19 General Enforcement Remedies
I. INTRODUCTION
§19.1 A. Scope of Chapter
This chapter discusses the various enforcement remedies available to child custody litigants in
California. It begins with a brief discussion of enforcement generally, including the elements of
jurisdiction, venue, notice, and defenses or limitations to enforcement. It then turns to specific
enforcement methods and procedures, including practical considerations for practitioners. This
area of child custody law overlaps with enforcement under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), which is discussed in chap 20. Topics more properly discussed in
the context of the UCCJEA are noted briefly in this chapter, and the reader should refer to chap 20
for a more detailed examination. This chapter closes with an overview of the availability of attorney
fees and costs awards in the custody enforcement context.
§19.2 B. Enforcement Generally
Enforcement of orders under the California Family Code is largely governed by Fam C §290, which
outlines the broad discretionary powers of the family courts (noting that, in addition to execution,
appointment of receivers, and contempt, courts have the authority to enter "any other order as the
court in its discretion determines from time to time to be necessary"). For an individual to be
subject to enforcement of a prior order, however, several procedural prerequisites must be
satisfied.
1. Jurisdiction
§19.3 a. Enforcement by California Court That Made Original Order
In many cases, the court seeking to enforce the order is the same court that originally entered the
order for which enforcement is sought. In such cases, the court's continuing jurisdiction over
family law matters previously adjudicated will suffice. See, e.g., Marriage of Kreiss (2004) 122 CA4th
1082. The court would have both personal jurisdiction over the parties to the judgment or order,
and subject matter jurisdiction over the issues decided earlier. See Sampsell v Superior Court (1948)
32 C2d 763; Marriage of Fitzgerald & King (1995) 39 CA4th 1419.
§19.4 b. Enforcement by California Court if Party Leaves State
When a party or parties have relocated to another state, a finding of "home state" under the
UCCJEA may provide any county in California with proper jurisdiction to enforce a California
order, even when the child no longer resides in the state, to discourage forum shopping and the
unilateral removal of a child by one parent. See Fam C §§3402(g), 3421. See also Plas v Superior
Court (1984) 155 CA3d 1008. See chaps 5 and 21 for more information regarding "home state"
determinations.
§19.5 2. Venue
Venue must be satisfied if a court is to enforce a prior order, and generally the court that made the
order initially is considered to be the court of proper venue CCP §395(a). This is not ordinarily a
problem because the parties, or at least the party seeking enforcement, will still reside in the
county in which the court sits.
In cases in which both parents have moved from the county, venue may be transferred to the
county in which either party currently resides, under CCP §397.5, "when the ends of justice and the
convenience of the parties would be promoted by the change." As a practical matter, though, the
proceedings must be commenced in the county where the order was made, and then may be
transferred as provided by statute.
A court's ability to transfer venue based on the relocation of the parents is discretionary, not
mandatory. CCP §397.5. Courts, however, generally recognize that the relocation of the parties and
a child from the county is compelling grounds for ordering a transfer of venue, and promotes more
efficient resolution of the matter.
§19.6 a. Enforcement Before Permanent Custody Order Made
Temporary child custody orders may be made on an ex parte basis or by noticed motion. Fam C
§§2045(b), 2047, 6323, 6340. If such an order is sought ex parte, the court must be satisfied that
the child is in danger of immediate or irreparable harm, including, but not limited to, domestic
violence, sexual abuse, or removal from the state. Orders for child custody, visitation, and support
survive the termination of any protective order. Fam C §3064(a). Enforcement of temporary orders
may include such methods as contempt, modification of custody or visitation, and other general
enforcement methods, which are detailed below. See §§9.15–9.46. If the party seeking enforcement
of the temporary order, however, cannot show a risk of immediate harm, the more reasoned
manner of proceeding is by a noticed motion with a request for an order shortening time. This
avoids the requirement of showing immediate harm while still accommodating an exigency that
does not rise to the level of "emergency" contemplated by Fam C §3064.
§19.7 b. Enforcement After Permanent Custody Order Made
When enforcement proceedings follow a dissolution or other judgment in which a permanent
custody or visitation order was made, the opposing party must be notified of the motion or order
to show cause for enforcement of the order. Service on the attorney of record is not sufficient. Fam
C §215(a). Unlike postjudgment custody or visitation modification motions, with respect to which
service of the motion may be made by first-class mail (Fam C §215(b); see §16.14), it appears that
notices and other papers in connection with motions to enforce a custody or visitation order must
be effected using the rules for personal service on a party. See Fam C §215(a) (requiring that notice
of modification be made "in the same manner as the notice as the notice is otherwise permitted by
law to be served, upon the party").
This requirement protects the party on whom enforcement is sought from becoming subject to
enforcement orders without actual knowledge of the motion having been filed. It is not uncommon,
after all, for ex-spouses to relocate following the dissolution proceedings. The party may be served
with the Request for Order (Judicial Council Form FL-300) and any supporting papers at his or her
last known address, under CCP §§1010–1020. Notice may be waived if the party voluntarily
appears on the merits in the proceeding or if the party's attorney accepts service on the party's
behalf and then enters a stipulation to continue the hearing. See Marriage of Askren (1984) 157 CA3d
205 (voluntary appearance); Marriage of Kreiss (1990) 224 CA3d 1033 (acceptance of service and
stipulation).
NOTE:
An exception to Fam C §215(a) exists when the court has ordered an issue bifurcated for separate
trial in advance of the disposition of the entire case. In that case, service of a motion on any
outstanding matter must be served either upon the attorney of record, if the parties are represented,
or upon the parties, if unrepresented. However, if there has been no pleading filed in the action for a
period of 6 months after the entry of the bifurcated judgment, service must be given to both the
party, at the party's last known address, and to the attorney of record. Fam C §215(a).
§19.8 3. Limitations on Enforcement
Enforcement of judgments or orders in family law custody cases is not without limitation. The
court has a good deal of discretion under Fam C §290, and stays, equitable defenses, and,
potentially, statutes of limitations (for criminal enforcement) may limit a parent's ability to enforce
his or her court order.
