)
he who seeks equity must do equity, and (2) he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently
stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he
who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a
litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground
that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.
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Here, petitioners, having reneged on their agreement
without any justifiable reason, come to court with unclean
hands. This Court may deny a litigant relief if his conduct has
been inequitable, unfair and dishonest as to the controversy in
issue. Since petitioners have come to court with inequitable and
unfair conduct, we deny them relief.
5. Solid Builders Inc v China Bank,
695 SCRA (2013)
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
event which must be granted only in the face of actual and
existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking
cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to
determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an
injunction are present in the case before it. In this connection, a
writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status
quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of two important
requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected
exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are
violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation
sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury.
As no clear right that warrants the extraordinary
protection of an injunctive writ has been shown by SBI and
MFII to exist in their favor, the first requirement for the grant of
a preliminary injunction has not been satisfied. In the absence
of any requisite, and where facts are shown to be wanting in
bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the
ancillary writ of injunction must be struck down for having
been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.
Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
Neither has there been a showing of irreparable injury.
An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and
frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be
had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by
which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy,
that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The
provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be
resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of
compensation.
Where there is a valid cause to foreclose on the
mortgages, it cannot be correctly claimed that the irreparable
damage sought to be prevented by the application for
preliminary injunction is the loss of the mortgaged properties to
auction sale. Foreclosure of mortgaged property is not an
irreparable damage that will merit for the debtor-mortgagor the
extraordinary provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.
6. Plaza v Lustiva, 718 SCRA
(2014)
The petitioners failed to show clear and unmistakable
rights to be protected by the writ; the present action has been
rendered moot and academic by the dismissal of the main
action.
7. Office of the Ombudsman v De
Chavez, 700 SCRA
Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes
the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of
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procedure. In this connection, Sections 18 and 27 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 also provide that the Office of the
Ombudsman has the power to "promulgate its rules of
procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its
powers, functions and duties" and to amend or modify its rules
as the interest of justice may require. For the CA to issue a
preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the
Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to encroach on
the rule-making powers of the Office of the Ombudsman under
the Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ will render
nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The CA's issuance of a preliminary mandatory
injunction, staying the penalty of dismissal imposed by the
Ombudsman in this administrative case, is thus an
encroachment on the rule-making powers of the Ombudsman
under Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution, and
Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Office
of the Ombudsman the authority to promulgate its own rules of
procedure. The issuance of an injunctive writ renders nugatory
the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman.
8. Novecio v Li, 754 SCRA 111
A preliminary injunction is proper when the plaintiff
appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has
substantial interest in the right sought to be defended. As this
Court has previously ruled, "while the existence of the right
need not be conclusively established, it must be clear.”
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.
Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based
solely on initial or incomplete evidence. Such evidence need
only be a sampling intended merely to give the court an
evidence of justification for a preliminary injunction pending
the decision on the merits of the case, and is not conclusive of
the principal action which has yet to be decided.
In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not
required to submit conclusive and complete evidence. He is
only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final
relief prayed for in his complaint.
The court in granting or dismissing an application for a
writ of preliminary injunction based on the pleadings of the
parties and their respective evidence must state in its order the
findings and conclusions based on the evidence and the law.
This is to enable the appellate court to determine whether the
trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in resolving, one way or the other,
the plea for injunctive relief.
9. Liberty Broadcasting Network v
Atlocom, 760 SCRA 625
A right to be protected by injunction, means a right
clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a
matter of law. An injunction is not a remedy to protect or
enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to
protect a right not in esse, and which may never arise, or to
restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action.
From the evidence on record, no clear, actual and
existing right to the subject frequencies or to the extension of
PA had been shown by Atlocom. Accordingly, no grave abuse
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of discretion was committed by the RTC in denying Atlocom's
application for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
implementation of MC 06-08-2005 insofar as the use of the reallocated frequencies claimed by Atlocom. The CA thus
seriously erred in reversing the RTC and holding that Atlocom
was entitled to injunctive relief due to alleged violation of its
right by the NTC.
A writ of preliminary injunction being an extraordinary
event, one deemed as a strong arm of equity or a transcendent
remedy, it must be granted only in the face of actual and
existing substantial rights. In the absence of the same, and
where facts are shown to be wanting in bringing the matter
within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be
struck down for having been rendered in grave abuse of
discretion.
CA gravely abused its discretion when it issued a writ of
preliminary injunction against the implementation of MC
06-08-2005 in the absence of a clear legal right on the part of
Atlocom, and subsequently denying LBNI's offer to file counter
bond despite compliance with the requisites provided in Section
6 of Rule 58. However, with our ruling that the writ of
preliminary injunction was improperly issued, hence, null and
void, the matter of allowing LBNI to post a counter-bond has
been rendered moot.
10. Republic v Cortez, 769 SCRA
267
"The main action for injunction is distinct from the
provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction."A
preliminary injunction does not determine the merits of a case
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
or decide controverted facts. Since it is a mere preventive
remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further
injury and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the
parties are settled. "It is usually granted when it is made to
appear that there is a substantial controversy between the
parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the
immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable
injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full
hearing can be had on the merits of the case." A preliminary
injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding
prior to judgment or final order.
For its issuance, the applicant is required to show, at
least tentatively, that he has a right which is not vitiated by any
substantial challenge or contradiction. Simply stated, the
applicant needs only to show that he has the ostensible right to
the final relief prayed for in his complaint.
On the other hand, the main action for injunction seeks
a judgment that embodies a final injunction. A final injunction
is one which perpetually restrains the party or person enjoined
from the commission or continuance of an act, or in case of
mandatory injunctive writ, one which confirms the preliminary
mandatory injuction. It is issued when the court, after trial on
the merits, is convinced that the applicant is entitled to have the
act or acts complained of permanently enjoined. Otherwise
stated, it is only after the court has come up with a definite
pronouncement respecting an applicant’s right and of the act
violative of such right, based on its appreciation of the evidence
presented, that a final injunction is issued. To be a basis for a
final and permanant injunction, the right and the act violative
thereof must be established by the applicant with absolute
certainty.
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Rev. Cortez failed to conclusively establish his claimed
right over the subject portion of Palaui Island as would entitle
him to the issuance of a final injunction.
R - 59: Receivership
1. Larrobis JR v Phil Veterans
Bank, 440 SCRA
When a bank is declared insolvent and placed under
receivership, the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board,
determines whether to proceed with the liquidation or
reorganization of the financially distressed bank. A receiver,
who concurrently represents the bank, then takes control and
possession of its assets for the benefit of the bank’s creditors. A
liquidator meanwhile assumes the role of the receiver upon the
determination by the Monetary Board that the bank can no
longer resume business. His task is to dispose of all the assets
of the bank and effect partial payments of the bank’s
obligations in accordance with legal priority. In both
receivership and liquidation proceedings, the bank retains its
juridical personality notwithstanding the closure of its business
and may even be sued as its corporate existence is assumed by
the receiver or liquidator. The receiver or liquidator meanwhile
acts not only for the benefit of the bank, but for its creditors as
well.
Settled is the principle that a bank is bound by the acts,
or failure to act of its receiver. However, the bank may go after
the receiver who is liable to it for any culpable or negligent
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
failure to collect the assets of such bank and to safeguard its
assets.
The period within which respondent bank was placed
under receivership and liquidation proceedings does not
constitute a fortuitous event which interrupted the prescriptive
period in bringing actions.
2. Chavez v CA, 610 SCRA
Receivership is not an action. It is but an auxiliary
remedy, a mere incident of the suit to help achieve its purpose.
Consequently, it cannot be said that the grant of receivership in
one case will amount to res judicata on the merits of the other
cases. The grant or denial of this provisional remedy will still
depend on the need for it in the particular action.
A petition for receivership under Section 1(b), Rule 59
of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the property or
fund subject of the action is in danger of being lost, removed,
or materially injured, necessitating its protection or
preservation. Its object is the prevention of imminent danger to
the property. If the action does not require such protection or
preservation, the remedy is not receivership.
Here Fidela’s main gripe is that Evelina and Aida
deprived her of her share of the land’s produce. She does not
claim that the land or its productive capacity would disappear
or be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. Nor does Fidela
claim that the land has been materially injured, necessitating its
protection and preservation. Because receivership is a harsh
remedy that can be granted only in extreme situations, Fidela
must prove a clear right to its issuance. But she has not. Indeed,
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in none of the other cases she filed against Evelina and Aida
has that remedy been granted her.
3. Tantano v Espina - Caboverde,
702 SCRA 508
Dominalda’s alleged need for income to defray her
medical expenses and support is not a valid justification for the
appointment of a receiver. The approval of an application for
receivership merely on this ground is not only unwarranted but
also an arbitrary exercise of discretion because financial need
and like reasons are not found in Sec. 1 of Rule 59 which
prescribes specific grounds or reasons for granting receivership.
The RTC’s insistence that the approval of the receivership is
justified under Sec. 1(d) of Rule 59, which seems to be a catchall provision, is far from convincing. To be clear, even in cases
falling under such provision, it is essential that there is a clear
showing that there is imminent danger that the properties
sought to be placed under receivership will be lost, wasted or
injured.
Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the
order appointing a receiver the court shall require the applicant
to file a bond executed to the party against whom the
application is presented. The use of the word "shall" denotes its
mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in
this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence,
the filing of an applicant’s bond is required at all times. On the
other hand, the requirement of a receiver’s bond rests upon the
discretion of the court. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 clearly states that the
court may, in its discretion, at any time after the appointment,
require an additional bond as further security for such damages.
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
4. Koruga v Arcenas, 509 SCRA
Consequently, it is not the Interim Rules of Procedure
on Intra-Corporate Controversies, or Rule 59 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure on Receivership, that would apply to this case.
Instead, Sections 29 and 30 of the New Central Bank Act
should be followed, viz.: The designation of a conservator
under Section 29 of this Act or the appointment of a receiver
under this section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary
Board. Furthermore, the designation of a conservator is not a
precondition to the designation of a receiver. It is the Monetary
Board that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings for
receivership of banks.
