Unguistics: The Representationof Language
241
6.3 Syntax
SomePreliminaries
Languagesare cognitive systemsthat enablehumanbeings to expressan infinite range
of meaningsin a physical, (typically ) acoustic form. However, having investigated a
theory of phonological representation, we are still far &om an understandingof how
linguistic sounds are paired with semanticinterpretations. Indeed, one of the central
mysteriesof natural languagecan be couchedin this way : how is it that the movement
of air molecules, and attendant changesin pressure,can ultimately be treatedby human
beings as meaningful?
Obviously , meanings must be correlated with morphemes and words, but there
must also be a procedure for assigning meaning to phrases, sentences
, and larger
discourses. Current linguistic theory maintains that there is a highly articulated subcomponent
of grammars- the syntax- that mediatesthe pairing of sound and meaning
. As in the case of phonological theory (or, indeed, any currently developing
theory), there are a number of alternative approaches to the study of syntax. However,
to permit us to examine syntax in some depth, we will concentrateon the theory of
generative grammar currently being developed by Chomsky and others known as
Government and Binding (GB). (For referencesto and summariesof other approaches,
seeSells 1985 and Wasow 1989.)
There are severalmotivations for positing a level of syntactic representation. Consider
a sentencelike Herb and Raewent to the beachin which there appearsto be an
intuitive boundary between the subject of the sentence, Herb and Rae, and the predicate
. The syntactic structure of the sentencecan be informally
, went to the beach
sketchedas follows:
(22)
[[Herb and Rae] [went to the beach]]
Sometimeswe have clear intuitions (introspective beliefs and judgments) about this
kind of structural categorization. Asking a native speakerto " divide a sentenceinto its
two main parts" will fairly reliably give the structure in (22). There is also considerable
experimental evidence within psycholinguistics to support the view that the mental
representationsof sentencesinvolve higher-order structure of this sort. Fodor, Bever,
and Garrett (1975) provide a good overview of these results. Levelt (1970), for instance
"
, showed that when subjects are asked to judge the " relative relatedness
of
adjacentwords in a sentence
, responsesshowing a high degree of relatednesscluster
around syntactic boundaries like those indicated in (22). In experiments using more
, Fodor and Bever (1965) inserted brief clicks into sentencesand
complex sentences
asked subjects to locate the noise. Subjects' performance was best when the click
coincided with a syntactic boundary.
In certain cases, however, our intuitions about syntactic structure are not always
clear and may be subject to disagreementamong speakers
. Moreover, we ought not
the
of
a
investigate
properties
languagesimply by asking speakersto tell us about its
structures. Although people often believe that they have insight into such matters, it
does not makefor good scienceto rely on the laypersons hunchesabout languageany
more than it would to employ suchan approachin the study of an organ like the brain,
or the mechanismsof visual perception.
Consequently, casesin which experimentalevidenceis unavailable, or in which we
may not yet know where to look for experimental confirmation, will require other
242
6
Chapter
. Fortunately, there
ways of establishingthe structure that we associatewith sentences
are tests that can be applied that provide linguistic evidence for assignedstructure.
tests.In this regard, considerthe following ambiguous
Among thesetools are constituency
sentence
, a casein which a single string of words can be assignedmore than one
semanticinterpretation.
(23)
The people talked over the noise.
This sentencemight be interpreted to mean that the people spoke so as to overcome
an interfering sound. In this casea plausible syntactic analysisof the sentencemight
be as in (24):
(24)
[ Thepeople] [talked [[over] [the noise]]]
Here, the verb is talked, and the rest of the predicateconsistsof a prepositional phrase
overthe noise(which in turn consistsof the preposition overand its object the noise
).
the
sentence
be
to
mean
that
the
discussed
,
Alternatively
might
interpreted
people
the noise. Under this interpretation, a reasonableconstituent analysismight look like
this:
(25)
[ Thepeople [[talked over] [the noise]]]
This analysisof (23) treats the verb ascomplex, consistingof the simpleverb talkedand
the particle over. But if this grouping is correct and the string talked over forms a
constituent (a structural unit), we should be able to substitute another verb for it - for
- and still have a sentencethat
instance, discussed
preservesthe same relationships
between structure and meaning. In the caseof (24), however, we cannot make such a
substitution. Instead, we can substitute a phraselike in spiteof the interruptionsfor over
the noise
, consistent with the claim that the latter constitutes a structural unit in (24)
(though not in (25 . We refer to this as the substitutiontest. In the caseat hand this test
reveals that a single sentencecan correspond to two quite different propositions,
eachof which has a distinct syntactic (and logical) structure, hence, a different cognitive
representation.
Additional confirmation for the conclusion that (23) can be associatedwith two
different syntactic representationscomesfrom considering the following example:
(26)
The people talked the noise over.
Notice that unlike (23), (26) can only mean that the people discussedthe noise,
and not that they overcame it. But why does the second meaning disappear? Our
explanation is that when (23) is structured as in (25), it can be transfonnedinto an
alternative representationin which the particle overappearsat the end of the predicate.
Other complex verbs such as call up and egg on also allow displacement of the
particle:
. +-+ The committeecalled
(27) a. The committee[calledup] the candidate
the candidateup.
b. The fans[eggedon] their opponents
. +-+ The fanseggedtheir
opponentson.
, however,do not allow a repositioningof the prepositionat the
Prepositional
phrases
endof the phrase
:
Linguistics: The Representationof Language
(28)
243
a. The man stood quietly [ behindthe tree]. .,t+ ~ e man stood
quietly the tree behind.
b. The duck worried about the football. .,t+ . The duck worried the
football about.
So, when (23) has the meaning and the structure of (25), over counts as a particle and
can be dislocated to the end of the predicate. This explains why (26) can carry the
meaning of (23) that is supported by (25). In contrast, when (23) has the meaning and
the structure of (24), over counts as a preposition. Sinceprepositions cannot dislocate
(see(28 , overcannot dislocatein this analysis. Thus, on its representationin (25), (23)
can be turned into (26), but not on its representationin (24). This provides a strong
argumentfor taking meaningto be assignedon the basisof syntactic structure, and not
directly to words and sentencesthemselves.By applying constituencytestssuchas the
substitution test and by examining distributional patterns in a language, linguists can
determine the nature of the syntactic structure.
We argued earlier that the inherent creativity of language, and the ability of the
human information-processingsystem to acquireand processit , cannot be explainedif
we view the language ability simply as a mental list of sentences
. Such a list of
sentenceswould need to be infinitely long, a fact at odds with the assumptionthat
all of our cognitive capabilitiesmust be representablewithin Anite-sized systems(our
brains). Our most recent considerationsadd a secondreasonto resist a conception of
- the
the languagefaculty as a list of sentences
interpretation of sentencesrequiresthe
assignmentof a particular syntactic structure. We have suggestedthat a more promising
conception of linguistic knowledge is that speakersknow the patterns of their
language, and that those patterns can be representedas a set of rules and principles
that define the infinitely large classof permissiblesentences
.
TheGoalsof a Grammar
What would an appropriateset of suchrules and principleslook like for a languagelike
English? To approach this question, consider first the simpler case of an abstract
formal languagethat consistsexclusively of sentencelikestrings containing any number
of instancesof the symbol "B " followed by a single occurrenceof the symbol " A ."
A grammar for this languagecontains the initial symbol " A ," and a rule that dictates
that the symbol " A " can dominate(consist of ) the string of symbols "B A " :
(29) A - + BA
The application of such a rule yields the string "B A " ; the symbol " A " dominatesthe
"
two symbols B A ," as the rule specifies(figure 6.16). Notice, however, that this rule
- it may
can apply recursively
. If we reapply the rule once,
reapply to its own output
"
"
"
the lower occurrenceof A will dominate the string B A ." If we reapply it twice, we
get the result shown in figure 6.17. There is, in fact, no limit to the number of times the
rule may be applied in a derivation.
A
1\A
B
Figure6.16
Treerepresentation
of a derivationemployingthe rule A -+ B A
Chapter 6
.m
244
Figure6.17
An exampleof a recursivederivatiol1
Supposewe considereachoccurrenceof a symbol that doesnot dominateany other
symbol a terminal element. The sequenceof terminal elements constitutes a wellformed string, or sentenceof the language. In the caseof figure 6.17, the sentencewe
have generatedis "8 B B A ." Sincethere is no upward bound on the number of times
that this rule can be recursively applied, there is an infinite number of sentencesin this
formal language. Accounts in current linguistic theory hold that the syntax of natural
languagescan be characterizedby a grammar that employs recursionin this senseto
provide for the essentialcreativity of linguistic systems.