§19.9 a. Court's Enforcement Discretion Under Fam C §290
Trial courts are authorized to appropriately shape their remedies in accordance with particular
factual circumstances surrounding individual cases. Family Code §290 ensures equitable
discretion, and the courts may indulge that discretion within reason. The courts may not, however,
order an enforcement remedy that runs afoul of a valid statute, nor do their discretionary powers
in equity extend beyond enforcement actions. County of Santa Clara v Wilson (2003) 111 CA4th 1324.
b. Stays
§19.10 (1) Stay After Appeal
In cases involving child custody, a timely appeal of the underlying judgment will ordinarily stay any
other trial court proceedings in that matter "embraced in" or "affected by" that judgment, under
CCP §916. This includes enforcement of the judgment. CCP §916(b).
A different statute, however, applies in cases in which a court order allows, or removes restrictions
against, a custodial parent to relocate out of state with the parties' minor child. In such cases, CCP
§917.7 mandates that "the perfection of an appeal shall not stay proceedings as to those provisions
of a judgment or order which award, change or otherwise affect the custody, including the right of
visitation, of a minor child." That statute goes on to state, however, that "the trial court may in its
discretion stay execution of these provisions pending review on appeal or for any other period or
periods that it may deem appropriate."
§19.11 (2) Stay After Judgment Allowing Child's Removal From State
The provisions of a judgment or order allowing the removal of a child from the state, or removing
restrictions against such removal, are subject to an automatic stay of 30 days from the date the
judgment or order was entered (7 days in the case of a juvenile court dependency action), unless a
writ from a "reviewing court" indicates otherwise. CCP §917.7; Andrew V. v Superior Court (2015)
234 CA4th 103, 107.
The stay commences on entry of the order for removal. If the court directs preparation of an Order
After Hearing or Judgment, the 30day period begins on entry of the order itself, not on
announcement of an intended decision. See Lief v Superior Court (2018) 30 CA5th 868, 870 (30-day
statutory stay did not begin when trial court issued oral statement of decision tentatively granting
request for move-away).
§19.12 c. Child Support Reduction Not Authorized for Denial of Visitation
When a noncustodial parent is denied his or her right of visitation in accordance with a court
order, his or her first reaction may be to withhold child support payments owed until such time as
visitation is restored. Family Code §3556, however, unequivocally states that no such withholding
of support is justified under these circumstances. The basis for this statute is closely tied to the
strong public policy promoting a parent's primary obligation to care for his or her child. For cases
interpreting this statute, see Practice Under the California Family Code: Dissolution, Legal
Separation, Nullity §8.34 (Cal CEB).
4. Defenses
§19.13 a. Laches and Estoppel
Except in family law cases involving payment of support, for which case law and statutes have
mandated otherwise (Fam C §291; Marriage of Fellows (2006) 39 C4th 179), the equitable defense of
laches may be generally available as a defense to an enforcement proceeding in a family law matter.
See Hafer v Superior Court (1981) 126 CA3d 856, 863 (delay harms all parties in custody disputes).
Because the Family Code and the courts strongly favor stability for children, a motion to enforce a
child custody order that has been essentially ignored by the parties for a significant period of time
could be subject to the defense of laches, as a change in a child's established routine could be
considered not to be in his or her best interest. See Marriage of Newsome (1998) 68 CA4th 949
(addressing importance of stability in custody cases). Of course, laches is an equitable defense, and
its success will largely depend on the circumstances of each case. If the original order continues to
be in the best interest of the child, even after the passage of time, the court, after weighing the
necessary statutory factors, is likely to enforce it.
A custody order may also eventually give rise to an estoppel, and may prevent enforcement of other
orders in the matter. This defense accrues to the detriment of a custodial parent who deliberately
conceals the child from the noncustodial parent, thus preventing whatever parenting time may
have been ordered. In such cases, the custodial parent will be estopped from obtaining an order for
child support arrearages, at least in cases in which the concealment continues until the child
reaches the age of majority. Marriage of Damico (1994) 7 C4th 673; Marriage of Comer (1996) 14 C4th
504.
Though this defense arises in child support cases, and hence appears to be beyond the scope of this
discussion, it points out the potential penalty for a parent acting in derogation of a valid custody
and visitation order and bears brief mention.
§19.14 b. 'Unclean Hands'
The equitable doctrine of "unclean hands" may be available to a party seeking to limit the
enforcement of a custody order. The doctrine stands for the proposition that a person seeking the
intervention of the court to enforce an order must not him- or herself be guilty of wrongdoing
regarding the relief requested. Though case law on the doctrine as it relates to child custody
enforcement principles is sparse, one appellate court, in Leathers v Leathers (1958) 162 CA2d 768,
775, noted that
in the interest of the welfare of the child, custody decrees of a sister state are subject
to an independent re-examination by the California courts although this discretion
will not usually be exercised where the parent seeking relief in the California courts
has "unclean hands."
Though this case involved the enforcement of a foreign custody order, discussed more fully in chap
20, it indicates that the best interests of the child standard as it relates to custody can withstand
application of the doctrine in other custody enforcement matters.
§19.15 II. ENFORCEMENT METHODS
General enforcement methods in child custody cases are similar to enforcement methods available
in other areas of family law, but also include remedies specific to custody. The various enforcement
remedies include contempt, habeas corpus proceedings, modification of custody, supervised
visitation, monetary compensation, penal enforcement, and passport restrictions.
§19.16 A. Contempt—Fam C §290
Contempt as a remedy in the child custody context is authorized under Fam C §290, but may be
best limited to cases in which the parent seeking enforcement of an order or judgment has no need
for the court to exercise any extraordinary or emergency powers, as it would need to do in child
abduction or even wrongful denial of visitation cases. Contempt motions, after all, are time
consuming and intricate. See §§19.17–19.21. Emergency situations, involving abduction or
domestic violence for instance, are not properly addressed by such involved proceedings. Those
situations are better resolved by criminal enforcement remedies. See §§19.40–19.44.
However, in cases involving infractions of the ordered parenting plan that do not rise to the level of
"emergency," such as those requiring the cooperation of both parents in complying with a court
order involving a minor child, contempt may have some practical use. Such situations may involve
schoolwork or enrollment, or daycare accommodations. To address problems such as these, in
which the time necessary to bring the contempt before the court is not prejudicial to the interests
of the child, contempt as a remedy may be a viable enforcement option. A party will also want to
consider whether the considerable expense associated with a contempt motion supports the
decision to proceed. Relatively insignificant matters, such as minor violations of parenting
agreements, may not justify the expense.