Crystal clear in Section 30 is the provision that says the
"appointment of a receiver under this section shall be vested
exclusively with the Monetary Board." The term "exclusively"
connotes that only the Monetary Board can resolve the issue of
whether a bank is to be placed under receivership and, upon an
affirmative finding, it also has authority to appoint a receiver.
This is further affirmed by the fact that the law allows the
Monetary Board to take action "summarily and without need
for prior hearing.”
And, as a clincher, the law explicitly provides that
"actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or
under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory, and
may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on a
petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in
excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as
to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
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From the foregoing disquisition, there is no doubt that
the RTC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a suit that seeks
to place Banco Filipino under receivership.
R - 60: Replevin
1. Orosa v CA, 329 SCRA
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial
court erred when it ordered private respondent to return the
subject car or its equivalent considering that petitioner had not
yet fully paid the purchase price. Verily, to sustain the trial
court's decision would amount to unjust enrichment. The Court
of Appeals was correct when it instead ordered private
respondent to return, not the car itself, but only the amount
equivalent to the fourteen installments actually paid with
interest.
2. Smart Communications v
Astorga, 542 SCRA
SMART’s demand for payment of the market value of
the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a
labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor
and creditor rather than employee-employer relations. As such,
the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the
right of possession in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought
therein is the return of the property in specie wrongfully
detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory
proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or possession of
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
personal property. The question of whether or not a party has
the right of possession over the property involved and if so,
whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken and
detained said property as to require its return to plaintiff, is
outside the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond
the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.
3. Hao v Andres, 555 SCRA
The rules provide that property seized under a writ of
replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. In
accordance with the said rules, Andres should have waited no
less than five days in order to give the complainant an
opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the
surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the seized
motor vehicles by filing a counter-bond. This, he failed to do.
The rule is clear that the property seized should not be
immediately delivered to the plaintiff, and the sheriff must
retain custody of the seized property for at least five days.
Hence, the act of Andres in delivering the seized vehicles
immediately after seizure to Silver for whatever purpose,
without observing the five-day requirement finds no legal
justification.
It must be stressed that from the moment an order of
delivery in replevin is executed by taking possession of the
property specified therein, such property is in custodia legis. As
legal custodian, it is Andres’ duty to safekeep the seized motor
vehicles. Hence, when he passed his duty to safeguard the
motor vehicles to Silver, he committed a clear neglect of duty.
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4. Navarros v Escobedo, 606
SCRA
Prior demand is not required before an action for a writ
of replevin is filed. For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the
applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond.
5. Agner v BPI Family Savings
Bank, 697 SCRA (2013)
The vehicle subject matter of this case was never
recovered and delivered to respondent despite the issuance of a
writ of replevin. As there was no seizure that transpired, it
cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of the use and
enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent pursued,
commenced or concluded its actual foreclosure. The trial court,
therefore, rightfully granted the alternative prayer for sum of
money, which is equivalent to the remedy of "exacting
fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly, there is no double
recovery or unjust enrichment30 to speak of.
R - 61: Support
1. De Asis v CA, 303 SCRA
The right to receive support can neither be renounced
nor transmitted to a third person. Furthermore, future support
cannot be the subject of a compromise.
To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation
of the family right of a person to support is virtually to allow
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public
burden. This is contrary to public policy.
It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or
paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the
parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same
is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for
the court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to
the will or agreement of the parties.
2. People v Manahan, 315 SCRA
On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the
child, a correction of the view of the court a quo is in order.
Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons
guilty of rape shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge the
offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so,"
and "in every case to support the offspring." In the case before
us, compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is
not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as it
appears that the accused is a married man. As pronounced by
this Court in People v. Guerrero, the rule is that if the rapist is a
married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring
of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently, that portion of the
judgment under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, we
sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as it
is in accordance with law.
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3. Lim v Lim, 604 SCRA
Petitioners Liable to Provide Support but only to their
Grandchildren.
Grandchildren cannot demand support directly from
their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest
degree) who are capable of supporting them.
This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently
provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to
the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal
(petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in
Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to
petitioners’ theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of
tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of
parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants
one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.
However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation
extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly
understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As
petitioners’ grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester
Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this
category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim
family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their
marital bond.
Petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of
the Civil Code, as amended, and pray that they be allowed to
fulfill their obligation by maintaining respondents at
petitioners’ Makati residence. The option is unavailable to
petitioners.
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
The persons entitled to receive support are petitioners’
grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the
option in Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a wellprovided future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to
the house which, for her, is the scene of her husband’s
infidelity. While not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as
indeed, Cheryl’s charge against Edward for concubinage did
not prosper for insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence on
its occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bringing the case
within the ambit of the exception clause of Article 204,
precluding its application.
4. Gotardo v Buling, 678 SCRA
"[F]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to
adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated
with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or
inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the
person who alleges that the putative father is the biological
father of the child.
A parent is obliged to support his child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is
variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount
of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the
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recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to
support.
5. Lim - Lua v Lua, 697 SCRA
Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either
parent or both may be ordered to give an amount necessary for
the support, maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be
in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the
necessities of the recipient.
In determining the amount of provisional support, the
court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) the
financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent
and those of the child; (2) the physical and emotional health of
the child and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3) the
standard of living the child has been accustomed to; (4) the
non-monetary contributions that the parents will make toward
the care and well-being of the child.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the
provisional support from the salary of the parent.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as
fixed by the CA was not appealed by either party, there is no
controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The
dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in settling
the support in arrears.
The monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial
court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such
as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioner’s
scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive
cars bought by respondent for his children plus their
maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli,
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and
dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear
no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite.
Judgment for support does not become final. The right
to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially
provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is
entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or
altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs,
and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as
subject to final determination.
6. Republic v Yahon, 726 SCRA
438
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term
"employer," which includes in its coverage the military
institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s employer. Where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g)
applies to all employers, whether private or government.
It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal
and child support, is a support enforcement legislation. Section
8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be
construed as laying down an exception to the general rule
above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from
execution.
7. Salas v Matusalem, 705 SCRA
560
The action for support having been filed in the trial
court when petitioner was still alive, it is not barred under
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Article 175 (2)42 of the Family Code. We have also held that
the death of the putative father is not a bar to the action
commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his
illegitimate child.
8. Del Socorro v Van Wilsem, 744
SCRA 516
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is
not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the
Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant
obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that
the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child (either before,
during or after the issuance of a divorce decree).
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law
of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign
law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts
will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands
as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the
same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of
parents to support their children and penalizing the noncompliance therewith.
Respondent is no longer liable to support his former
wife. To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our
laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article
109 of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property.
Special Civil Actions
R - 62: Interpleader
1. Wack - Wack Golf & Country
Club, Inc v Won, 70 SCRA 165,
(1976)
A stakeholder6 should use reasonable diligence to hale
the contending claimants to court.7 He need not await actual
institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill
of interpleader.8 He should file an action of interpleader within
a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to
be sued by either of the contending claimants.9 Otherwise, he
maybe barred by laches10 or undue delay.11 But where he acts
with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental
circumstances, the remedy is not barred.
It has been held that a stakeholder’s action of
interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been
rendered against him in favor of one of the contending
claimants,13 especially where he had notice of the conflicting
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claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the
opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where
judgment was entered. This must be so, because once judgment
is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to
the latter.
2. Eternal Gardens v IAC, 165
SCRA 438 (1988)
The essence of interpleader, aside from the disavowal of
interest of the property in litigation by petitioner, is the deposit
of the property or funds in controversy, with the court. It is a
rule founded on justice and equity: “that the plaintiff may not
continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation
during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will
ultimately be decided as entitled thereto.” The case at bar was
elevated to the Court of Appeals on certiorari with prohibitory
and mandatory injunction. Said appellate court found that more
than twenty million pesos are involved; so that on interest alone
for savings or time deposit would be considerable, now
accruing in favor of the Eternal Gardens. Finding that such is
violative of the very essence of the complaint for interpleader
as it clearly runs against the interests of justice in this case, the
Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for finding that the lower
court committed a grave abuse of discretion which requires
correction by the requirement that a deposit of said amounts
should be made to a bank approved by the Court.
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
3. Pasricha v Don Luis Dizon
Realty, 548 SCRA 273, (2008)
Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. When interpleader proper.—Whenever conflicting
claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made
against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject
matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed
by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting
claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several
claims among themselves. Otherwise stated, an action for
interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom
payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on
the property (or on the right to collect). The remedy is afforded
not to protect a person against double liability but to protect
him against double vexation in respect of one liability.
4. Bank of Commerce v Planters
Development Bank, 681 SCRA
521, (2012)
When the court orders that the claimants litigate among
themselves, in reality a new action arises,134 where the claims
of the interpleaders themselves are brought to the fore, the
stakeholder as plaintiff is relegated merely to the role of
initiating the suit. In short, the remedy of interpleader, when
proper, merely provides an avenue for the conflicting claims on
the same subject matter to be threshed out in an action.
The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is
primarily governed by the specific provisions in Rule 62 of the
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Rules of Court and secondarily by the provisions applicable to
ordinary civil actions.136 Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly
authorize the filing of a complaint-in-interpleader as part of,
although separate and independent from, the answer. Similarly,
Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules
of Court137 does not include a complaint-in-interpleader as a
claim,138 a form of defense,139 or as an objection that a
defendant may be allowed to put up in his answer or in a
motion to dismiss. This does not mean, however, that the BSP’s
“counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader” runs counter
to general procedures.
Apart from a pleading,140 the rules141 allow a party to
seek an affirmative relief from the court through the procedural
device of a motion. While captioned “Answer with countercomplaint/cross-claim for interpleader,” the RTC understood
this as in the nature of a motion,142 seeking relief which
essentially consists in an order for the conflicting claimants to
litigate with each other so that “payment is made to the rightful
or legitimate owner”143 of the subject CB bills.
The rules define a “civil action” as “one by which a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong.” Interpleader may be
considered as a stakeholder’s remedy to prevent a wrong, that
is, from making payment to one not entitled to it, thereby
rendering itself vulnerable to lawsuit/s from those legally
entitled to payment.