Note that all the sentencesgeneratedby our simple grammar will be of the form
" "
"
"
" "
8I1A - some number n of 8 s followed by exactly one A . Any other string is
ungrammatical it is not a part of the language, and the grammar will not be able to
generate(assigna structure to ) it. The syntacticianundertakesto determinejust which
finite set of rules is adequateto the task of defining the syntactic patternsof a particular
language. The primary goal of syntactic theory &om the perspectiveof the cognitive
scientistis to model the systemof knowledge that determineswhich utterancesconstitute
the language, and to contribute to an explanation of how that knowledge is
acquiredand used.
As we have pointed out, the criterion of grammaticality is not to be found in
. We test claims about syntactic
grammar books, but in the judgments of speakers
structure and the adequacy of a particular hypothesis against data in the form of
intuitions of native speakers
. All speakersof English will , without hesitation, report
without a is not a sentenceof English. Neither
that the string .girl the the hippopotamus
is .girl the kissedboy the, even though we can make more senseof this string. Furthermore
, we can produce and understand a sentencelike Melvin ate a bulldozerthat he
believedwas trying to turn him into a watennelonand determine that it is grammatical,
in spite of the fact that it expresses a bizarre claim. Indeed, Chomsky (1957) observed
that a sentencelike Colorlessgreenideassleepfuriously is grammatical (that is, fits the
pattern of English) even though it is nonsensical.
'
Syntacticiansdo not ordinarily rely on the production of speakersactual utterances
in gathering their data. For one thing, speakersmay not necessarilyproduce the types
of sentencesthat we wish to investigateeven though they are within their grammatical
competence.For another, actualutterancesmay involve errors in perfonnance: shifts of
attention, limits on memory, drunkenness
, and so forth , can produce outputs that are
not actually consistentwith the grammar(and whose inconsistencyhasa different kind
of explanation).
Unguistics: The Representationof Language
245
S
~~~- - "'--~.."- "
'- ~,,- ,,
",- - ~", r
- -" NP
VP
TENSE
""
""""""""""""""
.............. , ............
...
..
/
...
"""
""'"
....
.............
I
/ /
,
DET
N
V
AP
PAST
I
the
I
dog
I
be
t
humble
Figure 6.18
Phrasemarker for the sentenceThedog was humble
As a result, we must provide a laboratory-like environment in which we arti6cially
induce the kind of linguistic behavior that we want to examine. Syntacticianstypically
' ' '
"
? is
; is . . . a grammatical sentence
proceed by asking questions of native speakers
normally all that is needed once a subject has a rough-and-ready understanding of
what is meant by grammaticality. By and large we can develop a substantialand highly
consistentbody of data in this fashion. We typically need not resort to more formal
experimentalprocedures, although in unclearcaseswe may well want to do so. In part,
this consistencyis achieved by investigating constructions that are sharedby many
speakersof a given dialect or language.
The Theoryof Grammar: PhraseStructure
We have already seen evidence that the syntacHc properHesof sentencescannot be
describedsolely in terms of linear sequencesof words. But linear order is an important
Hon of grammaHcality for many (though not all) languages. In
part of a characteriza
new
books
is
a
well -formed phrase, whereas. booksnew is not. By contrast, in
English
Sinhalapot alut- literally ' booksnew' - is grammatical, but . alut pot is not. Syntactic
theory must therefore characterizea level of representaHon that allows us to capture
the noHon of syntactic constituency, permits a characteriza
Hon of the linear order of
elements within and between units, and admits of (at least some) variaHon among
dialects and languages. One form that such representaHons can take is the phrase
structuretree, or phrasemarker.
Phrasemarkersare upside-down treelike structuresin which the nodes are labeled
by syntactic category. For a sentencelike Thedog was humble, the phrasemarker will
have roughly the form shown in figure 6.18. Some of the symbols appearing in the
phrasemarkersthat we will discussare listed in table 6.4.
Although you are no doubt familiar with terms like noun, it may not be so clearwhat
a Noun Phrase( NP) is. Although the subject or object of a sentencesometimesis a
), other sentencescontain subjects
single noun (for example, a proper noun like Seymour
or objects consisHng of a sequenceof words. For example, in figure 6.18 we find the
subjectNP thedog. The sentencewould have been equally grammaHcalwith a subject
as complex as the only otherbookthat I haveeverreadthat I can rememberthe title of, or
everyotherarmadilloin the town. Furthermore, these samesequencesof words can also
appearin object posiHon, for example, after the verb liked in the string I liked. . . We
can categorizeall sequencesof words (phrases) that can appear in subject (or object)
position by assigning them to the category NP, noHng that phrasesthat occupy this
slot contain at least one noun.
246
Chapter 6
Table 6.4
Symbols used in phrase markers
Symbol
Name
Examples
S
NP
OET
N
TENSE
VP
V
AP
A
Sentence
Noun Phrase
Oetenniner
Noun
Tense Marker
Verb Phrase
Verb
Adjective Phrase
Adjective
A girl walked the dog .
the dog, a girl
the, a, some
dog, girl
PAST, PRESENT
walk the dog
walk, kiss
very smart, tall and thin
interesting
Next we will addressthe TENSEnode. We have madean unintuitive assumptionin
figure 6.18: the tense marker appears in the tree in front of the verb rather than
following it (as we might expect by observing that ordinary past tense verbs like
walkedexhibit a past tense marker, -ed, suffixed after the verb stem). There are some
important reasonsfor this decision, which we will survey later in the discussion. We
should also note that English phrasemarkerscontain only two possible tenses, PAST
and PRESENT. Other languageshave more complex tense systems, but English is
restricted to past and present tense forms of the verb. Referenceto future time is
"
"
accomplishedby means of a helping or auxiliary verb, for example, will , which
precedesthe verb stem. '
In our analysis, the verb s tenseis determinedby selectingeither PAST or PRESENT
as the node under TENSE. Notice that the verb itself is inserted in the phrasemarker
in its basic unaffixed form. By convention, the TENSEnode specifiesthe tense of the
verb immediately to its right , and the tenseof the verb is determinedby the value of
the tensemarker chosenin the tree. The tree for the sentenceThedog is humblediffers
from figure 6.18 only in that the node under TENSEis PRESENTrather than PAST.
The explanation of the need for the Verb Phrase( VP) and Adjective Phrase(AP)
categoriesis parallel to the explanation for the category NP. In eachcasewe find that
although some sentencesexhibit simple adjectivesand verbs, others-contain complex
phrases. For example, instead of the simple adjective humblein figure 6.18, we might
have had the complex AP more humblethan the lowliestsnail, or very, very humble.
Similarly, died, chasedthecat, and gavehis ownera hard time are all VPs that might have
substituted for was humblein the examplephrasemarker.
Two final, brief comments. The Determiner (DET) category comprisesa class of
words including some
, every, and a, in addition to the. These introduce and specify
common nouns. The S node, at the top of the tree, can be thought of in two ways: as
the symbol for Sentence
, and also as the Start symbol that begins eachphrasemarker.
Not every arrangementof nodes into a phrase marker correspondsto an English
sentence. For example, in English the subject NP typically precedesthe VP predicate.
Therefore, reversing the first NP and the VP in figure 6.18 resultsin the ungrammatical
.
string was humblethe dog. A competent speakerof English must know a set of rules
and principles that distinguish possible from impossible phrase markers. Although
some of these restrictions will be particular to a given language, others may follow
from general properties of language. However, it is not always clear at the outset
whether any given syntactic property is to be attributed to a language-specificrule or
: The Representation
of Language 247
Unguistics
a general linguistic principle. Consequently, we will begin by
assuming that every
feature of the language under investigation must be spelled out by a rule, and later
suggestways in which some of theserules might be replacedby generalprinciples.
