39. Manotok v. NHA and RP
Facts:
Pursuant to LOI No. 555 instituting nationwide slum improvement and
resettlement program (SIR) and LOI No. 557 adopting slum improvement as a national
housing policy, the City of Manila and NHA declared the Tambunting Estate and the
Sunog-Apog area in its priority list for a Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) which they
described as blighted areas. With this, the President issued the challenged Presidential
Decrees Nos. 1669 and 1670 which respectively declared the Tambunting Estate and
the Sunog-Apog area expropriated. The decrees gave the City Assessor the
authority to determine the market valueof the lands involved and stated that “no
improvement has been undertaken on the land and that the land is squatted upon
by resident families which should considerably depress the expropriation cost”.
Petitioners maintain that the Presidential Decrees providing for the direct
expropriation of the properties in question violate their constitutional right to due process
and equal protection of the law because by the mere passage of the said decrees their
properties were automatically expropriated and they were immediately deprived of the
ownership and possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such
expropriation or to contest the just compensation to which they are entitled.
Thepetitioners argue that the government must first have filed a complaint with the
proper court under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court in order to fulfill the
requirements of due process.
Issue: (1) whether or not the decrees in question deprived the petitioners of their
properties without due process oflaw
(2) whether or not the petitioners were denied to their right to just compensation
Held:
Petitions are GRANTED. Presidential Decree Numbers 1669 and 1670 which
respectively proclaimed the Tambunting Estate and the Estero de Sunog-Apog area
expropriated, are declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
Due process
 The areas are summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated by
decree without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever.
The expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the signing
of the decree.
 Not only are the owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the expropriation,
plead their side, or question the amount of payments fixed by decree, but the
decisions, rulings, orders, or resolutions of the NHA are expressly declared as beyond
the reach of judicial review.
 In City of Manila v. Arellano Law Colleges (85 Phil. 663), we reiterated that a necessity
must exist for the taking of private property for the proposed uses and purposes but
accepted the fact that modern decisions do not call for absolute necessity. ---- In the
instant petitions, there is no showing whatsoever as to why the properties involved
were singled out for expropriation through decrees or what necessity impelled the
particular choices or selections
Just Compensation
 The fixing of the maximum amounts of compensation and the bases thereof which are
the assessed values of the properties in 1978 deprive the petitioner of the opportunity
to prove a higher value because, the actual or symbolic taking of such properties
occurred only in 1980 when the questioned decrees were promulgated. --- The
decision of the government to acquire a property through eminent domain should be
made known to the property owner through a formal notice wherein a hearing or a
judicial proceeding is contemplated as provided for in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
This shall be the time of reckoning the value of the property for the purpose of just
compensation.
 For the compensation to be just, it must approximate the value of the property at the
time of its taking and the government can be said to have decided to acquire or take
the property only after it has, at the least, commenced a proceeding, judicial or
otherwise, for this purpose.
 The so-called “conditions” of the properties should not be determined through a
decree but must be shown in an appropriate proceeding in order to arrive at a just
valuation of the property.
 The market value stated by the city assessor alone cannot substitute for the court’s
judgment in expropriation proceedings. It is violative of the due process and the
eminent domain provisions of the Constitution to deny to a property owner the
opportunity to prove that the valuation made by a local assessor is wrong or
prejudiced.
40. Office of the Solicitor General vs Ayala Land
Facts:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
filed by petitioner seeking the reversal and setting aside of the decision of CA which
affirmed the decision of RTC, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of OSG. The
RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land Incorporated (Ayala Land), Robinsons
Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM
Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in
their malls to their patrons and the general public.
The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce found that the collection of parking
fees by shopping malls is contrary to National Building Code and figuratively speaking,
the Code has “expropriated” the land for parking. Also, Committee stated that the
collection of parking fees would be against Article II of RA 9734 (Consumer Act of the
Philippines) as to the State’s policy of protecting the interest of consumers. Moreover,
Section 201 of the National Building Code gives the responsibility for the administration
and enforcement of the provisions of the Code, including the imposition of penalties for
administrative violations thereof to the Secretary of Public Works. This is not being
strictly followed as the LGUs are tasked to discharge the regulatory powers of DPWH
instead of DPWH instead.
As such, Senate Committee recommended that: 1) Office of Solicitor General should
institute the action to enjoin the collction of parking fees and enforce the sanctions for
violation of National Building Code; 2) DTI pursuant to RA 7394 should enforce the
provisions of Code relative to parking; and 3) Congress should amend and update the
National Building Code to prohibit the collection of parking fees and its waiver of liability.
Respondent SM Prime assailed the recommendation of the Committee and filed a
Petition for Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court against
DPWH and local building officials, contending that: 1) Rule XIX of Implementing Rules
and Regulations of National Building Code is unconstitutional and void; 2) respondent
has the legal right to lease parking spaces; and 3) National Building Code IRR is
ineffective as it was not published for 3 consecutive weeks in newspaper of general
circulation as mandated by Section 211 of PD 1096.
OSG then filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) to the RTC against
respondents, prohibiting them from collecting parking fees and contending that their
practice of charging parking fees is violative of National Building Code.
The RTC held that: 1) OSG has the capacity to institute the proceeding it being a
controversy of public welfare; 2) a petition for declaratory relief is proper since all the
requisites are present; 3) the Building Code with its IRR does not necessarily impose
that parking spaces shall be free of charge and providing parking spaces for free can be
considered as unlawful taking of property right without just compensation; and 4) there
was no sufficient evidence to justify any award for damages. They deemed that the
respondents are not obligated to provide parking spaces free of charge.
OSG appealed the decision to CA, saying that RTC erred in holding that the National
Building Code did not intend the parking spaces to be free of charge. On the otherhand,
respondent SM filed a separate appeal to the CA, contending that: 1) RTC erred in
failing to declare Rule XIX of IRR as unconstitutional; 2) RTC erred in failing to declare
IRR ineffective for not having been published as required by law; 3) RTC erred in
dismissing the OSG’s petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and 4) RTC
erred in failing to declare that OSG has no legal standing as it is not a real party-ininterest.
CA denied the appeals of both petitioners and respondents on the following grounds: 1)
OSG did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies and that an administrative review is
not a condition precedent to judicial relief where the question in dispute is purely a legal
one and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done; 2) the validity of
National Building Code IRR cannot be proceeded as it was not discussed in RTC and
the controversy could be settled on other grounds without touching the issue of validity
since the courts should refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of a law; and 3)
Section 803 of National Building Code and Rule XIX of IRR are clear that they are only
intended to control the occupancy of areas and structures, and in the absence of
provision of law, respondents could not be obliged to provide parking spaces free of
charge.
As such, OSG presented itself to SC for the instant Petition for Review.
Issues:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of RTC that respondents are not obliged
to provide free parking spaces to their customers or the public.
2. Whether the petition of OSG for prohibiting the collection of parking fees is a valid
exercise of the police power of State.
Held:
1. No. The CA was correct in affirming the ruling of RTC, and the respondents are not
obliged to provide free parking spaces. SC found no merit in the OSG’s petition:
Sec 803 of National Building Code.
Percentage of Site Occupancy states that maximum site occupancy shall be governed
by the use, type of construction, and height of the building and the use, area, nature,
and location of the site; and subject to the provisions of the local zoning requirements
and in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary.
RULE XIX – PARKING AND LOADING SPACE REQUIREMENTS
Pursuant to Section 803 of the National Building Code (PD 1096) providing for
maximum site occupancy, the following provisions on parking and loading space
requirements
shall
be
observed:
1. The parking space ratings listed below are minimum off-street requirements for
specific
uses/occupancies
for
buildings/structures:
1.1 The size of an average automobile parking slot shall be computed as 2.4 meters by
5.00 meters for perpendicular or diagonal parking, 2.00 meters by 6.00 meters for
parallel parking. A truck or bus parking/loading slot shall be computed at a minimum of
3.60 meters by 12.00 meters. The parking slot shall be drawn to scale and the total
number of which shall be indicated on the plans and specified whether or not parking
accommodations, are attendant-managed. (See Section 2 for computation of parking
requirements).
x
xxx
1.7 Neighborhood shopping center – 1 slot/100 sq. m. of shopping floor area
SECTION 102. Declaration of Policy
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property, and
public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and
control; and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and
structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control
their location, site, design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and
maintenance.
The requirement of free-of-charge parking, the OSG argues, greatly contributes to the
aim of safeguarding “life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the
principles of sound environmental management and control.” Adequate parking spaces
would contribute greatly to alleviating traffic congestion when complemented by quick
and easy access thereto because of free-charge parking. Moreover, the power to
regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures
carries with it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control — partially or, as in
this case, absolutely — the imposition of such fees.
The explicit directive of the above is that respondents, as operators/lessors of
neighborhood shopping centers, should provide parking and loading spaces with the
minimum ratio of one slot per 100 square meters of shopping floor area. There is
nothing therein pertaining to the collection (or non-collection) of parking fees by
respondents. In fact, the term “parking fees” cannot even be found at all in the entire
National Building Code and its IRR. One rule of statutory construction is that if a statute
is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any
attempt at interpretation. Since Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX
of its IRR do not mention parking fees, then simply, said provisions do not regulate the
collection of the same
The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the National Building Code to expand the
coverage of Section 803 of the same Code and Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include
the regulation of parking fees. The OSG limits its citation to the first part of Section 102
of the National Building Code declaring the policy of the State “to safeguard life, health,
property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental
management and control”; but totally ignores the second part of said provision, which
reads, “and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and
structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control
their location, site, design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and
maintenance.” While the first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code lays
down the State policy, it is the second part thereof that explains how said policy shall be
carried out in the Code. Section 102 of the National Building Code is not an allencompassing grant of regulatory power to the DPWH Secretary and local building
officials in the name of life, health, property, and public welfare. On the contrary, it limits
the regulatory power of said officials to ensuring that the minimum standards and
requirements for all buildings and structures, as set forth in the National Building Code,
are complied with.
Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the minimum
requirements for parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR also mandates that
such parking spaces be provided by building owners free of charge. If Rule XIX is not
covered by the enabling law, then it cannot be added to or included in the implementing
rules. The rule-making power of administrative agencies must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted,
and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be
in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between
the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
2. No. The petition of OSG to prohibit collection of parking fees is not a valid exercise of
the police power of State.
