#1
G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005
NORMA A. ABDULLA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
Norma Abdulla, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, public officers of the
Sulu State College, were found to have willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, without lawful authority, applied for the payment of wages of
casuals, the amount of P40,000.00, which appropriated for the payment of
the salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the said school, to
the damage and prejudice of public service. Nenita Aguil and Mahmud
Darkis were both acquitted, only petitioner was found guilty and
sentenced by Sandiganbayan of the crime of illegal use of public funds
defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. This
Article is also known as technical malversation.
Petitiner's contention was that the payment of the salary differentials of
only 28 out of 34 teachers were holding the position of Secondary School
Teacher III receiving the salary of Instructor I, and that the remaining 6
were still holding Secondary Teacher II positions and therefore were
receiving a salary lower than that of Instructor I. Hence, the 6 teachers were
the only ones who received salary differentials. The said act of the
petitioner was justified by the notarized audit investigation report and the
Joint Resolution of the Office of the Ombdusman.
ISSUE:
Whether the accused acted with criminal intent.
RULING:
No, the petitioner did not act with criminal intent.
The presumption of criminal intent will not, however, automatically apply
to all charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public
funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be
said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the
Sulu State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits
such employees were entitled to under existing civil service laws.
The Sandiganbayan’s improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not
save the prosecution’s deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent
nor could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional presumption of
innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent, this Court has
no basis to affirm appellant’s conviction.
Thus, the Court granted the petition of the petitioner and acquitted the
crime charged against her.
#2
G.R. Nos. 83373-74, July 5, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
REYNALDO CORDOVA @ "REY" CORDOVA, EDUARDO CORDOVA
@ "SULI" CORDOVA, ISIDRO CORDOVA, JR. @ "DROBAT," FREDDIE
BUENCONSEJO @ "ODONG," and ERNESTO ESTORQUE,
JR., Accused. REYNALDO CORDOVA @ "REY" CORDOVA, EDUARDO
CORDOVA @ "SULI" CORDOVA and ERNESTO ESTORQUE,
JR., Accused-Appellants
FACTS:
On May 29, 1986, Marcelo Barruela and Segundo Maguad were killed. It
was alleged that the murder involved heavy firearms and the use of banca.
The accused had alibis, and only 13-year old Estorque Jr. testified to be at
the vicinity of the incident. Estorque stated that he heard gunshots and to
have contact with several men, whom he suspected to have come from the
crime scene. Estorque claims that the boat that he and his grandmother
used on the night of the crime was commandeered and was ordered at
gunpoint to ferry the appellants to another town.
The Regional Trial Court charged Reynaldo and Eduardo Cordova guilty
for the death of Marcelo Barruela and Segunda Maguad, while Ernesto
Estorque Jr., guilty of committing crime as an accessory.
ISSUE:
Whether Ernesto Estorque Jr. can be charged of committing the crime as an
accessory.
RULING:
No, Ernesto Estorque Jr. cannot be charge of committing a crime as an
accessory. For one to be held liable as an accessory, it is essential that he
must have knowledge of the commission of the crime. Estorque Jr. did not
possess malice as he was held at gunpoint to ferry the appellants and did
not know of the crime committed. In addition, according to Article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code, a person over nine years of age and under fifteen,
unless he has acted in accordance with the provision of Article 80 of this
code is exempted from criminal liability.
#3
G.R. No. 75256, January 26, 1989
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, Petitioner
vs.
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, Respondent
FACTS:
Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, 11 years old then, was playing with his
best friend, Teodoro Almine Jr. along with three other children in their
backyard. They were target-shooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed around 15
to 20 meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. During the
game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his
unfortunate death.
The examining Fiscal declared petitioner not guilty due to his age and the
incident appeared to be an accident. The parents of the victim appealed to
the Ministry of Justice, which ordered the Fiscal to file a case against
petitioner for homicide through reckless imprudence.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the said information on three grounds: (a) that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, (b) that the information
contains averments which if true would constitute a legal excuse or
justification, and (c) that the honorable court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charges and the person of the defendant. The motion was
dismissed except on the second ground until evidence is presented during
the trial. Hence, petitioner filed for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the term "discernment" used in the information is synonymous
with "intent" constitute a legal excuse or exception.
RULING:
No, discernment and intent are two different concepts and the terms
should not be confused with. Intent is defined as design, a determination to
do certain things, an aim the purpose of the mind. On the other hand,
discernment, as used in Article 12 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, is one that
constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor
under 15 years of age but over 9, who commits an act prohibited by law, is
his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong.
The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary
to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit
act, no crime can exist, and because the infant has no intelligence, the law
exempts him from criminal liability.
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are
not capable of performing a criminal act. On the other hand, minors above
nine years of age but below fifteen are not absolutely exempt. However,
they are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which presumption
may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were "capable of
appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted
with discernment."
Therefore, petition was dismissed for lack of merit and the case was sent
back to the lower court for trial on the merits.
#4
G.R. No. 97471, February 17, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and
ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias "Enry," accused-appellants.
FACTS:
Appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom. It was alleged that
the appellants conspired together, confederated with and mutually helped
each other and willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped Maria Del
Socorro Sarmiento Y Mutuc.
On the day of the crime, respondent Puno was the temporary driver of the
victim. When travelling, the car turned right in a corner of Araneta Avenue
and stopped. Appellant Amurao boarded the car beside the driver and
clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto where the
victim was seated at and poked his gun at her. Appellants asked for the
money that was contained in the victim's bag and said that if she gave it to
them, they would let her go. The victim gave the appellants P7,000.00,
which was the cash she had in her bag. However, the appellants were not
satisfied and demanded P100,000.00 more. The victim agreed to it with
condition that they drop her off at a gas station. Appellants demanded the
victim to issue a check of P100,000.00, victim did so by drafting three
checks in denominations of two P30,000.00 and one P40,000.00. After being
freed, victim reported the incident to CAPCOM and appellants were
arrested the following day. Appellants claim to have freely let the victim go
after receiving the checks and even saw that his employer to have gotten a
ride. When he took stand at the stand at the trials of the case, appellant
Puno tried to mitigate his liability by explaining that he was in dire need of
money for the medication for his ulcer.