The rules that describe constituency relations and linear order are called
phrase
structurerules. Here are the rules we need to construct the phrasemarker in
figure 6.18:
(30) S- + NP TENSEVP
NP - + DET N
TENSE- + { PRES,PAST}
VP - + VAP
AP - + A
The rules shown in (30) tell us that asentenceS ) consistsof an NP, a TENSEnode,
and a VP, in that order. This rule encodes the basic order of
English subjects and
predicates. The secondrule specifiesthat an NP dominatesa determinerfollowed by a
noun. The TENSErule provides the two tensealternativesin
English. Exclusivechoices
are listed within braces, set off by commas. The next rule dictates that a VP includesa
Verb followed by an Adjective Phrase, and the final rule indicates that an Adjective
Phrase dominates an Adjective. Although each of these rules
requires considerable
amendmentsto be complete and accurate, this small grammar is sufficient to
generate
the phrasemarker in figure 6.19, which is the sameas that in figure 6.18, without its
lexical items.
In order to associatethe bottom nodes of the tree with actual lexical material
(words), we must apply the processof le.ricalinsertion
. To accomplishthis, we require a
list of vocabulary words called the le.ricon, which specifiesa syntactic
category for each
entry as well as infonnation about its phonological fonn and semanticinterpretation.
In the caseof verbs, a subcategorization
frameis also specifiedto indicate which syntactic
categoriesmay cooccur with eachparticular verb (its complement
structure
). Notice, for
instance, that becan appearwith an NP as well as an AP:
(31) Dogs are [NPa responsibility]NP
(32)
Dogs are [ APquite bothersome]AP
Verbs like perspireand elapsediffer from bein that they cannot cooccurwith NPs at all:
(33)
(34)
A carpenterperspired.
.A
carpenterperspiredsweat.
S
~
"
.
_
.
_
.
.
~
_
.
~
l
NP
TENSE
VP
.
.
"
.
,
.
"
.
,
,
.
.
.
.
"
.DET
I
.
NPAST
V ,AP
I
A
(35)
(36)
The time remaining in Rover' s life elapsed.
" The time remaining in Rover' s life elapsedtwo hours.
Figure6.19
Phrasemarkerfor the sentence
in figure6.18 beforelexicalinsertion
248
6
Chapter
for perspired
for elapsed
, andexceeded
By substitutingexpelled
, we reversethe patternof
in
33
36
.
Each
verb
then, must be associated
(
)
,
(
)
grarnmaticality
judgments
through
with a rangeof appropriatecomplements
. Samplepartiallexicalentriesfor someof the
vocabularyunderconsideration
might look like this:
(37) be, Ibi/ , V, _
{NP, AP}
/
0
, Iprspair, V, _
perspire
0
, lilzps / , V, _
elapse
/
V
NP
_
,
,
,
expel IwpEl
I
exceed
/
V
NP
, Eksid, , _
time, Itaim/ , N
the, lOAf, DET
On thebasisof suchlexicalinformation
, we canselecttheappropriatewordsandinsert
theminto trees.
Transfonnations
In addition to the phrasestructureand lexical componentsof the grammar, collectively
known as the base
, there is a secondtype of syntactic rule that hasplayed an important
role in linguistic theory, the transfonnation
. Unlike phrasestructure rules, this classof
rules does not characterizephrase structure trees. Rather, transformations rearrange
phrase markers in certain ways. The rule discussedabove that optionally moves a
particle to the end of a VP (particle movement) is an example of a transformational
rule.
Another type of phenomenon that has yielded to transformational analysis is socalled
wh-questionfonnation. Wh-questionsare sentencesthat ask 'Who ? Where? Why ?
What?" and so forth , in contrast to yes/ no questions, which merely require an affirmative
or negative answer. Examplesof English wh-questionsare given in (38) and (39):
(38)
Who spilled it?
(39) What is the problem?
Wh-question words in other languagesmay not, of course, begin with the letters
wh- (even in English, how questionsare of the wh-question type), but such questions
typically involve a query correlatedwith somemajor constituent of the sentence
, such
as the subjector object NP. In English the question word takesthe placeof somesuch
constituent and usually appearsat the beginning of the sentence.
In (38), becausewe are questioning the subject, it is not possibleto detect any shift
in position. But in (39), where we are questioning a noun phraseat the end of the VP,
the question word appearsin sentence-initial position. Linguists have analyzed these
types of questions by assuming that the question word is initially generated in a
normal argumentposition(as subjector object), but is consequentlymoved to sentenceinitial position by a transformation. The structure for (39) that is generated by the
phrasestructure rules is shown in figure 6.20.
Notice that we are assumingthat what is a noun, and that it is generatedby the
phrase structure rules for NPs. The transformation of Wh-Movementthen applies to
rearrangethe phrasemarker in figure 6.20, moving what to the front of the S. Another
transformation, Inversion
, will also apply to reversethe order of the verb and subject.
6.21
shows
an
informal
Figure
representationof these two movements.
S
,
Nrr
I
vp
"
"
/
/
"
/
"
I
/the
"
/
DET
N
PRES
V
NP
I problem
I be
I wha
I
S
Unguistics: The Representationof Language
249
NP
~
"
/I "prob
"DET
'the
N
P
I,lPRES
I wha
I
em
be
Figure6.20
Phrasemarkergeneratedby phrasestructurerolesfor the sentence
?
(39), Whatis theproblem
Figure 6.21
Informal representationof transformations applying to the phrase marker in Agure 6.20 in the derivation
of (39), What is the problem?
Perhapsit is not clearwhy we could not simply generatethe word what insentenceinitial position in the initial phrasemarker rather than appealingto a transformationto
move it to the front of the sentence. The reasonis that there is a dependency
between
the fronted question word and its initial argument position that would not be accounted
for by this more direct analysis. The dependencymay be stated as follows:
whenever there is a question word at the front of a sentence
, there is also a corre<
,
sp nding gap a missing constituent inside the sentence. Thus, in (38) there is a
missing subject; in (39), a missing object. Sentencesin which thesepositions are 8lIed,
and a question word occursas well, are ungrammatical:
.
(40) Who Johnspilled it?
.
(41) What is the problem the book?
In the framework we are developing, if we were to directly generatequestionwords
in initial position, we would not be able to correlatesentence-initial wh-words with the
corresponding gaps in argument position. We can, however, explain the facts in the
transformationalaccount. On this analysis, the only way to produce a question word
at the beginning of a sentenceis for that question word to have been moved there
from its normal position, where it was initially placed by the phrase structure rules.
Thus, it is an automatic consequenceof the transformationalmovement that a gap is
left behind.
Chapter 6
250
The
should
fonnation
that question
also predicts
clauses . ( 42 ) and ( 43 ) present some relevant
examples :
in subordinate
In
the
account
transfonnational
( 42 )
I know
( 43 )
John
case
Bill
who
knows
Mary
I know
what
indicates
( 45 )
started
John
, the what
( 46 )
John
knows
object
clause to
insulted
of the lowest
as the subject
Mary
knew
Nancy
~
can move
two
Mary
~
clause :
subordinate
considered
t
Furthennore
in
I
out
knows
word
who was
question
to the & ont of the subordinate
, the
:
t
In ( 43 ), what
.
considered
Nancy
clause . It is moved
Bill
~
knew
.
Wh - Movement
( 42 ), before
of
in the subordinate
position
fonn ( 42 ), as ( 44 ) infonnally
( 44 )
insulted
be possible
I
up , as in ( 46 ) :
clauses
knew
considered
Nancy
t
t
I
Finally , it is possible in both of these cases to move the questioned word all the way
to the front of the main clause. Further rules apply , in this case, to insert a form
of the auxiliary verb do, but (47 ) and (48 ) gives the basic idea of how this works :
(47 )
.
(48 )
do I know Bill insulted
~
t
What does John know
t
I
Nancy considered
Mary knew
t
t
I
The full range of these constructions can be accounted for if we assume that the
Wh - Movement transformation moves a question word to the front of an S. This type
of formulation allows the rule to move the wh -word to either of two positions in
constructions like those above , which contain more than asingleS node .
Question formation , then , involves a movement transformation: the derivation involves
moving a constituent to a new position in the phrase marker . We will now
briefly discuss another type of transformation : a deletion rule .
(49)
Moe added salt, and Curly did too.
Max preferred the mackerel, and Bill the brill .
(51) Herman owned some dogs, and Mary owned some too.
"
"
In each of these sentencesthere is a phrase that is understood but not overtly
present. In (49), for instance, what Curly is understood to have done is to have added
salt. Similarly, Bill is understood to have preferredthe brill, and what Mary owned was
dogs. Thesesentencesare derived by deletion transformationsfrom the structuresthat
:
underlie the following sentences
(50)
(52)
Mae added salt, and Curly added salt too.