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that “the power to regulate and control the use,
occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it the power to
impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this case, absolutely, the
imposition of such fees.” Firstly, the fees within the power of regulatory agencies to
impose are regulatory fees. It has been settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad and
all-compassing governmental competence to restrict rights of liberty and property
carries with it the undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment
of specific measures that govern the relations not only as between individuals but also
as between private parties and the political society. True, if the regulatory agencies
have the power to impose regulatory fees, then conversely, they also have the power to
remove the same. Even so, it is worthy to note that the present case does not involve
the imposition by the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees
upon respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who
use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the DPWH Secretary
and local building officials do have regulatory powers over the collection of parking fees
for the use of privately owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or prohibit such
collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting the collection of such
parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local building officials must pass
the test of classic reasonableness and propriety of the measures or means in the
promotion of the ends sought to be accomplished.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to justify the
regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local building officials, of
privately owned parking facilities, including the collection by the owners/operators of
such facilities of parking fees from the public for the use thereof. The Court finds,
however, that in totally prohibiting respondents from collecting parking fees, the State
would be acting beyond the bounds of police power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use
and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to regulate, however, does not
include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power
to confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with
the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in
order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting the
general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as
opium and firearms.
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is no
longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent
domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands intended for
public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation
of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears
why the said power may not be availed of only to impose a burden upon the owner of
condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is a settled rule that neither
acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is essential to taking. It is usually in
cases where title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to
determine whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a
compensable taking. A regulation that deprives any person of the profitable use of his
property constitutes a taking and entitles him to compensation, unless the invasion of
rights is so slight as to permit the regulation to be justified under the police power.
Similarly, a police regulation that unreasonably restricts the right to use business
property for business purposes amounts to a taking of private property, and the owner
may recover therefor.
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s
with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the public,
for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their
properties. The State is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the
latter’s properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the
public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion
into the property rights of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right to
use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting
from its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and
operation of the required parking facilities.
In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees
from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building
Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally
invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents’
property without payment of just compensation.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated 25 January 2007 and Resolution dated 14 March 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, affirming in toto the Joint Decision dated 29 May
2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 00-1208
and No. 00-1210 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
41. City of Manila vs Chinese Cemetery of Manila
Summary:
The appellant questions the exercise of eminent domain by the City of Manila over a
real property used as cemetery arguing, among others, that it is not necessary for the
plaintiff (City of Manila) to expropriate the said property. The Supreme Court explained
that the exercise of eminent domain is political, and not judicial. As such, the appellant
and Courts cannot inquire, much less substitute, into the wisdom and prerogative of the
State in choosing which and what property to expropriate.
Doctrine:
1) In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary,
the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions
essentially political and not judicial in their character. The determination of those
questions (the necessity and the expediency) belongs to the sovereign power; the
legislative department is final and conclusive, and the courts have no power to review it
(the necessity and the expediency) * * *. It (the legislature) may designate the particular
property to be condemned, and its determination in this respect cannot be reviewed by
the courts.
2) The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may
directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular
improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In
such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of
the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the
suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land
selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the
courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own views for those of the
representatives of the people.
3) The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and
before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When
the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or
authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right
or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are
two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the
land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial,
finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it
cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law.
Facts: On 11 December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Manila praying that certain lands (extension of Rizal Avenue
within Block 3 of the district of Binondo) be expropriated for the purpose of constructing
a public improvement. The Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of
Manila] alleged in its answer that it was a corporation organized and existing under and
by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the benefit and
general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of Manila; that it was the owner of
parcels one and two of the land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint; that it denied
that it was either necessary or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street
purposes; that existing street and roads furnished ample means of communication for
the public in the district covered by such proposed expropriation; that if the construction
of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes were
available, which would fully satisfy the City's purposes, at much less expense and
without disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had a Torrens title for the lands
in question; that the lands in question had been used by the Chinese Community for
cemetery purposes; that a great number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if
said expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead,
would require the expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the
bodies to some other place or site and in the purchase of such new sites, would involve
the destruction of existing monuments and the erection of new monuments in their
stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the Chinese Community and to all
those persons owning and interested in the graves and monuments which would have
to be destroyed; that the City was without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery
or any part or portion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, was
not necessary as a public improvement. Ildefonso Tambunting, answering the petition,
denied each and every allegation of the complaint, and alleged that said expropriation
was not a public improvement. Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with her husband, Jose
Maria Delgado, and each of the other defendants, answering separately, presented
substantially the same defense as that presented by the Comunidad de Chinos de
Manila and Ildefonso Tambunting. Judge Simplicio del Rosario decided that there was
no necessity for the expropriation of the strip of land and absolved each and all of the
defendants (Chinese Community, Tambunting, spouses Delgado, et. al.) from all liability
under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. From the judgment, the City of
Manila appealed.
Issue: Whether portions of the Chinese Cemetery, a public cemetery, may be
expropriated for the construction of a public improvement.
Held: No. Section 2429 of Act 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides that the city
(Manila) may condemn private property for public use. The Charter of the city of Manila,
however, contains no procedure by which the said authority may be carried into effect.
Act 190 provides for how right of eminent domain may be exercised. Section 241 of said
Act provides that the Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province or
department thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or public or private
corporation having, by law, the right to condemn private property for public use, shall
exercise that right in the manner prescribed by Section 242 to 246. The right of
expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can
exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts
come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists
for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is
being exercised in accordance with the law. Herein, the cemetery in question is public
(a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church) and seems to
have been established under governmental authority, as the Spanish GovernorGeneral, in an order creating the same. Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a
public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general
authority. To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us in life sometimes
becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except in cases of necessity, or for laudable
purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last resting place of our friends, should be
maintained, and the preventative aid of the courts should be invoked for that object.
While cemeteries and sepulchers and the places of the burial of the dead are still within
the memory and command of the active care of the living; while they are still devoted to
pious uses and sacred regard, it is difficult to believe that even the legislature would
adopt a law expressly providing that such places, under such circumstances, should be
violated.
42. Moday vs Court of Appeals
Facts: On 23 July 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in
Agusan del Sur passed Resolution 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate
the Petition for Expropriation of a 1 Hectare Portion of Lot 6138-Pls-4 Along the National
Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other
Government Sports Facilities." In due time, the Resolution was approved by then
Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
for its approval. On 11 September 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved
said Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is unnecessary
considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the
government center." The Municipality of Bunawan subsequently filed a Petition for
Eminent Domain against Percival Moday before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. The complaint was later amended to include the
registered owners, Percival Moday's parents, Zotico (+) and Leonora Moday, as party
defendants. On 6 March 1991, the municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the
Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the
municipal treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the government's best interest for the
municipality to be allowed to take possession of the property. Despite Moday's
opposition and after a hearing on the merits, the RTC granted the municipality's motion
to take possession of the land; holding that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to
declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective, and that the duty of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and resolutions passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of BP 337 (the old Local Government Code)
and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the two acts enumerated in
Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Moday's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on 31 October 1991. Moday
elevated the case before the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari, which was
dismissed on 15 July 1992. The appellate court also denied Moday's motion for
reconsideration on 22 October 1992. Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had
erected three buildings on the subject property: the Association of Barangay Councils
(ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool, both wooden structures, and the Bunawan
Municipal Gymnasium, which is made of concrete. Moday filed on 23 November 1992
the petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal
resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Held: Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised, is a
fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public
use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature the power of eminent
domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public
utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must
be for public use and there must be just compensation. The Municipality of Bunawan's
power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided
for in Batas Pambansa 337, the Local Government Code in force at the time
expropriation proceedings were initiated. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval
of Municipal Resolution 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution
null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of BP 337, grants the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that
it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Thus, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal
Resolution 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the
right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said
resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of BP337. Perforce; it follows that
Resolution 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition
for the condemnation of Moday's property.
43. Landbank of the Philippines vs Dalauta
This is an action for determination of just compensation.
FACTS: Respondent was the registered owner of an agricultural land in Butuan City
with an area of 25.2160 hectares and which was placed by DAR under compulsory
acquisition of CARP as reflected in the Notice of Coverage. Petitioner LBP offered
₱192,782.59 as compensation for the land, but Dalauta rejected such valuation for
being too low.
The case was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) through the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Butuan City, who affirmed the valuation made
by LBP, after a summary administrative proceeding was conducted.
Respondent filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting
as SAC. He alleged that LBP’s valuation of the land was inconsistent with the rules and
regulations prescribed in DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 06, series of 1992, for
determining the just compensation of lands covered by CARP’s compulsory acquisition
scheme.
The Board of Commissioners constituted by SAC inspected the land and recommended
that the value of the land be pegged at ₱100,000.00 per hectarei in which both parties
objected.
DAR Admin. Order No. 06 (1992) – II (A)
There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by VOS or CA
regardless of the date of offer or coverage of the claim:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
Where: LV = Land Value; CNI = Capitalized Net Income; CS = Comparable Sales; MV
= Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant, and
applicable.
A.1
When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be: LV=(CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2
When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the
formula shall be: LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.3
When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the
formula shall be: LV = MV x 2
A.4
In all the above, the computed value using the applicable formula or the
Declared Value by Landowner (DV), whichever is lower, shall be adopted as the Land
Value.
x xx
Dalauta claimed that he had a net income of Php350,000.00 in 1993 from sales of trees
to one person, Fonacier, thus the formula of LV = CNI x 0.9 + MV x 0.1 should be used,
which yields a total value of ₱2,639,557.oo.
LBP alleged that the land had no income and the corn production found during the
ocular inspection in 1994 was only for family consumption. Thus they used the
formula LV= MVx 2 which yielded a total value of ₱192,782.59.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is considered the trial court correctly
computed the just compensation of the subject property.
RULING: Upon an assiduous assessment of the different valuations arrived at by the
DAR, the SAC and the CA, the Court agrees with the position of Justice Francis
Jardeleza that just compensation for respondent Dalauta’s land should be
computed based on the formula provided under DAR-LBP Joint Memorandum
Circular No. 11, series of 2003 (JMC No. 11 (2003)). This Memorandum Circular,
which provides for the specific guidelines for properties with standing commercial trees,
explains:
The Capitalized Net Income (CNI) approach to land valuation assumes that there would
be uniform streams of future income that would be realized in perpetuity from the
seasonal/permanent crops planted to the land. In the case of commercial trees
(hardwood and soft wood species), however, only a one-time income is realized
when the trees are due for harvest. The regular CNI approach in the valuation of
lands planted to commercial trees would therefore not apply. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Dalauta’s sale of falcata trees indeed appears to be a one-time transaction. He did not
claim to have derived any other income from the property prior to receiving the Notice of
Coverage from the DAR in February 1994. For this reason, his property would be more
appropriately covered by the formula provided under JMC No. 11 (2003).