PRACTICE TIP:
Consider alternatives to a contempt motion. On the occurrence of an event that would give rise to a
potential contempt motion, counsel might consider sending a letter to the opposing party (if
unrepresented) or opposing counsel outlining how the elements of contempt are met given the
factual circumstance. This both educates the other side on the legal requirements for a finding of
contempt and gives them the opportunity to open a dialogue regarding possible solutions short of
polarizing litigation. Practitioners should be wary, however, of Cal Rules of Prof Cond 3.10, which
states that "[a] lawyer shall not threaten to present criminal, administrative, or disciplinary charges
to obtain an advantage in a civil dispute." Because contempt carries with it potential criminal
liability, any letter to opposing counsel or parties should be worded with care so as not to give the
appearance that, to coerce a result in the underlying matter, a threat has been made.
§19.17 1. Elements
The elements of contempt in a child custody matter do not differ from those available in civil
proceedings. The petitioning party must demonstrate:
The issuance of a valid order;
Knowledge of that order on the part of the party alleged to be in contempt;
The ability of that party to comply with the order; and
That party's willful failure to do so (Coursey v Superior Court (1987) 194 CA3d 147, 154).
Jurisdiction is conferred on the court adjudicating the contempt charge by virtue of the moving
party's presentation of a prima facie case of contempt as reflected in the charging document, under
CCP §1211.
§19.18 a. Valid Order
A valid order is a prerequisite to a finding of contempt. A court may ordinarily presume that an
order is valid, unless void on its face. See Stone v Bach (1978) 80 CA3d 442, 448. The burden of proof
is on the party charged with contempt to prove that the order is not valid, either by way of a
motion to discharge the contempt allegation or by way of an affirmative defense to the contempt
charge. See Marriage of Jensen (2003) 114 CA4th 587, 590.
To support a finding of contempt, the order must be clear, specific, and unequivocal. Ketscher v
Superior Court (1970) 9 CA3d 601, 604. It must be written and signed by the judge, or set forth as a
detailed minute order. An oral order does not provide the level of certainty necessary to support a
contempt ruling. In re Marcus (2006) 138 CA4th 1009, 1015.
§19.19 b. Knowledge of Order
The charging document for contempt must allege that the contemnor had knowledge of the order.
See Matter of Ivey (2000) 85 CA4th 793. This knowledge can be demonstrated by proof of the order
having been served on the party, by his or her presence in court when the order was made, by
evidence that the party had sought relief from the order previously, or by the party's voluntary
signed stipulation on which the order is based. See Shibley v Superior Court (1927) 202 C 738.
It is also possible to show knowledge of the order by evidence demonstrating that the party's
attorney was present when the order was made and thereafter was served with the order. Matter of
Ivey (2000) 85 CA4th 793, 804. Counsel should be aware that some constitutional protections may
be implicated in cases of criminal contempt. See §19.22.
§19.20 c. Ability to Comply
Once a valid order is shown and knowledge on the part of the party charged with the contempt is
established, the charging party must demonstrate that the alleged contemnor had the ability to
comply with the order. In contempt proceedings involving child custody or visitation, the prima
facie burden resides with the charging party to prove ability to comply. See Coursey v Superior
Court (1987) 194 CA3d 147.
This element is most frequently encountered in custody matters involving a preteen or teenaged
child who intentionally disobeys the parent charged with the contempt by, for instance, refusing to
comply with the parenting order. In these situations, courts may view the parent charged with the
contempt as unable to comply with the underlying custody order or parenting scheme because he
or she lacks sufficient control over the child in question. 194 CA3d at 154.
§19.21 d. Willful Failure to Comply
In the context of child custody and visitation, the charging party must describe with particularity
the details of the violations that give rise to the charge of contempt. Willful failure to comply with
the order can be shown by describing how the order was violated and when it was violated.
Without a showing of willful disobedience, the prima facie case for contempt is incomplete, and the
contempt charge will fail. Coursey v Superior Court (1987) 194 CA3d 147, 156.
§19.22 2. Distinguishing Civil and Criminal Contempt
Civil contempt is characterized by a curable type of penalty that inures to the benefit of the
charging party. In other words, the contemnor may be imprisoned until he or she pays a fine or
performs some other court-imposed duty, but the term of imprisonment is essentially up to the
contemnor. Criminal contempt is characterized by the punitive measures taken against the alleged
contemnor when found guilty of the contempt, as in fixed and determinate jail sentences over
which the contemnor has no power. See generally Hicks v Feiock (1988) 485 US 624, 108 S Ct 1423.
When a family law practitioner brings a contempt action using standard Judicial Council forms, it
is technically a civil action with quasi-criminal aspects; e.g., the citee has the right to counsel, the
right to compel witnesses, and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination. See Findings and Order Regarding Contempt (Judicial Council Form FL-415) in
§19.53.
3. Custody-Related Orders Enforceable by Contempt
§19.23 a. Court-Ordered Parenting Plan for Custody and Visitation
Case law specifically indicates that contempt is a remedy available against a parent who does not
comply with a court-ordered parenting plan regarding custody and visitation. Moffat v Moffat
(1980) 27 C3d 645; Rosin v Superior Court (1960) 181 CA2d 486. On parenting plans, see chap 4.
PRACTICE TIP:
As a practical matter, a motion for contempt in matters relating to the parenting plan ordered by the
court may inflame the situation to a degree that prevents reasonable cooperation between the
parties in following the established parenting plan. Such a conflict may detrimentally affect the
child, and the decision to bring the motion should be carefully considered for this reason.
Strategically, the charging party may wish to pursue less combative means to bring the other parent
into compliance with the parenting plan than that engendered by a threat of criminal punishment.
§19.24 b. Attorney Fees and Costs and Other Costs
A contempt proceeding may be brought to seek enforcement of an order to pay attorney fees and
costs, or other ordered costs associated with the underlying case, such as those associated with a
custody investigation or evaluation. Contempt is statutorily available as a remedy under Fam C
§§290 and 4500. Additionally, CCP §1209(a)(5) authorizes contempt for "disobedience of any
lawful judgment." As a matter of constitutional law, of course, an individual may not be imprisoned
for failure to pay a debt. US Const amend VIII.
Under the Family Code, however, most monetary obligations are considered as arising from a lawimposed source, and so are not considered "debts" in the ordinary sense of the word. See Moss v
Superior Court (1998) 17 C4th 396, 415 (imprisonment for failure to support child not "involuntary
servitude"); Ex Parte Perkins (1861) 18 C 60, 1861 Cal Lexis 135. Because attorney fees orders made
under Fam C §2030 are based on need, a disparity in access to funds to retain an attorney, and the
ability of a party to pay (see §19.47), the failure to pay the fees so incurred actually represents the
failure of one spouse to support the other, not simply the failure to pay an ordinary debt. On
applying for and responding to a request for attorney fees and costs based on need, see Cal Rules of
Ct 5.427.