(53)
Max preferred the mackerel, and Bill preferred the brill .
(54)
Herman owned some dogs, and Mary owned some dogs too.
: TheRepresentation
of Language 2S1
Unguistics
The rule that converts the tree correspondingto (52) into the one correspondingto
49
( ) deletesa VP, in this caseaddedsalt. There is an interesting specialcondition that
must be met in order for this rule to apply: there must be a copy of a VP that is the
potential deletion target elsewherein the sentence, or the larger discourse. For example
, it would not be possibleto apply the VP-Deletion rule to the structureunderlying
(55) in order to derive (49):
(55)
Moe added salt, and Curly added pepper too.
Another way of putting the point is that this type of deletion transformationcan only
&om the sentencethat
remove material that is redundant, and therefore recoverable
results after the rule applies. In the caseof (49) and (52), this recoverability condition
is met.
The examplesin (50) and (53) involve a rule that deletesverbs, sometimesknown
as Gapping. In the caseof (51) and (54) a rule of IdenticalNoun Deletionis at work. For
both of theserules, the conditions on recoverability of deletion obtain. Notice that the
principle of recoverability of deletion has a very powerful practical motivation it
must be possiblefor a hearerto determineexactly what constituent meaningis missing
. Since the preservation of meaning is what is
in order to interpret elliptical sentences
involved, this may well be a case where general properties of human information
processingare at work , interacting with the form and functioning of linguistic rules.
A CaseStudy
We will now examine more closely a special problem in the syntactic analysis of
English, casemarking, and consider its relevancefor universal grammar. Casemarking
is a device for varying the form of a word , typically to provide an indication of the
role that it plays in a sentence. For example, in (56) the third person pronoun appears
in a different form depending on whether it is the subjector the object of accused
(heis
case):
in the nominativecase, him, in the accusative
'
(56) After John saw Irv leave the victim s room, he accusedhim of the
murder.
In general, English appearsto have relatively little casemarking, especiallyin comparison
to a languagelike Finnish, which has more than a dozen distinct casetypes.
Furthermore, English speakersdraw systematiccasedistinctions only in the pronoun
,
system (and to indicate possessionwith the genitivemarkers ). By contrast, Japanese
which provides case markings for subject and object- ga and 0, respectivelyattachesthem quite generally to subjectsand objects:
(57)
hon-o
Jon-ga
yonda.
John (subj) book (obj) read
'
'
John read the book.
However, although it may appearthat English employs very little casemarking, we
will show that caserelations actually playa highly significant role in English syntax,
a role that may in part be determinedby properties of universal grammar.
We begin this analysis by advancing an abstract hypothesis: all nouns in English
bear case, but it is only in the pronoun system that case is markedby an overt
phonological form. Is such a claim plausible? Are there other circumstancesin English
grammar where a significant morpheme or syntactic category may not have a
S
'
"
'
,
"
~
~
-N
,NP
r
"II TENSE
~
VP
"
!
'
"
I
I
I
,
,
PAST
VI
NPI
I him
I
see
John
252
Chapter 6
Figure6.22
Phrasemarkerenrichedwith indices
phonetic realization? Although most English nouns are pluralized by adding the suffix
/ z/ , there are exceptions such as deer, which are superficially invariant in the singular
and plural. That is, Thedeergrazedpeacefullyis ambiguously about either one deer or
more than one deer. Notice that it will not do to suggest that deeris neither singular
nor plural- that it does not bear plurality - becausein the caseslike (58) in which the
verb inflects for number, deermust be plural sincewereis the third person plural form
of the verb, which can only appearwith plural subjects:
(58)
The deer were grazing peaceably.
The logic of the situation with regard to English case is similar. We know that
pronounsmust be assignedcasebecausethey display it phonetically; we must look for
additional evidence if we wish to claim that other forms (nouns in general) also are
assignedcase- evidencefrom which we can deducethe presenceof caseeven where
it is not overtly marked.
-assignedby
We begin by formalizing the claim that all nouns in English are case
adopting the CaseFilter (from Chomsky 1986):
(59)
CaseFilter
Every NP must bear a case.
According to (59), there can be no grammaticalphrasemarkersin which NPs do not
have a case. Typically , the noun in subject position of any grammaticalsentencewill
receivenominative casemarking, and the object, accusativecasemarking.
. For example, we will treat the
We further hypothesizethat casemarking is assigned
transitive verb as assigning accusativecase to its object. On this view, the verb
"
"
deposits a case property on the object NP, by analogy to the way electrons are
transferred from electron donors to electron recipients in chemical models. We can
indicate this formally by annotating a verb that has assigneda caseand the NP to
which it has assignedit with the sameindex, as in figure 6.22. In this caseseeand its
object are coindexedwith the index i. Sincean NP that is coindexedto a verb hasbeen
assignedthe accusativecaseby that verb, the third person object pronoun appearsin
the accusativecase (him). If the object of seehad been other than a pronoun, case
assignment(and coindexing) would proceed in the samemanner. For example, if Bill
had been the direct object, the phrasemarker in figure 6.23 would result. That is, we
can generalizecaseassignmentso that verbs case-assign their objects regardlessof
whether the assignedcaseshows itself in the form of an overt morphological marking.
Unguistics: The Representationof Language
. -NP
---
I
N
253
S
- - ~~
- -
r
I
PAST
- - -
- - vp
~
//
/
/
" " ' "
VI
NPI
I
N
John
I
Bill
.88
Figure6.23
Indexed
marker
forJohnsawBill
phrase
S
~..- '...' ."'"
'
,
~
,
,
,~~..._~
T
"" ".,.,TENSE
NPI
I
N
I
PAST
/
VI
VP
. /
" " ' "
NP
I
N
John
see
I
Bill
Figure6.24
marker
forJohnsawBill
megalindexed
phrase
In a moment we will turn to evidencein favor of this assumption
, but first we examine
the caseassignmentmechanismwe have introduced a bit more closely.
How does caseassignmentsucceedin linking a transitive verb to its object and
, namely, that a
transferring case? Supposewe start off with the simplest assumption
verb can case-mark any NP. H this were so, we would expect the phrase marker in
figure 6.24, in which seecase-marks the subjectJohn, as an alternative to the one in
figure 6.23. Since caseis not overtly displayed on proper nouns, it might not seem
problematical that the subject in figure 6.24, John, is coindexed with see. However, in
situations where subject position is filled by a pronoun, it is clear that accusativecase
cannot be assignedto subjectposition:
.
(60) Her saw Bill.
(61)
She saw Bill.
We must therefore rule out the possibility of transitive verbs &eely case-assigning
any NP. We can eliminate this option by specifying a domainin which caseassignment
must take place. We will say that caseassigners(in this case, verbs) can assign
case only to NPs that are in their governingdomain. This domain is defined as
follows:
254
Chapter 6
A
a
~_-:I"pf
GOVERNS
Figure6.25
"
of thenotion"governing
domain
Graphic
representation
(62 )
A node (Xis in the governing domain of a node .8 if the first branching
node that dominates .8 also dominates (X(where a branching node is one
that dominates at least two other nodes).
The simplest circumstance that satisfies this definition is illustrated in figure 6.25.
In this case (Xgoverns .8 (and vice versa) because the first branching node that dominates
(x, namely , X, also dominates .8. Below we will see other phrase structure configurations
that fit the definition of government . For now , though , let us formalize the
of
case assignment as follows :
principle
(63 )
CaseAssignment under Government
A case assigner can assign case only to an NP within the governing
domain of the case assigner.
We must now account for how case is assigned to subject position . Recall that the
Case Filter requires every NP to be assigned case. Furthermore , the facts of English (as
evidenced by the form of subject pronouns ) demand that it be nominative case that is
assigned. First , we must identify a case assigner that can assign case to subject NPs.
Our hypothesis is that it is the TENSE node that plays this role , assigning nominative
case to NPs in subject position . Notice that TENSE is an appropriate choice in that
it governs the subject NP , providing some motivation for our earlier decision to place
TENSE before rather than after the verb .
Now consider the phrase marker of the sentence He saw him , incorporating the two
chains of indices that are required by the assumption that the nodes V and TENSE each
separately coindex NPs within their governing domains (see figure 6.26 ). Here TENSE
has case-assigned the subject NP , and V has case-assigned the object NP . Since TENSE
assigns nominative case, the subject receives that case; since V assigns accusative case,
the object is so marked .
