NOTE: ALPHABETICAL
ARRANGMENT, NOT ACCORDING
TO THE SYLLABUS.
Article 163
Angeles vs. Maglaya (2005)
Corazon Angeles-Maglaya, herein respondent, filed a petition
for letters of administratix and her appointment as administratix
of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles. She claims that
she is the sole legitimate heir of Francisco Angeles and
Genoveva Mercado, and together with Belen Angeles, herein
petitioner and 2nd wife of Francisco, they are the surviving heirs
of the decedent. Franscisco died intestate in 1998 leaving
behind 4 parcels of land and a building. Belen opposed this
petition and prayed that she, instead of Corazon, be
proclaimed the admistratrix of Francisco‘s estate. After
establishing the circumstances of her marriage to Francisco
(i.e. married before a Judge and ratified two months later in
religious rites; Francisco presented himself to be single that
time), Belen attacked the legitimacy of Corazon, saying that
her birth certificate was not signed by Francisco. She has also
failed to present the marriage contract between her parents,
Francisco and Genoveva. Furthermore, Belen averred that she
and Francisco legally adopted Concesa Yamat during their
marriage.
Respondent‘s reply: (a) records of parents‘ marriage in the
Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga were destroyed. (b) She
has been in open and continuous possession of the status of
legitimate child as testified by 4 witnesses. (c) Her birth
certificate was presented containing a handwritten word ―Yes‖
under the question ―Legitimate?‖
Trial court dismissed petition for lack of proof of filiation as
legitimate child, but the Court of Appeals reversed this on the
grounds that petitioner‘s motion being a demurrer (under Sec 1
Rule 33) thereby waived her right to present opposing
evidence, and that respondent has sufficiently established her
filiation.
ISSUE: WON Corazon is a legitimate child of Francisco and
Genoveva? NO.
RATIO:
Article 164: Children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents are legitimate.
Tison vs. Court of Appeals: A legitimate child is a product of
and therefore implies a valid and lawful marriage. A child is
presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock.
The presumption of legitimacy in the FC actually fixes a status
for the child born in wedlock and that civil status cannot be
attacked collaterally. Only the husband can contest the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. The intent of the law is to
prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being
uncertain.
Presumption of legitimacy may only be availed upon proof of
the factual basis that child‘s parents were legally married and
that his/her conception of birth occurred during the marriage. In
the case at bar, there is no absolute proof of the decedent‘s
marriage to respondent‘s mother Genoveva. No marriage
certificate or contract was offered in evidence. No solemnizing
officer was called to witness. Also, respondent never
questioned what would necessarily be a bigamous marriage
between Belen and Francisco. In fact, in her petition, she
alleged that petitioner is the ―surviving spouse‖ of the
decedent.
Under Article 172, the court concedes that even in the absence
of direct evidence of marriage of parents, legitimate filiation of
the child can be established by the following modes: 1. Record
of birth in civil registry 2. Admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or private handwritten instrument signed by
parent concerned. In the absence of these foregoing evidence,
filiation is proved by: 3. Open and continuous possession of
the status of legitimate child 4. Any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court.
Evidence that respondent showed: 1. Birth certificate 2. School
and government records 3. Photographs of her wedding and
testimonies. Although respondent was able to show a birth
certificate, this was not signed by Francisco or Genoveva. It
was signed only by the attending physician. This document is
only evidence of the birth of the child, and not conclusive proof
of her legitimate filiation. The signature of the father is a
necessary requirement in determining legitimate filiation and it
can not be made dependent on the declaration of the attending
physician or midwife or mother of the newborn child. The same
holds true for the school and government records which were
unsigned by Francisco and the execution of which he had no
part in. Lastly, photographs are not sufficient evidence of
filiation as settled in jurisprudence. However, due to these
evidences, court conceded that Corazon might be natural child
of Francisco and Genoveva. However this is not the issue in
this case, since the respondent predicated her petition for
administration on her being a legitimate child who was legally
married to her mother.
Respondent also filed a petition against the adoption of
Consesa Yamat, alleging that as the legitimate child of
Francisco, she should have been notified of the adoption
proceedings. Since the lower court has ruled with finality that
she is not legitimate since no proof has been given as to the
marriage of her parents, this petition has become moot and
academic.
On the matter of administration, it should be noted that the
surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of decedent.
Next of kin refers to the heirs.
DECI: Decision of CA is REVERSED and the order of the
trial court REINSTATED.
1
Arcaba vs. Vda. De Batocael
Art. 87 Every donation or grant or gratuitous advantage,
direct or indirect, between spouses during the marriage
shall be void… The prohibition shall also apply to
persons living together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage.
FACTS
1. Francisco Comille, a 75-year old widower, is the owner of a
property in Zamboanga del Norte with a total area of 418 sq.
meters. After the death of his wife, his mother in law executed
a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, wherein
she waived ¼ of her share of the property to Francisco.
2. Francisco does not have children to take care of him, so he
asked the ff to take care of his house: Leticia Bellosillo – his
niece, Luzviminda Paghacian – Leticia‘s cousin, Cirila Acaba –
petitioner
3. When Leticia and Luzviminda were married, Cirila was the
only one left to take care of Francisco.
4. Before Francisco‘s death, he executed an instrument
entitled ―Deed of Donation Inter Vivos‖ where he gave a portion
of his lot, consisting of 150 sq. meters, together with his house,
to Cirila, who accepted it. Francisco left the rest in his name.
The deed stated that the donation was made in consideration
of the faithful services Cirila had rendered in the past 10 years.
5. In 1991, Francisco died without any children. In 1993, the lot
Cirila received had a market value of P57, 105.
6. Francisco‘s nephews and nieces and heirs by intestate
succession, herein respondents, filed a complaint pleading for
declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos. They
contend that Francisco‘s donation is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code, since Cirila is Francisco‘s common-law wife.
7. Testimonies by Leticia and Erlinda, another niece of
Francisco, claimed that Francisco and Cirila were lovers since
they slept in the same bedroom, and that Francisco had
intimated that Cirila was his mistress. Erlinda added that
Francisco did not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a
househelper, though he provided her family with food and
lodging. Cirila contends that she was a mere helper and only
entered his room when the old man asked her. She says
Francisco is too old for her, and that she never had sexual
intercourse with him.
8. Trial court ruled in favor of the respondents, holding the
donation to Cirila void. They ordered her to deliver possession
of the house and lot to the nieces and nephews.
9. Cirila appealed to the CA which affirmed trial court‘s
decision. Their conclusion was based on (1) testimonies of
Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila (2) documents showing Cirila‘s use
of Francisco‘s surname (3) pleading in another civil case
mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as Francisco‘s
common-law wife and (4) the fact that Cirila did not receive
regular cash wage.
ISSUE: WON CA correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family
Code in ruling the donation void on the ground that it was
granted during marriage and that it applies to persons
living as husband and wife without a valid marriage
HELD/DECI: YES, application was correct. Decision of CA
AFFIRMED. Donation is VOID.
RATIO: (same reasons that CA gave)
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially
when one party is no longer interested in sex due to old age.
Cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman
of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife.
(Bitangcor vs. Tan)
Cirila and Francisco‘s public conduct indicated that their
relationship was more than caregiver and patient, but that of
husband and wife. (Cirila admitted that they lived under one
roof for a long time. Cirila gave him therapeutic massage.
Consummation is likely.)
Documents with Cirila signing using Francisco‘s surname
(Comilla) were presented proving she saw herself as his
common-law wife.
Cirila never demanded for a regular cash wage. Difficult to
believe she stayed with him out of pure beneficence.
Belcodero v Court of Appeals
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Alayo Bosing married Juliana Oday in 1927 and they
had 3 children. In 1946 he abandoned them and lived
with Josefa Rivera (whom he acknowledged as
common law wife Josefa Bosing). They had one child,
Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Belcodero.
He married Josefa Bosing in 1958, while still married
to Juliana.
Alayo purchased parcel of land on installment basis in
1949 and his deed he named Josefina Bosing as his
wife and transferred lot in her name. Final deed
executed in 1959.
Alayo died March 1967. In 1970 Josefa and
Josephine executed a document of extra-judicial
partition and sale of the lot, which was described as
‗conjugal property‘. Josefa‘s share went to Josephine
for P10,000, so Josephine Belcodero had full
ownership. Notice was published.
In October 1980 Juliana (real widow) and 3 children
filed for reconveyance of property. Trial Curt and
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Juliana.
ISSUES:
1.
The husband acquired ownership while living with a
paramour, after deserting his wife. Property bought
prior to effectivity of 1950 Civil Code but the final deed
was ensued after. And the Family Code took effect
1988.
a. Whether the property was acquired in 1949
when he first started paying installment or in
1959 when the deed was finalized, result is
the same. Property belongs to conjugal
partnership of Alayo and legal wife Juliana.
Under old and new Civil Code ―all property is
presumed to belong to conjugal partnership
2
2.
3.
4.
unless it is provided that it is exclusive to
either spouse‖
b. Property acquired by Alayo, he merely had
the title transferred to Josefa‘s name. She
implicitly recognized Alayo‘s ownership when
she and Josephine filed extrajudicial partition
of the said property—the partition would
have conformed with partition in intestancy
had they been sole and legitimate heirs of
Alayo.
Common law spouses
a. In Art 144 and in Maxey v. CA the coownership rule had been repudiated when
either of the spouses had impediments to
marry
b. Art 147 and 148 of Family Code did not
deviate from old rules. Art 148 says that:
when one of the parties is validly married to
another, his or her share of the co-ownership
shall accrue to the conjugal property of the
valid marriage. But the provisions can‘t apply
to this case without interdicting prior vested
rights, so the provisions don‘t apply.
Constructive trust
a. Acc to Art 1456: If property is acquired by
mistake the person obtaining it is trustee for
implied trust
b. The applicable reconveyance period is ten
years. Under the Torrens System the
prescriptive period starts when transaction is
registered and a Certificate of Title is issued.
Josephine Belocdero got the Certificate in
1974 and Juliana filed the case in 1980.
New evidence
a. Juliana married again, but no legal
separation was brought to Alayo during his
lifetime si this holds no relevance
recognition can be filed within 4 years after child
reaches majority. FC does not take away that.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Can the Civil Code Art 285 apply? Yes.
a. Petitioner says Art 285 CC has been omitted
by Art 172, 173, 175 of the Family Code
which outline hoe a child may establish
legitimacy.
b. Under new law the action for recognition
has to be brought within the lifetime of the
alleged parent, so punitive parent can
dispute claim. BUT the FC can‘t prejudice
rights that were already vested prior to
enactment of FC.
c. Adrian, born in 1981, already had vested
right before the enactment of the FC.
Natural children only? No.
a. Petitioner: Art 285 of CC refers to recognition
of natural children. Adrian is not a natural
child because at the time of his conception
his parents were impeded from marrying
each other.
b. SC: In the case of Aruego it was decided
that minors were allowed to file case even if
parents had impediments to marry. The case
of Divinagracia v Rovira says Art 285 also
applies to spurious children.
c. Illegitimate children who were still minors
when FC took effect and whose punitive
parent died during minority are given right to
seek recognition for a period of up to 4 years
after they reach majority. It is a vested right.
DECSISON:
CA decision affirmed, Adrian allowed to prove paternity.
DECISION:
Affirmed, property goes to Juliana.
Buenaventura v Court of Appeals
Date: 31 March 2005
Bernabe v Alejo
Ponente: Justice Azcuna
FACTS
Parties: Noel Buenaventura, petitioner, v Court of Appeals and
Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura, respondents
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Fiscal Bernabe fathered son with secretary Carolina
Alejo. Son born in 1981, named Adrian Bernabe.
Fiscal Bernabe died Aug 1993, Wife Rosalina died.
Daughter Ernestina sole heir.
Carolina filed complaint saying Adrian should be
given share of Adrian‘s estate.
RTC dismissed complaint, father had not
acknowledged
CA ruled that Adrian should be allowed to prove he is
son of Bernabe, under Art 285 of CC action for
Action: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of Court of
Appeals
Facts:


This is actually a petition for certiorari on TWO of the
CA‘s decisions
12 July 1992 Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of both spouses
3






Isabel filed an answer denying that she was
psychologically incapacitated
RTC found that:
o Noel deceived Isabel into marrying him
because he was under parental pressure to
marry; he wasn‘t actually ready to marry –his
career was and still is his first priority
o He couldn‘t related to Isabel or Javy as
husband and father respectively
o He had no inclination to make the marriage
work or any desire to keep Isabel and Javy
o He caused Isabel to suffer mental anguish,
anxiety, besmirched reputation, and
sleepless nights
RTC decision:
o Petition granted; Noel and Isabel‘s marriage
was declared null and void ab initio
o Noel must pay Isabel

Moral damages: 2.5 Million

Exemplary damages: 1 Million with
6% interest from date of decision

Attorney‘s fees: 100,000

Expenses of litigation: 50,000 plus
costs

Liquidation of conjugal partnership
property

50% of Noel‘s
separation/retirement
benefits
(Php1,837,667.89) plus
12% per annum interest
from date of decision

Half of outstanding stock
shares with Manila
Memorial Park and
Provident Group of
companies

Monthly support in favor of their
son, Javy Singh Buenaventura:
15,000
o Custody of Javy to Isabel
o Isabel is authorized to revert to the use of
her maiden name
Noel appealed the RTC‘s decision
o Assailed the RTC‘s decision on the ground
that damages arising as a consequence of
marriage may be awarded (unlike those
arising from a breach in ordinary contracts)
While Noel‘s appeal was pending, Isabel filed a
motion to increase the monthly support, which Noel
filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied or
set for oral arguments
CA decision:
o Issued a Resolution to increase the support
pendent lite to Php20,000 (2 Sept 1996)


Noel filed a motion for
reconsideration questioning the
Decision (13 Nov 1996)
o Dismissed petitioner‘s appeal for lack of
merit and affirmed in toto RTC‘s decision
(Decision: 8 Oct 1996, Resolution: 10
December 1996)

Just because there has
not yet been any decision
in the Supreme Court
where damages for non
performance of marital
obligations has been
awarded, doesn‘t
necessarily mean that no
such award may be made

Noel filed a motion for
reconsideration

Motion was denied
Noel filed for petition for certiorari to question the two
resolutions; SC ordered the two cases consolidated
Issues:




WoN CA abused its discretion when it refused to set
Isabel‘s motion for increased support for hearing
WoN there is a need for CA to increase Javy‘s
monthly support
WoN CA should have examined the list of expenses
submitted by respondent
WoN Petitioner should have been given opportunity to
prove his income to show that he can‘t afford to
increase support
Ruling:



1. CA decision is MODIFIED so that:
o Decision dated 8 Oct 1996 and Resolution
dated 10 December 1996

Moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys‘s fees, and expenses of
litigation are deleted

Half of the petitioner‘s retirement
benefits and shares of stocks will
still be given to the respondent, but
on the basis of liquidation, partition
and distribution of the co-ownership
(not of the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains)

The rest of the Decision are
affirmed
2. Resolutions of 2 Sept 1996 and 13 Nov 1996 for
increased support is MOOT and DISMISSED
On decision #1:
o Division of conjugal assets doesn‘t involve
the annulment of a bigamous marriage

The provisions providing for the
dissolution of the absolute
4
o
community of community or
conjugal partnership do not apply

Applicable property regime is that of
equal co-ownership
Award of damages by trial court is based on
Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code

Art 2217: Moral damages (physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright,
anxiety, besmirched reputation,
etc.) can be recovered if they are
the ―proximate result of the
defendant‘s wrongful act or
omission‖

Art 21: ―Any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a
manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the
damage‖

There is a flaw in the
RTC‟s reasoning, since
the marriage was
declared void through
Art. 36, which states that
the party was
“psychologically
incapacitated to comply”
o Psychological
incapacity: “No
less than a
mental (not
physical)
incapacity that
causes a party
to be truly
incognitive of
the basic marital
covenants that
concomitantly
must be
assumed and
discharged by
the parties to
the marriage…
the intendment
of the law has
been to confine
the meaning of
“psychological
incapacity” to
the most
serious cases of
personality
disorders
clearly
demonstrative
of an utter
insensitivity or
o
o
o
inability to give
meaning and
significance to
the marriage”
(p.269-270)

i.e.
under
Art. 36,
the
party
really
CAN‟T
HELP IT

Contradiction: grounds
for moral
damages=willful act,
grounds for declaring
nullity of
marriage=psychological
INCAPACITY
o Incapacity
means that Noel
couldn‟t have
purposely
deceived Isabel
by willful acts;
he did not do it
ON PURPOSE

If the decision is to stand,
Noel should have been
aware of his disability and
yet willfully concealed it so
that Isabel‘s suffering
would have been ON
PURPOSE (done with
malice)
o There‘s no
evidence to
support this
The award of moral damages has no basis in
law and in fact
Award of exemplary damages can‘t stand
either, because the Civil Code provides that
they are imposed in addition to moral
damages
Because award of moral and exemplary
damages aren‘t justified anymore, the award
of attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses
also doesn‘t have any basis
Cariño v Cariño
2 February 2001, Justice Ynares-Santiago
Facts:
- The deceased, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño (died 23
November 1992), married two women
5
o 20 June 1969, Susan Nicdao (petitioner) – two
children (Sahlee and Sandee Cariño)
o 10 November 1992, Susan Yee (respondent) – no
children, ten years of cohabitation
- 1988: Santiago became bedridden due to diabetes
complicated by pulmonary tubercolosis and Yee took care of
him, and spent for medical and burial expenses
- When he died, both Yee and Nicdao filed for monetary
benefits and financial assistance
o Nicdao got PhP146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig
o Yee got PhP21,000 from GSIS Life, Burial and
burial (SSS)
- RTC ruled in favor of Yee
o Yee filed for collection of at least half of the
PhP146,000 (―death benefits).
o Nicdao had to pay Yee PhP73,000 (half of the
PhP146,000 plus PhP5,000 attorney‘s fees and
costs of suit)
- Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling in toto
o Vda. De Consuegra v GSIS: Court gave half of the
deceased‘s retirement benefits to the first wife,
and the other half to the second wife
 First marriage has not been dissolved, but even
though the second one is void ab initio, it still
needs a judicial declaration of nullity. Therefore,
the conjugal properties are split between the two
marriages.
Susan Nicdao (petitioner)‟s contention:
- CA gravely erred in:
o Affirming the findings of the lower court that Vda.
De Consuegra v. GSIS is applicable to the case
o Applying equity instead of the mandate of the
Family Code
o Not finding the Vda. De Consuegra case to have
been modified by the Family Code
Supreme Court‟s Ruling:
- Petition is GRANTED, CA decision reversed and set aside
and Yee‘s complaint is DISMISSED
- Article 40 of the Family Code says: absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
o Translation: To remarry, you need to show that
the court ruled the previous marriage void
o If you want to invoke the absolute nullity of the
last marriage so that you can remarry, the only
way for the remarriage to be “free from legal
infirmity” is through a final judgment that
declares the last marriage void
o If it isn‟t for remarriage (for example, if it‟s for
determining heirship or legitimacy of children,
settlement of an estate, a criminal case, etc.),
you don‟t need any judicial action to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity
 In those cases, even if they haven‟t been
directly instituted to question the validity of
a marriage, evidence has to be adduced to
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
prove the existence of grounds for rendering
that marriage void.
The Court has sufficient authority to decide whether or not
the two marriages are void; the decision is essential to
figuring out who is entitled to the death benefits
Nicdao and Santiago were married under the Civil Code, and
under the Civil code, without a marriage license, their
marriage is void ab initio. The presumed validity of this
marriage has been overcome
Just because Nicdao and Santiago‟s marriage was void,
doesn‟t mean that Yee‟s marriage with Santiago is valid
either
o There must be a prior judicial declaration of
the nullity of the previous marriage before one
can marry again
 If there isn‟t one, the remarriage is void too.
 This means that Yee and Santiago‟s
marriage is ALSO void ab initio.
Applicable property regime for this case is Arts. 147 and
148, the ―Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage‖ of
the Family Code
Yee and Santiago‘s marriage is bigamous and the applicable
regime is Family Code Art. 148 (bigamous
marriage/adulterous marriage/concubine
relationships/parties married to other persons/married man‘s
multiple alliances)
o Only properties acquired through joint contribution
belong to the co-ownership; salaries and wages
exclusively belong to each party
o Santiago earned the PhP146,000 on his own, so
Yee doesn‘t get any of it; it goes to his legal heirs.
Nicdao and Santiago‘s marriage (legally capacitated but void
for other reasons) applicable property regime is Art. 147
o Properties acquired while they lived together are
joint property and governed by rules on coownership
o The PhP146,000 that Santiago earned is coowned by Nicdao, the other half goes to his heirs,
the children.
Domingo v CA: Court clarified that in Art. 40, a prior and
separate declaration of nullity is all important for
remarriage
Niñal v Bayadog: Court also clarified that it may pass on the
validity of a marriage as long as it‘s essential to the case
o When necessary, final judgment of declaration
of nullity is needed even if it isn‟t for
remarriage
Articles 164, 166 (1) (b) and 167, Family Code
Concepcion v CA (2005)
FACTS

Theresa and Ma Theresa married in 1989 and they
had a son after a year named Jose Gerardo.
However, in 1991, Gerardo filed to have his marriage
with Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He
found out that in 1980, Theresa married a Mario
6





Gopiao, which was still subsisting when they got
married.
The RTC annulled Gerardo and Theresa‘s marriage
on this ground and declared Jose Gerardo as
illegitimate. Custody of the child was given to Theresa
but Gerardo was granted visitation rights.
Theresa moved for a reconsideration of this decision
to have Jose Gerardo‘s surname changed to Almonte,
her maiden surname, because he is after all an
illegitimate child and such children use the mother‘s
surname. At the same time, she asked that Gerardo‘s
visitation rights be taken from him because the father
of an illegitimate child does not have the privilege to
have such rights.
The RTC, by applying the ‗best interest of the child‘
rule found in Article 8 of PD 603 or the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, retained the visitation rights of
Gerardo.
CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. It also held that
an illegitimate kid cannot use his mother‘s surname
motu proprio, because he should file for a separate
proceeding for a change of name.
On consideration, CA reversed its ruling and declared
Jose Gerardo to be the legitimate child of Theresa
and her estranged husband Mario. Gerardo was
denied visitation rights.
ISSUE

Was the CA right in ruling that Jose Gerardo is the
Theresa‘s legitimate child by her first marriage?
SC says yes, but it‘s an iffy decision.
There is a strong presumption in favor of a child‘s legitimacy,
and it can be impugned only by the husband or, in exceptional
cases, the husband‘s heirs. Since Gerardo and Theresa‘s
marriage is void ab initio, he did not acquire the status of being
her husband and has no right to impugn the legitimacy of Jose
Gerardo.
To overthrow presumption of legitimacy based on Art 166 (1)
(b), it must be shown without reasonable doubt that the
spouses cannot possibly have access to each other. In this
case, Mario and Theresa lived within the same city, four
kilometers away from each other. Theresa‘s claim that Jose
Gerardo is illegitimate cannot affect the latter‘s legitimacy
because he was born within a valid marriage. She is not
permitted by law to disavow her child‘s legitimacy because
maternity is never uncertain.
Between Jose Gerardo‘s birth certificate and the quasiconclusive presumption of law of his legitimacy, the latter
should stand because it bears more weight and is in
consonance with the purpose of the law.
RULING
Jose Gerardo is the legit child of Theresa by Mario, and he
should use Mario‘s surname. Gerardo does not have any
visitation rights to Jose Gerardo.
Petition denied.
Articles 150 and 151, Family Code
Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank v Judge Acuña and Moreno
(2006)
FACTS

Private Alfredo Moreno filed a complaint against
Hiyas, his wife Remedios, the spouses Owe and the
Reigster of Deeds of Caloocan Cit y for cancellation
of mortgage. He said that he did not secure any loan
from the petitioner bank or execute any mortgage
contract in its favor. He says that the petitioners were
the only ones benefited by the mortgage and it‘s not
possible for him to have signed the contract because
he was working abroad at the time it was entered into.