ISSUE:
Whether appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING:
No, the appellants did not commit the felony of kidnapping for ransom
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court ruled that the
appellants did not show any motive when they committed wrongful acts
against complainant, other than extortion of money from her under the
compulsion of threats or intimidation. The appellants have admitted this
much and appellant Puno laid the blame for his predicament on his need
for funds for ulcer. The proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this
crime to exist states that there must be undubitable proof that the actual of
ancient of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty,
and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an
incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the
offenders. The Court finds the appellants in this case had no intention
whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her personal liberty is
clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant
Puno. Accordingly, the Court held that crime committed is robbery as
defined in Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code.
#5
G.R. Nos. 96649-50, July 1, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
LYNDON V. MACOY, Accused-Appellant
FACTS:
On July 4, 1989, patrolmen Ferdinand Tumakay, Felipe Nonong,
Gaudencio Javier, and Pelayo Dingcong, were ten meters from Bottom's Up
Beerhouse when they heard a gunshot and a commotion. The patrolmen
rushed to the beerhouse and found appellant with a .38 cal. paltik Smith
and Wesson revolver and consequently arresting him. They also found
Paul Ocampo, manager of the said beerhouse, to have been shot with a
gun. Appellant surrendered the gun to the patrolmen. The victim was
taken to a hospital where he was found dead on arrival.
The trial court acquitted appellant of the charge of the violation of illegal
possession of firearms but found him guilty of murder and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the sum of P30,000.00 and the costs.
The defense of the appellant was that he fired a warning shot at first only
because as a member of CAFGU, he wanted to stop the assailant whom he
heard hacked the manager of the beerhouse. Appellant claimed that he
brought a gun to have a means of self-protection.
ISSUE:
Whether motive is essential when there is doubt as to the identity of the
assailant.
RULING:
Yes, motive is essential when there is doubt as to the identity of the
assailant. It has been held that where the identity of the assailant is in
dispute, motive becomes relevant, and when it is supported with sufficient
evidence for a conclusion of guilt, a conviction is sustainable.
Appellant admitted to the psychiatrist that he had shot the victim because
the victim refused to allow the appellant to enter the beerhouse due to
inappropriate clothing. Hence, appellant came back the next day and
exacted his revenge. This divulgence of facts by appellant constitutes
extrajudicial confession which supplied his motive for crim.
Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court with
modification to increased indemnification of P50,000.00.
#6
G.R. No. 124670, June 21, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
PATROLMAN DOMINGO BELBES, Accused-Appellant
FACTS:
Appellant was assigned with Patrolman Jose Babon to maintain peace and
order at the prom of Pili National High School. During the prom, two
students told their Teacher-In-Charge that someone was making trouble at
the school's temporary building. The patrolmen responded forthwith. The
patrolmen found Fernando Bataller along with Carlito Bataller and Rosalio
Belista at the temporary building. According to the appellant, Fernando
had a knife with which he tried to stab the patrolmen. Appellant claimed to
have been stabbed by the knife. Respondent fired his armalite without
warning. In the end, appellant and Fernando struggled with each other and
the gun went off. Fernando got hit in several locations in his body.
Hence, appellant was charged of murder of Fernando Bataller. Appellant
claims to have acted in his official duty and that the firing of the gun was
self-defense.
ISSUE:
Whether appellant's claim of self-defense is a justifiying circumstance as
defined in Article 11, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING:
No, the appellant's claim of self defense is not a justifying circumstance.
Article 11, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code provides two justifying
circumstance: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a duty or of a right and (b) that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such
right or office. In this case, only the first requisite is present and the second
requisite is lacking. Appellant was tasked to maintain peace and order but
he exceeded his duty when he fired his armalite without warning.
However, appellant cannot be charged with murder. The Court ruled that
the appellant is guilty only of homicide, mitigated by the incomplete
justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty.
#7
G.R. No. L-6641. July 28, 1955
FRANCISCO QUIZON, Petitioner
vs.
THE HON. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF BACOLOR, PAMPANGA, ET
AL., Respondents
FACTS:
Respondent Chief of Police of Bacolor, Pampanga, filed a criminal
complaint against the petitioner, with the Justice of the Peace Court of said
municipality with a crime of damage to property through reckless
imprudence. The value of the damage amounted to P125.00. Petitioner filed
a motion to quash the complaint on the ground that, under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty which might be imposed would be a
fine ranging from P125.00 to P375.00, which is in excess of the fine that may
be imposed by the justice of the peace court. The Justice of the Peace
forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, but the
latter returned it to him for trial on the merits, holding that the justice of
the peace court had jurisdiction. The petitioner appealed from this ruling of
the Court of First Instance to this Court on the question of law raised.
ISSUE:
Whether the justice of the peace court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
court of First Instance when the crime charged is damage to property
through reckless negligence or imprudence
RULING:
No, to hold that the Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction to try cases
of damage to property through reckless negligence is to assume that the
former offense is but a variant of the latter. Section 44 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948 provides that " Courts of First Instance shall have original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two
hundred pesos." In addition, Section 87 of said Act provides " Justices of
the peace and judges of municipal courts of chartered cities shall have
original jurisdiction over all criminal cases arising under the laws relating
to malicious mischief."
Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code reads that if the offender "shall
deliberately cause to the property of another any damage not falling within
the terms of the next preceding chapter" then it follows that, in the very
nature of things, malicious mischief cannot be committed through
negligence, since culpa and malice are essentially incompatible.
Thus, it is further declared that the jurisdiction over the offense in question
lies exclusively in the Court of First Instance. Hence, the writ of certiorari is
granted and the order of remand to the Justice of the Peace Court is
reversed and set aside.
#8
G.R. No. 140794, October 16, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee
vs.