We have limited our commentsso far to the details of simple sentencesinformal -
izing the account of English caseassignmentwe want to defend. The sentencesare
. For one thing, they do not involve any Rorid constructions. But
simple in two senses
in a more technical sense they are simple becauseeach contains a single clause
, a
constituent with the basic properties of a sentence. English, as well as other natural
languages, also allows constructionsthat can involve one or more subordinateclauses
in addition to the main clause. Someexamplesof such constructionsare given in (64)
through (68), with the subordinateclausesitalicized:
(64)
The position you aredefendingis preposterous.
(65)
After sizingup thesituation, John died.
S
'
"
'
'N
~
,
,NPJ
"
~
.
1
_
-I~TENS
VP
"
/
I
"
,
PAST
VI
NPI
I
N
hesaw
him
2SS
(
zQ
>
Q
Q
~
(>Q
(~
>
Q
(
~
C
W
:.m
.Q.Q>
Linguistics: The Representationof Language
Figure6.26
Indexedphrasemarkerfor the sentence
HesmDhim
Figure6.27
Phrasemarkerfor the sentence
BrendR
is a spy
(66), 1believe
(66)
I believe Brendais a spy.
(67)
That beansare magicalbecameobvious.
(68)
I suspectthat youfearedthat I knew Vernasneezed
.
Although the syntax of these constructions is complex (and fascinating), we will
restrict our attention to points that bear on the analysisof abstract case, case
assignment
, and government. Severalof theseconsiderationsprovide interesting arguments
in support of this analysisof case. Observe that (69), which is almost synonymouswith
(66), differs somewhatin its syntactic structure:
(69)
I believe Brendato bea spy.
First of all, the verb to beappearsin a tenseless
(or infinitival) form in (69), whereasthe
sameverb occursin (66) in its present tense form, is. The phrasemarkersfor (66) and
S
"
'PRE
/N
-NP
-I"V
,~
1
.ITEN
"NP
/VP
"N
,I~
S
"
'
;
"
,
1
to
VP
"
/
'
"
;
V
NP
~
D
E
N
I
Isp
Ibeli
Bre
be
a
256
Chapter 6
Figure6.28
Phrasemarkerfor the sentence
Brenda
to bea spy
(69), I believe
(69) are roughly as given in Agures 6.27 and 6.28; case indexing is suppressedfor
clarity. Another important detail to notice is that in Agure 6.28 there is no TENSE
marker of the usual sort in the lower S, just the in Anitive marker to. This accountsfor
the fact that be appearsin its untensed uninflectedform. Given our previous assumptions
about caseassignment, we can now account for a very interesting further difference
between the structuresin Agures6.27 and 6.28 that is not immediately apparent.
In the following set of data we have substituted pronouns for Brendawhere it occurs
in the earlier examples:
(70)
I believe she is aspy .
(71)
. 1believe her is
(72)
. 1believe she to be
aspy .
(73)
I believe her to be a spy.
aspy .
Thesedata show that the subjectposition of the tensedsubordinateclauseis assigned
nominative case- just like the subject position in simple sentences
; we see this in
(70). But the subject position of tenselesssubordinate clausesis assignedaccusative
case, as, for example, in (73). We can explain these phenomenain the following way .
We have claimed that it is TENSEthat is responsiblefor assigningnominative caseto
subject NPs. The coindexing operations for the phrasemarker in Agure 6.27 and for
sentence(70) will proceeduneventfully, and nominative casewill be assignedto each
subject position (in both the main and subordinate clauses
); accusativecase will be
to
the
NP
in
the
lower
subordinate
clause
in
object
assigned
Agure6.29 (assumingthat
believedoes not assigncaseinto tensedsubordinateclauses
).
Consider, by contrast, the phrasemarker in Agure6.30, which underliesthe sentence
(73). Sincethere is no TENSEnode in the subordinateclauseto assignnominative case
to the subject of that clause, the theory predicts that nominative casewill not appear
Linguistics: The Representationof Language
S
"" ""- """ "
"
"
""
~
"
~""",,,,"
1
"~",~"",
TENSE
NP1
,
!
pls
/ /
y
"VP
'
/ "" "
"
" 8
""' -..~~""
""""
""
"""""""
""
r
"""""
"",,,
VP
NPJ
TENSEJ
'
//
/
I
/
" " "
PRES V
'
NP
"
/ ' "N
D
Ei
I spy
I
/
- _r
I
believe
S
~""" "- ~'
'
"
~
'
""
"
"",,,'~
T
""""~~""
TENSE
NP1
,
I
N
I
Figure6.30
Phrase
marker
for
I
PRES
/ /
VJ
2S7
she
be
I
.
VP
" "'
" " ,
S-"
""' ~""
'
"
""
"'"""
"
""
"
""",,,,~
1
"""
to
VP
NPJ
'
/
/
""",
Vk
""
""NPk
"
"
""""'
,
"
""
""
"
"
"
DET
N
believe her
be
I
.
the sentence(73), I beliIW her to bea spy, after coindexing
I
spy
258
Chapter 6
in this position. This, of course, leavesus with the question of what does
assigncase
to herin (62). One standardassumptionis that believecan be recruited to
assigncaseto
the subject position of tenselesssubordinate clauses
, perhaps because(unlike in the
caseof (61)) it is the closestpotential caseassignerthat governs the embedded
subject
position. Sincebelieveis a verb, we expect accusativecaseto be assigned, as desired.
Given the constellationof assumptionsthat we have
developed, we can accountfor
what appears, at first blush, to be a very curious correlation between tense and case.
More evidencefor this connection is to be found in contrastslike the
following :
took
.
(74) Mary
him to be a fool.
.
{ cons.ders}
(75)
Mary
made
.
him a believer.
.
{ cons.ders}
(76)
Mary
concluded
that he was a spy.
{ determined}
Concentrating on the caseform of the subject of the subordinate clause, we note
that the contrast between (74) and (76) is expected: subjectsof tenselessclausesare
accusative, and subjectsof tensedclausesare nominative. The
interesting caseis (75).
Here the subordinate clause (if , indeed, it is a clause) apparently contains neither a
tense marker nor the infinitival to. The case form of the third
person pronoun is
accusative(compare: .1 considerhe a spy), patterning with (74) rather than (76), in this
regard.
Again, this is th~ expected result, given our hamework of assumptions. Since the
embeddedmaterial in (75) does not include TENSE, there is no case
assigneravailable
capable of assigning nominative case. Rather, the higher verb must case-assign the
pronoun, resulting in accusativecasemarking.
This pattern can also be observedin sentencescontaining
complementsto the verb
see
:
(77)
John saw her leave.
Here again, the complementto the verb, herleave
, is untensed(compare. Her leavewith
Sheleft). Consequently, caseassignmentof her cannot come Horn within the subordinate
clauseand must be assignedby the higher verb, saw. Notice,
incidentally, that this
account of caseassignmentdirectly explains why strings like .Him/ He a believerand
.Her/ She leave
cannot appear as main clausesin standard English: in both of these
there
would be no availablecaseassigner. This guaranteesthat these
examples
strings
can only appearas complementsto verbs that are capableof
assigningcaseto subordinate
structures(for example, (75) and (77 .
One final pieceof evidencein favor of our theory of abstractcase
assignmentspeaks
more directly to the claim that all NPs are case-assigned(even if
they do not reveal
any overt casemarking). We have claimed that verbs assign accusativecaseto their
direct objects. We might be more speci6c by restricting this
principle to transitive
verbs- verbs that take a direct object. Intransitiveverbs (those that do not
appearwith
direct objects) obviously cannot assignaccusativecase.
then
that
we stipulate
,
,
Suppose
that intransitive verbs do not assign case, as a basic
property of all intransitive
verbs. We can extend this generalization to include passive verbs. That is,
just as
linguistics : The Representationof Language
259
verbphrases
areintransitive
Putanotherway, passive
, suggesting
to assign
case
.
:
thefollowingcontrasts
, let usreconsider
Againstthisbackground
she
(78) a. Johnbelieved Brenda wasaspy.
.
{ her }
.she
b. Johnbelieved Brenda to beaspy.
{ her }
she
(79) a. It wasbelieved Brenda wasa spy.
.
{ her }
she
.
b. It wasbelieved Brenda to beaspy.