Hiyas filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that no
earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made
because the parties involved here are family
members. On the other hand, Moreno says that since
three of the parties are not his family members, such
compromise need not be made before the action is
instituted. He also said that the defendants be
declared in default for not filing an answer in time.

RTC ruled in favor of Moreno and denied the order to
dismiss. It said that when one of the parties to a case
is not a family member, there is no need to show that
earnest efforts towards a compromise have been
made.
ISSUE

Is the RTC correct? YES.
The petition did not go through the CA so it ignored the
hierarchy of courts. On this note, the petition is already
dismissed. But even if it were given due course, the RTC is still
correct.
In Magbaleta v Gonong, the rule was already laid down that
when a stranger becomes party to a suit between family
members, the law no longer requires that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have to be made before the action can
prosper. Article 151 applies only when the suit is exclusively
among family members, and it may be invoked only be a party
who is the same member of that family.
RULING
Petition dismissed
Property relations between husband and wife
Articles 121 and 124, Family Code
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank v Dailo
petition for review on certiorari
FACTS


CA affirmed the RTC decision in favor of Miguela
Dailo, respondent.
Miguela and Marcelino Dailo were married in 1967.
They bought a house and lot during their marriage in
San Pablo City, Laguna but the absolute deed of sale
was executed only in favor of Marcelino and excluded
7




his wife.
In 1993, Marcelino executed a special power of
attorney to authorize a certain Lilibeth Gesmundo to
obtain a loan from petitioner bank HSLB with the
house and lot as security. The property was
mortgaged and the loan was approved in the amount
of P300,000. Miguela did not know about this at
all.
When Gesmundo failed to pay the loan in full upon
maturity, the spouses' property was extrajudicially
foreclosed, sold, and bought by petitioner bank.
Because it was not redeemed after one year, the
bank consolidated their ownership over it.
Marcelino died and it was only then that Miguela knew
of the mortgage, foreclosure and sale of their conjugal
property.
The CA ruled that Art 124 of the Family Code is
controlling in the case because it provided for the
nullity of any encumbrance or disposition without the
knowledge and consent of both spouses.
Petition denied.
HONTIVEROS v RTC
FACTS:




ISSUES

Which provision of law applies—article 493 of the Civil
code or article 124 of the family code? Basically, art
493 provides for the co-owner of a property to have
full ownership of his part and therefore he may
dispose of it as he wants. Because Marcelino was
such co-owner, he can do what he wants with the
property, like mortgage it. On the other hand, art 124
provides for the joint administration of conjugal
properties.
Petitioner says that the framers could not have intended that
the co-owner spouse cannot exercise his full rights because of
the bar in art 124.
There is no marriage settlement between Miguela and her
dead spouse, so their property regime is automatically
conjugal partnership of gains or CPG. If there is no consent
as to the action of one spouse with regards to the
administration of the property, the same is void. Art 124 is
contr

Payment of the principal obligation on the mortgage
should be made by the conjugal partnership because
the loan redounded to the benefit of the family under
Art 121 of the Family Code.
Burden of proof is on the one who alleges that the mortgage
benefited the conjugal partnership. Petitioner bank alleges that
the loan was used to finance the construction of housing units
but it was not adequately proven. Also, since they kept on
saying that Marcelino owned the property in his individual
capacity, it cannot be admitted that the money was used for his
family.





December 3, 1990 – spouses Agusto and Maria
Hontiveros (petitioners), filed a complaint for damages
against Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson.
Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of
land, in the town of Jamindan, Province of Capiz by OCT
No. 0-2124, issued pursuant to the decision of the
Intermediate Appelate Court which modified the decision
of the CoFI of Capiz, in a land registration case filed by
Gregorio Hontiveros.
Petitioners were denied of income from the land as a
result of the filing of the land registration case. Rentals
lost: 1968-1987 66,000 per year; 595,000 per year after
1987.
Answer filed by the respondent denied that they were
married and it also alleged the Gregorio Hontiveros was a
widower and Ayson was single. They alleged that the
possession of the property in question had already been
transferred to the petitioners on August 7, 1985 by virtue
of a writ of possession dated July 18, 1985. Since then,
the petitioners have been receiving rentals from the
tenants of the land. The answer also alleged that the
complaint failed to state a cause action since it did not
allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had
been made, considering that the Agusto and Gregorio are
brothers.
Respondent also contends that the petitioner‘s claim for
damages was barred by prescription with respect to claims
before 1984, that there were no rentals due since Gregorio
was a possessor in good faith and for value; and that
Ayson had nothing to do with the case as she was not
married to Gregorio and did not have any proprietary
interest in the subject property.
May 16, 1991 – petitioners filed an amended complaint to
insert therein the allegation that earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made between the parties but the
same were unsuccessful.
Answer of the respondent: denied the earnest effort that
had been made to reach a compromise agreement but the
parties were unsuccessful.
July 19, 1995 – petitioners moved for a judgement on the
pleadings on the ground that Gregorio‘s answer did not
tender an issue or that it otherwise admitted the material
allegations of the complaint.
November 23, 1995 – trial court denied petitioners‘ motion
and dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint
was not verified as required by article 51 of the FC.
o Art. 151. No suit between members of the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts
were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.
This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be
the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
(222a)
RULING
ISSUES:
8
1.
2.
3.
WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to rule on the
case. YES
WON after denying petitioners‘ motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the trial court could dismiss their complaint
motu proprio for failure to comply with Art. 151 of the
Family Code. NO
WON Article 151 of the Family Code applies in this case.
NO



The phrase ―members of the same family‖ refers to
husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and
descendants, and brothers and sister whether full or half
blood.
Guerrero v. RTC – brothers and sisters does not
comprehend sisters-in-law
Ayson and Maria Hontiveros are considered strangers to
the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.
RATIO:
1. Yes
Juaniza vs. Jose


FACTS

Petition was filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals – Supreme Court is vested with the
power to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on
appeal or certiorari as law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgements and orders of lower court in all
cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
When the appeal would involve purely questions of law or
any of the other cases specified in Article X of the
Constitution, it should be taken to the SC by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rules 42 and 45 of
the Rules of Court.
2. No






Baja vs. Macandong – court cannot dismiss a case motu
proprio without violating the plaintiff‘s right to be heard,
except in the following instances:
o Plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial
o Fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time
o He fails to comply with rules or any order of the court
o Court finds that it has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit.
None of these exceptions appears in this case
The trial court found that judgement on the pleadings in
inappropriate not only for the fact that respondent in their
answer specifically denied the claim of damages against
them, but also because of the rule that the party claiming
damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof –
TRIAL MUST BE HELD
It is improper for the judge to render judgement based on
the pleadings alone. Factual issues have to be resolved:
o Ayson‘s participation and/or liability if any
o Nature, extent and duration of Gregorio‘s possession
of the subject property
Trial Court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground
that it was not verified for which reason the trial court
could not believe the veracity of the allegation.
Absence of verification required by Art. 151 does not affect
the jurisdiction of the court. Verification is merely a formal
requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters
which are alleged are true and correct. The court could
have ordered the petitioners to verify them.
1. Eugenio Jose is the registered owner and operator of a
passenger jeepney involved in accident with a freight train
killing 7 and injuring 5 people.
2. At the time of accident, Eugenio was legally married to a
certain Socorro Ramos, but had been cohabiting with Rosalia
Arroyo for 16 years in a relationship akin to husband and wife.
3. Trial court ordered Eugenio and Rosalia to jointly and
severally pay Victor Juaniza the sum of P1,500 plus legal
interest, as well as jointly and severally pay heirs of the
deceased Josefa Leus, Fausto Retrita, Nestor Anonuevo, and
Arceli dela Cueva in the sum of P12,000 for the life of each
plus legal interest.
4. Rosalia filed for motion for reconsideration. She says she
cannot be held liable under Art. 144 of the Civil Code because
one of the parties (Eugenio) is incapacitated to marry. She also
contends she is not a registered owner of the jeepney and
cannot be held liable for damages.
ISSUES/HELD
1. Is Art. 144 of the Civil Code applicable in this case where
one party in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to
marry? NO
2. Should Rosalia, a non-registered owner of a jeepney, be
held jointly and severally liable for damages? NO
DECI: Rosalia Arroyo is declared free from liability for
damages. Decision is modified.
RATIO
Co-ownership contemplated in Art. 144 requires that parties
living together as husband and wife not be incapacitated to
marry. Eugenio is legally married to Socorro, which is an
impediment to marriage to Rosalia. Rosalia cannot be coowner of the jeepney since this belongs to conjugal partnership
of Eugenio with his legal wife.
Rosalia is not a registered owner of the jeepney and cannot be
liable for damages. Only registered owners of public service
vehicles are responsible for damages arising from its
operation.
3. No


Art 151 does not apply because the suit is not exclusively
among family members.
Ayson is a stranger to the Hontiveros family.
Persons: Family Code: A 176
Leonardo v CA (2003)
9
NO. There is no remedy. Article 176 of the Family
Code repealed Title XIII, Book I of the New Civil Code
regarding the Use of Surnames. Article 254 of the
Family Code reads:
Petitioner Ann Brigitt Leonardo was born July 14, 1993 to
common-law-spouses Eddie Fernandez and Gloria Leonardo.
In her birth certificate, her given surname is that of her mother,
Leonardo.
As petitioner‘s parents later wanted her to carry the surname of
her father, he executed an affidavit and wrote a letter to the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila requesting for the change of
petitioner‘s registered surname.
The Local Civil Registrar of Manila denied the request. Ann
Brigitt, being illegitimate, should carry her mother‟s
surname as provided under:


Article 176 of the Family Code
Article 412 of the New Civil Code which provides that
no entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order
Petitioner‘s parents appealed, citing: Title XIII (Use of
Surnames), Book I of the New Civil Code:

Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both
parents shall principally use the surname of the
father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a
natural child shall employ the surname of the
recognizing parent.
Appeal denied on the ground that neither the Office of the
Civil Registrar General nor any of the Civil Registry Offices in
the country is given the power or discretion to effect an
administrative change of entry in the civil register.

Article 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV
of Book I Republic Act 386, otherwise known as the
Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and
Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and
42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known
as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended
and all laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
The Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of
Article 366 of the Civil Code of the Philippines giving a natural
child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the
surname of the father. The Family Code has limited the
classification of children to legitimate and illegitimate,
eliminating the category of acknowledged natural children and
natural children by legal fiction.
When there is a right, there is a remedy. Conversely, if there is
no right, there is no remedy as every remedial right is based on
a substantive right. Since petitioner was born an illegitimate
child after the Family Code took effect, she has no right to use
her father‘s surname.
Petition denied.
Martinez vs. Martinez
They then went to CA, which held:

Title XIII, Book I of the New Civil Code on the Use of
Surnames was not repealed by the Family Code

The Local Civil Registrar of Manila is not allowed to
administratively correct the entry in the Civil Registry

Petitioner could change her surname by judicial action
ISSUES:
1. WON an illegitimate child born after the effectivity of the
Family Code has the right to use her father‟s surname
NO, by virtue of Article 176 FC. The rule applies even if
petitioner‘s father admits paternity.

Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname
and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate
child.
2. WON resort to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court requiring
judicial proceeding and publication, is the proper action to
be taken to enable the petitioner to use her natural father‟s
surname.
Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were
owners of a parcel of land as well as the house constructed
thereon. Daniel Sr. Executed a Last Will and Testament
directing the subdivision of the property into 3 lots. He then
gave the lots to each of his sons, Rodolfo, Manolo, and Daniel
Jr. Manolo was designated as administrator.
Natividad died on October 1996. Daniel, after suffering a stroke
two years prior, died on October 1997.
Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father
where he appears to have sold Lot 18-B-2, which Rodolfo was
occupying, to Manolo and his wife. The title was also issued to
the spouses on the said deed of sale.
Rodolfo filed for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of
title. He also filed a criminal complaint for estafa through
falsification of a public document. Spouses moved for
cancellation of petition for annulment of deed of sale on the
ground that trial court had no jurisdiction since it has not been
alleged in the complaint that last will of Daniel Sr has been
admitted to probate. Rodolfo then filed petition for probate of
will.
Spouses Martinez wrote a letter to Rodolfo demanding him to
vacate the lot, which he ignored. They then filed complaint for
unlawful detainer against Rodolfo. They allege that they were
the owners of the lot in question and that pursuant to PD 1508,
10
the matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation and
amicable settlement, but none was reached. Rodolfo, in his
answer, allege that complaint failed to state the condition that
earnest efforts for settlement were made but that none was
reached. He also said that dispute had not been referred to
barangay before complaint was filed. Spouses filed an
amended complaint.
Trial court favored Spouses Martinez, holding that the spouses
have sufficiently complied with Article151 of the Family Code .
They ordered Rodolfo to vacate premises.
Court of Appeals reversed this ruling and said the spouses
have not complied with Article 151. They also held that the
defect in their complaint was not cured by filing of an amended
complaint because the latter pleading was not admitted by the
trial court.
ISSUES: WON (a) earnest efforts were made but the same
have failed and that certification to file action and (b)
allegations that the case passed through the
barangay are sufficient compliance to prove earnest
efforts
WON CA erred in finding there was noncompliance with Article 151 given that one of the parties in
the suit is
not a member of the family
RATIO
Article 151 of the Family Code provides:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper
unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but
that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts
were, in fact, made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject
of compromise under the Civil Code.
The phrase "members of the family" must be construed in
relation to Article 150 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or
half-blood.
Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly.
Hence, a sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not included in the
enumeration.
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters."
Court holds that petitioners were able to comply with
requirements of Article 151. Their actions of allegation in the
complaint that they initiated proceeding of unlawful detainer
against respondent, and that no amicable settlement has been
reached , hence, resulting in barangay chairman‘s issuance of
certification to file action, was found to be sufficient.
DECI: petition GRANTED. Decision of CA REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Trial court decision REINSTATED.
Mercado v. Tan
FACTS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Dr. Vincent Mercado was married to Thelma Olivia in
April 1976 by a judge, with a completed marriage
certificate; religious rights followed in Cebu City on
Oct 10, 1976
Dr. Vincent Mercado and Consuelo Tan were married
on June 27, 1991 in front of a judge, marriage
contract duly executed and signed by the parties;
religious rights followed in Bacolod June 29, 1991.
Mercado had 2 children with Olivia and 1 child with
Tan
On October 1992 Tan filed a letter-complaint for
bigamy with the City Prosecutor in Bacolod
On November 1992 Mercado filed for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Olivia. On May 1993 the
marriage was declared null and void
Charged with bigamy (Art 349 Revised Penal Code).
All elements present.
a. Offender was previously legally married
b. First marriage not legally dissolved, or
absent spouse not yet presumed dead
c. He contracted subsequent marriage
d. Second marriage was valid
Mercado said his previous marriage was judicially
dissolved and Tan had knowledge of it
But there was no declaration of nullity before Mercado
contracted his second marriage, hence the bigamy
Court of Appeals Ruling
Also, Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides:"No suit shall be filed
or maintained between members of the same family unless it
should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the
limitations in Article 2035."
It is necessary that every effort should be made towards a
compromise before a litigation which could breed hatred and
passion between family members.
This phrase, "members of the same family," should, however,
be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code,
pursuant to which:
"Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
1.
Bigamy. The nullity of marriage was declared AFTER
the contracting of the second marriage.
ISSUES
1.
Effect of Nullity of previous marriage
a. All elements of bigamy were present.
b. However, Mercado contends that he
obtained judicial declaration of nullity under
Art 36 which means that his marriage is void
and deemed never to have taken place. So
there is no first marriage and no charge of
bigamy.
11
c.
d.
e.
2.
Mercado quotes Reyes commentaries: if first
marriage is void, it is a defense against
bigamy. If it‘s simply voidable it is not a
defense
Respondent Tan counters that the
declaration of nullity came AFTER the crime
of bigamy had been consummated. A judicial
declaration of nullity must be obtained before
contracting a second marriage.
Court agrees with Respondent.
i. Jurisprudence regarding need for
judicial declaration of nullity is
conflicting. In some cases ( People
v. Mendoza, People v. Aragon)
marriage is so obviously void that
no declaration was needed.
However, some subsequent cases
had a need for judicial declaration
of nullity.
ii. In Mendoza and Aragon Court
relied on Sec 29 of Act No. 3613
(Marriage Law) which says
subsequent marriages contracted
by person whose spouse is still
alive is illegal and void from its
performance and no judicial decree
is necessary to establish invalidity
iii. Article 40 of Family Code (a
newer provision) expressly requires
a judicial declaration of nullity. It
changes the old rule which doesn‘t
require a judicial decree.
iv. In Domingo v. CA the court ruled
that a declaration of nullity is now
explicitly required either as a cause
for action or a ground for defense.
In Domingo it specifically states that
with such a declaration a person
who marries again cannot be liable
for bigamy. This case underlined
need for judicial declaration of
nullity, even of the case itself was
more about property.
v. Mendoza and Aragon have been
cast aside. Absent a declaration of
nullity, one may be charged with
bigamy.
vi. Justice Reyes changes his view
because of Article 40. He says a
judicial declaration of nullity is
essential
vii. Court Ruling: Petitioner contracted
second marriage without judicial
declaration of nullity. Even if he did
obtain a declaration, it was too late.
He is guilty of bigamy.
a.
b.
c.
Tan wishes for claim of damages (of
reputation) and attorney‘s fees
No merit; she did not appeal CA ruling
against her so she cannot have affirmative
relief. This court agrees with CA.
CA also said: Tan is not innocent victim, she
was aware of previous marriage, she relied
on hope that 1st wife would not return to
Mercado. She cannot claim damages, her
own personal instigation of this case brought
her humiliation do the damages to her
reputation are her own fault.
DECISION:
Bigamy affirmed.
Concurring and Dissenting:
Vitug
1.
2.
Necessity of judicial declaration of nullity for purposes
of remarriage should only refer to cases where a
marriage has taken place. (none required for gay
―marriages‖ etc)
The complete nullity (void-ness) of a previous
marriage should be capable of being raised a a
defense against bigamy
Mercado-Fehr v Fehr
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Bruce and Elna had a 2 year long-distance
relationship. Elna left Cebu and moved in with Bruce
in Manila. First child born in December of ‘83. They
were married March ‘85. They purchased LCG 204
condo unit in installment with Bruce as the buyer,
Elna was witness to contract and the title was issued
in her name.
The marriage between Elna Mercado-Fehr and Bruno
Fehr was declared void ab initio under Article 36 of
the Family Code. Bruno was psychologically
incapacitated. Court ordered dissolution of their
conjugal property.
Regime of complete separation of property between
spouses is established in accordance with Family
Code. Decision was given Jan 30, 1998.
Custody of children awarded to Elna, she was the
innocent spouse.
Aug 24, 1999 the trial court issued Order resolving
certain property issues. Cars and condo units were
split evenly. Monthly rentals of several LGC condo
units are to be split evenly after tax deduction. Child
support split evenly.
Petitioner has issues with
a. 204 LGC condo unit which was declared
exclusive property of Bruno because it was
acquired before marriage.
Damages
12
c.
i.
7.
8.
Contends that it was purchased on
installment basis when couple was
living together as husband and wife
w/o benefit of marriage. So rules on
co-ownership should apply in
accordance with Art 147 of Family
Code.
b. Child support
i. Contends that it would not be in
children‘s best interests if she
demanded periodical support. She
proposes that 2 condo units be
adjudicated to her so she can use
income as support for children.
TC ruling: Article 147 applies but parties already
agreed to split property 1/3 for Elna, 1/3 Bruce and
1/3 for children. And it affirmed that 204 condo LCG
goes to Bruce because it was acquired before
marriage.
Appeal to CA for certiorari, they dismissed petition for
lack of merit. They said the errors she raised were
errors of judgment and she should have ordinary
appeal not certiorari.
d.
ISSUES:
9.
Petitioner says that certiorari was proper because of
the grave abuse of discretion the CA exhibited in it‘s
ruling about the 204 LCG condo and the 3-way divide
of property.
10. Respondent Bruce says Elna lost right to appeal as
soon as trial court decision became final. He also
says that dividing property into 3 is in accordance with
Family Code Art 50, 51, 147 and 148 which calls for
delivery of presumptive legitime of common children
upon dissolution of property regime. Also claims
condo unit in contention is his.
11. SC says: As a rule, certiorari is generally applied only
when there is abuse of discretion or jurisdiction and
not in errors of judgment. However, the rule is relaxed
if there is mischief, as in this case. Adherence to the
rule will prevent petitioner from significant source of
income.
12. Substantive issue: Ownership of 204 LCG condo unit
and how should the property be divided?
a. In view of the facts of how the 204 LCG unit
was bought court gives credence to Elna that
it was acquired during couple‘s cohabitation.
And so it should be governed by rules of coownership.
b. Article 147 is for parties who are legally
allowed to marry, and not incapacitated
or legally barred to marry but who have a
void marriage. As is the case at bar. Their
provision creates co-ownership with respect
to their properties acquired during
cohabitation.
e.
Vargas v RTC: the term „capacitated‟ in
first paragraph of Art. 147 means legal
capacity. Property acquired by both
spouses thru their work shall be governed by
rules on co-ownership. Any property
acquired during union presumably obtained
thru their joint efforts. Even housewives
contribute efforts through maintaining the
household and are entitled to property as a
co-owner.
For Art 147 to operate, man and woman
should
i. Be capacitated to marry each
other
ii. Live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife
iii. Their union is without benefit of
marriage or marriage is void
1. All these elements present
in this case.
2. The 204 LCG condo was
purchased on July 1983
when parties were already
living together. So it
should be considered
common property.
Common properties: No records support trial
court‘s decision that parties agreed to 3 way
split of property. Elna alleged she wanted a 4
way split.
DECISION
Petition granted, 204 LCG is common property and common
property should be divided in accordance with rules on coownership. Petition granted.
Patricio v Dario III
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
On July 5, 1987 Marcelino Dario died intestate. Wife
Perla Patricio and 2 sons Marcelino Marc and
Marcelino Dario III survive him.
Among properties left behind was a parcel of land
with a residential house and a pre-school in Cubao.
The wife and 2 sons extra-judicially settled estate and
the title was issued in their names.
Then the sons told Perla that they wanted to partition
property and terminate co-ownership. But Perla
refused. So the sons went to the RTC of QC.
RTC ordered the partition Perla 4/6, Marcelino Marc
1/6, Marcelino D 1/6. Also ordered sale of property by
public auction so all parties may bid. In case of failure
13
6.
the property will be distributed in the aforestated
manner.
Sons petitioner to CA using Article 159, saying the
family home should continue despite death of one or
both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary
thereof (the grandson is included in the minor
beneficiaries). Unless court has a compelling reason
the heirs cannot partition property.
ISSUE
1.
Is partition of a family home proper where one of the
co-owners rejects partition on the grounds that a
minor beneficiary still lives in the house?
a. Respondent claims his 12-yr old son is still
living in the family home and even after
death of his father the property is considered
the family home because a minor beneficiary
is living in it
b. Petitioner alleges the property was a family
home for the heirs only until 10th year after
the death of the father. The sons were
already of age by the time the father died so
there are no more minor beneficiaries.
c. SC: The family home is constituted from the
time it is occupied as a family residence.
From time of constitution and so long as any
beneficiaries reside therein, the family home
continues as such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except
as allowed by law.
i. Law provides that occupancy of
family home by beneficiaries must
be actual, not possible or
presumptive.
ii. Property may be occupied by
beneficiaries enumerated in Art
154: 1) husband and wife 2)
parents, ascendants, descendants,
bros & sis (legit or ill)
iii. 3 requisites to be a beneficiary:
1)among relationships in Art 154 2)
live in family home 3) dependent on
head of family for legal support
iv. Art 159 says family home shall
continue despite death of one or
both spouses
d. Tolentino says: No more beneficiaries at
death then family home dissolved. If there
are beneficiaries then family home continues
for 10 years unless there is a minor
beneficiary in which case the family home
continues until that beneficiary comes of
age. Tolentino also says he believes it will
cease to be a family home if it is partitioned.
e. Pineda says: as long as there is a minor
beneficiary residing in the home it is a family
home
f.
2.
Obviously, the intent of the law is to protect
the minor beneficiaries until he reaches legal
age and can support himself
Can the minor son of respondent be a minor
beneficiary?
a. He fulfills the first 2 requisites for
beneficiaries. He is a descendant, living in
the family home. However, he is not
dependent on his grandparents for support,
only his parents. Father has means to
support him and grandmother shows no
willingness to support him.
DECISION:
No legal impediment to partition. Remanded to RTC,
directed to make partition by commissioners. Court should
assign 3 disinterested commissioners to partition.
Badua v CA
DATE: January 24, 1994
PONENTE: Puno
PARTIES: Marissa Benitez-Badua (contested heir) vs. CA,
Victoria Benitez Lirio (Vicente‘s Sister) and Feodor Benitez
Aguilar (nephew)
FACTS:
1. The spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian
owned various properties especially in Laguna.
2. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the
grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate. The fight
for administration of Vicente's estate ensued.
3. Victoria Benitez-Lirio (sister) and Feodor Benitez Aguilar
(nephew) filed before the RTC of San Pablo City for
issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's estate in
favor of Aguilar. Stating that:
“The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives.
Petitioners can well and truly establish, given the chance
to do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel
Chipongian were without descendants and that Marissa
Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them since
childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor
legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir; . . .”
4. Marissa Badua opposed the petition. She alleged that she
is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and
capable of administering his estate.
5. Badua: tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child
of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian by
submitting documentary evidence, among others: (1) her
Certificate of Live Birth, (2) Baptismal Certificate,
(3)Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for
Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her
as his daughter (4) School Records.
She also testified that the said spouses reared and
continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter.
6. Aguilar: proved mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the
said spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage
and despite treatment by a gynecologist, were unable to
physically procreate.
7. RTC: decided in favor of Badua. Dismissed Aguilar‘s
petition for letters and administration and declared Badua
as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses.
14
The RTC relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family
Code.
8. CA: overturned decision of RTC. Ruled that Marissa
Benitez is not the biological daughter or child by nature of
the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and,
therefore, not a legal heir. The CA held that the RTC erred
in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
9. BADUA CONTENTION (SC):
- The CA erred when it failed to apply Arts. 164, 166, 170
and 171 of the Family Code in this case and in
upholding respondent's theory that the instant case
does not involve an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child;
- Assuming arguendo that private respondents can
question or impugn directly or indirectly, the legitimacy
of Marissa's birth, CA committed grave abuse of
discretion when it gave more weight to the testimonial
evidence of witnesses than the documentary and
testimonial evidence of the now petitioner Marissa
Benitez-Badua;
- CA decided the case in a way not in accord with law or
with applicable decisions of the supreme Court, more
particularly, on prescription or laches.
ISSUE:
1. Can Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family
Code apply in this case?
2. WON Marissa Badua is the biological child of the
deceased couple
RULING:
1. NO. The said articles can not be applied.
- A careful reading of the above articles will show that they
do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case,
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or
biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles
govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as
his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the
husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child.
Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of
the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of
his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of
said child.
- CA did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the
case since it is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente
are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel.
Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not
born to Vicente and Isabel.
2. No. Badua is not the biological child of the couple.
- The Certificate of Live Birth that Badua presented did not
stand against testimonies of witnesses and the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased
Isabel Chipongian made by her ―father‖ Vicente Benitez
and ―uncle‖ Dr. Nilo Chipongian, which stated that Isabel
Chipongian died without descendants or ascendants.
- Appellee's evidence is utterly insufficient to establish her
biological and blood kinship with the aforesaid spouses,
while the evidence on record is strong and convincing that
she is not. She may have been treated, cared for, reared,
considered, and loved her as their own child but without
being legally adopted, she can not claim rights afforded to
the legal heirs of the deceased
DISPOSITIVE:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for
lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
NOTES:
a.
-
-
-
-
b.
-
EVIDENCE AGAINST BADUA
Very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian never
became pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a
child.
Isabel's own only brother and sibling, Dr. Lino
Chipongian, admitted that his sister had already been
married for ten years and was already about 36 years
old and still she has not begotten or still could not bear
a child. And he referred her Dr. Constantino Manahan,
a well-known and eminent obstetrician-gynecologist
who treated his sister for a number of years.
There is likewise the testimony of the elder sister of the
deceased Vicente O. Benitez, Victoria Benitez Lirio,
who said that her brother Vicente and his wife Isabel
being childless, wanted to adopt her youngest
daughter and when she refused, they looked for a baby
to adopt elsewhere, that Vicente found two baby boys
but Isabel wanted a baby girl as she feared a boy
might grow up unruly and uncontrollable, and that
Vicente finally brought home a baby girl and told his
elder sister Victoria he would register the baby as his
and his wife's child.
Victoria Benitez Lirio was already 77 years old and too
weak to travel and come to court in San Pablo City, so
that the taking of her testimony by the presiding judge
of the lower court had to be held at her residence in
Parañaque, MM. Considering, her advanced age and
weak physical condition at the time she testified in this
case, Victoria Benitez Lirio's testimony is highly
trustworthy and credible, for as one who may be called
by her Creator at any time, she would hardly be
interested in material things anymore and can be
expected not to lie, especially under her oath as a
witness.
Ressureccion A. Tuico, Isabel Chipongian's personal
beautician who used to set her hair once a week
(Isabel's) residence, likewise declared that she did not
see Isabel ever become pregnant, that she knows that
Isabel never delivered a baby, and that when she saw
the baby Marissa in her crib one day she went to
Isabel's house to set the latter's hair, she was
surprised and asked the latter where the baby came
from, and Isabel said Vicente brought the baby home.
Appellee's birth certificate with the late Vicente O.
Benitez appearing as the informant, is highly
questionable and suspicious. For if Vicente's wife
Isabel, who wads already 36 years old at the time of
the child's supposed birth, was truly the mother of that
child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate,
should the child not have been born in a hospital under
the experienced, skillful and caring hands of Isabel's
obstetrician-gynecologist Dr. Constantino Manahan,
since delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel would
have been difficult and quite risky to her health and
even life? How come, then, that as appearing in
appellee's birth certificate, Marissa was supposedly
born at the Benitez home in Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan,
Laguna, with no physician or even a midwife
attending?
The mere registration of a child in his or her birth
certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a
valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the
status of an adopted child and the legal rights of
such child, and even amounts of simulation of the
child's birth or falsification of his or her birth
certificate, which is a public document.
15
c.
-
-
-
If Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological daughter
of the late Vicente O. Benitez and his wife Isabel
Chipongian, why did he and Isabel's only brother and
sibling Dr. Nilo Chipongian, after Isabel's death on April
25, 1982, state in the extrajudicial settlement when
they executed her estate, "that we are the sole heirs of
the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she
died without descendants or ascendants?"
- Dr. Chipongian, placed on a witness stand by
appellants, testified that it was his brother-in-law Atty.
Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said document and
that he signed the same only because the latter told
him to do so. Why would Atty. Benitez make such a
statement in said document, unless appellee Marissa
Benitez is not really his and his wife's daughter and
descendant and, therefore, not his deceased wife's
legal heir?
- As for Dr. Chipongian, he lamely explained that he
signed said document without understanding
completely the meaning of the words "descendant and
ascendant" This we cannot believe, Dr. Chipongian
being a practicing pediatrician who has even gone to
the United States. Obviously, Dr. Chipongian was just
trying to protect the interests of appellee, the fosterdaughter of his deceased sister and brother-in-law, as
against those of the latter's collateral blood relatives.
d. Before Isabel‘s death, she wrote a note to her husband
pleading him to make Marissa their heir. Obviously,
Isabel had to implore and supplicate her husband to
give Marissa their properties since she knew that
Marissa is not truly their daughter and could not be
their legal heir unless Vincente makes her so.
e. Finally, Victoria Benitez Lirio testified that her brother
Vicente gave the date December 8 as Marissa's
birthday in her birth certificate because that is the
birthday of their (Victoria and Vicente's) mother. It is
indeed too much of a coincidence for the child Marissa
and the mother of Vicente and Victoria to have the
same birthday unless it is true, as Victoria testified, that
Marissa was only registered by Vicente as his and his
wife's child and that they gave her the birth date of
Vicente's mother.
The weight of these findings was not negated by
documentary evidence presented by Marissa, the most
notable of which is her Certificate of Live Birth
purportedly showing that her parents were the late
Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate
registered on December 28, 1954 appears to have been
signed by the deceased Vicente Benitez.
However, this Certificate is sufficiently rebutted by the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
Deceased Isabel Chipongian where Vicente Benitez and
Dr. Nilo Chipongian, stated that "(they) are the sole
heirs of the deceased Isabel Chipongian because she
died without descendants or ascendants".
In executing this Deed, Vicente Benitez effectively
repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner
where it appeared that he was petitioner's father. The
repudiation was made twenty-eight years after he
signed petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.
Manacop v CA
DATE: August 11, 1997
PONENTE: Panganiban
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli
purchased on March 10, 1972 a 446-square-meter
residential lot with a bungalow for P75,000.00.
2. On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L
Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and
F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an
indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an
answer, petitioner and his company entered into a
compromise agreement with private respondent and
agreed that defendants will undertake to pay the amount
of P2,000,000.00 as and when their means permit.
3. On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment
approving the aforementioned compromise agreement. It
enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in good
faith. On July 15, 1986, private respondent filed a motion
for execution which the lower court granted. However,
execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the
sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal
properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the
judgment debt, these chattels were sold at public auction
for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued
by the sheriff.
4. On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a
motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop
the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground
that the judgment was not yet executory. They alleged that
the compromise agreement had not yet matured as there
was no showing that they had the means to pay the
indebtedness or that their receivables had in fact been
collected. They buttressed their motion with supplements
and other pleadings.
5. On August 11, 1989, private respondent opposed the
motion on the following grounds:
(a) it was too late to question the September 23, 1986
Order considering that more than two years had elapsed;
(b) the second alias writ of execution had been partially
implemented; and
(c) petitioner and his company were in bad faith in refusing
to pay their indebtedness notwithstanding that from
February 1984 to January 5, 1989, they had collected the
total amount of P41,664,895.56.
6. On September 21, 1989, private respondent filed an
opposition to petitioner. It alleged that the property
could not be considered a family home on the
grounds that petitioner was already living abroad and
that the property, having been acquired in 1972,
should have to have been judicially constituted as a
family home for it to be exempt from execution.
7. RTC: denied the motion to quash the writ of execution.
Finding that petitioner and his company had not paid their
indebtedness even though they collected receivables
amounting to P57,224,319.75, the lower court held that
the case had become final and executory. It also ruled that
petitioner's residence was not exempt from execution as it
was not duly constituted as a family home, pursuant to the
Civil Code. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with CA.
8. CA: dismissed the petition for certiorari. Saying that:
(a) the judgment based on the compromise agreement
had become final and executory, stressing that petitioner
and his company had collected the total amount of
P57,224,319.75 but still failed to pay their indebtedness
and
16
(b) there was no showing that petitioner's residence had
been duly constituted as a family home to exempt it from
execution. It is the clear implication of Article 153 that
the family home continues to be so deemed
constituted so long as any of its beneficiaries
enumerated in Article 154 actually resides therein.
Conversely, it ceases to continue as such family home
if none of its beneficiaries actually occupies it. There
is no showing in evidence that any of its beneficiaries
is actually residing therein. On the other hand, the
unrefuted assertion of private respondent is that
petitioner Florante Mañacop had already left the
country and is now, together with all the members of
his family, living in West Covina, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.
9. Petitioner and his company filed a motion for
reconsideration. The CA denied the motion. It anchored its
ruling on Modequillo v. Breva, which held that "all existing
family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under
the Family Code." Both the debt and the judgment
preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988. So the case at bar does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided under Article 155
of the Family Code.
10. MANACOP: filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari with SC arguing that the Court of Appeals
misapplied Modequillo. He contends that there was no
need for him to constitute his house and lot as a family
home for it to be treated as such since he was and still is a
resident of the same property from the time "it was levied
upon and up to this moment."
ISSUE:
May a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment
issued before the effectivity of the Family Code be executed on
a house and lot constituted as a family home under the
provision of said Code?
RULING:
YES. The CA committed no reversible error. Its Decision and
Resolution are supported by law and applicable jurisprudence.
FAMILY HOME
Petitioner incurred the indebtedness in 1987 or prior to the
effectively of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Hence,
petitioner's family home was not exempt from attachment
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted
on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family
actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home
as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the
necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending
credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the
home.
Article 155
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment except:
(1)
For nonpayment of taxes;
(2)
For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the
family home;
(3)
For debts secured by mortgages on the premises
before or after such constitution; and
(4)
For debts due to laborer, mechanics, architects,
builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service
or furnished material for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from
the time of the constitution of the family home as such,
and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of
petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether
judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became
a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of
the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family
home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3.
True, under the Family Code the subject property became
his family home under the simplified process embodied in
Article 153 of said code. However, Modequillo explicitly
ruled that said provision of the Family Code does not
have retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August
3, 1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code
had to be followed for a family home to be constituted
as such. There being absolutely no proof that the
subject property was judicially or extrajudicially
constituted as a family home, it follows that the law's
protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioner.
Since the debt involved herein was incurred and the
assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to
August 3, 1988, the petitioner cannot be shielded by
the benevolent provisions of the Family Code.
OCCUPANTS OF FAMILY HOME
In view of the foregoing discussion, there is no reason to
address the other arguments of petitioner other than to
correct his misconception of the law. Petitioner contends
that he should be deemed residing in the family home
because his stay in the United States is merely temporary.
He asserts that the person staying in the house is his
overseer and that whenever his wife visited this country,
she stayed in the family home. This contention lacks
merit.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the
family home either by the owner thereof or by "any of
its beneficiaries" must be actual. That which is
"actual" is something real, or actually existing, as
opposed to something merely possible, or to
something which is presumptive or constructive. 10
Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner
of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be
occupied by the "beneficiaries" enumerated by Article
154 of the Family Code.
Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1)
The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is
the head of the family; and
(2)
Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and
sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate,
who are living in the family home and who depend upon the
head of the family for lead support.
This enumeration may include the in-laws where the family
home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the
law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not
the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for utter lack of
merit. This Decision is immediately executory. Double costs
against petitioner.
Matabuena v Cervantes
DATE: March 31, 1971
17
PONENTE: Fernando
PARTIES: Cornelia Matabuena v Petronila Cervantes
3.
4.
ACTION: Appeal for decision of CFI of Sorsogon
FACTS:
1. Felix Matabuena donated a parcel of land to his then
common law wife, Petronila, in 1956.
2. A few years after the donation, on March 1962, Felix and
Petronila got married.
3. A few months after, in September 1962, Felix died
intestate.
4. His sister and heir (being the only sister and nearest
collateral relative), Cornelia, is claiming the land as part of
her inheritance. Alleging that the land donation was invalid
because when her brother gave it to Petronila, they were
already in a common law relationship.
ISSUE:
WON the prohibition on donation during marriage, applies to
common law marriages as well.
RULING:
YES donation during a common law marriage is also
considered void.
Exempting common law marriages from the bar on
donation is untenable since doing so would defeat the purpose
of the law. The prohibition is in place because the law
recognizes that there is a definite bias on the part of the donee
to his or her spouse, to the detriment of his other heirs. The
purpose of the law is to inhibit this undue influence. For all
intents and purposes, a legal marriage and a common law one
is essentially the same. The undue influence would still be
present even if they are categorically not legally married, as is
evident in the intimacy of living as husband and wife.
Moreover, holding that the prohibition won‘t apply to a common
law marriage would give more benefits and in essence,
rewarding common law relationships over a legal marriage.
Mischief Rule of stat con was applied by the SC.
The intent of the law, which is to prevent an undue
influence over the donee, MUST prevail over the language.
BUT, the lack of validity of the donation does not
mean that Cornelia is the only heir. Before his death, Felix and
Petronila were married. This makes her the widow and a valid
heir of Felix, entitling her to half of the inheritance.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, lower court decision is reversed. Donation is
declared null and void. Case is remanded to lower court for the
appropriate disposition.
Partosa – Jo v Court of Appeals
DATE: December 18, 1992
PONENTE: Cruz
PARTIES: Prima Partosa – Jo (legal wife) v CA and Jose Jo
(philandering husband)
ACTION: Petition to review decision of the CA
FACTS:
1. Jose Jo admits cohabiting with three women and fathering
15 children.
2. Prima Partosa – Jo is the first of these women and had a
daughter (Monina Jo) with Jose. The other women and
children are not parties of the case.
5.
6.
In 1980, Prima filed for judicial separation of conjugal
property in addition to her suit for support against Jose.
The Negros Oriental CFI granted her support but was
silent on the separation of conjugal property. Prima filed
the petition with the CA.
CA: Affirmed the support but dismissed the judicial
separation complaint for lack of cause of action because
separation by agreement was not covered by art 178 of
CC.
Motion for reconsideration by both parties were denied
and they filed with SC. Jose‘s SC case for certiorari was
dismissed for tardiness. BUT the SC upheld the validity of
the marriage between Prima and Jose and affirmed the
obligation of Jose to support Prima and her daughter. The
current case filed is now just about the judicial separation
of the conjugal property.
ISSUE:
1. Can the decision of the trial court still be reviewed even if it
was already final?
- Jose: The decision of the CFI is already final and
executory and can‘t be reviewed. Since the decretal portion
made no disposition on the separation of properties case, it is
impliedly dismissed.
- Prima: The body of the decision will show that it decided
in favor of her regarding the separation of the conjugal
property. She thought this was enough and didn‘t feel she had
to appeal since the decision was in favor of her. It was only
when the CA dismissed the property separation case (thinking
the RTC dismissed it since it wasn‘t in the dispositive) that she
found it necessary.
2. WON a judicial separation of conjugal properties available to
the parties.
- Prima: Agreement with Jose was for her to temporarily
live with her parents during her pregnancy with the
understanding that he will support and visit her but she never
agreed to permanently separate. She actually went back to
Jose but he turned her away. She invokes Art 178 (3) of CC
now Art. 128 of the FC (abandonment and failure to comply
with obligation)
RULING:
1. YES.
The dispositive portion of the CFI decision was lacking.
Prima‘s lawyer should‘ve caught that and taken necessary
action to make sure all the rulings on the text of the decision be
embodied in the dispositive. Nevertheless, technicality should
not prevail over substantive justice. In any case, technical
defect is not insuperable. It was long settled that when a doubt
results from an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion,
the SC by looking at the pleadings and the body of the
decision, could amend the dispositive even if the decision was
already final.
2. YES.
The CA dismissed the case on the ground that the
separation was due to agreement and not on abandonment.
But Prima claims that their agreement to separate was only
temporary until she‘s able to give birth and it only became
permanent when she was turned away by Jose when she
came back to their conjugal house.
There was no abandonment on the part of Prima.
Abandonment implies departure of a spouse with an intent
never to return again, which is not the case with Prima. Jose,
on the other hand, clearly showed no intention to resume a
conjugal relationship when he turned Prima away when she
tried to come home to their conjugal dwelling and when he
18
refused to support her and their daughter. He also freely
admitted to cohabiting with different women and fathering
illegitimate children. These facts and their physical separation
is enough to constitute abandonment as a ground for the
judicial separation of their property.
The separation falls under Art 135 of FC and even
though the amendment is new, the FC was still deemed
applicable because it was viewed in Ramirez v CA that on
reviewing a judgment on appeal, what is considered is not
the law when the appealed judgment was finalized but on
the law prevailing at the time of the rendition of the
appealed judgment.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, petition is granted. CA decision is modified.
The conjugal property is divided between them, share and
share alike. Division shall be implemented by the trial court
after determination of the properties.
Republic v CA and Bobiles
DATE: Jan 24, 1992
PONENTE: Regalado
FACTS:
1. On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles before the
RTC of Legaspi City filed a petition to adopt Jason
Condat, a 6 years old boy who had been living with her
family since he was 4 months old.
2. The testimonies of Zenaida together with her husband,
Dioscoro Bobiles, and Ma. Luz Salameno of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development were
taken and admitted in the proceedings.
3. RTC: On March 20, 1988, the trial court declared that ―the
minor child, JASON CONDAT, be freed from all legal
obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to
his natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes,
the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles,
and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles"
which is the surname of the petitioner.‖
4. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the RTC decision of the court below.
5. PETITIONER CONTENTION: (I‘m assuming Sol Gen
since it is RP vs CA)
a) The CA erred in ruling that the Family Code cannot be
applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed
by Zenaida C. Bobiles;
It argues that the Family Code must be applied
retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles,
as the latter did not acquire a vested right to
adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her
petition for adoption
b) CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision which
granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of
spouses Dioscoro Bobiles and Zenaida C. Bobiles.
the petition for adoption should be dismissed
outright for it was filed solely by private
respondent without joining her husband, in
violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which
requires joint adoption by the spouses.
6. The petition for adoption was filed by Zenaida C.
Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable
was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth
Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption
may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them.
7. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and
while the case was pending on appeal in the CA, the
Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the
said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory.
ISSUE:
1. What statute should apply in the case at bar? Child and
Youth Welfare Code or Family Code? Child and Youth
Welfare Code
2. WON the husband is also party to the Adoption. YES
RULING:
1. Child and Youth Welfare Code should be applied not
Family Code.
- Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, Zenaida had
the right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without
joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her
petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional
right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to
file such petition alone and to have the same proceed
to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in
force at the time, was already vested and cannot be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
- The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in
criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be
ousted by subsequent happenings or events,
although of a character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.
- A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to
comply with a law which was not yet in force and
effect at the time.
- As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in
form and substance in accordance with the law in
governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires
jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the
case.
- Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive
effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to
the qualification that such retrospective application will
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
- A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and
extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of
the holder. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable
title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an
exemption from new obligations created after the right has
vested.
2. Yes the granting of the adoption is not only in favor of
Zenaida but her husband as well even if he wasn‘t
expressly named as petitioner.
- Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the
petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his wife, his
affidavit of consent, shows that he himself actually joined
his wife in adopting the child. The declarations he
submitted and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in
open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner.
- The future of an innocent child must not be
compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to
procedural rules on the form of pleadings.
- It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, as well as
matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should
be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent
purposes of the adoption institution and to protect the
adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to it
as a result of the adoption.
- The approval of the adoption rests in the sound
discretion of the court and should be exercised in
19
accordance with the best interests of the child, as
long as the natural rights of the parents over the child
are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of
grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the
approving official will not be disturbed.
- Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration. They are designed to provide homes,
parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or
orphaned children as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give
them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED.
Saguid v Court of Appeals
DATE: June 10, 2003
PONENTE: Ynares- Santiago
PARTIES: Jacinto Saguid v CA, RTC of Marinduque and Gina
S. Rey
ACTION: Petition for review on Certiorari on the decision of the
CA
FACTS:
1. Gina was married but separated de facto from her husband
when she met Jacinto. (She was 17)
2. After a brief courtship, they cohabited as husband and wife
on a house built on a lot owned by Jacinto's dad.
3. Jacinto was a patron of a fishing vessel and Gina was a fish
dealer.
4. Gina had a bad relationship with her in laws and decided to
work in Japan as entertainer for 2 years.
5. When the conflict remained unresolved, they decided to end
their 9 year cohabitation.
6. Gina then filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of
Personal Property with Receivership in the RTC of
Marinduque.
7. Gina: - contributed 70,000 to the construction of the house
- acquired and accumulated appliances worth 111,375.00
- had 35,465 in the joint bank account
8. Jacinto: only his income was used on the construction of the
house and Gina didn‘t work continuously in Japan only on 6
months increments for each year and her earnings was used
for the daily needs and business of her parents.
9. RTC Decision: allowed Gina to present evidence ex parte
since the petitioner, Jacinto, failed to file a pre-trial brief as
required by an SC Circular.
- Found for the respondent (Gina) and directed Jacinto to
reimburse her 70,000 for her contribution in the construction of
the house, instructing him to return the personal properties she
claimed was hers and pay moral damages amounting 50,000.
10. CA Decision: affirmed decision of RTC but deleted, for lack
of basis, the moral damages award of 50,000
ISSUE:
1. WON trial court erred in allowing respondent to present
evidence ex parte
2. WON trial court‘s decision is supported by evidence
RULING:
1. NO the trial court didn‘t err in allowing Gina to give
evidence ex parte (heard one side only).
Rules of court are important and should be taken
seriously. Non observance may result to in prejudice to a
party‘s substantive rights. Jacinto argues that he didn‘t
have a lawyer so he wasn‘t able to file a pre trial brief. This
justification is not enough to relax the application of the
rules. The assistance of lawyers, though desirable, is not
indispensible in non-criminal proceedings. The legal
profession is not engrafted in due process that the
absence of participation of its members deems this
safeguard violated. The petitioner could‘ve inquired from
the court or filed for a motion to extend the filing of the
brief, instead, he waited 14 days from the receipt of the
ruling before he filed a motion asking the court to excuse
his failure to file a brief.
2. The CA decision is affirmed with modification.
Since Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry
during their cohabitation, art 148 of the FC applies in
their relationship (bigamous marriage): only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their contribution
and proof of the actual contribution is required.
Although the adulterous cohabitation commenced
before the affectivity of FC, Art 148 was meant to fill
up the gap left by art 144 of CC that had no provision
governing property relations of couples living in
adultery, so art 148 applies.
The burden of proof rests upon the party to prove
their contribution in the acquisition of the property else
it would be divided in half. Contentions must be
proved by competent evidence and must rely on the
strength of party‘s own evidence not the weakness of
the opponent‘s defense. This rule is more rigorously
applied in this case since she was already allowed to
produce evidence ex parte. Ex parte proceedings
don‘t give automatic relief. To protect the other party,
she must still prove her allegations and only when the
court is convinced by her argument can she get the
relief she wants.
Though Gina alleges contributing 70,000 in the
house, she produced no proof. The records she gave
only show 11,413.00 worth of receipts in her name
that was used to buy construction materials.
Though they obviously both contributed to the joint
bank account, she can‘t prove the exact amount of
money she gave so it will be presumed they
contributed equally to the account.
This goes the same with the appliances. She will get
half of the estimated value (111,375) so they‘ll get
55,687.50 each.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed
with modification. Gina S. Rey is declared co-owner of the
house to the extent of 11,413.00 and personal properties of
55,687.50. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the amount of
67,100.50 to the respondent and failing which, the house shall
be sold at public auction to satisfy respondent‘s claim.
Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun (June, 1984)
J. Melencio-Herrera
20
Art. 87/FC: Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage,
direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage
shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may
give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The
prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage. (Article taken from
A133/Old Civil Code- OCC)
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Petitioner Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas and Fernando
Canullas married Dec 12, 1962; five children. Lived in
a small house on disputed residential land in
Pangasinan. FC inherited land in 1965 when his
father died.
1978, FC abandoned family and lived with Corazon
Daguines. During pendency of instant appeal, the
two were convicted of concubinage (CFI final
judgment, 1981).
Apr 1980, FC sold said property with the house
thereon to CD for P2K. FC said in document sale that
land was inheritance from parents.
Unable to take possession of land, CD filed complaint
Jun, 1980 for quieting of title and damages against
MCC.
a. MCC resisted:
i. house and trees on land were built
with conjugal funds and through her
industry.
ii. Sale of land together with house
and improvements to CD was null
and void (NV) bec they are conjugal
properties and she had not given
consent to sale.
b. CFI orig. decision: CD lawful owner of land
and half of house thereon.
NOTE HERE: CFI thinking was that land was
FC‘s alone so he could sell it. House being
conjugal property, half of which he could sell.
c.
After MCC made MR, CFI amended
decision:
i. CD true owner of land and the 10
coconut trees
ii. Sale of conjugal house to CD NV
plus 3 coconut tree and other crops
thereon during conjugal relation bet.
FC and MCC.
NOTE HERE: CFI thinking was that land was
FC‘s alone so he could sell it. House
thereon was conjugal property so sale of
which w/o wife consent was void.
NOTE HERE: Whereas CFI thinking was that land was FC‘s
alone so he could sell it, SC in correction says that sale of land
was contrary to law, public morals and public interest.
Meanwhile, both courts agree that house could not be sold. In
sum, both land and house goes to widow (the lawful wife).
Rationale:
1. A 158(2)/OCC: ―xxx ―Buildings constructed at the
expense of the partnership during the marriage on
land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to
the partnership, but the value of the land shall be
reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.‖
Court says that pursuant to A 158(2)/OCC, both the
land and building belong to conjugal partnership but
conjugal partnership is indebted to husband for value
of land. Spouse owning lot becomes creditor of
conjugal partnership for value of the lot wc value
should be reimbursed at liquidation of conjugal
partnership.
2. CFI Judge Fortun relied on Maramba v. Lozano: land
belonging to one of spouses becomes conjugal
property only when conjugal partnership is liquidated
and indemnity is paid to owner of land.
a. But Court followed Padilla v. Paterno (JBL
Reyes; pp. 679) wherein reimbursement
happens after liquidation of conjugal
partnership and conjugal property happens
at marriage. Court deemed it better ruling:
FC could not have alienated house and lot to
CD bec MCC had not given consent to said
sale. Contract NV for being contrary to
public morals and public policy. Sale made
to a concubine after he left family and left
conju home where wife and children support;
subversive to stability of family.
3. A1409/OCC: contracts whose cause contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy
are void and inexistent from the very beginning.
Same idea in A 1352/OCC.
4. A133/OCC: Law prohibits spouses from selling
property to each other subject to certain exceptions.
Also, donations bet spouses during marriage are
prohibited. The reverse will destroy system of
conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law.
Prohibition designed to prevent exercise of undue
influence by one spouse over the other as well as to
protect marriage.