Interpleader is a civil action made special by the
existence of particular rules to govern the uniqueness of its
application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules
of Court, governing ordinary civil actions, a party’s claim is
asserted “in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
(fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention.” In
an interpleader suit, however, a claim is not required to be
contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-(of the
conflicting claimants)-in-interpleader. This claim is different
from the counter-claim (or cross-claim, third party-complaint)
which is separately allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule 62.
R - 63: Declaratory Relief and Similar
Remedies
1. Almeda v Bathala Marketing
Ind., 542 SCRA 470 (2008)
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person
interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive
order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights
and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such
a petition is the question of construction or validity of
provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general
rule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequate
relief or remedy is available under the circumstances.
Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action
for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the
controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are
doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have
been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be
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an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one
between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must
be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not
available through other means or other forms of action or
proceeding.
It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are
present in the instant case, except that petitioners insist that
respondent was already in breach of the contract when the
petition was filed. We do not agree.
A petition for declaratory relief may not be dismissed
despite the filing of an action for rescission, ejectment and
damages where the trial court had not yet resolved the
rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the
declaratory relief petition.
2. Republic v Orbecido, 472 SCRA
114 (2005)
The petition for authority to remarry filed before the
trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief.
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1)
there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy
must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that
the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where
one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree,
and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties
are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to
remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries,
litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his
second marriage.
3. Malana v Tappa, 600 SCRA 189
(2009)
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there
has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of
rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the
rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or
contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an
alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the
breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it
refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy
for ending controversies that have not reached the state where
another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need
for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before
they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights,
and a commission of wrongs.
Where the law or contract has already been contravened
prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts
can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other
words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for
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declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or
transgressed before the institution of the action.
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had
already been deprived of the possession of their property, the
proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief.
4. Chavez v Judicial Bar Council,
676 SCRA 579 (2012)
The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity
and construction of Section 8 (1), Article VIII as the issue
raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which
would result in the adjudication of rights sans the execution
process because the only relief to be granted is the very
declaration of the rights under the document sought to be
construed. It being so, the original jurisdiction over the petition
lies with the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised in
the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not among those
within the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
5. Sabitsana v Muertegui, 703
SCRA 145 (2013)
On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the
Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the
RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in
dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action to quiet
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be
brought in the appropriate RTC.
It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title
was prompted by petitioners’ August 24, 1998 letter-opposition
to respondent’s application for registration. Thus, in order to
prevent a cloud from being cast upon his application for a title,
respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to obtain a declaration
of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory
relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.
6. Republic v Roque, 706 SCRA
273 (2013) in relation to
Southern Hemisphere Case, 630
SCRA 146 (2010)
It is clear that the Court, in Southern Hemisphere, did
not make any definitive ruling on the constitutionality of RA
9372. The certiorari petitions in those consolidated cases were
dismissed based solely on procedural grounds, namely: (a) the
remedy of certiorari was improper; (b) petitioners therein lack
locus standi; and (c) petitioners therein failed to present an
actual case or controversy. Therefore, there was no grave abuse
of discretion.
The same conclusion cannot, however, be reached with
regard to the RTC’s ruling on the sufficiency of private
respondents’ petition for declaratory relief.
Case law states that the following are the requisites
for an action for declaratory relief: first, the subject matter
of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or
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other written instrument, statute, executive order or
regulation, or ordinance; second, the terms of said
documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require
judicial construction; third, there must have been no breach
of the documents in question; fourth, there must be an
actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one
between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth, the issue
must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth, adequate
relief is not available through other means or other forms of
action or proceeding.
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court
observes that while the first, second, and third requirements
appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth
requirements, however, remain wanting.
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an
actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one
exists in this case.
Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an
existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely
anticipatory.38 Corollary thereto, by “ripening seeds” it is
meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with,
but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has
accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and
violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept
describes a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable
litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by
tranquilizing declaration.
A perusal of private respondents’ petition for
declaratory relief would show that they have failed to
demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate
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Professor
danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far
removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere
cases, private respondents only assert general interests as
citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government
could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law
would remain untrammelled. As their petition would disclose,
private respondents’ fear of prosecution was solely based on
remarks of certain government officials which were addressed
to the general public.40 They, however, failed to show how these
remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental
action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against
them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent
threat to any of them. As held in Southern Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy, the
petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief,
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Then again, declaratory actions characterized by
“double contingency,” where both the activity the
petitioners intend to undertake and the
anticipated reaction to it of a public official are
merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for
lack of ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the
implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take
the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal
and merely imagined. Such possibility is not
peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power
granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse
must be anchored on real events before courts may
step in to settle actual controversies involving rights
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which are legally demandable and enforceable.41
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed
the SC petitions in the Southern Hemisphere cases on the
basis of, among others, lack of actual justiciable
controversy (or the ripening seeds of one), the RTC should
have dismissed private respondents’ petition for
declaratory relief all the same. Thus, it follows that the
fifth and sixth requisites are not met with in this case.
7. Department of Finance v De la
Cruz JR, 768 SCRA 73 (2015)
Here, the declaratory relief was recognized to be under
the jurisdiction of the RTC because of Respondents’ raising the
issue of validity and effectivity of EO 140, by virtue of which,
Respondents are being transferred to other positions. It did not
dwell however to the appropriateness of the declaratory relief in
this case.
Author submits that the dissenting opinion of Justice
Leonen in this case is a better ruling in tackling the issue of the
appropriateness of the declaratory relief in this case.
[Dissenting opinion] A petition for declaratory relief
may prosper only if there is no breach or violation yet of the
assailed government regulation, and adequate relief is not
available through other means or other forms of action or
proceeding. The third and sixth requisites are absent. The
Complaint before the lower court did not simply ask for a
declaration of a hypothetical breach. Adequate relief through
the Civil Service Commission was also available.
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Professor
R-64: Review of Judgements and Final
Orders of the COMELEC and COA
Alliance for Nationalism and
Democracy v COMELEC, 705 SCRA
340 (2013)
The only question that may be raised in a petition for
certiorari under Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is
whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. For a
petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing
of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.
“Grave abuse of discretion,” under Rule 65, has a
specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of
power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the
whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an
act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of
discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.
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R-65: Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus
S-1: Certiorari
1. Ampil v Ombudsman, 703 SCRA
1 (2013)
Plainly, the Ombudsman has “full discretion,” based on
the attendant facts and circumstances, to determine the
existence of probable cause or the lack thereof.20 On this score,
we have consistently hewed to the policy of non-interference
with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally
mandated powers.21 The Ombudsman’s finding to proceed or
desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed
through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground
that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
which contemplates an abuse so grave and so patent equivalent
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.22
However, on several occasions, we have interfered with
the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining probable cause:
(a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of
the accused;
(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of
justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub
judice;
(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in
excess of authority;
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Professor
(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation;
(f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense;
(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution;
(i)
Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance.23 (Emphasis supplied).
The fourth circumstance is present in G.R. No. 192685.
While we agree with the Ombudsman’s disquisition that there is
no probable cause to indict respondents for Falsification of
Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal
Code, we are puzzled why the Ombudsman completely glossed
over Ampil’s charge that respondents committed prohibited acts
listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Nowhere in the Resolution or in the Order denying
reconsideration thereof did the Ombudsman tackle and resolve
the issue of whether respondents violated the particular
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019.
We are aware that the calibration of evidence to assess
whether a prima facie graft case exists against respondents is a
question of fact. We have consistently held that the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact
nor law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. In this case, however,
certiorari will lie, given that the Ombudsman made no finding
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
at all on respondents possible liability for violation of Sections
3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
3. Maglalang v PAGCOR, 712
SCRA 472 (2013)
2. A.L. Ang Netwrok, Inc. v
Mondejar, 714 SCRA 514 (2014)
It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner
availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for
certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal.
Suffice it to state that an appeal and a special civil action such
as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate
from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the
ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no
appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a
case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that
remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the lost
remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of
petitioner's allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright
dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal
standing and should therefore be set aside.
Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
is valid only when the question involved is an error of
jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an
original action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction
and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore
incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors
tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either
grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of whether
or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously,
whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material
to the controversy.
Considering that small claims cases are exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its
dispositions should be filed before their corresponding
Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it
instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as
previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In fine,
the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground that
it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No.
11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its
proper disposition.
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court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence,
courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from
reviewing factual assessments of the respondent court or
agency. Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade
into factual matters when the evidence on record does not
support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded,
inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing
on record.Considering the circumstances and since this Court is
not a trier of facts, remand of this case to the CA for its
judicious resolution is in order.
4. People v Castañeda, 712 SCRA
800 (2013)
At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was
filed beyond the reglementary period for the filing under Rule
65. The petition itself stated that a copy of the 15 May 2013
Resolution was received by the BOC 2 days after its
promulgation, or on 17 May 2013. RATS was only alerted by
the developments in the case on 24 July 2013, when Atty.
Campos received the 15 July 2013 Resolution of the CTA
ordering the entry of judgment in the case, considering that no
appeal was taken by any of the parties. According to Atty.
Campos, it was only on that occasion when he discovered the
15 May 2013 Resolution of the CTA. Thus, it was prayed that
the petition be given due course despite its late filing.
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
is explicit in stating that certiorari should be instituted within a
period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is
inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate
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Professor
the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of
their case. While there are recognized exceptions to such strict
observance, there should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious
explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.
No convincing justification for the belated filing of the
petition was advanced to warrant the relaxation of the Rules.
Notably, the records show that the petition was filed only on
August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due date
which fell on July 16, 2013. To excuse this grave procedural
lapse will not only be unfair to the other party, but it will also
sanction a seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing
rules of procedure. The late filing of the petition was borne out
of the petitioner’s failure to monitor incoming court processes
that needed to be addressed by the office. Clearly, this is an
admission of inefficiency
Even if the Court decides to suspend the rules and
permit this recourse, the end result would remain the same.