§19.25 c. Restraining Orders
A party who fails to comply with restraining orders in a custody context may also be charged with
contempt. CCP §1209(a)(5); Fam C §290. See also Vanderstok v Bank of America (1972) 29 CA3d 731,
734, holding that "[e]very court has power to compel obedience to its judgments and orders
[citations] and a court of equity retains inherent jurisdiction to oversee and enforce execution of its
decrees." Additionally, Pen C §273.6(a) indicates that a violation of a restraining order under Fam C
§6218 is "punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1000), or by imprisonment
in a county jail for not more than one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment." The fine and jail
time increase if the violation results in any actual physical harm to the protected party. Pen C
§273.6(b). See Fam C §6218(b).
NOTE:
Code of Civil Procedure §1219(b) forbids imprisonment of a victim of a sexual assault or domestic
violence crime for contempt when the contempt consists of refusing to testify concerning that sexual
assault or domestic violence crime.
4. Procedure
a. Initiating Proceeding
§19.26 (1) Preparation of Moving Papers and Filing
The moving party must first complete the necessary paperwork, beginning with the proper
Judicial Council forms and a declaration describing the facts constituting the contempt. Counsel
for the moving party then submits the completed paperwork, i.e., the Order to Show Cause and
Affidavit (Judicial Council Forms FL-410, FL-412), to the clerk, with a request for delivery to the
judge for signature. The clerk of the court from which the contempt order is sought is responsible
for acquiring the judge's signature on the charging documents. The judge is under no time
constraint to sign the Order to Show Cause. On signature, the paperwork is filed under the case
number of the underlying family law action. The clerk will set the date and time of hearing under
CCP §1005.
§19.27 (2) Service
Under CCP §1005, the moving papers must be served at least 16 court days before the day set for
the hearing. The papers must be personally served on the party charged with contempt, under Fam
C §215(a). Service on the party's attorney will not suffice, unless the party charged has attempted
to dodge or otherwise thwart service. See Cedars-Sinai Imaging Med. Group v Superior Court (2000)
83 CA4th 1281. See also CCP §1015.
§19.28 b. Statute of Limitations
Code of Civil Procedure §1218.5 indicates that the statute of limitations for contempt is 3 years
from the date of the violation in situations involving failure to pay support, and 2 years from the
date of the violation for any other order under the Family Code.
§19.29 c. Response
A party charged with contempt may respond in a number of ways. He or she may file a declaration
that sets out sufficient facts to prove an inability to comply with the order, or otherwise excuses a
failure to comply. Such facts must not reveal that the failure to comply arose from reasons
essentially produced by the charged party, or be based on following erroneous legal advice. See
Moss v Superior Court (1998) 17 C4th 396, 401; In re Bongfeldt (1971) 22 CA3d 465, 476.
The charged party may also file a motion to discharge the contempt motion for various reasons
related to the form and substance of the charging papers, as well as for jurisdictional defects.
Marriage of Jensen (2003) 114 CA4th 587, 590.
§19.30 d. Hearing—CCP §1217
At the hearing on the order to show cause for contempt, the court may advise the citee of his or her
due process rights, consistent with the quasi-criminal nature of the proceeding, such as the right
to counsel, the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, and the right to
cross-examine witnesses. See item 3 of Findings and Order Regarding Contempt (Judicial Council
Form FL-415), illustrated in §19.53. Criminal contempt defendants have the constitutional right to
a hearing with all of the protections generally afforded to criminal defendants. This includes the
Fifth Amendment privilege regarding self-incrimination. See Crittenden v Superior Court (1964) 225
CA2d 101. This does not, however, require the court to advise the potential criminal defendant of
the privilege, unless the court has reason to know that any of the defendant's testimony might be
incriminating. See People v Berry (1991) 230 CA3d 1449.
Practically speaking, in California, even civil contempt defendants will usually be granted these
same protections, primarily because of the procedural dilemma outlined above concerning due
process. The alleged contemnor or his or her legal representative is required to be present at the
hearing, and the court may issue a warrant if the defendant does not appear. Farace v Superior
Court (1983) 148 CA3d 915.
Generally, the court may not proceed without the defendant present unless the court finds that the
nonappearance is voluntary on the part of the defendant, and the charging papers were validly
served. Farace v Superior Court, supra.
PRACTICE TIP:
Another problem with regard to the possible criminal nature of the contempt charge arises in the
context of deposition testimony. If a contempt motion is filed, and then the moving party schedules
the deposition of the alleged contemnor, the contemnor-deponent may assert his or her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination regarding facts surrounding the contempt charge
due to the higher procedural protections afforded to criminal defendants (this may be true whether
or not the privilege applies). This problem may be resolved by scheduling the deposition before a
motion for contempt is filed. This may enable the deposing party to gather the information that
otherwise would be protected by the Constitution because of the pending (potentially) criminal
action. Of course, if nothing in the matter is pending except the contempt, as would usually be the
case in a postjudgment enforcement action, this may not be possible. In such cases, the moving
party should be diligent regarding the collection of facts and evidence supportive of the contempt
charge in the absence of testimony from the alleged contemnor.
§19.31 5. Penalties
In addition to the penalties imposed under the Penal Code, CCP §§1218–1219 authorize community
service time, imprisonment of up to 5 days (conditional on the curing of the defect or fixed), and a
monetary fine, including administrative fees. CCP §1218(c)(3)(B). Family courts are reluctant to
impose heavy fines, but are authorized under §1218 to do so if the facts of the case warrant it.
Additionally, if imprisonment exceeds 6 months, the defendant has the Constitutional right to a
jury trial, unless expressly waived. In re Kreitman (1995) 40 CA4th 750.
Code of Civil Procedure §1218 also authorizes the imposition of an award for the charging party's
attorney fees and costs associated with bringing the contemnor before the court.
§19.32 6. Recovery of Attorney Fees and Costs for Proceeding
Code of Civil Procedure §1218(a) authorizes the court to require any party actually found guilty of
the contempt charged to pay the "reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred" by the party who
brought the contempt motion.
