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Unworthy Democracy: The failure of
both Western ‘establishments’ and
‘anti-establishments’ on the Arab
Spring
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A few quotes on Syria’s ‘counter-contrarian continuity’
[Key: ‘Establishment’ quote |‘Anti-establishment’ quote]
‘In Syria, Obama said the idea that arming rebels would have made a
difference has “always been a fantasy… This idea that we could provide some
light arms or even more sophisticated arms to what was essentially an
opposition made up of former doctors, farmers, pharmacists and so forth...
that was never on the cards”’
US President Barack Obama 1
“The idea, which is very widespread that there was a
moment that, with a few more guns and ammunition,
that a moderate Syrian opposition could have taken
over in Syria in 2011 or '12 or ’13, is just unreal.”
Stop the War Coalition interview with Patrick
Cockburn 2
“The United States and our partners are not seeking so-called regime change…
What we have said is that we don't believe that Assad himself has the ability to
be able to lead the future Syria, but we didn't — we focused today not on our
differences about what can or can't be done immediately about Assad”
US Secretary of State, John Kerry 3
US, British, French, Saudi, Qatari and Turkish officials
could not resist the temptation to adapt the Libyan "regime
change" model to Syria, knowing full well all along that
this would unleash an even bloodier and more destructive
conflict. There seems to be no limit to the horror that our
leaders will inflict on the people of Syria to get rid of
President Assad.
STWC republished editorial 4
1
Obama, B., ‘Obama on the World: President Obama Talks to Thomas L. Friedman About Iraq, Putin and
Israel’, NY Times, 2014, <Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/opinion/president-obamath
thomas-l-friedman-iraq-and-world-affairs.html> [Accessed 28 August 2017]
2
Sinclair, I., ‘Inconvenient truth – the West's intervention in Syria is key reason for growth of ISIS’, Stop the
War Coalition, 2014, <Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/news-comment/1282-inconvenient-truth-theth
west-rsquo-s-intervention-in-syria-is-key-reason-for-growth-of-isis> [Accessed 28 August 2017]
3
Kerry, J., ‘John Kerry just made a key admission about the US's policy in Syria’’, Business Insider, Dec 2015,
<Available at: http://uk.businessinsider.com/john-kerry-regime-change-syria-bashar-assad-2015th
12?r=US&IR=T> [Accessed 28 August 2017]
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“I think it's important when Assad leaves, and he will leave, to try to preserve
stability in that country... The best way to preserve that kind of stability is to
maintain as much of the military and police as you can, along with security
forces, and hope that they will transition to a democratic form of government.
That's the key.”
US Defence Secretary, Leon Panneta 5
“We do not see a situation in which the rebels are able to remove him from
power… It will have to be a diplomatic process.”
US envoy to the International Coalition against ISIS, Brett McGurk, December
2014 6
But Obama is so intent on war that he will not even discuss
peace with the Syrian government. He has repeatedly
stated that there are “preconditions” for peace
negotiations, the most important one being the downfall of
the Syrian government, i.e., regime change. If a toppling of
a nation’s government is Obama’s precondition for peace,
then Obama is by definition choosing war. 7
“We continue to believe that further arms into Syria is not the answer.
Silencing the guns is the answer, and that is the trajectory that we are
working on”
White House Spokesperson, Victoria Nuland 8
“The problem is that, you know, you get, quote, enforcers in there and then
everybody ups the ante, right? Russia puts in more, Iran puts in more;
Hezbollah is there more and Nusra is more; and Saudi Arabia and Turkey put
all their surrogate money in, and you all are destroyed.”
US Secretary of State John Kerry 9
4
Davies, N., ‘How the west blocked peace plans and fueled the carnage in Syria’, Stop the War Coalition, April
2013, <Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news-comment/1766-how-the-west-blockedth
peace-plans-and-fueled-the-carnage-in-syria> [Accessed 28 August 2017]
5
Panetta, L., ‘U.S. defence chief - Syria military must remain intact when Assad goes’, Reuters, 2012, <Available
th
at: http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-syria-crisis-usa-idUKBRE86T1KF20120730> [Accessed on 24 August]
6
McGurk, B., ‘State Dept: Rebels Are Never Going to Defeat Assad Militarily’, Foreign Policy, 2014, <Available
at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/10/state-dept-rebels-are-never-going-to-defeat-assadth
militarily/>[Accessed on 24 August 2017]
7
Cooke, S., ‘How Barack Obama chose war over peace in Syria’, Stop the War Coalition/Counterpunch, April
2013, <Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news/1770-there-s-nothing-new-about-ciath
torture-it-predates-9-11-by-many-decades> [Accessed 28 August 2017]
8
Nuland, V., ‘Daily Press Briefing’, The White House, 2012 <Available at:
rd
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/02/183913.htm> [Accessed 23 August 2017]
9
Kerry, J., ‘Audio Reveals What John Kerry Told Syrians Behind Closed Doors’, NY Times, Sept 2016, <Available
at: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/30/world/middleeast/john-kerry-syria-audio.html>
th
[Accessed 28 August 2017]
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“The aim of the intervention so far has been to effect
regime change, again illegal under international law. The
solution in Syria cannot lie in further militarising the
conflict, or in intervention by Western powers.”
Letter to David Cameron by Jeremy Corbyn MP and
Lindsey German, Convenor of Stop the War Coalition 10
“There's a Russian impatience and a regime impatience with the terrorists
who are behaving like terrorists and laying siege to places on their side and
killing people…”
US Secretary of State, John Kerry, on the regime-Russian offensive on
Aleppo11
‘Bin Laden’s own al-Qaeda movement had morphed
into Iraq and then into Syria and is now, after at
least two name transfusions, the best known is alNusrah, fighting the Assad regime in Syria,
especially in the rubble of eastern Aleppo, where we
rightly weep for the civilians but respectfully call alNusrah the ‘rebels’’.
Editorial published by Stop the War Coalition during
the Siege of Aleppo 12
“The fact of the matter is the ability to identify a moderate middle in Syria —
there was no moderate middle, because the moderate middle are made up of
shopkeepers, not soldiers.”
US Vice President Joe Biden
The “moderate rebels” are a good deal like the Third
Force once dreamed of by the architects of the Vietnam
War, as an alternative to the French colonial government
and the communist Viet Minh… The sheer quantity of selfdeception that is required to support this fantasy ought to
be obvious; but the fantasy will tempt us until our leaders
break once and for all with the dreamers of the Third Force.
STWC-republished Editorial 13
10
Corbyn, J & German, L., ‘Letter to David Cameron: No UK intervention in Syria’, Stop the War Coalition, Sept
2015, <Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/middle-east--north-africa/462-spot-the-differenceth
between-bahrain-and-syria-at-the-royal-wedding> [Accessed 28 August 2017]
11
Kerry, J., 2015, op. cit.
12
Fisk, R., ‘The Invasion of Afghanistan 15 Years Ago Was an Arrogant, Wretched Adventure’, Stop the War
Coalition/The Independent, Sept 2015, <Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news/2211-whyth
has-the-us-invaded-occupied-or-bombed-14-muslim-countries-in-30-years> [Accessed 28 August 2017]
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‘At one point, Mr. Kerry astonished the Syrians at the table when he suggested
that they should participate in elections that include President Bashar alAssad, five years after President Obama demanded that he step down. “You
can have an election and let the people of Syria decide: Who do they want?” ’
Interview with US Secretary of State, John Kerry 14
‘For years the Foreign Office echoed Washington’s
dictat that “Assad must go” as a precondition for any peace
talks to bring to an end what was then still mainly a civil
war. Unsurprisingly, this only had the effect of prolonging
the conflict. It is also wrong in principle – the Syrian people
themselves should choose their government, without
having a pre-veto exercised by the big powers.’
Editorial by Andrew Murray, Chair of Stop the War
Coalition 15
“Syria today is not about choosing between two sides but rather about
choosing one among many sides… It is my belief that the side we choose must
be ready to promote their interests and ours when the balance shifts in their
favour. Today, they are not.”
Chairman of US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Martin Dempsey, 201316
‘James Harkin, the author of Hunting Season about
the kidnapping of foreigners in Syria and a frequent visitor
to opposition-held areas, says that it is important to grasp
that “none of these people [the armed opposition inside
Syria] like us” ’
Briefing to parliament by Patrick Cockburn
17
13
Bromwich, D. “Syria, the Times and the Mystery of the “Moderate Rebels””, Huffington Post, Oct 2016,
<Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-bromwich/syria-the-times-and-myste_b_8236164.html>
th
[Accessed 28 August 2017]
14
Kerry, J., 2016, op. cit.
15
Murray, A. “How to end Syria's agony as Britain joins in the bombing”, Stop the War Coalition, Feb 2016,
<Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news-comment/1808-ending-syria-s-agony> [Accessed
th
28 August 2017]
16
Dempsey, M., ‘Dempsey: Syrian rebels not ready to back U.S. interests’, CBS News, 2013, <Available at:
th
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/dempsey-syrian-rebels-not-ready-to-back-us-interests/> [Accessed 24
August 2017]
17
Murray, A. “How to end Syria's agony as Britain joins in the bombing”, Stop the War Coalition, Feb 2016,
<Available at: http://stopwar.org.uk/images/documents/31.08.13_Leaflet_Syria_National_Demo.pdf>
th
[Accessed 28 August 2017]
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University of Sussex
School of Global Studies | Human rights
Dissertation
Unworthy Democracy: The
failure of both Western
‘establishments’ and ‘antiestablishments’ on the Arab
Spring
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Contents
1. Introduction
2. Establishment response to Arab Spring
2.1 Overview
2.2 Examining the record
3. Anti-establishment response
3.1 Overview
3.2 Case Study: ISIS, Syria and Iraq
i. The alternative narratives explaining the rise of
ISIS
ii. Influence in the new opposition movements
4. Conclusion
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1. Introduction
This paper adapts its title from the concept of 'Worthy and Unworthy victims',
introduced by Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman in 1988 18, and seeks to
interrogate how the initial euphoria of the forgotten Arab Spring was substituted
with a narrow 'War on Terror' focus which neglected the counter-revolutions
launched by authoritarian regimes in the region. Here, the rise of ISIS in
particular was used to argue for the return to authoritarian, dictatorial stability
which undermined the type of human rights revolted for in 2011. However, the
choice was not a two-fold one between religious extremism and authoritarian
'stability'. There was a third force (indeed, which preceded the nihilism of ISIS)
which continued to offer an alternative to both these forces as part of the 2011
revolutions.
This however would be negated - not only by Western governments, but also
indeed by the Western 'anti-establishments'. This encompassed for instance
Western left-wing and anti-war groups, which failed to offer a solidarity to the
Arab Spring uprisings because of a narrow, Western-centric focus (which
portrayed the Arab Spring on many occasions, as in Syria, as a Western-plotted
'destabilising' conspiracy which led to the rise of ISIS - thus negating both the
existence of moderate alternatives and the agency of those who demanded it) .
Here, Western governments would be often condemned not for the reality of
abandoning the Arab Spring in exchange for a renewed War on Terror (which
relied on a return to collaboration with authoritarian governments) - but for the
opposite: that it was a misguided attempt to 'impose' democracy on the region
that led to the current wars and instability. Accordingly, a false analogy of the
uprisings as 'another example of Iraq-style "regime-change" would be often
deployed 19. Such notions have not however only been relegated to the
18
Herman, E., & Chomsky, N., “Worthy and Unworthy Victims” in Manufacturing Consent: The Political
Economy of the Mass Media, New York: Pantheon, 1988, pp. 37-87
19
STWC Press. “The wishful thinking war: a briefing on Syria to MPs before they vote”, Stop the War Coalition,
Feb 2016, <Available at:
th
http://stopwar.org.uk/images/documents/31.08.13_Leaflet_Syria_National_Demo.pdf > [Accessed 28 August
2017]
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'alternative' fringe of politics - but since the rise of populist alternative figures
(Jeremy Corbyn for instance in the UK and Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump in
the US), such positions have come to infiltrate mainstream opposition politics as
a whole. Such figures (for instance all of Sanders, Trump and Corbyn) would
condemn examples of Arab Spring 'regime-change' as 'interfering' Western
destabilisations - as for instance in Syria, the only sustained ‘original’ Arab Spring
protest where the ruler did not resign 20.
Thus ironically, a misunderstanding of the actual nature of Western policy vis a
vis the Arab Spring (i.e. whereby nominal diplomatic/rhetorical support for the
uprisings was taken as proof of another example of Iraq-style 'regime-change')
and the adoption of (what was falsely perceived as) an 'opposite' (anti-Arab
Spring) position by many within the 'anti-establishment' (both right and left)
meant an ironic continuity between largely-camouflaged support for the reestablishment of authoritarian ‘stability’ by the establishments, and demands for
(what amounted to) precisely that by their opponents (who falsely believed their
establishments' policies to be one of promoting neoconservative-inspired 'regimechange’ destabilisation –what was famously termed ‘Creative Chaos’ by some
members of the George W Bush administration). The result was a failed solidarity
amongst the political segments of the Western opposition which had previously
been preferred (as during the Iraq War). In congruence with the failure of
Western political establishments to support democratic transition in the Middle
East, this could be termed a form of ‘counter-contrarian continuity’.
2. Establishment response to Arab Spring
STWC Press. “Syria: Safe Havens and No-Fly Zones”, Stop the War Coalition, Oct 2015, <Available at:
http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news-comment/58-stop-the-war-coalition-briefing-safe-havens-andth
no-fly-zones> [Accessed 28 August 2017]
AP Press. “The silent military coup that took over Washington”, The Guardian, Sept 2013, <Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/silent-military-coup-took-over-washington>
th
[Accessed 28 August 2017]
20
Hogg, B. “These documents show US to blame for destabilising Syria”, The Canary, Feb 2016, <Available at:
th
https://www.thecanary.co/2016/02/17/documents-show-us-blame-destabilising-syria/> [Accessed 28 August
2017]
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2.1 | Overview
Prior to the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, the Middle East had long been
described as an exceptionally democracy-resistant region in the world. Popular
narratives in the West often placed this lack of democracy to a culturalist reading,
namely the ‘exceptional’ hold of Islam in the Muslim world, by contrast to the
concurrent trend of religious marginalisation (especially in public affairs) in other
regions of the world.
Noted proponents of this school of thought included the likes of Bernard Lewis,
Samuel Huntington, Daniel Pipes, Michael Curtis and Elie Kedourie 21. This
school of thought was based in a belief that Islam’s intrinsically political (and
subsequently, authoritarian or totalitarian) nature made it incompatabile with
constitutional democracy. Thus Bernard Lewis argued that the lack of democracy
was in part because “secularity of the state… [was] profoundly alien to the
Muslim political tradition” 22 - and accordingly the political history of Islam was
“one of almost unrivalled autocracy… to which the subject owed complete and
unwavering obedience as a religious duty imposed by the Holy Law” 23. Islam
could only accommodate a theocratic state which entailed “a polity ruled by God…
the law was God’s law” 24. As a result, Islam was a source of a “passive nature of
the population in Oriental societies” 25.
Similarly, despite Francis Fukiyama’s renowned thesis on the “End of History” 26
and the victory (and inevitable spread) of ‘liberal democracy’ after the collapse of
the Cold War, he nevertheless noted that Muslim societies were “particularly
21
See Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy." Atlantic Monthly 271 (2), 1993, pp 89-98; Huntington S., The Clash
of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996; Pipes, D., In the Path of
God Islam and Political Power, 2nd ed., New York: Transaction Publishers, 2002; Curtis, M., Orientalism and
Islam: European Thinkers on Oriental Despotism in the Middle East and India, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009; Kedourie,E., Politics in the Middle East, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1992(a);
Kedourie, E., Democracy and Arab Political Culture, Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
1992(b)
22
Kedourie, E., 1992(b), p5
23
Lewis, B.,“Communism and Islam” in Laqueur, W. (ed.), The Middle East in Transition, New York: Praeger,
1958, pp. 318–319
24
Lewis, 1993, p96
25
Curtis, M., 2009, p305
26
Fukuyama, F., The end of history and the last man. New York: Free Press, 1992
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resistant to modernity” 27. Arguing that “moderity has a cultural basis”,
Fukuyama thus cited an ‘Islamic culture’ as a main reason for the lack of
democracy in the Muslim world – by contrast to the modernity of liberal
democracy which “emerged first in the Christian West… since the universalism of
democratic rights can be seen as a secular form of Christian universalism”
[Emphasis added] 28. Meanwhile, in his seminal ‘Clash of Civilisations’ Samuel
Huntington cited Islam as the major “basis for future conflict with the West” 29 further arguing that the “Underlying problem for the West is not Islamic
fundamentalism… [but] Islam itself” 30. Such readings would strongly influence
the War on Terror undertaken by the administration of George W Bush 31.
According to these readings, the Middle East was ‘culturally exceptional’ in its
non-democratic nature and a historical and sustained ‘Oriental despotism’ 32.
However, the nature of this exceptionalism was disputed by many others 33.
Notably, Eva Bellin argued that the Middle East was indeed exceptional – but due
to the lack of pressure on Middle Eastern regimes to democratically-reform due
to the greater economic rents from natural resources as well as Western military
aid for ‘fighting Islamist terror’ – rents of a scale unavailable in other ‘thirdworld’ regions 34. Similarly, in his “Political backwardness in historical
perspective”, Ian Lustick argued that the general political ‘backwardness' of the
Middle East could be attributed to a historical repetition of external intervention
during the process of Middle Eastern modern state-building – an interference
absent from the same state-building processes which occurred in Western
27
Fukuyama, F., "The West Has Won", The Guardian, October 11 2001, <Available at:
th
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/11/afghanistan.terrorism30> [Accessed 25 August 2017]
28
Ibid.
29
Huntington, S., "The Clash of Civilizations", Foreign Affairs 72 (3):25, 1993, p23
30
Huntington S., 1996, p217
31
Dunn, M., “The Clash of Civilisations and the War on Terror”, 49th Parallel 20, 2006, pp 1-20
32
See Wittfogel, K.A., “A State Stronger than Society” in Oriental despotism; a comparative study of total
power, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957, pp 49-101; Kedourie,E., 1992(a), pp 12-21; Kedourie, E.,
1992(b), pp 7-11; Curtis, M., 2009
33
See Bromley, S., “Middle East Exceptionalism: Myth or Reality?” in Democratization, eds. Potter, D. et al,
Cambridge: The Open University Press, 2000, pp 321-343; Lustick, I., "The absence of Middle Eastern great
powers: political “backwardness” in historical perspective", International Organization 51.4, 1997, pp 653-683;
Bellin, E., ‘The Robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in comparative perspective’,
Comparative Politics, Vol.36, No.2, 2004, pp. 139-157
34
Bellin, E., op. cit.
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states 35. Thus, according to these readings, there was nothing ‘inevitable’ or
‘culturally intrinsic’ about the lack of democracy in the Middle East; rather,
structural and socio-economic conditions were what explained the phenomenon
more accurately. With the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, this latter
viewpoint seemed largely vindicated.
Edward Said famously argued that these conceptions were part of a wider
framework of “Orientalism”, which he defined as:
…a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over
the Orient… Orientalism, therefore, is not an airy European fantasy about
the Orient, but a created body of theory and practice in which, for many
generations, there has been a considerable material investment. 36
Thus according to Said, arguments by Western governments chiding the Muslim
world’s lack of democracy was part of an ideological framework necessary to
justify intervention (generally justified in terms of a ‘civilising’ mission) by the
Western ‘Free World’ in its affairs 37. The proof of this would be seen in the record
of Western governments when dealing with authoritarian governments in the
Middle East. The historical support for regional dictatorships – including during
the neoconservative-inspired years of the ‘democracy-promotion’ agenda of the
George W Bush Administration –posed the question as to what extent criticisms
of the Middle East’s lack of democracy was genuine, or instead constituted a
method of establishing Western ‘civilisational’ supremacy in a wider ‘clash of
civilisations’ which was confined not to the pages of academic literature, but
thoroughly informed government policies 38. The breakout of the Arab Spring in
2011 was to pose the ultimate test.
35
Lustick, I., 1997, pp 653-683
Said, E., Orientalism: Western representations of the Orient, New York: Pantheon, 1978, pp.3, 6
37
rd
Milton-Edwards, B., Contemporary Politics in the Middle East, London: Polity, 3 Edition, 2000, pp. 9-10
38
See Carothers, T, “Promoting democracy and fighting terror”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1, 2003, pp. 84-97;
Yom, S., “The Dillemas of American Democracy Promotion in the Arab World”, Yale J. Int'l Aff. 3, 2008, pp. 131,
133, 135-142; Stein, K, “The Bush Doctrine: Selective Engagement in the Middle East”, Middle East 6.2, 2002,
p.55
36
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2.2 | Examining the record of Western governments on the Arab
Spring
After the breakout of the Arab Spring, many Western officials would declare that
they had been mistaken in previously supporting dictatorships in the name of
stability and security (these included notable names such as later-US Secretary of
State, John Kerry, and UK Prime Minister David Cameron) 39.
For the purposes of this paper, we will look at the seven main Arab Spring
domains which may qualify – in a nominal sense – as a ‘revolution’ – qualified
for instance by a widespread popular demand for the resignation of the ruler or
head of government. These are Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Iraq and
Bahrain (Bahrain qualifies as ‘borderline’ in terms of whether it constituted a
revolution or a major pro-reform uprising, as the demands of the protesters
fluctuated between ‘reform of the regime’ and the resignation of the Prime
Minister – the longest-serving in the world – but not the King, and occasionally
also demanding ‘the regime’s downfall’ 40; nonetheless, it will be included). These
domains will be categorised as ‘Arab Spring revolutions’, to contrast them with
other examples of Arab Spring protests which not demand regime overthrow but
rather reform (such protests took place in a wide range of countries, from Jordan
to Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, Morocco and Algeria). Here, we look at the
reactions of the US, UK, France and the EU – i.e. the three Western permanent
members of the UN Security Council in addition to the EU. Whilst some
diplomatic divergences existed in the positions of these parties in certain Arab
Spring contexts (especially the European powers versus the United States –
39
Kurkip, J., "Middle East: David Cameron says West was wrong to back dictators", The Telegraph, October 11
2001, <Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/8341211/Middle-East-DavidCameron-says-West-was-wrong-to-back-dictators.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Kerry, J., "Allying Ourselves With the Next Egypt", The New York Time, Jan 13 2001, <Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/opinion/01kerry.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
40
AJE & Agencies., "Thousands protest in Bahrain", Al Jazeera English March 2011, <Available at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/20113685530525305.html> [Accessed 24th August
2017]
Guardian Editor., "Bahrain mourners call for end to monarchy", The Guardian, Feb2011, <Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/18/bahrain-mourners-call-downnfall-monarchy> [Accessed
24th August 2017]
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notably on the question of Syria, where the UK and France were much more
willing to militarily intervene yet were prevented by the United States), in terms
of actuated (practical) policy, no unilateral undertaking took place without an
agreement of all the parties (notably the United States).
Here, we can categorise the type of reaction by Western powers to the Arab
Spring in three:
1. Nominal Support for leadership’s resignation
This took place in Egypt, Syria and Yemen. This encompassed a strong and
consistent public (for instance, diplomatic or rhetorical) alignment with
the protests.