Dalauta alleges to have sold all the falcata trees in the property to Fonacier in
1993. After Fonacier finished harvesting in January 1994, he claims that, per advice of
his lawyer, he immediately caused the date of effectivity of this Joint Memorandum
Circular x xx.” It is submitted, however, that applying the above formula to compute just
compensation for respondent’s land would be the most equitable course of action under
the circumstances. Without JMC No. 11 (2003), Dalauta’s property would have to be
valued using the formula for idle lands, the CNI and CS factors not being applicable.
Following this formula, just compensation for Dalauta’s property would only amount to
₱225,300.00, computed as follows:
LV = MVx2
Where: LV = Land Value; MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration*

For the area planted to corn, ₱7,740.00/hectare

For idle/pasture land, ₱3,890/hectare
Thus:
For the 4 hectares planted to corn: LV = (P7, 7 40/hectare x 4 hectares) x 2 =
₱61,920.00
For the 21 hectares of idle/pasture land: LV = (₱3,890/hectare x 21) x 2 = ₱163,380.00
Total Land Value = P61,920.00 + Pl63,380.00 = P225,300.00
44. Republic vs Lim
Fact: On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a
special civil action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu,
involving Lots of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of
establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. After depositing ₱9,500.00
with the Philippine National Bank, the Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter,
the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of
₱4,062.10 as just compensation. In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons,
filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it
“denied knowledge of the matter.” Another heir, Nestor Belocura, brought the claim to
the Office of then President Carlos Garcia who wrote the Civil Aeronautics
Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite action on said claim.
in 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding
that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over Lots 932 and 939
because of the Republic’s failure to pay the amount of ₱4,062.10, adjudged in the
expropriation proceedings. In view of “the differences in money value from 1940 up to
the present,” the court adjusted the market value at ₱16,248.40, to be paid with 6%
interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings,
until full payment.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged and foreclosed Lot 932 to
Vicente Lim for failure to pay. in 1992, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title
with the (RTC) seeking an absolute and exclusive possession of the property. in 2001,
the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent. Petitioners elevated the case to the
CA but the Ruling of the RTC was upheld and affirmed.
Issue: Whether the owner of the expropriated land is entitled for the repossession of his
property when party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been
assessed or agreed upon?
Held: Yes, while the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just compensation
does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots,26
however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5)
years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in
consonance with the principle that “the government cannot keep the property and
dishonor the judgment.” To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the
government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and
equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private
persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation which the court
defined as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property
owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered “just.”
45. Republic vs PLDT
FACTS: PLDT, is a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise to install,
operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines and to carry
electrical transmission of messages within the Philippines and between the Philippines
and the telephone systems of other countries.
The RCA Communications, Inc., is an American corporation authorized to
transact business in the Philippines and is the grantee, by assignment, of a legislative
franchise to operate a domestic station for the reception and transmission of long
distance wireless messages and to operate broadcasting and radio-telephone and
radio-telegraphic communications services.
Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc.,
entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the United
States and received by RCA’s domestic station, could automatically be transferred to
the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa. The arrangement was later extended to radiotelephone messages to and from European and Asiatic countries.
Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its
own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment
and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private
parties. However, its application for these trunk lines contained a statement whereby it
states that it would abide by the rules and regulations of PLDT.
The Director of Telecommunications entered into an agreement with RCA
Communications whereby the Bureau would convey overseas calls from RCA to local
residents. Defendant PLDT then complained to the Bureau that they had used the trunk
lines not for government offices only but also to serve the general public; which is in
direct competition of PLDT. The Bureau did not respond, thus PLDT severed the lines.
After failure to negotiate terms, the Bureau filed a suit against defendant in the
CFI of Manila praying that PLDT be commanded to execute a contract with plaintiff for
the use of the latter’s telephone system under such terms as the court would deem just
and a preliminary injunction to prevent further severance or to restore those that had
already been severed.
The lower court ruled that it could not force PLDT to enter into a contract, nor is
the Bureau not allowed to service the general public with telephone connections. Thus,
this appeal
ISSUE: w/n the trunk lines of PLDT can be validly expropriated
HELD:
Yes. The court a quo has apparently overlooked that while the
Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in
the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone
company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that
of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the
payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.
Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation
of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears
why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the
owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT’s lines and services to allow interservice connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In either
case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under
section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national
welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there
is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the
general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary
of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the
condemnation would be for public use.
46. Barangay San Roque vs Heirs of Pastor
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls
within the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the
subject property.
Facts: Barangay San Roque in Talisay, Cebu filed before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1) a Complaint to expropriate a property of Heirs of
Francisco Pastor (Eugenio Sylianco, Teodoro Sylianco, Isabel Sylianco, Eugenia S.
Ong, Lawrence Sylianco, Lawson Sylianco, Lawina S. Notario, Leonardo Sylianco, Jr.
and Lawford Sylianco). In an Order dated 8 April 1997, the MTC dismissed the
Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[e]minent domain is an
exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of just
compensation. In an action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action
is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also involves real property
is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court." When the
complaint was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the RTC also dismissed the
Complaint on 29 March 1999, holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to
real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine
whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC; therefore concluding that
the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property
was less than P20,000. The Barangay's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
on 14 May 1999. The Barangay filed the petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)
has jurisdiction over expropriation cases.
Held: The primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or
any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private
property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the
necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the
subject of an expropriation suit is the government's exercise of eminent domain, a
matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. True, the value of the property to be
expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine
the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit.
Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of
the expropriation. Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that
"condemnation proceedings are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance," the
forerunners of the regional trial courts (RTC). The said case was decided during the
effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like Batas Pambansa 129 in respect to
RTCs, provided that courts of first instance had original jurisdiction over "all civil actions
in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation." The 1997
amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended to change these jurisprudential
precedents.
47. Mactan Cebu International Airport vs Lozada, Jr.
“airport NOT improved”
DOCTRINE: It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Government’s
power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a
particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner.
These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied
with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated. If this particular
purpose or intent is NOT initiated or NOT at all pursued, and is peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of
the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received.
In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for
lack of the required factual justification.
FACTS:
Subject of this case is a lot (Lot No. 88) located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner
was Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings,
initiated by Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA),
for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. During the pendency of
the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88
from Deiparine. The trial court ruled for the Republic and ordered the latter to pay
Lozada the fair market value of the lot. The CAA assured the previous owners that
should the expansion be abandoned, they will be prioritized in repurchasing the
lot. However, the projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport,
however, was not pursued. It was sold to the petitioner and have been used for
commercial purposes. The plaintiff-respondents initiated a complaint for the recovery of
possession and reconveyance of ownership the subject lot since the lot, which was
expropriated for the Lahug Airport’s improvement, was abandoned and have NOT been
sold to them . On the other hand, the petitioners asked for the immediate dismissal of
the complaint. They specifically denied that the Government had made assurances to
reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents in the event that the property would no longer be
needed for airport operations. Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of
condemnation was unconditional, and respondents were, therefore, not entitled to
recover the expropriated property notwithstanding non-use or abandonment thereof.
RTC RULING: ruled IN FAVOR of LOZADA CA RULING: affirmed RTC ruling
Petitioners’ argument in SC: argued that the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 was
absolute and unconditional, giving title in fee simple to the Republic.
ISSUE: WON Lozada has the right to repurchase their expropriated property.
HELD: YESSSSS
Petitioners anchor their claim to the controverted property on the supposition that the
Decision in the pertinent expropriation proceedings did not provide for the condition that
should the intended use of Lot No. 88 for the expansion of the Lahug Airport be aborted
or abandoned, the property would revert to respondents, being its former owners.
Petitioners cite, in support of this position, Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan, which
declared that the Government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land
as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties —
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally (since
they argue that the expropriation did not stipulate that it can be repurchased by
the Lozadas should the purpose of the expropriation be abandoned because
there was NO EXPRESS STIPULATION which is against the Statute of Frauds),
either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no
right in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a
different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to
the former owner.
The Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 should be read in its entirety, wherein it is
apparent that the acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated lots was subject to the
condition that the Lahug Airport would continue its operation. The condition not
having materialized because the airport had been abandoned, the former owner should
then be allowed to reacquire the expropriated property.
Fery was not decided pursuant to our now sacredly held constitutional right that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. It is well settled
that the taking of private property by the Government’s power of eminent domain is
subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and
(2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of
the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor
to keep the property expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If
not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private
owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same . Otherwise, the judgment of
expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the
proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose
for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be
denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owner’s right to
justice, fairness, and equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property,
consequent to the Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always
subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for
which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at
all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire,
may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just
compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain
has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
48. City Government of Quezon City vs Ericta
Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating the
Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or
Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of Quezon City and Providing Penalties for the
Violation thereof" provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park
cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be
determined by competent City Authorities, and where the area so designated shall
immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than 6 months
from the date of approval of the application. For several years, section 9 of the
Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but 7 years after the enactment of the
ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer,
Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in
Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space
intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be
enforced. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal (Branch XVIII at Quezon City), a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction (Special Proceeding Q-16002) seeking to annul
Section 9 of the Ordinance in question for being contrary to the Constitution, the
Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal, both the City
Government and Himlayang Pilipino agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the
pleadings. The CFI rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64
null and void. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government
and City Council filed the petition or review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for
charity burial grounds of deceased paupers is tantamount to taking of private property
without just compensation.
Held: There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the
total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and
the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private
cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of
Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the
center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to
the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in
such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide
its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public
cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past and it continues to the
present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The
questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of
subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public
facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public
safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are
intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome
environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the
subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.
49. Republic vs Castelvi
FACTS: This case involves two cases of a complaint for eminent domain – one against
Carmen Vda. de Castellvi, as the administratix of the estate of the late Alfonso de
Castellvi, and the other is against Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun.
Republic: the fair market value of the subject properties, according to the Committee on
Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P 2,000 per hectare, or a
total market value of P 259,669.10.
Castellvi: the subject land, being a residential land, had a fair market value of P15.00
per square meter, so it had a total market value of P 11,389,485.
: The Republic, through the Philippine Air Force (PAF), had been, despite repeated
demands, illegally occupying her property since July 1, 1956, thereby preventing her
from using and disposing of it, thus causing her damages by way of unrealized profit.
: This stemmed from the fact that there was a lease agreement between Castellvi and
the PAF on a yearly basis, which started on July 1, 1947. When the contract expires,
Castellvi did not renew the same because they want to sell the leased property.
Toledo-Gozun: the parcels of land owned by her were residential lands and the fair
market value of said lands was P 15.00 per square meter, so they had a total market
value of P 8,085,675
: the complaint be dismissed, or that she be paid the amount of P 8,085,675, plus
interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from October 13, 1959, and attorney’s fess
in the amount of P 50,000.
RTC: ordered that the Republic be placed in possession of the lands after it had
deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga the amount of P 259,669.10.
: authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay Toledo-Gozun the
sum of P 107,609 as provisional value of her lands
: authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay Castellvi the amount
of P 151,859.80 as provisional value of the land
: appointed three commissioners to determine the value of the subject
properties
Commissioners: Atty. Amadeo Yuzon, as commissioner for the court; Atty.
FelicisimoPamandanan for the plaintiff; and Atty. Leonardo Lansangan for the
defendants
: after having determined that the lands sought to be expropriated were residential
lands, they recommended unanimously that the lowest price that should be paid was P
10.00 per square meter, for both lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun. An additional P
5,000 be paid to Toledo-Gozun for improvements found on her land. Legal interest on
the compensation, computed from August 10, 1959, be paid after deducting the
amounts already paid to the owners, and that no consequential damages be awarded
RTC: the court finds that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of ten
pesos (P10.00) per square meter for the lots of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun is fair and
just
: the Republic will pay 6% interest per annum on the total value of the lands to ToledoGozun from the time that the provisional value has been deposited (August 10, 1959)
until full payment
: Republic will pay 6% interest per annum from July 1, 1956 when Republic commenced
its illegal possession of the Castellvi land until July 10, 1959 when the provisional value
thereof was actually deposited in court
ISSUE: (As alleged by the Republic) Whether or not the “taking” of the properties under
expropriation commenced with the filing of the action.
Republic: the “taking” should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a
special lease agreement between the Republic and Castellvi, the former was granted
the “right and privilege” to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease
and that in the event of such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should be
as of the time of occupancy; and that the permanent improvements amounting to more
than half a million pesos constructed during a period of twelve years on the land,
subject of expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of permanency and
stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of national security.
Castellvi: the “taking” of property under the power eminent domain requires two
essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private
property for more than a momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use
in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
: the two elements are lacking
RULING: YES. A number of circumstances must be present in the “taking” of property
for purposes of eminent domain.
1) The expropriator must enter a private property – this circumstance is present in the
instant case, when by virtue of a lease agreement the Republic, through PAF, took
possession of the property of Castellvi
2)
The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period –
the word “momentary” when applied to possession or occupancy of property should be
construed to mean “a limited period” – not indefinite or permanent. The entry on the
property, under the lease, is temporary and considered transitory considering that the
said contract is renewable from year to year. The fact that the Republic constructed
some installation of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the
land was transitory or intended to last a year.
3) The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority – this
circumstance is present in the instant case because Republic entered the Castellvi
property as lessee
4) The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected – this is likewise present in this case because the property was
used by the air force of the AFP
5)
The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property – this is wanting in this
case as Castellvi remained as owner and she was receiving the monthly rentals of the
property; hence, she was not deprived of the beneficial enjoyment of the property.
We hold, therefore, that the “taking’ of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as
of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same pursuant to the contract of
lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not be
determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did
not commit an error when it held that the “taking” of the property under expropriation
commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just compensation” is to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when
the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement
of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint
for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed
in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959.
The “taking” of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just
compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the
complaint for eminent domain was filed.
50. Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty
Facts:
Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Parañaque filed on September 20,
1993, a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty
Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000 square meters. The city previously
negotiated for the sale of the property but VM didn’t accept.
The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take
possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount
equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it
was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the
Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior
judgment or res judicata. Petitioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioner’s MFR was denied. The CA affirmed.
Issues:
1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and
effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of
action.
2. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable
when public interest is primarily involved.
Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the
purpose of initiating an expropriation case “substantially complies with the requirements
of the law” because the terms “ordinance” and “resolution” are synonymous for “the
purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its chief
executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power
of eminent domain.
To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides: “If the LGU
fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase,
the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian
authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.”
Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of
government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and
public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property
only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control and restraints,
imposed “through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
Sec 19, RA 7160
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminentdomain for public use, or purpose, or welfare
for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the
power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for
the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power
of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no
compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
We are not convinced by petitioner’s insistence that the terms “resolution” and
“ordinance” are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of
a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere
resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local
Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous
Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the
local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a
fundamental or private right of the people.[35] Accordingly, the manifest change in the
legislative language -- from “resolution” under BP 337 to “ordinance” under RA 7160 -demands a strict construction.
When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes,
appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law
should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a
resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the
clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative
rule issued for its implementation.
Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality
not eminent but “inferior” domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by the
delegation, and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain.
2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, all the requisites for the
application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on
the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and
cause of action, which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds
application in generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or
its agent to expropriate private property.
Eminent Domain can reach every form of property which the State might need for public
use whenever they need it.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to
exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case.
In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to
exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment
over the property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties.
The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate
the same property, once all legal requirements are complied with.
51. Hermano Oil Manufacturing and Sugar Corporation vs Toll Regulatory Board
TOPIC: Easement of right of way, due process, equal protection, eminent domain
FACTS:
The petitioner owned a parcel of land located at the right side of the Sta. Rita
Exit of the NLEX. The parcel of land was bounded by an access fence along the NLEX.
In its letter, the petitioner requested that respondent Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) grant
an easement of right of way, contending that it had been totally deprived of the
enjoyment and possession of its property by the access fence that had barred its entry
into and exit from the NLEX. However, the TRB denied the petitioner’s request.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner has the right to demand access to the North
Luzon Expressway (NLEX) by way of an easement of right of way.
2. Whether or not the limited access imposed on the petitioner’s property may be
considered as a compensable taking due to the exercise of the power
of eminentdomain.
HELD:
First issue: NO
The putting up of the access fence on the petitioner’s property was in the valid
exercise of police power, assailable only upon proof that such putting up unduly violated
constitutional limitations like due process and equal protection of the law. In Mirasol v.
Department of Public Works and Highways, the Court has further noted that:
A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest
access to certain destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close
regulation. Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll
ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable
that not all forms of transport could use it.
Clearly, therefore, the access fence was a reasonable restriction on the
petitioner’s property given the location thereof at the right side of Sta. Rita Exit of the
NLEX. Although some adjacent properties were accorded unrestricted access to
the expressway, there was a valid and reasonable classification for doing so because
their
owners
provided ancillary services
to
motorists
using
the
NLEX,
like gasoline service stations and food stores. A classification based on practical
convenience and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may lack
purely theoretical or scientific uniformity.
Second issue: NO
The limited access imposed on the petitioner’s property did not partake of a
compensable taking due to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. There is no
question that the property was not taken and devoted for public use. Instead, the
property was subjected to a certain restraint, i.e. the access fence, in order to secure
the general safety and welfare of the motorists using the NLEX. There being a clear and
valid exercise of police power, the petitioner was certainly not entitled to any just
compensation.
52. NAPOCOR vs San Pedro
Facts: Petitioner for the construction of its Transmission Line and Tower negotiated with
respondent for an easement of right of way over her property. respondent executed a
Right of Way Grant in favor of NPC. The payment voucher for the residential portion of
the lot valued was then processed. However, the NPC Board of Directors approved
Board Resolution stating that it would pay only for easement over agricultural lands,
adopt median or average if there are several amounts involved. NPC filed a complaint
for eminent domain in the RTC against Maria and other landowners. According to NPC,
in order to construct and maintain its Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line Project it
was necessary to acquire several lots for an easement of right of way. The RTC
rendered judgment, declaring as well-grounded, fair and reasonable the compensation
for the property. NPC appealed the amended decision to the CA, asserting that the
lower court gravely erred in fixing the just compensation for Respondents. the CA
rendered judgment dismissing the appeal, NPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which the CA denied, Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether the Right of way easement resulting to the deprivation of use of the
property is considered a taking.
Held: Yes, The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property
rights over the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls
within the ambit of the term “expropriation.” While it is true that petitioner only after a
right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their
proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that
below said transmission lines. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results
in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property;
but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a
burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right-of-way.”
53. Philippine Press Institute vs COMELEC
FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide
free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as “Comelec Space” which
shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the
area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the
candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their
platforms and programs of government. Philippine Press Institute, a non-stock, nonprofit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers asks the Court to declare
said resolution unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition
imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the
taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of Comelec alleged that the resolution
does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the
newspapers. It merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the
procurement of “Comelec space”. And if it is viewed as mandatory, the same would
nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State- a permissible
exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the
communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election
period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain?
HELD: No. The court held that the resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain. To compel print media companies to donate “Comelecspace” amounts to “taking” of private personal property for public use or purposes
without the requisite just compensation. The extent of the taking or deprivation is not
insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the
use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory “donation,” measured by
the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in
non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.
The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are the
necessity for the taking and the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of
necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been
suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates
to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to
buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let
alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain
either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship
between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by
Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution,
but not without payment of “just compensation” (Article III, Section 9). And apparently
the necessity of paying compensation for “Comelec space” is precisely what is sought to
be avoided by respondent Commission.
54. Napocor vs. Gutierrez
Facts: The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), a government owned and
controlled entity, in accordance with Commonwealth Act 120, is invested with the power
of eminent domain for the purpose of pursuing its objectives, which among others is the
construction, operation, and maintenance of electric transmission lines for distribution
throughout the Philippines. For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico- Limay
transmission lines, NAPOCOR's lines have to pass the lands belonging to Matias Cruz,
Heirs of Natalia Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit (covered
by tax declarations 907, 4281 and 7582, respectively). NAPOCOR initiated negotiations
for the acquisition of right of way easements over the aforementioned lots for the
construction of its transmission lines but unsuccessful in this regard, NAPOCOR was
constrained to file eminent domain proceedings against Gutierrez, et. al. on 20 January
1965. Upon filing of the corresponding complaint, NAPOCOR deposited the amount of
P973.00 with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga, tendered to cover the provisional
value of the land of the Malit and Gutierrez. And by virtue of which, NAPOCOR was
placed in possession of the property of the spouses so it could immediately proceed
with the construction of its Mexico-Limay 230 KV transmission line. In this connection,
by the trial court's order of 30 September 1965, the spouses were authorized to
withdraw the fixed provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00. Meanwhile, for
the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due Gutierrez, et. al., the
court appointed 3 commissioners, comprised of one representative of NAPOCOR, one
for the affected families and the other from the court, who then were empowered to
receive evidence, conduct ocular inspection of the premises, and thereafter, prepare
their appraisals as to the fair and just compensation to he paid to the owners of the lots.