RICARDO AGLIDAY y TOLENTINO, Appellant
FACTS:
On or about in the evening of February 25, 1999 at Barangay Nalsian Sur,
Municipality of Bayambang, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, the
appellant, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shot his son Richard Agliday with an unlicensed shotgun
causing his death.
Appellant pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of San
Carlos City rendered the assailed decision where appellant is found guilty
of parricide and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00.
Prosecution assumes the testimony of the appellant's wife, Conchita
Agliday. According to the wife of the appellant, about 8:00 pm of February
25, 1999, while washing the dishes, their son, Richard Agliday was shot by
the appellant with a shotgun, resulting to their son's death. Before the
shooting, the spouses quarrelled over the wife's job as a laundry woman.
Prosecution's witness, Rey Agliday, another son of the appellant, testified
that he was in their house at the time of the incident and saw that their
parents quarrelling. Rey saw his father, appellant, shoot his brother,
Richard, with a shotgun, but did not interfere. Rey also said that while their
parents were quarrelling, Richard intervened and for that reason appellant
got his shotgun and shot Richard.
Defense argues that about the same time and date, the appellant was
cleaning a homemade shotgun which he intended to bring to his night
patrol in their barangay with his fellow barangay tanods. While appellant
was cleaning his shotgun and his wife and son, Richard, were about to go
upstairs, the gun suddenly went off and Richard's buttocks were hit
leading to his death.
Given two different versions of facts, the trial court gave credence to the
prosecution witnesses who gave straightforward, spontaneous, sincere and
frank accounts of the events that had unfolded before their very eyes.
Because of their relationship with appellant, there was no reason for them
to testify falsely against him.
ISSUE:
Whether the court erred in convicting the appellant of parricide when he
claims it to be accidental.
RULING:
No, the court did not err in convicting the appellant of parricide when the
witnesses are credible. An appellate court will not disturb the factual
findings of the trial court. That is, unless the lower court has reached
conclusions that are dearly unsupported by evidence, or unless it has
overlooked some facts or circumstances of weight and influence, which, if
considered, would affect the results.
Both the trial court and the solicitor general rejected the appellate's defense
where he claims that the incident to be accidental. Under Article 12
paragraph 4 of the Code, criminal liability does not arise in case a crime is
committed by any person who, while performing a lawful act due care,
causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
The exemption from criminal liability under the circumstance showing
accident is based on the lack of criminal intent. The declarations of
innocence by appellant are contradicted by the testimonies of his wife and
son. Before the accused may be exempted from criminal liability by reason
of Article 12 (paragraph 4), the following elements must concur: (1) a
person is performing a lawful act (2) with due care, and (3) he causes an
injury to another by mere accident and (4) without any fault or intention of
causing it. For an accident to become an exempting circumstance, the act
has to be lawful. The act of firing a shotgun at another is not a lawful act.
#9
G.R. No. 85204, June 18, 1990
JORGE TAER, Petitioner
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents
FACTS:
Cirilo Saludes slept in the house of his compadre Jorge Taer at Datag
Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. At about 2:00 dawn on December 6, 1981, Emilio
Namocatcat and Mario Cago arrived at Taer's house with 2 male carabaos
owned by and which Namocatcat wanted Taer to tend. The carabaos were
left at Taer's place.
Tirso Dalde and Eladio Palaca of Lantang, Valencia Bohol discovered in the
morning of December 6, 1981, that their respective male carabaos, 3 to 4
years old, were missing at their grazing grounds. After searching in vain
for the carabaos, Dalde and Palaca reported the matter to the police. On
December 15, 1981, one Reyes of Hinopolan, Valencia, Bohol, informed
Dalde that he saw the latter's lost carabao at Datag, Garcia-Hernandez.
Dalde and Palaca went on that day to Datag and found their missing
carabaos tied to a bamboo thicket near the house accused Taer. Dalde and
Palaca asked Taer why their carabaos were found at his place and told
them that the carabaos were brought to his place by the accused
Namocatcat who asked him to tell anybody looking for them that they just
strayed there. Dalde and Palaca took the carabaos from Taer's possession
on that day.
Taer was convinced for the crime of cattle rustling. The Court of Appeals
affirmed this, finding evidence of the prosecution that conspiracy indeed
existed between Emilio Namocatcat and Taer. Taer appealed and argued
that the extent of his participation did not go beyond the participation of
the original defendants Saludes and Cago. Taer further argues that the
acquittal of Saludes and Cago should also lead to his acquittal. The only
evidence proving the alleged conspiracy between him and Namocatcat was
the confession of Namocatcat, however this should not be considered as
admissible because the same is hearsay under the rule of res inter alios
acta.
ISSUE:
Whether conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt to convict the
accused as principal for the crime of cattle rustling as defined and
punished by P.D. No. 533.
RULING:
No, conspiracy must be established not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence.
Although the facts in this case show unity of purpose and unity in the
execution of the crime, it is essential to have an agreement to commit the
crime and a decision to commit it. There is conspiracy only when two or
more persons come to an agreement regarding the commission of an
offense and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be established not by
conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. It is required to
support a finding of criminal conspiracy to be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. It is not enough to constitute one party to a conspiracy when mere
knowledge or approval of the act without agreement to cooperate is
present.
Taer did not participate either as principal or as an accomplice for he did
not participate in the taking of the carabaos. He took part subsequent to the
commission of the act of taking by profiting himself by its effects.
Therefore, Taer is only an accessory to the crime committed.
#10
G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996
ROLANDO P. DELA TORRE, petitioner
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MARCIAL
VILLANUEVA, respondents
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari against two COMELEC resolutions
which disqualified him from running for mayor of Cavinti, Laguna.
COMELEC disqualified the petitioner for being convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude which is in accordance with Section 40 (a) of the
Local Government Code. During the Second Resolution, petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied, wherein the petitioner argued that
the probation granted to him must be applicable to Section 40 (a) of the
Local Government Code and he must therefore be allowed to run for office
as his conviction and other legal consequences be suspended.