{ her }
The pattern in (78) is usual. In (78a) the tense marker in the lower clausewill assign
nominative caseto the lower subject, explaining why Brendaor shecan appearin the
embeddedsubjectposition. Her is ungrammaticalsinceit would require accusativecase
assignment. In contrast, in (78b), in the absenceof a tense marker in the lower clause,
believedassignsaccusativecaseto the embeddedsubject, accountingfor the grammaticality of Brendaand her, but not she. (79a) also follows the expected generalizations.
The caseof the subject of the subordinateclausemust be nominative, as assignedby
the tensemarker in the lower clause. Thus, just as in (78a), either Brendaor she, but not
her, is suitable as the subject in the subordinate clause. Notice that in each of these
three cases
, either the nominative form (she) or the accusativeform (her) is possible, and
. On our analysis, the choice of pronoun shifts
so is the non-case-marked name Brenda
with the choiceof caseassigner(either TENSE, for nominative, or the main clauseverb,
for accusative). The proper name can receive either nominative or accusativecaseand
therefore is generally compatible. However, this generalizationappearsnot to obtain
in (79b).
The puzzle is, Why are noneof the possibilitiesfor the embeddedsubjectgrammatical
in (79b)1 Let us consider each option in turn. First, since the subordinateclauseis
infinitival , there is no tense marker available to assign nominative caseto embedded
subject position, explaining the impossibility of she in subject position. In fact, case
cannot be assignedfrom within the subordinateclause, since there are no governing
caseassignersin the clause. In this regard, the subordinateclausepatterns with (78b).
Of course, in such a circumstance
, it fell to the higher verb believedto assign (accusative
) caseto the lower subject. In (79b), however, the main clausecontains the passive
verb phrase was believed
, which, becauseit is intransitive, is incapable of assigning
accusativecaseto the lower subject. This explains why the third candidate, her (the
accusativeform), is ungrammaticalin (79b).
260
6
Chapter
We have ruled out the nominative form of the pronoun in (79b) becausethere is no
nominative caseassignment, and the accusativeform becausethere is no accusative
caseassignment. But why can't Brenda, the overtly non-case-marked proper name,
appear as the embedded subject of (79b)1 The explanation depends on the crucial
differencebetween casemarkingand caseassignment
to which we are committed. Even
though Brendais not overtly marked for case, it must, on our account, be assigned
either nominative or accusativecase. But in (79b) there is no caseassigneravailableto
assign caseto the subject of the subordinateclause. Consequently, if Brendawere to
appear in this position, it would go without being assignedcase, violating the Case
Filter and rendering the sentenceungrammatical.
Although we have barely scratchedthe surfaceof even one tiny comer of English
syntax, we are already able to glimpse the deductive richnessand explanatory depth
that one hopes for in the scientificinvestigation of a language. Moreover, the study of
aspectsof grammar such as casetheory has come to occupy a prominent position in
current syntactic researchbecauseit has turned out that they figure importantly in our
understanding of the grammars of many disparate languages. The most ambitious
claim we might pursue is that the abstractprinciples that we uncover are universal
that they apply to everynatural language. We turn next to this,
perhaps the most
area
of
research
in
.
important
ongoing
linguistic theory
6.4 Universals
According to much of current linguistic theory, certain linguistic properties (for example
, the CaseFilter and the Maximal Onset Principle; see below) are principles that
are reflected by every natural language. Consequently, although certain
properties
hold for eachindividual language, they are not best understoodas having beencoincidentally
written into the grammar of each language. Instead, linguists, following the
pioneering work of Chomsky (1965) and Ross (1967), have located such principles in
universal grammar (UG). UG is not a grammar in the usual, generative sense of
the term. Rather, UG comprisesthe featuresthat are instantiated in the
grammarsof
all natural languages. Principles of UG are perfectly general, and the rule systems
of individual languages will only need to state the idiosyncratic
properties of the
languagesthey generate.
The principles of UG have also been claimed both to playa central role in the
acquisition of languageby children and to constitute species-specific, domain-specific,
innate properties of mind. The role of the principles of UG in language
acquisition is
discussedin some depth in chapter 9. For now, it will suffice to emphasizethat these
principles are taken to limit the range of hypothesesthat children will normally consider
during the courseof acquisition. Let us examinehow this way of conceptualizing
the processof languageacquisition
proceeds.
.
When a child is faced with the task of deciphering the pattern revealed by some
subsetof sentencesof a language, there will be a number of systemsof rules that are
consistentwith the availabledata (for instance, the sentencesthe child is
exposedto),
although ultimately divergent in the languagesthey generate. The child' s learning
problem can be seenas that of figuring out which of thesepossibilities to reject. The
principles of UG are thought to aid in this task by delimiting the live options- only
those grammarsthat are consistentwith UG will be availableto the child as candidates
for capturing the pattern of the language. Without this restriction on
hypothesis
Linguistics: The Representationof Language
261
fonnation, the child' s task seemsdaunting, and, somelinguists have contended,
impossible
. Researchand debate concerning the role of UG in
languagelearning are at the
center of the ongoing work in linguistics and cognitive science.
The claim that the principlesof UG are speciesspecificturns on the
proposition that
only humanshave languageability . Of course, different speciescertainly have effective
communicationsystems, and some may even possesssystemsthat are
languagelikein
significant regards. Yet most cognitive scientists have come to the conclusion that
whatever suchabilities amount to , they appearto be distinct from the human
capacity
(see, for example, Premack1986). In turn, linguists have reasonedthat although the
principles of UG may well be (part of) what enableshumans to learn language, the
absenceof theseproperties and the learning advantagesthey afford may
explain why
other organismscannot acquirehuman languages.
The principlesof UG have also been assertedto be domain specific- to
govern the
shapesof grammars and thereby direct the course of language acquisition, but to
have no direct impact on other cognitive capacitiesor in other
learning domains. This
position typically forms a part of the modularitythesisthat ascribesdifferent cognitive
abilities to separatefacultiesof mind (seeFodor 1983; Piatelli-Palmerini 1980; Garfield
1987). On this view, sincelanguageis a distinct cognitive
capacity, the principlesof its
theories should not be expected to characterizeother capacities. This entails that the
principles of UG, in particular, are specificto language, and also that the way children
learn languagemay be importantly unrelatedto the way they learn
anything else.
Finally, the principles of UG have been claimed to be innate (see Chomsky 1965,
1980). As such, they are taken to be a part of the organism's
biological endowment,
ultimately to be identified in tenns of human genetics. The argument, roughly put, is
that such principles are not simply inducible from the primary data available to children
- yet learnerscannot fonn
adequatehypothesesabout their own languageswithout
such principles. They must, perforce, be innate. If notions like the CaseFilter are
indeeda part of the biological systemthat guides the fonnation of
grammars, it should
not be surprising to find that abstract case plays a crucial and
widespread role in
English even though there is little overt evidence for casemarking. We should also
find evidencethat thesekinds of principles are at work even in
languagesthat exhibit
no overt manifestationof casewhatsoever. Such results would be
impressiveindeed,
and much of current linguistic researchis directed toward
uncovering this kind of
evidence. Although there are alternative accountsof the relationship between
grammars
and cognition (seeGazdaret al. 1985), and severalrival accountsof the details of
syntactic theory (see Sells 1985; Wasow 1989), much current linguistic researchis
directed at working out the details of casetheory and other subtheoriesof
generative
models of linguistic knowledge.
The task of elucidating the properties of universal grammar would be
relatively
straightforward if all languages uniformly embodied a fixed and unvarying set of
principles. But matters are not so simple. The details of caseassignmentvary from
languageto language. Syllable structure can vary significantly, and there is no single
stresssystem that follows inexorably from principles of metrical structure. Factssuch
as these threaten to vitiate the important claims that have been made about UG.
Indeed, if part of the empiricalappealof UG was that its claimsare testable
againstthe
data of any natural language, the failure to accountfor the data of even one
languageis
deeply problematic.
262
Chapter 6
In an attempt to solve theseproblems, generativelinguists remaincommitted to the
view that the grammarsof particular languagesreflect a set of core propertiescaptured
by the principles of UG, but hold that thesebasicsare subject to a (limited) degree of
variation as well - parameters
that mark the range of possiblehuman languages. Before
we turn to someexamplesof the principles-and-parametersview of things, an analogy
may be useful.