2. Practical Support for leadership’s overthrow
This took place only in Libya. This comprised active support for the
overthrow of intransigent leaderships by military force.
3. Nominal Support for protests without publicly calling for
leadership change
This took place in Tunisia, Bahrain and Iraq. This generally entailed
expressing support for political reforms. The nature of such postures
however could be split in terms of type and scale: for instance, the US did
not publicly align itself with (or express diplomatic support for) the Iraqi
Spring protests against Nouri al-Maliki, or publicly call for his removal.
Nonetheless, it did privately encourage the resignation of Al-Maliki, an
event which ultimately took place 41. Similarly, the scale of alignment by
Western governments with the protests (and/or scale and intensity of
criticisms of the regimes) differed. Thus whilst major Western
governments largely sought to align with the symbolic and explosive
Tunisian uprising (even if not supporting the resignation of Ben Ali),
41
Al Jazeera Services., "Obama ups pressure on Maliki, says future of Iraq ‘hangs in balance’", Al Jazeera
America, June 2014, <Available at: http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/19/obama-iraq-maliki.html>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
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expressions of public alignment with the Bahraini uprising were far more
limited (and in the Iraqi case, almost non-existent).
However, it should be noted that even in the cases of support for the overthrow of
existing leaderships (i.e. ‘1’ and ‘2’ above), this should not be confused with
alignment with the revolutions demands for ‘the downfall of the regimes’ (i.e. not
merely government or president – such demands were distinguishable in the
political programmes of the Arab Spring revolutionaries, and were separately
made) or so-called ‘regime-change’, as occurred in Iraq. Indeed, as will be seen,
the policy towards the Arab Spring domains arguably exclusively comprised
support for ‘Orderly Transition’ – a policy attempting to gain as much
continuity from underlying and still-intact ancien régime structures (or as they
have also been described, deep states
42)
as possible – often centred around
‘unbroken’ institutions such as the military 43. Here, there will be a noted trend of
supporting ‘new-old’ strongmen: figures from the previous (generally military or
security) establishment who would return to power in the post-revolution state;
these included Egypt’s Abdel Fatah al-Sisi (Director of Military Intelligence under
Hosni Mubarak), Tunisia’s Beji Caid Essebsi (Speaker of the Tunisian Parliament
under Zaid al-Abedine Ben Ali) and Libya’s Khalifa Haftar (previously Libya’s
military Chief-of-Staff under Qadaffi and member of Qadaffi’s 1969 military
coup 44).
Tunisia qualifies as the most ‘straight-forward’ example of the Arab Spring. Here,
the United States administration of Barack Obama sided nominally with the
protests, though not joining them in calling for the resignation of long-time
strongman Zaid al-Abedine Ben Ali – a close US and European ally. The EU, UK
42
See: Filiu, J.. From deep state to Islamic state: The Arab counter-revolution and its jihadi legacy, Oxford
University Press, 2015; Tharoor, I., ‘What an actual ‘Deep State’ looks like’, Washington Post, 2017, <Available
at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/07/what-an-actual-deep-state-looksth
like/?utm_term=.048d3fe6ce70> [Accessed 28 August 2017]
43
Matta, N, "What Happened to the Arab Spring?’", Jacobin Magazine, Dec 2015, <Available at:
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/12/achchar-arab-spring-tunisia-egypt-isis-isil-assad-syria-revolution/>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
44
Madi, M, "Profile: Libya's renegade General Khalifa Haftar", BBC News, Dec 2014, <Available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20140828031913/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-27492354>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
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and France similarly expressed support for the ‘democratic aspirations’ of the
protesters, without calling for the resignation of Ben Ali. Such equivocal
statements often encompassed a demand for ‘dialogue’ and for “all parties” to
“show restraint” and “avoid violence” 45.
Egypt, Yemen and Syria serve as the three most poignant examples of the nuance
in Western policy, being the most consequential ‘frontline’ countries lying on the
geopolitical fault-lines of the War on Terror, and with the strongest (and most
politically-embedded) militaries. In both Egypt and Syria, the military institution
dominated political society and owned large sectors of the economy 46. The
Egyptian, Syrian and to a lesser extent Yemeni militaries represented the
dominant unit of the ‘deep-state’ nexus (alongside crony-capitalist business
interests and state-security complexes) 47. By contrast, such a recognisable,
professional politically-integrated military institution did not exist in the
patrimonial regime of Qadaffi in Libya, whilst in Tunisia state-security
institutions (paramilitary and police) had been far more politically integrated by
the Ben Ali regime than the military – meaning that the Tunisian military had the
least vested interest from all the other regimes in maintaining what had been
largely a police state, not a military one (by contrast to Syria especially, and to a
lesser extent Egypt) 48. Ultimately the fact that the Tunisian military was
nonetheless more powerful than the state-security apparatuses combined with its
relative detachment from the survival of an existent leadership which had
marginalised its role (by contrast to Egypt, and to a greater extent Syria) meant
that the Tunisian uprising was the shortest and the least costly in number of
protesters (excepting Bahrain) killed.
45
BBC News Editor, "In quotes: Reaction to Tunisian crisis", BBC News, Jan 2011, <Available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12197681> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
46
See: Petran, T., Syria, London: Ernest Benn Ltd.,, 1972, p. 235; Marshall, S., “The Egyptian Armed Forces and
the Remaking of an Economic Empire”, Carnegie Middle East Center, April 2015;
47
It is in Egypt where the military was the most cohesive, due to the largely homogenous nature of the society
from which its ranks were conscripted – by contrast to the sectarian divisions in Syria (which led to the splitting
of the Syrian Army, though this splitting did not dismantle the army as it was structured by the regime to rely
on an Alawite corps, due to fears of Sunni soldiers siding with any uprising dominated by the Sunni majority)
and tribal ones in Yemen (whereby sections of the military linked to tribes which sided with the uprising
against Ali Abdullah Saleh abandoned him, though again most of the military remained loyal).
48
See Brooks, R., “Abandoned at the Palace: Why the Tunisian Military Defected from the Ben Ali Regime in
January 2011”, Journal of Strategic Studies Volume 36 Issue 2, 2012, pp. 205-220
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This section will give a case-by-case overview of the reactions of Western
governments to the Arab Spring in each of the stated domains. The cases of Syria
and Iraq will be discussed together as part of the case study in the following
section.
Egypt
In the case of Egypt and Yemen, Western governments (US, UK, EU and France)
supported a ‘political solution’ which served as a compromise to the crisis. In
Egypt, this political solution entailed President Hosni Mubarak passing power to
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the higher command of the
military. This was reportedly a decision encouraged by the United States, which
pressured the military to sacrifice Mubarak 49. The United States described this
policy as one of ‘Orderly Transition’ 50. Despite promising to give up power to an
elected civilian within six months, the military would prolong its stay in power to
18 months (initially proposing three years, according to a communique which was
subsequently revoked after popular protests) 51. The rule of SCAF was rife with
human rights abuses, including infamous ‘virginity tests’ of female detainees by
the military – justified at the time by then SCAF member and later President
Abdel-Fatah al-Sisi 52. SCAF initially refused to put Mubarak on trial, until forced
to under the pressure of popular protests. Similarly, a plethora of basic demands
of the revolution would go unheeded unless subjected to considerable popular
49
Cooper, H & Landler, M., "White House and Egypt Discuss Plan for Mubarak’s Exit", New York Times, Feb
2011, <Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/04/world/middleeast/04diplomacy.html?pagewanted=all> [Accessed 24th
August 2017]
50
Cohen, T., "U.S. navigates carefully between supporting Mubarak, democratic ideals", CNN Politics, Feb
2011, <Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/01/31/us.egypt.response/index.html> [Accessed
24th August 2017]
51
Shenker, J., "Egypt's ruling generals accused of buying time to stay in power", The Guardian, Oct 2011,
<Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/06/egypt-military-accused-buying-time>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
52
Wilson, G., "From virginity test to power", The Guardian, Feb 2012, <Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2012/sep/03/virginity-test-to-power> [Accessed 24th August
2017]
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mobilisation 53. During the rule of SCAF, more than 300 protesters were
estimated killed and more than 12,000 arrested and trialed in military courts (a
53
For instance, trials of officers complicit in the killing of more than 800 protesters would eventually occur only
after popular protests. However, these trials would be slow, elongated and repeatedly postponed, with the
prosecution consistently refusing to put forward substantive evidence, and eventually resulted in an acquittal
of all officers being charged. Up to date, there has been only three convictions for the killing of protesters.
Similarly, the SCAF authorities refused to implement a ban on Mubarak-serving officials taking up political
posts, and a Mubarak-era Prime Minister and ex-General eventually ran for the 2012 Presidential election
(widely believed with SCAF backing). Indeed, the transitional Prime Ministers were all from the Mubarak era,
whilst the Public Prosecutor in charge with convicting pro-Mubarak symbols was appointed by Mubarak
i
himself .
On the above, see:
i
Aziz, S., “(De)liberalizing judicial independence in Egypt” - in Fahmy, D & Faruqi, D. (eds.), Egypt and the
Contradictions of Liberalism, London: Oneworld, 2017, p. 105
By contrast, even symbols of the regime were eventually acquitted, after being trialled (by contrast to
revolutionaries and activists) in civilian courts. Mubarak himself was repeatedly acquitted of charges of killing
i
protesters and corruption, and was finally released in 2017 . His sons – symbols of corruption in the regime –
and the Interior Minister – head of state security and police – were all similarly acquitted of killing protesters
and released in 2015, whilst the most renowned symbol of financial embezzlement and corruption, ex-General
Secretary of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP) and business tycoon, Ahmed Ezz, was released in
ii
2014 . Every one of these figures (along with some other prominent names excluded for brevity) had been
convicted in 2012 when a ‘moment’ of continued revolutionary fervour in the streets existed, only to be
acquitted on retrials following the military coup against President Morsi in 2013. The military similarly
extended the state of emergency, extended powers of arrest to members of the military, and gave itself
iii
extensive ‘supra-constitutional’ powers even after the election of Morsi .
On the above, see:
i
First (2014) Mubarak acquittal for deaths of protesters:
Shenker, J., "Egypt's ruling generals accused of buying time to stay in power", The Guardian, Oct 2011,
<Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/06/egypt-military-accused-buying-time>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]; Hanna, J., "Egypt: Ex-ruler Hosni Mubarak, accused in deaths of hundreds,
cleared of charges", CNN, Nov 2014, <Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/29/world/meast/egyptmubarak-trial/index.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Reuters., "Mubarak acquitted in final ruling on
Egypt's Arab spring deaths", The Guardian, March 2017, <Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/02/hosni-mubarak-acquitted-in-final-ruling-on-egypts-arabspring-deaths> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Final (2017) acquittal:
AP., "Egypt's Mubarak freed after six years in prison", The Telegraph, March 2015, <Available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/24/egypts-mubarak-free-six-years-prison/> [Accessed 24th
August 2017]
ii
Release of Ala’a and Jamal Mubarak:
AP., "Egypt court orders release of Hosni Mubarak's sons", The Guardian, Oct 2015, <Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/12/egypt-court-hosni-mubarak-sons-gamal-alaa-releasecorruption-conviction> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Acquittal and release of Interior Minister, Habib al-Adly:
AJE Agencies., "Egypt court acquits Mubarak-era minister", Al Jazeera, June 2014, <Available at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/egypt-court-acquits-mubarak-era-minister2014612145549307558.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Release of Ahmed Ezz:
Ahram Editor., "Mubarak-era Egyptian steel tycoon Ahmed Ezz released on bail", Ahram Online, August 2014,
<Available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/0/107956/Business/0/Mubarakera-Egyptiansteel-tycoon-Ahmed-Ezz-release.aspx> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
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greater number of military trials of civilians than during Mubarak’s three-decade
rule) 54, and many Western governments were accused of downplaying and/or
refraining from serious criticisms of the military’s abuses 55, and eventually
praising it for its ‘successful steering’ of the transition after the election of
Morsi 56. Indeed, Human Rights-related conditionalities on US military aid to
SCAF during this period were waived, against the calls of Human Rights groups
(such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International) 57.
Meanwhile, the status of human rights in Egypt after the 2013 military coup
against Mohammed Morsi represents the “worst human rights crisis in decades” ,
according to the UK director of Human Rights Watch (HRW) 58. On the 14th
August 2013, military and security forces cracked down on two pro-Morsi sit-ins
in Cairo, killing an estimated 817 civilians in one day 59 (the Egyptian Ministry of
Health itself admitted the death of almost 600 civilians
60).
This massacre (known
as the Raba’a massacre), represented “one of the world’s largest killings of
iii
Hill, H., "Background: SCAF's last-minute power grab", Al Jazeera, Aug 2014, <Available at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/egypt/2012/06/201261812449990250.html> [Accessed 24th
August 2017]
54
Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: The Trial of Hosni Mubarak”, Human Rights Watch, May 2012, p.3 <Available
at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/MubarakTrialQ%26A.pdf>
55
Chick, K. "US response to Tahrir Square crackdown angers Egyptians (VIDEO)", CS Monitor, Nov 2011,
<Available at: https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1122/US-response-to-Tahrir-Squarecrackdown-angers-Egyptians-VIDEO> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
56
BBC Editor. "Hillary Clinton meets Egypt military leader Tantawi", BBC News, July 2012, <Available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18846208> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
57
“There’s a much bigger question here,” he said, “and that is: if we want to help a post-Mubarak Egypt, does
the current aid package make the slightest bit of sense?” - Malinowski, T. (HRW Washington Director) quoted
in Myers, S.L., “Despite Rights Concerns, U.S. Plans to Resume Egypt Aid”, New York Times, 2012, <Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/world/middleeast/us-military-aid-to-egypt-to-resume-officialssay.html?mcubz=0> [Accessed 28th August 2017];
Singh, S. ‘“Ship of Shame” carrying weapons and explisove to Egypt from United States should not be allowed
to deliver cargo share’, Amnesty International, March 2012, <Available at:
https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/ship-of-shame-carrying-weapons-and-explosives-to-egypt-fromunited-states-should-not-be-allowed-to-deliver-cargo/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
58
Mepham, D., in Hooper, S. "UK welcome for Egypt's Sisi faces criticism", Al Jazeera, Nov 2015, <Available at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/uk-egypt-abdel-fattah-el-sisi-human-rights-criticism151105054117461.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
59
HRW. "Egypt: Rab’a Killings Likely Crimes against Humanity", Human Rights Watch, Nov 2013, <Available at:
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/12/egypt-raba-killings-likely-crimes-against-humanity> [Accessed 24th
August 2017]
60
Manar, M. "Health Ministry raises death toll of Wednesday’s clashes to 638", Daily News Egypt, Aug 2013,
<Available at: https://dailynewsegypt.com/2013/08/16/health-ministry-raises-death-toll-of-wednesdaysclashes-to-638/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
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demonstrators in a single day in recent history”, according to HRW 61, and was
the “single biggest incident of mass killing in Egypt’s recent history” 62. There
have been more than 40,000 detainees, most held without charge, including both
local and international journalists (with the example of the al-Jazeera journalists
the most well-covered) and thousands of student protesters. The authorities have
also issued collective death sentences in ‘mass trials’ for hundreds of detainees at
a time 63.
After the coup, no police officer or soldier had been convicted for any of these
events 64. Indeed, in leaked video-footage from a meeting in the Egyptian
military, General al-Sisi assured his officers that soldiers and officers will no
longer be ‘forced’ to be dragged to courts for prosecution – arguing that the ‘The
revolution has dismantled all the shackles that were present — not just for us, not
just for the military, but for the entire state… and they are being rearranged” 65.
Despite all these realities, ties between Western governments and the al-Sisi
regime would indeed improve in the aftermath of the coup, despite the human
rights situation in Egypt being worse under al-Sisi than under Mubarak. US
Secretary of State John Kerry indeed declared that the “army was effectively
61
HRW. "Egypt: Rab’a Killings Likely Crimes against Humanity", Human Rights Watch, Nov 2013, <Available at:
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/12/egypt-raba-killings-likely-crimes-against-humanity> [Accessed 24th
August 2017]
62
Perry, T. "Rights groups demand Egypt probe killings of Mursi supporters", Reuters, Dec 2013, <Available at:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-protests/rights-groups-demand-egypt-probe-killings-of-mursisupporters-idUSBRE9B90PH20131210> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
63
Cunningham, E. "Middle East: Egypt sentences 683 to death in latest mass trial of dissidents", Washington
Post, April 2014, <Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypt-sentences-683to-death-in-latest-mass-trial-of-dissidents/2014/04/28/34e0ca2c-e8eb-4a85-8fa8a7300ab11687_story.html?utm_term=.0bf22a724ec5> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Northam, J "Egyptian
Court Condemns 183 To Death In Mass Trial", NPR , Dec 2013, <Available at:
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/02/02/383320219/egyptian-court-condemns-183-to-deathin-mass-trial> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Reprieve Editor "Egypt death sentences near 2,000, amid fears for
Irish student", Repreive, Dec 2016, <Available at: http://www.reprieve.org.uk/press/egypt-death-sentencesnear-2000-amid-fears-irish-student/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Bounaim, N. "Egypt: Seven men facing
imminent execution after being tortured in custody", Amnesty International, June 2017, <Available at:
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/egypt-seven-men-facing-imminent-execution-after-beingtortured-in-custody/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
64
Kingsley, P. "Egypt carries out first death sentence after mass trials of Morsi supporters", The Guardian,
March 2015, <Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/07/egypt-death-sentence-morsisupporters-mahmoud-ramadan-cairo-muslim-brotherhood> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
65
Mepham, D., in
Kirkpatrick, D.. "In Leaked Video, Egyptian Army Officers Debate How to Sway News Media", NY Times, Oct
2013, <Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/world/middleeast/in-leaked-video-egyptian-armyofficers-debate-how-to-sway-news-media.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
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restoring democracy” in Egypt, weeks after consecutive massacres had been
recorded by the military 66. The Obama Administration famously attempted to
avoid calling the events in Egypt a ‘coup’ (though a portion of $1.3 bn package of
military aid was subsequently suspended by congress – this was soon to be
restored), and military aid continued to flow to the Egyptian army 67. Again,
human rights conditionalities on US military aid were ‘rolled back’ 68. The UK in
particular would significantly deepen ties with the Egyptian military and
economic investments, becoming the largest non-Arab investor in the country,
training Egyptian military units and even approving of Egypt’s “tough security
measures” 69. The UK and Germany would all host President Sisi on official visits,
with such a visit scheduled in France later this year 70. Human Rights groups
accused all of the UK, France and the US of indulging Egypt’s military abuses 71.
Yemen
66
Kerry, J. "Egypt army 'restoring democracy', says John Kerry", BBC News, Aug 2013, <Available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23543744> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
67
Zengerle, P.. "U.S. military aid for Egypt seen continuing despite rights concerns", Reuters, Nov 2015,
<Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-usa-aid/u-s-military-aid-for-egypt-seen-continuingdespite-rights-concerns-idUSKCN0T22E520151113> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
68
Gouette, N. "U.S. seeks to roll back human rights conditions on Egypt aid", CNN Politics, Feb 2016,
<Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2016/02/26/politics/egypt-u-s-aid-kerry-military-humanrights/index.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Labott, E. "In Cairo, Kerry downplays rift with Egypt over human rights", CNN Politics, April 2016, <Available at:
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/20/politics/kerry-el-sisi-human-rights-egypt/index.html> [Accessed 24th
August 2017]
69
Curtis, M."Britain And The Military Rulers Of Egypt - Another Extraordinary Special Relationship", Huffington
Post, Aug 2016, <Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/mark-curtis/britain-egypt-foreignpolicy_b_11972278.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
UK training Egyptian Army
Fallon, M.,’UK supports training of Egyptian Armed Forces’, UK Government, Sept 2016, <Available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-supports-training-of-egyptian-armed-forces> [Accessed 24th
August 2017]
70
Hooper, S."UK welcome for Egypt's Sisi faces criticism", Al Jazeera, Nov 2015, <Available at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/uk-egypt-abdel-fattah-el-sisi-human-rights-criticism151105054117461.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Editor."UK welcome for Egypt's Sisi faces criticism",
Ahram Online, Aug 2017, <Available at:
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/274687/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-Sisi-to-visit-France-later-thisyear-French.aspx> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
71
Stork, J."France Under Macron Still Indulges Egypt’s Harsh Repression”, Human Rights Watch, Aug 2017,
<Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/26/france-under-macron-still-indulges-egypts-harshrepression> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Crowcroft, O."Human rights groups: Britain's support of Egypt's Sisi
'is pushing Muslims towards al-Qaeda'”, International Business Times, March 2015, <Available at:
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/human-rights-groups-britains-support-egypts-sisi-pushing-muslims-towards-alqaeda-hold-1493096> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Singh, S., op. cit.
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Meanwhile in Yemen, US officials would meet with Saleh even whilst the protests
were taking place to coordinate on ‘security’ matters 72. Later, Western
governments (including the US, France, EU and UK) would support a Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC)-backed ‘power-sharing deal’ 73. This initiative
entailed the resignation of long-time strongman, Ali Abdullah Saleh, in exchange
for Saleh being given immunity, allowed to stay in Yemen and continue political
activity as head of the ruling party (the General People’s Congress) – which in
turn was preserved intact, not required to dissolve and retained its majority bloc
in parliament (no demand for new elections was made); similarly, the various
military and security institutions were not required to dissolve, and continued to
be controlled by the Saleh family (with Saleh’s son serving as the head of the
Republican Guards and ‘Special counter-terrorism units’, his nephew heading the
‘Central Security Forces’, and his brother heading the air force) 74. In short the
GPC – effectively a front for the Saleh family – and its loyalist military would
continue in power. This arrangement was criticised by revolutionary coalitions
and activists, who declared that it accomplished none of the demands for the
revolution which aimed to end a family-military dictatorship (including
restructuring and/or dissolving the plethora of military, security and intelligence
apparatuses to ensure its impartiality), and furthermore – even on a nominal
basis (i.e. of focussing only on the personal status of Saleh as opposed to the
72
CNN Wire Staff."Yemen's president meets with top U.S. anti-terrorism official”, CNN News, July 2011,
<Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/07/10/yemen.unrest/index.html> [Accessed 24th
August 2017]
73
Burt, A.,"UK supports Gulf Co-operation Council initiative to resolve crisis in Yemen”, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, July 2011, <Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-supports-gulf-cooperation-council-initiative-to-resolve-crisis-in-yemen> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Al Jazeera &
Agencies."Yemen's Saleh agrees to transfer power”, Al Jazeera, Nov 2011, <Available at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/11/2011112355040101606.html> [Accessed 24th August
2017]; France: Reuters Staff ."Yemen worries G8 as France and U.S. condemn Saleh”, Reuters, May 2011,
<Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-g8-france-yemen/yemen-worries-g8-as-france-and-u-scondemn-saleh-idUSTRE74P33M20110526> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; EU:
Al Qadhi, M ."EU envoy extends visit to Yemen to try to end standoff”, The National, July 2011, <Available at:
https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/eu-envoy-extends-visit-to-yemen-to-try-to-end-standoff-1.424244>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
74
Alwazir, A ."Yemen's GCC Initiative: Cosmetic or Comprehensive Change?”, Al-Akhbar English, Nov 2011,
<Available at: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/2088> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Alkamali, Z ."Ali Abdallah Saleh: The Shadow President of Yemen”, Al-Akhbar English, March 2012, <Available
at: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/5611> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
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entire regime) – opened the door for Saleh’s return 75. The US would defend the
immunity deal 76, and after signing the GCC-sponsored deal, Saleh would be
allowed into the United States for medical treatment 77. Hundreds of Yemeni
protesters had been killed by pro-Saleh forces during the uprising, and thousands
more wounded 78.