ISSUE:
Whether the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
RULING:
The Court dismissed the petition and assailed COMELEC's resolution as it
is upon the discretion of the Supreme Court to decide if a crime involves
moral turpitude. The Court resolved the issue by stating that crimes mala
in se involves moral turpitude while crimes ala prohibita does not. The
reason is that crimes that are mala in se is inherently immoral.
Fencing is a crime which involves moral turpitude as the accused, having
knowledge that an item is a product of robbery or theft still had the
intention to gain the same for himself or for another. The Court ruled that
the grant of probation merely suspends the execution of sentence and does
not extinguish other legal consequences.
#11
G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B.
HERNANDEZ, Petitioners
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
FACTS:
Petitioners are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager,
and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcoppet
Mining Corporation, a corporation engaged in mining in the province of
Marinduque.
In a pit in Mt. Taipan, Marcopper had been storing tailings from its
operations. At the base of the pit, there was a drainage tunnel leading to
the Boac and Makalupnit rivers and Marcopper placed a concrete plug at
the end of the tunnel. On March 24, 1994, tailings gushed out of near the
tunnel's end. After a few days, the pit in Mt. Taipan had discharged
millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
The Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal
Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque with violation of Article 91 (b), subparagraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of
the Philippines (P.D. No. 1067), Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 or
the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (P.D. No, 984), Section 108 of
Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (R.A. No.
7942), and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property.
Petitioners moved to quash the informations stating that information were
duplicitous as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for
a single act. Petitioners, John Loney and Steven Reid, claim that they were
not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident subject of the informations
took place and the informations contain allegations which constitute legal
excuse or justification.
ISSUE:
Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be
quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property should stand.
RULING:
No, the several charges filed against the petitioners would prosper.The
filing of multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same
incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
The petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC
absorbs the charges for violation of P.D. No. 1067, P.D. No. 984, and R.A.
No. 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony cannot absorb mala
prohibita crimes. What makes the former a felony is criminal intent or
negligence and what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting
them.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art.
365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate
precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the
accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required under
the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine
tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river system,
much more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by
special law are mala prohibita in contrast with those punished by the
Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.
#12
G.R. Nos. 221849-50, April 04, 2016
DATU GUIMID P. MATALAM, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
FACTS:
Petitioner was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan of non-remittance of the
employer's share in the Government Insurance System and Home
Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG Fund) premiums, as discussed in
Criminal Case Nos. 26707 and 26708. In Case No. 26707, the
Sandiganbayan held that the act constituting the offense is the failure,
refusal or delay in the payment, turnover, remittance or delivery of such
accounts to the GSIS within 30 days from the time that the same shall have
been due and demandable. In Case No. 26708, the Sandiganbayan found
Matalam guilty of non-remittance of the employer's share of Pag-IBIG
Fund premiums since under the pertinent rules and law, it is the employer
who is penalized for the non-remittance to Pag-IBIG Fund.
Matalam filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the
Sandiganbayan on November 2, 2015.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of non-remittance of
the employer's share of the GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums.
RULING:
Yes, petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of non-remittance of the
employer's share of the GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund.
The act is considered malum prohibitum, it is the commission of that act as
defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines
whether or not the provision has been violated. The non-remittance of the
GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums is malum prohibitum.
Petitioner has failed to show that the Sandiganbayan committed reversible
error in rendering the assailed decision and resolution. Petitioner is liable
for the non-remittance of the contributions to GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund
which are clearly set out in the laws mandating the collection and
remittance of the premiums.
#13
G.R. No. L-47722, July 27, 1943
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants
FACTS:
Captain Godofredo Monsod ordered the arrest of an escaped convict
Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene Requiniea in Cabanatuan
whether dead or alive. It was headed by the appellants Oanis and Galanta.
The appellants went to the house of Irene and mistakenly shot a man,
Serapio Tecson, who was sleeping with his back towards the door, thinking
that it was Balagtas. These are the facts found by the trial court and fully
supported with evidence, particularly by the testimony of Irene Requinea.
Appellants gave a different version of the tragedy and the trial court
refused to believe the appellants. The statement of some facts by Irene
Requinea and appellants are contradicting but their mutual incriminating
averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially. The true fact of the
case is that while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards
the door, appellants fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing
him to be Balagtas, without identifying or making inquiry as to the identity
of the person shot.
The appellants contended that they acted in innocent mistake of fact in the
honest performance of their official duties, both believing that Tecson was
Balagtas. They argue that they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining the
statement of the appellants, the lower court held and declared the
appellants guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence
and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and
six months to two years and two months of prison correcional and to
indemnify jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P1,000.00. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellants be held responsible for the death of Serapio Tecson.
RULING:
Yes, the appellants are held responsible for the death of Tecson. The crime
committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing
being intentional and not accidental.
In article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal
provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the
fulfilment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are
two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying
one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be
the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office.
In this case, only the first requisite is present. Appellants have acted in the
performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by
them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of
their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if
resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through
impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have
exceeded in the fulfilment of such duty by killing the person whom they
believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without
making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
#14
G.R. No. 128083, March 16, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
RODOLFO HILARIO Y MARTINEZ, RODRIGO HILARIO Y
MARTINEZ, and JOHN DOE, Accused
RODRIGO HILARIO Y MARTINEZ, Accused-Appellant
FACTS:
Appellants are two brothers and their cumpadre. On October 30, 1990,
appellants conspired to kill Berong but mistakenly killed Carlos Reyes.
Danilo Manzanares, nephew of the two appellants, was a witness to the
crime. Danilo testified that he overheard appellants conversation on their
plan to kill someone. When Danilo went to a store to buy snacks in the
evening, he saw appellants approaching Carlos and Berong, who were
both wearing white. However, Berong removed his white shirt later on.