Hearings were consequently held before said commissioners and during their hearings,
the case of the Heirs of Natalia Paule was amicably settled by virtue of a Right of Way
Grant executed by Guadalupe Sangalang for herself and in behalf of her co-heirs in
favor of NAPOCOR. The case against Matias Cruz was earlier decided by the court,
thereby leaving only the case against the spouses Malit and Gutierrez still to be
resolved. Accordingly, the commissioners submitted their individual reports. With the
reports submitted, the lower court rendered a decision, ordering NAPOCOR to pay Malit
and Gutierrez the sum of P10 per square meter as the fair and reasonable
compensation for the right-of-way easement of the affected area, which is 760 squares,
or a total sum of P7,600.00 and P800.00 as attorney's fees. Dissatisfied with the
decision, NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration which was favorably acted upon
by the lower court, and in an order dated 10 June 1973, it amended its previous
decision, reducing the amount awarded to to P5.00 per square meter as the fair and
reasonable market value of the 760 square meters belonging to the said spouses, in
light of the classification of the land to be partly commercial and partly agricultural. Still
not satisfied, an appeal was filed by the NAPOCOR with the Court of Appeals but
appellate court, on 9 March 1982, sustained the trial court. NAPOCOR filed the petition
for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the spouses are deprive of the property’s ordinary use and thus the
easement of right of way in favor of NAPOCOR constitutes taking.
Held: The acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power
of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of easement of rightof-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private
property condemned for public use. Herein, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a
taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the
installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by
NAPOCOR against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives spouses Malit
and Gutierrez of its ordinary use. For these reasons, the owner of the property
expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less,
whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said
property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason
of the expropriation. The price or value of the land and its character at the time it was
taken by the Government are the criteria for determining just compensation. The above
price refers to the market value of the land which may be the full market value thereof. It
appearing that the trial court did not act capriciously and arbitrarily in setting the price of
P5.00 per square meter of the affected property, the said award is proper and not
unreasonable.
55. Republic vs Fajardo
Facts: On 15 August 1950, during the incumbency of Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the
municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed Ordinance 7, series
of 1950, providing that "any person or persons who will construct or repair a building
should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal
Mayor," that "a fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit
and P1.00 for each repair permit issued," and that any violation of the provisions of the
ordinance shall make the violator liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than
P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the
discretion of the court; and that if said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or
occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the
building or house. 4 years later, after the term of Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and
his son-in-law, Pedro Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal
mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel
of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated
from the public plaza by a creek. On 16 January 1954, the request was denied, for the
reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the
public plaza. On 18 January 1954, Fajardo and Babilonia reiterated their request for a
building permit, but again the request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon,
Fajardo and Babilonia proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit,
because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been
destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. On 26
February 1954, Fajardo and Babilonia were charged before and convicted by the justice
of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of Ordinance 7. Fajardo and
Babilonia appealed to the Court of First Instance (CDI), which affirmed the conviction,
and sentenced both to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as well as to demolish the
building in question because it destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao. From this
decision, Fajardo and Babilonia appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter
forwarded the records to the Supreme Court because the appeal attacks the
constitutionality of the ordinance in question.
Issue: Whether the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit on the
ground that the proposed building would destroy the view of the public plaza is an
undue deprivation of the use of the property in question, and thus a taking without due
compensation.
Held: The refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to Fajardo and
Babilonia was predicated on the ground that the proposed building would "destroy the
view of the public plaza" by preventing its being seen from the public highway. Even
thus interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates — to
permanently deprive the latter of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps
the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of the property without just
compensation. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare
such as to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and
happiness of residents), and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to
the sight, the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest
owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to
preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the case now
stands, every structure that may be erected on Fajardo's land, regardless of its own
beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere
with the view of the public plaza from the highway. Fajardo would, in effect, be
constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it
is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality
must give Fajardo just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
56. US vs Causby
Facts: Causby owns 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. It
has on it a dwelling house, and also various outbuildings which were mainly used for
raising chickens. The end of the airport's northwest-southeast runway is 2,220 feet from
Causby's barn and 2,275 feet from their house. The path of glide to this runway passes
directly over the property-which is 100 feet wide and 1,200 feet long. The 30 to 1 safe
glide angle approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority passes over this property at 83
feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn and 18 feet above the
highest tree. The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease executed
in May 1942, for a term commencing 1 June 1942 and ending 30 June 1942, with a
provision for renewals until 30 June 1967, or 6 months after the end of the national
emergency, whichever is the earlier. Various aircraft of the United States, i.e. bombers,
transports and fighters, use this airport. Since the United States began operations in
May 1942, its four-motored heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier type, and its
fighter planes have frequently passed over Causby's land buildings in considerable
numbers and rather close together. They come close enough at times to appear barely
to miss the tops of the trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow the
old leaves off. The noise is startling. And at night the glare from the planes brightly lights
up the place. As a result of the noise, the Causbys had to give up their chicken
business. As many as 6 to 10 of their chickens were killed in one day by flying into the
walls from fright. The total chickens lost in that manner was about 150. Production also
fell off. The result was the destruction of the use of the property as a commercial
chicken farm. The Causbys are frequently deprived of their sleep and the family has
become nervous and frightened. Although there have been no airplane accidents on
their property, there have been several accidents near the airport and close to their
place. These are the essential facts found by the Court of Claims. On the basis of these
facts, it found that the property had depreciated in value. It held that the United States
had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the value of the
property destroyed and the easement taken was $2,000. The United States contends
that when flights are made within the navigable airspace (Air Commerce Act of 1926, as
amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938) without any physical invasion of the
property of the landowners, there has been no taking of property. It says that at most
there was merely incidental damage occurring as a consequence of authorized air
navigation.
Issue: Whether there was taking of the Causby’s property, even in the light that the
United States allegedly has complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air
space over the country.
Held: The United States conceded that if the flights over Causby's property rendered it
uninhabitable, there would be a taking compensable under the 5th Amendment. It is the
owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of the value of the property
taken. Market value fairly determined is the normal measure of the recovery. And that
value may reflect the use to which the land could readily be converted, as well as the
existing use. If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, Causby could not
use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete. It would be as complete as
if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive
possession of it. Herein, there was a taking. Though it would be only an easement of
flight which was taken, that easement, if permanent and not merely temporary, normally
would be the equivalent of a fee interest. It would be a definite exercise of complete
dominion and control over the surface of the land. The fact that the planes never
touched the surface would be as irrelevant as the absence in this day of the feudal
livery of seisin on the transfer of real estate. The owner's right to possess and exploit
the land-that is to say, his beneficial ownership of it-would be destroyed. It would not be
a case of incidental damages arising from a legalized nuisance such as was involved in
Richards v. Washington Terminal Co. (233 U.S. 546). In that case property owners
whose lands adjoined a railroad line were denied recovery for damages resulting from
the noise, vibrations, smoke and the like, incidental to the operations of the trains.
Herein, the line of flight is over the land, and the land is appropriated as directly and
completely as if it were used for the runways themselves. However, since the record in
the case is not clear whether the easement taken is a permanent or a temporary one, it
would be premature for the Court to consider whether the amount of the award made by
the Court of Claims was proper, and thus the Court remanded the cause to the Court of
Claims so that it may make the necessary findings in conformity with the Court's
opinion.
We agree that, in those circumstances (USAF planes taking off and landing near
property), there would be a taking. Though it would be only an easement of flight which
was taken, that easement, if permanent and not merely temporary, normally would be
the equivalent of a fee interest. It would be a definite exercise of complete dominion and
control over the surface of the land. The fact that the planes never touched the surface
would be as irrelevant as the absence in this day of the feudal livery of seisin on the
transfer of real estate. The owner's right to possess and exploit the land -- that is to say,
his beneficial ownership of it -- would be destroyed.
57. Lagcao vs Judge Labra
Facts:
The Province of Cebu donated several lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was
Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City. In 1965, petitioners purchased Lot 1029
on installment basis. But then, in late 1965, the lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the
Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the
City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific
performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance. CFI ruled in favor of
petitioners. After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to
discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus, petitioners instituted ejectment
proceedings against the squatters. The MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a
decision ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the
MTCC’s decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition. However, when
the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote
two letters to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that
the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the mayor’s
request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120
days. During the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City passed
a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.
Then, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772 which
included Lot 1029 among the identified sites for socialized housing. On July, 19, 2000,
Ordinance No. 1843 7 was enacted by the SP of Cebu City authorizing the mayor of
Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 which was
registered in the name of petitioners. The intended acquisition was to be used for the
benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale to the actual occupants thereof.
Petitioner’s Claim:
They argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation
of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the
concept of “public use” contemplated in the Constitution. 8 They allege that it will benefit
only a handful of people. The ordinance, according to petitioners, was obviously passed
for politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big source of votes.
Respondent’s Claim:
That the ordinance in question is valid under the claim that Local Government Units has
the delegated power of Eminent Domain and that the requirements was satisfied as
there is an ordinance authorizing the Executive to expropriate the land and that just
compensation was already deposited in favor of the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 1843 is a valid exercise of eminent domain under RA
7279?
Ruling:NO. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity
and that necessity must be of public character. Government may not capriciously or
arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case, there was
no showing at all why petitioners’ property was singled out for expropriation by the city
ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No.
1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners’ property as the site of a socialized
housing project. There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1)
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Thus, the exercise by local
government units of the power of eminent domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of
RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must comply with the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws. Strict limitations on the exercise of the power of
eminent domain by local government units, especially with respect to (1) the order of
priority in acquiring land for socialized housing and (2) the resort to expropriation
proceedings as a means to acquiring it. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for
purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings may be
resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with
these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of oftentimes
helpless owners of private property against what may be a tyrannical violation of due
process when their property is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use. The
Local Government Unit failed to follow section 9 and 10 of RA 7279.
58. City of Mandaluyong vs Francisco
Fact: On August 4, 1997, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168,
Pasig City a complaint for expropriation against the respondents. Petitioner sought to
expropriate three (3) adjoining parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,847 square
meters respondents constructed residential houses several decades ago which they
had since leased out to tenants until the present; on November 7, 1996, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of petitioner, upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an association of
tenants and occupants of the subject land, adopted Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996
authorizing Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the
expropriation of the subject lots and construction of a medium-rise condominium for
qualified occupants of the land
September 17, 1998, the trial court issued an order dismissing the Amended Complaint
after declaring respondents as “small property owners” whose land is exempt from
expropriation under Republic Act No. 7279. The court also found that the expropriation
was not for a public purpose for petitioner’s failure to present any evidence that the
intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are landless and homeless residents of
Mandaluyong.
Issue: whether the RESPONDENT who is a SMALL PROPERTY OWNERS is EXEMPT
FROM EXPROPRIATION.”
Held: Yes, R.A. No. 7279, the “Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992”
introduced a limitation on the size of the land sought to be expropriated for socialized
housing. The law expressly exempted “small property owners” from expropriation of
their land for urban land reform.