Prohibition applies to common-law
relationship for same reason said in
Matabuena v. Cervantes 1971. Case cites
Buenaventura v. Bautista and Matabuena.
Issue:
1.
2.
Was sale of land by FC to mistress valid even if he
owned it prior to marriage with legal wife?
Was sale by FC to mistress of house, which was built
on said land during said lawful marriage, valid?
Held: NO to both. CFI Judge Fortun‘s decision was set aside
and sale of lot and improvements thereon NV. Land could not
have been sold to the mistress given A133/OCC. In this case,
even if sale of land was done legally, reimbursement which
happens before conjugal partnership takes effect, goes to
widow.
Maquilan v. Maquilan (June, 2007)
J. Austria-Martinez
Art. 134/FC: In the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either
be voluntary or for sufficient cause. (190a)
Facts:
1.
Petitioner and respondent are spouses who were
married and had a son.
21
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Issue:
1.
2.
Husband Virgilio Maquilan (VM) discovered wife Dita
Maquilan (DM) had a paramour. DM and paramour
were sued by VM for adultery and the two were
convicted.
After, DM filed for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of
Gains and Damages with RTC, imputing
psychological incapacity on part of VM.
a. During pre-trial of said case, VM and DM
entered into a Compromise Agreement
(COMAG).
i. Therein, parties agreed to certain
partition of their properties and
savings between them, with some
going to their common child.
ii. COMAG also said that such was
only partial settlement, i.e., without
prejudice to the litigation of other
conjugal properties that have not
been mentioned.
Said COMAG was given judicial imprimatur by
respondent judge.
But VM filed Omnibus Motion, praying for repudiation
of COMAG and the reconsideration of Judgment on
COMAG on grounds that his previous lawyer did not
intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the
consequential effects of the COMAG.
a. Judge denied Omnibus Motion.
b. VM filed for MR but same was denied.
VM filed for certiorari and prohibition with CA.
Arguments: COMAG should have been repudiated
since DM, having been convicted of adultery, is
therefore disqualified from sharing in the conjugal
property.
CA dismissed petition for lack of merit, saying
adultery does not ipso facto disqualify her from
sharing in the conjugal property. Also, CA noted that
spouses voluntarily separate their property through
COMAG with court approval under A134/FC. Claim
on lawyer not having informed VM of legal effects of
COMAG is untenable in that simple language of the
COMAG was not difficult to understand for the
average person and hence did not vitiate his consent.
WON a COMAG entered into by spouses, one of
whom was convicted with adultery, giving the
convicted spouse a share in the conjugal property,
valid and legal.
WON the partial voluntary separation of property
made by spouses pending petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage is valid.
place except by judicial order. Such judicial
separation of property may either be voluntary or for
sufficient cause. COMAG was judicially approved
and was one allowed by law. This conclusion holds
true even if the proceedings for the declaration of
nullity of marriage was still pending. But Court must
stress that this voluntary separation of property is
subject to rights of all creditors of the conjugal
partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary
interest pursuant to A36/FC.
Villanueva v. CA (April, 2004)
J. Carpio
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her
share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if
both parties are in bad faith. (144a)
Facts:
1.
2.
Decision:
1. Valid
2. Valid
Rationale:
1. Law does not disqualify a spouse convicted of
adultery from sharing in conjugal properties.
Disqualification in A43/FC applies only in void
marriages while that in A63/FC refer to effects of legal
separation; both not applicable to instant case.
2. Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in
the marriage settlements, the separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take
3.
Eusebia Napisa Retuya (ENR) is legal wife of Nicolas
Retuya (NR), married Oct 1926; 5 children. During
marriage, they acquired real properties and all
improvements in Mandaue City and Consolacion,
Cebu (Case enumerated 20 parcels of land).
a. One of those parcels of land was in the
name of Pacita Villanueva (PV).
b. Also, NR is co-owner of a parcel of land in
Mandaue wc he inherited from parents.
c. Some of abovementioned properties earn
income from coconuts and the other
lands/houses are leased to a number of
individuals and corporations.
In 1945, NR no longer lived with legit family and
cohabited with PV with whom he had an illegitimate
son, Procopio Villanueva (PRV).
a. Nicolas then was the only person who
received income of abovementioned
properties.
b. Pacita from time of concubinage with NR, no
occupation, no properties.
In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke, could not talk nor
walk. From time NR suffered stroke until present,
PRV has been receiving income of said properties.
a. Daughter Natividad Retuya (DNR) asked
PRV that they talk things over but PRV said
it was not yet time to talk about the matter.
22
b.
4.
5.
No settlement was reached between
legitimate family and the illegitimate family.
Oct 1988, ENR filed complaint before RTC against
NR, PV and PRV, seeking reconveyance from NR
and PV of several properties as such were her
conprops with NR. She also prayed for accounting,
damages and delivery of rent and other income from
subject properties.
a. At the court, DNR testified that land in name
of PV was property bought by NR from one
Adriano Marababol for at time of purchase,
PV had no means of livelihood.
b. RTC decided in favor of Eusebia.
c. The petitioners appealed to CA. Eusebia
died and so heirs substituted her pursuant to
CA resolution. CA upheld RTC decision.
d. Petitioners filed for MR but it was denied.
Petitioners went to SC.
a. RTC and CA were one in saying PV failed to
rebut presumed conjugality of properties
under A116/FC.
b. Petitioners sought reversal and raised
among others (as conjugality and bar by
prescription on action for reconveyance over
lot under PV name. They are off-tangent to
topic though) whether CA erred in not
applying instead presumption under
A148/FC in favor of co-ownership bet NR
and PV.
Issue: Did CA err in not applying instead presumption under
A148/FC in favor of co-ownership bet NR and PV?
Decision: NO. CA was correct in not applying instead
presumption under A148/FC in favor of co-ownership bet NR
and PV.
Rationale:
1.
2.
Petitioner‘s reliance on A148 of FC is misplaced. A
reading of said provision shows there must be proof
of ―actual joint contribution‖ by both live-in partners
before the property becomes co-owned by them in
proportion to their contribution.
The presumption of equality of contribution in
A148/FC arises only in the absence of proof of their
proportionate contributions, subject to condition that
actual joint contribution is proven first. Petitioners
failed to provide such proof of actual joint contribution
in the acquisition of land in PV name. Hence, no coownership and no presumption of equal sharing.
Persons: Property relations: Art. 148
28 July 1997
Agapay v Palang
Ponente: Justice Romero
SUMMARY: Miguel Palang married Carlina, left for Hawaii,
and then refused to return to her and their daughter, Herminia.
Instead, he married Erlinda Agapay (the marriage was void,
since he was still married to Carlina), bought some rice land
and a house and lot, and had a son, Kristopher, with Erlinda.
Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of the crime of
concubinage. After he died, Carlina and Herminia demanded
that they get the properties Miguel bought while he was living
with Erlinda. The RTC ruled that the properties would go to
Erlinda and Kristopher. The CA reversed the decision and
gave the properties to Carlina and Herminia. Kristopher wasn‘t
officially recognized as Miguel‘s illegitimate child. The
Supreme Court ruled that under Art. 148, Erlinda should
have made an actual contribution to the purchase of the
rice land if she wanted to have a share in it. Since she
didn‟t, she and Kristopher weren‟t entitled to any part of it.
As for the house and lot, the sale was under Erlinda‘s name,
but the money was Miguel‘s, making it a donation to her. Art.
87 prohibits donations made between people who are living
together as husband and wife.
FACTS:
- Case is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of
Appeals
- Miguel Palang married respondent Carlina (or Cornelia)
Vallesterol in 1949, then left to work in Hawaii. They had
one child in 1950: Herminia
o Miguel tried to divorce Carlina as early as 1957, and
when he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live
with Carlina and Herminia
- 15 July 1973: Miguel (63) married Erlinda Agapay (19,
petitioner)
o Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly
purchased a parcel of rice land which was issued in
their names
o 23 September 1975: Erlinda allegedly bought a house
and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan. It was issued in her
name
o They had a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on 6
December 1977
- 30 October 1975: Miguel and Carlina Palang executed a
Deed of Donation as a compromise agreement. They both
agreed to donate their conjugal property to Herminia
Palang.
- 1979: Upon Carlina‘s complaint, Miguel and Erlinda were
convicted of Concubinage
- 15 February 1981: Miguel died
- 11 July 1981: Carlina Palang and Herminia Palang de la
Cruz instituted the case at bar
o They wanted recovery of ownership and possession
with damages against Erlinda
 They wanted the rice land and the house and lot
that Miguel allegedly bought while he was living
with Erlinda
- Lower Court: DISMISSED Carlina‘s complaint. There was
little evidence to prove that the properties were Carlina
and Miguel‘s conjugal properties, and the Lower Court
provided for the intestate shares of the parties
o It confirmed the fact that Erlinda Agapay exclusively
owned the house and lot in Binalonan and that she
owned half of the rice land in Binalonan
o It adjudicated to Kristopher as his inheritance, half of the
rice land; as long as he executes a quit-claim within 15
days, renouncing claims to annul or reduce Herminia‘s
donation from her parents
- Court of Appeals: REVERSED the trial court‘s decision
o Declared that Carlina and Herminia were the owners of
the properties
o Ordered Erlinda to vacate the properties and deliver
them to Carlina and Herminia
o Ordered the Pangasinan Registrar of Deeds to cancel
the Transfer Certificates of Title and issue another
certificate of title in Carlina‘s and Herminia‘s names
23
ISSUES
o Erlinda claims that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. In not sustaining the validity of the deeds covering the
absolute sale of the rice land and the house and lot
2. In not finding that Kristopher should be considered partydefendant in the case before the trial court
3. In not declaring Kristopher as Miguel‘s illegitimate son and
thus entitled to inherit from Miguel‘s estate
SUPREME COURT RULING
Petition DENIED, challenged CA decision AFFIRMED
HELD
- Petitioner Agapay‘s claims have no merit
1. The deeds of sale of the properties should go to Carlina
and Herminia
- Deeds of conveyance were valid
- Applicable provision of law is Art. 148 of the Family
Code: property regime for when a man and a woman
who aren‟t capacitated to marry cohabitate or live
under a void marriage
o Miguel and Erlinda married in 1973, but their union
was void because Miguel was still married to
Carlina.
o Art. 148: only properties acquired by both through
actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common, in
proportion to their respective contributions. If a
party‟s contribution isn‟t proven, there will be no coownership and no presumption of equal shares
- Rice Land:
o CA correctly ruled that it would revert to Miguel and
Carlina‘s conjugal partnership
o Purchase was made when Erlinda was only 20; she
couldn‘t have been able to have contributed the
PhP3750 that she claims was her share in the purchase
price. Also, Miguel was already 64 and a pensioner of
the US Government
- House and Lot:
o Erlinda allegedly bought it for PhP20,000, but the notary
public testified that Miguel provided the money and
simply asked that Erlinda alone be placed as vendee.
 This makes it a donation, which is void under Art.
739 of the Civil Code since it was made by persons
guilty of concubinage
 Art. 87 also expressly provides that donations
between spouses now also applies to donations
between those who cohabitate as spouses
- The fact that Miguel and Carlina agreed to donate their
conjugal property to Herminia is immaterial. It doesn‘t
count as a judicial confirmation of separation of property
since it wasn‘t specifically and expressly for separation of
property.
2. Kristopher‘s claim as illegitimate son and heir to Miguel‘s
estate should have been ventilated in the proper probate
court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose.
An unrecognized child has no rights from his parents or to
their estate
3. Kristopher had not been impleaded before the trial court
and therefore was not involved in the case at bar
Property relations: Art 121 Family Code
Ayala Investment and Development Corp v. CA (1998)
Private respondents: spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching
FACTS:
1.
Respondent Alfredo, as executive VP of Philippine
Blooming Mills, made himself answerable with PBM‘s
indebtedness to Ayala when he executed security
agreements. PBM failed to pay the P50M loan.
2. Ayala filed a case for sum of money with CFI Pasig,
which in turn ordered PBM and Alfredo to pay Ayala.
While appeal of the judgment was pending, the lower
court issued a writ of execution. There, a sheriff sale
was conducted on 3 of the respondents‟ conjugal
properties. An auction sale of the properties was
scheduled.
3. The spouses sought to enjoin the auction sale. Lower
court favored the spouses. Ayala filed with CA, which
in turn, enjoined the lower court from enforcing its
order (to suspend auction sale). So, the auction sale
took place. Ayala was the only bidder (as usual), and
was issued a Certificate of Sale and later, Final Deed
of Sale.
4. A different legal situation arose because 2 of the
properties are in the name of Encarnacion Ching, a
non-party to the case before CFI Pasig.
5. So CFI Pasig proceeded with the trial. It decided that
the sale on execution was null and void. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Art 121 FC: ―The conjugal partnership shall be liable for… all
debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains.‖ (Art 161 CC is similarly worded.)
Ayala‘s main contention: The conjugal partnership of the
spouses is liable for Alfredo‘s obligation. There‘s no need to
prove that actual benefit redounded to the benefit of the
partnership. The transaction Alfredo entered into was for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
ISSUE: Is the agreement that Alfredo entered into considered
―for the benefit of the conjugal partnership‖ which is chargeable
against the conjugal partnership?
RULING:
NO. Alfredo acted only as a surety or guarantor, i.e., he did
not directly receive the money and services to be used for his
own business or profession… unless Ayala can prove that the
conjugal partnership actually benefited from the contract. Ayala
failed to do so.
Ayala merely cited as benefits the prospects of longer
employment and probable increase in the value of stocks of
the family in PBM. The Court said these were indirect and
remote, incidental and speculative—not the benefits referred to
by Art 121 FC and Art 161 CC.
The contract of loan is clearly for the benefit of the
principal debtor (PBM), and not for his family. PBM has a
personality distinct from Alfredo‘s family, even if the family
owns stocks in PBM.
It was a corporate debt. And Ayala‘s right of recourse against
Alfredo as surety is only to the extent of his corporate
24
stockholdings. It does not extend to the conjugal partnership of
gains of Alfredo‘s family.
stopped supporting Joanne. He said he wasn‘t the father.
(cue Maury / Jerry Springer audience) Thus, the complaint.
Why does the contract have to be those that redounded to the
benefit of the family and that the measure of the partnership’s
liability is to the extent that the family is benefited? Because
the law’s concern is for the conservation of the conjugal
partnership, for the husband’s duty to protect and safeguard, if
not augment. Not to dissipate it.
The RTC ordered Rogelio to recognize Joanne as his natural
child, and to provide support of P10,000 as well as pay
attorney‘s fees and the costs of the suit. Then, in a new trial,
the RTC held that, because Joanne was born during Jinky‘s
marriage to the Japanese guy, the law presumes that Joanne
is a legitimate child of that marriage (Art 164 FC). The child is
still presumed legitimate, even if the mother may have
declared against her legitimacy (Art 167 FC). Art 166 provides
for the grounds upon which one may impugn the legitimacy of
a child—physical incapacity, having the husband and wife live
separately such that sex was not possible, and serious illness
of the husband which prevented sex.
Babiera v Catotal
IMPORTANT THINGS TO REMEMBER:
Art. 171 of the Family Code: ―The heirs of the husband may
impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in
the preceding article only in the following cases:
1. If the husband should die before the expiration of the
period [1 year if husband/heirs reside in the city or
municipality where the birth took place, 2 years if within
the Philippines, 3 years if abroad –Art. 170] fixed for
bringing his action
2. If he should die after the filing of the complaint without
having desisted therefrom; or
3. If the child was born after the death of the husband.‖
Main point of the case: Presentaction B. Catotal asks that
Teofista Guinto‘s birth certificate be cancelled. Teofista claims
that she is Hermogena and Eugenio Babiera‘s legitimate child,
and she presents her (clearly forged) birth certificate as proof.
The case doesn‟t apply to Art. 171, since it doesn‟t involve
impugning Teofista‟s legitimacy as Hermogena‟s child, but
whether or not Teofista is Hermogena and/or Eugenio‟s
child at all.
Evidence showed that the Japanese guy lived outside the
country and came home just once a year. No evidence was
shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year preceding
Joanne‘s birth. On the other hand, Rogelio admitted to having
shouldered all the hospital bills from Joanne‘s birth. He also
admitted that he and Jinky used to go to motels and that he still
used to see Jinky even after Joanne was born. The RTC thus
found that Joanne was the illegitimate child of Jinky and
Rogelio. BUT, he died during the pendency of the case with
the Court of Appeals, so Rogelio was substituted by his
estate—the Estate of Rogelio Ong.
The CA set aside the decision of the RTC and ordered the
parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis in order to
determine Joanne‘s paternity. The CA held that DNA paternity
testing would be the most reliable and effective method of
settling the paternity dispute.
The SC focused on the issue of the propriety of the CA
decision remanding the case to the RTC for the conduct of
DNA testing.
DNA TESTING!
Paternity and Filiation: Rule on DNA Evidence
Estate of Rogelio Ong v Diaz
December 17, 2007
Joanne Rodjin Diaz, a minor represented by her mother and
guardian, Jinky Diaz, had filed a complaint before the RTC of
Tarlac City for compulsory recognition, with a prayer for
support, against Rogelio Ong. Joanne wanted:

Rogelio Ong to recognize her as his daughter

Rogelio Ong to give her monthly support of P20,000
pendente lite and to fix monthly support

Rogelio Ong to pay her attorney‘s fees of P100,000

Other such relief as may be just and equitable
Jinky had met Rogelio when she was already married to a
Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding on
February 19, 1993 by an MTC judge. However, Jinky and
Rogelio were so in love that they decided to live together (IN
SIN!) from January 1994 to September 1998. It is from this
relationship that Joanne was conceived AND subsequently
born, on February 25, 1998. Rogelio took care of Joanne and
Jinky—he brought them home, paid all the hospital bills, paid
for all the baptismal expenses, provided for all Joanne‘s needs,
effectively recognizing Joanne as his child. However, in
September 1998, Rogelio abandoned Joanne and Jinky, and
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a
biological sample obtained from an individual is examined.
The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile,
for the individual from whom the sample is taken.
Petitioners contend that it would be impossible to conduct DNA
testing, since Rogelio has already died. However, Section 4 of
the New Rules on DNA Evidence, which allow the conduct of
DNA testing, provide that

as long as a biological sample exists

and it has not been previously subjected to DNA
testing OR the results of a prior DNA test require
confirmation

the DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique

the DNA testing has scientific potential to produce
new information that is relevant to the resolution of
the case

and the existence of other factors, if any, which the
court may consider as potentially affection the
accuracy/integrity of the DNA testing.
It is evident from this section that the death of Rogelio
does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing,
for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples
of his DNA. ―Biological sample‖ means any organic material
originating from a person‘s body. Petitioners have not shown
25
the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample
that can be used for DNA testing. Also, it was held in Tecson v
COMELEC that the physical residue of the long-dead parent
could be resorted to, for DNA testing.
The petition for review of the decision and resolution of the CA
is thus dismissed.
Magbaleta v Gonong
April 22, 1977
Rufino Magbaleta, his wife Romana Magbaleta, and another
person, Susan G. Baldovi, filed a petition praying for a
preliminary injunction against the orders of respondent Judge
Arsenio Gonong. The assailed orders denied petitioners‘
motion to dismiss a complaint filed against them by Rufino‘s
brother, Catalino Magbaleta.
The original case was this: Catalino had filed a suit to have a
parcel of land, which was in Rufino‘s name, be declared in his
name instead. Catalino had also claimed that Susana Baldovi,
the third petitioner, was trying to take possession of said land
from his representative. Susana, on the other hand, had
claimed that she had bought the land from spouses Rufino and
Romana.
The main contention is this: That the assailed orders violated
Article 222 of the Civil Code, and Section 1 Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court, which provide that, before suits within the same
family can be filed, an earnest efforts towards compromise had
been made. It is contended that Catalino had not alleged that
such earnest efforts towards compromise had already been
made before he filed his complaint.
Judge Gonong had refused the petitioners‘ complaint to
dismiss because one of the parties, Susana Baldovi, is a
stranger—thus, the aforementioned legal provisions did not
apply to this case.
The SC held that Judge Gonong‘s ruling was correct. While it
is necessary that every effort towards compromise be
made before litigation ensues within a family, this is not a
prerequisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a
stranger to the family is a party therein. It is neither
practical, nor fair, that the determination of the rights of a
stranger to the family be made to depend on the way how the
family settles its differences.
Petition dismissed.
DOMINGO v CA
DATE: September 17, 1993
PONENTE: Justice Romero
PARTIES: Roberto Domingo v CA and Delia Soledad Avera
ACTION: PETITION for review of the decision of the CA (that
dismissed Domingo‘s petition to dismiss Delia Avera‘s petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of
Property).
FACTS:
1. Delia filed a petition before RTC of Pasig against Roberto
Domingo.
2. They were married November 29, 1976 but unknown to
her, Roberto already had a previous marriage with
Ermelina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which was still valid
and existing. She only found out when in 1983 Ermelina
sued them for bigamy.
3. Since 1979, Delia has been working in Saudi Arabia and
she used to come to the Philippines only when she would
avail of the one-month annual vacation she‘s given.
4. Since 1983 up to the present, Domingo has been
unemployed and completely dependent upon her for
support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings,
she purchased real and personal properties which are
under the possession and administration of Roberto
5. In June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman
and she further discovered that he had been disposing of
some of her properties without her knowledge or consent
6. Thereafter she appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as
her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties
7. Domingo failed and refused to turn over the possession
and administration of said properties to her
brother/attorney-in-fact.
8. The petition in the Pasig RTC

Petitioner of that case (respondent in this one),
Delia wanted
- temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued enjoining Domingo from exercising
any act of administration and ownership over said
properties
- their marriage be declared null and void and of no force
and effect
- and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive
owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void
marriage and such properties be placed under the proper
management and administration of her attorney-in-fact.

Domingo:
- filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition
stated no cause of action.
- The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the
declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and
unnecessary.
- He added that Delia has no property which is in his
possession.
9. RTC Ruling: Denied Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
Judge Maria Austria says:
- On Domingo arguing that no judicial decree is necessary
to establish the invalidity of a void marriage: Indeed, under
Yap v CA there is no dispute that the second marriage
contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first
marriage with another woman is illegal and void. However,
the issue in the Yap case wasn‘t whether or not the
second marriage should first be judicially declared a
nullity. The case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, is more
applicable when the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms
that there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity.
- Finally, the contention of respondent that petitioner has
no property in his possession is an issue that may be
determined only after trial on the merits.
10. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Domingo
stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v.
GSIS and the absence of justiciable controversy as to the
nullity of the marriage.
11. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion
for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from
receipt within which to file his answer.
26
12. Instead of filing the required answer, Domingo filed a
special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground
that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to
dismiss.
13. On February 7, 1992, the CA dismissed the petition.
- It explained that the case of Yap v. CA cited by petitioner
(Domingo) and that of Consuegra v. GSIS cited by the lower
court do not have relevance in the case at bar, because these
cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife
while this case prays for separation of property corollary with
the declaration of nullity of marriage.
- It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of
the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon
proper determination of the status of the marital relationship
between said parties.
- Furthermore, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be
invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and
distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and
52 of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer
for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be
raised together with other incidents of their marriage such as
the separation of their properties.
- Lastly, it noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the
alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is
merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have
been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an
adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.
14. Case filed at the SC

Petitioner‘s Argument for SC case (Domingo):
- That the Declaration of nullity must be dismissed for being
unnecessary (since marriage was void ab initio in the first
place) AND
- he interprets Art 40 of FC to mean that a declaration of nullity
should only be sought for the purpose of remarriage. And since
there was no mention of an intention to remarry in the petition,
petition should be dismissed.