Consider the great variety that seemsto exist in handwoven rugs. On entering a
rug store, we may be struck by the great wealth of different designs: colors, patterns,
and sizesall vary accordingto the country of origin , the maker, and so forth. Yet when
we examine the rugs more closely, it is possible to discern some interesting, though
much less obvious, similarities. Two rugs that appear when viewed from the usual
distance to be constructed from utterly different weaving patterns turn out, when
viewed at close range, to be built up from identical knots- which happen to be
oriented differently and made from wool of different thicknesses
. As thesetwo simple
similar
at
a
,
certain
level
of
examination) take on strikparametersvary highly
rugs (
distinct
. The universal linguistic properties that we have
ingly
superficialappearances
consideredmay well have this character- admitting of small variations on relatively
abstractparametersthat, from afar, createthe appearanceof great diversity .
A Phonological
Example
According' to the theory we have been describing, many of the identifying details of
the world s languagescanbe viewed as small variations on universalthemes. Consider,
again, the matter of syllable structure. At the heart of the syllabiAcationprocessis a set
of fundamental- and invariant- principles. Many phonologists maintain that universal
grammar requiresall languages(as a consequenceof the Maximal Onset Principle,
among others) to have at least some syllablesof the form [CV . . . ], with an onset. No
language is known to violate this principle. Nevertheless, it is subject to parameterization: some languages, like Klamath, a Native American language of Oregon,
require everysyllable to be of this form. Others, like English, pennit someonsetless
syllables. Similarly, all languagesexhibit syllableswith vowels at their nucleus. But the
: some
appearanceof two vowels or of consonantsin nuclearposition is parameterized
exhibit
vowels
or
sonorants
as
,
nuclear
consonants. Others
languages
long
diphthongs,
forbid them and admit only single vowels in the nucleus. Finally, the " coda parameter
"
regulatesthe appearanceof consonantsin syllable-Analposition. No Axedprinciple
determineswhether a languagemust have syllables beginning and ending with con"
"
sonents (closedsyllables
): they are optional, subject to what we may describe as a
"
"
"
"
simple yes/ no parameter. Set to yes, the parameterpermits syllableslike [ . . . VC ];
" "
English is an example. Set to no, the parameterprohibits them, Hawaiian and Italian
" "
being casesin point . But if a languagechoosesthe yes option, a core principle of
universal grammar still requires that it must also allow open syllables without a Anal
consonant. Thus, the range of syllable structuresthat is availableto languagesis quite
broad- but still set within rather stringent limits.
SomeSyntacticPrinciplesand Parameters
The application of the theory of principles and parametersto problems in syntactic
analysis has been one of the most important programs of researchin contemporary
linguistic theory. Following Chomsky (1986), linguists have decomposedsyntactic
theory into a number of subtheories, each one of which contains parameterizedprin-
.
of Language 263
: TheRepresentation
Linguistics
ciples that define its core properties. These subtheoriesinclude casetheory, binding
theory, boundingtheory, theta theory, and X -bar theory. We have already considered
problems in casetheory, which is responsiblefor establishing the principles of case
assignment. The central principle in case theory is the Case Filter the (universal)
principle that requires that NPs must be assignedcase. In fact, the principle may be
more general, for in some languages(for example, Russianand German) it has been
proposed that "certain adjectival phrasesare marked for case. Thus, the principle may
take the form all XPs must receive case," with the value of X being set somewhat
differently for different languages. If this is correct, we would expect languagesall to
involve case, but to assignit and mark it in somewhatdifferent ways.
Binding theory concernsitself with the anaphoricproperties of pronouns, reflexives,
and lexical NPs. These principles capture the structural circumstancesunder which
certain expressions(for example, pronouns) can depend on an antecedentfor their
interpretation. For example, John and he can be naturally construed to be the same
person in (80), but not in (81):
(80)
John thinks [that Scruffy likes him]
(81)
Scruffy thinks [that John likes him]
One part of binding theory constrainsthe interpretation of personalpronounslike him,
as follows:
(82)
Bindingtheory
A pronoun must be free in its local X.
. For
Pronouns that are free are interpreted independently of potential antecedents
that
amounts
to
is
.
What
this
to
clause
out
X
works
,
English personal
roughly
English
pronouns cannot depend for their interpretation on antecedentsthat are locally contained
in the sameclauseas they are. Thus, him can refer to the sameperson asJohnin
80
because
( )
Johnis the subject of the higher clause, whereashim is the object of the
lower clause. In (81) both Johnand him are contained in the sameclause, and so him
must be interpreted as being free from John; that is, him and Johncannot refer to the
sameperson.
Other languagesalso limit the interpretations of pronouns, but in ways that may be
somewhatdifferent from the pattern in English. In particular, languagescandiffer in the
distributions. In
setting for the parameterX in binding theory, producing
' contrasting
Icelandic, for example, the personalpronoun hann ' him appears, at first, to follow the
English pattern in subordinateclauses:
(83)
Jon segir aO [ Maria elskarhann]
Jon says that Maria loves him
The interpretation of (83) is parallel to that of the English translation; JOnand hann
can refer to the sameperson. In tenselesssubordinateclauses
, however, the patterns
diverge:
(84)
Jon skipaOi mer aO [raka hann]
Jon ordered me to shavehim
Whereasin the English translation him can refer to Jon, hanncannot refer to Jon in the
Icelandic sentence. This is becausein Icelandic the value of the parameterX in the
binding theory clausethat applies to pronouns is set differently from the value for
264
Chapter 6
"
'
English. The value for Icelandicis tensedclause: meaning that potential antecedents
must not be membersof the smallesttensedclausecontaining a corresponding
personal
pronoun. In (83) hannis in a separatetensedclausefrom Jon. In (84), however, although
these two terms are in separateclauses
, the smallesttensedclausecontaining Jonalso
contains hann.
Once again we have profit ably compared and contrasted two different
linguistic
systemswithin the principles-and-parametersframework of UG. Similar inquiries have
also been undertaken into the other subdomainsof linguistics. Bounding theory, for
example, concernsitself with how distant a moved elementcan be from its corresponding
gap. In some languagesa moved element must appearwithin the sameclauseas
does the gap, whereas other languages permit greater distance between the two .
is the hypothesizeduniversal principle that establishes theserestrictions on
Sublacency
movement:
(85)
Sublacency
A moved element may not crossX.
where X, as in the previous example, is a parameterthat can be set in a small number
of ways (for example, a clauseboundary or two clauseboundaries), specific to each
language. Seeif you can figure out what the value for X is in the caseof English.
Theta theory is the part of linguistic theory that exploresthe assignmentof thematic
rolesto arguments. Thematic roles determine the action structure of the sentenceby
distinguishing who is doing what, to whom. For example, if we understandJohnas the
agentin (86), then he is taken to be the initiator of the action:
(86)
John rolled down the hill.
It is possible, however, to construeJohnas receiving an action (as a patient), as well,
although this interpretation is easierto assignin (87):
(87)
The rock rolled down the hill.
Theta theory is interested in the principles that mediate the assignmentof these
roles, and like the other subdomainsof the grammar, it contains principles that are
thought to be universal. The central principle of theta theory is the Theta Criterion,
which requires that every argument position must be assignedexactly one thematic
role. In the caseof (86), for example, this principle entails that if John may be a either
the agent or a patient, then he cannot be taken to be both simultaneously, or neither
at all. This criterion and the related theory are currently objects of considerableattention
by linguists who are exploring the application of theseprinciples (along with any
parameterization) acrossthe languagesof the world.
Finally, the subdomainof universal grammar that characterizesthe phrasestructure
of each natural languagecan also be looked at from the perspective of its
principles
and parameters. Earlier we noted that although it is possible to write out a
phrase
structure grammar for each languagethat generatesthe initial phrasemarkersof that
language, there are cross-linguistic generalizations in this aspect of grammar that
suggestan alternative approach. Indeed, sometime ago linguists noticed that there are
regularities in word order and constituent structure both within and acrosslanguages
that deserve to be captured by the principles of UG. X-bar theory, which is the
universal principle at the heart of this component of the grammar, is an
attempt to
distill universal principles of phrase structure and constituency. To the extent that
Linguistics: The Representationof language
265
X-bar theory succeeds
, the phrase structure rules for each languagecan be simplified
and will only need to record the featuresof phrasemarkersthat are idiosyncratic in a
particular language. Proposedprinciplesinclude the claim that in all languagesa phrase
of the form XP must contain an occurrenceof X , which is called the headof the phrase.