Danilo overheard one of the appellant say "The one in the white shirt" to
their cumpadre. After hearing the statement, their cumpadre stabbed
Carlos. The appellants ran after committing the crime. Danilo hurriedly left
the place and back to their house due to fright. Moments later, Greg Reyes,
his business associate and father of the victim, came and asked why his
uncles killed his son. Greg kept going back to Danilo's house to ask why
they killed his son but later on stopped. Greg did not anymore ask about
his son's death, instead he discussed their business venture. Appellants
raised their suspicion on Danilo. Appellants decided to ambush Danilo and
hacked him on his head repeatedly. Due to fear, Danilo transferred
residence to a far-away place and decided to institute a case against him.
Danilo and Greg went to the NBI to file a complaint against the appellants
for hacking him on the head and stabbing Carlos to death.
ISSUE:
Whether the killing constitutes evident premeditation even if the person
killed was mistaken to be someone else.
RULING:
No, the killing of another person who was not the person they intended to
kill does not constitute evident premeditation. The lower court qualified
the killing by evident premeditation but the Supreme Court states
otherwise. Evident premeditation may not be properly taken into account
when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from
the one who became his victim. When the person decided to kill a different
person and premeditated on the killing of the latter, but when he carried
out his plan he actually killed another person, it cannot be properly said
that he premeditated on the killing of the actual victim. Nevertheless,
appellants are still found criminally liable with murder.
#15
G.R. No. L-1477, January 18, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant
FACTS:
In the presidential elections held in 1946, Julio Guillen y Corpus has voted
for the defeated candidate, Sergio Osmeña. Manuel A. Roxas, the
successful candidate, assumed the office of the President of the Philippine
Republic. According to appellant, President Roxas disappointed him for
failure to fulfill his promises which were made during the election
campaign. Hence, appellant was determined to assassinate the President.
On the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the
Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, an opportunity
presented itself to appellant. This was when President Roxas stood on a
platform erected and delivered his speech. He thought of using two hand
grenades which were given to him by an American soldier and decided to
carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on
the night of March 10, 1947.
General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the grenade and kicked
it away from the platform, and towards an open space. He covered the
President with his body and told the people to get down. The grenade
exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to
the platform. It was found that the fragments of the grenade had seriously
injured Simeon Varela, who died the following day as the result of mortal
wounds cause by the fragments. Included are Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio,
Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang to the injured parties.
ISSUE:
Whether appellant is guilty of murder for the death of Simeon Varela and
of the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder.
RULING:
Yes, the appellant is found guilty for the death of Simeon Varela and of the
complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder.
The appellant acted with malice when he threw the hand grenade at the
President with the intention of killing him. Therefore, he is liable for
consequences of his wrongful act. According to Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing felony
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
In criminal negligence, the injury cause to another should be unintentional,
it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
This case is clearly governed by the first clause of Article 48 because by a
single act, that throwing a highly explosive hand grenade at the President,
the appellant committed two grave felonies. These are murder, of which
Simeon Varela was the victim and multiple attempted murder of which
President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio
Maglalang were the injured parties.
There is no doubt that the appellant attempted to kill President Roxas by
throwing a hand grenade at him with the intention to kill him, thereby
commencing the commission of a felony by over acts. However, appellant
did not succeed in assassinating President Roxas "by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." For the same
reason, we qualify the injuries caused on the four other persons already
named as merely attempted and not frustrated murder.
#16
G.R. No. 205228, July 15, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee
vs.
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, LEAN ADRIANO @ DENDEN, ABBA
SANTIAGO y ADRIANO, JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, Accused,
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, Accused-Appellant
FACTS:
This is an appeal of the decision of the Court of Appeals on May 30, 2011,
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated April 7, 2009
which convicted the accussed-appellant Rolly Adriano y Santos for the
crime of homicide for the killing of Ofelia Bulanan and for the crime of
murder for the killing of Danilo Cabiedes in "People of the Philippines vs.
Rolly Adriano y Sales."
On March 13, 2007 at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning in Malapit San
Isidro, Nueva Ecija, Adriano, conniving together, with intent to kill,
treachery and abuse of superior strength, willfully shot Ofelia Bulanan and
Danilo Cabiedes, several times with assorted firearms. Victims were hit on
different parts of their bodies which resulted to their deaths.
Police Officer 1 Matthew Garabiles and PO2 Alejandro Santos were the
primary witnesses of the crime. The two officers were on their way to
Camp Olivas, Pampanga, riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-Gapan
National Road. While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva
Ecija, a speeding blue Toyota Corollo overtook them and the car in front of
them, which was a maroon Honda CRV. When the Corollo reached
alongside the CRV, the passenger on the front seat of the Corollo shot the
CRV which caused the same to swerve and fall in the canal in the road
embankment. Four armed men suddenly got out from the Corollo and
started shooting at the driver of the CRV, who was later identified as
Cabiedes. During the shooting, a bystander, Bulanan, who was standing
near the road embankment, was hit by a stray bullet. The four armed men
hurried back to the Corollo and immediately left the crime scene.
During the investigation, it was found out that the Corollo belonged to
Antonio Rivera, who claims that the Corollo was leased to Adriano since
he owns a car rental business. The two officers identified Adriano who
came to the car rental shop later that day. Adriano was arrested and
brought to the Provincial Special Operations Group (PSOG) headquarters
in Cabanatuan City.
On March 13, 2007, at the time of the incident, Adriano testified that he was
at his house in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga, washing the clothes of his
child and later took his motorcycle to a repair shop and left it there. At
about 8 o'clock in the morning, Adriano went to the house of his friend,
Ruben Mallari, to ask for a lighter spring needed to repair his motorcycle.
On his way to his mother's house to drop off his kids, he met his brotherin-law, Felix Aguilar Sunga. Adriano then went to a cockpit arena to watch
cockfights, where he saw his friend, Danilo Dizon. After the fights, he left
the cockpit at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon and went home and took a
rest. After resting, Adriano picked-up his motorcycle and proceeded to a
store and stayed there. At around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, he went back
home. He received a call from a certain Boyet Garcia, who borrowed the
Corollo from him, which he rented from Rivera. At 8 o'clock in the evening,
he met with Garcia to get the Corollo, then Adriano went to Rivera to
return the Corollo, where he was arrested by police officers, thrown inside
the Corollo's trunk, and brought to a place where he was tortured.