A look at the demands of the Yemeni revolutionary youth coalition would show
that, as is the case with their counterparts in the other Arab Spring domains, their
programmes and demands were not limited to the fate of ‘one man’ but the fate of
the regime as a whole 79. This arrangement was in keeping with the interests of
the key regional powers with interests in Yemen – namely Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates – as well as long-standing Western allies. During the next
few years Saleh would plot his return to power, and in 2014 he was the main force
behind a military coup against the transitional government (with Hadi starting to
attempt to undermine Saleh loyalists in the military) in Sana’a, carried out in
conjunction with the Houthis 80.
75
See Alwazir, A., op. cit.
Associated Press,"United States defends immunity law for Yemeni president Saleh”, The Guardian, Jan 2012,
<Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/10/us-backs-yemen-immunity-for-saleh>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
77
Associated Press,"Yemen president in U.S. for treatment”, CBS News, Jan 2012, <Available at:
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/yemen-president-in-us-for-treatment/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
78
Reuters ."Yemen: Reject Immunity Law for President Saleh and Aides”, Human Rights Watch, Jan 2012,
<Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/10/yemen-reject-immunity-law-president-saleh-andaideshttps://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/yemen-says-more-than-2000-killed-inuprising/2012/03/18/gIQAGOtcLS_story.html?utm_term=.7b80f6f20fe9> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
79
For a list of such demands, see:
Karoui, H ."The Yemeni Revolution: Replacing Ali Abdullah Saleh, or Replacing Obsolete Institutions?”, Doha
Institute: Arab Center For Research and Policy Studies - Case Analysis Series, May 2011, p.11
80
The takeover of Sana’a was commonly and falsely attributed in Western coverage as mainly undertaken by
‘Houthi rebels’, a force of a few thousand fighters compared to more than 100,000 Saleh loyalists in the
Yemeni Army and security apparatuses – by contrast the movement is commonly described as ‘Saleh-Houthi
forces’ in Arabic media coverage. The Houthis’ involvement meant the ability to present the coup as a
‘revolution’, with the Houthis being one of the factions with a love-hate relationship with Saleh and a ‘partial’
participant in the 2011 uprising. - See:
Associated Press, "Yemen’s former president Ali Abdullah Saleh behind Houthis’ rise”, Financial Times, Jan
2012, <Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/dbbc1ddc-d3c2-11e4-99bd-00144feab7de> [Accessed 24th
August 2017]; Associated Press,"Soldiers loyal to Yemen's former president storm Aden airport”, The
Guardian, March 2015, <Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/19/soldiers-loyalformer-yemen-president-aden-airport-dead> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Finn, T ."UN report reveals
collusion between ex-president Saleh and Yemen's Houthis”, Middle East Eye, Feb 2015, <Available at:
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/un-reports-reveals-collusion-between-ex-president-saleh-and-yemenshouthis-1718560512> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Al- Moliky, G ."Yemen: Pulling the Strings”, Al Jazeera,
76
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Yet whilst this coup against the transitional government was all-round
condemned by regional and international powers, the early indicators were that it
would be largely accepted and acquiesced to (including by regional states such as
Saudi Arabia and the UAE 81), with the United States in particular establishing
relations with the Saleh-Houthi alliance 82. The death of King Abdullah in
January 2015 and his succession by King Salman (whose regime would be marked
with a markedly different foreign policy in more than one Arab Spring domain)
would bring an intervention in March 2015 which would target the Saleh-Houthi
forces - core amongst them the Yemeni Army units (some of whom joined the side
of the transitional government and the Saudi-backed coalition, but most of which
April 2016, <Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeraworld/2016/04/yemen-pullingstrings-160420111557078.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
81
See for instance: Al Zarqa, A ."Yemen: Saudi Arabia recognizes new balance of power in Sanaa as Houthis
topple Muslim Brothers”, Al Akhbar Management, March 2015, <Available at: http://english.alakhbar.com/node/21636> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Indeed, perhaps somewhat surprisingly to many, both the Saudi Arabian regime of King Abdullah and the UAE
had in fact helped support the Saleh-Houthi forces in the years prior to the coup; this was because they were
seen as a lesser evil to the Islah party - the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood – which was an
i
increasingly dominant force on the side of the transitional government . Contrary to much Western media
portrayal, the policy of Saudi’s King Abdullah and the UAE was far more hostile to democratic and/or pro-Arab
Spring Sunni Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, than with Iran, seeing them as a threat to their own
legitimacies due to their potential capacity to establish a popular base amongst their (Sunni) populations.
These priorities were reversed with the ascension of the far more anti-Iran and less anti-Muslim Brotherhood
King Salman, who ascended to power in January 2015 and launched a military intervention in Yemen shortly
thereafter. Meanwhile, despite the transitional president (previously Saleh’s deputy), Mansur Hadi, coming
from the GPC, the party (and most of the state’s military and security institutions, including the infamous
Republican Guard) would emphatically take the side of Saleh in his coup against his former deputy, and
ii
branded Hadi a ‘traitor’ .
On the above, see:
i
AP ."Saudi’s support for Houthis; could this be the final nail in the coffin?”, Middle East Monitor, Oct 2014,
<Available at: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20141031-saudis-support-for-houthis-could-this-be-thefinal-nail-in-the-coffin/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Hearst, D ."Saudi Crapshoot in Yemen”, Huffington Post,
Oct 2014, <Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-hearst/saudi-high-risk-bet-inye_b_5895984.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Hearst, D ."Was the UAE behind the Houthi takeover of
Sana'a?”, Middle East Eye, Oct 2014, <Available at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/was-uae-behindhouthi-takeover-sanaa-1340168724 > [Accessed 24th August 2017]
ii
Ottens, N ."Saleh Loyalists Abandon Yemen’s Hadi”, Atlantic Sentinel, March 2015, <Available at:
http://atlanticsentinel.com/2015/03/saleh-loyalists-abandon-yemens-hadi/ > [Accessed 24th August 2017];
Alabsi, M ."Yemen’s Houthis Violence”, SCISCO Media, June 2016, <Available at:
https://sciscomedia.co.uk/yemen-houthis-violence/ > [Accessed 24th August 2017];
AlAbadi, S ."The Invisbile hand behind the coup in Yemen”, Mantle Thought Media, Feb 2015, <Available at:
http://www.mantlethought.org/international-affairs/invisible-hand-behind-coup-yemen> [Accessed 24th
August 2017]
82
McManus, D ."Why the U.S. is courting the Houthis taking control in Yemen”, LA Times, Feb 2016, <Available
at: http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcmanus-yemen-houthis-20150208-column.html>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]; Slavin, B ."US maintains intelligence relationship with Houthis”, Al Monitor, Jan
2015, <Available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/yemen-houthis-obamaadministration.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
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remained loyal to Saleh) which had in fact been backed for years by Saudi
Arabia 83. Saudi bombing would even target the home of Saleh himself – the man
sheltered by Saudi during the 2011 uprising (receiving medical treatment there
after an insurgent attack) and given immunity under its lobbying
84.
The
relatively-undisputed legitimacy (i.e. in terms of international law) of the
transitional government similarly meant that Western allies supported the
legitimacy of the Saudi intervention requested by the ousted transitional
government – though to varying degrees (with the US far more critical of the
Saudi intervention than the likes of the UK and France: asking Saudi Arabia from
early on to cease it, arguing that there was ‘no military solution’ and condemning
Saudi airstrikes in international fora 85). Despite what appeared to be an early
willingness to acquiesce to the coup, many Western governments would engage in
major lucrative arms sales to the Saudi government, including providing weapons
later implicated in war crimes 86.
Libya and Tunisia
83
See for example: Miles, T."Yemen talks end without ceasefire, air strikes hit Republican Guards”, Reuters,
June 2015, <Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/yemen-talks-end-withoutceasefire-air-strikes-hit-republican-guards-idUSKBN0OZ1IJ20150619> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
84
AJE,"Coalition bombs ex-Yemen president Saleh's residence”, Al Jazeera, May 2015, <Available at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/cloneofstrikes-yemen-saada-breach-international-150510035539400.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017] -Conversely, the Saudi Arabian intervention in 2015
represented its (rare) siding with the Arab Spring revolutionary forces, most of whom remained aligned with
the transitional government against the GPC and the Houthi-allied loyalists of the former regime; however, the
bombardment would lead to heavy civilian casualties and a humanitarian disaster.
85
US calling on Saudi to cease airstrikes:
Taylor, G."U.S. pressures Saudi Arabia to stop bombing Iran-backed rebels in Yemen”, Washington Press, May
2015, <Available at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/30/us-pressures-saudi-arabia-to-stopbombing-iran-bac/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; (Repeating call in 2016) Borger, J."US calls for end to Saudi
airstrikes in Yemen”, The Guardian, Oct 2016, <Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/31/us-calls-for-end-to-saudi-airstrikes-in-yemen> [Accessed
24th August 2017]; Wintour, P."US says support for Saudi Arabia not a 'blank cheque' after Yemen air raid”,
The Guardian, Oct 2016, <Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/09/saudi-arabiainvestigate-air-raid-on-funeral-in-yemen> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
86
Maalouf, L."Yemen: Multibillion-dollar arms sales by USA and UK reveal shameful contradiction with aid
efforts”, Amnesty International, March 2017, <Available at:
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/yemen-multibillion-dollar-arms-sales-by-usa-and-ukreveal-shameful-contradiction-with-aid-efforts/> [Accessed 24th August 2017];
Sanchez, R."Britain stands behind Saudi air campaign in Yemen even as strike on funeral prompts US to review
its support ”, The Telegraph, October 2016, <Available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/10/britain-stands-behind-saudi-air-campaign-in-yemen-even-asstrike/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
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Libya represents the only example where military force was taken to topple the
Qadaffi regime. After a brief attempted crackdown by regular security forces, the
regime launched an almost-immediate military offensive to attempt to put down
the protests. The lack of an independent military institution and the loyalistmilitia nature of the closest Libya had to an ‘army’ meant that unlike in other
Arab Spring domains, the choices on offer in Libya were between allowing an
imminent repression of the uprising – especially with a rapid Qadaffi assault on
Benghazi which would’ve dealt an early and potentially fatal blow to the uprising
- or supporting rebel forces. The UK, France and Italy had all come under
scrutiny on cases with accusations of corrupt economic dealings with the Qadaffi
regime as part of the rapprochement with Libya in the years beforehand.
However it is these powers which would take a lead in intervening against
Qadaffi, with the US reluctant. From all the seven examined Arab Spring
domains, it is only in the case of Libya where the doctrine of Responsibility to
Protect (R2P) was applied. The regime was left isolated with no committed
regional or international allies (both Saudi Arabia and Iran took part in the
intervention, whilst Russia and China did not blockade it).
However, within a few years the same European powers would come to the fore in
supporting another ‘new-old’ strongman, in the form of General Khalifa Haftar.
Widely described as ‘renegade general’, Haftar was a Qadaffi-era colonel who
defected from the regime after being caught and disowned during Libya’s
embarrassing invasion of Chad, with the presence of Libyan troops denied by
Qadaffi (the presence of Libyan military units contravened a ceasefire agreement
signed by Qadaffi) 87. In February 2014 Haftar would unilaterally announce a
‘movement for a new roadmap’ by the ‘national command of the Libyan army’
without authorisation (or appointment) by the transitional parliament(s) 88. In
87
Wilkenfeld, J. & Brecher, M., A Study of Crisis, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1997, p. 92; Editor,
‘Profile: Libya's military strongman Khalifa Haftar’, BBC News, September 2016 <Available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-27492354> [Accessed 25th August 2017]
88
In other words, until December 2014 this non-recognition would include both of the rival parliaments which
would emerge: the UN-backed House of Representatives in Tobruk and the General National Congress (whose
mandate had expired) based in Tripoli.
On military takeover attempt:
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2016, it emerged that Haftar was supported by Western powers including the UK,
France and the US, despite continuing to combat the internationally-recognised
Government of National Accord (GNA) – a reconciliation government arrived at
after a protracted series of UN-sponsored mediation talks between different
Libyan political factions 89.
Meanwhile in Tunisia, the aforementioned relative unwillingness of the Tunisian
military to support security forces in the repression of anti-Ben Ali protests
ensured Ben Ali’s departure within weeks of protests. However in the years that
followed, the police-state institutions of the Ben Ali era would rigorously resist
attempts at reform – a key demand of the Tunisian revolution 90. The election in
2014 of Beji Caid Essebsi – speaker of the Tunisian parliament under Ben Ali–
after years of tumult and political turmoil was widely seen as a victory for the
Reuters."Libya Major General Khalifa Haftar claims gov't suspended in apparent coup bid; PM insists Tripoli
"under control"”, CBS News, Feb 2014, <Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/31/uscalls-for-end-to-saudi-airstrikes-in-yemen> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
On Rejection (including by later Prime Minister of Tobruk government, Abdullah al-Thinni):
Adbual Habab, A."General Haftar announces coup”, Libya Herald, Feb 2014, <Available at:
http://www.libyaherald.com/2014/02/14/general-hafter-announces-coup-politicians-react-with-scorn-orderhis-arrest/#axzz4rcIsqifP> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; AJE."Libya army imposes no-fly zone over Benghazi”,
Al Jazeera News, May 2014, <Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/libya-exgeneral-vows-terrorist-hunt-201451713449976167.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Convening of Tobruk-based House of Representatives (August 2014):
Thomas, E."Libya army imposes no-fly zone over Benghazi”, BBC News, Aug 2014, <Available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-28628407/libya-new-parliament-meets-in-tobruk-under-heavyguard> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Recognition of Haftar by HORs (December 2014):
Mahmoud, K."Haftar set to be Libya’s highest-ranking military official: minister”, Asharq Al Awsat, Dec 2014,
<Available at: https://english.aawsat.com/khalid-mahmoud/news-middle-east/haftar-set-to-be-libyas-highestranking-military-official-minister> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
89
AJE."Libya: Leaked tapes suggest West supports Haftar”, Aljazeera English, July 2016, <Available at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/leaked-tapes-expose-western-support-libyan-general160708182646443.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]. On Haftar’s Refusal to recognise GNA, see:
Assad, A."Al-Sirraj: Haftar let slide an invaluable chance to end Libya’s political fragmentation”, The Libya
Observer, Feb 2017, <Available at: https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/al-sirraj-haftar-let-slide-invaluablechance-end-libya%E2%80%99s-political-fragmentation> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Wintour, P."Libyan rival leaders agree to ceasefire after Macron-hosted talks”, The Guardian, July 2017,
<Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/25/france-raises-hopes-of-deal-between-libyanrival-factions> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
90
Bougerra, B., “Reforming Tunisia’s troubled security sector”, Atlantic Council: Rafik Hariri Center for the
Middle East Issue Brief, October 2014, pp. 1-6;
Hussein, T."A Deep State of Mind: Tunisia’s Deep State Could be Combatted by Democratic and Social
Reforms”, Huffington Post, Sept 2013, <Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/tam-hussein/tunisiadeep-state_b_3555764.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
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‘deep state’ 91. On his election, Essebsi nominated a Ben Ali security chief (former
interior-minister) as Tunisia’s new Prime Minister, proposed a bill to grant
amnesty to corrupt Ben Ali-era businessmen 92, and Tunisian security forces have
been accused by rights groups of ‘returning to old habits’ with widespread human
rights abuses under his tenure 93.
Bahrain
The examples of Bahrain and Iraq meanwhile, were largely marginalised and
uncovered in Western media, meaning that along with substantial interests in
these two countries (Iraq for the obvious investment during the US-led
occupation of 2003, and Bahrain due to the close commercial and economic ties
with the oil-rich Bahraini monarchy and presence of naval fleets there) there was
little pressure to align with the revolutions
94.
No demands were made for the
resignation of the Bahraini monarch or the long-serving Bahraini Prime Minister
(the latter’s departure serving as the main protester demand). Indeed, 7,000 US
military personnel were stationed only a few kilometres from the Pearl
Monument, the symbolic gathering icon of the protests and which was forcibly
evicted before being torn down 95. The repression of the protests was met with
little criticism. Indeed, some EU officials would be on record defending the
91
Hammai, M.D., "Essebsi and Tunisia: The support of Ben Ali's elites”, The New Arab, Dec 2014, <Available at:
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/politics/2014/12/19/essebsi-and-tunisia-the-support-of-ben-alis-elites>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
92
Tarek, A."Tunisia parliament debates contested amnesty for Ben Ali-era corruption”, Reuters, April 2013,
<Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-economy-lawmaking-idUSKBN17S24L> [Accessed
24th August 2017]
93
Amnesty."Tunisia: Abuses in the name of security threatening reforms”, Amnesty International, Feb 2017,
<Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/02/tunisia-abuses-in-the-name-of-securitythreatening-reforms/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Benlakehal, B."Bad habits die hard in Tunisia's security
services”, Al Araby, Feb 2017, <Available at: https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2017/2/16/badhabits-die-hard-in-tunsias-security-services> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
94
The fact that the Bahraini protests took place under a monarchy and mainly demanded reform, rather than
the overthrow of the king, whilst the Iraqi protests were ‘belated’ (taking place in 2012) and limited to the
Sunni Arab demographic, may have also played a role in this media marginalisation.
95
Holmes, A."The military intervention that the world forgot”, Al Jazeera America, March 2014, <Available at:
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/3/bahrain-uprisinginterventionsaudiarabiaemirates.html>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
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Bahraini crackdown 96, and in subsequent years the UK would reach an
agreement to establish a naval base on the island 97.
Finally, in nearly all of the Arab Spring contexts financial assets of ruling regime
symbols would either continue to flourish within Western countries (as
documented in the leaked Panama papers 98 – most prominently this has
included the example of ‘stashed’ billions of the regimes of Assad, Qadaffi,
Mubarak and Ben Ali 99) or remain frozen and unreturned. The UK in particular
seems to be a popular destination for regime ‘money-laundering’ 100, and has been
called upon by Transparency International not to be a “safety deposit box for
96
Rettman, T."Top EU official defends Bahrain crackdown”, EU Observer, March 2011, <Available at:
https://euobserver.com/foreign/32038> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
97
Merrill, J."British military base in Bahrain is a 'reward' for UK's silence on human rights, say campaigners”,
The Independent, December 2014, <Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middleeast/british-military-base-in-bahrain-is-a-reward-for-uks-silence-on-human-rights-say-campaigners9908284.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
For EU indulgement of Bahraini regime abuses, see: Matthiesen, T., “EU foreign policy towards Bahrain in the
aftermath of the uprising” in Echagüe, A. (ed.), The Gulf States and the Arab Uprisings, Madrid: FRIDE, 2013,
pp. 77-85; For France, see: Mikail, B., “France and the Arab Spring: an opportunistic quest for influence”, FRIDE
Working Paper No.110, October 2011, pp. 1, 6, 10
98
Lusher, A."Panama Papers: 12 world leaders linked to offshore dealings - and the full allegations against
them”, The Independent, April 2016, <Available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/panama-papers-assad-putin-poroshenko-mubarak-alsaud-pm-iceland-sigmundur-davio-gunnlaugsson-a6967411.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
99
Mubarak:
Shenker, J."Scandal of Mubarak regime millions in UK”, The Guardian, Sept 2012, <Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/02/scandal-mubarak-regime-millions-assets-uk> [Accessed
24th August 2017]; Kingsley, P."Hosni Mubarak's family own assets on British territory”, The Guardian, March
2013, <Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/27/hosni-mubarak-assets-britishterritory> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Qadaffi:
Coker, M."Libya's Hunt for Gadhafi-Era Assets Leads It to High-End U.K. Property Firm”, The Wall Street
Journal, May 2014, <Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/libyas-hunt-for-gadhafi-era-assets-leads-it-tohigh-end-u-k-property-firm-1399514660> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Trew, B."Gaddafi’s freed son Saif ‘has
access to $30bn’”, The Times, June2017, <Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/gadaffis-freed-sonhas-access-to-30bn-n8znm36md> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Assad:
Garside, J."Assad’s London fixer uses offshore firms to hold luxury London flats”, The Guardian, April 2016,
<Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/05/panama-papers-assad-fixer-londonproperty> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Ridgwell, H."Pressure Grows on Britain to Seize Assad Family Assets”, VOA News, April 2017, <Available at:
https://www.voanews.com/a/pressure-grows-on-britain-to-seize-assad-family-assets/3808670.html>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
100
FT Editor."How laundered money shapes London’s property market”, Financial Times, April 2017, <Available
at: https://www.ft.com/content/f454e3ec-fc02-11e5-b5f5-070dca6d0a0d> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
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despots” 101. This has notably included the example of Assad family property in
London 102. Other transitional governments (including Tunisia, Egypt and
Libya 103) have complained of unreturned assets, with Egypt suing the UK for
instance in 2012 104.
To avoid repetition, the policies of Western governments in Syria and Iraq will be
examined in the next section as part of the ‘alternative’ narratives on the Arab
Spring, as they constituted the basis of these narratives which were conversely
shaped by them.
3. Anti-establishment response to Arab Spring
3.1 | Overview
The professed adoption of support by Western governments for the Arab Spring
uprisings posed dilemmas for many ‘alternative’ and anti-establishment
progressive movements. Traditionally hostile to ‘Western imperialism’, the
nominal adoption by Western powers of the cause of most of the Arab Spring
uprisings caused problems; this was especially the case where the regime’s
‘visible’ leadership (i.e. the president) refused to resign. This especially took place
101
MEE Staff."UK failed in seizing assets of 'despots': Report”, Middle East Eye, Nov 2016, <Available at:
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uk-failed-seizing-assets-despots-report-701-pm-est-586507812>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
102
Law, B."The UK's role in cleaning dirty money from the Middle East”, Middle East Eye, Nov 2016, <Available
at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/cleaning-dirty-money-middle-east-1918870589> [Accessed 24th
August 2017].