R.A. 7279. Section 3 (q) defined that: “Small-property owners” are defined by two
elements: (1) those owners of real property whose property consists of residential lands
with an area of not more than 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities and 800
square meters in other urban areas; and (2) that they do not own real property other
than the same.
59. Filstream International vs CA
FACTS:
Filstream International is the registered owner of parcels of land located in Antonio
Rivera St., Tondo II Manila. On January 7, 1993, it filed an ejectment suit against the
occupants (private respondents) of the said parcels of land on the grounds of
termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. The ejectment suit
became final and executory as no further action was taken beyond the CA.
During the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private respondents filed a complaint
for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against Filstream. The City of Manila came into the
picture when it approved Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo Lim to
initiate acquisition through legal means of certain parcels of land. Subsequently, the City
of Manila approved Ordinance No. 7855 declaring the expropriation of certain parcels of
land which formed part of the properties of Filstream. The said properties were sold and
distributed to qualified tenants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the
City of Manila. The City of Manila then filed a complaint for eminent domain seeking to
expropriate lands in Antonio Rivera St. The RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of
the City.
Filstream filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the writ of possession. The
motion to dismiss was premised on the following grounds: no valid cause of action; the
petition does not satisfy the requirements of public use and a mere clandestine
maneuver to circumvent the writ execution issued by the RTC of Manila in the ejectment
suit; violation of the constitutional guarantee against non-impairment of obligation and
contract; price offered was too low hence violative of the just compensation provision of
the constitution.
The RTC denied the two motions. Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA
which dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form and substance, aside from the
fact that copies of the pleadings attached to the petition are blurred and unreadable.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON City of Manila may exercise right of eminent domain despite the existence
of a final and executory judgment ordering private respondents to vacate the
lots.
YES. Petitioner Filstream anchors its claim by virtue of its ownership over the properties
and the existence of a final and executory judgment against private respondents
ordering the latter’s ejectment from the premises.
Private respondents’ claim on the other hand hinges on an alleged supervening event
which has rendered the enforcement of petitioner’s rights moot, that is, the expropriation
proceedings undertaken by the City of Manila over the disputed premises for the benefit
of herein private respondents. For its part, the City of Manila is merely exercising its
power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction by expropriating petitioner’s properties
for public use.
There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment in favor of
petitioner Filstream ordering the ejectment of private respondents from the properties
subject of this dispute. Thus, petitioner has every right to assert the execution of this
decision as it had already became final and executory.
However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila has an undeniable right to
exercise its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction. The right to expropriate
private property for public use is expressly granted to it under Sec 19 of the Local
Government Code. Sec 100 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila further
empowers the city government to expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban
land reform and housing program. The city’s right to exercise these prerogatives
notwithstanding the existence of a final and executory judgment over the property to be
expropriated had already been previously upheld by the court in the case of Philippine
Columbian Association vs Panis:
“The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to
acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to
bona-fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of
the city.
That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not
diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and
shelter for all who need them (Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987]).
Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to
vast tracts of land and landed estates. It is therefore of no moment that the land sought
to be expropriated in this case is less than the half a hectare only (Pulido v. Court of
Appeals, 122 SCRA 63 [1983]).
2. WON expropriation of Filstream’s lots were legally and validly undertaken.
NO. We take judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a paramount
task in view of the acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas particularly in Metro
Manila. Nevertheless, despite the existence of a serious dilemma, local government
units are not given an unbridled authority when exercising their power of eminent
domain in pursuit of solutions to these problems. Constitutional provisions on due
process and just compensation for the expropriation of private property must be
complied with. Other laws have also set down specific rules in the exercise of the power
of eminent domain, to wit:
• Sec 19 of LGC provides that such exercise must be pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws.
• Sec 9 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA) provides an order
of priority in the acquisition of land for socialized housing, with private lands listed as the
last option.
• Sec 10 of UDHA provides that expropriation shall be resorted to only when other
modes of acquisition such as community mortgage, land swapping, donation to the
government, etc. have been exhausted, and, where expropriation is resorted to, parcels
of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted.
Compliance with the above legislated conditions are deemed mandatory because these
are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to DUE
PROCESS when their property is expropriated for public use.
There is nothing in the records which would indicate that the City of Manila complied
with the above conditions. Filstream’s properties were expropriated and ordered
condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to
the acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile.
Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstream’s right to due process.
It must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power of
eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to
expropriate private property as long as it is for public use always takes precedence over
the interest of private property owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that
the individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection,
bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of
due process extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated.
60. JIL vs Municipality of Pasig
Fact: The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a
municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig.
The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square
meter property of Cuancos. On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig
approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation
proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor, filed a
expropriation of the property under R.A. No. 7160, deposited with the RTC 15% of the
market value of the property, filed motion to issued a writ of possession which was
granted by the RTC, constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three meters.
In their answer, the Cuancos claimed that, as early as February 1993, they had sold the
said property to JILCSFI. When apprised about the complaint, JILCSFI filed a motion for
leave to intervene as defendant-in-intervention, which motion the RTC granted on
August 26, 1994.10
In its answer, JILCSFI averred, that the Respondent ’s exercise of eminent domain was
only for a particular class. JILCSFI also averred that it has been denied the use and
enjoyment of its property because the road was constructed in the middle portion and
that the Respondent was not the real party-in-interest. The intervenor, likewise,
interposed counterclaims against the Respondent for moral damages and attorney’s
fees. On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an Order in favor of the Respondents.
Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the CA. the CA affirmed the order of the RTC
Issue: whether the respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19 of the
Local Government Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the
filing of the complaint;
Held: No, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a
written definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road.
The only evidence adduced by the respondent to prove its compliance with Section 19
of the Local Government Code is the photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the
signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.
Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the co-owners, the letter is not a valid and
definite offer to purchase a specific portion of the property for a price certain. It is merely
an invitation for only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to
discuss the project and the price that may be mutually acceptable to both parties.
61. Berman vs Park
SUMMARY
In Berman v. Parker, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the federal government's
eminent domain power under the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. The case involved
Washington, D.C. legislation to redevelop a blighted section of the city. A property
owner objected to the government's taking of a piece of property that was not blighted
and would be given to another private party as part of the redevelopment project.
The Court ruled that the government can transfer property from one private party to
another as part of a redevelopment plan that serves a public purpose (i.e., to promote
the general physical, aesthetic, sanitary, or economic quality of an area) under the Fifth
Amendment and the constitution only requires payment of just compensation to a
property owner.
BACKGROUND
In the 1940's and 50's, several areas of Washington, D.C. exhibited substantial urban
blight (i.e., buildings in serious disrepair, and a pervasive lack of utilities, sanitation, and
hygiene). The District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 empowered an agency
to acquire real property in D.C., by eminent domain and otherwise, and transfer that
property to a private development company, for “the redevelopment of blighted territory
in [D.C.] and the prevention, reduction, or elimination of blighting factors or causes of
blight” (id. at 29). With proper approval, the agency sought to implement a
redevelopment plan for an area of Southwest D.C. that included the plaintiffs' property,
a lot with a department store that was not blighted. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
agency from condemning their lot by eminent domain, claiming that the act violated the
Fifth Amendment's provisions that (1) “[n]o person shall be deprived of…property,
without due process of law” and (2) “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation” (id. at 31). A three-judge federal District Court panel
dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, but held that the agency could only acquire and
transfer property to clear and prevent slums, that is housing “injurious to the public
health, safety, morals and welfare” (id. at 31).
ISSUES
The Supreme Court considered whether the Fifth Amendment allows the government
to:
1. transfer property from one private party to another and change that property's use
from one private use to another and
2. condemn property that does not exhibit blight as part of a broad and comprehensive
plan to prevent, reduce, or eliminate blight from an area.
ANALYSIS
The Fifth Amendment's takings clause bars the government from taking private property
“for public use, without just compensation.” Here, the Court agreed with the District
Court panel's understanding of “public use” to include uses that serve a public purpose.
Such uses include traditional public facilities like streets, utilities, recreational facilities,
and schools (id. at 30), and those private uses that promote “public safety, public health,
morality, peace and quiet, [and] law and order” (id. at 32).
The Court found that the promotion of these ends falls within the traditional scope of the
state's police powers. In this case, Congress is the “state” because Congress governs
D.C. and has “all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs (at
31-32). Because the state can regulate private activities as an exercise of its police
powers, it can regulate the private uses of property within the state, even to the
point of condemning one private use and establishing another private use. The Court
noted that “the means of executing the [redevelopment] project are for [the state] and
[the state] alone to determine, once the public purpose has been established” (id. at
33).
The District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 authorized the agency charged
with acquiring land for redevelopment to do so (1) in accordance with a comprehensive
redevelopment plan created by the National Capital Planning Commission and (2) for
“the redevelopment of blighted territory in [D.C.] and the prevention, reduction, or
elimination of blighting factors or causes of blight” (id. at 29).
Here, the Court disagreed with the District Court panel's narrow reading of these
authorizations that restricted the agency to acquiring and redeveloping blighted areas
on a building-by-building basis. The Court rejected the argument that the standards set
for the agency were so indefinite as to be arbitrary. Rather, the Court deferred to
Congress's purpose to “redesign the whole area so as to eliminate the conditions that
cause slums” (id. at 34) and noted that “[i]f owner after owner were permitted to resist
these redevelopment programs on the ground that his particular property was not being
used against the public interest, integrated plans for redevelopment would suffer
greatly” (id. at 35).
The Court decided that “[o]nce the question of the public purpose has been decided, the
amount and character of land to be taken for the [redevelopment] project and the need
for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the
legislative branch (id. at 35-36). The Court concluded, noting that “[t]he rights of [the]
property owners are satisfied when they receive that just compensation which the Fifth
Amendment exacts as the price of the taking” (id. at 36).
HOLDINGS
The Court unanimously held that:
1. once the state determines that the post-redevelopment use of some private property
has a public purpose, it is free to employ reasonable means to see that the purpose is
promoted;
2. using reasonable means includes condemning and transferring property that is not
blighted when that property is within an area of planned redevelopment, taking full title
to condemned property, and transferring condemned property to a private
redevelopment company or companies; and
3. the constitutional rights of owners whose property is condemned are satisfied when
they receive just compensation as required by the Fifth Amendment.
62. Estate of Jimenez vs PEZA
Facts: On 15 May 1981, Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), then called as the
Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), initiated before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite expropriation proceedings on 3 parcels of irrigated riceland in Rosario, Cavite.
One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, with an
approximate area of 29,008 square meters, is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez
(TCT T-113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite). More than 10 years later, the said
trial court in an Order dated 11 July 1991 upheld the right of PEZA to expropriate,
among others, Lot 1406 (A and B). Reconsideration of the said order was sought by the
Estate of Salud Jimenez contending that said lot would only be transferred to a private
corporation, Philippine Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be utilized for a public purpose.