The Regional Trial Court rejected Adriano's defense of alibi on the ground
that it was not supported by clear and convincing evidence and convicted
him. According to the Regional Trial Court, Adriano's alibi cannot prevail
over the testimonies of credible witnesses, who positively identified
Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether treachery be appreciated in aberratio ictus.
RULING:
Yes, treachery may be appreciated in aberratio ictus.
The present case is a case of murder by ambush. In ambush, the crime is
carried out to ensure that the victim is killed and at the same time, to
eliminate any risk from any possible defenses or retaliation from the victim
- ambush exemplifies the nature of treachery.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an
aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to
defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of
himself.
Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately and often without warning,
precluding the unknowing victim from repelling the attack or defending
himself. At the outset, Adriano had no intention to kill Bulanan, much less,
employ any particular means of attack. Logically, Bulanan's death was
unintentional and the method used to kill her was not deliberate as she was
shot with a stray bullet. Nonetheless, Adriano is guilty of the death of
Bulanan under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the
doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal liability as incurred by
any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different
from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is
responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or logically result
therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is
found in the doctrine, 'el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado', or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused
for the acts committed in violation of law and for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom.
It may not have been Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will
not exculpate him. Bulanan's death caused by the bullet fired by Adriano
was the natural and direct consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly
assault against Cabiedes.
#17
G.R. No. L-33284 April 20, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ROLANDO CENTENO, ET AL., defendants. ROLANDO
CENTENO, defendant- appellant
FACTS:
On December 1, 1968, Rolando Santos was enjoying himself with some
friends and beer at the Municipal Building. After a while, Rolando Santos
died due to brain hemorrhage. Rolando Centeno, the police chief and one
of his policemen were accused of murdering Santos. Questions were
brought about as to how Santos died. Prosecution claim that Santos was
killed with karate blows by the appellants. However, the defense denies
this. Defense argues that Santos staggered drunkenly and fell. Santos hit
his head and bled to death. The trial court believed the prosecution and
convicted the police chief while absolving his co-accused.
Centeno filed an appeal. In his appeal, medical evidence were present and
could not be disputed. It was confirmed that Santos died as a result of
internal bleeding in the brain due to trauma. Santos' head showed various
contusions and abrasions but not in the nape of the neck where the karate
blows were allegedly delivered. Defense further explains that the death of
Santos is hardly plausible and mainly speculative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant had not intended to commit so grave
as wrong as the actual killing of Santos.
RULING:
No, the accussed-appellant cannot argue to have not intended to kill
Santos. Murder cannot be excused on such improbable conjectures. It was
indeed murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery. There was
alevosia because Santos was suddenly attacked from behind while he was
intoxicated and weak. The accused-appellant had employed means aimed
at achieving his purpose without risk to himself from any defense the
victim could have made.
Assuming there was abuse of superior strength, the aggravating
circumstance is deemed absorbed by treachery. As for the mitigating
circumstances claimed by the defense, the Court holds that they cannot be
allowed. The derogatory statement made by Santos which so irritated
Centeno did not constitute such a grave provocation as to warrant the
lessening of his penalty for reacting as he did in punishing the victim to
death. Centeno cannot argue that he had not intended to commit so grave a
wrong as the actual killing of Santos as he knew, or should have known,
that the karate chops on the nape of the neck would have a lethal effect
upon the defenseless and drunken victim.
Therefore, the Court affirmed the appealed judgment against the accusedappellant with modification as to civil indemnity increasing to P30,000.00.
#18
G.R. No. 213792, June 22, 2015
GUILLERMO WACOY y BITOL, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 213886
JAMES QUIBAC y RAFAEL, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
FACTS:
Petitioners filed petitions for review on certiorari and were consolidated.
On April 11, 2004, the petitioners conspired, confederated and mutually
aided each other, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted, mauled and kicked the
stomach of Elner Aro y Lauran. This lead to traumatic injuries which
directly caused his death. The offense alleged to be attended by the
aggravating circumstance of superior strength.
The case of the petitioners were tried in the Regional Trial Court and was
convicted of the crime of Death Cause by Tumultuous Affray under Article
251 of the Revised Penal Code Court of Appeals.
When the case was brought to the Court of Appeals, the crime was
modified to homicide under Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code with
mitigating circumstances.
Petitioners now separately moved for a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals found respondents guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
RULING:
Yes, the petitioners were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code with mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong under Article 13 (3) of the same Code.
Praeter intentionem states that more serious consequences not intended by
the offender result from his felonious act. Petitioners claim to have had no
intent to kill Aro. However, even if there is no intent to kill, the petitioners
will still be convicted with homicide. It is because with respect to crimes of
personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results
following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the
consequences thereof.
#19
G.R. No. L-5272, 19 March 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant
FACTS:
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant was
awakened because someone tried to open the door of his room. Defendant
asked who was trying to get in, there was no reply. After the intruder
successfully opened the door, defendant took out his knife which was kept
hidden under his pillow in cases of robberies which were rampant in the
Fort McKinley's quarters. The defendant struck with his knife the intruder,
who turned out to be his roommate, Pascual Gualberto. After being struck
with the knife, Pascual ran out on the porch and fell down on the steps in a
wounded condition. The defendant recognized that it was his roommate
and immediately cried out for assistance and secured bandages on
Pascual's wounds. Subsequently, Pascual died because of the injuries
sustained.
Defendant admitted to have stabbed his roommate but claimed that he did
it under the impression that Pascual was a ladron because he forced open
the door of their room, despite the warnings given. Defendant further
argues that he had no intent killing Pascual and that he stabbed him for in
exercise of self-defense.
Defendant was arrested and charged with the crime of assassination.
ISSUE:
Whether defendant could be exempted from criminal liabilities in this case.