- Indeed, whilst the UK has refused to strip Assad’s wife, Asma’a al-Assad, of her British citizenship, it has done
so for British fighters who have gone to fight Assad in ‘moderate’ (non al-Qaeda groups with no ‘designation’)
brigades, and has also seized the passports of Syrian activists “on the request of the Syrian government”. See:
OBrien, Z."EXCLUSIVE: ‘I’m no terrorist’ Abu Hamza’s son vows to return to Britain after war in Syria”, Sunday
Express, April 2017, <Available at: http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/788589/Abu-Hamza-s-son-SufyanMustafa-passport-revoked-denies-ISIS-Britain-Syria-war> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Graham-Harrisson, E."Syrian activist barred from travel after UK seizes passport at Assad’s request”, The
Guardian, April 2016, <Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/24/syrian-journalistzaina-erhaim-passport-held-assad-requet> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
103
Worth, R."Obstacles Mar Quest for Arab Dictators’ Assets”, NY Times, June 2012, <Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/world/middleeast/libya-egypt-and-tunisia-try-to-recover-assets.html>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
104
Tovrov, D."Egypt Sues UK Over Frozen Mubarak Assets”, International Business Times, April 2012,
<Available at: http://www.ibtimes.com/egypt-sues-uk-over-frozen-mubarak-assets-437994> [Accessed 24th
August 2017]
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in the most patrimonial states, namely Syria and Libya 105, both of which had a
history of mixed relations with Western powers led by the United States (with
Libya especially having a significantly more adversarial relationship at various
points) 106. Despite the fact that relations between Western governments
105
On Syrian patrimonialism, see: Bellin, E., op. cit., pp. 143, 149-150; On Libyan patrimonialism, see:
Arjomand, S.A., The Arab Revolution of 2011: A comparative perspective, New York: State University of New
York Press, 2015, p.22
106
It should be noted however, that the history of relationship between Western governments and Syria
differed drastically from that with Libya. Whilst the the greater duration of the Qadaffi regime’s reign could be
considered as as one of adversarialism vis-à-vis the West and regional powers, the relationship between the
Assad regime (under both the father, Hafez al-Assad and the son Bashar) and the West by contrast consisted
far more often of collaboration. This took place for instance during the First Gulf War, where Syrian ground
forces took part in the US-led Coalition, the Lebanese Civil War, where the US (and famously Henry Kissinger)
supported the Syrian invasion of Lebanon, at the time aimed at the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) –
indeed the Syrian occupation of Lebanon would be effectively ‘granted’ by the United States as part of the
ceasefire agreement which ended the war – and during the War on Terror, where even the adversarial Bush
i
administration sent prisoners to be ‘renditioned’ and tortured in Syrian regime jails .
Similarly, the Syrian regime had rigorously enforced a ceasefire agreement in Syria’s Israeli-occupied Golan
Heights since 1974, with no Syrian offensives against Israeli forces there since that time, and the regime under
both Hafez and Bashar al-Assad would engage in direct negotiations with Israel and effectively publicly
ii
recognise it . Thus in 2015, Assad would be cited by US Secretary of State John Kerry as agreeing to the
iii
normalisation of ties with Israel and the exchange of embassies before the Arab Spring struck . Indeed, under
the Obama Administration, the Assad regime was reportedly on the verge of achieving a peace-deal with Israel
that would form part of a wider ‘full’ normalisation with the United States, as part of which Assad would even
iv
agree to compromise support for Hamas and Hezbollah . Thus, far from a history of ‘intransigence’, the Syrian
regime has very often proved to be cooperative with the US, despite the continued occupation of its territory
by Israel.
For the above, see:
On 1976 Syrian invasion of Lebanon against PLO with US and Israeli tacit support:
Quote by Henry Kissinger: “Now if I could design the solution, I would go to Assad and say, ‘If you could move
in quickly, and if you could give us an iron clad guarantee that you will get out again quickly and that you will
not go south of the [Litani] river, we will keep the Israelis out…We have to go back to Assad … Ask him what he
is up to and, if we agree with him, we will do our best to help him… But warn him what he does must be done
without the use of Syrian regular forces. I want to make it clear that a Syrian defeat in Lebanon would be a
disaster...If Syria could go in quickly and clean it out, it would be good”- Stocker, J.R., Spheres of Intervention:
US Foreign Policy and the Collapse of Lebanon, 1967–1976, New York: Cornell University Press, pp. 181, 196;
Shaheen, K., ‘Kissinger saw the benefits of Syrian intervention in Lebanon’, The Daily Star, Sep 2013 <Available
at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2013/Sep-23/232198-kissinger-saw-the-benefits-ofsyrian-intervention-in-lebanon.ashx#axzz2ffEF9Yya> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Rendition and torture:
Ackerman, S., ‘More than 50 countries helped the CIA outsource torture’, Wired, May 2013 <Available at:
https://www.wired.com/2013/02/54-countries-rendition/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
On pacified Golan frontier:
Pelham, N., ‘The Golan waits for the green light’, Middle East Research and Information Project, 2007
<Available at:http://www.merip.org/mero/mero072607> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
ii
News, ‘Clinton launches Middle East talks’, BBC, 1999 <Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/565950.stm> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Archives, ‘Syrian
lawmaker speaks on Israeli TV’, UPI, Dec 1995 <Available at:
http://www.upi.com/Archives/1995/12/12/Syrian-lawmaker-speaks-on-Israeli-TV/2981818744400/>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
i
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(especially the United States) with the Qadaffi and Assad regimes had both been
normalised and dramatically improved in the years preceding the Arab Spring,
the adversarial elements of the regimes’ history with the West would return to the
fore (especially amidst ‘alternative’ circles) once the uprisings broke out. The
description of the popular uprisings as a ‘Western conspiracy’ by Qadaffi and
Assad would in time find much resonance within alternative circles. Here, it
would be claimed that the soon-to-be-militarised rebellions against the Syrian
and Libyan regimes were an indistinguishable example of Western-orchestrated
‘regime-change’ à la Iraq 107. Similarly, the demand for humanitarian
intervention, No-Fly Zones and the application of the doctrine of Responsibility
to Protect (R2P) by the Syrian and Libyan oppositions was seen as an ‘invitation’
of Western imperialism – in vindication of the regimes’ propaganda – thus
making these movements ‘proxies’ of Western imperialism by extension.
The reality however was that the recourse to the theory of ‘Western conspiracy’
was not one restricted to the likes of Assad and Qadaffi, but a populistic
(intended) tactic adopted by every Arab Spring ruler. Thus, both Egypt’s Mubarak
and Yemen’s Saleh – sacrificed by their regimes with US-led support – would cite
the uprisings against them and the Arab Spring as a whole as a destabilising
‘Western conspiracy’ – despite notoriously (for their populations) being strong
iii
Kerry, J., ‘Negotiating the Whirlwind: Can Secretary of State John Kerry break through in Syria?’, The New
Yorker, 2015, <Available at: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/12/21/negotiating-the-whirlwind>,
th
[Accessed on 24 August 2017]
iv
Lutz, M., ‘Syria's Assad seems to suggest backing for Hamas negotiable, leaked cables say’, LA Times, Dec 2010
<Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/02/world/la-fg-wikileaks-syria-20101202> [Accessed 24th
August 2017]; Wikileaks, ‘Re: INSIGHT - US/Syria/Lebanon - Syria bargaining with US over HZ’, The Global
Intelligence Files, 2012 <Available at: https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/18/1830975_re-insight-us-syrialebanon-syria-bargaining-with-us-over-hz.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
107
See as examples: Robinson, P."Helping Syria: it's time for an end to regime change wars”, Open Democracy,
July 2017, <Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/piers-robinson/helping-syria-its-time-for-end-toregime-change-wars> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Strauss, S."Regime Change in Syria: We Should Learn the
Lessons of Iraq”, Huffington Post, July 2017, <Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stevenstrauss/regime-change-in-syria_b_1472673.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Carr, M."Now we know who is
responsible for the war in Syria. It's Stop the War Coalition”, Stop the War Coalition, November 2015,
<Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news-comment/651-it-s-official-stop-the-war-isresponsible-for-the-syrian-civil-war> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Carr, M., ‘Hey look: here we are again at
war with evil in the Middle East’, Stop the War Coalition, Sep 2014 <Available at:
http://stopwar.org.uk/index.php/middle-east-and-north-africa/1189-the-real-motive-for-westernintervention-in-syria-is-not-to-stop-the-killing> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
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surrogates of Western interests in the decades beforehand 108. Meanwhile, the
pejorative associations ascribed to the Syrian and Libyan oppositions by virtue of
their request for a No-Fly Zone or the provision of arms from any external backer,
was one that negated the realities of their contexts (that of facing regimes
evidenced to have been committing massacres against protesters, or armies
possessing an unparalleled firepower vis-à-vis their oppositions as armies of the
state). Reports by both international and local Human Rights monitors of the
regimes’ atrocities and main culpability for the carnage would be seen in the eyes
of those who opposed the militarisation of the rebellions as either irrelevant
(‘more guns or bombs will simply result in more carnage’), or deemed proxies of
‘Western establishment’ interests (despite these Human Rights monitors later
serving as the main source for reports later cited by these groups for the killing of
civilians by the anti-ISIS US-led International Coalition, or the abuses by US
allies in places like Bahrain and Yemen).
Ultimately however, this approach of demonising the rebellions by virtue of their
being ostensibly ‘backed’ by Western governments represented a Western-centric
counter-conformity, whereby the key unit of analysis was not the oppressed
‘Other’ fighting an oppressive (post-colonial) regime overseas, but the Western
(‘anti-establishment’) citizen. This citizen adopted a converse form of patriotism
– an ‘alternative patriotism’ where the e citizen’s main concern was not ‘what are
the people there demanding?’ – or even, ‘how do they see the West’s intervention
in their uprising?’ – but instead ‘are we being lied to?’, or ‘are our politicians
telling the truth?’. As an example, here is a headline from Stop the War Coalition
108
Spencer, R."Hosni Mubarak says US plotted to overthrow him in Egypt from 2005”, The Telegraph,
September 2013, <Available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/10310904/Hosni-Mubarak-saysUS-plotted-to-overthrow-him-in-Egypt-from-2005.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017];
Saleh, A.A., "Former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh: The Arab Spring was a Zionist-Western Conspiracy”,
MEMRI, November 2014, <Available at: https://www.memri.org/tv/former-yemeni-president-ali-abdallahsaleh-arab-spring-was-zionist-western-conspiracy> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
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after the 2013 Sarin gas attack on rebel-held suburbs of Damascus: “Syria and
chemical weapons: can we really get fooled again after the Iraq WMD fiasco?” 109.
Thus everything here continued to revolve around ‘the West’, even if in an upsidedown sense. Here the cases of Syria and Libya – grassroots and internal popular
uprisings acknowledged even by the likes of Assad (who once poignantly declared
that “Millions of Syrians are harbouring terrorism” – with ‘terrorism’ being
synonymous with opposition in the regime’s lexicon, effectively excommunicating
large parts of his population as extremists - before later warning Western
countries about the dangers of Syrian refugees and agreeing subsequently voicing
approval for Trump’s immigration ban 110) – would be constantly equated with the
example of Iraq – a foreign invasion and occupation which did not take place with
popular Iraqi support – or ‘Afghanistan in the 1980s’ (i.e. repeating regime
propaganda that the rebels were all Islamist extremists, and citing Western
support for them as akin to that of the Afghan mujahedin in the 1980s 111) . The
109
Carr, M."Syria and chemical weapons: can we really get fooled again after the Iraq WMD fiasco?”, Stop the
War Coalition, November 2015, <Available at: http://stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news/1730-what-you-need-toknow-about-terrorism-and-its-causes-a-graphic-account> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
For other such alternative pieces on the 2013 chemical attack: Editor, ‘Structural Inclinations - The Leaning
Tower of Propaganda: Chemical Weapons Attacks In Ghouta, Syria’, Media Lens, Oct 2013 <Available at:
http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/744-structural-inclinations-thechemical-weapons-attacks-in-ghouta-syria.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
110
Al-Assad, B., ‘Bashar al-Assad in speech to Syrian Parliament on 29 April 2014: “Millions of Syrians are
harbouring terrorism and al-Saud faced against Abdel-Nasser...and civilisation was built in Damascus and not
Mecca.’ CNN Arabic, 29 April 2014, <Trans. Available at:
https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=ar&tl=en&u=https%3A%2F%2Farabic.cnn.com%2Fmiddleeas
th
t%2F2014%2F04%2F29%2Fsyria-assad-speech> [Accessed 24 August 2017] ; Assad, B., ‘President al-Assad:
Terrorism will not stop here, it will export itself through illegal immigration into Europe’, Syrian Presidency
Twitter, 2013, <https://twitter.com/presidency_sy/status/346700451087015937> [Accessed 24th August
2017]; Assad, B., ‘Assad says he agrees with Trump travel ban’, CNN, 2017
<http://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2017/02/10/assad-agrees-with-trump-lia-lkl.cnn> [Accessed 24th
August 2017]
111
AJE."Syrian Civil War: US should not arm the rebels”, Al Jazeera English, April2016, <Available at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/04/syrian-civil-war-arm-rebels-160403113531178.html>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]; Cockburn, P."Britain’s policy on Syria has just been sunk, and nobody noticed”,
The Independant, Sept 2013, <Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/britain-s-policyon-syria-has-just-been-sunk-and-nobody-noticed-9005332.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Kabir, Z."Are
America and its allies getting too cozy with al Qaeda in Syria?”, Stop the War Coalition, July 2015, <Available at:
http://www.stopwar.org.uk/news-comment/792-are-america-and-its-allies-getting-too-cozy-with-al-qaeda-insyria> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Carr, M."Is U.S. 'game of thrones' in Iraq and Syria responsible for the rise
of ISIS?”, Stop the War Coalition, June 2014, <Available at: http://stopwar.org.uk/index.php/newscomment/36-matt-carr/1223-iraq-and-the-us-game-of-thrones-was-isis-made-in-washington> [Accessed 24th
August 2017]
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arms sales by other powers to repressive regimes - such as Russia and Iran to
Assad - was largely irrelevant; with the logic explaining this lop-sidedness being
‘Our purpose is to oppose our establishments at home’ 112. The ‘Other’ who was
now revolting against a regime abandoned by the West (as every Arab Spring
regime without exception had been supported by Western governments) was
irrelevant – they had no agency, and were to be cited only as effective pawns in a
‘larger’ battle with the domestic establishment. Where their complaints against
Western imperialism were in line with the alternative patriots’ own
understandings, they could be cited – where they weren’t, or condemned rather
the role of Russian imperialism or ‘pariah-again’ regimes now being condemned
by the West, they were to be marginalised and ignored 113. Ironically, whilst
disparaging the right of Syrians to ask for the support of Western establishments
overseas (such as in the form of a No-Fly Zone) to stop the daily aerial
bombardments of their governments (whose formation, incidentally, had been
directly shaped by ‘Western’ colonialism), the alternative patriot would find no
qualm with lobbying that very same establishment for higher social expenditure
at home (for things like schools, the NHS or welfare), or even claiming economic
support (such as benefits) from the ‘imperialist state’. This therefore represented
an inconsistent and postural form of Western-centric privilege, and the
alternative patriot’s approach towards the revolting and unrelateable Other
increasingly resembled a lopsided form of Orientalism and arguably a form of
‘core-periphery’ dissonance.
112
Donaghy, R., “UK anti-war group rejects protests against Russia’s war in Syria”, Middle East Eye, October
2016 <Available at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/british-anti-war-movement-rejects-call-protestrussia-war-syria-1275315746> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; German, L."They attack Stop the War because
we're an effective anti-war movement and we won't stop”, Stop the War Coalition, Dec 2015, <Available at:
http://www.stopwar.org.uk/news-comment/lindsey-german/573-the-task-of-any-anti-war-movement-is-tooppose-its-own-government> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
113
See for example: Ayoub, J., ‘What's behind Stop the War's aversion to Syria voices?’, The New Arab, Oct
2016 <Available at:
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2016/10/17/whats-behind-stop-the-wars-aversion-to-syriavoices> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Fisher, M., ‘Syrian refugee 'felt oppressed' by Stop the War protest’, BBC
News, Apr 2017 <Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39540340> [Accessed 24th August 2017];
Bloodworth, J., ‘Stop the War refuse to listen to Syrians during debate…on Syria’, Left Foot Forward, Nov 2015
<Available at:
https://leftfootforward.org/2015/11/stop-the-war-refuse-to-listen-to-syrians-during-debate-on-syria/>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
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3.2 | Case Study: Syria, Iraq and ISIS
i.
The alternative narratives for the rise of ISIS
The Syrian war represents one of the most poorly-understood conflicts in recent
history. Following the outbreak of the Arab Spring in Syria in March 2011, Bashar
al-Assad’s regime cracked down on the protests, with Assad refusing to step
down. Within six months the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed from army
defectors and armed civilians to defend the protests, and quickly transformed
into a decentralised, national popular guerrilla army. The United States
administration of Barack Obama – which had been heavily invested in a postBush rapprochement process with the Assad regime – would eventually call on
Bashar al-Assad to resign in August, six months after the outbreak of the protests
(this in fact represented the longest period for the Administration to call on an
Arab Spring leadership to resign), with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
infamously describing Assad early on as a ‘reformer’ whilst his forces cracked
down on the protests 114.
With the growth of the FSA and its transformation from a ‘neighbourhoodprotection’ force increasingly to a national coalition of locally-organised and wellmanned brigades capable of seizing territory from the Assad regime, the FSA’s
calls for external support (both in the form of the No-Fly Zone and the provision
of arms) would lose it support amongst many ‘anti-war’ and anti-establishment
movements in the West. Whilst the US and its Western allies officially opposed
the provision of arms until 2013 (relying only on ‘non-lethal aid’), the US and its
Western allies repeatedly called on Assad to step down, arguing that there was ‘no
military solution’ to the conflict. With the significant escalation of the war in
2013, and the public US abandonment of its ‘anti-arming’ stance under regional
(i.e. Saudi and Qatari) and domestic pressure, the rebels would be increasingly
demonised in ‘alternative’ media coverage – with this demonisation reaching a
height today. With the increasing death toll in the war, Western anti114
Clinton, H., ‘Syrian President Assad Regarded As a ‘Reformer,’ Clinton Says’, CNS News, 2011 <Available at:
www.cnsnews.com/news/article/syrian-president-assad-regarded-reformer-clinton-says> [Accessed 25th
August]
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establishment movements, alternative media platforms and leftist and anti-war
coalitions would increasingly point at the ‘Western-backed’ rebels as the
destabilising source of the continued conflict in Syria. Accordingly, ‘the West’s’
demand for regime-change and proclaimed ‘obsession’ with getting rid of Assad
was seen as the obstacle to a political solution 115. Following the rise of ISIS in
2013, the rebels (most of whom were Muslims belonging to moderate Islamic
brigades within the FSA, a decentralised coalition whose programme argued for
religious pluralism and multi-confessionalism within a civil state, which they
argued did not contradict a role for Islamic in public affairs 116) would
subsequently be equated with the religious extremists, with the term ‘moderate
rebel’ becoming a widely-derided label. The rise of ISIS would be cited by antiestablishment movements as proof of the folly of ‘supporting the rebels’ and belief
that the West should now abandon ‘regime-change’ in Syria 117. Whilst these
narratives varied in the extent of their ‘anti-regime-change’ scope, many of them
posited Assad as a ‘lesser evil’ to not only ISIS, but all of the opposition forces
(which were portrayed as either ISIS or ISIS-lite). Ironically, this ‘lesser evil’
approach towards Assad was of course one which was also publicly adopted by
many members of the ‘Western establishment’ as well as ‘mainstream media’
115
Cooke, S., ‘How Obama Chose War Over Peace in Syria’, Counterpunch, Mar 2013 <Available at:
https://www.counterpunch.org/2013/03/29/how-obama-chose-war-over-peace-in-syria/> [Accessed 26th
August 2017]; Murray, A., ‘Should Britain jump into the toxic mix of military intervention in Syria?’, Stop the
War Coalition, Oct 2015 <Available at:
http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news-comment/669-should-britain-jump-into-the-toxic-mix-ofmilitary-intervention-in-syria> [Accessed 25th August 2017]
116
Indeed, research led by Vera Mironova showed that most Syrian rebels interviewed including in rebel
Islamist coalitions such as the Islamic Front believed that representative democracy was the best form of
government. For summary see McCarthy, J., ‘Voices of Syria’, Harvard Gazette, April 2015 <Available at:
http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2015/04/voices-of-syria/> [Accessed 25th August 2017]; For full
report, see: Mironova, V., Marie, L., & Whitt, S., ‘Fight or Flight in Civil War? Evidence from Rebel-Controlled
Syria’, 2015 <Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2478682f> [Accessed 25th
August 2017]
117
“Even more unrealistic are US plans to build up the Free Syrian Army (FSA) as a counter weight to the IS.
The FSA is Sunni and has the same objective as the Islamic State, ousting the Assad regime in Damascus.”
[Emphasis added] - Taylor,J. ”ISIS: Do Obama and Cameron understand what they are getting us into in Syria?”,
Stop the War Coalition, Sept 2014, <Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/news-comment/1197-isis-doobama-and-cameron-understand-what-they-are-getting-us-into> [Accessed 24th August 2017];
Sachs, J., ‘Obama opened the door to ISIS and is architect of chaos in Iraq, Syria and Libya’, Stop the War
Coalition, Aug. 2014 <Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news-comment/1301-obamaopened-the-door-to-isis-and-is-architect-of-the-chaos-in-iraq-syria-and-libya> [Accessed 25th August 2017];
Sinclair, I., ‘Eight facts everyone should know about the rise of ISIS and the new war in Iraq’, Stop the War
Coalition/Peace News, Sep 2014 <Available at:http://stopwar.org.uk/index.php/usa-war-on-terror/1257-tenways-to-tell-kony-2012-is-a-warmongering-hoax http://peacenews.info/blog/7760/8-facts-everyone-shouldknow-about-iraq-crisis> [Accessed 25th August 2017]
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narratives – not to mention the Western ‘alt-right’, whereby Western far-right
parties were unanimous in their support for the ‘anti-Islamic terrorism’ Assad
regime 118.
Thus, the most widespread alternative narrative explaining the rise of ISIS over
the past few years has been that the United States and/or its regional allies have
‘funded ISIS’ by virtue of their attempts to get rid of Assad and their support for
the ‘so-called Syrian rebels’ 119. This was combined with citing ISIS as a product of
the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Whilst left-wing alternatives approached this
narrative from a perspective of opposing Western interventionism and perceived
‘regime-change’, the far-right alternatives approached it largely from a
perspective of believing that their establishments were ‘too lenient’ on Islamic
118
Sly, L. & Noack, N., ‘Syria’s Assad has become an icon of the far right in America’, Washington Post, August
2017 <Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/13/syrias-assad-hasbecome-an-unexpected-icon-of-the-far-right-in-america/?utm_term=.c56629732baf> [Accessed 25th August
2017]; Macdonald, A., ‘Europe's far-right activists continue to throw their weight behind Syria's Assad’, Middle
East Eye, Feb 2015 <Available at:
http://www.middleeasteye.net/in-depth/features/europes-far-right-activists-continue-throw-their-weightbehind-syrias-assad> [Accessed 25th August 2017]; Strømmen, Ø, ‘Assad’s far-right Europe corps?’, Hate
Speech International, Nov. 2013 <Available at: https://www.hate-speech.org/other-volunteers/> [Accessed
25th August 2017]; Whelan, B., ‘Are Greek Neo-Nazi Mercenaries Fighting for Assad in Syria?’, Vice News, Oct.