While a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, it must be shown that there was grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a
denial of due process. A perusal of the challenged resolutions of
the CTA does not disclose any indication of grave abuse of
discretion on its part or denial of due process. The records are
replete with indicators that the petitioner actively participated
during the trial and, in fact, presented its offer of evidence and
opposed the demurrer.
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5. UP Board of Regents v LigotTeylan, 227 SCRA 342 (1993)
The Court finds that the lower court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May
29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower
court's finding that the implementation of the disciplinary
sanction of suspension on Nadal "would work injustice to the
petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and
consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job." Sadly,
such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without
taking into account the circumstances clearly of his own
making, which led him into such a predicament. More
importantly, it has completely disregarded the overriding issue
of academic freedom which provides more than ample
justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon
an erring student of an institution of higher learning.
From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower
court should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction
over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in
doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part
of the petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an
official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise
of discretion or judgment.
6. Tuazon v RD of Caloocan, 157
SCRA 613 (1988)
The procedural issue is quite easily disposed of. It is
true that the extraordinary writ of certiorari may properly issue
to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of
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prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or
ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with
the writ of certiorari in relation to “any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the
same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to
“proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person x x
exercising functions judicial or ministerial.” But the petition
will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an
unlawful exercise of judicial power.
7. Province of Leyte v Energy
Development Corp, 760 SCRA
149 (2015)
Thus, in petitions for certiorari filed before the CA, the
latter acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent
upon: (a) the service of the order or resolution indicating the
CA’s initial action on the petition to the respondent; or (b) the
voluntary submission of the respondent to the CA’s jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, records reveal that the CA served its
Resolution dated November 4, 2009 indicating its initial action
on the Province of Leyte’s certiorari petition before it, i.e.,
directing EDC to file a comment to the petition, among others.
In fact, the EDC complied with such directive by filing its
comment dated December 14, 2009 to such petition. Hence, the
CA had already acquired jurisdiction over both parties to the
instant case.
Admittedly, the Rules require that the petition filed
before the CA should include proof of service to the other party.
Essentially, the purpose of this rule is to apprise such party of
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the pendency of an action in the CA. Thus, if such party had
already been notified of the same and had even participated in
the proceedings, such purpose would have already been served.
Considering that in this case, the CA had already issued a
Resolution dated November 4, 2009 directing EDC to file a
comment which the latter had complied with, it cannot be
denied that EDC was already aware of the certiorari
proceedings before the CA and that jurisdiction had been
acquired over its person. The CA, therefore, should have
brushed aside the Province of Leyte’s procedural mishap and
resolved the case on the merits in the interest of substantial
justice.
8. Cawad v Abad, 764 SCRA 1
(2015)
Certiorari as a special civil action is available only if:
(1) it is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or
officer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On the other hand, prohibition is available only if: (1)
it is directed against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial; (2) the tribunal, corporation, board or person acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Based on the foregoing,
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Professor
this Court has consistently reiterated that petitions for certiorari
and prohibition may be invoked only against tribunals,
corporations, boards, officers, or persons exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, and not against their
exercise of legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
S-2: Prohibition
1. Vivas v Monetary Board of BSP,
703 SCRA 290 (2013)
Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is
already an ineffective remedy under the circumstances
obtaining. Prohibition or a “writ of prohibition” is that process
by which a superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals,
officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction
with which they have not been vested by law, and confines
them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. Its
office is to restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons
from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its
cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it
has cognizance.
Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that
a judgment be rendered which would direct the defendant to
desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived
to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ of
prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be
done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already
accomplished.
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Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy
demands that where the issuance of the extraordinary writs is
also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, the special
action for the obtainment of such writ must be presented to
either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort
to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate lower courts; or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and with
serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary
remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling
for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. The judicial policy
must be observed to prevent an imposition on the precious time
and attention of the Court.
2. Corales v Republic, 703 SCRA
623 (2013)
Prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a
judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with
the commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be
resorted to when there is “no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” In this
case, petitioners insist that it is no longer necessary to exhaust
administrative remedies considering that there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy and appropriate remedial measure to
assail the imposition under the AOM aside from an action for
prohibition.
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
3. Tan v CA, 524 SCRA 306 (2007)
Basic is the rule that the writ of prohibition is an
extraordinary remedy to prevent the unlawful and oppressive
exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly
administration of justice. It is available only when there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, and when the proceedings are done
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. The petitioner must allege in his petition and
establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is not
speedy or adequate. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it
will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of
that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior court.
Further, the writ will not lie to correct errors of judgment but
only errors of jurisdiction. As long as the tribunal acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of
judgment which are correctible by a timely appeal. In
determining whether a tribunal acted in grave abuse of
discretion, mere abuse of discretion is not enough. There must
be grave abuse of discretion as where the tribunal exercised its
power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as would
amount to an evasion, or virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined, or to act in contemplation of law.
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S-3: Mandamus
1. Hipos SR v Bay, 581 SCRA 674
(2009)
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or
at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done,
when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As an
extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a
discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the
exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes
upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
manner in which he is required to act, because it is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters
involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a
writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel
action in those matters, when refused. However, mandamus is
never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion
in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action
already taken in the exercise of either. In other words, while a
judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations
can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such
Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on
the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on
it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available
anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying
the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of
petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari
against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.
2. Sanchez v Lastimosa, 534 SCRA
84 (2007)
We have repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions that
the remedy of mandamus is employed only to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to
require anyone to fulfill a discretionary one. The issuance of the
writ is simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. In Manila
International Airport Authority v. Rivera Village Lessee
Homeowners Association, Inc., 471 SCRA 358 (2005), we
emphasized, through the erudite and eloquent ponencia of
Justice Dante O. Tinga, that the writ can be issued only when
the applicant’s legal right to the performance of a particular act
sought to be compelled is clear and complete, one which is
indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law.
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3. Social Justice Society v Atienza,
517 SCRA 657 (2007)
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a
petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an
extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance,
when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on
the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should
have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the
performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative
duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.
We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus
proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a
public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of
the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they
need not show any specific interest. Besides, as residents of
Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of
the city’s ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of
petitioners to institute this proceeding.
4. Funa v Manila Economic and
Cultural Office, 715 SCRA 247
(2014)
The rules regarding legal standing in bringing public
suits, or locus standi, are already well-defined in our case law.
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
Again, We cite David, which summarizes jurisprudence on this
point: By way of summary, the following rules may be culled
from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters,
concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to
sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) the
cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must
be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a
showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing
that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a
claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators. We rule that the instant petition
raises issues of transcendental importance, involved as they are
with the performance of a constitutional duty, allegedly
neglected, by the COA. Hence, We hold that the petitioner, as a
concerned citizen, has the requisite legal standing to file the
instant mandamus petition.
The last preliminary issue is concerned with the
petition’s nonobservance of the principle of hierarchy of courts.
The COA assails the filing of the instant mandamus petition
directly with this Court, when such petition could have very
well been presented, at the first instance, before the Court of
Appeals or any Regional Trial Court. The COA claims that the
petitioner was not able to provide compelling reasons to justify
a direct resort to the Supreme Court. In view of the
transcendental importance of the issues raised in the mandamus
petition, as earlier mentioned, this Court waives this last
procedural issue in favor of a resolution on the merits.
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
5. Cudia v Superintendent of PMA,
751 SCRA 469 (2015)
6. Villanueva v JBC, 755 SCRA 182
(2015)
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It
may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer,
or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must
be a ministerial act or duty. An act is ministerial if the act
should be performed “[under] a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or
corporation’s] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety
of the act done.” The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person must have no choice but to perform the act specifically
enjoined by law. This is opposed to a discretionary act whereby
the officer has the choice to decide how or when to perform the
duty.
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases.
It cannot be availed against an official or government agency
whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. For
a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the
thing demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the
part of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated.
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within
the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and
screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance
of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the
formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that
the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the
exercise of the JBC’s constitutional mandate, a determination
must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing and enforcing the said policy.
The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the
petitioner in assailing JBC’s policy. The petitioner insisted that
mandamus is proper because his right was violated when he
was not included in the list of candidates for the RTC courts he
applied for. He said that his noninclusion in the list of
candidates for these stations has caused him direct injury. It is
essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the
applicant should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded
and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform
the act required. The petitioner bears the burden to show that
there is such a clear legal right to the performance of the act,
and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the
respondent to perform the act. The remedy of mandamus, as an
extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Clearly, the use of
discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually
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exclusive. The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or
review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of
conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what the petitioner
would have the JBC do in his favor. The function of the JBC to
select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is
discretionary, not ministerial. More so, the petitioner cannot
claim any legal right to be included in the list of nominees for
judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and
statutory qualifications for appointment to the judiciary may
not be used to legally demand that one’s name be included in
the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One’s inclusion in
the list of the candidates depends on the discretion of the JBC.
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a
person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other
written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute,
an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief
sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and
determination of the validity of the written instrument and the
judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.”
“[T]he purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a
statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in its
enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from
its alleged breach.
The instant petition must necessarily fail because this
Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.
The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to
Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.
No. 7691. Therefore, by virtue of the Court’s supervisory duty
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded judicial power,
the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in
any event, even if the Court will set aside procedural
infirmities, the instant petition should still be dismissed.
R-66: Quo Warranto
1. Mendoza v Allas, 302 SCRA 623
(1999)
The instant petition arose from a special civil action for
quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court. Quo
warranto is a demand made by the State upon some individual
or corporation to show by what right they exercise some
franchise or privilege appertaining to the state which, according
to the Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally
exercise except by virtue of a grant or authority from the state.
In other words, a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to
determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a
franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if
his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to
enjoy the privilege. The action may be commenced for the
Government by the Solicitor General or the fiscal against
individuals who usurp a public office, against a public officer
whose acts constitute a ground for the forfeiture of his office,
and against an association which acts as a corporation without
being legally incorporated. The action may also be instituted by
an individual in his own name who claims to be entitled to the
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another.