In an Order dated 25 October 1991, the trial court reconsidered the Order dated 11 July
1991 and released Lot 1406-A from expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406-B
was maintained. Finding the said order unacceptable, PEZA interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, the Estate and PEZA entered into a compromise
agreement, dated 4 January 1993. The compromise agreement provides "(1) That
plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal from the Order of the Honorable Court dated
October 25, 1991 which released lot 1406-A from the expropriation proceedings. On the
other hand, defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez agrees to waive, quitclaim and forfeit its
claim for damages and loss of income which it sustained by reason of the possession of
said lot by plaintiff from 1981 up to the present. (2) That the parties agree that
defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez shall transfer lot 1406-B with an area of 13,118
square meters which forms part of the lot registered under TCT No. 113498 of the
Registry of Deeds of Cavite to the name of the plaintiff and the same shall be swapped
and exchanged with lot 434 with an area of 14,167 square meters and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite which lot will
be transferred to the name of Estate of Salud Jimenez. (3) That the swap arrangement
recognizes the fact that the lot 1406-B covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the estate of
defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of the government based
on Order of the Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991. However, instead of being paid
the just compensation for said lot, the estate of said defendant shall be paid with lot 434
covered by TCT No. T-14772. (4) That the parties agree that they will abide by the
terms of the foregoing agreement in good faith and the Decision to be rendered based
on this Compromise Agreement is immediately final and executory." The Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for the approval of the said compromise
agreement entered into between the parties, consequent with the withdrawal of the
appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the Order dated 23 August 1993, the trial court
approved the compromise agreement. However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot
434 to the Estate inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the covering TCT T14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on 13 March 1997, the Estate filed a
"Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993." In the Order dated 4
August 1997, the trial court annulled the said compromise agreement entered into
between the parties and directed PEZA to peacefully turn over Lot 1406- A to the
Estate. Disagreeing with the said Order of the trial court, respondent PEZA moved for
its reconsideration, which was denied in an order dated 3 November 1997. On 4
December 1997, the trial court, at the instance of the Estate, corrected the Orders dated
4 August 1997 and 3 November 1997 by declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and not Lot
1406-A that should be surrendered and returned to the Estate. On 27 November 1997,
PEZA interposed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition
seeking to nullify the Orders dated 4 August 1997 and 3 November 1997 of the trial
court. Acting on the petition, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated 25 March 1998,
partially granted the petition by setting aside the order of the trial court regarding "the
peaceful turn over to the Estate of Salud Jimenez of Lot 1406- B" and instead ordered
the trial judge to "proceed with the hearing of the expropriation proceedings regarding
the determination of just compensation over Lot 1406-B." The Estate sought
reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 March 1998. However, the appellate court in a
Resolution dated 14 January 1999 denied the Estate's motion for reconsideration. The
Estate filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the purpose of the expropriation by PEZA is of “public use.”
Held: This is an expropriation case which involves two (2) orders: an expropriation
order and an order fixing just compensation. Once the first order becomes final and no
appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use cannot anymore
be questioned. Contrary to the Estate's contention, the incorporation of the expropriation
order in the compromise agreement did not subject said order to rescission but instead
constituted an admission by the Estate of PEZA's authority to expropriate the subject
parcel of land and the public purpose for which it was expropriated. This is evident from
paragraph three (3) of the compromise agreement which states that the "swap
arrangement recognizes the fact that Lot 1406-B covered by TCT T-113498 of the
estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of the
government based on the Order of the Honorable Court dated 11 July 1991." It is crystal
clear from the contents of the agreement that the parties limited the compromise
agreement to the matter of just compensation to the Estate. Said expropriation order is
not closely intertwined with the issue of payment such that failure to pay by PEZA will
also nullify the right of PEZA to expropriate. No statement to this effect was mentioned
in the agreement. The Order was mentioned in the agreement only to clarify what was
subject to payment. Since the compromise agreement was only about the mode of
payment by swapping of lots and not about the right and purpose to expropriate the
subject Lot 1406-B, only the originally agreed form of compensation that is by cash
payment, was rescinded. PEZA has the legal authority to expropriate the subject Lot
1406-B and that the same was for a valid public purpose. PEZA expropriated the
subject parcel of land pursuant to Proclamation 1980 dated 30 May 1980 issued by
former President Ferdinand Marcos. Meanwhile, the power of eminent domain of
respondent is contained in its original charter, Presidential Decree 66. Accordingly,
subject Lot 1406-B was expropriated "for the construction of terminal facilities,
structures and approaches thereto." The authority is broad enough to give PEZA
substantial leeway in deciding for what public use the expropriated property would be
utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority, PEZA leased a portion of the lot to commercial
banks while the rest was made a transportation terminal. Said public purposes were
even reaffirmed by Republic Act 7916, a law amending PEZA's original charter. As
reiterated in various case, the "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the power
of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.
The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal
import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the
broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. What ultimately emerged is a
concept of public use which is just as broad as "public welfare."
63. Manosca vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: Alejandro, Asuncion and Leonica Manosca inherited a piece of land located at P.
Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about 492 square
meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the National Historical Institute (NHI) to
have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed
Resolution 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree 260,
declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 6 January
1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS). Later, the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his
opinion 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative.
Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the office of the Solicitor-General,
instituted a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and
in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, the Republic filed an urgent motion for the
issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The
motion was opposed by the Manoscas. After a hearing, the trial court issued, on 3
August 1989, an order fixing the provisional market (P54,120.00) and assessed
(P16,236.00) values of the property and authorizing the Republic to take over the
property once the required sum would have been deposited with the Municipal
Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila. The Manoscas moved to dismiss the complaint on
the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and,
incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary
to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court
issued its denial of said motion to dismiss. The Manoscas moved for reconsideration
thereafter but were denied. The Manoscas then lodged a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On 15 January 1992, the appellate court
dismissed the petition/A motion for the reconsideration of the decision was denied by
the appellate court on 23 July 1992. The Manoscas filed a petition for review on
certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the setting up of the marker in commemoration of Felix Manalo, the
founder of the religious sect Iglesia ni Cristo, constitutes “public use.”
Held: Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency,
as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It
need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our
Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the
exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as "the highest and
most exact idea of property remaining in the government" that may be acquired for
some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State.
It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to
meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most
primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only direct constitutional
qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible
abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is
sought to be enforced. The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the
constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a
public exigency. The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for
traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public
use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that "public use" is
strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been discarded. The
purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of
the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his
founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The attempt to give some religious
perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is
the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the
exercise of the power. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a
peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature.
Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does
not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
64. Guido vs Rural Progress Administration
Social justice does not champion division of property or equality of economic status;
what it and the Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of political
rights, equality before the law, equality between values given and received on the basis
of efforts exerted in their production.
Facts: Justa Guido, owner of the land being expropriated by the Rural Progress
Administration (RPA), filed a petition for prohibition to prevent RPA and Judge Oscar
Castelo from proceeding with the expropriation. Guido alleged, among others, that the
land sought to be expropriated is commercial and therefore excluded within the purview
of the provisions of Act 539. Commonwealth Act No. 539 authorized the President of the
Philippines to acquire private lands or any interest therein through purchaser or farms
for resale at a reasonable price. The National Assembly approved this enactment on the
authority of section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution which provides that the Congress
may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots and conveyed at costs to individuals.
Issues: Whether the expropriation of Guido’s land is in conformity to the principle of
Social Justice
Held: NO. Hand in hand with the principle that no one shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law, herein invoked, and that "the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of
the state," is a declaration, with which the former should be reconciled, that "the
Philippines is a Republican state" created to secure to the Filipino people "the blessings
of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy."
Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its
necessary components freedom and along with these freedoms are included economic
freedom and freedom of enterprise within reasonable bounds and under proper control.
In paving the way for the breaking up of existing large estates, trust in perpetuity,
feudalism, and their concomitant evils, the Constitution did not propose to destroy or
undermine the property right or to advocate equal distribution of wealth or to authorize
of what is in excess of one's personal needs and the giving of it to another.
The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply
paramount basis for untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress
Administration or any other government instrumentality. Social justice does not
champion division of property or equality of economic status; what it and the
Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of political rights, equality
before the law, equality between values given and received on the basis of efforts
exerted in their production.
65. Heirs of JuanchoArdona vs Reyes
Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated
in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to acquire
by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within
and without the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2),
of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for the development into integrated
resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism
value, specifically for the construction of a sports complex (basketball courts, tennis
courts, volleyball courts, track and field, baseball and softball diamonds, and swimming
pools), clubhouse, gold course, children's playground and a nature area for picnics and
horseback riding for the use of the public. The Heirs of Juancho Ardona (Represented
by Gloria Ardona) Anastacio C. Cabilao, Heirs of Cipriano Cabilao (Represented by
Jose Cabilao) Modesta Cabilao, Heirs of Roman Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto
Cabuenas), Agripino Gabisay and Prudencia Mabini, Antonio Labrador and Lucia
Gabisay, Geronimo Mabini and Marcelina Sabal, Inocencio Mabini and Arsenia Reyes,
Patricio Mabini and Gregoria Borres, Aniceto Gadapan and Maxima Gabisay, Bartolome
Magno and Calineca E. Magno, Alberto Cabuenas, Narciso Cabuenas and Victoria
Cabuenas, Eutiquioseno, Heirs of Esperidion Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto
Cabuenas), Maximina Navaro, Sulpicio Navaro, Eduardo Navaro, Martiniano Roma (In
Representation of Arcadio Mabini, Deceased), Martin Seno, Fausto Arda, Maxima
Cabilao, Estrella Seno, Eduvegis S. Cabilao, Rosario Cabilao, Minors Danilo, Socorro,
Josefina and Marites, All Surnamed Cabilao, Juan Borres (Represented by Francisca
Borres), Ramon Jabadan, Jesus Alipar and Leonila Kabahar, Antonio Labrador, Heirs of
Nicasio Gabisay (Represented by Arsenio Gabisay), Pacifico Labrador, Demetrio
Labrador and Fructosa Tabura, Venancio Del Mar, Marino Del Mar, Heirs of Teodora
Arcillo (Represented by Brigida Arcillo) Dionisia Gabunada, Heirs of Buenaventura
Francisco (Represented by Felicidad Sadaya Francisco), Heirs of Victoria C. Cabuenas
(Represented by Alberto Cabuenas) Heirs of Cipriano Gabunada (Represented by
Claudio Gabunada) filed their oppositions, and had a common allegation in that the
taking is allegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution; alleging that
there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for
tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot be
paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting the
amount of compensation by legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since
the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not
the Court of First Instance (CFI), that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases.The
Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Cebu
City Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1533, the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA
to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of
possession. The Heirs of Ardona, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the expropriation of parcels of land for the purpose of constructing a
sports complex, including a golf course, by the Philippine Tourism Authority be
considered taking for “public use.”