2013 <Available at:
https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/8gd9ev/are-greek-neo-nazis-fighting-for-assad-in-syria1> [Accessed 25th
August 2017]
119
Sinclair, I., op. cit. ; Sinclair, I. ”Inconvenient truth – the West's intervention in Syria is key reason for growth
of ISIS”, Stop the War Coalition/New Left Project, Aug 2014, <Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/newscomment/1282-inconvenient-truth-the-west-rsquo-s-intervention-in-syria-is-key-reason-for-growth-of-isis>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]; Milne, S. ”Now the truth emerges: how the US fuelled the rise of Isis in Syria and
Iraq”, Stop the War Coalition, June 2015, <Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/03/us-isis-syria-iraq> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Ultimately one of the most noticeable things about the rise of ISIS is the absence of an alternative narrative to
explain its rise beyond one which find its answer in “Islamic extremism” (i.e. the dominant mainstream one). In
the Syrian context alternative platforms and outputs have from the beginning of the conflict sought to portray
that the Syrian revolutionary movement was dominated by sectarian, intolerant ‘anti-minority’ Muslim
extremists. All these would point out to Daesh or al-Qaeda as the cause rather than the symptom of a
problem, and as proof of the invalidity of any originally cited cause of grievance.
Further propagated was the notion and suspicion held by many within anti-establishment circles that the West
‘was not really fighting extremism in Syria’, if not that the West was actively ‘supporting Islamist extremism in
Syria’. The logical consequence of what follows is a lack of recognition of the tens of thousands of airstrikes
(and accompanied destruction to life and property, from an anti-imperialist point of view) launched by
Western warplanes on the towns and cities held by ISIS (and other groups arbitrarily deemed to be
“extremist”) – thus entailing a denial and lack of coverage of the casualties and suffering caused by “the
West”. The result consequently was not only one that did not constitute ‘anti-imperialism’, but propagation of
narratives which actively distracted from Western imperialism’s actual policies.
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extremism, and that Barack Obama (the first Black and ‘potentially-Muslim’
president - in the eyes of the alt-right) was actively funding it overseas. According
to the latter, Assad was to be applauded for his ‘iron fist’ against barbaric Islamic
extremists who the West foolishly believed had democrats amongst them.
Beyond the fact that the Assad regime is on record killing multiple times the
number of civilians as ISIS (or that the vast majority of refugees polled have
stated that they have fled the regime 120), and beyond the fact that “regimechange” was not a Western-orchestrated demand, but the chant of the Arab
Spring protesters (‘Al-Sha’b yoreed isqat al-nizam’ – “the people want the
downfall of the regime”) - or the fact that Western support for such a popular and
democratic demand (if true) would be justifiable, such narratives ultimately rely
on a thorough misunderstanding of US policy on Syria. Here, a key metric was the
inability to distinguish between the US demand for Assad to ‘step-down’, and for
the very different demand of ‘regime-change’. US policy in Syria was not – from
the very start – one of ‘regime change’. Indeed, as we will see this wasn’t an
‘undeclared’ matter consisting only of undeclared US policy on the ground, but
was explicitly declared at various points in policy statements which went largely
uncovered (both in mainstream and alternative media, whose “regime-change”
understanding of US policy in Syria continued to revolve around the statement
that ‘Assad should step down’).
As stated, the US publicly opposed the militarisation of the rebellion between
2011-2013, arguing (much like its ‘alternative’ counterparts) that arming the
rebels would increase the violence 121, and that both the regime and the
120
Johnson, B., ‘Assad Killed Nearly Nine Times as Many Civilians as ISIS in 2015, Says NGO’, PJ Media, Jan 2016
<Available at: https://pjmedia.com/news-and-politics/2016/1/4/assad-killed-nearly-nine-times-as-manycivilians-as-isis-in-2015-says-ngo/> [Accessed 25th August 2017]; Berlin Social Service Center in Osborne, S., ‘8
graphs that challenge what you think you know about Syrian refugees in Europe’, The Independent, October
2015 <Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/8-graphs-that-challenge-what-youthink-you-know-about-syrian-refugees-in-europe-a6689021.html> [Accessed 25th August 2017]
121
See for example: State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland :“We continue to believe that further
arms into Syria is not the answer. Silencing the guns is the answer, and that is the trajectory that we are
working on” – Nuland, V. (US State Department Spokesperson), ‘Daily Press briefing’, 2012 <Available at:
rd
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/02/183913.htm> [Accessed 23 August 2017]; White House
Spokesman Jay Carney: "We still believe that a political solution is what's needed in Syria… we don't want to
take actions that would contribute to the further militarisation of Syria…” – Carney, J., ‘Syria: Sunday Times
journalist Marie Colvin 'killed in Homs'’, The Telegraph, 2012 <Available at:
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opposition’s guns should be ‘silenced’ 122. Whilst this period has been commonly
referred to as one of US ‘non-intervention’, this is a false categorisation. Indeed,
during this period the US had been rigorously intervening, in the form of
monitoring and controlling the arms supplies crossing into Syria via Jordan and
Turkey, as well as exerting strong diplomatic pressure on regional countries
(mainly Saudi Arabia and Qatar) to refrain from arming the rebels. The nature of
this intervention however has both been underplayed and misunderstood. The
CIA would routinely seize arms shipments at Syrian border crossings, both
private and governmental (including shipments of light weaponry); meanwhile,
the US imposed an embargo on the third-party provision of heavy, ‘gamechanging’ qualitative weaponry – such as anti-aircraft defences (possessed in
Qatari and Saudi stocks) and until 2014, guided anti-tank missiles (Saudi Arabia
and Qatar would be permitted for a period of time to provide these, albeit in
restricted and monitored quantities) 123. Indeed, the US would attempt to
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9097762/Syria-Sunday-Times-journalistrd
Marie-Colvin-killed-in-Homs.html> [Accessed 23 August 2017]
122
See for example: Senior State Department official: “Our main focus and the focus that we have with our
partners is on trying to get the guns silenced, first and foremost, Asad’s guns silenced… but everybody with
influence working with the opposition to make clear that their guns should be silenced as well” - Senior State
Department official, ‘Special briefing: senior State Department officials en route to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, media
release’, US State Department, 2012, <Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/187218.htm>
[Accessed 23rd August 2017]
123
On seizing of weapons shipments:
- “The rebels were […] continuing to assert that they lacked the firepower to fight a military armed with tanks,
artillery, multiple rocket launchers and aircraft … Many were also complaining, saying they were hearing from
arms donors that the Obama administration was limiting their supplies and blocking the distribution of the
antiaircraft and anti-armor weapons they most sought.” - Nissenbaum, D., ‘Private Group Sought to Arm Syrian
Rebels’, The Wall Street Journal , 2014, <Available at:
th
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304655304579549630324551774> [Accessed on 15 August 2017];
- “The Pentagon and CIA ramped up their presence on Turkey’s southern border… In July [2012], the U.S.
effectively halted the delivery of at least 18 Manpads sourced from Libya, even as the rebels pleaded for more
effective antiaircraft missiles to counter regime airstrikes in Aleppo, people familiar with that delivery said.” Malas, N., ‘Syrian Rebels Get Missiles’, The Wall Street Journal , 2012, <Available at:
th
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443684104578062842929673074> [Accessed on 17
August 2017];
- “Over the past 10 months, a Syrian opposition official told The Sunday Times, the CIA has blocked shipments
of heavy anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, which rebel units of the Free Syrian Army have long said are vital
to their efforts to overthrow the regime of President Bashar al-Assad.” - ‘CIA allegedly overseeing arms into
Syria’, UPI, 2012, <Available at: http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2012/08/13/CIA-allegedly-overseeingth
arms-into-Syria/UPI-93401344880820/> [Accessed 24 August 2017]; Follian, J., ‘CIA chokes rebels’ weapon
supply amid Islamist fears’, The Sunday Times, 2012 <Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ciath
chokes-rebels-weapon-supply-amid-islamist-fears-zfjk2b9rfnb>[Accessed on 24 August 2017];
- Paraszczuk, J., ‘Syria Special: The US-Saudi Conflict over Arms to Insurgents’ , EA Worldview, 2013, <Available
at: http://eaworldview.com/2013/06/syria-special-the-us-saudi-conflict-over-arms-to-insurgents/>, [Accessed
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redirect rebel efforts away from Assad as early as 2014, and consistently
therefter 124.
This was because the US opposed a ‘military solution’ to be imposed by ‘any side’
– this included the armed opposition, and was declaredly against rebels bringing
about a forced ‘collapse’ of the Syrian regime (entailing the defeat of the Syrian
Army) 125. A FSA fighter would encapsulate US policy in 2013 in the following
terms: “The Americans want the (rebellion) to continue but they are not allowing
enough supplies in to make the Damascus regime fall” 126, whilst another member
stated: “For the US, the dilemma has always been how to bring the Assad regime
to serious negotiations without damaging it to the point where it collapses" 127.
Thus there were ‘red-lines’ on rebel operational activity, with unauthorised rebel
th
on 24 August 2017]
On US embargo on anti-aircraft weaponry:
Lister, C. , ‘Russia’s Intervention in Syria: Protracting an Already Endless Conflict’, The Huffington Post, 2012,
<Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-lister/russias-intervention-inth
s_b_8350266.html?ir=Australia>, [Accessed on 24 August 2017]; Engel, P. , ‘Senior US official describes the
'nightmare' scenario in Syria right now’, Business Insider, 2015 <Available at:
http://uk.businessinsider.com/us-official-describes-nightmare-manpad-scenario-in-syria-2015-10>, [Accessed
th
on 24 August 2017]; M.E.N. , ‘U.S., Jordan Block MANPADS To Rebels’, Middle East Newsline, 2012,
<Available at: http://www.menewsline.com/article-27134-U-S-Jordan-Block-MANPADS-To-Reb.aspx>,
th
[Accessed on 24 August 2017]
124
Sands, P., ‘America's hidden agenda in Syria's war’, The National, 2013, <Available at:
https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/america-s-hidden-agenda-in-syria-s-war-1.449522>[Accessed on
th
24 August 2017];
- “They only give weapons to those who specifically fight ISIS. They are not giving us weapons to fight Assad,
they give us weapons to fight ISIS” – SRF Fighter, “Syria’s Unending Rebel Conflict: Wolves of the Valley”, Vice
News, 25 April 2014,<Available at:
th
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=9Cb3OURdl3g> [Accessed 24 August 2017];
- “By September 2014 the United States started to pressure us to leave the battle field against Assad and to
send all our forces to fight ISIS. We had no problem to go fight ISIS, but wouldn’t agree to stop fighting Assad.
From then on, our relations with the Americans went from bad to worse and eventually they stopped backing
us. When Jabhat al-Nusra attacked us, we had already lost all foreign support…because we dared to disobey
the Americans.” - Legrand, F., Foreign Backers and the Marginalization of the Free Syrian Army, Arab Reform
Initiative, 2016, <http://www.arab-reform.net/en/node/1007> [Accessed 24th August 2017
125
Luce, D., ‘CIA: US does not want to see Assad fall’, The Times of Israel, 2015, <Available at:
www.timesofisrael.com/cia-us-does-not-want-to-see-syrian-regime-collapse/>
th
[Accessed on 24 August 2017]
126
Follain, J. & Allen-Mills, T., ‘CIA chokes rebels’ weapon supply amid Islamist fears’. The Times, 2012,
<Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/cia-chokes-rebels-weapon-supply-amid-islamist-fearsth
zfjk2b9rfnb> [Accessed 19 August 2017]
127
Azm, A., ‘Why are US-made anti-tank missiles showing up in Syria?, PRI, 2014, <Available at:
th
https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-04-17/why-are-us-made-anti-tank-missiles-showing-syria> [Accessed 24
August 2017]
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offensives often resulting in a freezing of ammunition lines
128.
Instead, US policy
consisted of attempting to exert pressure on the influential power-holders within
the Syrian military to sacrifice Assad. Indeed, it was later revealed that the US
attempted in 2011 to encourage an intra-regime coup by the Syrian military
which would push out Assad, similar to the experience of SCAF in Egypt 129. This
policy never changed, and was succinctly expressed by US Secretary of State John
Kerry: John Kerry: “If you don’t want the government to crash, you can’t have
Assad go boom” 130. In short, the critical nuance of US policy – so often missed by
‘anti-establishment’ parties – was the US wanted Assad to resign, not fall (a
resignation would preserve the regime, a fall would not). The US policy however
was always likely to lead to Assad himself staying in place, since by 2012 it was
clear that unlike the cases of Tunisia, Egypt or to a lesser extent Yemen, the core
of the Syrian state had decided to stick with Assad and tied its fortunes with him;
thus, retaining the Syrian regime was always likely to retain its central figure
Assad as well, the effectively publicly-admitted outcome of US-led policy today
131.
Iraq
Another main narrative for the rise of ISIS is the 2003 occupation and invasion of
Iraq. Yet whilst this narrative has been propagated heavily by anti-war and ‘antiestablishment’ movements, it can hardly be categorised as exclusive to that
milieu; indeed, mainstream and ‘establishment’ opinion largely acknowledges
128
Szakoloa, A., ‘South Syria rebels ordered to not attack regime-held town: report’, Now Media, 2016,
<Available at: https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/567284-south-syria-rebels-ordered-to-not-attackth
regime-held-town-report>, [Accessed on 24 August 2017]; Lucas, S., ‘Syria Feature: Joint Operations Room in
Jordan Halted Rebel Assault on Key Regime Airbase’, EA Worldview, 2015, <Available at:
http://eaworldview.com/2015/06/syria-feature-joint-operations-room-in-jordan-halted-rebel-assault-on-keyth
regime-airbase/ > [Accessed on 24 August 2017]
Szakoloa, A , ‘Daraa rebels ordered to stop fighting Syria regime: report’, Now Media, 2016, <Available at:
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/566514-daraa-rebels-ordered-to-stop-fighting-syria-regimeth
report> [Accessed on 24 August 2017]
129
Malas, N. & Lee, C.., ‘U.S. Pursued Secret Contacts With Assad Regime for Years’, Wall Street Journal, 2015,
<Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-pursued-secret-contacts-with-assad-regime-for-yearsth
1450917657>[Accessed 24 August 2017]. This was also the US policy towards the ‘betrayed’ Iraqi rebellion
against Saddam Hussein of 1991, with which many similarities exist with Syria today.
130
Kerry, J. in Remnick, D., ‘Negotiating the Whirlwind: Can Secretary of State John Kerry break through in
Syria?’, The New Yorker, 2015, <Available at: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/12/21/negotiatingth
the-whirlwind>, [Accessed on 25 August 2017]
131
Tillerson, R., ‘US signals openness to Assad staying put’, CNN, March 2017 <Available at:
http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/30/politics/tillerson-haley-syria-assad-turkey/index.html> [Accessed 25th
August 2017]
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that the invasion of Iraq played a role in the rise of ISIS (including the likes of
Tony Blair) 132. Whilst the occupation of Iraq (and the oft-forgotten decade of
suffocating economic sanctions of the 1990s that preceded it) and the
disbandment of the Iraqi Army provided the Islamic State of Iraq (or ISI, as it was
then – alternatively known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq or AQI) with much of its strength,
arguments drawing the invasion to ISIS have often not sufficiently examined the
period in between – i.e. the aftermath of the US-led Coalition withdrawal. For the
reality was that in 2008 ISI was defeated in a popular insurgency carried out by
Iraq’s Sunni tribes (who had previously been allied with it against the Coalition
forces and the Central government of Nouri al-Maliki) within the space of a few
months, in what was known as the Anbar Awakening
133.
The ‘awakening’ took
place after Sunni communities grew tired of ISI and received US assurances of an
end to state discrimination and marginalisation which had occurred in the
aftermath of the invasion by the Coalition-backed Maliki government (promises
which ultimately went unfulfilled, leading to the Iraqi Spring protests of 2012 134).
Indeed, when the Arab Spring protests broke out, Al-Qaeda was generally noted
by its absence.
After ISI was driven underground from its popular constituencies, the Sunni Arab
minority continued to be targeted for discrimination, abuse and arbitrary
detention (either under anti-terror or anti-Ba’athist laws) by the central
government 135. The issue of the sexual abuse of Iraqi Sunni women detainees in
particular would serve as a major spark for the renewed uprising of 2012 136.
132
Blair, T., ‘Tony Blair Says 2003 Iraq Invasion Played a Role in Rise of ISIS’, Time Magazine, Oct. 2015
<Available at:
http://time.com/4086381/tony-blair-isis-iraq-invasion/> [Accessed 25th August 2017]
133
Lister, C., The Syrian jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the evolution of an insurgency, Oxford University
Press, 2016, pp. 268-270
134
Caputi, R. ”Iraqi protests defy the Maliki regime and inspire hope”, The Guardian, 2013, <Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/17/iraq-protest-defy-maliki-regime> [Accessed 24th
August 2017]
135
Lister, C., op. cit.
136
HRW Press. ”“No One is Safe””, Human Rights Watch, 2014, <Available at:
https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/06/no-one-safe/abuse-women-iraqs-criminal-justice-system> [Accessed
24th August 2017]
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Furthermore, the re-emergence of ISIS there was also a notorious ‘stolen election’
in 2010, whereby the Sunni community voted in great numbers for the Shia (but
Iraqi nationalist) Iyad Alawi, whose parliamentary block “Al-Iraqia” (“The Iraqi”)
went on to win a majority of seats in the election and defeating the incumbent
Shia Islamist Da’wa Party of Nouri al-Maliki. However the sectarian and Iraniansupported Maliki refused to give up power, and the theft of the election indeed
took place with the direct abetting of the United States, with one poignant
example of a US official declaring “Iraq was not ready for democracy… and
needed a strongman like Maliki” 137.
The crackdown by the Iraqi government on the Iraqi Spring protests and sit-ins
demanding the ‘fall of the regime’ in 2012-13 – and al-Maliki’s use of sectarian
language to describe the protesters –served as the ‘last straw’ for the Sunni
community, who took up arms again against the state. A Sunni insurgent
coalition (of which ISIS was one constituent, fighting alongside an Iraqi
‘revolutionary’ coalition including Sunni tribal forces, Iraqi Ba’athists and
mainstream Islamists) would take Fallujah, Ramadi and Mosul in 2014 and reach
the environs of Baghdad 138. Nouri al-Maliki would resign under both domestic
and US pressure (and would be accused of complicity in the Iraqi Army’s collapse
in Mosul 139).
The US would subsequently announce its intention to support the government
against the insurgency, and the prospect of US intervention would lead to the
137
Sky, E. ”How Obama Abandoned Democracy in Iraq”, Politico, 2015, <Available at:
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/04/obama-iraq-116708_Page2.html#.WaxYILKGPIV>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
138
For more on the various actors within the Iraqi insurgency:
Hassan, H. ”Maliki’s alienation of Sunni actors is at the heart of ISIS’s success in Iraq.”, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2014, <Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/55930> [Accessed 24th August
2017]; Arraf, J. ”Middle East- Iraq’s Sunni tribal leaders say fight for Fallujah is part of a revolution”, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2014, <Available at:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqs-sunni-tribal-leaders-say-fight-for-fallujah-is-partof-a-revolution/2014/03/12/cac86d7a-9f19-11e3-b8d8-94577ff66b28_story.html?utm_term=.225189b4e03c>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]; Khasraw, Z. ”Who is in control of Mosul?”, Open Democracy, 2014, <Available at:
https://www.opendemocracy.net/zana-khasraw-gul/who-is-in-control-of-mosul> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
139
AJE Agencies. ”Iraq probe implicates Maliki over Mosul's fall to ISIL”, Al Jazeera English, 2015, <Available at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/08/iraq-probe-implicates-maliki-mosul-fall-isil150816165729860.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
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withdrawal of the non-ISIS forces (including the Military Council of Iraqi
Revolutionaries or MCIR, the Supreme Council for Jihad and Liberation, the Free
Iraqi Army, the Army of Islam and the Anbar tribal council) from the antigovernment frontlines to avoid impending US airstrikes, leaving the armed
insurgency to the domination of ISIS. However, allegations of sectarian abuse by
pro-government forces would in fact subsequently increase - with the formation
of the paramilitary coalition (later integrated into the Iraqi military) known as the
Popular Mobilisation Units (dominated by pro-Iran Shia Islamist militias) in the
aftermath of the Iraqi Army’s collapse in Mosul. In subsequent years (including in
the recent recapture of Mosul), the US-led Coalition would heavily rely on the
PMUs in pro-government ground offensives – yet the PMUs have been accused
by human rights groups of ‘cleansing’ recaptured Sunni territories, razing entire
villages to the ground, and systematic torture and extra-judicial execution of noncombatants on the basis of sectarian identity, and rights groups have called on
Western governments to cease arms provision to Iraq
140.
In the case of Syria, there has been a much-marginalised reporting of the role of
support by Western powers for the Assad regime (largely because it has been
viewed as unintuitive considering the constantly-repeated declarations that
‘Assad should step down’). This has not only included the indirect form
aforementioned – the United States blockading the supply of Arab weaponry to
the rebel forces – but has also included the direct sharing of intelligence, the
carrying out of joint airstrikes (on ISIS-held towns and cities) and even on
occasion providing air-cover to pro-Assad ground forces (this included the US-led
140
HRW, ”After Liberation Came Destruction: Iraqi Militias and the Aftermath of Amerli”, Human Rights Watch,
2015, <Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/03/18/after-liberation-came-destruction/iraqimilitias-and-aftermath-amerli> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Luther, P. ”Iraqis fleeing IS-held areas face
torture, disappearance and death in revenge attacks”, Amnesty International, 2015, <Available at:
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/10/iraqis-fleeing-is-held-areas-face-torture-disappearanceand-death-in-revenge-attacks/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Associated Press, ”Iraqi Shia Militias Fighting ISIS
Are Kicking Sunnis Out Of Their Homes”, UK Business Insider, 2015, <Available at:
http://uk.businessinsider.com/iraqi-shia-militias-fighting-isis-are-kicking-sunnis-out-of-their-homes-2015-1>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]; Beauchamp, Z. ”The US uses Iraq's Shia militias to fight ISIS. They just got
accused of ethnic cleansing.”, VOX, 2015, <Available at: https://www.vox.com/2016/2/5/10918780/shiamilitias-diyala-cleansing> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Amnesty. ”Iraq: End irresponsible arms transfers
fuelling militia war crimes”, Amnesty International, 2017, <Available at:
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/01/iraq-end-irresponsible-arms-transfers-fuelling-militia-warcrimes/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
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Coalition even providing air-support to foreign pro-Assad militias in Palmyra –
including Hezbollah and brigades from the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Units
fighting for Assad in Syria) 141. Thus, Syrian residents would often declare that a)
the entry of of the US-led Coalition led to an intensification of bombardment by
the Syrian regime 142, b) that there was certain coordination between the two
airforces in order to avoid airborne accidents 143 (this was admitted by Assad 144),
141
- Sharing of intelligence:
Porter, T. ”US Gives Intelligence To Assad For Targetting Isis Commanders”, International Business Times, 2014,
<Available at: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/us-gives-intelligence-assad-targetting-isis-commanders-1462375>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]; Khoury, J. ”Report: U.S. Providing Assad Regime With anti-Islamic State
Intelligence”, Haaretz, 2014, <Available at: http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium-1.615892>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]; Hughes, C. ”ISIS air strikes: MI6 in secret talks with Syrian dictator Bashar alAssad’s regime”, Mirror, 2014, <Available at: http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/isis-air-strikes-mi6secret-4336637> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Carrying out of joint airstrikes:
Reuters. ”U.S., regime air strikes kill 20 people in Aleppo: reporter”, Zaman Alwasl, 2014, <Available at:
https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/16357.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Ara News, “U.S. and Syrian
warplanes launch simultaneous strikes against ISIS in Raqqa”, ARA, May 2015 <Available at:
http://aranews.net/2015/05/u-s-and-syrian-warplanes-launch-simultaneous-strikes-against-isis-in-raqqa/>
[Accesesed 24th August 2017]; Dettmer, J., ‘Here’s How Obama and Assad Team Up Against ISIS’, The Daily
Beast, Oct 2015 <Available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/heres-how-obama-and-assad-team-up-againstisis?utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=dlvr.it
Support for ground forces:
Ara News, “U.S. warplanes and pro-Assad forces target ISIS locations in Hasakah”, ARA, November 2014
<Available at:http://aranews.net/2014/11/u-s-warplanes-pro-assad-forces-target-isis-locations-hasakah/>
[Accessed 24th August 2017];
Sly, L, “Hezbollah, Russia and the U.S. help Syria retake Palmyra”, Washington Post, November 2014 <Available
at:https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrian-army-retakes-the-ancient-city-of-palmyra-from-theislamic-state/2017/03/02/fe770c78-ff63-11e6-9b78-824ccab94435_story.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
Fadl, L, “Nowhere to Retreat for ISIS Militants in Deir Ezzor; Syrian Army Intensifies Their Attacks in the West”,
ADN News, November 2014 <Available at:https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/nowhere-retreat-isismilitants-deir-ezzor-syrian-army-intensifies-attacks-west/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
142
“Syrian warplanes used to shell us two or three times a week but now they target us every day thanks to
the coalition forces,” Faris Samir, from Harm in the northern Idlib region, complained on Thursday. “We are
losing martyrs and many get injured but no one pays any attention. Now the Syrian [regime] army is taking
areas bombed by the coalition forces after the Islamic factions withdraw. I have to say that the coalition
military campaign is in the interest of the Syrian regime and against the Syrian people.”' –Black, I. ”Coalition air
strikes against Isis aid Bashar al-Assad, Syrian rebels claim”, The Guardian, October 2014, <Available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/09/syria-isis-bashar-al-assad-coalition-air-strikes> [Accessed
24th August 2017]
143
“The American and Syrian warplanes are flying in the same airspace,” he expounds incredulously. “There
has to be some communication for them to avoid each other!"