PRACTICE TIP:
Advise client about cost. A contempt proceeding can be a time-consuming process, and hence very
expensive to see through to a final judgment. Clients should be prepared for this potentially lengthy
litigation and its associated costs before initiating a motion for contempt.
Advise client about polarization and impact on child. In addition to the time and expense involved,
a motion for contempt can polarize litigation dramatically because of its inherently punitive
nature. If any flexibility existed in the parenting plan before a motion for contempt is filed, filing a
contempt will essentially destroy it, and the opposing parent is likely to become resentful and
entrenched in an antagonistic litigation position. This is not conducive to peaceful coparenting,
and must be considered before the decision to file the motion is made. Furthermore, the child
involved may learn that one of the parents may have to go to jail as a result of the motion, and this
knowledge can be devastating to a child. Parent-child relationships can be forever damaged this
way.
§19.33 B. Habeas Corpus Proceedings
Habeas corpus proceedings are authorized under Pen C §§1473–1508, and can be utilized in a
custody action to obtain a court order for the removal of a child from a person without legal
entitlement to that child's custody. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is sometimes also used to
challenge a final custody order in cases in which the court allegedly lacked jurisdiction to enter the
order. See Ex Parte Miller (1895) 109 C 643.
Alternatively, Pen C §1497 authorizes a peace officer, acting on a valid warrant, to retrieve the child
and bring him or her before the court. The court must believe that the child is in some immediate
danger of "irreparable injury" if not retrieved. Pen C §1497.
Habeas corpus proceedings are somewhat antiquated, and not largely in use in family law matters
in recent years. They are, however, still statutorily available, and may be utilized in cases involving
the appropriate factual circumstances.
PRACTICE TIP:
Habeas corpus proceedings are very rarely heard by the courts. Courts and opposing counsel are
thus understandably unfamiliar with the law and procedure regarding such matters, which can lead
to confusion and unnecessarily time-consuming and expensive hearings. Before initiating a habeas
corpus proceeding, the conscientious practitioner should consider seeking other more common
remedies, such as an order modifying custody or an order for the return of the child. This may
achieve identical client objectives, while simultaneously relieving the court of the burden of learning
an old and esoteric statutory scheme before ruling on a motion.
§19.34 C. Modification of Custody for Violation of Visitation Rights
Because of the strong public policy disfavoring the use of "self-help" remedies, particularly in the
area of child custody and visitation, the Family Code, in addition to voluminous case law,
authorizes the courts to modify the custody order when a noncustodial parent is unjustifiably
prevented from enjoying his or her parenting time with a child. This is typically accomplished by
the noncustodial parent's initiation of a formal proceeding to change custody. See Burchard v Garay
(1986) 42 C3d 531, 541 n11 (conduct by custodial parent designed to frustrate visitation and
communication may be grounds for changing custody); Marriage of Moschetta (1994) 25 CA4th
1218, 1234 (acknowledging common knowledge among family lawyers that quickest way for parent
to lose primary physical custody is for parent to obstruct other parent's visitation rights); Moffat v
Moffat (1980) 27 C3d 645, 652 (court has authority to change custody or otherwise modify custody
and child support provisions of original decree).
PRACTICE TIP:
For the attorney representing the primary custodian, the client should be made absolutely clear on
what is expected of him or her regarding the parenting schedule. Any change in that schedule should
be followed up with a written confirmation to the other parent (if unrepresented), or his or her
attorney, that memorializes the change. This serves as evidence of compliance with a parenting
arrangement should the noncustodial parent later complain about lack of cooperation, and also
helps to identify any misunderstanding between parents regarding what the agreed change actually
is so that the agreement can be clarified.
For an attorney representing the parent denied visitation rights, that client should be instructed to
document in a writing each perceived violation of his or her parenting rights as soon as possible
following the violation. If the parents are still communicating, this potentially may be as easy as
sending a short, factual e-mail to the other parent pointing out the violation, as well as to keep a
journal listing the dates and events involved. In addition, or as an alternative, counsel for the parent
denied visitation rights can notify the other party (if unrepresented) or his or her attorney in
writing of the improper denial and request that the offending conduct cease. This will be helpful in
establishing a pattern of behavior regarding the denial of visitation rights for the court to review
before ruling on the motion.
§19.35 D. Supervised Visitation
Supervised visitation is available in situations involving a threat or danger to the health or safety of
the child arising from one of the parent's actions or behaviors. The court is authorized to require
that the noncustodial parent be allowed visitation with the child with another adult present only.
The supervising adult may be agreed on by the parties or appointed by the court. Fam C §§3100(b),
3031(c), 6323(d). For discussion of this topic as it pertains to parenting plans, see chap 4.
PRACTICE TIP:
As an enforcement remedy, supervised visitation should be approached with caution, and the client
should be careful what he or she wishes for. Unless a family member or mutual friend agrees to
supervise free of charge, supervised visitation can mean significant cost. Depending on the
underlying parenting plan, a supervisor may need to be present for several hours a day, several days
a week. Costs for that time can multiply rapidly.
Additionally, supervised parenting time is not always beneficial for the child. The child may wonder
why the visiting parent never gets to visit alone with him or her, which can degrade the bond
between the child and the visiting parent, as well as increase friction between the primary
custodial parent and the child who may resent the supervision. Such negative effects could
outweigh whatever benefit may be garnered by supervised parenting, and should be carefully
considered before supervision is sought as a remedy.
§19.36 E. Monetary Compensation in Certain Cases
Some circumstances will allow a family law litigant to request monetary compensation for the
other parent's violation of a custody order, as discussed below.
§19.37 1. Thwarting Exercise of Custody or Visitation
Family Code §3028(a) allows for "financial compensation" for periods of time during which one
parent has been
thwarted by the other parent when attempting to exercise custody or visitation
rights contemplated by a custody or visitation order, including, but not limited to,
an order for joint physical custody, or by a written or oral agreement between the
parties.
The compensation awardable is limited to the reasonable expenses incurred resulting from the
other parent's failure to cooperate in the agreed parenting plan, and may include the value of
caretaker services, but is not limited to such expense. The amount requested must be a minimum
of $100, or the parent must allege that the other parent has thwarted visitation on at least three
occasions within the previous 6 months. Fam C §3028(c).
Family Code §3028(d) states that "[a]ttorney's fees shall be awarded to the prevailing party on a
showing of the nonprevailing party's ability to pay."