Respondent (Delia): Declaration is necessary not
for the purpose of remarriage but as basis for the
separation and distribution of properties.
ISSUE:
1. WON petition for judicial declaration of a void
marriage is necessary and should it be filed only for
the purpose of remarriage.
2. WON Declaration of Nullity and Separation of
Property is the proper remedy for Delia to recover her
properties.
RULING:
1. WON declaration is necessary: YES!
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is bigamous. Petitioner himself does not dispute
the absolute nullity of their marriage. However, the rule is, it is
not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or
not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. After a lot of
conflicting jurisprudence, the Family Code finally ruled that
even if a marriage is void ab intio, it still needs a judicial
declaration for nullity to be upheld. (See notes on the
movement of requiring the declaration)
Should it be filed only for the purpose of remarriage?
NO!
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the
position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, it
shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void." The provision in question, as it finally
emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . .
.," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for
purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the
interpretation of petitioner would have been correct that the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely
for purposes of remarriage.
The way Article 40 is formulated denotes that final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be
obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
2.
WON Declaration is proper remedy: YES!
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states
that final judgment on the case shall provide for: the
liquidation of properties, custody of common children and
delivery of presumptive legitimes. So since FC clearly
provides for the effects of a declaration of nullity (as seen in
Art 43 and 44), including jurisdiction to rule over property
relations, lower court committed no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
Court of Appeals decision, AFFIRMED.
NOTE: (Just in case it is important)
MOVEMENT ON HOW JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF
NULLITY WAS FINALLY AFFIRMED
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v.
Mendoza are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void,
bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice
Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating
that:
―Though the logician may say that where the former marriage
was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the
spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That
judgment is reserved to the courts. . . .‖
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority
position in subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus,
in Gomez v. Lipana, the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's
order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property
acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if
the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the
application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial
declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for
that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held
in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
System, that "although the second marriage can be presumed
to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage
was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of
such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras, however, the Court turned
around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once
again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a
declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of
the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that
"(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private
respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and
void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void
marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v.
Sempio-Diy the Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held
27
that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the
existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact
and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all
the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil
Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now the
Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to
a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they
can be allowed to marry again.
ILLUSTRATION:
Aragon and Mendoza (no need) -- dissent by J.
Reyes (there is)  dissent adopted in Gomez v Lipana and
abandoned Aragon and Mendoza (there is need) 
Consuerga v GSIS (applied Gomez v Lipana = there is
need)  Tolentino v Paras (went back to Aragon and
Mendoza = no need)  Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (applied
Consuerga = need)  FC: there is need
Persons: Family Code: Art 163
Court described the process of DNA analysis (p. 209)
and its admissibility in court in which it cited the Vallejo
case which offered guidelines in considering the
probative value of DNA testing (p. 211)
Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence:
Please note: Despite the relatively liberal rules on
admissibility, trial courts applies a cautious approach in
giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence.
Previous ruling in the Vallejo case:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
courts should consider, among other things, the
following data:
1. how the samples were collected
2. how they were handled
3. the possibility of contamination of the samples
4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples
5. whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests
6. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the
tests.
COURT ALSO CITED THE FOLLOWING RELEVANT
PROVISIONS OF THE FC: Art 172 and 175
2. WON the motion to direct the petitioner to take a
DNA paternity test is a violation of his right against
self-incrimination (Art 3 Sec 17 Consti). NO.
This privilege is only applicable to testimonial
evidence.
HERRERA v. ALBA
FACTS:
1. 13 year old Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother
Armi, filed a petition for recognition and support against
the petitioner.
2. Petitioner denied he was the biological father. He
denied having any physical contact with Alba's mother.
3. Alba filed a motion to direct the petitioner to take a
DNA paternity test. Alba presented the testimony of Dr.
Halos (check page 200-201 for the doctor's full list of
credentials)
4. Doctor described the process of DNA testing: the test
had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing
paternity
"The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on
the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to
the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own
defenses. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is
obtainable through the facilities of modern science and
technology, such evidence should be considered subject
to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence."
Petition DISMISSED. CA decision AFFIRMED.
Modequillo v Breva
Persons: Family Code: Art 163
Petitioner says: It has not gained acceptability and that
DNA testing violates his right against self incrimination.
Trial court: granted motion to conduct DNA paternity
test, in effect compelling the petitioner to undergo
testing.
Petitioner appealed to the CA, but CA affirmed TC's
decision. Thus, he appealed to the SC.
ISSUES:
1. WON DNA test is a valid probative tool to
determine filiation. YES
HERRERA v. ALBA
FACTS:
5. 13 year old Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother
Armi, filed a petition for recognition and support against
the petitioner.
6. Petitioner denied he was the biological father. He
denied having any physical contact with Alba's mother.
7. Alba filed a motion to direct the petitioner to take a
DNA paternity test. Alba presented the testimony of Dr.
Halos (check page 200-201 for the doctor's full list of
credentials)
28
8. Doctor described the process of DNA testing: the test
had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing
paternity
Petitioner says: It has not gained acceptability and that
DNA testing violates his right against self incrimination.
Trial court: granted motion to conduct DNA paternity
test, in effect compelling the petitioner to undergo
testing.
Petitioner appealed to the CA, but CA affirmed TC's
decision. Thus, he appealed to the SC.
ISSUES:
1. WON DNA test is a valid probative tool to
determine filiation. YES
Court described the process of DNA analysis (p. 209)
and its admissibility in court in which it cited the Vallejo
case which offered guidelines in considering the
probative value of DNA testing (p. 211)
Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence:
Please note: Despite the relatively liberal rules on
admissibility, trial courts applies a cautious approach in
giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence.
Previous ruling in the Vallejo case:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
courts should consider, among other things, the
following data:
7. how the samples were collected
8. how they were handled
9. the possibility of contamination of the samples
10.
the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples
11.
whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests
12.
the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.
COURT ALSO CITED THE FOLLOWING RELEVANT
PROVISIONS OF THE FC: Art 172 and 175
2. WON the motion to direct the petitioner to take a
DNA paternity test is a violation of his right against
self-incrimination (Art 3 Sec 17 Consti). NO.
This privilege is only applicable to testimonial
evidence.
"The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on
the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to
the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own
defenses. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is
obtainable through the facilities of modern science and
technology, such evidence should be considered subject
to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence."
Petition DISMISSED. CA decision AFFIRMED.
People v Vergara
IMPORTANT THINGS TO REMEMBER:
Art. 184 of the Family Code:
―The following persons may not adopt:
1. The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval
of the final accounts rendered upon the termination of their
guardianship relation;
2. Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude;
3. An alien, except:
a. A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative by consanguinity;
b. One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his
or her Filipino spouse; or
c. One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt
Filipino children in accordance with the rules on intercountry adoption as may be provided by law.
Art. 185 of the Family Code:
―Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
1. When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or
2. When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of
the other
Persons: Family Code: A172, 173, 175
Tayag v CA (1992)
Petitioner: Corito Ocampo Tayag
Respondents: CA & Emilie Dayrit Cuyugan
Emilie is mother and legal guardian of minor Chad. In April
1987, she filed a complaint denominated "Claim for
Inheritance" against Corito, the administratrix of the estate of
Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who died in Sept 1983. Emilie alleged
that:
1. She is Chad‘s mother by the father of the Corito, the late
Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. Corito is the known administratrix of the
real and personal properties left by her deceased father
(Ricardo) who died intestate.
3. She has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan,
for several years now and during which time, she and Ricardo
had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, and they
bore Chad, their only son
4. Chad, although illegitimate, is nevertheless entitled to a
share in the intestate estate left by his deceased father
5. Ricardo at the time of his death was the owner of real and
personal property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and in
the Province of Pampanga with approximate value of several
millions of pesos;
6. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been
29
inventoried by the defendant and the inheritance of the
surviving heirs including that of Chad has not been
ascertained;
7. The only known surviving heirs of Ricardo are his children,
namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo,
Felina Ocampo, and Chad
9. She has no means of livelihood and only depends on the
charity of friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son,
and that she needs extended financial support from the estate
of Ricardo
10. She made several demands for Corito to grant Chad's
lawful inheritance, but she was refused
IN SUM, Emilie prays that Corito be ordered to render an
inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties
left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine and deliver
Chad‟s share in the estate of the deceased; and to give him
support pendente lite.
Corito disputed the allegations, said there was no cause of
action; that the action is premature and barred by
prescription, according to Art 175 (2) of FC.


Trial court denied Corito‘s motion to dismiss. More
evidence must be adduced.
This was affirmed by CA, which found that the
complaint is sufficient in form and substance.
Corito prayed that be orders of TC and CA be annulled and set
aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Is Art 175 (2) of FC applicable in determining WON the
action has prescribed?
HELD: NO. Art 285 of CC applies. Where a complaint for
recognition was filed before FC, it should be resolved
under the provisions of the Civil Code.
Article 175 of FC doesn‘t apply because it will affect adversely
Emilie‘s and Chad‘s rights which have been vested with the
filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore,
correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil
Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action
has not yet prescribed.

Article 285 CC:
The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child,
in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration
of four years from the attainment of his majority;

Article 175 FC:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period
specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.

Article 256 FC:
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws."
The fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner
her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time,
and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the
enactment of a new law.
Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
Teotico v Del Val (1965)
Petitioner: Vicente Teotico
Respondent: Ana del Val
FACTS:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died in 1955,
leaving properties worth P600,000. She left a will and affixed
her signatures in the presence of 3 persons, who in turn affixed
their signatures. The will was acknowledged by the testatrix
and the witnesses before a notary public.

In the will, she stated that she was: possessed of the
full use of her mental faculties; free from illegal
pressure or influence from the beneficiaries; freely
and spontaneously executed; she had no ascendants
or descendants
P20,000 went to Rene Teotico, her physician, and husband of
testatrix's niece Josefina Mortera. She left the usufruct of her
interest in a building to them, while the naked ownership of it,
she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the
legitimate children of the spouses. Josephina was instituted as
her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her
properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.

Petitioner Vicente Teotico filed for the probate of the
will before the CFI Manila

Respondent Ana del Val Chan, claimed to be an
adopted child of Francisca Mortera, testatrix‘s
deceased sister, as well as an acknowledged natural
child of Jose Mortera, testatrix‘s deceased brother.

She opposed the probate of the will alleging that:
(1) will was not executed as required by law
(2) testatrix was physically and mentally incapable at the time
(3) the will was executed under duress
(4) will is inoperative as to the share of Rene Teotico because
he was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her
last illness
30


The probate court
(1) admitted the will to probate
(2) declared the disposition made in favor of Rene
void and that instead, it should go to the
testatrix's heirs
by way of intestate succession
Petitioner and respondent both filed motions for
reconsideration, but both were denied.
ISSUES:
Case remanded for further proceedings.
Property relations: Art 147 FC
Valdes vs RTC QC (1996)
Petitioner: Antonio Valdes (husband)
Respondent: Consuelo Gomez (wife)
FACTS:
(1) Does Ana del Val Chan have the right to intervene in
this proceeding? NO.
NO. She has no right to intervene because she has no material
or direct interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or
administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property
affected by the will, because it nowhere appears any provision
designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the
estate.
Even if the will is denied probate, she‘d still have no interest
because under the Civil Code, she is not a legal heir of the
deceased.

Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate
child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother;"

Also, no relationship is created between the adopted and the
collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the
adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the
adopter.
(2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?
YES.
YES. The will was duly executed because it was signed by the
testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary public
in the manner provided for by law. The burden is on the person
challenging the will (respondent) that such duress/influence
was exerted at the time of its execution, a matter which here
was not done, for the evidence presented is insufficient, and is
disproved by the testimony of the instrumental witnesses. Also,
nothing could have prevented the testatrix, had she really
wanted to from subsequently revoking her will if it did not in
fact reflect and express her own testamentary dispositions.
(3) Could the probate court determine the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of a will? NO.
NO. Its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been
executed in accordance with the requirements of the law and
that the testator was in a condition to make a will. It does not
determine nor prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions, despite its authentication. It can‘t decide, for
example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is valid.
Petitioner and respondent‘s marriage was declared
null pursuant to Art 36 FC on the ground of mutual
psychological incapacity. They were directed to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Art 147, and to comply with
the provisions of Art 50, 51, 52.
2. The trial court later clarified that they will own their
family home and all their properties in equal shares,
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Petitioner contends: Art 50, 51, 52 should be held controlling.
Art 147 does not apply to cases where parties are
psychologically incapacitated.
1.
ISSUE: What law should govern?
RULING:
Art 147 and 148 FC. In a void marriage, regardless of the
cause, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Art
147 and 148 of the Family Code.
Art 50, 51, 52 are explicit in its terms. They relate only to
voidable marriages, and exceptionally, to void marriages under
Art 40.
The trial court correctly applied the law.
Persons: Property relations: Art. 121 & 122
Villaranda v Villaranda
23 February 2004 Ponente: Justice Panganiban
SUMMARY: Two brothers, Vicente and Honorio Villaranda,
executed a Deed of Exchange so that Honorio gets a parcel of
land in Divisoria CDO City that Vicente inherited, in exchange
for a property in Macandasig, CDO City. Vicente claims that
the Deed is null and void because the contract didn‘t specify
the object of exchange and because Honorio‘s wife, Ana, didn‘t
sign the contract (meaning it was executed without her
consent). The Court DENIED Vicente‘s petition, saying that he
brought up the issue of the object of exchange too late, and
that the provisions of the Family Code don‟t apply to the
contract, since it was executed in 1976.
FACTS:
- Action is a Petition for Review of the decision of the Court
of Appeals
- A parcel of land in Divisoria, Cagayan de Oro City was
divided between ten siblings.
o The controversy is between two of the brothers, Vicente
(petitioner) and Honorio (respondent) Villaranda
31
-
-
-
-
o Honorio was leased 124 sq. meters of the property,
Vicente inherited 64.22 sq. meters of it.
o The brothers executed a Deed of Exchange on July 6,
1976:
 Vicente would give his 64.22 sq. meters to Honorio
in exchange for a 500 sq. meter property in
Macandasig, CDO City.
Honorio took Vicente‘s lot and constructed a building on it
Honorio and his wife, Ana Maria Y. Villaranda
(respondent), brought a court action to comply with the
Dee of Exchange:
o Get Vicente to identify and delineate his 500 sq. meter
portion of property
o Get Vicente to give them the 64.22 sq. meter lot
During the pendency of the Case, Honorio conditionally
sold the Divisoria lot to Colorhouse Laboratories, Inc.
(intervening respondent)
Respondent:
o Vicente admitted to entering into the Deed, but said that
it had not been consummated. He also said that both of
them had revoked it.
 Vicente and the other siblings asked Honorio to
agree to the rescission of the Deed.
 Vicente said that Honorio agreed
Regional Trial Court: stipulated on the facts of the case
(that the deed existed, that the parties were who they said
they were, that the lot being fought over existed and had
been registered in the Registry of deeds, that Colorhouse
now possessed the 64.22 sq. meter lot through Honorio)
o Ruled in favor of Honorio
Court of Appeals: DISMISSED Vicente‘s petition for
reconsideration and affirmed the Trial Court‘s decision. CA
Held…
o Since the Deed was executed before the enactment of
the Family Code, CIVIL CODE provisions apply to the
case at bar
 Absence of the wife‟s signature on the Deed
only made it voidable, not void outright. CA
found that:
 ANA knew about the Deed, but didn‘t bring any
action for its annulment over the 10 year
proscription period: she assented to it
 On the capacity of the parties to enter into the Deed
of Exchange: moment of its execution is the only
time to be reckoned with
 Consideration wasn‘t unconscionable enough to
warrant voiding of the Contract
ISSUE
4. Was there a Deed of Exchange even though
a. There was no specific identification and
delineation of the Deed‘s object
b. Another contract had to be executed to
identify the object of exchange in the first
place
c. There was no acceptance and delivery of the
500 sq. meters
5. Is the Deed of Exchange valid and in force, even though
Honorio‘s wife didn‘t sign it?
SUPREME COURT RULING
Petition DENIED, challenged CA decision AFFIRMED
HELD
4. There was a Deed of Exchange. Petitioner‘s argument that
the Deed was null and void because the object of the
contract wasn‘t determinate was brought up too late.
- Points of law, theories, issues and arguments that weren‘t
brought up in the lower court usually won‘t be considered
by a reviewing court
5. The Deed of Exchange is valid even though Ana didn‟t
sign it.
- The Family Code doesn‟t apply to the Deed, because it
was executed in 1976, before the Family Code was
enacted
o Art. 4 of the Civil Code: Laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided
o Civil Code provisions should apply
- Relevant Civil Code provisions:
o Art. 166: Unless the wife is crazy, in jail, a ―spendthrift,‖
or in a leprosarium, the husband can‘t alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership
without her consent
o Art. 173: The wife may ask the courts for the annulment
of any contract the husband entered into without her
consent, or when the contract defrauds or impairs her
interest in the conjugal partnership property
(proscription period: during the marriage, up to 10 years
from the transaction)
- Read together, the two provisions of the Civil Code merely
make the contract voidable, but not void. The Deed is valid
unless annulled.
o Ana knew about the contract, but didn‘t bring any action
to annul Honorio‘s transfer, and her right to bring an
action to invalidate it has already prescribed. It‘s
assumed that she was OK with the contract.
o Papa v Montenegro: legal prohibition against the
disposition of conjugal property by one spouse without
the other‘s consent must be established by the spouse
for whom the law wants to save the conjugal partnership
from damages. Vicente can‘t use Art. 173
- Personal remarks: This case seems a bit far removed from
the provisions it was filed under, so I‘ll just assume that
Ma‘am is trying to emphasize the prospective application
of the Family Code again. …But! I‘m assuming that the
Deed of Exchange is presumed to fall under the liabilities
of conjugal partnership. …but the case itself doesn‘t even
specify WHICH Family Code provisions Vicente used to
assail the contract. (…not that the Family Code would‘ve
helped Vicente anyway, because without Ana‘s signature
or consent, the contract could still stand. The only
difference is that, under Art. 121, it would only bind
Honorio and whatever property he has that isn‘t within the
conjugal partnership)
Andal v. Macaraig (May 30, 1951)

Art. 54 of the Family Code: Children conceived or
born before the judgment of annulment or absolute
nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become
final and executory shall be considered legitimate.
Children conceived or born of the subsequent
marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
Plaintiff: MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueñas
as guardian ad litem, and MARIDUEÑAS
Defendant: EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant.
Ponente: BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
A.
FACTS:
32
1.
Facts about path of case:
a. Plaintiffs brought action at CFI
Camarines Sur for recovery of
ownership of land. COMPLAINT
alleges:
i. Mariano Andal is surviving son
of Emiliano Andal and Maria
Dueñas
ii. Emiliano Andal died on
September 24, 1942
iii. Emiliano Andal was owner of
land in question having
acquired it from his mother
Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of
a donation propter nuptias
iv. Emiliano Andal had been in
possession of land from 1938
up to 1942, when Eduvigis
Macaraig, taking advantage of
abnormal situation then
prevailing, entered land in
question.
b. CFI favored plaintiffs:
i. declaring Mariano Andal
legitimate son of Emiliano
Andal and such entitled to
inherit land in question
ii. declaring Mariano Andal owner
of said land
iii. ordering defendant to pay
costs of suit
c. Defendant went to SC with plea that
only questions of law are involved.
d. Undisputed: land was given by Eduvigis
Macaraig to son Emiliano Andal by
virtue of a donation propter nuptias on
marriage with Maria Dueñas. If son
born to couple is deemed legitimate, he
is entitled to inherit land. If not, land
should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig
as next of kin entitled to succeed him
under the law.
d.
This presumption may be rebutted
only by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have
had access to his wife during the
first one hundred and twenty days
of the three hundred next preceding
the birth of the child.
B.
ISSUE:
Is Mariano Andal legitimate son of Emiliano
Andal, considering relationship between Emiliano
and wife during period of conception of child up
to birth in connection with the death of the
alleged father Emiliano Andal?
C.
DECISION: YES, LEGITIMATE.
―Wherefore, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED
xxx ―.
D.
RATIONALE:
1.
2.
2.
Facts on legitimacy of son Mariano Andal:
a. Emiliano Andal became sick of
tuberculosis January 1941. Sometime
thereafter, brother Felix went to live in
his house to help him work his house
and farm. His sickness became worse
and around eight months after
(September 10, 1942), he could hardly
move and get up from bed.
b. That time, his wife eloped with Felix and
both went to live in house of Maria's
father for 9 months (until mid 1943).
Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had
sexual intercourse and treated each
other as husband and wife.
c. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died
without presence of wife, who did not
even attend his funeral. On June 17,
1943, Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy,
who was given the name of Mariano
Andal. Under these facts, can the child
be considered as the legitimate son of
Emiliano?
Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:

Children born after the one hundred
and eighty days next following that
of the celebration of marriage or
within the three hundred days next
following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
3.
Since boy was born on June 17, 1943, and
Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy
is presumed to be legitimate son of Emiliano and
wife, he having been born within 300 days
following dissolution of marriage. This
presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it
was physically impossible for the husband to
have had access to his wife during the first 120
days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the
child.
Manresa says (Manresa, 492-500, Vol. I, cited by
Dr. Arturo Tolentino in his book "Commentaries
and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1,
p.90) impossibility of access by husband to wife
would include:
1) absence during the initial
period of conception
2) impotence which is patent,
continuing and incurable
3) imprisonment, unless it
can be shown that
cohabitation took place
through corrupt violation of
prison regulations
NO EVIDENCE Emiliano Andal was absent
during initial period of conception, specially
during period comprised between August 21,
1942 and September 10, 1942 (the 120 days of
the 300 next preceding the birth of the child).
a. On the contrary, ENOUGH EVIDENCE
during that initial period, Emiliano Andal
and wife still living under marital roof.
b. Even if brother, was living in same
house, and he and the wife were
33
4.
indulging in illicit intercourse since May,
1942, that does not preclude
cohabitation between Emiliano and his
wife.
Emiliano may be said to be really physically weak
during time at issue, but experience shows that
this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There
are cases where persons suffering from this
sickness can do the carnal act even in the most
crucial stage because they are more inclined to
sexual intercourse. As an author has said, "the
reputation of the tuberculosis towards eroticism
(sexual propensity) is probably dependent more
upon confinement to bed than the consequences
of the disease." (An Integrated Practice of
5.
NO EVIDENCE Emiliano was suffering from
impotency, patent, continuous and incurable. NO
EVIDENCE he was imprisoned. PRESUMPTION
OF LEGITIMACY under Civil Code in favor of
child NOT OVERCOME.
6. Same result viewing case under S68(3)/Rule
123/Rules of Court, which is practically based
upon the same rai'son d'etre underlying Civil
Code. Said section provides:
o The issue of a wife cohabiting with the
husband who is not impotent, is indisputably
presumed to be legitimate, if not born within
one hundred eighty days immediately
succeeding the marriage,
Aruego v. CA (March 13, 1996)
Chapter 2 of the Family Code: Proof of Filiation
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
Chapter 3: Illegitimate Children
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may
be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a)
Medicine, by Hyman, Vol. 3, p.2202).
Petitioners: JOSE ARUEGO, SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO,
MA. IMMACULADA ALANON, ROBERTO TORRES,
CRISTINA TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN
TORRES
Respondents: CA and ANTONIA ARUEGO (Guardian: Luz
Fabian)
Ponente: HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.
A.
FACTS:
1. Private respondent (minor), together with alleged
sister Evelyn F. Aruego, filed Complaint for
Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of
Successional Rights at RTC Manila. Defendants
were Jose Aruego and the 5 minor children of
deceased Gloria Torres, represented by their
father and natural guardian, Justo Torres.
Defendants are now the petitioners in case at
SC.
a. COMPLAINT says: Jose Aruego, Sr., a
married man, had an amorous
relationship with Luz Fabian (guardian
of respondent) sometime in 1959 until
his death on March 30, 1982. Out of
this relationship were born respondent
and her alleged sister Evelyn.
b. COMPLAINT prayed: these sisters be
declared
illegitimate
children
of
deceased Jose Aruego, Sr.; that
petitioners be compelled to recognize
and acknowledge them as compulsory
heirs of the deceased etc.
c. COMPLAINT is founded on the sisters‘
alleged
"open
and
continuous
possession of the status of illegitimate
children" founded on that the deceased:
―acknowledged and recognized the
herein plaintiffs as his children
verbally among plaintiffs' and their
mother's family friends, as well as
by myriad different paternal ways,
including but not limited to the
following:
(a) Regular support and
educational expenses;
(b) Allowance to use his
surname;
(c) Payment of maternal
bills;
(d) Payment of baptismal
expenses and attendance
therein;
(e)
Taking
them
to
restaurants
and
department
stores
on
occasions
of
family
rejoicing;
(f) Attendance to school
problems of plaintiffs;
(g) Calling and allowing
plaintiffs to his office every
now and then;
(h) Introducing them as
such children to family
friends.
2.
Petitioners denied all these allegations.
34
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
RTC declared private respondent illegitimate
daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian (Evelyn
was not declared illegitimate daughter) and
among others, that she was entitled to 1/2 portion
of share of the legitimate children of Jose
Aruego.
Herein petitioners filed MR alleging loss of
jurisdiction of RTC by virtue of the passage of
Family Code which took effect August 3, 1988.
RTC denied MR.
Petitioners went to CA for Petition for Prohibition
and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction but CA dismissed for such for lack of
merit. MR here was also denied.
Petitioners went to SC arguing among others CA
erred in ruling there is not perceptible difference
between Civil Code provision and those of Family
Code anent the time an action for compulsory
recognition may be made and that there is no
difference under the CC from that of the FC
concerning the requirement that an action for
compulsory recognition on the ground of
continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child should be filed during the lifetime
of the putative parent, in utter disregard of Court
ruling in Uyguangco case that the CC provision
had been superseded or at least modified by the
corresponding articles in FC.
Arguments:
a. Private
respondent:
action
for
compulsory
recognition
as
an
illegitimate child is under A285/CC,
which states the manner by which
illegitimate children may prove their
filiation, to wit:
Art. 285. The action for the
recognition of natural children may
be brought only during the lifetime
of the presumed parents, except in
the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother
died during the minority of
the child, in which case the
latter may file the action
before the expiration of
four years from the
attainment of his majority; .
...
b. Petitioners: with the advent of FC, RTC
lost jurisdiction over the complaint of
private respondent on the ground of
prescription, considering that under
A175(2) FC in relation to A172/FC, it is
provided that an action for compulsory
recognition of illegitimate filiation, if
based on the "open and continuous
possession of the status of an
illegitimate child," must be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent
without any exception, otherwise the
action will be barred by prescription.
i. Petitioners point out that, since
COMPLAINT was filed March
7, 1983 or almost one year
after death of presumed father
on March 30, 1982, action has
clearly prescribed under the
new rule as provided in the
Family Code.
Petitioners,
further, maintain that even if
the action was filed prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code,
this new law must be applied to
the instant case pursuant to
A256/FC which provides:

This Code shall,
have retroactive
effect insofar as it
does
not
prejudice
or
impair vested of
acquired rights in
accordance with
the Civil Code or
other laws.
B.
ISSUE:
1. Should the provisions of the FC be applied in the
instant case?
2. Will the application of the FC in this case
prejudice or impair any vested right of the private
respondent such that it should not be given
retroactive effect in this particular case?
C.
DECISION:
1. NO. WHAT SHOULD BE APPLIED IS THE
CIVIL CODE.
2. YES.
IT
WILL
IMPAIR
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT‘S VESTED RIGHTS.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals xxx hereby
AFFIRMED.
D.
1.
2.
RATIONALE:
The phrase "vested or acquired rights" under A256 is
not defined by the FC.
Sempio-Diy says "The
Committee did not define what is meant by a 'vested
or acquired right,' thus leaving it to the courts to
determine what it means as each particular issue is
submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the answer
for each and every question that may arise in the
future."
In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals (1992), which
compeled recognition as an illegitimate child brought
prior to the effectivity of FC by the mother of the minor
child, and based also on the "open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child," Court
ruled:
Under the circumstances obtaining in the
case at bar, we hold that the right of action of
the minor child has been vested by the filing
of the complaint in court under the regime of
the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling
in the recent case of Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. 7
where we held that the fact of filing of the
petition already vested in the petitioner her
right to file it and to have the same proceed
to final adjudication in accordance with the
law in force at the time, and such right can
35
3.
4.
no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the
enactment of a new law.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code
finds no proper application to the instant
case since it will ineluctably affect adversely
a right of private respondent and,
consequentially, of the minor child she
represents, both of which have been vested
with the filing of the complaint in court. The
trial court is, therefore, correct in applying
the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code
and in holding that private respondent's
cause of action has not yet prescribed.
The action filed by private respondent prior to FC
must be governed by A285/CC and not by
A175(2)/FC.
The present law cannot be given
retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is
concerned, as its application will prejudice vested
right of private respondent to have her case decided
under A285/CC. Thus the action was not yet barred,
despite it was brought when putative father was
already deceased, since private respondent was then
still a minor when it was filed, an exception to general
rule under A285/CC.
Hence, RTC never lost jurisdiction over case despite
passage of FC. It is a principle that the jurisdiction of
a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once
attached cannot be ousted by subsequent
happenings or events, although of a character which
would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in
the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it
finally disposes of the case.
36
5.
6.
adoption vested under the regime of then
A348/Civil Code1 and A192/FC2.
In April, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition.
Petitioner goes to SC for certiorari.
B. ISSUE: May the subject adoption (decreed May 5, 1972)
still be rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of RA
8552?
PERSONS Digest
C. DECISION: NO.
Lahom v. Sibulo (2003)
A. FACTS:
1. Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom had
decided to adopt Isabelita‘s nephew, Jose Melvin
Sibulo. On May 5, 1972, the petition was granted
through an order. Civil Registrar of Naga City
changed the name of the adopted to ―Jose Melvin
Lahom‖.
2. Twenty seven (27) years later, Mrs. Lahom petitioned
at the RTC for the rescission of the decree of
adoption. In the petition, she averred:
a. Respondent refused to change his surname
to Lahom to the frustration of the spouses
esp of the husband until the latter died
b. Respondent‘s records with the Professional
Regulatory Commission (PRC) showed his
name as Sibulo originally issued 1978 until
present. He uses that name in all his
dealings and activities in connection with the
practice of his profession.
c. Respondent remained indifferent and would
visit the widowed mother only once a year.
d. Respondent remained callous despite her
need for care given the check-ups she has
been undergoing for the past three to four
years due to a leg ailment.
e. Petitioner has suffered wounded feelings
knowing after all, respondent was just after
his alleged rights over properties of the
spouses as clearly shown by his recent filing
for partition against petitioner.
3. Prior to institution of case, March 22, 1998, RA 8552
(Domestic Adoption Act) went into effect. This
deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a
decree of adoption. A6/S19/RA8552 now reads:

Sec. 19. Grounds for rescission of
adoption.- xxx ―Adoption, being in the best
interest of the child, shall not be subject to
rescission by the adopter(s). However, the
adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for
causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil
Code.‖
4.
Arguments:
a. Jose Melvin filed for dismissal of the petition
saying petitioner has no cause of action in
view of the aforequoted provision of RA
8552.
b. Petitioner said the proscription in RA 8552
should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases
where the ground for rescission of the
D. RATIONALE:
1. Very brief history:

Spain which previously disfavored adoption
accepted the Roman law concept of
adoption of which primary purpose was the
continuity of the adopter‘s family and focus
was on the rights of the adopter. This law
found its way to our archipelago.

The Americans came with their own ideas of
adoption which unlike most countries in
Europe, focused on the interests of the child.

Children‘s rights invited international
attention in the early 20th century:
i. 1924: Geneva Declaration of Rights
of the Child
ii. 1948: Universal Declaration of
Human Rights
iii. 1989: UN Declaration of the Rights
of the Child
2. In 1989, UN initiated the Convention of the Rights of
the Child. We are a State Party to the Convention.
We accepted the principle that adoption was
impressed with the social and moral responsibility and
its underlying intent was geared in favor of the
adopted child. RA 8552 secured these rights.
3. Court cites adoption cases RP v. CA and RP v. Miller,
wherein ―rights vested‖ by laws governing their
petitions at the time they were respectively filed,
remained despite amendments by a new law. But,
herein petitioner filed her action to rescind adoption
decree months after the effectivity of RA 8552.
(Besides, even before passage of RA 8552, an action
to rescind adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule
under Rule 100/Rules of Court3
1
Art. 348. The adopter may petition the court for revocation of the
adoption in any of these cases:
(1) If the adopted person has attempted against the life
of the adopter;
(2) When the adopted minor has abandoned the home of
the adopter for more than three years;
(3) When by other acts, the adopted person has
definitely repudiated the adoption (new)
2
Art. 192. The adopters may petition the court for the judicial
rescission of the adoption in any of the following cases:
(1) If the adopted has committed any act constituting a
ground for disinheriting a descendant; or
(2) When the adopted has abandoned the home of the
adopters during the minority for at least one year, or,
by some other acts, has definitely repudiated the
adoption.
3
Sec. 5. Time within which to file petition. - A minor or other
incapacitated person must file the petition for rescission or
revocation of adoption within five years following his majority, or if
37
Mendoza v. CA (September 24, 1991)
Chapter 2 of the Family Code: Proof of Filiation
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the
child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
Chapter 3: Illegitimate Children
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article
172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a)
he was incompetent at the time of the adoption, within the five (5)
years following the recovery from such incompetency.
The adopter must also file the petition to set aside the
adoption within five (5) years from the time the cause of or causes
giving rise to the rescission or revocation of the same took place.
38
39

Petitioner: ASIMIRO MENDOZA
Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS and TEOPISTA
TORING TUÑACAO
Ponente: CRUZ, J.
A.
FACTS:
1. The private respondent claimed she was
the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro
Mendoza (around 90y/o already) in a
complaint filed on August 21, 1981 at
RTC in Cebu. But the latter denied her
claim. He denied it to his dying day.
2. RTC established that according to
evidence, Teopista is not illegitimate
daughter for lack of ―open and
continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child‖. CA reversed decision.
3. Case was brought to SC for certiorari.
Here, petitioner who had died prior
appeal at SC, was replaced by his
(illegitimate) son Vicente Toring.
4. TESTIMONIES FOR Teopista‘s
illegitimacy:
a. Teopista: It was her mother
who told her that her father
was Casimiro. She called him
Papa Miroy. She lived with her
mother because Casimiro was
married but she used to visit
him at his house.

When
she
married
Valentin
Tufiacao
,
Casimiro
bought a
passeng
er truck
and
engaged
him to
drive it
so he
could
have a
livelihoo
d.
Casimiro
later
sold the
truck but
gave the
proceed
s of the
sale to
her and
her
husband
. In
1977,
b.
Casimiro
allowed
her son,
Lolito
Tufiacao
, to build
a house
on his
lot and
later he
gave her
money
to buy
her own
lot from
her
brother,
Vicente
Toring.

In 1977,
Casimiro
opened
a joint
savings
account
with her
as a codeposito
r. Two
years
later,
Margarit
a Bate,
Casimiro
's
adopted
daughter
, took
the
passboo
k from
her, but
Casimiro
ordered
it
returned
to her
after
admonis
hing
Margarit
a
Lolito Tufiacao (Teopista‘s son)
said he considered Casimiro
his grandfather because
Teopista said so. He would
kiss his hand whenever they
saw each other and Casimiro
would give him money.
Casimiro used to invite him to
his house and give him
jackfruits. when his grandfather
D2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. URSUA 40
B.
C.
learned that he was living on a
rented lot, the old man allowed
him to build a house on the
former's land.
c. Gaudencio Mendoza, cousin of
Casimiro: Gaudencio said he
was a cousin of Casimiro and
knew Brigida Toring because
she used to work with him in a
saltbed in Opao. Casimiro
himself told him she was his
sweetheart. Gaudencio acted
as a go-between for their
liaison many times in the past.
d. Isaac Mendoza, nephew of
Casimiro: Casimiro was the
father of Teopista because his
father Hipolito, Casimiro's
brother, and his grandmother,
Brigida Mendoza, so informed
him. He had also acted gobetween.
5. TESTIMONIES AGAINST Teoppista
illegitimacy:
a. Casimiro himself did not testify
because of his advanced age,
but Vicente Toring took the
stand to resist Teopista's claim.
b. Vicent (who professed to be
Casimiro's only illegitimate
child by Brigida Toring):
Teopista's father was not
Casimiro but a carpenter
named Ondoy, who later
abandoned her. Vicente said
that it was he who sold a lot to
Teopista, and for a low price
because she was his half
sister. It was also he who
permitted Lolito to build a
house on Casimiro's lot. This
witness stressed that when
Casimiro was hospitalized,
Teopista never once visited her
alleged father. 5
c. The last statement was shared
by the other defense witness,
Julieta Ouano, Casimiro's
niece.
ISSUE:
May other means aside from the
requirements in A172/FC be resorted to in
establishing filiation?
DECISION:
Yes.
―WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING
Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be the
illegitimate child of the late Casimiro
Mendoza and entitled to all the rights
appurtenant to such status. XXX‖
D.
Rationale:
1. What both the trial court and the
respondent court did not take into
account is that an illegitimate child is
allowed to establish his claimed
filiation by "any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special
laws," according to the Civil Code, or
"by evidence or proof in his favor
that the defendant is her father,"
according to the Family Code.
2. Such evidence may consist of his
baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his
name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.
3. The complaint was filed on August 21,
1981, in the Regional Trial Court in
Cebu City. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the
herein private respondent, alleged that
she was born on August 20, 1930, to
Brigida Toring, who was then single,
and defendant Casimiro Mendoza,
married at that time to Emiliana
Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza
recognized her as an illegitimate child
by treating her as such and according
her the rights and privileges of a
recognized illegitimate child.
4. Art. 283. In any of the following cases,
the father is obliged to recognize the
child as his natural child:
1. In cases of
rape,
abduction or
seduction,
when the
period of the
offense
coincides
more or less
with that of
the
conception;
2. When the
child is in
continuous
possession
of status of a
child of the
alleged
father by the
direct acts of
the latter or
of his family;
D2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. URSUA 41
3.
when the
child was
conceived
during the
time when
the mother
cohabited
with the
supposed
father.
4. When the
child has in
his favor any
evidence or
proof that the
defendant is
his father.
NOTE: A283 was reproduced in A172/FC.
5. In respondent‘s presentation of
accounts about pedigree, she as able to
satisfy the following conditions before
such may be admitted as evidence:
1) The declarant is dead or
unable to testify.
2) The pedigree must be in issue.
3) The declarant must be a
relative of the person whose
pedigree is in issue.
4) The declaration must be made
before the controversy arose.
5) The relationship between the
declarant and the person
whose pedigree is in question
must be shown by evidence
other than such declaration.
Can aliens adopt Filipinos despite the prohibition
under the Family Code, effective on August 3, 1988
when the petition for adoption was filed on July 29,
1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code which allowed aliens to adopt?
Adoption
Facts:
Republic v Miller (1999)
The petition has become a vested right and the
Family Code cannot be made to apply retroactively in
their case. The jurisdiction of the court is dependent in
force at the time of the commencement of the action.
Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption
before the effectivity of the Family code, although
denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code,
may continue with his petition under the law prevailing
before the Family Code
Decision affirmed
Republic v Tayag-San Jose
Date: 28 February 2007
Ponente: Justice Carpio-Morales
Parties: Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, v Laila
Tanyag-San Jose and Manolito San Jose,
respondents
Action: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals

FACTS

RTC Branch 59 of Angeles City granted the
adoption of the minor Michael Magno
Madayag by respondents Claude and
Jumrus Miller, who were American citizens.
Michael was voluntarily given up for adoption
by his parents because of poverty, and the
American couple wanted to adopt him
because they can‘t have a child anymore
(the wife has problems).

DSWD recommended approval of the
petition and the RTC ruled favorably on the
petition.

The OSG questioned the fact that the
spouses are both aliens and yet they were
allowed to adopt a Filipino child, because
this is prohibited under the Family Code.
ISSUE
YES.




Laila Tanyag-San Jose and Manolito San
Jose were married on 12 June 1988, they
had two children, and they lived with
Manolito‘s parents for nine years
Manolito was jobless and gambled and did
drugs
Laila sold fish at the Taguig wet market
Laila left Manolito and went to live in her
parents‘ house on 20 August 1998, and on 9
March 1999, she filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Art
36 in the RTC of Pasig City.
o Manolito left the house that night,
but didn‘t return the next morning
Dr. Nedy Tayag testified for Laila, saying that
she found Manolito to be psychologically
incapacitated because he showed signs of
Anti-Social Personality Disorder.
D2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. URSUA 42
o



Findings were brought about
through her psychological test and
clinical interview of Laila
o Manolito‘s behavior (constant
irresponsibility, lack of concern for
others‘ welfare, self-centered
orientation, absence of remorse,
violent tendencies, involvement in
activities defying social and moral
ethics) falls under Anti-Social
Personality Disorder
RTC decision:
o Petition was DENIED
o Republic v CA and Molina (as well
as Santos v CA) were cited

“Psychological
incapacity” should refer
to a serious personality
disorder that clearly
demonstrates “utter
insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and
significance to
marriage,” characterized
by

Gravity

Juridical
antecedence

Incurability
o Layla‘s portrayal of Manolito isn‘t
enough; Dr. Tayag‘s assessment of
Manolito doesn‘t count. The data
that her findings were based on is
inadequate, since she wasn‘t able
to interview him or any of his
relatives
Laila filed for a motion of reconsideration,
was denied, and then appealed to the Court
of Appeals saying that RTC erred in holding
that she failed to comply with the guidelines
enumerated in Molina
CA decision:
o Reversed RTC‘s decision
o ―Totality of evidence presented‖
were enough to sustain that
Manolito is psychologically
incapacitated
o Took exception from the Molina
case; noted in Handbook of the
Family Code of the Philippines, by
Judge Sempio-Diy: ―committee did
not give any example of
psychological incapacity… the
Committee would like the judge to

apply the provision on a case-tocase basis…‖ and found that
whether or not psychological
incapacity exists is for the Court to
establish
Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, was denied, and filed the
current Petition for Review
o RP posts that:

Manolito‘s defects have
not been proven to
constitute psychological
incapacity and that the
defects have not been
proven to have juridical
antecedence or to be
grave and incurable

CA erred in not adhering
to the Molina case ruling
under the doctrine of stare
decisis
Issues:


Do Manolito‘s alleged defects constitute
psychological incapacity?
Did the CA make the right call in deviating
from the ruling in Molina?
Ruling:

o



Petition GRANTED; CA decision reversed
and RTC decision REINSTATED
The totality of evidence doesn‘t show Manolito‘s
psychological incapacity
Ferraris v. Ferraris: Article 36 “refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage…
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage… the root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained”
There is no requirement for one to be
personally examined by a psychologist or
physician in order to be declared
psychologically incapacitated
Dr. Tayag‘s report was based on information from
Laila and is therefore hearsay (cited Choa v
Choa in saying that a doctor‟s testimony is
unscientific and unreliable if information
D2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. URSUA 43




o
o
o
about the other spouse is relayed by the
petitioning spouse)
Report said nothing about whether or not the
alleged anti-social personality disorder is
incurable or present at the inception of marriage
Laila‘s testimony is the only proof that Manolito is
psychologically incapacitated:
That he is jobless and a drug user and cannot
support his family
That he doesn‘t want to assume the obligations
of marriage
It‘s not enough to show that it‘s rooted in some
debilitating or incapacitating psychological
condition
Ferraris v Ferraris: habitual alcoholism,
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, and
failure or refusal to meet the duties and
responsibilities of a married man do not
constitute as a ground from declaring nullity
of marriage based on psychological
incapacity
The facts and circumstances of this case do not
warrant a deviation from the Molina case
Republic v Toledano
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Alvin and Evelyn Clouse, aliens, wanted to
adopt Solomon Alcala (younger brother of
Evelyn)
The hearing was set and notice was
published in newspaper for 3 weeks
consecutive
Alvin is a natural born US citizen and Evelyn
is a naturalized US citizen
Simon, mother Nery and social worker all
give consent and approval of adoption
Judge Toledano granted petition for adoption
Sol Gen contested adoption, spouses
Clouse aren‘t qualified to adopt
ISSUES:
1.
Under Art 184 Alvin can‘t adopt. He is not
part o the exceptions listed in paragraph 3 of
Art 184.
a. He is not a former Filipino
b. Solomon isn‘t a relative by
consanguinity nor a legitimate child
of his spouse
c. Evelyn gave up citizenship when
she was naturalized as a US citizen
2.
3.
Evelyn can adopt under p 3 Art 184, BUT Art
185 mandates joint adoption by husband and
wife. The spouses don‘t fall under the
exceptions of Art 185
This rule is to promote joint parental
authority over child and to ensure harmony
between spouses. PD 603 says spouses
―may‖ jointly adopt, but it was amended by
E.O. 91, which says husband and wife ―shall‖
jointly adopt if one of them is an alien. The
Family Code reiterated by saying alien
spouses ―must‖ jointly adopt.
DECISION:
Petition granted, lower court ruling set aside. Alien
spouses can‘t adopt Solomon.
Republic v. Valencia [1986]
FACTS:
Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor
children, Bernardo Go and Jessica Go filed w/ the
CFI-Cebu a petition for the cancellation and/or
correction of entries of birth of her 2 minor children in
the Civil Registry of Cebu. The petition seeks to (1)
change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo Go
and Jessica Go from "Chinese" to "Filipino" and (2)
their status from "Legitimate" to "Illegitimate," and (3)
changing also the status of the mother from "married"
to "single."
The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the corrections sought are
not merely clerical but substantial. The lower court
denied the motion to dismiss. From the decision of the
lower court, oppositor-appellant Republic appealed.
HELD/DECI: petition DENIED.
If the subject matter of a petition is not for the
correction of clerical errors of a harmless and
innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or
citizenship, w/c is indisputably substantial as well as
controversial, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a
proceeding summary in nature.
However, it is also true that a right in law may be
enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as
the appropriate remedy is used. This court adheres to
the principle that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding.
What is meant by appropriate adversary
proceeding? Black's Law Dictionary defines
"adversary proceeding" as follows: "One having
opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an
D2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. URSUA 44
ex parte application, one of which the party seeking
relief has given legal warning to the other party, and
afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.‖
Provided that the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully
and properly developed, where opposing counsel
have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite
party's case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered, the suitor
proceeding is "appropriate."
xxx
[T]he persons who must be made parties to a
proceeding concerning the cancellation
or correction of an entry in the civil register are-(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or
claim any interest w/c would be affected thereby.
Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of
the court to—
(1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the
hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for
hearing to be published once a wk for 3 consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose
the petition-- (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been
followed, a petition for correction and/ or
cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if
filed and conducted under R 108, ROC can no longer
be described as "summary." There can be no doubt
that when an opposition to the petition is filed either
by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming
any interest in the interest in the entries sought to be
cancelled and/ or corrected and the opposition is
actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become
adversary proceedings.
In this case, the court took note of the fact that all the
procedural requirements have been
followed and hence the recorded proceedings that
actually took place could very well be regarded as
that proper suit or appropriate action.