Dettmer, J. ”Why Does the Free Syrian Army Hate Us?”, The Daily Beast, March 2014, <Available at:
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/10/03/why-does-the-free-syrian-army-hate-us.html> [Accessed
24th August 2017]
144
Assad, B., ”Assad says Syria is informed on anti-IS air campaign”, BBC News, Feb 2015, <Available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-31312414> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
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with the two ‘taking turns’ in such places as Raqqa 145 and c) that in certain areas,
both the US-led Coalition and the Syrian Airforce would bomb them
simultaneously 146. It should be noted that the Syrian regime’s deployment of its
airforce (from 2012 to 2017) represents the longest by any government inside its
own borders in history; the rebel-held half of Aleppo, for instance, had been
bombed more than any other city since the Second World War prior to its
recapture by the Assad regime 147. Not only has the United States blockaded Arab
allies from providing crucial anti-aircraft defences to the Syrian rebels (indeed,
the US has even refused to provide early radar warnings of incoming regime
airstrikes to the Syrian Civil Defence, commonly known as the ‘White
Helmets’ 148), but it actively joined the same airspace as the Assad regime’s in
2014 (the UK would join in 2015).
Indeed, the US-led intervention in 2014 was welcomed by the Syrian regime 149
(by contrast to the intervention was being termed a ‘backdoor’ regime-change
145
"[The U.S.] bombed Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, parts of Homs and Aleppo. But [their] airplanes fly over our city
along with the regime air force, which means that they and the regime are coordinating. They say they don't
want to coordinate with the Assad regime, but [U.S.] planes are flying with the regime’s in the same air space"
Assad, B.. ”Assad says Syria is informed on anti-IS air campaign”, BBC, Feb 2015, <Available at:
http://www.worldcrunch.com/54d9089fd29b53f0e879ecc81cd99d34/world-affairs/no-the-progressive-syrianopposition-is-not-dead/protests-raed-fares-activism-assad/c1s17292/#.VEzWuxYxg1J> [Accessed 24th August
2017]
“The politics don’t matter to the people here, all we see is one type of death - it comes from the sky, whether
the Americans are dropping the bombs or Assad, it makes no difference. They are both murdering us. What do
you expect any sane person to think here? One day American airplanes and the next Bashar’s, how do they not
crash or shoot each other? It is simple, they call each other and say today is my turn to kill the people of
Raqqa, please don’t bother me, it will be yours tomorrow." –
Dark, E. ”Sharing the skies with Assad: America’s predicament in Syria”, Middle East Eye, Nov 2014, <Available
at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/sharing-skies-assad-america-s-predicament-syria-1105355734>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
146
"We are seeing coalition warplanes hit targets during the day in Raqqa province and then Syrian warplanes
follow-up with more indiscriminate strikes at night,” a commander with the Free Syrian Army told The Daily
Beast. “This is not a coincidence—to argue that it is stretches credulity”" –
Dettmer, J. ”Here’s How Obama and Assad Team Up Against ISIS”, Middle East Eye, Dec 2015, <Available at:
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/10/here-s-how-obama-and-assad-team-up-against-isis.html>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
147
Roussinos, A., “Ghosts of Aleppo”, Vice, October 2014, <Available at: https://news.vice.com/video/ghostsof-aleppo-full-length/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
148
The Syria Campaign, ‘Warn Civilians about incoming barrel bombs’, The Syria Campaign, 2015 <Available at:
th
https://act.thesyriacampaign.org/sign/warn_civilians_of_attacks/> [Accessed on 25 August 2017]
149
Mualem, W., “AP INTERVIEW: Syrian foreign minister says Syria 'OK' with US airstrikes in his country”,
Associated Press, September 2014 <Available at: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/09/29/ap-interview-
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plot by anti-war movements 150). Assad himself would boast that Western
governments “attack us politically and then they send officials to deal with us
under the table, especially the security” 151 152. Indeed, the US-led Coalition did
not only target ISIS-held territories (or the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front), but
also repeatedly targeted mainstream rebel factions. This in particular took place
in 2015, when a largely independent rebel coalition refused to comply with USestablished operational ‘red-lines’ and launched an offensive on the Assad
regime’s coastal heartland of Latakia. Amongst the targeted groups were an FSA
brigade as well as the mainstream Islamist coalition, the Islamic Front 153. As well
syrian-foreign-minister-says-syria-ok-with-us-airstrikes-in-his.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Mualem, W.,
“Exclusive: Syrian minister says US-led strikes going in ‘right direction’”, Reuters, September 2014 <Available
at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-minister/exclusive-syrian-minister-says-u-s-led-strikesgoing-in-right-direction-idUSKCN0HJ19S20140924?utm_source=twitter> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
150
STWC, “Stop the War Coalition Briefing: Syria: Safe Havens and No-Fly Zones”, Stop the War Coalition,
October 2015 <Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news-comment/58-stop-the-war-coalitionbriefing-safe-havens-and-no-fly-zones> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
151
Assad, B., ”West cooperating secretly with Damascus against militants: Assad”, Reuters, Nov 2014,
<Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-assad/west-cooperating-secretly-withdamascus-against-militants-assad-idUSKCN0ZG28G?utm_source=Facebook&utm_medium=Social> [Accessed
24th August 2017
152
By contrast, the US-led intervention was rejected by the vast majority of armed rebel factions on the
ground – this constituted mainly rebel groups which had already been fighting ISIS for a year, notably (to their
complaint) without US support. These groups often noted the double-standard in targeting ISIS whilst leaving
the regime intact, despite the regime’s far greater crimes, and viewed it as an attempt to pacify the revolution
i
via reopening the door of the ‘War on Terror’ . They also condemned the US for not supporting their year-long
ii
fight against ISIS and ignoring their warnings about the extremist movement
For above, see:
i
Karadjis, M., ‘Why the Syrian rebels oppose U.S. air strikes’, Socialist Worker,2014, <Available at:
th
https://socialistworker.org/2014/10/06/why-syrian-rebels-oppose-us-air-strikes>[Accessed 24 August 2017];
Bayoud, F., ‘FSA founder warns of airstrikes, says ISIS not U.S. target, Zaman AlWasl, 2014, <Available at:
th
https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/6704.html >[Accessed on 27 August 2017]
ii
Sherlock, R., ‘Syria rebels blame US for failing to strike advancing Isil militants in Turkey border town’, The
Telegraph, 2015 <Available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11644674/Syria-rebels-blame-US-for-failingth
to-strike-advancing-Isil-militants-in-Turkey-border-town.html> [Accessed on 24 August 2017]; Inanc, Y.S.,
‘FSA disappointed with US airdropping weapons to Kurds’, Daily Sabah, 2014 <Available at:
http://www.dailysabah.com/mideast/2014/10/23/fsa-disappointed-with-us-airdropping-weapons-to-kurdsl>,
th
[Accessed on 24 August 2017]; Chivers, C.J., ‘Rebels Say West’s Inaction Is Pushing Syrians to Extremism’, The
NY Times, 2016 <Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/06/world/middleeast/rebels-say-weststh
inaction-is-radicalizing-syria.html> [Accessed on 24 August 2017]
153
Weiss, M., ‘Did the U.S. Just Kill 5 Kids in Syria?’, The Daily Beast, 2015, <Available at:
th
www.thedailybeast.com/did-the-us-just-kill-5-kids-in-syria>, [Accessed on 15 August 2017];
AP, “Syrian Ahrar al-Sham rebels targeted in US airstrikes”, The New Arab, Novemeber 2014 <Available at:
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2014/11/6/syrian-ahrar-al-sham-rebels-targeted-in-us-airstrikes>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
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as more than 50,000 ISIS fighters, the US-led intervention has also killed 200
anti-ISIS rebel fighters – another aspect of the Syrian war which has been largely
unknown 154. Meanwhile, the main US-backed group in Syria – the Kurdish-led
‘Syrian Democratic Forces’, has militarily cooperated with the Assad regime and
even returned territories to it (instead of surrendering them to Turkish-backed
FSA groups) 155.
Meanwhile, Western allies in the region have been a major source of manpower
and weaponry for the Assad regime. The Egyptian regime of al-Sisi has been
recorded to have provided both arms and pilots to support the Assad regime
156,
whilst the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces – which since November 2016 were
legally integrated into the Iraqi Armed Forces – a key Western ally in the war
against ISIS inside Iraq have deployed an approximate 20,000 fighters in support
of Assad in Syria 157.
OConner, T “Syria at war: As U.S. bombs rebels, Russia strikes ISIS and Israel targets Assad”, Newsweek, June
2017 <Available at: http://www.newsweek.com/syria-war-us-rebels-russia-isis-israel-569812> [Accessed 24th
August 2017]
154
Al Jazeera; Agencies, ‘Hundreds killed by Russian air strikes in Syria’, Al Jazeera English, 2015, <Available at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/hundreds-killed-russian-air-strikes-syria-151029130146883.html>
th
[Accessed on 25 August 2017]
155
MEE Staff., ‘US-backed Kurdish forces agree to hand over key area to Syrian government’, Middle East Eye,
2017, <Available at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-backed-kurdish-forces-agree-hand-over-keyth
area-syrian-government-2116188328>, [Accessed on 25 August 2017]
156
MEMO Staff., ‘Egyptian military helping Assad forces’, Middle East Monitor, 2016, <Available at:
th
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20161124-egyptian-military-helping-assad-forces/>, [Accessed on 13
August 2017];NOW Staff., ‘Retired general: Egypt arming Syria regime’, NOW Media, 2016, <Available at:
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/565813-retired-general-egypt-arming-syria-regime> [Accessed
th
on 13 August 2017]; Ali, N., ‘Does Sisi Send Weapons to Assad? Egyptian-Made Ammunition Left by Regime
Forces in Aleppo’, Middle East Observer, 2016, <Available at:
https://www.middleeastobserver.org/2016/11/02/does-sisi-send-weapons-to-assad-egyptian-madeth
ammunition-left-by-regime-forces-in-aleppo/>, [Accessed on 13 August 2017]
157
Besides receiving US-led aircover in neighbouring Iraq (and on occasion as in the case of Palmyra, inside
Syria as well), the PMUs receive major Western arms via the central Iraqi government, and have been
i
repeatedly recorded fighting inside Syria with US tanks and APCs provided in Iraq . Indeed, for symbolic value,
the Baghdad airport which serves as a major conduit for the transfer of tens of thousands of Iraqi military
fighters to Syria, is protected by a US military base; in short, the US is fully aware of Iraq’s role in militarily
supporting Assad (and has for years been called upon to condition support to Iraq on its not supporting Assad
ii
– a call it has ignored) . Other US allies such as the UAE, Bahrain, Jordan and Israel have all expressed support
iii
for Russia’s military intervention in 2015 .
For above, see:
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In total, the US-led Coalition has carried out more than 12,000 airstrikes on
Syrian territory 158. Barring four incidents, these bombs have exclusively targeted
territories not controlled by the Syrian regime. These territories on which both
US and Russian bombs fell – provinces such as Raqqa, Deir al-Zor, Manbij as well
as (ISIS-free) Idlib – also happened to be the epicentres of the revolt against the
regime in 2011 (regardless of whether the territories later came under the
occupation of ISIS, which took these territories after significantly outgunning –
not outnumbering – local FSA brigades by virtue of heavy military stocks seized
from the Iraqi Army 159). The US bombs which have fell exclusively in anti-regime
areas and have killed more than 2,000 Syrian civilians 160 – exclusively in antiregime areas, amongst whom will undoubtedly be those who came out on the
streets against Assad in 2011. This therefore means that the reality in Syria –
poignantly unlike the cases of other Arab Spring domains – is that both
the US and Russia have directly killed scores of Arab Spring protesters who went
out in the streets in 2011. That this reality is so little-known and covered by
alternative and anti-war movements points to the serious problem posited by
their fundamental misunderstanding of the conflict.
Thus the reality is that far from ‘regime-change’, US-led Western policy in Syria
has overwhelmingly been one of regime-preservation – whether with Assad
i
Baker, G., ‘American tanks and weapons used by pro-Assad Iraqi militias’, Middle East Eye, February 2016
<Available at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-backed-militias-using-american-tanks-battle809449820> [Accessed 25th August 2017]
ii
See Sabbour, O., ‘Assad’s Secret Ingredient? The Iraqi Military’s Unknown Invasion of Syria’, Huffington Post,
2017 <Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/assads-secret-ingredient-the-iraq-militarysth
unknown_us_5972076be4b0f1feb89b42c2> [Accessed 24 August 2017]
iii
Hearst, D., ‘Russia’s holy war in Syria’, , Middle East Eye, 2015, <Available at:
th
http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/russia-s-holy-war-syria-2076967171>, [Accessed 25 August 2017];
MEE Staff., ‘Bahrain's king hands 'sword of victory' to Putin after Syria talks’, Middle East Eye, 2015, <Available
at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sword-victory-presented-putin-bahraini-king-453188057>,
th
[Accessed 25 August 2017]; Hfeitz, Z., ‘Israel fully supports Russia’s actions to fight terrorism in Syria’, TASS,
th
2016, <Available at: http://tass.ru/en/world/879577> [Accessed 25 August 2017]
158
th
Airwars ‘Coalition Reports’, Airwars, <Available at: https://airwars.org/> [Updated Daily - Accessed on 24
August 2017]
159
This took place following the capture of tonnes of US stockpiles from the Iraqi Army in Mosul in 2014, a
quantity which according to the Guardian’s Middle East Correspondent Martin Chulov, was reportedly
sufficient to “supply any modern army for many years” - Chulov, M., ‘Enemy of Enemies: The Rise of ISIL’, Al
Jazeera English, 2015 <Available at: https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2015/riseofisil/chapter-five.html>
[Accessed 28th August 2017]
160
Airwars, op. cit.
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personally at the helm of the regime or not. This has indeed been explicitly
declared repeatedly and throughout the duration of the Syrian conflict by (largely
marginalised) US statements. Indeed, US officials would repeatedly condemn the
arming of the rebels and pressure Arab states to stop doing so 161 (by contrast to
popular media misrepresentation, the US has only involvement with rebel groups
has been to control what comes in from external sources; the US has only directly
armed groups in Syria which have agreed only to fight ISIS, such as the SDF and
the New Syrian Army 162). The fundamental lack of awareness of these realities (in
exchange only for a single focus on ‘Assad should step down statements’) ensured
an ironic continuity in the demands of many ‘anti-establishment’ groups who
demanded the application of policies already in place for years 163.
161
Worth, R., ‘Citing U.S. Fears, Arab Allies Limit Syrian Rebel Aid, The New YorkTimes , 2012, <Available at:
www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/world/middleeast/citing-us-fears-arab-allies-limit-aid-to-syrian-rebels.html
th
[Accessed on 24 August 2017]; Black, I., ‘Gulf states warned against arming Syria rebels, The Guardian , 2012,
<Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/05/gulf-states-warning-arming-syria>
th
[Accessed on 24 August 2017]; Sands, P., ‘America's hidden agenda in Syria's war’, The National, 2013
<Available at: https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/america-s-hidden-agenda-in-syria-s-warth
1.449522>[Accessed on 24 August 2017]; ‘Mahmoud Marrouch, a young fighter from Liwaa al-Tawhid, the
rural Aleppo group that is believed to have been a major recipient of Qatari arms, says Qatar is like the rest of
the world – promising weapons but not delivering. What the fighters have, he says, was seized from regime
bases, or purchased on the black market. “The Qataris and the Saudis need a green light from America to help
us”’ FT, ‘How Qatar seized control of the Syrian revolution’, FT , 2015, <Available at:
th
https://www.ft.com/content/f2d9bbc8-bdbc-11e2-890a-00144feab7de> [Accessed 24 August 2017]; Black, I.,
‘Syria Crisis: US urges Saudis to support diplomacy to end bloodshed’, 30 March 2015, <Available at:
th
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/30/syria-crisis-saudi-arabia-diplomacy> [Accessed 24 August
2017]
162
i
Thus, media headlines would often describe US airdrops to the SDF as ‘arms drops to the rebels’ – when
the SDF was a group that repeatedly fought the FSA and indeed, collaborated with the Assad regime
ii
consistently – including in the recent fall of Aleppo .
For above, see:
i
As an example: AJE Staff, ”US drops weapons to rebels battling ISIL in Syria”, Al Jazeera, June 2016, <Available
at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/airdrops-arms-rebels-battling-isil-syria-160603035007074.html>
[Accessed 24th August 2017
ii
Ibrahim, A. ”ANALYSIS: The Kurdish 'frenemies' aiding Assad in Aleppo”, Middle East Eye, Nov 2016,
<Available at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/what-role-are-kurdish-ypg-forces-playing-aleppo554547107> [Accessed 24th August 2017
163
This has sometimes even included asking Western governments to support groups such as Hezbollah and
Iranian-backed militias; again, a policy that was applied in places like Iraq and Syria.
See: Cockburn, P., ”The Alice in Wonderland absurdity of Obama's policy for stopping ISIS in Syria”, Stop the
War Coalition/The Independent, Nov 2016 <Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/usa-war-onterror/1198-how-we-are-being-brainwashed-into-a-war-with-iran> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Amal, K.
”There is no such thing as a moderate Syrian opposition”, Open Democracy, Feb 2015, <Available at:
https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/kamal-alam/there-is-no-such-thing-as-moderatesyrian-opposition> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
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Indeed, US statements (since 2012) declared that US ‘support’ for the rebels only
existed as political (not military) form of placing pressure on the regime to
sacrifice Assad in a negotiated ‘political solution’ 164. Not only should this policy
be described as ‘pro-regime’, but it should also be described as ‘pro-Assad’, since
once it became clear (by 2013) that the regime was either not willing or not
capable to sacrifice Assad, the natural terminus of US policy was that Assad
would have remain in power if the regime was also to survive 165. The US – indeed
ironically considering the similar disparagement by anti-establishment outlets –
would consistently justify such a policy both by highlighting the decentralised
nature of the rebels (even though the rebels had nonetheless been able to take
70% of Syrian territory by 2013) and obfuscating the existence of ‘moderates’
fighting Assad. However the reality was not that there was no moderate
alternative, but whether that alternative would be relied upon to serve US
interests 166.
164
Allen, J., ”General John Allen sees FSA role in political, not military solution”, Al Arabiya English, Oct 2014,
<Available at: https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/10/27/John-Allen-sees-FSA-role-inpolitical-not-military-solution.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Kerry, J., ‘John Kerry: U.S. must eventually
negotiate with Assad’, CNN, March 2015 <Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2015/03/15/politics/johnkerry-negotiate-assad-syria/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
165
To put it simply, the first US preference was for Assad to step down in order to stabilise the regime;
however, if the only way to retain the regime in tact was Assad’s remaining in power, this was tacitly accepted
as preferable to the armed rebels bringing a forced ‘fall’ or ‘collapse’ of the regime (whilst UK and French
policy may have differed with the US on this, ultimately the US ensured an veto against ‘regime-change’,
whether via ‘direct’ military intervention or by allowing the rebels to be empowered sufficiently by regional
states with the necessary weaponry).
166
The unequivocal rejection of the rebel groups (across the ideological spectrum, encompassing dozens of
FSA subcoalitions and the Islamic Front) of the US intervention as a ‘violation of national sovereignty’ and an
‘attack on the revolution’, and the rejection of US support against ISIS which was conditional on ceasing the
i
fight against Assad – contrasted for instance with the policy of the SDF, which allowed US military bases to be
constructed in its territory, welcomed the presence of ground US Special Forces (by contrast to anti-ISIS FSA
groups which refused them), agreed not to fight Assad (though this was largely a prexisting pragmatic
arrangement between the Kurdish YPG and the regime), ‘called in’ thousands of US airstrikes against ISIS and
ultimately refused to heed later calls by Syrian revolutionaries and activists to no longer coordinate with them
ii
(due to reports of widespread civilian casualties in areas under US-led bombardment) .
For the above, see:
i
On US conditionalities to fight ISIS only and not Assad:
Weiss, M., ‘Exclusive: Syrian Rebels Backing Out of U.S. Fight Vs. ISIS ‘, The Daily Beast, 2015, <Available at:
th
www.thedailybeast.com/exclusive-syrian-rebels-backing-out-of-us-fight-vs-isis>, [Accessed on 18 August
2017]; “They only give weapons to those who specifically fight ISIS. They are not giving us weapons to fight
Assad, they give us weapons to fight ISIS” [Emphasis added] – SRF Fighter, “Syria’s Unending Rebel Conflict:
Wolves of the Valley”, Vice News, 25 April 2014,<Available at:
th
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=9Cb3OURdl3g> [Accessed 18 August 2017];
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Ironically, the group which would be supported the most in Syria by
establishments (owing to their ‘secular’ - in the context of Syria, ‘non-politicallyIslamic’ nature), right wing anti-establishments (as secular groups fighting
Islamist extremism) and left-wing anti-establishments (as the Kurdish YPG was
left-wing) was the Kurdish YPG – the dominant component of the SDF – despite
this group receiving by far the greatest US support in the conflict. The Orientalist
imagery of supporting the Westernised and secular YPG as ‘relateable’ by the
Western left by contrast to the unfamiliar Islamically-identifiying rebels has been
written extensively on elsewhere 167.
ii.