Held: There are three provisions of the 1973 Constitution which directly provide for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain. Section 2, Article IV states that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Section 6, Article
XIV allows the State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and upon payment of
just compensation to transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private enterprises
to be operated by the government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the Batasang
Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the expropriation of
private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens.
While not directly mentioning the expropriation of private properties upon payment of
just compensation, the provisions on social justice and agrarian reforms which allow the
exercise of police power together with the power of eminent domain in the
implementation of constitutional objectives are even more far reaching insofar as taxing
of private property is concerned. The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate
for a nation which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns
and which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to
take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the
Philippines. The Philippines has never been a laissez faire State, and the necessities
which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce
public land or limited government resources. There can be no doubt that expropriation
for such traditional purposes as the construction of roads, bridges, ports, waterworks,
schools, electric and telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets
and slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office buildings, and flood control or
irrigation systems is valid. However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional
purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases
of "use by the public" has been discarded. The Philippine Tourism Authority has
stressed that the development of the 808 hectares includes plans that would give the
Heirs of Ardona, et. al. and other displaced persons productive employment, higher
incomes, decent housing, water and electric facilities, and better living standards. The
Court’s dismissal of the petition is, in part, predicated on those assurances. The right of
the PTA to proceed with the expropriation of the 282 hectares already identified as fit for
the establishment of a resort complex to promote tourism is, therefore, sustained.
66. Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: On 22 December 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Camarines Sur passed Resolution 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial
Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in
order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a
housing project for provincial government employees. Pursuant to the Resolution, the
Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R. Villafuerte, filed two
separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San
Joaquin with the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur (Hon. Benjamin V. Panga
presiding; Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89). Forthwith, the Province of
Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. The San
Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion. The San Joaquins moved to
dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their
property. In an order dated 6 December 1989, the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the
property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the
amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that San Joaquin
may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court
issued a writ of possession in an order dated 18 January 1990. The San Joaquins filed
a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both
motions were denied in the order dated 26 February 1990. The San Joaquins filed their
petition before the Court of Appeals, praying (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for
expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i) denying
the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26,
1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They
also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of
possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction. The Court of Appeals set aside
the order of the trial court, and ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation
proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the
property of the San Joaquins from agricultural to non-agricultural land. The Province of
Camarines Sur filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the establishment of the Pilot Development Center and the housing
project are deemed for “public use.”
Held: Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can
exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. In delegating the power to
expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the
exercise thereof by the local governments. While such delegated power may be a
limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise
of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the
power or in other legislations. It is the legislative branch of the local government unit
that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be
public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such
legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no
real or substantial relation to the public use. Statutes conferring the power of eminent
domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication.
Section 9 of BP 337 does not intimate in the least that local government units must first
secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from
agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation
proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local
government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The rules on
conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order 129A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian
Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to
which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the
Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove
conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such
authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners
or tenant beneficiaries. Further, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader
interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain
may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be
used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking
thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new
concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to
contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a
resort complex for tourists or housing project. The expropriation of the property
authorized by Resolution 129, Series of 1988, is for a public purpose. The
establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and
advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center
would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on
agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers,
fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the
public purpose requirement of the Constitution. Housing is a basic human need.
Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects
public health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare. Thus, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's
order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property of the
San Joaquins; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and
(c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify the property of the San Joaquins property from
agricultural to non-agricultural use.
67. Sumulong vs Guerrero
Facts: On 5 December 1977 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for
expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately 25 hectares, (in Antipolo Rizal)
including the lots of Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of
6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought to be
expropriated were valued by the NHA at P1.00 per square meter adopting the market
value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees
prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings. Together with the
complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited
the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the “total
market value” of the subject 25 hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree 1224
which defines “the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing
upon payment of just compensation.” On 17 January 1978, Judge Buenaventura
Guerrero issued the order issuing a writ of possession in favor of NHA. Sumulong and
Vidanes-Balaoing filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been
deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law. This was,
however, denied. They filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the taking of private property for “socialized housing,” which would
benefit a few and not all citizens, constitutes taking for “public use.”
Held: The exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain limitations
imposed by the constitution (1973), i.e. that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation” (Art. IV, sec. 9); and that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws” (Art. IV, sec. 1). The “public use” requirement for a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced
by changing conditions. The term “public use” has acquired a more comprehensive
coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the
public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.
Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing
is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public
use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The 1973 Constitution
made it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and ensure adequate social
services including housing [Art. II, sec. 7]. Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in
housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public
health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public character of
housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be
occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has
to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all who need it, all at once.
“Socialized housing” falls within the confines of “public use”. Provisions on economic
opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or slum clearance, relocation and
resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the public purpose of the project. Herein,
the use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets the requisites of
“public use”. The lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion
of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried
government employees. The Supreme Court holds that “socialized housing” defined in
Presidential Decree 1224, as amended by Presidential Decrees 1259 and 1313,
constitutes “public use” for purposes of expropriation. However, as previously held by
the Supreme Court, the provisions of such decrees on just compensation are
unconstitutional. Herein, the Court finds that the Orders issued pursuant to the corollary
provisions of those decrees authorizing immediate taking without notice and hearing are
violative of due process.
68. Mactan Cebu International Airport vs Lozada
“airport NOT improved”
DOCTRINE: It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Government’s
power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a
particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner.
These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied
with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated. If this particular
purpose or intent is NOT initiated or NOT at all pursued, and is peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of
the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received.
In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for
lack of the required factual justification.
FACTS:
Subject of this case is a lot (Lot No. 88) located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner
was AnastacioDeiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings,
initiated by Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA),
for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. During the pendency of
the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88
from Deiparine. The trial court ruled for the Republic and ordered the latter to pay
Lozada the fair market value of the lot. The CAA assured the previous owners that
should the expansion be abandoned, they will be prioritized in repurchasing the
lot. However, the projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport,
however, was not pursued. It was sold to the petitioner and have been used for
commercial purposes. The plaintiff-respondents initiated a complaint for the recovery of
possession and reconveyance of ownership the subject lot since the lot, which was
expropriated for the Lahug Airport’s improvement, was abandoned and have NOT been
sold to them . On the other hand, the petitioners asked for the immediate dismissal of
the complaint. They specifically denied that the Government had made assurances to
reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents in the event that the property would no longer be
needed for airport operations. Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of
condemnation was unconditional, and respondents were, therefore, not entitled to
recover the expropriated property notwithstanding non-use or abandonment thereof.
RTC RULING: ruled IN FAVOR of LOZADA CA RULING: affirmed RTC ruling
Petitioners’ argument in SC: argued that the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 was
absolute and unconditional, giving title in fee simple to the Republic.
ISSUE: WON Lozada has the right to repurchase their expropriated property.
HELD: YESSSSS
Petitioners anchor their claim to the controverted property on the supposition that the
Decision in the pertinent expropriation proceedings did not provide for the condition that
should the intended use of Lot No. 88 for the expansion of the Lahug Airport be aborted
or abandoned, the property would revert to respondents, being its former owners.
Petitioners cite, in support of this
position, Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan, which declared that the Government
acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the
character of its title over the properties —
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally (since
they argue that the expropriation did not stipulate that it can be repurchased by
the Lozadas should the purpose of the expropriation be abandoned because
there was NO EXPRESS STIPULATION which is against the Statute of Frauds),
either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no
right in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a
different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to
the former owner.
The Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 should be read in its entirety, wherein it is
apparent that the acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated lots was subject to the
condition that the Lahug Airport would continue its operation. The condition not
having materialized because the airport had been abandoned, the former owner should
then be allowed to reacquire the expropriated property.
Fery was not decided pursuant to our now sacredly held constitutional right that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. It is well settled
that the taking of private property by the Government’s power of eminent domain is
subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and
(2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of
the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor
to keep the property expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If
not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private
owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same . Otherwise, the judgment of
expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the
proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose
for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be
denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owner’s right to
justice, fairness, and equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property,
consequent to the Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always
subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for
which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at
all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire,
may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just
compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain
has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
69. Mactan Cebu International Airport vs Inocian
AnunciacionVda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu
International Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in his personal capacity and as
Attorney-in-Fact of OlympiaE. Esteves, et al. and Aletha SuicoMagat in her personal
capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Philip M. Suico, et al.G.R. Nos. 168770 & 168812,
February 9, 2011.
Facts: In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA’s predecessor agency,
pursued a program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of
negotiators, NAC met and negotiated with the owners of the properties situated around
the airport, which included Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942,
and 947 of the Banilad Estate. As the landowners would later claim, the government
negotiating team, as a sweetener, assured them that they could repurchase their
respective lands should the Lahug Airport expansion project do not push through or
once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport.
Some of the landowners accepted the assurance and executed deeds of sale with a
right of repurchase. Others, however, including the owners of the aforementioned lots,
refused to sell because the purchase price offered was viewed as way below market,
forcing the hand of the Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA), as successor agency of the NAC, to file a complaint for the
expropriation of Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947,
among others, docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881 entitled Republic v. Damian Ouano,
et al.
Issue: Whether or not the right of the former owners of lots acquired for the expansion
of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City to repurchase or secure reconveyance of their
respective properties.
Expropriation; abandonment of public purpose.
In this case, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and/or
its predecessoragency had not actually used the lots subject of the final decree
of expropriation in Civil Case No.R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by
the government,i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport.
In fact, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. Also, in this case, it was
preponderantly established by evidence that the National Airport Corporation,
MCIAA’spredecessor, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to
the affected landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in
the event they are no longer used for airport purposes.
The SC held that the government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of
land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties. This means that
in the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is expropriated is
abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter
of right, unless such recovery or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly deducible
from the condemnation judgment.
The SC held that the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 enjoined MCIAA, as a condition
of approving expropriation, to allow recovery or repurchase upon abandonment of the
Lahugairport project. In effect, the government merely held the properties condemned in
trust until the proposed public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was
actually consummated by the government. Since the government failed to perform the
obligation that is the basis of the transfer of the property, then the lot owners can
demand the reconveyance of their old properties after the payment of the condemnation
price.
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in
the petitionfor expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new
purpose. If not, then itbehooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private
owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it
expropriated in any manner it pleasesand, in the process, dishonor the judgment
of expropriation.