RULING:
Yes, the defendant is exempted from criminal liabilities in this case.The
Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the trial court and thereby acquitted
the defendant of the crime. The Court provided that the defendant acted in
good faith, without malice and criminal intent, and there was an
immediate danger upon his life and property. It was a legitimate exercise
of the right of self-defense. In addition, if the facts he believed them to be,
he would be wholly exempt from criminal liability. The defendant is said to
have no recklessness or negligence or even carelessness in falling into his
mistake as to the facts, or in the means he used to defend himself from
danger which he believed threatened his person and his property and the
property under his charge.
#20
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
ESMAEL GERVERO, FLORENCIO ARBOLONIO, DANILO
CASTIGADOR, CELSO SOLOMON AND EDUARDO BAÑES, Accused
FACTS:
On or about the 25th day of November 1991, in the municipality of Lemery,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, the accused, conspiring and confederating
with one another, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, armed
with firearms, through treachery, evident premeditation and superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked,
assaulted, and hit Hernando Villegas, Jose Villegas and Benito Basug, Jr.
Numerous gunshots wounds were found on different parts of their bodies
which immediately caused their deaths.
On defense, the accused contend that they were given instructions to
conduct a patrol against NPA members. In the order, they are to use coded
calling and response. When they noticed a group of people approaching,
they called out with codes. But instead of answering, the group of people
fired at them. This prompted the accused to fire back which resulted to the
death of the victims. Accused now invoke mistake of fact.
The court ruled out the defense of mistake of fact noting that the
misencounter due to mistake of fact was unbelievable. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction of the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether the Trial Court erred in not appreciating the defense of mistake of
fact.
RULING:
No, the Trial Court did not err in appreciating the defense of mistake of
fact.
There was no reason for the accused not to recognize the victims because
they were traversing an open area which was illuminated not only by the
moonlight, but also by a light bulb. In addition, they all reside in the same
town and certainly, the accused who were all members of the CAFGU
would know the residents of that town so as to easily distinguish them
from unknown intruders who might be alleged members of the NPA.
When Jose fell down, Hernando identified himself and shouted, "This is
Hernando!" However, instead of verifying the identities of the victims, the
accused continued to fire at them. One of them even shouted, "Birahi na!"
("Shoot now!"). When the victims fell down, the accused approached their
bodies. At that point, they could no longer claim that they didn't recognize
the victims; and still not contented, they sprayed them with bullets such
that Jose suffered 14 gunshot wounds Hernando 16 gunshot wounds, and
Benito 20 gunshot wounds. Contrary to their testimonies during trial to the
effect that the victims were the first to fire their weapons, Brgy. Capt.
Balinas testified that when he asked the accused whether the victims had
fired at them, the accused answered him in the negative. The accused
would like the Court to believe that the victims knew the safe word
"Amoy" which must be uttered in response to "Simoy" in order to easily
determine whether they were members of the NPA. However, the victims
could not have known the safe words as accused Gervero himself stated in
his testimony that only he and his co-accused were present when their
commanding officer briefed them about the safe words to be used in their
operation.
#21
G.R. No. 117954, April 27, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ORLANDO ACURAM, accused-appellant
FACTS:
On June 29, 1991, at around 7 o’clock in the evening, Rolando Manabat,
Oscar Manabat, Bartolome Nabe, and Peterson Valendres proceeded to the
market in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental after work to buy fish. There was
no fish available so they decided to go home. When they were on the
national highway trying to get a ride home, a passenger jeep that they tried
to flag down suddenly swerved dangerously towards them. Rolando
Manabat shouted at the jeepney and a passenger inside the jeepney
shouted back at them. Immediately thereafter, two gunshots rang out in the
air, accompanied by sparks coming from the front right side of the jeepney.
Rolando was shot on his right knee and was brought to Cagayan de Oro
Medical Center. Rolando needed blood transfusion thereby transferring
him to the Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital in the same city.
When Rolando was transferred, he was examined. The doctor decided to
operate on Rolando but unfortunately he died. The doctor testified that the
cause of Rolando’s death was “secondary to huddle respiratory syndrome
secondary to blood loss, secondary to gunshot wounds,” or briefly, massive
loss of blood due to the gunshot wound. However, the doctor testified that
under normal circumstances, the wound would not necessarily cause death
but because the wound transected the major part of the leg, the wound was
fatal. Furthermore, victim only sustained one gunshot wound which
entered at the front portion of the right knee and exited at the back, causing
two wounds.
The El Salvador conducted investigation on the incident. It was discovered
that Orlando Acuram, a policeman, was among the passengers of the
jeepney and was seated at the front, right side. Acuram was the only one
among the passengers of the jeepney to have been carrying a firearm.
Acuram was later surrendered by his commanding officer to the custody of
the court on the basis of the warrant of arrest.
Acuram admitted he was on board the mentioned jeep and had a gun at
that time but denied firing it. The trial court found the defense weak, selfserving and unreliable. Acuram then raised that there were errors
committed by the trial court in his appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the delay in giving proper medical attendance to the victim
constitutes an efficient intervening cause which exempts him from criminal
responsibility.
RULING:
The delay in giving proper medical attendance to the victim does not
constitute an efficient intervening cause which exempts the accused from
criminal responsibility. The statement of the accused that cause of the
death of the victim is the delay in giving proper medical attendance to the
victim is disingenuous. Accused was not able to prove that the attending
doctors were negligent in treating the victim.
The Supreme Court ruled that the accused would be charged with the
crime homicide since the qualifying circumstance was not proved in this
case.
#22
G.R. No. 164749, March 15, 2017
ROMULO ABROGAR AND ERLINDA ABROGAR, petitioners
VS.
COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY AND INTERGAMES, INC.,
respondents
FACTS:
To promote the sales of “Pop Cola”, defendant Cosmos, jointly with
Intergames, organized an endurance running contest billed as the “1st Pop
Cola Junior Marathon” scheduled to be held on June 15, 1980. A 10kilometer course was organized starting from the premises of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa and would end at the Quezon Memorial Circle.