§19.38 2. Failure to Assume Caretaker Responsibility
Family Code §3028 allows for monetary relief in cases involving one parent's failure to assume the
caretaker responsibilities under a custody or visitation order. The compensation awardable is
limited to the reasonable expenses incurred resulting from the other parent's failure to assume his
or her responsibilities. The amount requested must be a minimum of $100, or the parent must
allege that the other parent has thwarted visitation on at least three occasions within the previous
6 months. Fam C §3028(c).
Attorney fees are available to the prevailing party on a showing of the other party's ability to pay.
Fam C §3028(d).
§19.39 3. Civil Action for Abduction
Though rarely utilized, and over 100 years old, CC §49 states that "[t]he rights of personal relations
forbid … [t]he abduction or enticement of a child from a parent, or a guardian entitled to its
custody." Penal enforcement for child abduction under Pen C §§277–278.5 seems much more likely
and appropriate in most circumstances, but this civil action does carry with it the right to seek
money damages for violation of the statute. See Surina v Lucey (1985) 168 CA3d 539 (noting that "[i]t
has long been established that the unlawful taking or withholding of a minor child from the
custody of the parent or guardian entitled to such custody constitutes an actionable tort").
F. Criminal Sanctions
§19.40 1. Domestic Violence Protective Orders Related to Custody or Visitation
Violation of a domestic violence protective order that affects child custody or visitation may be
punished as a criminal offense. Pen C §273.6. Family Code §§6211 and 6218 allow for the issuance
of a domestic violence restraining order in cases involving abuse of a child by a parent. Any person
convicted of domestic violence under Pen C §273.5 may also face a restraining order for up to 10
years issued by the criminal court. Pen C §273.5(j). In the context of a custody dispute, a
restraining order can have extremely severe results for an abusing custodial or noncustodial
parent. The restraining order can essentially cut off all contact between the parent and child, and,
if that parent had been the primary custodial parent, the noncustodial parent could find him- or
herself in a position to assert sole physical custody. Further, the perpetrator of the domestic
violence may very well face imprisonment, which would obviously curtail parenting time
significantly.
PRACTICE TIP:
If a court makes a finding of domestic violence and issues a domestic violence restraining order at a
hearing requesting a modification of child custody, it is virtually guaranteed that the abusive parent
will lose nearly all rights regarding the child. Practically speaking, the only contact that such a
parent could rightly expect would be supervised visitation, because the "best interest of the child"
would not countenance physical violence, regardless of the weight of the other factors involved in a
best interest analysis. The threat of a domestic violence restraining order is powerful, and could have
a significant impact on a custody order or parenting plan.
Client record-keeping and notification of law enforcement as aids to seeking protective order. In
situations involving actual or threatened domestic violence of any kind, the attorney should advise
the client to keep careful and detailed notes concerning each incident, as well as to notify law
enforcement authorities in appropriate cases. In general, counsel should advise the client to seek a
protective order through counsel, and the client's notes can help provide a basis for a declaration in
support of an application for the order. The important point is that a parent must take action in
cases involving violence against a child, or violence against the parent with the child present, or
that parent could be found by the court as not providing the necessary protection for the child, and
could lose whatever custody rights that parent has. This would leave the child without either
parent in most cases, because the parent who committed the domestic violence would not be a
proper custodian for the child either. A quick response to the alleged violence usually removes the
perception that a custodial parent has acted irresponsibly with regard to the health and safety of
the child.
Importance of considering alternatives. Note, however, that, because domestic violence protective
orders can have such punitive consequences, practitioners should think creatively when fashioning
an appropriate response to a potential for future domestic violence. For instance, a stipulation to
mediation or to counseling may be more appropriate under the circumstances of a particular case
than a protective order that may lead to eventual incarceration, unless it is clear that these
remedies would be efficacious only if a protective order also were issued or that any type of
mediation or counseling including both parties would pose a danger to the nonoffending party.
For related discussion, see §19.25.
2. Custody Orders
a. California Law
§19.41 (1) Abduction
Penal Code §§277–278.5 articulate the definitions of and penalties available for child abduction.
Any person who does not have a legal right to custody of the minor child, whether a parent or an
unrelated third party, who "maliciously takes, entices away, keeps, withholds, or conceals" the child
from that child's rightful custodian, with the intent to do so, is at risk of incurring a substantial
fine and may face incarceration of up to 4 years in state prison. A state agency can be considered
the child's rightful guardian when such custody is granted under a court order or statute. Pen C
§277(d). In addition, any person who "takes, entices away, keeps, withholds, or conceals a child and
maliciously deprives a lawful custodian of a right to custody, or a person of a right to visitation,"
risks incurring additional fines as well as imprisonment in a county jail for up to 1 year. Pen C
§278.5. The victim of the offense need not have been a party to the underlying action; the statute
requires only that they were awarded visitation by court order. People v DeJongh (2015) 237 CA4th
1124.
Though this penalty may overlap with a court's contempt power, it does not preclude a finding of
contempt, nor is contempt considered a lesser included offense because violation of the underlying
custody or visitation order is not an element of the offense as defined under the statutes. Pen C
§278.5(b).
This indicates that a court could punish the abductor under both its equitable contempt power,
penalizing the contemnor with jail time, and also under the Penal Code, which could also lead to
substantial incarceration time. Aggravating circumstances, including the extent to which the child
is put in physical danger, taking the child outside of the United States, altering the child's name or
appearance, and actual harm to the child during the abduction, may affect the punishment, as
could certain mitigating factors under the circumstances. Pen C §278.6(b).
The offense is subject to an affirmative defense that the abductor reasonably believed that the
abduction was necessary to protect the child from imminent danger. Pen C §278.7. To establish
that defense, a defendant charged with a violation of Pen C §278.5 bears the burden of proof that
he or she believed in good faith that abducting a child ensured the child's physical and emotional
well-being. People v Neidinger (2006) 40 C4th 67, 74. Thus, for example, a father who had made 20
complaints to child protective service agencies about his children's deteriorating physical and
emotional health before he abducted them to Nevada made a factual showing sufficient to cast a
reasonable doubt that the abduction was malicious. The supreme court established a reasonable
doubt standard as the burden of proof for an affirmative defense under Pen C §278.7(a). 40 C4th at
79.
§19.42 (2) False Imprisonment
False imprisonment is an offense found in Pen C §§236 and 237. This offense involves the unlawful
violation of the personal liberty of any person effected by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit. It is
punishable by fine and imprisonment.