Influence in the new opposition movements
The widespread disillusionment with Western establishments especially in the
aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis has led to a rise in ‘anti-establishment’
politics, both right and left. Eventually, an infiltration of the ‘alternatives’ into
mainstream politics was manifest, as was the example of the rise of Jeremy
Corbyn to the leadership of the Labour party in the UK, and the rise of Bernie
Sanders and Donald Trump in the US. Amongst all these, an isolationist
(especially economically protectionist) trend would be evidenced.
With regards to the Arab Spring, and in particular Syria – the only sustained
‘original’ Arab Spring protest where the leader did not resign (and the movement
was not crushed) – the dominance of the aforementioned alternative narratives
would doubtlessly influence the politics of the new ‘alternative’ political
Weiss, M., ‘They’ve Got U.S. Guns. Can They Stop ISIS?’, Daily Beast, 2016, <Available at:
th
http://www.thedailybeast.com/theyve-got-us-guns-can-they-stop-isis> [Accessed 19 August 2017]; Fadel, L.,
‘US backed rebels declare neutrality with the Syrian Arab Army’, AMN News, 2016, <Available at:
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/us-backed-rebels-declare-neutrality-syrian-arab-army/>, [Accessed
h
on 24 August 2017]
ii
Wilgenburg, W.V., ‘Kurds to Syrian opposition: halting coalition airstrikes will only help ISIS’, ARA News, July
2016 <Available at: http://aranews.net/2016/07/kurds-syrian-opposition-halting-coalition-airstrikes-will-helpisis/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
167
See Shami, L., ‘The Struggle for Kobane – An Example of Selective Solidarity’ in Alford, J & Wilson, A. (Eds).
Khiyana: Daesh, the Left and the Unmaking of the Syrian Revolution. London: Unkant Publishers, 2016, pp.
197-205; Hamad., S., Anti-anti-Imperialism–The Syrian Revolutionary War and the anti-Imperialist Left in
Alford, J, & Wilson, A. (eds.), op. cit., p88; Yassin-Kassab, R. & Al-Shami, L., Burning country: Syrians in
Revolution and War, London: Pluto Press, 2016
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oppositions, as would soon be exhibited in the foreign policies of Corbyn, Sanders
and Trump 168. All of these would express opposition to a proclaimed US ‘regimechange’ effort in Syria.
Firstly, taking the example of Jeremy Corbyn, the former chair of Stop the War
Coalition – a group which according to Syrian and British Muslim activists
represented one of the main proponents of Assad apologism in the UK (losing it
much of its previously high standing amongst Muslim activists). In 2014, Corbyn
would declare that the FSA included “a wide range of groups few would regard as
moderate” 169 – an allegation repeatedly made and always without empirical
reference, and contradicted by most war monitors and institutes studying the
conflict (it is these institutes which were also the initial source of the increased
number of fighters within ISIS; however, whilst these reports simultaneously
cited the strong existence of the mainstream opposition –with manpower
estimates constantly putting those as superior to ISIS – generally only the ‘ISIS
numbers’ would be cited) 170. Indeed, there would be no study that could be cited
168
Sullivan, A,“Bernie Sanders And Donald Trump Actually Agree On Something”, Huffington Post, 2016,
<Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/bernie-sanders-donald-trumpsyria_us_5676efbde4b0b958f65708e6>, [Accessed on 24h August 2017]
169
Corbyn, J.“Jeremy Corbyn's speech against military action against Isis in Syria”, New Statesmen, Dec 2015
<Available at: http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2015/12/jeremy-corbyns-speech-againstmilitary-action-against-isis-syria> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
170
Indeed, a simple test of researching which rebel group for instance today controls a certain locality in
opposition-held territory (approximately a quarter-to-a-fifth of the country – including wide swathes of the
provinces of Dara’a, Aleppo, Idlib, Homs, Hama and Damascus) would reveal that the majority of the local
brigades (with their various different names) in the hundreds of towns, villages and city-districts proclaim
allegiance to the FSA coalition. Numerically, FSA brigades continue to be the single largest coalition within the
armed rebellion, followed respectively by the Islamic Front and the Nusra Front; however, its battlefield role
has declined in recent years due to its aforementioned reliance on debilitating external actors, a dependence
which more independent groups such as Al-Nusra are more free from. Indeed, before the proliferation of
external ‘support’, the FSA dominated overall rebel military offensives between 2011-2013.
- Lister, C.“Yes, there are 70,000 moderate opposition fighters in Syria. Here’s what we know about them”, The
Spectator, Nov 2015 <Available at: https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2015/11/yes-there-are-70000-moderateopposition-fighters-in-syria-heres-what-we-know-about-them/> [Accessed 24th August 2017];
AP.“Syrias many moderate members”, Now Media, Nov 2015 <Available at:
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentary/566300-syrias-many-moderate-rebels> [Accessed 24th August
2017]
For studies on the armed opposition, see:
Balanche, F., ‘Status of the Syrian Rebellion: Numbers, Ideologies, and Prospects’, The Washington Institute,
Policywatch 2727, November 2016, <Available at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyth
analysis/view/status-of-the-syrian-rebellion-numbers-ideologies-and-prospects> [Accessed 28 August 2017];
Lister, C., ‘The Free Syrian Army’: A decentralised insurgent band’, Brookings Institute, Analysis Paper No.26,
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that denied the existence of the hundreds of battalions of the Free Syrian Army (a
common refrain by alternative platforms – confusing the lack of a centralised and
unified opposition ‘army’ with the lack of its existence; ironically, this would also
often be coupled with contradictory statements that there were ‘too many’
opposition groups – in this case made in order to highlight the opposition’s
fragmentation), with even the rare studies which did allege that ‘most rebels were
extremist’ – most prominently a 2015 report titled ‘If the Castle Falls’ by Tony
Blair’s think tank, the Tony Blair Faith Foundation (this would be the source of
an article headline such as ‘Most Syrian rebels sympathise with ISIS’ –being often
widely circulated by ‘anti-imperialists’ without paying attention to the source) –
not denying the existence of tens of thousands of fighters belonging to the FSA,
but simply declaring that its adherents were ‘extremists’ nonetheless 171.
November 2016, <Available at https://www.brookings.edu/wpth
content/uploads/2016/11/iwr_20161123_free_syrian_army.pdf> [Accessed 28 August 2017];
Qabalan, M., ‘The Armed Syrian Opposition: Common aim but no vision”, Arab Centre for Research and Policy
Studies, August 2013, <Available at: http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/4bd15c98-978f-427c-9856th
3cb727a56f5b> [Accessed 28 August 2017];
Cafarella, J., & Casagrande, G., ‘Syrian Opposition Guide’, Institute for the Study of War, October 2015,
<Available at: http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrian%20Opposition%20Guide_0.pdf>
th
[Accessed 28 August 2017];
Halliday, J., ‘Syria’s Armed Opposition’, Institute for the Study of War, Middle East Security Report 3, March
2012, <Available at: http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrias_Armed_Opposition.pdf>
th
[Accessed 28 August 2017];
Cafarella, J., & Casagrande, ‘Syrian Armed Opposition Forces in Aleppo’, Institute for the Study of War,
February 2016, <Available at:
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/196016/Syrian%20Armed%20Opposition%20Forces%20in%20Aleppo_0.pdf>
th
[Accessed 24 August 2017]; Policy Analysis Unit, ‘Syria’s Armed Uprising: The Status Quo’, Arab center for
research & policy studies, July 2016 <Available at: http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/Get/7c2ce290-3e67th
44e4-8e31-8458c025c8a6> [Accessed 28 August 2017]
171
i
In the case of the Tony Blair thinktank report for example, the metric used to make the ISIS analogy was
that most Syrian rebels believed in a role for Sharia or Islamic law in any future state and thus were not
‘secular’ – an opinion concurrent with the vast majority of the world’s Muslims, and indeed already existent in
the Syrian constitution under the Assad regime. Though not ‘secular’, rebel programmes made clear that they
believed in a civil state based on citizenship. Indeed, the fact that most rebel fighters remained in FSA brigades
despite being the least well-funded within the different insurgent coalitions (the other main three being the
Islamic Front, Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS) – with their backing from regional states (Qatar and Saudi Arabia)
being outstripped by the transfers of Gulf Arab private citizens (most of whose donations went to the more
conservative Islamist groups) was testament to their continued belief in the FSA’s national (pluralist) political
ii
programme . Beyond this, there were clearly basic errors even according to the report’s methodology. Thus
groups such as Imam Bukhari Jamaat and the Liwa al-Muhajerin wal Ansar were categorised as “Islamist” (as
opposed to the category of cross-national ‘Salafist-Jihadists’) despite being made up respectively of Uzbek and
Chechen foreign fighters, whilst local (not even nationally organised) groups which fight under the banner of
the FSA – such as Aleppo’s Fastaqim Kama Umert and the Ajnad al-Sham of the Damascus suburbs – were
declared as ‘Salafist-Jihadist’. Meanwhile, anti-Assad factions which were not categorised as ‘Islamist’ or
iii
‘Salafist-Jihadist’ were labelled “ambiguous”, a symbolic microcosm of the report’s methodology .
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Similarly, despite allegations that ‘both sides are as bad as each other’ (if not that
Assad was the ‘lesser evil’) 172, there would again be a marked absence of
empirical sources which could be cited (with sets of numerical data with compiled
names of casualties, etc.) to substantiate the claim. There are no studies or
reports by human rights groups or war monitors that could be cited which would
declare that the Syrian rebels (or indeed, ISIS for that matter) had committed
anything near the amount of abuses of the Syrian regime. Whilst Human Rights
reports highlighting and condemning abuses of all sides of the conflict did exist,
none could be found that provided empirical proof for anything near a
symmetrical responsibility for civilian deaths 173.
On the above, see:
i
Tony Blair Faith Foundation, ‘If the Castle Falls: Ideology and Objectives of the Syrian Rebellion’, Centre on
Religion and Geopolitics, 2016 <Available at: http://www.religionandgeopolitics.org/syria/if-castle-falls>
[Accessed on 28th August 2017]
ii
Carnegie, ‘Free Syrian Army: Statement of Principles’, Carnegie, Middle East Centre, 2012, <Available at:
http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50243?lang=en>, [Accessed on 28th August 2017]; RFS Media Office., ‘The
Free Syrian Army – Southern Front: Transitional Phase’, Revolutionary Forces of Syria, 2016 <Available at:
https://rfsmediaoffice.com/en/2014/12/15/the-free-syrian-army-southern-front-transitional-phase/>
[Accessed on 28th August 2017]
iii
Weiss, C. “Foreign jihadists advertise role in Latakia fighting”, Long War Journal, August 2016, <Available at:
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/07/foreign-jihadists-advertise-role-in-latakia-fighting.php>
th
[Accessed 28 August 2017]; Roggio, B. “Uzbek jihadist group releases footage from Syrian training camp”,
Long War Journal, June 2014, <Available at:
th
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/06/uzbek_jihadist_group.php> [Accessed 28 August 2017]
172
Fisk, R. ”Syria’s ‘moderates’ have disappeared... and there are no good guys”, The Independant, Oct 2015,
<Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/syria-s-moderates-have-disappeared-and-there-are-nogood-guys-a6679406.htmls> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Prashad, V., ”The Futility of Air Strikes in the War
on Terror”, Alternet, August 2016, <Available at: http://www.alternet.org/world/bombs-not-effective-warterror> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
173
Indeed, the most accurate reports from human rights groups from the ground collected by two Syrian
Human Rights organisations, the Syrian Network for Human Rights/SNHR (which includes amongst its statistics
anonymous casualties) and the more rigorous Violations Documentation Centre/VDC (which only draws
statistics on victims with identities – leading to much lower statistics) – whose reports have been attested to
i
by other major Human Rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch – have
ii
estimated the regime’s responsibility for more than 90% of the casualties . To negate any accusation of ‘rebel
bias’, it should be noted that both these groups have attributed a greater number of civilian casualties to the
rebels than other parties in the conflict, including (until November 2016 – this changed afterwards) the proregime Russian intervention, the Kurdish YPG, ISIS and the US-led Coalition (this is a realistic analysis when
considering the wider scope and duration of rebel activity) – and that the majority of reports of rebel abuses
iii
are sourced from these monitors . Indeed, in the case of the VDC, the founders of the group have been
iv
missing for years in an abduction the group alleges to have been carried out by a rebel group, Jaish al-Islam .
i
On Amnesty International attesting SNHR/VDC:
Amnesty. “USA must come clean about civilian deaths caused by Coalition air strikes in Syria”, Amnesty
International, Oct 2016, <Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/10/usa-must-cometh
clean-about-civilian-deaths-caused-by-coalition-air-strikes-in-syria/> [Accessed 28 August 2017]; HRW
attesting SNHR:
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In the place therefore of such empirically-backed claims, stood a marked and
consistent resort to polemics 174. To take an example, a major ‘alternative’ writers
HRW. “Syria: Activists Not Released Despite Amnesty”, Human Rights Watch, July 2014, <Available at:
th
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/18/syria-activists-not-released-despite-amnesty> [Accessed 28 August
2017]; On HRW attesting VDC:
HRW. “If the Dead Could Speak. Mass Deaths and Torture in Syria’s Detention Facilities”, Human Rights Watch,
Dec 2015, <Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/12/16/if-dead-could-speak/mass-deaths-andth
torture-syrias-detention-facilities> [Accessed 28 August 2017]
ii
Syrian Network for Human Rights, ‘The Killing of 203097 civilians at the hands of the influential parties in
Syria from March 2011 until November 2016. Distributed as follows’, SNHR, August 2016 <Accessible at:
th
https://qph.ec.quoracdn.net/main-qimg-7754848d6014955c44eba571a2949416-c> [Accessed 24 August
2017]; Violation Documentation Center, ‘Who’s Killing Civilians in Syria?’, VDC, November 2015 <Available at:
https://diary.thesyriacampaign.org/whats-happening-to-civilians-in-syria/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
iii
VDC, op. cit. ; SNHR, op. cit.
iv
Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Human Rights Organizations Mark Birthday of Razan Zaitouneh with Renewed
Call for Release of ‘Duma Four’ ”, HRW, April 2015 <Available at:
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/28/syria-human-rights-organizations-mark-birthday-razan-zaitounehrenewed-call-release> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
174
Examples:
Borowitz, A., ”Six ways to tell a moderate Syrian rebel from an ISIS extremist”, Stop the War Coalition, Oct
2015, <Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news/1395-how-syria-s-new-hitler-turned-into-uspartner-in-less-than-a-year> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; “But for heaven’s sake, let’s stop fantasising. A few
days ago, a White House spokesman even told us that Russian bombing “drives moderate elements… into the
hands of extremists”... Who’s writing this fiction? “Moderate elements” indeed.” - Fisk, R. ”Syria’s ‘moderates’
have disappeared... and there are no good guys”, The Independent, Oct 2015, <Available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/syria-s-moderates-have-disappeared-and-there-are-no-good-guysa6679406.html> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; “The Free Syrian Army and the Syrian National Council, the
vaunted bulwarks of the moderate opposition, only really exist in hotel lobbies and the minds of Western
diplomats” - Reynolds, B., ”There are No Moderate Syrian Rebels”, Counterpunch, Oct 2014, <Available at:
https://www.counterpunch.org/2014/10/03/there-are-no-moderate-syrian-rebels/> [Accessed 24th August
2017]; “The moderate Syrian opposition is a figment of Whitehall & DC’s imagination. It is about time the right
partner was chosen to fight the greatest threat to the west; that of terrorism. That partner lies in the Army of
the Syrian Arab Republic”’ - Amal, K. ”There is no such thing as a moderate Syrian opposition”, Open
Democracy, Feb 2015, <Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/kamalalam/there-is-no-such-thing-as-moderate-syrian-opposition> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; “After a two-year
absence from the international stage — during which the mainstream media dispatched them to the realm of
nonexistent entities — on October 1 the “moderate rebels” of Syria were back.” - Bromwich, D. “Syria, the
Times and the Mystery of the “Moderate Rebels””, Huffington Post, Jan 2015, <Available at:
th
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-bromwich/syria-the-times-and-myste_b_8236164.html> [Accessed 28
August 2017]; “Of course, it’s never phrased as a plea to kill shepherds in pursuit of our geopolitical interests.
By the time it hits the broadsheets, it’s a plea to arm moderate rebels (they’ve got a moderate vision of the
country’s future and they’re going to kill until they get it!). It’s a humanitarian intervention. We’re not fighting
wars for control of resources. We’re not the aggressor in countries such as Iraq, we’re actually defending Iraq.
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From the Iraqis. The most obvious anti-war argument that none of this has ever worked just doesn’t seem to
come up.” - Boyle, F. “The west normalised racist wars and thinks 1000lb bombs will solve Syria and Iraq”, Stop
the War Coalition, Jan 2015, <Available at: http://stopwar.org.uk/index.php/middle-east-and-northafrica/868-gadaffi-killing-behind-the-gloating-the-western-powers-remained-mired-in-endless-war> [Accessed
th
28 August 2017]; “The trouble for Cameron in Syria is that the only ground troops worth the name belong not
to the joint intelligence committee’s phantom army but to President Assad, whom Cameron wants to topple.
In support of Assad are Iran and Russia, from whom Cameron does everything to distance himself.”- Jenkins, N.
“It's Cameron, not Corbyn, who is the terrorist appeaser over Syria”, Stop the War Coalition, Dec 2015,
th
<Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/Resources/28_sept.pdf> [Accessed 28 August 2017]; “Like David
Cameron, he envisages an army of “moderate” or “human rights” anti-Assad rebels who could utilise such
armaments against all-comers (and there are unfortunately many in Syria). This is as fantastic as his phantom
Iraqi Shia brigades in 2003.” - Murray, A. “Human Rights and Liberal War”, Stop the War Coalition, Dec 2016,
<Available at:
http://www.stopwar.org.uk/Resources/28_sept.pdfhttp://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/newsth
comment/2324-human-rights-and-liberal-war> [Accessed 28 August 2017]; “The US is backing a group of
moderates who barely exist and wants to weaken the Assad government”- Cockburn, P. “The Alice in
Wonderland absurdity of Obama's policy for stopping ISIS in Syria”, Stop the War Coalition/Independent, Dec
2016, <Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/usa-war-on-terror/1198-how-we-are-beingth
brainwashed-into-a-war-with-iran> [Accessed 28 August 2017]; “Without troops on the ground, air attacks
cannot win a war. In the case of Syria, the only forces available are the Syrian army or radical Islamist rebel
militias, from the al-Qaida-linked Nusra Front to the Gulf regime-backed Islamist Jaish al-Fatah. So which do
the western governments have in mind? Their own sponsored rebel groups are entirely marginal.”- Milne, S.
“Western bombs won’t defeat Isis. Only a wider peace deal can draw its poison”, The Guardian, Dec 2015,
<Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/09/west-isis-peace-military-actionth
syria-war-refugee> [Accessed 28 August 2017]; “The lie he told, accepted by far too many MPs, that there are
70,000 “moderate rebels” who will provide ground troops for the air strikes has been widely disbelieved”German, L. “They attack Stop the War because we're an effective anti-war movement and we won't stop”,
Stop the War Coalition, Dec 2016, <Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/news-comment/lindseyth
german/573-the-task-of-any-anti-war-movement-is-to-oppose-its-own-government> [Accessed 28 August
2017]; “They pretend they are fostering a ‘third force’ of moderate Syrian rebels to fight both Assad and Isis,
though in private Western diplomats admit this group doesn’t really exist outside a few beleaguered pockets” Cockburn, P. “The rise of Isis is the ultimate disaster for the US, Britain and their allies who invaded Iraq”, Stop
the War Coalition, Dec 2016, <Available at: http://stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news-comment/1311-the-riseth
of-isis-is-the-ultimate-disaster-for-the-us-britain-and-their-allies-who-invaded-iraq> [Accessed 28 August
2017]; “Well, God bless Barack Obama – he’s found some “moderate” rebels in Syria… So just keep repeating
the word “moderate”. Over and over again.”- Fisk, R “Syrian ‘moderates’ aren’t so moderate in Iraq”, The
Independent, June 2014, <Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/incoming/syrian-moderates-aren-t-soth
moderate-in-iraq-9569548.html> [Accessed 28 August 2017]; “Their response was to fantasise that there was
a moderate alternative. These were the famous 70,000 moderate fighters that David Cameron talked about
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and figure, Robert Fisk, would declare that there were no moderate Syrian rebels,
with his litmus test being “besides, who heard of a “moderate” with a
Kalashnikov?” 175. Yet these were precisely the sources that would be relied by
major leftist and anti-war movements, such as Stop the War Coalition, and in
turn the likes of Jeremy Corbyn. Such polemics were endemic amongst most
popular alternative left-wing outlets: for instance Jacobin, The Canary,
Counterpunch, Mint Press News, Alternet, the Huffington Post as well as Stop the
War Coalition 176.
Similarly, Corbyn would declare again in a much-publicised speech in May 2017
that ‘regime-change wars’ in Syria and Libya had made the world a safer place
last November. The problem was that they didn’t really exist. We know that because those who claim they
exist never actually go to areas that they say are in moderate hands because they know that, if they did, they
would be kidnapped very quickly.” - Cockburn, P.,“The causes of chaos: interview with Patrick Cockburn”, Stop
the War Coalition, June 2014, <Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news-comment/1924-theth
causes-of-chaos-interview-with-patrick-cockburn> [Accessed 28 August 2017];Beeley, V. ”Syria: “There are no
Moderates”, Tulsi Gabbard’s Report from Syria”, 21st Century Wire, Jan 2017, <Available at:
http://21stcenturywire.com/2017/01/26/syria-there-are-no-moderates-tulsi-gabbards-reports-from-syria/>
[Accessed 24th August 2017]
175
Fisk, R. “David Cameron, there aren't 70,000 moderate fighters in Syria - and whoever heard of a moderate
with a Kalashnikov, anyway?”, The Independent, Nov 2015, <Available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/david-cameron-there-arent-70000-moderate-fighters-in-syria-andth
whoever-heard-of-a-moderate-with-a-a6753576.html> [Accessed 28 August 2017];
176
Fein, B. “Five Stupendous Lies Told By Buglers for Military Intervention in Syria”, Huffington Post, Oct 2016,
<Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bruce-fein/five-stupendous-lies-told_b_12613702.html>
th
[Accessed 28 August 2017]; Wistanley, A. “Syria: The Revolution That Never Was”, Jacobin, Oct 2013,
th
<Available at: https://www.jacobinmag.com/2013/11/syria-the-revolution-that-never-was/> [Accessed 28
August 2017]; Khalek, R. “How U.S. Support for Syrian Rebels Drove the Refugee Crisis That Trump Has
Capitalized On”, Alternet, 2017, <Available at: http://www.alternet.org/grayzone-project/us-support-syrianth
rebels-drove-refugee-crisis> [Accessed 28 August 2017]; Blumenthal, M. “CNN hired top al-Qaeda
propagandist for award-winning Syria documentary and wants to cover its tracks”, Salon , 2017, <Available at:
http://www.salon.com/2017/07/09/cnn-hired-top-al-qaeda-propagandist-for-award-winning-syriath
documentary-and-wants-to-cover-its-tracks_partner/> [Accessed 28 August 2017];
“Media bias is laid bare as the battle for Aleppo comes to an end”, The Canary, Dec 2016, <Available at:
https://www.thecanary.co/2016/12/14/media-bias-is-laid-bare-as-the-battle-for-aleppo-comes-to-an-end/>
th
[Accessed 28 August 2017]; Maupin, C. “The truth about Syria”, Mint Press News, May 2016, <Available at:
http://www.mintpressnews.com/truth-syria-manufactured-war-independent-country-2/216688/> [Accessed
th
28 August 2017]
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and increased the threat of terrorism 177. Surprisingly, following the May
Manchester attack carried out by Libyan Salman Abedi, Corbyn accordingly
highlighted the background of the attacker and connected this to the 2011 NATO
intervention in the country. Yet the attacker could hardly be considered to be a
disgruntled Gadaffi supporter, since his family had fled the regime in the early
1990s, his father later fought in the civil war on the side of the rebels 178.