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Where the action is filed by a private person, he must
prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise
respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the
office. If the court finds for the respondent, the judgment
should simply state that the respondent is entitled to the office.
x x x If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping
or intruding into the office, or unlawfully holding the same, the
court may order: 1. The ouster and exclusion of the defendant
from office; 2. The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator; 3.
The determination of the respective rights in and to the office,
position, right, privilege or franchise of all the parties to the
action as justice requires.
Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard
to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule,
however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment
in quo warranto does not bind the respondent’s successor in
office, even though such successor may trace his title to the
same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo
warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but
always against the person—to determine whether he is
constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or
exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. In
the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by
petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed
out before the trial court was the qualification and right of
petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray
Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did
not err in denying execution of the trial court’s decision.
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
2. Calleja v Panday, 483 SCRA 680
(2006)
It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for
quo warranto that certain persons usurped the offices, powers
and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees
and/or officers make out a case for an intra-corporate
controversy. Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the
Court, adopting Justice Jose Y. Feria’s view, declared in
Unilongo v. Court of Appeals that Section 1, Rule 66 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is “limited to actions of quo
warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or
franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and
associations which act as corporations without being legally
incorporated,” while “[a]ctions of quo warranto against
corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a
corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No.
902-A as amended).” However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and
Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows: 5.2. The Commission’s
jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the
Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial
Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its
authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that
shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. x x x Therefore,
actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in
a corporation, which were formerly cognizable by the
Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have
been transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this
does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
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Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons
who usurp an office in a private corporation.
As explained in the Unilongo case, Section 1(a) of Rule
66 of the present Rules no longer contains the phrase “or an
office in a corporation created by authority of law” which was
found in the old Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies
to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public
office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their
office; and associations which act as corporations without being
legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is,
therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing
IntraCorporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter
the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo
warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what
is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to
assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers
of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.
The RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of
jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for quo warranto. Based
on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one
involving an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should have
been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned
administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never
designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never
vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the
SEC. Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the
requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the case to
another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that
RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition
for lack of jurisdiction. In HLC Construction and Development
Corp. v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners’ Association,
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
the Court held that the trial court, having no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the complaint, should dismiss the same so
the issues therein could be expeditiously heard and resolved by
the tribunal which was clothed with jurisdiction.
3. Lokin JR v COMELEC, 621
SCRA 385 (2010)
An election protest proposes to oust the winning
candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the
defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of
electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between
them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast
and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a
candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has
been voted for in the preceding elections. A special civil action
for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State,
or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the
action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not
to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the
action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the
parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be
seated even if the respondent may be unseated.
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election
protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very
peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the
second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may
properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to
unseat another party-list organization to determine which
between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations
actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is
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not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list
organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the
same party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo
warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the
ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of
the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for
certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the
September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance
with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution,
notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by CruzGonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by
Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of
the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64
states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in
accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court
within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for
certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.
4. Aratea v COMELEC, 683 SCRA
105 (2012)
In a quo warranto petition, the grounds to oust an
elected official from his office are ineligibility and disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines. This is provided under Section
253 of the OEC and governed by the Rules of Court as to
procedures. While quo warranto and cancellation share the
same ineligibility grounds, they differ as to the time these
grounds are cited. A cancellation case is brought before the
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Professor
elections, while a quo warranto is filed after and may still be
filed even if a CoC cancellation case was not filed before
elections.
5. De Castro v Carlos, 696 SCRA
400 (2013)
“A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to
determine the right of a person to use or exercise a franchise or
an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if
the claim is not well-founded, or if his right to enjoy the
privilege has been forfeited.” Where the action is filed by a
private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is
entitled to the controverted position, otherwise, respondent has
a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.
6. Velasco v Belmonte, 780 SCRA
81 (2016)
A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to
determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a
franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if
his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to
enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed by a private
person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted
position; otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed
possession of the office. In this case, given the present factual
milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory resolutions of this Court
in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of
the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes’s
Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory
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resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null
and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as
the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the
Lone District of the Province of Marinduque — it cannot be
claimed that the present petition is one for the determination of
the right of Velasco to the claimed office. To be sure, what is
prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal
duties and not to try disputed title. That the respondents make it
appear so will not convert this petition to one for quo warranto.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
provides that any person may file a verified petition for
mandamus “when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled,
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.” A petition for mandamus will prosper
if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty,
and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or
person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and
certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
R -67: Expropriation
1. City of Manila v Serrano, 359
SCRA 231 , 20 JUNE 2001
Doctrine/s: Upon compliance with the requirements for
expropriation, issuance of writ of possession becomes
ministerial.
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Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first,
condemnation of the property after it is determined that its
acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and,
second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for
the taking of private property to be made by the court with the
assistance of not more than three commissioners.
Facts: The City of Manila has filed a complaint for
expropriation on certain plots of land in the First District of
Tondo before the RTC on the premise of using such properties
to give lands to the landless, pursuant to the Land Use
Development Program of the City of Manila.
Respondents and alleged landowners of the properties filed for
expropriation alleged among others that their land should not be
covered by the expropriation proceedings because their plot of
land, 1-C if distributed among the co-owners would result to
plots of lands that are inhabitable; that their plot of land is
exempt by expropriation under RA 7279; and that the trial
court should have not ordered the writ of possession and
petitioner’s entry into the property.
Issue: WON the issuance of the writ of possession and
petitioner’s entry into the property after filing the proper
complaint and deposits made is not proper when there are still
questions on the validity of the complaints.
Held: Yes. A writ of execution may be issued by a court upon
the filing by the government of a complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the
government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of
the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with
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these requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession
becomes ministerial. In this case, these requirements were
satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the
trial court to issue the writ of possession.
As to the question of compliance of the other section of
RA 7279 it is held that Whether petitioner has complied with
these provisions requires the presentation of evidence, although
in its amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had
complied with the requirements. The determination of this
question must await the hearing on the complaint for
expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of
the properties sought to be expropriated. Expropriation
proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the
property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a
public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of
just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property
to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than
three commissioners.
2. NAPOCOR v CA, GR No. 106804,
12 August 2004
Doctine/s: The Court pointed out that a government agency
could not initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a persons
property, and then just decide not to proceed with the
expropriation. It cannot avail of the automatic dismissal right
given to plaintiffs in ordinary civil actions because
expropriation as a manifestation of the State’s power of
Eminent Domain are still subject to limitations.
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Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case
restores possession of the expropriated land to the landowner.
However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to
the landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible
anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved
landowner is to demand payment of just compensation.
Facts: Antonio Pobre has a 141,300 square meter land in Albay
which he turned into a resort-subdivision and were given the
necessary permits and titles to said land. A 68,969 square meter
plot of land remained with Pobre when the NPC decided to
lease 11 plot of lands with Pobre for a geothermal power plant.
Later, 2 expropriation proceedings were commenced by
the NPC against the plots of lands of Pobre. The first, in 1977,
Pobre did not opposed but asked that NPC to stop or limit the
waste being dumped on the property outside the leased or
expropriated lands. This request was to no avail. The 2nd
expropriation in 1 September 1979, and the NPC was given the
writ of possession after complying with the proper deposits.
This was later on opposed by Pobre and prayed for damages for
the permanent damages done to his land, on 10 December
1984.
On 2 January 1985, the NPC filed for the dismissal of
its 2nd expropriation complaint against the land of Pobre and
was granted but the trial for the damages prayed for by Pobre
still continued. This is then opposed by NPC on the ground that
should have been dismissed together with their expropriation
complaint.
Issue: WON the complaint for damages filed for by an
aggrieved land owner against the initiator of the expropriation
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proceedings be also automatically dismissed when the
expropriation proceedings were withdrawn by the complainant.
WON the aggrieved landowner may be still given just
compensation when the land being expropriated has been
restored to him.
Held: No. In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the
plaintiffs matter of right to dismiss the complaint precisely
because the landowner may have already suffered damages at
the start of the taking. The plaintiffs right in expropriation cases
to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to court
approval and to certain conditions. The exceptional right that
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court conferred on the
plaintiff must be understood to have applied only to other civil
actions. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure abrogated this
exceptional right.
The power of eminent domain is subject to limitations. A
landowner cannot be deprived of his right over his land until
expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court
must then see to it that the taking is for public use, there is
payment of just compensation and there is due process of law.
If the propriety of the taking of private property through
eminent domain is subject to judicial scrutiny, the dismissal of
the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry because private
rights may have suffered in the meantime. The dismissal,
withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be
made arbitrarily. If it appears to the court that the expropriation
is not for some public use, then it becomes the duty of the court
to dismiss the action. However, when the defendant claims that
his land suffered damage because of the expropriation, the
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.
Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
dismissal of the action should not foreclose the defendants right
to have his damages ascertained either in the same case or in a
separate action.
Yes. Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case
restores possession of the expropriated land to the landowner.
However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to
the landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible
anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved
landowner is to demand payment of just compensation.
In this case, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that it
is no longer possible and practical to restore possession of the
Property to Pobre. The Property is no longer habitable as a
resort-subdivision. The Property is worthless to Pobre and is
now useful only to NPC. Pobre has completely lost the Property
as if NPC had physically taken over the entire 68,969 squaremeter Property.
We have held that the usual procedure in the
determination of just compensation is waived when the
government itself initially violates procedural requirements.
NPCs taking of Pobres property without filing the appropriate
expropriation proceedings and paying him just compensation is
a transgression of procedural due process.
From the beginning, NPC should have initiated
expropriation proceedings for Pobres entire 68,969 squaremeter Property. NPC did not. Instead, NPC embarked on a
piecemeal expropriation of the Property. Even as the second
expropriation case was still pending, NPC was well aware of
the damage that it had unleashed on the entire Property. NPC,
however, remained impervious to Pobres repeated demands for
NPC to abate the damage that it had wrought on his Property.
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NPC moved for the dismissal of the complaint for the second
expropriation on the ground that it had found an alternative site
and there was stiff opposition from Pobre. NPC abandoned the
second expropriation case five years after it had already
deprived the Property virtually of all its value. NPC has
demonstrated its utter disregard for Pobres property rights.