Not only is this crime freestanding, but violation of the child abduction statutes may also trigger a
charge of false imprisonment, in which case the abductor may face further jail time or monetary
fines resulting from his or her actions in unlawfully taking the child. Pen C §237.
PRACTICE TIP:
In custody situations with the potential for abduction out of state (for instance, if one parent has
relatives out of state or does not currently reside in California), counsel for the California parent
should make sure that the custody order includes language regarding "home state" designation
under the UCCJEA. See chap 21. This will provide the California courts with presumptive
jurisdiction in the matter. Additionally, if the possibility exists that the child may be taken out of the
country, the California parent should check to see if the country of destination is a signatory of the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, discussed in chap 20.
Hague Convention signatories have agreed to cooperate with each other in jurisdictional matters
relating to international child custody disputes.
In either case, the California parent who believes there is a potential for abduction should plan
ahead, and take reasonable precautions to speed the return of the child if an abduction takes place.
Such precautions include getting to know the relevant policies and procedures at the district
attorney's office, as well as the district attorney him or herself. Parents should also obtain contact
information for security personnel at local airports and other transportation hubs so that the
appropriate individuals there can be given physical descriptions of the child and the abductor.
b. Federal Enforcement
§19.43 (1) Fugitive Felon Act
The federal Fugitive Felon Act (18 USC §1073) states that
[w]hoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce with intent … to avoid
prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, under the laws of the place
from which he flees, for a crime, or an attempt to commit a crime, punishable by
death or which is a felony under the laws of the place from which the fugitive flees …
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
A parent who has been found guilty of a felony violation of a child abduction statute who flees with
the child across state lines is considered a "fleeing felon" under this statute, and is subject to its
penalties. 18 USC §1073.
§19.44 (2) Federal International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act
The federal International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act (18 USC §1204) was adopted in 1993, and
was intended to work in conjunction with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction (discussed in chap 20). It defines as a felony punishable by fine and
imprisonment the removal or attempted removal of a child under the age of 16 outside of the
United States "with intent to obstruct the lawful exercise" of parental custody rights or visitation
rights. 18 USC §1204(a).
The purpose of the Act is to prevent parents from absconding with children to countries that have
not yet signed on to the Hague Convention, and thereby avoid the penalties. The Act sets forth only
three defenses: (1) acting under authority of a court order obtained under the UCCJA (now former)
or UCCJEA in effect at the time of the offense; (2) fleeing from domestic violence; or (3) failing to
return the child while in legal custody after having attempted to contact the other parent within
24 hours after the expiration of the parenting visit, and returning the child as soon as possible
thereafter. 18 USC §1204(c).
Though the Hague Convention's civil remedies should ordinarily be sought first, initiating a
criminal remedy under this act is not precluded. See U.S. v Ventre (9th Cir 2003) 338 F3d 1047.
§19.45 G. Passport Restrictions
According to Fam C §3048(b)(2), "[i]n cases in which the court becomes aware of facts which may
indicate that there is a risk of abduction of a child," the court may require that the potential
abductor turn over all travel documents, including passports, it may prohibit that parent from
applying for a new passport for a child, and it may require notification to any relevant foreign
embassies or consulates regarding the passport restrictions. That statute also provides for a
variety of other methods to prevent the wrongful abduction of children from the country.
In most cases, the determination of flight risk will be made in the initial proceedings, and thus will
be made part of the order. Such restrictions could be quite effective in preventing abduction. In
cases involving the threat of abduction arising after the final judgment has been entered, however,
these restrictions will not have been put in place. In such circumstances, the parent seeking to
prevent the abduction should file a request for child abduction prevention orders to obtain a
finding by the court that the other parent is a flight risk. At that point, the court could order the
appropriate restrictions to prevent the abduction. See Fam C §3048(b)(2).
NOTE:
Effective January 1, 2013, Fam C §2040 automatically restrains both parties from applying for a
new or replacement passport for a minor child when a family law proceeding is filed. Fam C
§2040(a)(1).
§19.46 H. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) (Fam C §§3400–3465) is
discussed thoroughly in chaps 20–21, and generally governs the appropriate jurisdictional
determination as between competing courts, both in terms of initial custody orders and
modifications. It also provides for recognition of foreign orders. Enforcement remedies under the
UCCJEA include temporary orders made by courts lacking jurisdiction to modify (Fam C §3444),
recognition and enforcement of another state's order (Fam C §3446), warrants to take custody of a
child (Fam C §3451), and orders for prevailing party costs and expenses (Fam C §3452).
III. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AWARDS IN CUSTODY ENFORCEMENT MATTERS
§19.47 A. Fam C §2030 Need-Based Fees
Family Code §2030 is the statute most frequently utilized by litigants seeking an award of
attorney fees. This section governs attorney fees and costs incurred during the dissolution process
and "in any proceeding subsequent to entry of a related judgment." It is thus available in
enforcement proceedings related to child custody. Fam C §2030(a)(1).
This statute requires an analysis of the respective needs of the parties, as well as the ability to pay
on the part of the party from whom fees have been requested. See Marriage of Rosen (2002) 105
CA4th 808, 829; Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 CA4th 1139, 1166. As long as the party requesting the
fee award under this section can show the requisite need, a disparity in income as between the
parties that works to his or her detriment, and ability of the other party to pay, a fee award under
§2030 is available. If a court makes findings that demonstrate a disparity in access to funds to
retain counsel and an ability to pay, the court must make an order awarding attorney fees and
costs. Fam C §2030(a)(2).
However, an attorney fee award is distinguishable from a support award, and it is an error for a
court not to consider the expenses of the potential payer in assessing the factors enumerated in
Fam C §2030(b). Alan S. v Superior Court (2009) 172 CA4th 238, 253.
PRACTICE TIP:
An attorney's invoices, to the extent they can be tied to the request for fees, can provide powerful
evidence of reasonable expenditures. Practitioners should be careful to omit or redact privileged
information or confidential material that could be the subject of an opposing counsel's claim of
waiver. Attorneys should obtain client approval in writing to include invoices as evidence of fees.
Counsel should provide clear details of all work performed on a client's behalf, paying special
attention to any extraordinary measures that may have incurred significant fees. The fees must
appear to the court as reasonable, and the more detail that the attorney can provide to the court
regarding the work performed, the more likely it is that the fees will be found to be reasonable.
