MODULE 2: EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
Cawad vs. Abad et. al.
G.R. No. 207145
FACTS
On March 26, 1992, RA No. 7305 which was The Magna Carta of Public Health Workerswas signed into law in order
to promote the social and economic well-being of health workers, their living and working conditions and terms of
employment, to develop their skills and capabilities to be better equipped to deliver health projects and programs,
and to encourage those with proper qualifications and excellent abilities to join and remain in government service.
Granted with the following allowances &benefits cited on Sec. 20 (Additional Compensation), Sec. 21 (Hazard
Allowance), Sec. 22 (Subsistence Allowance) &Sec. 23 (Longevity Pay)
On July 28, 2008, the Fourth Congress issued resolution entitled Joint Resolution Authorizing the President of the
Philippines to Modify the Compensation and Position Classification System of Civilian Personnel and the Base Pay
Schedule of Military and Uniformed Personnel in the Government, and for other Purposes.
On June 17, 2009, resolution was approved which provided for certain amendments in the Magna Carta and its IRR.
On September 3, 2012, DBM and CSC issued Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, to prescribe the rules on the grant
of Step Increments due to meritorious performance and Step Increment due to length of service. Specifically, it
provided that "an official or employee authorized to be granted Longevity Pay under an existing law is not eligible
for the grant of Step Increment due to length of service.
On November 29, 2012, circulatedDBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012 which diminished and limited
benefits granted by the Magna Carta to Public Health Worker
On January 23, 2013, issued a letter to Secretary of Budget &Management &Secretary of Health expressing
opposition to the cited joint circulars above on the ground that the same diminishes the benefits granted by RA
7305.
On May 30, 2013, filed a petition to the court for certiorari and prohibition on the Rules 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing validity of circulars issued by DBM &CSC.
ISSUE
WON DBM-DOH Joint Circulars is null and void for not complying Section 35 of RA # 7305 which requires 30 days
publication and file copy with the UP Law Center-Office of the National Administrative Register
HELD
NO. These regulations need not be published for they add nothing to the law and do not affect substantial rights of
any person. Though, publication, as a basic postulate of procedural due process, is required by law in order for
administrative rules and regulations to be effective.
There are, however, several exceptions, one of which are interpretative regulations which "need nothing further
than their bare issuance for they give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.
As ruled, in the case of Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System v. Velasco, not all rules and
regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center."Interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature are not required to be filed with the U.P. Law Center.
In this case, the DBM-DOH Joint Circular in question gives no real consequence more than what the law itself had
already prescribed. As previously discussed, the qualification of actual exposure to danger for the PHW's
entitlement to hazard pay, the rates of P50 and P25 subsistence allowance, and the entitlement to longevity pay
on the basis of PHW's status in the plantilla of regular positions were already prescribed and authorized by preexisting law. There is really no new obligation or duty imposed by the subject circular for it merely reiterated those
embodied in RA No. 7305and its Revised IRR. The Joint Circular did not modify, amend nor supplant the Revised
IRR, the validity of which is undisputed. Consequently, whether it was duly published and filed with the UP Law
Center-ONAR is necessarily immaterial to its validity because in view of the pronouncements above, interpretative
regulations, such as the DBM-DOH circular herein, need not be published nor filed with the UP Law Center-ONAR
in order to be effective.
Norman del Socorro v. Ernst Johan Brinkman van Wilselm
G.R. No. 193707
Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman
Van Wilsem,docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise
known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
Norma Del Socorro and Ernst Johan Van Wilsem contracted marriage on September 25, 1990 in Holland. On
January 19, 1994, they had a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the petition
was 16 years old.
Their marriage was ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by a court in Holland on July 19, 1995. At this time,
their son was 18 years old. After the divorce, Norma and her son returned to the Philippines.
According to Norma, Ernst promised to give monthly support of P 17, 500.00 more or less, however, since their
arrival to the Philippines, they have never received any support.
Not long after, Ernst came back to Cebu and married another woman. It is to be noted that all the parties are
residing in Cebu at this point. Norma sent a legal demand letter to Ernst but acceptance was refused.
As a response, Normal filed a Complaint-Affidavit to which Ernst submitted a Counter-Affidavit. Upon the hearing,
a Hold Departure Order was issued against Ernst.
Issue:
WON a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; andWON a foreign
national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child
Ruling:
The Court ruled that because Ernst is a citizen of Holland, he is to be subjected to the laws of his country. It cannot
be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support the petitioners son under Article 195 of the
Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland.
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support the petitioners son altogether.
In view of the respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and
proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44
Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and
proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of
parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
The Divorce Covenant presented by the respondent does not completely show that he is not liable to give support
to his son after the divorce decree was issued.
We likewise agree with the petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents
have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still
not find applicability.