Thus, it would now be futile to compel NPC to institute
expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation
for Pobres 68,969 square-meter Property. Pobre must be spared
any further delay in his pursuit to receive just compensation
from NPC.
3. Republic v Andaya, 524 SCRA
671, 15 JUNE 2007
Taking, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
occurs not only when the government actually deprives or
dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its
ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or
material impairment of the value of his property.
Andaya is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must
be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the
land.
4. Asia’s Emerging Dragon v
DOTC, 552 SCRA 59 (2008)
Only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus,
that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear,
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
and that the writ will not issue in cases where the right is
doubtful.
The rights or privileges of an original proponent of an
unsolicited proposal for an infrastructure project are never
meant to be absolute; An unsolicited proposal is subject to
evaluation, after which, the government agency or local
government unit (LGU) concerned may accept or reject the
proposal outright.
Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) does not
possess any legal personality to interfere with or restrain the
activities of the Government as regards Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III
(NAIA IPT III).
It must be emphasized that under Sections 2 and 3, Rule
65 of the revised Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions for
prohibition and mandamus, such as in the instant case, can only
be resorted to when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy for the party in the ordinary course of law.
As the revised Rules now stand, a petition for certiorari
may be filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order
or resolution sought to be assailed. Reasonable time for filing a
petition for mandamus should likewise be for the same period.
The filing by the AEDC of its petition for mandamus 20 months
after its supposed right to the project arose is evidently beyond
reasonable time and negates any claim that the said petition for
the extraordinary writ was the most expeditious and speedy
remedy available to AEDC.
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of
the State to condemn private property for public use upon
payment of just compensation. Thus, for expropriation to be
valid, the following requirements must be met: (1) the taking
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must be for public use and (2) just compensation must be paid
to the owner of the private property.
To be valid, the taking must be for public use. The
meaning of the term “public use” has evolved over time in
response to changing public needs and exigencies. Public use
which was traditionally understood as strictly limited to actual
“use by the public” has already been abandoned. “Public use”
has now been held to be synonymous with “public interest,”
“public benefit,” “public welfare” and “public convenience.” It
includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or
advantage. Whatever may be beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
The State, through expropriation proceedings, may take
private property even if, admittedly, it will transfer this property
again to another private party as long as there is a public
purpose to the taking. In 2005, the United States Supreme
Court held in Kelo v. New London that promotion of economic
development qualifies as a public use even if private parties are
benefited.
As we stated in Agan (which we likewise recognized in
Gingoyon), compensation must conform not only with law but
equity as well. This means that the expropriation court is not
confined to strictly following the formula spelled out in the law
and instead is given latitude in its determination of the
compensation due to PIATCO. After all, the determination of
just compensation is a judicial function.
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.
Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
5. Abad v Fil-homes Realty, 636
SCRA 247 (2010)
In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the
State expropriates private property for public use upon payment
of just compensation. A socialized housing project falls within
the ambit of public use as it is in furtherance of the
constitutional provisions on social justice.
When the Government seeks to acquire, through
purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands belonging to any
estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment
against the tenants occupying said lands shall be automatically
suspended, for such time as may be required by the
expropriation proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the
purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period of
suspension shall not exceed one year. To avail himself of the
benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the
landowner the current rents as they become due or deposit the
same with the court where the action for ejectment has been
instituted.
The exercise of expropriation by a local government
unit is covered by Section 19 of the Local Government Code
(LGC).—A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the
power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare
for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of
just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the
power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid
and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and
such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local
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government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and
upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on
the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated:
Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court,
based on the fair market value of the property.
Expropriation of lands consists of two stages: The first
is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in
the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action,
“of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right
to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use
or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint x x x.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is
concerned with the determination by the court of “the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done
by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners x x x. It is only upon the completion of these
two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed.
The process is not complete until payment of just
compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of
possession in this case does not write finis to the expropriation
proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is
necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners the final just
compensation.
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.
Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of
possession in the expropriation proceedings did not transfer
ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance was
only the first stage in expropriation. There is even no evidence
that judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents
prior to the City’s possession of the lots, contrary to Section 19
of the LGC.
6. NPC v YCLA Sugar
Development Corporation, GR
No. 193936, 11 December 2013
In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the
taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word "just" is used to
intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to
convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample. The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is
considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one
who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of
the actual taking by the government.
It is settled that the amount of just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides
with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the
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property, the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained
as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
The Court has consistently ruled that just compensation
cannot be arrived at arbitrarily; several factors must be
considered such as, but not limited to, acquisition cost, current
market value of like properties, tax value of the condemned
property, its size, shape, and location. But before these factors
can be considered and given weight, the same must be
supported by documentary evidence.16 The amount of just
compensation could only be attained by using reliable and
actual data as bases for fixing the value of the condemned
property. A commissioners’ report of land prices which is not
based on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and
should be disregarded by the court.
R-68 Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage
1. Ramirez v Manila Banking
Corp., GR No. 198800, 11
December 2013
We have consistently held that unless the parties
stipulate, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings is not necessary because Section 3 of
Act No. 3135 only requires the posting of the notice of sale in
three public places and the publication of that notice in a
newspaper of general circulation.
The CA erred in ruling that absence of notice of
extrajudicial foreclosure sale to Ramirez as required by
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
paragraph N of the real estate mortgage will not invalidate the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. We rule that when respondent
failed to send the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale to
Ramirez, it committed a contractual breach of said paragraph N
sufficient to render the extrajudicial foreclosure sale on
September 8, 1994 null and void. Thus, we reverse the assailed
CA Decision and Resolution.
2. Marquez v Alindog, 714 SCRA
460 (2014)
It is an established rule that the purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the possession of the
property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the
same either during (with bond) or after the expiration (without
bond) of the redemption period therefor. To this end, the Court,
in China Banking Corp. v. Sps. Lozada (China Banking Corp.),
557 SCRA 177 (2008), citing several cases on the matter,
explained that a writ of possession duly applied for by said
purchaser should issue as a matter of course, and thus, merely
constitutes a ministerial duty on the part of the court.
In the case of Spouses Espiridion v. Court of Appeals,
490 SCRA 273 (2006), the Court expounded on the ministerial
nature of the foregoing issuance as follows: The issuance of a
writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a
ministerial act. After the consolidation of title in the buyer’s
name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the
writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a
purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a
ministerial function. The trial court has no discretion on this
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matter. Hence, any talk of discretion in connection with such
issuance is misplaced.
The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor
of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, however,
admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court (Rules) pertinently provides that the possession of the
mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding
the property by adverse title or right. In the recent case of Rural
Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. v. Centeno, 693 SCRA 110
(2013), citing the case of China Banking Corp., the Court
illumined that “the phrase ‘a third party who is actually holding
the property adversely to the judgment obligor’ contemplates a
situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse
title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary.
The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the
property in their own right, and they are not merely the
successor or transferee of the right of possession of another coowner or the owner of the property. Notably, the property
should not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by
the third party adversely to the judgment obligor.” In other
words, as mentioned in Villanueva v. Cherdan Lending
Investors Corporation, 633 SCRA 173 (2010), the third
person must therefore claim a right superior to that of the
original mortgagor.
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.
Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
3. LZK Holdings v Planters
Development Bank, 714 SCRA
294 (2014)
LZK Holdings can no longer question Planter Bank’s
right to a writ of possession over the subject property because
the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation
of such particular issue. Moreover, the authority relied upon by
LZK Holdings defeats rather than support its position. The
ruling in PNB echoes the very same rationale of the judgment
in G.R. No. 167998 that is — the purchaser in foreclosure sale
may take possession of the property even before the expiration
of the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion for such
purpose and upon posting of the necessary bond.
No hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of
possession. This is clear from the following disquisitions in
Espinoza v. United Overseas Bank Phils., 616 SCRA 353
(2010), which reiterates the settled rules on writs of possession,
to wit: The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is
ex parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding
brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by
the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding
wherein relief is granted without giving the person against
whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. By its
very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of
possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It is a judicial
proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as
purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in
court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a
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wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.
4. Goldenway Merchandising
Corp. v Equitable PCI Bank, 693
SCRA 439 (2013)
The law governing cases of extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage is Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.
The one-year period of redemption is counted from the
date of the registration of the certificate of sale. In this case, the
parties provided in their real estate mortgage contract that upon
petitioner’s default and the latter’s entire loan obligation
becoming due, respondent may immediately foreclose the
mortgage judicially in accordance with the Rules of Court, or
extrajudicially in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended.
The right of redemption being statutory, it must be
exercised in the manner prescribed by the statute, and within
the prescribed time limit, to make it effective.
5. Allied Bank v Mateo 588 SCRA
538 (2009)
Considering that petitioner is a banking institution, the
determination of the redemption price for the foreclosed
property should be governed by Section 78 of the General
Banking Act. Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 359 SCRA 480 (2001), is instructive: x x x
Petitioner’s contention that Section 78 of the General Banking
Act governs the determination of the redemption price of the
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
subject property is meritorious. In Ponce de Leon v.
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 146 SCRA 862 (1970),
this Court had occasion to rule that Section 78 of the General
Banking Act had the effect of amending Section 6 of Act No.
3135 insofar as the redemption price is concerned when the
mortgagee is a bank, as in this case, or a banking or credit
institution. The apparent conflict between the provisions of Act
No. 3135 and the General Banking Act was, therefore, resolved
in favor of the latter, being a special and subsequent legislation.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Sy v. Court of
Appeals, 172 SCRA 125 (1989), where we held that the amount
at which the foreclosed property is redeemable is the amount
due under the mortgage deed, or the outstanding obligation of
the mortgagor plus interest and expenses in accordance with
Section 78 of the General Banking Act. It was, therefore,
manifest error on the part of the Court of Appeals to apply in
the case at bar the provisions of Section 30, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court in fixing the redemption price of the subject
foreclosed property.
In BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Veloso, 436 SCRA
1 (2004), the Court had occasion to state the requirements for
the redemption of the foreclosed property. The Court held: The
general rule in redemption is that it is not sufficient that a
person offering to redeem manifests his desire to do so. The
statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and
simultaneous tender of payment. This constitutes the exercise
of the right to repurchase. In several cases decided by the Court
where the right to repurchase was held to have been properly
exercised, there was an unequivocal tender of payment for the
full amount of the repurchase price. Otherwise, the offer to
redeem is ineffectual. Bona fide redemption necessarily implies
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a reasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price,
otherwise the rule on the redemption period fixed by law can
easily be circumvented.
It is not difficult to understand why the redemption
price should either be fully offered in legal tender or else
validly consigned in court. Only by such means can the auction
winner be assured that the offer to redeem is being made in
good faith. Thus, the Court finds that respondent’s action for
legal redemption was not filed in good faith. It was not filed for
the purpose of determining the correct redemption price, but to
stretch the redemption period indefinitely.
6. Robles v Yapcinco, 739 SCRA 75
(2014)
The registration of the sale is required only in
extrajudicial foreclosure sale because the date of the
registration is the reckoning point for the exercise of the right
of redemption. In contrast, the registration of the sale is
superfluous in judicial foreclosure because only the equity of
redemption is granted to the mortgagor, except in mortgages
with banking institutions. The equity of redemption is the right
of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and
retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt
within the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final, or
even after the foreclosure sale but prior to the confirmation of
the sale.
Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this.
We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.
Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
7. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
v CPR Promotions and
Marketing Inc, 760 SCRA 59
(2015)
We have already ruled in several cases that in
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, where the proceeds of the
sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee has the right
to recover the deficiency from the debtor. In ascertaining the
deficit amount, Sec. 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court is
elucidating, to wit: Section 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale.—
The amount realized from the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged
property shall, after deducting the costs of the sale, be paid
to the person foreclosing the mortgage, and when there shall
be any balance or residue, after paying off the mortgage debt
due, the same shall be paid to junior encumbrancers in the order
of their priority, to be ascertained by the court, or if there be no
such encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue after
payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his duly authorized
agent, or to the person entitled to it. (emphasis added) Verily,
there can only be a deficit when the proceeds of the sale is not
sufficient to cover (1) the costs of foreclosure proceedings; and
(2) the amount due to the creditor, inclusive of interests and
penalties, if any, at the time of foreclosure.
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R-69: Partition
1. Vda. de Figuración v Figuracion
- Gerilla, 690 SCRA 495 (2013)
The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement
of the issue of ownership. Such an action will not lie if the
claimant has no rightful interest in the subject property. In fact,
the parties filing the action are required by the Rules of Court
to set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their
title to the property. It would be premature to effect a partition
until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely
resolved.
2. Balus v Balus, 610 SCRA 178
(2010)
Petitioner’s contention that he and his siblings intended
to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property
contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of
having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning
to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion
of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance
of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. It
seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner,
vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and
giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision
or interference from the other. In other words, the purpose of
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective which
negates petitioner’s claims in the present case.
3. Feliciano v Canosa, 629 SCRA
550 (2010)
We affirm the ruling of the CA. As the records show, the
heirs of Doroteo and Esteban did not participate in the
extrajudicial partition executed by Salina with the other
compulsory heirs, Leona, Maria and Pedro. Undeniably, the
said deed was fraudulently obtained as it deprived the known
heirs of Doroteo and Esteban of their shares in the estate. A
deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some
of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same,
is fraudulent and vicious. Hence, an action to set it aside on the
ground of fraud could be instituted. Such action for the
annulment of the said partition, however, must be brought
within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.
The applicable prescriptive period to institute the action
to annul the deed of extrajudicial settlement was four (4) years
counted from the discovery of fraud as held in the case of
Gerona v. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964). However, the
records show that petitioners’ complaint was filed only on
October 18, 1993, or almost sixteen (16) years after Jacinto
Feliciano was issued Free Patent No. (IV-4) 012293 on
November 28, 1977, and almost fourteen (14) years from the
time Pedro Canoza was issued OCT No. P-364 on November
28, 1979. As petitioners are deemed to have obtained
constructive notice of the fraud upon the registration of the Free
Patent, they clearly failed to institute the present civil action
within the allowable period. The same result obtains even if
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their complaint is treated as one (1) essentially for
reconveyance as more than ten (10) years have passed since
petitioners’ cause of action accrued. The CA committed no
error in dismissing their complaint.
4. Mangahas v Brobio, 634 SCRA
351 (2010)
The foregoing discussion renders the final issue
insignificant. Be that as it may, we would like to state that the
remedy suggested by the CA is not the proper one under the
circumstances. An action for partition implies that the property
is still owned in common. Considering that the heirs had
already executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement and waived
their shares in favor of respondent, the properties are no longer
under a state of co-ownership; there is nothing more to be
partitioned, as ownership had already been merged in one
person.
R-70: Forcible Entry and Unlawful
Detainer
1. Suarez v Emboy JR, 718 SCRA
677 (2014)
In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key
jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently established:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by
contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually,
such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof;
and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to
vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.
This Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to
effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it
is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class
of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort
to parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature.
In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive
of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state
how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started,
the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria.
2. Alconera v Pallanan, 714 SCRA
204 (2014)
It must be borne in mind that the case at bar traces its
roots to an unlawful detainer case wherein the MTCC ruled
against Rafols, complainant’s client. In ejectment cases, the
rulings of the courts are immediately executory and can only be
stayed via compliance with Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, to wit: Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment;
how to stay same.—If judgment is rendered against the
defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion,
unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay
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execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the
Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to
pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of
the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency
of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of
rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as
determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the
absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial
Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the
premises for the preceding month or period at the rate
determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the
tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas
bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the
other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which
the action is appealed.
Clearly then under said Sec. 19, Rule 70, a judgment on
a forcible entry and detainer action is made immediately
executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor. The
defendant in such a case may have such judgment stayed only
by (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and
(c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during
the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to
comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright
execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect
being ministerial and imperative. Hence, if the defendantappellant has perfected the appeal but failed to file a
supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment
would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a
supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if
the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the
appeal.
3. Teodoro v Espino, 715 SCRA
435 (2014)
The ground rules in forcible entry cases: (1) One
employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to
deprive another of physical possession of real property. (2)
Plaintiff (Teodoro Teodoro) must allege and prove prior
physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived
thereof by the defendant (herein respondents). This requirement
implies that the possession of the disputed land by the latter
was unlawful from the beginning. (3) The sole question for
resolution hinges on the physical or material possession
(possession de facto) of the property. Neither a claim of
juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of
ownership by the defendant can, at the outset, preclude the
court from taking cognizance of the case. (4) Ejectment cases
proceed independently of any claim of ownership, and the
plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and
undue deprivation thereof.
4. Ferrer v Rabaca, 632 SCRA 204
(2010)
Indeed, respondent Judge should have granted the
plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution considering that the
defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas bond despite
having appealed. Granting the plaintiff’s motion for immediate
execution became his ministerial duty upon the defendant’s
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failure to file the sufficient supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule
70, of the Rules of Court clearly imposes such duty, viz.:
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay
same.—If judgment is rendered against the defendant,
execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an
appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay
execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by
the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the
plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down
to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless,
during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the
appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time
under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of
the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he
shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value
of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding
month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the
lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding
month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by
the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of
the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed. x x x
Respondent Judge’s excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction
over the case by virtue of the defendant’s appeal, was
unacceptable in light of the clear and explicit text of the
aforequoted rule. To begin with, the perfection of the appeal by
the defendant did not forbid the favorable action on the
plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution. The execution of the
decision could not be stayed by the mere taking of the appeal.
Only the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the
deposit with the appellate court of the amount of rent due from
time to time, coupled with the perfection of the appeal, could
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
stay the execution. Secondly, he could not also credibly justify
his omission to act according to the provision by claiming good
faith or honest belief, or by asserting lack of malice or bad
faith. A rule as clear and explicit as Section 19 could not be
misread or misapplied, but should be implemented without
evasion or hesitation. To us, good faith, or honest belief, or lack
of malice, or lack of bad faith justifies a non-compliance only
when there is an as-yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or
applicability of a rule or legal provision. It was not so herein.
And, thirdly, given that his court, being vested with original
exclusive jurisdiction over cases similar to Civil Case No.
176394-CV, had been assigned many such cases, he was not a
trial judge bereft of the pertinent prior experience to act on the
issue of immediate execution, a fact that further exposed the
abject inanity of his excuses.
5. CGR Corp., v Treyes, 522 SCRA
765 (2007)
The 2006 case of Dumo v. Espinas, 480 SCRA 56
(2006), reiterates the long-established rule that the only form of
damages that may be recovered in an action for forcible entry is
the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of the property: Lastly, we agree with the CA
and the RTC that there is no basis for the MTC to award actual,
moral, and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that
in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the
fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the property. Considering that the only issue
raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages
which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could
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have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss
of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages
which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to
his loss of material possession. x x x (Emphasis and italics
supplied; citations omitted) Other damages must thus be
claimed in an ordinary action.
Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia—that the
identity between the pending actions, with respect to the
parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such that any
judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration—is not present, hence, it may not be invoked to
dismiss petitioners’ complaint for damages. Res judicata may
not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no
jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the use and
occupation of the premises and attorney’s fees.
Petitioners’ filing of an independent action for damages
other than those sustained as a result of their dispossession or
those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their
properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause
of action.
6. Abad v Fil-homes Realty, 636
SCRA 247 (2010)
When the Government seeks to acquire, through
purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands belonging to any
estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment
against the tenants occupying said lands shall be automatically
suspended, for such time as may be required by the
expropriation proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period of
suspension shall not exceed one year. To avail himself of the
benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the
landowner the current rents as they become due or deposit the
same with the court where the action for ejectment has been
instituted.
It has been held that a person who occupies the land of
another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
them.