PRACTICE TIP:
Practitioners would do well to remember that, in addition to showing a disparity in the parties'
relative incomes to justify an award of need-based fees, they also must indicate to the court a source
of payment for those fees. After all, if a party does not have the resources to make the payment of
fees as requested, a court would have little motivation to make the award. As long as the attorney
can show a source for payment or that the party could restructure his or her finances in such a way
as to make the payment, the court may more easily decide that the award is justified under the
circumstances.
On applying for and responding to a request for attorney fees and costs under Fam C §2030, see
Cal Rules of Ct 5.427.
PRACTICE TIP:
Counsel must be aware of the timing requirements for a request for attorney fees. Under the
California Rules of Court, including Rule 3.1702, and as confirmed in Marriage of Perow & Uzelac
(2019) 31 CA5th 984, a motion for statutory attorney fees for services up to and including rendition
of judgment must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal (within 180 days of
entry of judgment or within 60 days of service of the Notice of Entry of Judgment (Judicial Council
Form FL-190), whichever occurs first). This request may be preserved by the court's retention of
jurisdiction over the issue of attorney fees and costs or sanctions.
§19.48 B. Fam C §271 Sanctions
A request for attorney fees as a sanction under Fam C §271(a) must be based on evidence that the
opposing party's behavior impedes the litigation or otherwise needlessly increases the costs to the
parties or frustrates settlement. See, e.g., Parker v Harbert (2013) 212 CA4th 1172, 1177. In the
context of a child custody enforcement matter, such evidence may include facts that tend to show
that the opposing party or attorney has unjustifiably withheld information concerning the child's
welfare or whereabouts or otherwise has needlessly inflamed the litigation beyond what mere
"zealous advocacy" would produce. See Marriage of Daniels (1993) 19 CA4th 1102, 1107.
Attorney fee awards, though often requested, are less frequently granted under Fam C §271 than
under some other provisions, such as those based on a party's need for fees to adequately present
his or her case. See, e.g., Fam C §2030, discussed in §19.47. The likely reason that courts hesitate to
exercise the authority granted to them under this statute is that doing so essentially punishes one
of the parties to the benefit of the other, which can lead to an increase in the conflict level in the
litigation, and a subsequent decrease in the likelihood that the matter will settle out of court.
Notwithstanding the general reluctance of courts to make an award under Fam C §271, sanctions
under this section are often used as a means to keep a party who may be late with discovery or
acting less than cooperatively in the litigation from further delaying the process. After one litigant
has notified the other that §271 sanctions are being sought, as is required under the statute, often
that litigant will fall back in line and cooperate appropriately. Standards of both state and federal
due process require notice and an opportunity to be heard before attorney fees are imposed as
sanctions. Parker v Harbert (2013) 212 CA4th 1172, 1178; Marriage of Duris & Urbany (2011) 193 CA4th
510, 513. However, case law has established that an attorney fees sanction under §271 is not a form
of affirmative relief within the meaning of Fam C §213 and, therefore, does not require a separately
filed motion to address the conduct of a party relating to an issue pending before the court.
Marriage of Perow & Uzelac (2019) 31 CA5th 984, 991.
Fees as a sanction under §271 require a detailed paper trail that evidences the costs involved, as in
the discussion of need-based fees above. In addition, however, counsel should be careful to provide
documentary evidence of his or her attempts to lower the costs of the litigation and promote
settlement. Such evidence can include, e.g., informal requests for, and compliance with, discovery;
requests for settlement meetings or meet and confers; and reasonable offers at settlement. Such
evidence can provide stark contrast to an obstreperous and uncooperative opposing attorney, and
will make the sanction more palatable to the court.
As in the discussion of need-based fees (see §19.47), invoices are frequently extremely useful in
detailing extraordinary expenses incurred because of the opposing party's failure to cooperate.
Counsel should take care to redact any privileged or confidential information contained in those
invoices, and the client should consent in writing to the inclusion of the invoices before attaching
them as exhibits to a motion for §271 sanctions. See County of Los Angeles Bd. of Supervisors v
Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2017) 2 C5th 282, 293 (attorney's billing invoices for work in
pending and active legal matter are so closely related to attorney-client communications that
attorney-client privilege protects confidentiality of such material).
Sanctions under Fam C §271 are limited to attorney fees and costs, and awards may not be given
simply to punish a party, even if that party has exhibited "deplorable" conduct. Sagonowsky v Kekoa
(2016) 6 CA5th 1142, 1151. Because Fam C §271 sanctions are intended to promote the settlement of
family law litigation by shifting fees between the parties, they may not be awarded to a nonparty to
the litigation, including an attorney. Webb v Webb (2017) 12 CA5th 876, 882.
PRACTICE TIP:
As a matter of professional courtesy, as well as good advocacy, it is a good idea to provide the
opposing counsel with a thorough explanation of the grounds for the sanction under the statute as
early in the process as possible. Often, this will convince an attorney to cooperate in the litigation,
which is, after all, the desired result of the sanction itself.
NOTE:
While there is no financial benefit to the party raising this issue, CCP §177.5 may be a powerful tool
to deter future bad conduct of a party. After the violating party is put on notice of the intent to seek
sanctions under this section, CCP §177.5 grants authority to the court to impose reasonable money
sanctions (not to exceed $1500) payable to the court for any violation of a lawful court order without
good cause or substantial justification.
IV. FORMS
§19.49 A. Form: Request for Child Abduction Prevention Orders (Judicial Council Form FL312)
§19.50 B. Form: Child Abduction Prevention Order Attachment (Judicial Council Form FL341(B))
§19.51 C. Form: Order to Show Cause and Affidavit for Contempt (Judicial Council Form FL410)
§19.52 D. Form: Affidavit of Facts Constituting Contempt (Domestic Violence/Custody and
Visitation) (Judicial Council Form FL-412)
Comment: For a form used to state facts constituting contempt if financial and injunctive orders
have been violated, see Affidavit of Facts Constituting Contempt (Financial and Injunctive Orders)
(Judicial Council Form FL-411). For an approved form for use in stating a court's findings and order
regarding contempt, see Findings and Order Regarding Contempt (Family Law—Domestic
Violence Prevention—Uniform Parentage—Governmental) (Judicial Council Form FL-415).
§19.53 E. Form: Findings and Order Regarding Contempt (Family Law—Domestic Violence
Prevention—Uniform Parentage—Governmental) (Judicial Council Form FL-415)