Santos v Court of Appeals
Date: 4 January 1995
Ponente: Justice Vitug
Parties: Leouel Santos, petitioner, v Court of Appeals
and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos, respondents
Action: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of
Court of Appeals
Philippine Army 1st Lieutenant Leouel Santos
and Julia Bedia-Santos married on 20 Sept
1986 and they lived with Julia‘s parents in
Iloilo
18 July 1987: they had a baby boy
Leouel says that they started fighting
because of Julia‘s parents meddling in their
affairs
o They fought over when they should
move out
o They fought whenever Leouel
would spend a few days with his
parents
19 May 1988: Julia went to the US to work
as a nurse
Julia didn‘t contact Leouel until 7 months
later (1 January 1989), and promised to
return home when her contract expired
Julia never returned, even when Leouel went
to the States to train (under the auspices of
the AFP) and searched for Julia (10 April-25
August 1990)
Leouel filed a complaint for ―Voiding of
Marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code‖ with the RTC of Negros Oriental
o Julia answered through counsel
that Leouel was the one who was
incompetent and irresponsible
o Julia never appeared for pre-trial
conferences and filed a
manifestation that she wouldn‘t
RTC decision:
o Complaint was dismissed for lack of
merit
CA decision:
o Affirmed RTC decision
Leouel filed for certiorari stating that CA
erred because
o Julia‘s failure to return or
communicate for more than 5 years
shows that she is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the
―essential marital obligations of
marriage‖
Issues:

Does Julia‘s behavior show that she is
psychologically incapacitated, as per the
requirements of Article 36 of the Family
Code?
Facts:
D2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. URSUA 45
Ruling:



PETITION DENIED
It didn‘t comply with Circular 28-91, which
requires a certification of non-forum
shopping
It lacks merit
o ―Psychological incapacity‖ should
refer to a serious personality
disorder that clearly demonstrates
―utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to
marriage,‖ characterized by

Gravity (party is
incapable of
carrying out
ordinary duties
required in
marriage)

Juridical
antecedence
(party had the
problem even
before the
marriage had
been contracted)

Incurability
o Deliberations during the Family
Code Revision Committee sessions
were reproduced in the case text to
show that Art.36 should be handled
on a case-to-case basis, which is
why the phrasing isn‘t specific

The judge should be
guided by experience, the
findings of experts and
researchers, and the
persuasive effect of church
decisions and Canon Law
(provision was taken from
Canon Law)

Sec. 3 of Canon
Law 1095: ―who
for causes of
psychological
nature are unable
to assume the
essential
obligations of
marriage‖

Fr. Ladislas Orsy,
S.J.: ―concedes
o
o
o
that
‗psychological
incapacity‘ defies
any precise
definition since
psychological
causes can be of
an infinite variety‖
Article 36 must be understood in
conjunction with existing marriage
law precepts

Psychological incapacity
means that the party
mentally cannot wrap their
head around (―truly
incognitive of‖) basic
marital covenants
expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code

Mutual
obligations to live
together, love,
respect, be
faithful to, and
support each
other
Article 36 doesn‘t refer to spouse‘s
inability to sexually perform; the
intendment of the law was to
confine psychological incapacity to
the ―most serious of personality
disorders‖
Other forms of psychoses present
at the inception of marriage
(alcoholism, concealed drug
addiction, homosexuality or
lesbianism, unsound mind, etc.)
only make a marriage voidable
under Art. 46

If the psychoses develop
during the marriage,
they‘re only grounds for
legal separation under Art.
55
SEPARATE OPINIONS:

Justice Padilla, Dissent:
o Julia is psychologically
incapacitated; she doesn‘t comply
with the obligation of cohabitation,
even though Leouel hasn‘t shown
D2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. URSUA 46

that he doesn‘t deserve to live with
her
o She has no intention of living with
him and doesn‘t even want him to
know of her whereabouts
Justice Romero, Concurring:
o Petitions should be handled on a
case-to-case basis, with the judge
guided by experience,
psychological research, exepert
findings, and the persuasive effect
of Canon Law and church tribunal
decisions
o Article 36 was created as a
recognition that some marriages,
because of one or both of the
contracting parties‘ incapacity, fall
short of the ideal. It offers them a
legally-accepted way out of such a
marriage

and Rene‘s deceased father (Hermogenes
Dezoller) was Teodora‘s brother.




TISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Article 163: The filiation of children may be
by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation
may be legitimate or illegitimate.




Corazon Dezoller Tison and Rene
Dezoller vs CA and Teodora Domingo

July 31, 1997

Regalado, J.
R.

FACTS:


1. A parcel of land with a house and and an
apartment located at Quezon City was
owned by the couple Martin Guerrero and
Teodora Dezoller-Guerrero.


5. During the pre-trial conference, one of the
issues was whether they were really nephew
and niece of Teodora.
6. Corazon was presented as lone witness in
court and claimed that sometime in 1946,
Teodora categorically said that she was her
niece. As proof, they also presented: a family
picture, baptismal certificates of Teodora and
Hermogenes, certificates of destroyed
records of birth of Teo and Hermo,
certification of destroyed records of live birth
of Corzaon and Rene, etc.



4. When Martin died, Corazon and Rene
filed an action for reconveyance of the said
property claiming that they have a share in
the inheritance by right of representation.
(Remember that since Teodora did not have
any descendants or ascendants, her brother
Hermogenes has a share in her property).



3. Upon the death of Teodora, Martin
executed a joint affidavit of settlement as
sole heir. He then sold the property to
Teodora Domingo.
7. Domingo alleged that Corazon and Rene
failed to prove legitimate filiation with
Teodora in accordance to Art 172 of the
Family Code.


8. The RTC upheld Domingo. CA affirmed
RTC.

2. Teodora died without descendants and
ascendants. She was survived by her
husband, Martin and her niece and nephew
Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller. Corazon

ISSUES:

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
common to both claimant and declarant, but
not from declarant himself or the declarant‘s
estate, the relationship to the common
relative may not be proved by the declaration
itself. Other evidences independent of this
must be brought up.
W/N the petitioners failed to meet the
quantum of proof required by Art 172 to
establish legitimacy and filiation


NO, they have successfully proven their
legitimacy and filiation.




On the issue of legitimacy: the lower court
erroneously assumed that the issue of
legitimacy may be controverted in an action
for reconveyance.

(a)
Presumption
of
legitimacy
is
universally recognized. It cannot be
contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose. Such action can be
brought only by the husband or his heirs
within the period allowed. Upon expiration of
the period, the status becomes fixed and can
no longer be questioned.






Thus: Domingo is not the propery party to
impugn legitimacy. The burden proof rests
on her part.
W/N the evidences presented is sufficient
to establish the relationship of the
petitioners to Teodora
Property relations between husband and wife
Tumlos v spouses Fernandez
FACTS

YES.



(a) A declaration about pedigree is sufficient
evidence for as long as the declaration was
made by the decedent whose estate is in
controversy.
(Remember
Corazon‘s
testimony).


HELD: CA decision is REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. Petitioners and respondent
declared as co-owner (¾ of the propertyDomingo, 1/4 –Corazon and Rene)
petition for review on certiorari


Going with Art 975, 995, 1001 of the Civil
Code, half of the property shall go to Martin.
The remaining half shall be divided between
Martin and the petitioners.
Article 148 Family Code



How should the estate be divided?
However, general rule is: Where the party
claiming seeks recovery against a relative

CA reversed the RTC decision that affirmed
the MTC decision in favor of Guillerma
Tumlos, which ordered the dismissal of the
petition.
The case is about the ejectment order of
Guillerma, Toto and Gina Tumlos from the
apartment building in Valenzuela of the
spouses Fernandez (Mario and Lourdes).
The spouses, on the other hand, say that
they are the absolute owners of the property.
They said that the Tumloses have been
living in their apartment for the last seven
years but that they had agreed that the
Tumloses will have to pay their rental after
such time, but they failed to do so.
Guillerma, on the other hand, say that the
ejectment suit cannot stand because she is
D2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. URSUA 48

actually co-owner of the property, because
she is a co-vendee together with Mario
Fernandez. They bought the property as
their love nest and had two kids. She was
deceived by him when she found out that his
prior marriage had not been annulled like he
said it was. She also said that Toto and Gina
were only transient dwellers in the property
and are not tenants of the spouses
Fernandez.
Guillerma also said that the contract to sell
submitted by the spouses as proof of their
ownership was falsified to reflect that
Lourdes was the co-vendee with Mario, after
she discovered their subsisting marriage and
Mario asked for the contract to be changed
to what it is now.
Mario is not legally capacitated to marry
Guillerma, so the rules on co-ownership
must fail. Also, Guillerma failed to show that
she made any actual joint contribution to the
property to prove that she has a claim in it.
Support and ejectment
-petitioner says that Mario failed to refute the
filiation of his alleged sons and in effect admits that he
is the father, thus making him liable to support them,
including providing for shelter. She says that their
right to support prevails over the ejectment suit.
-SC says that the ejectment suit deals
exclusively with the issue of possession of the
property and nothing else. Filiation is irrelevant.
Petition denied.
Uyguangco v CA
FACTS:
ISSUES


RULING
CA RULING

-no actual joint contribution, and the claim of
administration over the property during
cohabitation has not been proven.
Preliminary matters
-Guillerma says that CA is biased in
favor of respondents, but then
procedural errors cannot now be raised
because they were not raised earlier.
Also, the CA has already rendered its
judgment.
1.
-MTC has jurisdiction over the case
because the issue of co-ownership may
be passed upon by the MTC to settle
issue on possession.
4.
2.
3.
5.

Petitioner is not co-owner
-procedural rules have been complied with,
because CA was right in saying that issues not raised
during trial cannot be raised for the first time during
appeal
-she is not co-owner under Art 144 of the
Civil Code, which applies only to a relationship
between a man and a woman not legally capacitated
to marry one another. It would be absurd to create a
co-ownership when there exists a prior CPG or
absolute community between a man and his legal
wife.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975,
leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate
children
They divided considerable properties
amongst themselves extrajudicially.
Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco claims to be
illegitimate son and filed a complaint for
partition against all the petitioners. He was
left out.
Graciano alleged that he was born in 1952 to
Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao
At 15 he moved to his father's hometown at
Medina, Misamis Oriental (with approval
from father‘s legitimate family). Here he
received support from his father for high
school.
He was also assigned by his father (again
without objection from the family) as
storekeeper at the Uyguangco store.
Graciano that he had none of the documents
mentioned in Article 278 to show that he was
the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco.
1) the record of birth 2) a will 3) a statement
before a court of record, or (in) any authentic
writing.
The petitioners thereupon moved for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the
private respondent could no longer prove his
alleged filiation under the applicable
provisions of the Civil Code.
Motion to dismiss was denied, so petitioners
appealed this case.
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ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.
The petitioners argued that only evidence
under Article 278 is allowed, which Graciano
doesn‘t have. He can‘t resort to Article 285
because he was already an adult when his
alleged father died in 1975, and his claim did
not come under the exceptions:
a. ART. 285. The action for the
recognition of natural children may
be brought only during the lifetime
of the presumed parents, except:
(1) If the father or mother died
during the minority of the child (2) If
after the death of the father or of
the mother a document should
appear in which either or both
parents recognize the child.
Graciano says he has a right to show under
Article 283 that he is "in continuous
possession of the status of a child of his
alleged father by the direct acts of the latter
or of his family."
Sc says: The Civil Code provisions both
parties invoke have been superseded the
Family Code.
a. Art. 175 and Art. 172. Private
respondent has admitted that he
has none of the documents
mentioned in Art 172 par 1, but he
says he has been "in open and
continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child," which is
now also admissible as evidence of
filiation under Art 172 paragraph 2.
b. He says lived with his father from
1967 until 1973, receiving support,
that he has been using the surname
Uyguangco without objection from
his father and the petitioners, that
he has shared in the profits of the
copra business of the Uyguangcos,
which is a strictly family business;
that he was a director, together with
the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons
Development Corporation, a family
corporation, and that in the
addendum to the original
extrajudicial settlement concluded
by the petitioners he was given a
share in his deceased father's
estate.
c. Illegitimate child is now also
allowed to establish his claimed
filiation by "any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws," like his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a
family Bible in which his name has
been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission
by silence, the testimonies of
4.
5.
witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
However, Graciano seeks to prove his
filiation under the second paragraph of
Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is
now barred because of his alleged father's
death in 1975.
a. The action must be brought during
the lifetime of the alleged parent.
b. It is clear that the private
respondent can no longer be
allowed to give evidence of his
status of an illegitimate child or
prove his alleged filiation.
Why the rule? Siempo-Diy: The putative
parent should thus be given the opportunity
to affirm or deny the child's filiation, and this,
he or she cannot do if he or she is already
dead.
DECISION:
Petition granted, Graciano not allowed to present
evidence or prove filiation.
Santos vs Republic
Petitioner Santos spouses seek to adopt the
4-year old sickly brother of the wife.
It was
established that the petitioners are both 32 years of
age and have maintained a conjugal home of their
own. They do not have a child of their own blood nor
has any one of them been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a
lawyer, with business interests in a textile
development enterprise and the IBA electric plant,
and is the general manager of Medry Inc. and the
secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His copetitioner-wife is a nurse by profession. The parents
of the child testified that they entrusted him to the
petitioners who reared and brought him up.
Issue: Can a sister adopt her own brother?
Held:
Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates
those persons who may not adopt, and it has been
shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not
among those prohibited from adopting. Article 339 of
the same code names those who cannot be adopted,
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and the minor child whose adoption is under
consideration, is not one of those excluded by the
law. Article 338, on the other hand, allows the
adoption of a natural child by the natural father or
mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or
mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or
stepmother. This last article is, of course, necessary
to remove all doubts that adoption is not prohibited
even in these cases where there already exist a
relationship of parent and child between them by
nature. To say that adoption should not be allowed
when the adopter and the adopted are related to each
other, except in these cases enumerated in Article
338, is to preclude adoption among relatives no
matter how far removed or in whatever degree that
relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the
policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child
to be adopted should be of paramount consideration.
Republic vs Court of Appeals
James Hughes, a natural born citizen of the
United States of America, married Lenita Mabunay, a
Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a
citizen of that country. The spouses jointly filed a
petition with the RTC to adopt the minor niece and
nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the
couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The
minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the
adoption. The RTC rendered a decision granting the
petition.
Issue: Can the spouses adopt the minors?
Held:
While James Anthony unquestionably is not
permitted to adopt under any of the exceptional cases
enumerated in paragraph (3) of the aforequoted
article, Lenita, however, can qualify pursuant to
paragraph (3)(a). Lenita may not thus adopt alone
since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the
husband and the wife, a condition that must be read
along together with Article 184. Art 185 provides: Art.
185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in
the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to
adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one
spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the
other.
As amended by Executive Order
91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it
mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when
one of them was an alien. The law was silent when
both spouses were of the same nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible
uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the
necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except in
only two instances: (1) When one spouse seeks to
adopt his own legitimate child; or (2) When one
spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the
other.
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186
of the Code, on the subject of parental authority, can
aptly find governance. Article 186. In case husband
and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the
legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority
shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with
this Code.
Republic vs Toledano
Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A.
Clouse who are aliens filed a petition to adopt the
minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are physically,
mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting
Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2,
1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was
and has been under the care and custody of private
respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the
adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise
consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability
to support and educate her son. The RTC granted the
petition.
Issue: Can the spouses adopt Solomon?
Held:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The
Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents
spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting
Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order
No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are
not qualified to adopt, viz.: (3) An alien, except: (a) A
former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative
by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c)
One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the
foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption
as may be provided by law.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the
other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to
paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a
former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her
younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for
adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without
violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption
by the husband and wife. It reads: Article 185.
Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
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following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt
his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse
seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article
185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and
wife, a condition that must be read along together with
Article 184.
Cang vs Court of Appeals
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie
Clavano who were married, begot three children.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang
couple's relationship was undisturbed. Not long
thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her
husband's alleged extramarital affair. Anna Marie
subsequently filed a petition for legal separation which
was granted. They had an agreement for support of
the children and that Anna Marie can enter into
agreements without the written consent of Herbert.
Petitioner left for the US.
Meanwhile, the brother and sister-in-law of
Anna Marie filed for the adoption of the 3 minor Cang
children. Upon learning of the adoption, Herbert went
back to the Philippines to contest it, but the petition for
adoption was granted by the court.
Issue: Can minor children be legally adopted without
the written consent of a natural parent on the ground
that the latter has abandoned them?
Held:
Article 256 of the Family Code provides for
its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws." As amended by the
Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for
adoption now reads: Art. 188. The written consent of
the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (2)
the parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian,
or the proper government instrumentality.
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident
that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the
written consent of the natural parent to the adoption
has remained a requisite for its validity.
As clearly inferred from the foregoing
provisions of law, the written consent of the natural
parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written
consent can be dispensed with if the parent has
abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or
hopelessly intemperate."
In the instant case, records disclose that
petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose
to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims over his children as to, constitute
abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without
financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to
abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was
physically absent as he was then in the United States,
he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations
of love, care and support for his children. He
maintained regular communication with his wife and
children through letters and telephone. He used to
send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Cervantes vs Fajardo
The minor was born to respondents Conrado
Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law
husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for
adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law,
the herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and
Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and
custody of the child when she was barely two (2)
weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of
the child by herein petitioners, was also executed by
respondent Gina Carreon.
The adoptive parents received a letter from
the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of
P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their
child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand.
Subsequently, the respondents took the child.
Issue: Can respondents take back their child?
Held:
In all cases involving the custody, care,
education and property of children, the latter's welfare
is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be
separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will
not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to
rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the
custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the
moral, physical and social welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the resources and
moral as well as social standing of the contending
parents. Never has this Court deviated from this
criterion.
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado
Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than
respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with
the latter is a common-law husband and wife
relationship. His open cohabitation with corespondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor
that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and
develop into an upright and moral-minded person.
Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously
given birth to another child by another married man
with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but
who eventually left her and vanished. Upon the other
hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be
morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of
supporting the minor and giving her a future better
than what the natural mother, whp is not only jobless
but also maintains an illicit relation with a married
man, can most likely give her.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted
by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect,
among others, of dissolving the authority vested in
natural parents over the adopted child, except where
the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural
parent of the adopted, in which case, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly
by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right
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to the care and custody of the adopted child and
exercise parental authority and responsibility over
him.
Sayson vs Court of Appeals
estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted
above, she is entitled to the share her father would
have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be
equal to the shares of her grandparents' other
children.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five
children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10,
1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who
had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972.
His wife died nine years later. Their properties were
left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel,
all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios,
together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed
a complaint for partition and accounting of the
intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. Delia,
Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this
time for the accounting and partition of the intestate
estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the
couple's four surviving children.
Both cases were decided in favor Delia, et al
on the basis of practically the same evidence. The
Judge declared in his decision that Delia and
Edmundo were the legally adopted children of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of
adoption. Doribel was their legitimate daughter as
evidenced by her birth certificate. Consequently, the
three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and
Rafaela by right of representation.
Held:
In consequence of the above observations,
we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo,
as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to
the intestate estate of the deceased couple,
conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil
Code: Art. 979. Legitimate children and their
descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and
even if they should come from different marriages. An
adopted child succeeds to the property of the
adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate
child.
There is no question that as the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of
Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent
her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate
D2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. URSUA 53