Philippine International Trading Corporation, vs. Commission on Audit
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205837, November 21, 2017
FACTS:
PITC, a government-owned and controlled corporation created under PD No. 252. President Marcos
issued EO No. 756 which authorized the reorganization of PITC and Section 6 provides for its exemption from the
rules and regulations of the OCPC (Office of the Compensation and Position Classification). EO No. 877 further
authorized its reorganization and restructuring that it shall be completed within 6 months with personnel not
reappointed deemed laid off and those who were laid off be entitled to benefits. The Supreme Court ruled that
PITC v. COA be included in the coverage of RA No. 6758 and is no longer exempted from the rules and regulations
of OCPC. PITC moved for a reconsideration but was denied. The decision in G.R. No. 183517 became final. Pursuant
to Section 6, PITC still allocated part of its Corporate Operating Budget for retirement benefits with the amount,
P46.36 million. PITC resident COA Auditor Elizabeth Liberato informed them that the accrual of the retirement
benefits was bereft of legal basis in accordance with the decision in G.R. No. 183517 and was advised to stop the
payment or reverse amount already accrued. PITC believed that decision be applied prospectively should the Court
deny its motion.
ISSUE:
WON the decision in G.R. No. 183517 must be applied prospectively upon its finality.
RULING:
The Court disagrees with PITC's position that the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 should be applied prospectively.
COA correctly argued, the decision in G.R. No. 183517 neither reversed an old doctrine nor adopted a new one.
The court construed the meaning and application of Section 6 of EO No. 756 by taking into consideration the
rationale behind the provision, its interplay with pre-existing retirement laws, and the subsequent enactments and
statutes that eventually repealed the same. Prior to the Decision in G.R. No. 183517, there was no other ruling
from this Court that explained the nature of the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756.
Thus, the Court's interpretation of the aforesaid provision embodied in the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 retroacts
to the date when Executive Order No. 756 was enacted. There is no merit in PITC's contention that the retroactive
application of the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 would divest qualified PITC employees of their vested rights to
receive the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756.
The fact that PITC continued to grant the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 from the
time of the issuance of said executive order until the Court's Decision in G.R. No. 183517 does not mean that said
benefits ripened into a vested right. In this case, the Court already ruled in G.R. No. 183517 that the grant of the
retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was temporary and limited in nature and the same
should have been restricted to the six-month period of the mandated reorganization of PITC.
Edna Mabugay-Otamias vs. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 189516 / June 8, 2016
FACTS:
On June 16, 1978, Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias &retired Colonel Francisco B. Otamias were married. They
had five children.
On September 2000, the couple separated due to the Colonels alleged infidelity. The children remained with Edna.
On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the Provost Marshall Division of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In the complaint- affidavit, Edna demanded monthly support which would be
equivalent to 75% of Colonel Otamiasretirement benefit. Colonel Otamias responded by executing an affidavit
stating that he can only commit 50% of his retirement benefits, to be pro-rated among his wife and five children.
On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived 50% of his salary and
pension benefits in favor of Edna and their children. The Deed of Assignment was considered by the parties as a
compromise agreement.
Colonel Otamias retired on April 1, 2003.
The agreement was honored until January 6, 2006. Edna alleged that the Armed Forces of the Philippines suddenly
decided not to honor the agreementbetween Colonel Otamias and his legitimate family.
In a letter dated April 3, 2006, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Pension and Gratuity Management Center (AFPPGMC) informed Edna that a court order was required for them to recognize the Deed of Assignment.
In another letter dated April 17, 2006, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Pension Gratuity Management Center
reiterated that it could not act on Ednas request to receive a portion of Colonel Otamiaspension unless ordered by
the appropriate court.
ISSUE/S:
WON the Deed of Assignment made by Colonel Otamias and Edna Otamias is valid.
RULING:
Yes, the Deed of Assignment executed and signed by Colonel Otamias and Edna Otamias is valid.
The Civil Code, specifically Article 6, provides that Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
The concept of waiver has been defined by this Court as a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver
the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by
him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or
such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act
inconsistent with claiming it.
When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived his right to claim that his
retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement benefits belong to Colonel Otamias.
His decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits does not infringe on the right of third persons, but even
protects the right of his family to receive support.
In addition, the Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law between the parties, and its provisions should
be respected in the absence of allegations that Colonel Otamias was coerced or defrauded in executing it. The
general rule is that a contract is the law between parties and parties are free to stipulate terms and conditions that
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Thus, the Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias was not contrary to law; it was in accordance with the
provisions on support in the Family Code. Hence, there was no reason for the AFP-PGMC not to recognize its
validity.
People vs. Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and
ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995
FACTS:
Angel Alquizas cadaver was seen floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila,
wrapped in a sack and yellow tablecloth tied with nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding from it. When
she was untied and was removed from its cover, she was seen clad only in a light colored duster, without her
panties, with gaping wounds on the left side of her face, her left chin, lacerations on her genitalia and with her
head bashed in.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided by law. Respondent-judge however, instead of imposing the
corresponding death penalty, imposed reclusion perpetua to each accused and he issued an order denying the
same for lack of jurisdiction.
The City Prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the decision be modified that the penalty be
death instead of reclusion perpetua. Respondent-judge still denied the motion citing religious convictions.
ISSUE:
WON Judge Veneracion acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction when he failed to impose
the mandatory death penalty under RA No. 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crime of Rape with
Homicide.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the proper penalty
provided for by law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs.
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or
political beliefs, were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to
exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the
exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by
the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor, "resist encroachments by governments,
political parties,or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.
In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the prosecution and the defendant at trial
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide. Since the law in force at
the time of the commission of the crime for which the respondent judge found the accused guilty was Republic Act
No. 7659, he was bound by its provisions.