Rommel, the plaintiff’s son, applied with defendants to be allowed to
participate in the contest. Rommel complied with all the requirements and
was given an official number. Allegedly, during the contest proper, it
turned out that the defendants failed to provide adequate safety
precautionary measures and exercise the diligence required of them. As
Rommel was running along the route of the marathon, he was bumped by
a jeepney and brought to the hospital. However, in spite of the medical
treatment given, he died due to severe head injuries.
Petitioners sued the respondents in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City to recover damages for the death of Rommel but Cosmos
denied liability. Cosmos insisted that they were merely sponsors of the
marathon and its participation had been limited only to providing financial
assistance to Intergame and that they had no cause of action against it
because there was not privity of contract between the participants in the
marathon and Cosmos. It averred a cross-claim against Intergames, stating
that the latter guaranteed to hold Cosmos completely free from any claim
or action for liability for any injuries or bodily harm sustained by any of the
participants in the marathon or for any damage to the property or
properties of third parties which may arise in the course of the race.
Intergames asserted that Rommel's death had been an accident exclusively
caused by the negligence of the jeepney driver. Intergames insisted that
they were not responsible for the accident the marathon organizer and will
not assume the responsibilities of an insurer of the safety of the participant.
They also contend that they have exercised due diligence in conduct of the
race for the adoption and implementation of all known and possible safeth
and precautionary measures in order to protect the participants from
injuries arising from vehicular and other forms of accidents.
ISSUE:
Whether Intergames was negligent in its conduct of the marathon and
whether its negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel
Abrogar
RULING:
No, Intergames was not negligent in its conduct of the marathon and such
negligence was not the proximate cause of the death of Rommel Abrogar.
According to the Supreme Court, the only way to conduct a safe road race
is to block off the traffic for the duration of the event and direct cars and
public utilities to take alternative routes when the event is being held. Such
standard is too high and even inapplicable in the case at bar, because there
is no alternative route from IBP to Don Mariano Marcos to Quezon City
Hall. The marathon was allowed by the Northern Police District, MPF,
Quezon City on the condition that the road should not be blocked off from
the traffic. Intergames had no choice but to comply with the rules or else
the marathon would not be allowed at all.
The general rule is that the party who relied on negligence for his cause of
action has the burden of proving the existence of the same, otherwise his
action fails. Here, the appellants failed to prove that there was inadequate
police officers, personnel and alike because they failed to prove what is
considered adequate.
The Court did not find the appellant Intergames' conduct of the marathon
the proximate cause of Rommel Agrobar's death. Proximate cause which in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause produces injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. Apparently, the driver of the jeepney was racing against a driver
of a minibus and were trying to crowd each other. In fact, there was a
criminal case filed against the jeepney driver for killing Rommel Agrobar,
which proves that his death was caused by the negligence of the jeepney
driver.
#23
G.R. No. 75369. November 26, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO, EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN and
JUAN MACANDOG (at large), Defendants, FERNANDO ILIGAN y
JAMITO and EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN, Defendants-Appellants.
FACTS:
While on their way home, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. and his companions,
Lukan and Asis, met Iligan and his group. A fight ensued between the two
groups which prompted the group of Quiñones to run but Iligan's group
had them in pursuit. When Quiñones felt that the coast was clear, they
proceeded on their way when suddenly Iligan emerged on the roadside
and hacked Quiñones with a bolo hitting him on the forehead and causing
him to fall down on the road while Lukan and Asis fled. They returned
when people saw Quiñones dead and shouted "may nadale na". The death
of Quiñones was due to shock and massive hemorrhages due to vehicular
accident.
The accused denied to having perpetrated the crime and supported it with
the testimony of Dr. Abas, the witness of the prosecution, who stated that
the death of Quiñones was due to a vehicular accident.
ISSUE:
Whether the hacking of the accused is the proximate cause of the victim's
death.
RULING:
Yes, the hacking of the accused is the proximate cause of the victim's death.
The Supreme Court ruled that while Iligan's hacking of the victim's head
might not have been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause.
Proximate legal cause is defined "that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom."
The sequence of events from Iligan's assault on him to the time Quiñones
was run over by a vehicle is one of the unbroken chain of events
considering that it was a very short span of time. Having triggered such
events, Iligan cannot escape liability.
#24
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents
FACTS:
On February 4, 1979, Sulpico Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and
Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez
Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of
Bernardina Palangpangan. Mandaya, Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig
had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. Aniceto told Mandaya that he
wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them
and that Mandaya should accompany the four men, otherwise, he would
also be killed.
At about 10 o'clock in the evening of the same day, petitioner, Mandaya,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, arrived at Palangpangan's house and
armed with firearms. Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's
bedroom and fired at the said room. However, Palangpangan turned out to
be in another city and her home was occupied by her son-in-law and his
family. The room they fired at was empty, therefore, no one was hit.
Petitioner and his companions were identified by witnesses. One testified
that before they left the premises, they shouted, "We will kill you (the
witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if
you were not injured."
The petitioner and his companions were tried at the Regional Trial Court
and Intod was convicted of attempted murder. The Regional Trial Court's
decision, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, held that petitioner was
guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks a modification of the
judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime, citing Article
4 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether Palangpangan's absence on the night when petitioner and his
companions riddled the room made the crime inherently impossible.
RULING:
Yes, the crime is inherently impossible.
The situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which
rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. Under Article
4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act
an impossible crime.
To hold that the contention of respondent that the offense was attempted
murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause
independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article
4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment..." In that case all circumstances which
prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident
independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and
frustrated felony.
#25
G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009
GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
FACTS:
Petitioner, as a collector at Mega Foam International Inc., received a check
amounting to P10,000.00 from a customer as payment for her purchases
from Mega Foam. However, the check received by the petitioner was
dishonored by the bank. After finding out that the check was unfunded,
she asked the customer to replace it with cash. The customer complied with
the request.
ISSUE:
Whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
RULING:
No, the crime of qualified theft was not produced.
Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully
taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be
unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she
would have received the face value, which as not rightfully hers. Therefore,
it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being
unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the
crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner
turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually
dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of
said dishonored check.