That is, NPs must contain nouns asheads, VPs must contain verbs asheads, and so on.
The ordering of subconstituentswithin a constituent is one locus of variation across
languages. In some languagesadjectives follow the noun (for example, Hebrew), in
somethey precedeit (for example, English), and in someboth alternativesare possible
(for example, French). Nevertheless, there are certain subregularities that generally
obtain. For example, languages like Japanese
, which is verb-final, also tend to be
postpositional (objects of prepositions follow prepositions), contain relative clauses
that precedethe noun they modify , and have adjectivesthat precedethe noun. These
- the
are languagesin which the HeadParameter
parameterthat establishes in which
or
of
a
constituent
its
(left
)
periphery
right
phase head will be located- is set to the
"
"
value heads right . In Hebrew, in contrast, where the verb is VP-initial, there are
prepositional phrases, relative clausesfollow the nouns they modify , and adjectives
follow the noun, the setting is "heads left." Although languagessometimestolerate
some exceptions to these ordering generalizations(for example, English- try to set
the Head Parameterand note any exceptions!), the Head Parametergenerally makes
accuratepredictions about connectedaspectsof word order acrosslanguages. In this
regard, it is an important component of the theory of Universal Grammar.
to the Theory
Challenges
's
Chomsky system of UG has been extremely influential in guiding the development
of researchprojects in many areasof cognitive science. Yet, like any important idea,
the position we have sketchedhas been seriously criticized, &equently amended, and
in somecasesjettisoned in favor of alternative &ameworks. We closeour discussionof
UG by briefly noting someof the interesting areasof continuing researchon UG, with
special attention to the more general psychological and biological claims that have
been made for UG.
The hypothesized innate universal grammar is often compared ( by Chomsky and
"
"
others) to a bodily organ- albeit a mental organ - that is organized in brain and
other neural tissue. Although the details of the biological basisof the linguistic capacity
are by no means well understood (see chapter 7), it is often claimed that UG
representsa modular, highly specializedcapacity and it is sometimessuggestedthat
it has a specializedgenetic basis. That is, the notion of linguistic innatenesshas been
taken to meanthat there must have been highly specificnatural selectionin the course
of human evolution for the details of UG. This view is sometimesfurther popularized
to suggest that there are specific genes for language. But there is little evidence to
support this notion. In fact, few organ systemsor behaviors are the products of single
genes. There is certainly little basisin contemporary molecularbiology to support the
notion that specific informational states, like the CaseFilter or abstract principles of
encodedin human chromosomes.The challenge
syllabification, could be somehow directly
' s claims
then
is
to
reconcile
about the biological basis of language
,
,
Chomsky
with what is known about genetic mechanismsand evolutionary principles.
There is also room for doubt about the claims of speciesspecificity that have been
made for the language organ. It has been discovered, for example, that mammals
other than humansexhibit categorical
( Kuhl and Miller 1975), the tendency to
perception
266
Chapter 6
perceive what are in fact distinct points along a continuum as falling into discrete
clumps of data. Humanshave been claimed to rely innately on categoricalperception
to distinguish voiced &om voicelesssounds. That is, despite considerableactualacoustic
variation, we hear sounds only as voiced or voiceless, with no apparent middle
categoriesof perception. Although' it is clear how categorical perception is useful in
speechperception, Kuhl and Miller s evidencethat nonhumansexhibit this phenomenon
is surprising. Although categoricalperception may not technically qualify as one
of the principles of UG (in that it js more a perceptual property than a narrowly
linguistic one), findings such as these fuel the hopes of those who maintain that
there must be substantial overlap between the cognitive properties of humans and
nonhumans.
Finally, there are also hesitationsconcerningthe claim that the properties of universal
grammar are strictly modular that is, that they pertain only to linguistic representation
and acquisition and the like, and do not follow &om more general architectural
or other characteristicsof cognition. It is difficult, of course, to attribute broader
(or analogous) functions to highly abstract properties like the Case Filter, and the
implausibility of this attribution has been taken by some researchersto be strong
evidencefor modularity. But much more will needto be known about cognition before
we can determine with any conAdencewhether some of the innate mechanismsthat
subserve languageturn out to have a broader organismicsignificance.
Again, motivation to pursuethis inquiry comes&om the phenomenonof categorical
perception, which has also been demonstrated in certain nonlinguistic domains, for
example, between certain musicalsoundsrelated on an acousticcontinuum, suchas the
plucking and bowing of a violin string (Cutting and Rosner 1974). These results
that some capacitiesthat support language learning may not be specifically
suggest
"
"
linguistic, but are instead part of more general cognitive capacities. Can this reduction
be accomplishedfor the principles of UG1 Certainly the universals we have
sketched, for instance, the CaseFilter, do not obviously admit of this kind of account,
though further researchmay indeed show that they do follow &om more general
aspectsof cognitive architecture. Indeed, researcherslike Lieberman(1985) have argued
that all linguistic universalsare ultimately a function of generalbiological mechanisms
, a view shared, in certain respects, with Piagetian psychologists. But many
generative linguists remain skeptical that the elimination of UG in favor of general
biological and cognitive properties is possible, and any strong conclusionsseempremature
.
Summaryand Reprise
Adult learnersof new languagesstruggle (much like linguists) to acquiresome understanding
of their language. The struggle will go on for sometime, and it typically ends
in an imperfect (if hard-won ) mastery. Very young children learning their first language
(or languages) face the same general task, complicated by the limited experiential
resourcesof infancy and an apparentlack of any linguistic context in which to embed
new knowledge. Despite theselimitations, children enjoy an easeof languagelearning
that adults envy.
'
The child s courseof learning is not instantaneous
, or free from errors and missteps.
But there does appearto be a highly systematicpattern to the range of falsestepsthat
children take. Moreover, there appearto be types of errors that children learning any
language simply do not make. For instance, children learning questions typically go
Linguistics: The Representationof Language
267
through several stagesof development, some of which involve utterance types that
differ in interesting ways from the adult system. But certain differencesdo not emerge.
For instance, children never seem to misjudge the appropriate position of question
words on the basis of evidence like I know what Johnate; they do not hypothesize a
rule to the effect that question words in English are to be placed in the middle of
sentences
. In the same vein, children never seem to hypothesize, on the basis of
frequent exposureto words with closed syllables, that all English words involve such
syllables(by contrast, many children for a considerabletime produce only open syllables
). There is no a priori reason why children do not entertain these alternative
hypotheses, yet they fail to do so even in the face of data that are consistent with
them. It is intriguing to conclude that they do not do so becausethey cannot, that
UG enforces a general constraint on the form of rules that precludes them from
"
"
deducing constructs like the middle of a sentence. Such constraints vastly simplify
the learning task by restricting the range of possiblehypotheses. By setting suchlimits
on the kinds of knowledge representationthat the organism can learn- whether by
highly specificneural constraints, or as a consequenceof more general constraintson
development evolution has facilitated the acquisition of the extraordinarily powerful
, flexible, and creative systemswe call language.
Suggested
Readings
A broader introduction to linguistic theory and the study of languagein general can
'
be found in An Introductionto HumanLanguage
(Gee 1993). Severalof Noam Chomskys
works also provide an accessibleperspectiveon theoretical issuesand on the intellectual
context of recent work; see in particular Rulesand Representations
(1980) and
and
Problems
:
The
Lectures
.
1988
The
(
)
Language
of Knowledge
Managua
LanguageLottery
(Lightfoot 1982) and How to SetParameters
(Lightfoot 1991) provide a perspectiveon
the biological nature of language, languageacquisition, languagechange, and universal
: Descriptionand Theory(Kenstowicz and Kisseberth
grammar. GenerativePhonology
1979) and Autosegmental
andMetrical Phonology(Goldsmith 1990) provide an introduction
to generative phonology. The ProblemBook in Phonology(Halle and Clements
1982) provides a seriesof phonological problems drawn from the languagesof the
world . A Coursein Phonetics(Ladefoged 1982) contains background information on
articulatory and acoustic phonetics. For work in contemporary syntactic theory, see
Introductionto Governmentand Binding(Haegeman1991) and Introductionto the Theory
of Grammar( Van Riemsdijk and Williams 1986). Finally, for a comparisonof various
es to syntactic theory, seeLectureson Contemporary
competing contemporary approach
"
"
Theories
Sells
1985
and
Grammatical
(
)
Syntactic
Theory ( Wasow1989).
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