Alternatively, Corbyn was thus highlighting the rebellion as a source of Islamic
extremism, and indirectly linking it to the Manchester attack. Similarly, Stop the
War Coalition released an article linking the November 2015 terrorist attack in
Paris on Western support for ‘extremist Sunni rebels’ in Syria 179- whilst the
Corbyn-appointed Director of Communications, Seamus Milne, would similarly
blame Western foreign policy such as ‘arming the rebels’ for the grievance linked
to the earlier January 2015 Paris attack 180. Ironically on that occasion, the
attacker in question, Amedy Coulibaly, would cite Western inaction against
Assad’s crimes (and later selective action against ISIS) in a phone conversation
during the hostage siege with a French radio channel 181 182.
177
Corbyn, J., ‘Jeremy Corbyn says military policy has made world less safe than during Cold War’, Evening
Standard, 2017 <Available at:
https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/jeremy-corbyn-says-military-policy-has-made-world-less-safe-thanduring-cold-war-a3537551.html> [Accessed 28th August 2017]
178
Evans, M. et al, ‘Everything we know about Manchester suicide bomber Salman Abedi‘, The Telegraph, May
2017 <Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/26/everything-know-manchester-suicidebomber-salman-abedi/> [Accessed 28th August 2017]
179
Floyd, C., ‘Paris reaps whirlwind of western support for extremist violence in Middle East’, Stop the War
Coalition/Empire Burlesque, 2015 <Available at: https://archive.is/du1n5#selection-637.0-637.78> [Accessed
28th August 2017]
180
Milne, S., ‘Let Paris be a warning: the terrorists are here because we are there’, The Guardian, 2015
<Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/15/paris-warning-no-insulation-warsarab-muslim-world> [Accessed 28th August 2017]
181
“I think of those who had to put up with Bashar al-Assad in Syria. He tortured people. Nobody did anything
for years. Then bombers, coaltion of 50,000 counries and all that.” – Coulibaly, A., cited in Lichfield, J., ‘Paris
attackers interview with French TV station: 'We are defenders of the Prophet... We took vengeance', said
Charlie Hebdo killer Cherif Kouachi’, The Independent, 2015 <Available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris-attackers-gave-interview-to-french-tv-station-weth
are-defenders-of-the-prophet-we-took-9969749.html> [Accessed w8 August 2017]
182
Meanwhile, during the 2016-17 siege of Aleppo and before its fall to the Assad regime, Labour’s Shadow
Foreign Secretary Emily Thornburry (an MP who voted for airstrikes in Iraq in 2014 and before that repeatedly
against an investigation into the Iraq War – yet who had now adopted the ‘alternative’ anti-intervention
politics) suggested that a solution the situation in Aleppo was the evacuation of what she described as 1,000
‘Jihadist’ fighters belonging to al-Nusra (the real number was closer to 150, out of more than 7,000 FSA rebels
i
ii
) which Russia and the regime cited as a justification for the assault . Thornburry argued that a similar such
evacuation had successfully ended the tragedy of Homs, another rebel-held Syrian city which fell to the Syrian
regime after a protracted siege (and which again, was controlled not by al-Nusra, but by FSA brigades. Al-
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Nusra’s presence is only heavy in the province of Idlib). Homs was the heart of the Syrian revolution, whose
population in 14 districts of the city were forcibly evacuated alongside the fighters and continue to be
prevented from returning today. Its ‘evacuation’ had been described by activists and human rights groups as a
iii
form of ‘sectarian cleansing’ . In turn, this proposal by Emily Thornburry, was labelled “very sensible” by Stop
iv
the War Coalition’s Deputy Chair, Chris Nineham .
Similarly, during the siege on Aleppo, Stop the War Coalition and Corbyn came under attack for ‘not calling for
protests in front of the Russian embassy’. Responding, a Corbyn spokesman declared that those who wanted
v
to protest in front of the Russian embassy could, but should equally protest in front of the US embassy .
Whilst Corbyn meant either meant this in the sense of protesting the killing of civilians by the US-led
International Coalition (protests which Syrian revolutionary groups in the UK actually did indeed previously
undertake long before this point, accusing the US of supporting the regime – notably without the presence of
vi
Stop the War Coalition ) or the purported US role in exacerbating the conflict by ‘supporting the Syrian
rebels’.
Ironically, during the siege of Aleppo Syrian activists would report that US warplanes would indeed join Russia
(albeit much less) in bombing rebel positions in the city, and the US-led Coalition was accused of assassinating
the commander of the rebel military coalition in charge of the operation to lift the siege – prompting protests
vii
against the US by revolutionary activists within Aleppo . Such realities was a testament to the disconnect
between alternative conceptions of what was happening in Syria, and the reality reported from the ground.
i
Miles, T., ‘Aleppo's Jabhat Fateh al-Sham fighters far fewer than U.N. says: sources’, Reuters, 2016, <Available
th
at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-nusra-idUSKBN12E0R6>, [Accessed on 24 August
2017]
ii
McGovern, A. “How should the UK respond to the crisis in Syria?”, The Guardian, Oct 2016, <Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/12/how-should-uk-respond-syria-crisis> [Accessed
th
28 August 2017];
iii
AP. “Hundreds deported from Syrian opposition-held enclave in Homs city”, The New Arab, 2017, <Available
at: https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2017/5/6/hundreds-deported-from-syrian-opposition-heldth
enclave-in-homs-city> [Accessed 28 August 2017];
iv
York, C. “Stop The War Coalition Deputy Chris Nineham On Today Programme Calls For ‘Opposing The
West’”, Huffington Post, 2017, <Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/stop-the-warth
syria_uk_57fdd68be4b0a9568544eed4> [Accessed 28 August 2017];
v
Stewart, H. “Protests at US embassy as valid as at Russia's, says Corbyn spokesman”, The Guardian, Oct 2016,
<Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/12/stop-the-war-coalition-protest-russianth
embassy> [Accessed 28 August 2017];
vi
SSC. “Statement against American support for Syria’s Assad regime”, Syria Solidarity Campaign, July 2017,
<Available at: http://syriasolidarity.org.uk/2016/07/17/statement-against-american-support-for-syrias-assadth
regime-17072016/> [Accessed 28 August 2017];
vii
Orient News, ‘US coalition bomb revolutionary forces south of Aleppo.’ ‘Revolution Syria’, Syrian Revolution
Network, 2015, <Available at: https://twitter.com/RevolutionSyria/status/766175934923833344>, [Accessed
th
on 24 August 2017]; Halaby, A., ‘Al-Jazeera Reporter Amro Halaby reports details of International Coalition
targeting of the strategic Tomar bridge in the Syrian city of Aleppo’ Transmission’, Al-Jazeera, 2016, <Available
th
at: https://www.facebook.com/aljazeerachannel/videos/10154650225289893>, [Accessed on 24 August
2017]; Al Jazeera News and Agencies., ‘US air raid kills Syrian rebel commander, rebels say’, Al Jazeera English,
2016, <Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/air-raid-kills-syrian-rebel-commander-rebelsth
160909040202201.html> [Accessed on 24 August 2017]; ‘The people of the town of Jina in a protest
demanding freedom and the downfall of the regime and asking America to stop killing rebel commanders’,
Syria Revolution Network 2016, <Available at:
th
https://www.facebook.com/Syrian.Revolution/videos/10157639292910727/>, [Accessed on 24 August
2017]
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Meanwhile in the US, Bernie Sanders would similarly condemn ‘regime-change’
in Syria, whilst his key ally (who quit the DNC in order to join his campaign) US
congresswoman, Tulsi Gabbard, was an Assad supporter who visited him in
2017 183. The Green Party presidential candidate, Jill Stein, similarly promoted
pro-Assad conspiracy theories 184 (such as the widely-debunked theory that the
war was ‘really’ about a US-backed Qatari ‘pipeline’ that Assad refused to let pass
through Syria; no such pipeline ever existed, and indeed, the alternative pipeline
would’ve run through Syria via US-occupied Iraq), whilst Donald Trump too
would oppose ‘regime-change’ in Syria 185.
4. Conclusion
After decades of emphasising the necessity for (and condemning the comparative
lack of) democracy in the Middle East, the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011
demanded just that. The continued repressive nature of Arab governments
combined with the increasing lack of economic security in an age of neoliberal
reform (thus constituting a policy of economic liberalisation with no political
liberalisation) brought about a rupture of the existing social contract between the
183
Manchester, J. “Gabbard says she met with Assad on Syria trip”, CNN, 2017, <Available at:
th
http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/tulsi-gabbard-lead-syria/index.html> [Accessed 28 August 2017]
184
AP. “On Syria, Jill Stein resorts to odd conspiracy theories”, Alaraby, Oct 016, <Available at:
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/blog/2016/10/23/on-syria-jill-stein-resorts-to-odd-conspiracy-theories>
th
[Accessed 28 August 2017]
185
Of course, by the very same logic of taking positions ‘opposite’ to one’s ‘own imperialist establishment’, the
likes of Hitler and Mussolini could too be considered ‘challengers’ of the traditional colonial powers. This
represents a lack of understanding of what imperialism is and what inter-imperialist relations entail:
collaboration as well as competition. Indeed, the German and French governments would cooperate with each
other in 1871 to repress the Paris Commune - months after the Franco-Prussian war, whilst the Scramble for
Africa and the Sykes-Picot agreement were agreed by colonial rivals. More recently, Putin’s Russia would
support the Bush administration during the ‘War on Terror’ (with Russia supporting NATO operations in
i
Afghanistan for example ) whilst the US acquiesced to Russia’s crushing of the Chechen uprisings, to the
chagrin of human rights groups.
On above see:
i
Sengupta, K. “Afghanistan: Russia steps in to help Nato”, The Independant, 2010, <Available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/afghanistan-russia-steps-in-to-help-nato-2117468.html>
th
[Accessed 28 August 2017];
ii
HRW. “War Crimes In Chechnya and the Response of the West”, Human Rights Watch, Feb 2000, <Available
th
at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/02/29/war-crimes-chechnya-and-response-west> [Accessed 28 August
2017]
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populations and the post-colonial authoritarian regime within the Arab Spring
domains. The solution demanded by the Arab Spring masses was accountable and
democratic popular self-government. The paper thus sought to examine whether
such popular representative government would truly be in the interest of Western
powers, and whether such previous demands constituted in fact a largely
symbolic veneer used traditionally to justify intervention and ‘civilisational’development by ‘the West’ in the Arab and Muslim worlds, by citing their
backwards nature vis-à-vis the West. We have found that despite declarations by
Western governments that they would abandon previous policies of supporting
autocracies in light of the clearly-expressed (and now-‘revealed’) will for
democracy by the Arab masses, no substantive realignment occurred. Rather, the
main policy of Western powers from the record examined can on the whole be
described as ‘regime-reformation’ or ‘rehabilitation’ 186.
Here, the paper arrives at a conclusion which vindicates the thesis of ‘Worthy and
unworthy victims’, and argues that the Arab Spring clearly represented in the eyes
of Western establishments an ‘unworthy’ attempt at democratic transformation.
The support – declared or undeclared – of regimes which had killed thousands
(and sometimes, tens of thousands) of civilians and tortured significantly more
represented a clear viewing of the victims of the regimes as unworthy – by
contrast to the victims of non-state Islamist insurgent groups. ISIS would be
(correctly) accused of genocidal intentions, whilst the Assad regime would be
spared such categorisations and cooperated with in a renewed ‘War on Terror’ –
expected public condemnations aside.
186
Indeed, nominal/overt support for democratic transformation did not extend to all Arab Spring domains
(e.g. Bahrain, Iraq), and even where they did the nominal or declared support was clearly contrasted by the
actual policies of supporting repressive and human-rights abusing regimes. This took place overtly (justified by
a change of faces) where ‘new-old’ leaderships representing old regime interests would eventually return to
power, in such examples as Egypt and Tunisia, and covertly in other examples, such as where the leadership
representing a ‘lesser evil’ and ‘dependable’ regime with decades of collaboration in a sensitive geopolitical
region refused to resign – i.e. Syria – and where the new strongman was not recognised by the transitional
political institutions – such as Libya. The case of Yemen represents an anomaly, whereby a change in Saudi
policy from supporting a ‘new-old’ Iranian-allied regime under King Abdullah changed to supporting the ‘new’
transitional and anti-Iran forces under King Salman. Here, Western governments vacillated between criticising
the Saudi intervention (as in the case of the US and EU) and overtly supporting it for the lucrative
opportunities it presented (as in the case in particular of the UK).
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That this cooperation occurred in the 21st century with a regime which incinerated
the bodies of tens of thousands of detainees 187, committed rape against
thousands of both Syrian women and men in its dungeons 188, had almost
200,000 recorded (i.e. validated with names and personal details – the number
may be much higher) civilian deaths attributed to it 189 and generally described as
‘genocidal’, is an extremely pertinent reality that has not received its due
attention. Such cases would receive far less coverage compared to the (far more
numerically limited) burning of detainees by ISIS or their rape of Yazidi sexslaves. That the example here of what has been described as an ‘epidemic’ of
sexual assault by a regime which far surpassed any other example in the regional
vicinity was so poorly known manifestly symbolised proof of the notion of
‘unworthy victims’. The presence of an alternative to the extremisms of both –
and of a repeatedly-attested numerical greater manpower than the armies of both
the Syrian regime and ISIS – was meanwhile downplayed, obfuscated and
ignored
190.
187
Ensor, J., ‘Syrian regime burned 'thousands' of bodies at crematorium to hide scale of slaughter, US
diplomat reveals ‘, The Telegraph, 2017 <available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/15/syrianregime-burned-bodies-thousands-prisoners-crematorium/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Campaigns, ‘End the
Horror in Syria’s Torture Prisons’, Amnesty International, 2017 <Available at:
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/08/syria-torture-prisons/> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
188
Forestier, M., ‘“You want freedom? this is your freedom”: rape as a tactic of the Assad regime’, in LSE
Centre for Women, Peace and Security Working Paper Series, Kirby, P. and Shepherd, L.J. (eds.) 3/2017, Center
for Women, Peace & Security, 2017
Wolfe, L., “Syria has a massive rape crisis”, The Atlantic, April 2013,
<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/syria-has-a-massive-rape-crisis/274583/>
[Accessed 25th August 2017]
For more detailed reports, see Women Under Siege, “Documenting Sexualised violence in Syria”, Women’s
Media Center, <Available at:https://womenundersiegesyria.crowdmap.com/> [Accessed 25th AUgust 2017]
189
VDC, op. cit.; SNHR, “Who’s killing civilians in Syria?”, Syrian Network for Human Rights, 2017 <Available at:
http://whoiskillingciviliansinsyria.org/> [Accessed 25th August 2017]
190
Indeed, the paper finds that the US-led collusion with the Syrian regime represents the most poorly-known
and greatest crime from amongst all the other examples of collaboration with repressive Arab Spring regimes.
Similarly, the rebellious defiance of (a prior-regarded ‘hidden’, ‘voiceless’ and ‘downtrodden’) ‘conservative’
Egyptian women as demonstrated in their heavy involvement in pro-Morsi protests against the military coup in
2013 (and their subsequent repression) was met with a conspicuous lack of interest by Western outlets –
despite this public display of self-expression being undertaken by a sect of society which traditionally served as
a major source of Western intrigue (in their coverage as subjects of repression by Islamic norms) - see Editor,
‘Women empowered but abused as they stand up to Egypt’s military junta’, The Conversation, April 2014
<Available at: https://theconversation.com/women-empowered-but-abused-as-they-stand-up-to-egyptsmilitary-junta-25512> [Accessed 24th August 2017]; Press Release, ‘Egypt must release 21 women and girls
jailed for Alexandria protest’, Amnesty, November 2013 <Available at: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/pressreleases/egypt-must-release-21-women-and-girls-jailed-alexandria-protest> [Accessed 24th August 2017]
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Meanwhile, an obsessively Western-centric methodology by a large section of
‘anti-establishment’ movements meant that they failed to recognise the agency of
the non-Western actors within the far-away conflicts which they purported to
theorise about. Ironically, this approach also entailed a comprehensive failure to
understand even the policy of Western establishments; this was because the
nature of the methodology (even from a Western-centric view) tended to be
cosmetic, lacking-in-depth and superficial (i.e. based on surface-level reactive
analyses, whereby for instance a widely-circulated statement by a Western official
was seen as an easy populist target to rally against, relative to not reacting in an
expectable fashion to the statement and engaging in a more onerous and complex
‘nuanced’ analysis). Reactive methodologies tend to be reactionary for the precise
reason of the simplified (and easily digestible, which is necessary in order to be
widely-propagated) narratives they put forward, and in the case of a ‘complex’ (in
terms of detail) situation like Syria. It was much easier to say that the problem in
Syria was the ‘West trying to repeat regime-change like Iraq again!’ than ‘the US
ideally wants Assad to resign but does not want to force him to do so as this can
dismantle the state’s military and security apparatuses which ultimately
constitute the core of the regime and which it wants to keep intact’. This has
indeed been a main reason why there has been a quasi-identical congruence
between ‘alt-right’ narratives on the conflict and those of the ‘alt-left’.
In the case of the latter, the transformation of the people’s call for the ‘downfall of
the regimes’ as an example of disparaged ‘regime-change’ inevitably posited an
implication that the people of the region could not achieve (or did not want)
democracy (conceived at least in the form of liberal representative democracy –
the form with which these ‘alternatives’ had much disillusionment towards at
home and thus may have projected in their outlook overseas). Democracy (at least
in this ‘liberal’ form) was thus in the eyes of many of these proponents really a
foreign, Western-imported (or imposed) inefficient concept into the region postthe disaster of Iraq. In cases such as Syria and Libya where the authoritarian
leadership was often falsely described as popular 191, a certain Orientalist imagery
191
One important and widely circulated example of this was an poll (repeatedly recirculated amongst groups
i
including Stop the War Coalition) which claimed that Assad had the majority of the population’s support . The
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of ‘fortress states’ headed by populist iconic rulers, demonised by the West but
ultimately loved by the masses was counterpoised to the image of inefficient and
false Western-style ballot-box “democracy” with their disingenuous
establishment politicians. The criticism of so-called Western-backed ‘regimechange’ in revolutionary contexts thus raised the question whether the oftensimultaneous criticisms of ‘Western support for dictatorships’ in other contexts
was largely merely a political weapon against hated domestic establishments 192.
Therefore, we find much proof in the argument that Orientalist conceptions of the
Middle East regarding the lack of democracy and abuse of women has been
largely selective and continues to dominate both mainstream, and unfortunately,
poll emerged to be an internet poll with only 98 Syrian participants, in a country in which 19% of the
population had access to internet (ironically for leftist redistributors of such theories, it is well-established the
main demographics constituting the Assad regime’s social base lies in religious minorities as well as the
merchant Sunni elite centred notably in the economic capitals of Damascus and Aleppo - who would be the
ii
more likely social segments with access to internet) .
For the above, see:
i
Steele, J., “Most Syrians back Assad, but you’d never know from Western media”, The Guardian, January 2012
<Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jan/17/syrians-support-assad-westernpropaganda> [Accessed 25th August 2017]; Davies, N., ‘How the west blocked peace plans and fueled the
carnage in Syria’, Stop the War Coalition/Alternet, 2014 <Available at:
http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news-comment/1766-how-the-west-blocked-peace-plans-and-fueledthe-carnage-in-syria> [Accessed 25th August 2017]; Davies, ‘How the west blocked peace plans and fueled the
carnage in Syria’, Stop the War Coalition/Alternet, 2014 <Available at:
http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news-comment/1545-ukraine-is-latest-of-35-countries-where-theunited-states-has-supported-fascists-drug-lords-and-terrorists> [Accessed 25th August 2017]
ii
For the report’s refutation: Sengupta, K., “Statistics showing strong support for Assad regime damned by the
truth”, The Independent, February 2012 <Available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/statistics-showing-strong-support-for-assad-regimedamned-by-the-truth-7447312.html> [Accessed 25th August 2017]
On the regime’s wealthy Sunni social base: Zambelis, C., “Syria’s Sunnis and the regime’s resilience”,
Combating Terrorism Center, May 2015 <Available at: https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/syrias-sunnis-and-theregimes-resilience> [Accessed 25th August 2017]; Hu, Z., “Why Bashar al-Assad is still in power”, Al-Jazeera
English, October 2016 <Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/syria-bashar-al-assad-power160904081138141.html> [Accessed 25th August 2017]
192
For an example of criticising Western governments for both supporting revolutionary forces and supporting
counter-revolutionary dictatorship in the same paragraph (with the dictatorship in question, the Al-Sisi regime,
‘ironically’ helping to fight the Syrian revolutionaries in question): “France famously refused to take part in the
US-British aggression against Iraq. But it has been making up for lost time ever since, sending troops to
Afghanistan, intervening in one African state after another, from Libya and Mali to Ivory Coast and the Central
African Republic, bombing Iraq and backing Syrian rebels. Like Britain, France has been arming and garrisoning
the Gulf autocrats, while the French president has declared himself a “partner” to the Egyptian dictator Sisi
and “ready” to bomb Libya again.” - Milne, S. “Let Paris be a warning: the terrorists are here because we are
there”, Stop the War Coalition, Jan 2015, <Available at: http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/newsth
comment/1047-let-paris-be-a-warning-the-terrorists-are-here-because-we-are-there> [Accessed 28 August
2017]
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progressive-alternative mindsets. Ultimately, the transformation of the Arab
Spring into a renewed ‘War on Terror’ has thus been an endeavour collectively
undertaken: implemented by Western establishments, overtly demanded by the
‘alt-right’ anti-establishment, and unwittingly pushed for by much of the left-wing
anti-establishment as well (such as in the core ‘War on Terror’ domain of Syria,
where the demand was to focus on Islamist extremism more than Assad). The
result has largely been an all-round failure to demonstrate solidarity with the
uprisings and examine (and campaign against) the main causes of human rights
abuses in the subsequent conflicts.
Essay Word Count: 8,231
(excl. cover pages + bibliography)
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