7. Zacarias v Anacay, 736 SCRA
508 (2014)
In Cabrera v. Gataruela, 586 SCRA 129 (2009), the
Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of
action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1)
initially, possession of property by the defendant was by
contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually,
such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof;
and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to
vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.
In Valdez v. Court of Appeals, 489 SCRA 369 (2006),
the Court ruled that where the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful
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detainer, the Municipal Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the
case. Thus: To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is
essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must
have been present right from the start of the possession
which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for
unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
8. Manalang v Bacani, 745 SCRA
27 (2015)
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to
the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the
same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings
had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or
briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the
Regional Trial Court. (7a) Hence, the RTC violated the
foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation and
verification survey “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” and by
hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was
tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The violation was
accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal
based on the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the
record of the proceedings had in the court of origin.
The case should be dismissed without prejudice to the
filing of a non-summary action like accion reivindicatoria. In
our view, the CA correctly held that a boundary dispute must be
resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an
ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession,
but encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the
defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful
detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant
unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the
expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession
under any contract, express or implied. The defendant’s
possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful
only because of the expiration or termination of his right of
possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is
illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which
between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession
de facto.
The MTC dismissed the action because it did not have
jurisdiction over the case. The dismissal was correct. It is
fundamental that the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought by the complaint determine the
nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over the
action. To be clear, unlawful detainer is an action filed by a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after
the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by
virtue of any contract, express or implied. To vest in the MTC
the jurisdiction to effect the ejectment from the land of the
respondents as the occupants in unlawful detainer, therefore,
the complaint should embody such a statement of facts clearly
showing the attributes of unlawful detainer.
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9. Supapo v De Jesus, 765 SCRA
211 (2015), GR. No. 198356
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independent of
title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of
one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in
accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the
courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the
parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication is
not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for
the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the
issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of
possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being
provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not
conclusive on the issue of ownership.
10. De la Cruz v Hermano, 754
SCRA 231 (2015)
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, requires that in
actions for forcible entry, it must be alleged that the
complainant was deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and
that the action was filed anytime within one year from the time
the unlawful deprivation of possession took place. This
requirement implies that in those cases, possession of the land
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Professor
by the defendant has been unlawful from the beginning, as the
possession was obtained by unlawful means. Further, the
complainant must allege and prove prior physical possession of
the property in litigation until he or she was deprived thereof by
the defendant. The one-year period within which to bring an
action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of
actual entry into the land, except when entry was made through
stealth; if so, the one-year period would be counted from the
time the plaintiff learned about it.
It is settled that where forcible entry occurred
clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive period should be
counted from the time the person who was deprived of
possession demanded that the deforciant desist from
dispossession when the former learned about it. The owners or
possessors of the land cannot be expected to enforce their right
to its possession against the illegal occupant and sue the latter
before learning of the clandestine intrusion. And to deprive
lawful possessors of the benefit of the summary action under
Rule 70 of the Revised Rules, simply because the stealthy
intruder managed to conceal the trespass for more than a year,
would be to reward clandestine usurpations even if they are
unlawful.
Ownership certainly carries the right of possession, but
the possession contemplated is not exactly the same as that
which is in issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in a
forcible entry suit refers only to possession de facto, or actual
or material possession, and not one flowing out of ownership.
These are different legal concepts under which the law provides
different remedies for recovery of possession. Thus, in a
forcible entry case, a party who can prove prior possession can
recover the possession even against the owner. Whatever may
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Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
be the character of the possession, the present occupant of the
property has the security to remain on that property if the
occupant has the advantage of precedence in time and until a
person with a better right lawfully causes eviction.
R-71: Contempt
11. Erorita v Dumlao, 781 SCRA 551
(2016)
We agree with respondents that the charge of contempt
partakes of the nature of a criminal offense. The exoneration of
the contemner from the charge amounts to an acquittal from
which an appeal would not lie.
“A distinction is made between a civil and criminal
contempt. Civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered
by a court to be done for the benefit of a party. A criminal
contempt is any conduct directed against the authority or
dignity of the court. x x x “Civil contempt proceedings are
generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is,
they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and
essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing
required.” “In general, civil contempt proceedings should be
instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone
who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected.” If the
contempt is initiated by the court or tribunal exercising the
power to punish a given contempt, it is criminal in nature, and
the proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the
principles and rules applicable to criminal cases. The State is
the real prosecutor. “The real character of the proceedings in
contempt cases is to be determined by the relief sought or by
the dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded as
criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil
when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.”
While the SEC is vested with the power to punish for
contempt, the salutary rule is that the power to punish for
To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint
must allege that: (a) initially, the defendant lawfully possessed
the property, either by contract or by plaintiff’s tolerance; (b)
the plaintiff notified the defendant that his right of possession is
terminated; (c) the defendant remained in possession and
deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a
complaint within one year from the last demand on defendant
to vacate the property. A complaint for accion publiciana or
recovery of possession of real property will not be considered
as an action for unlawful detainer if any of these special
jurisdictional facts is omitted.
Although the complaint bears the caption “recovery of
possession,” its allegations contain the jurisdictional facts for
an unlawful detainer case. Under RA 7691, an action for
unlawful detainer is within the MTC’s exclusive jurisdiction
regardless of the property’s assessed value.
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1. Yasay v Recto, 313 SCRA 739
(1999)
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contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive
principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of
punishment. The courts and other tribunals vested with the
power of contempt must exercise the power to punish for
contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power
is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for
the functions that they exercise.
2. Sison v Caoibes JR 429 SCRA
258 (2004)
At first blush, it would seem that the respondent judge
was justified in holding the complainant for contempt, due to
the latter’s refusal to comply with the judge’s Order of
September 15, 1999. However, it is not lost upon this Court that
the complainant was not a party to any of the cases pending
before the RTC, Branch 253. What triggered the contempt
charge was, in fact, the traffic violation incident involving the
respondent judge’s son. Furthermore, the record shows that
when the complainant filed his reply to the charge as required
by the respondent judge, the same was refused by some staff
member in the latter’s sala.
We agree with the Investigating Justice when he opined
that the respondent judge should have refrained from ordering
the arrest and detention of the complainant, since the incident
involved his own son, and the matter was very personal to him.
The fact that the respondent judge insisted that the complainant
personally file his comment in court gives rise to doubts as to
the motive behind it; as the Investigating Justice puts it, the
requirement of personal filing was deliberately inserted so that
the respondent could confront and harass the complainant.
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Professor
The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of
court in a manner which smacks of retaliation, as in the case at
bar, is appalling and violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which mandates that “a judge should so
behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.” The very delicate function of
administering justice demands that a judge should conduct
himself at all times in a manner which would reasonably merit
the respect and confidence of the people, for he is the visible
representation of the law. The irresponsible or improper
conduct of judges erodes public confidence in the judiciary; as
such, a judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance
thereof.
We do not agree, however, that the respondent judge
should be merely reprimanded for his actuations. The Court has
not been blind to the improper use by judges of the erstwhile
inherent power of contempt which, in fine, amounts to grave
abuse of authority. The penalty imposed by the Court in such
cases ranges from a fine of P2,500; one month’s salary;
suspension from the service without pay for a period of three
months; and even the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the
service.
3. Español v Formoso, 525 SCRA
216 (2007)
Contempt of court has been defined as “some act or
conduct which tends to interfere with the business of the court,
by a refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or some act
of disrespect to the dignity of the court which in some ways
tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly proceedings of the
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court and thus lessens the general efficiency of the same”—
simply put, it is despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of
the court.
The offense of contempt traces its origin to that time in
England when all courts in the realm were but divisions of the
Curia Regia, the supreme court of the monarch, and to
scandalize a court was an affront to the sovereign, a concept
which was adopted by the Americans and brought to our shores
with modifications.
Direct contempt is a contumacious act done facie curiae
and may be punished summarily without hearing—one may be
summarily adjudged in direct contempt at the very moment or
at the very instance of the commission of the act of contumely.
Indirect or constructive contempt is one perpetrated
outside of the sitting of the court; The use of falsified and
forged documents is a contumacious act but constitutes indirect
contempt not direct contempt.
A contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but a
separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court
exercises limited jurisdiction—thus, the modes of procedure
and the rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are
assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal
prosecutions.
4. Marantan v Diokno, 716 SCRA
164 (2014)
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render
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Professor
one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court.
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt
are criminal in nature. This form of contempt is conduct that is
directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge
acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of
justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt,
and no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the
evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.
For a comment to be considered as contempt of court “it
must really appear” that such does impede, interfere with and
embarrass the administration of justice. What is, thus, sought to
be protected is the all-important duty of the court to administer
justice in the decision of a pending case. The specific rationale
for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of
fact and law should be immune from every extraneous
influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced
in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order
to allow them to conduct their business unhampered by
publications and comments which tend to impair the
impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the
administration of justice.
The “clear and present danger” rule means that the evil
consequence of the comment must be “extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high” before an utterance
can be punished. There must exist a clear and present danger
that the utterance will harm the administration of justice.
Freedom of speech should not be impaired through the exercise
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of the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt that
the utterances in question make a serious and imminent threat
to the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent,
not merely a likely, threat.
The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and
extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless
necessary in the interest of justice.
5. Tormis v Paredes, 749 SCRA 505
(2015)
The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice
Atty. Dela Peña
Professor
7. Balindong v CA, 773 SCRA 27
(2015)
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice
or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses
during litigation.
Verily, the power of the courts to punish for contempt is
to be exercised cautiously, sparingly, and judiciously. Selfrestraint in wielding contempt powers should be the rule unless
the act complained of is clearly contumacious. An act, to be
contumacious, must manifest willfulness, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to cause injustice.
6. Pulumbarit SR v CA, 772 SCRA
244 (2015)
In In the Matter of Contempt Proceedings Against
Ventura O. Ducat and Teng Mariano and Cruz Law Offices,
269 SCRA 615 (1997), we resolved to grant a petition to cite
respondents Ducat, et al. in contempt for delaying the
satisfaction of a final judgment against them “by refiling
motions and attempting to reopen finally settled issues through
the expediency of hiring a new counsel.”
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