RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.
FACTS:
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on
Appointments confirmed the appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged
lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari and
prohibition. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years.
2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
confirming Monsod’s appointment.
HELD:
1. YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works where the work
done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions
(PLA vs. Agrava.) The records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the interpretation of
the term practice of law was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as
engaged in the practice of law provided that they use their legal knowledge or talent in their
respective work. The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star,
that lawyers nowadays have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that
because of the demands of their specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet
them. These days, for example, most corporation lawyers are involved in management policy
formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group
from 1963-1970, then worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in
1986, and also became a member of the Davide Commission in 1990, can be considered to have
been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.
2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the
president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the
discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its
corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.
People v. Hon. Bonifacio Maceda
January 24, 2000
FACTS:
This case stems from denial by the SC of the People’s motion seeking reconsideration of our August
13, 1990 decision holding that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T.
Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Antique RTC, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the
pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why
Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial court’s order specifically
provided for private respondent’s detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private
respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as detention prisoner in
said residence. It was howevere found that the order was not strictly complied with because Javellana
was not detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he
were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession
nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.
Held:
Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By
such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias
del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation “to hold and detain” him in
Atty. del Rosario’s residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional trial court.
Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of
accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same
undertaking.
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the
custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer
for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case
against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be
stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention.
OCA vs. Ladaga OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGAA.M.
No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001
Facts:
Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, appeared as
counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No.
84-885 for ―Falsification of Public Documents before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that
the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court.
During the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon
City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan
was aware of the case he was handling. Respondent appeared as pro bono counsel for his cousin client Narcisa Ladaga. Respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was
and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion
and high regard for her. This is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his
family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case
amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin.
On top of this, during all the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his
integrity and independence. He failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department.
The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department
contemplated by law.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was engages into private practice? NO
Held:
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their
profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which
disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession.
Admission a. Legal ProfessionIn re: Cunanan Resolution Cunanan, et. al 18March1954
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953;
Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners. In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much
public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the ―Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.‖
Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling
below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams the passing grades were changed
depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations(1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 194870% 194974%, 1950-1953 – 75%). Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against,
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to
the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president
after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill
no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June
21, 1953 Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and
large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate
preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration
of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL. - An adequate legal preparation is
one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be developed constantly and
maintained firmly. - The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial. - The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the
constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court. - Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that
what the law seeks to ―cure are not the rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect
in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to
Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary. -Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a
manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.2. It is in effect a
judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in
attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.3. That congress has exceeded its power to
repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress
must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.)4. It is a
class legislation5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.
HELD:
Under the authority of the court: 1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations
of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force
and
effect.2.
The
part
of
ART
1
that
refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall
continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952are denied,
and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a
grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have filed petitions
for admissions or not.)
Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999
Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
vs.
Vicente D. Ching, petitioner
Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was born on
April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines
He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to take the
1998
Bar
Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the following
documents
as
proof
of
his
Philippine
Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of
his
place;
and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La
Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was scheduled on
May
5,
1999.
Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath.
He
was
required
to
submit
further
proof
of
his
citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission
to
the
Philippine
Bar.
In
his
report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, unless upon
reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing for the manner in which the option to elect
Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does, it
would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.
Issue:
Whether
or
not
he
has
elected
Philippine
citizenship
within
"a
reasonable
time".
Rulings:
1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a
reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years from
"upon reaching the age of majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship
14 years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered not within the reasonable time.
Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship, as procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required is an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry.
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE
2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004
Facts:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to
impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral
Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and
other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the
injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications,
as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and
appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on
November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the
said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law,
Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same
parties as “closed and terminated.” Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts
complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word “Attorney” as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of nondisclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the
Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction
can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are
still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still
required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take
the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
Issue:
Whether or not the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is proper and shall
subsequently barred him from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of Attorneys
Held:
The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S.
Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling
in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from
taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the
same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Alawi v Alauya
January 31, 2016Thinker Bell
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real
estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.
Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one
of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi
had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso
wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her
grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of “attorney,” which only regular members of the
Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is “lexically synonymous” with
“Counsellors-at-law.” a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the
title of “attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken for “councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao
term “consial,” connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney
Held:
He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.
As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only
practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who
has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they
give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney”
is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully
taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction
GRANDE v DA SILVA
FACTS:
Emilio Grande is the private offended party (of estafa and BP 22) against a certain Sergio
Natividad, the client of Atty. De Silva
De Silva tendered a check to Grande as settlement of the civil aspect of the case.
The check was returned with the notation that the ACCT CLOSED
Grande filed a suit against De Silva for violation of BP 22 and Estafa (sha naman ang
nakasuhan tuloy hehe)
De Silva refused to comment on notices of complaints sent to her.
IBP recommended that de Silva be suspended for two years.
ISSUE:
WoN de Silva should be suspended?
HELD:
YES
1.
The nature of the office of an atty requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral
character. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt may render her
unfit to continue in the practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt
validly incurred. The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her
suspension or disbarment.
2.
Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or
non-pro, justifies disciplinary action. For a lawyer’s professional and personal conduct must at all
times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.
Her deliberate refusal to accept the notices served on her stains the nobility of the profession. How
else would a lawyer endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow even
simple directives. Also, Canon 1 says that a lawyer shall uphold the consti, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the legal processes.
In
Re:
Argosino
B.M.
No.
712
July
13,
1995
FACTS:
This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant. Argosino was
previously involved with hazing that caused the death of Raul Camaligan but was sentenced with
homicide through reckless imprudence after he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced with 2 years
imprisonment where he applied for a probation thereafter which was granted by the court with a 2 yr
probation. He took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take oath. He filed a petition to
allow him to take the attorney’s oath of office averring that his probation was already terminated. The
court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was terminated.
ISSUE:
WON
Argosino
may
take
oath
of
office.
RULING:
The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar members, keeping in mind
that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice
are concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Hence he was asked by the court to produce
evidence that would certify that he has reformed and have become a responsible member of the
community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for truth and who
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify he is morally fit to the
admission of the law profession. The court also ordered that said a copy of the proceeding be
furnished to the family/relatives of Raul Camaligan.
TAPUCAR VS TAPUCAR
EN BANC[ A.C. No. 4148, July 30, 1998 ]
REMEDIOS
RAMIREZ
TAPUCAR,
COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
LAURO
L.
TAPUCAR,
RESPONDENT
Facts:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the
disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral
conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous circumstances.
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980,
respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months suspension
without pay, while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated,
this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from service of respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated canon 1 of the code of professional responsibility
Ruling:
Yes.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. Exacted from him, as a
member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is
right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been
compendiously described as “moral character.” To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at
all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public
regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.
GARRIDO vs. GARRIDO
Facts:
The petitioner, the respondent’s legal wife, filed a complaint-affidavit and a supplemental affidavit for
disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Discipline, charging them with gross immorality,
in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01, of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complaint
arose after the petitioner caught wind through her daughter that her husband was having an
affair with a woman other than his wife and already had a child with her; and the same
information was confirmed when one of her daughters saw that her husband walking in a
Robinsons mall with the other respondent, Atty. Valencia, with their child
in
tow. After a much further investigation into the matter, the time and effort given yielded results telling
her that Atty. Valencia and her legal husband had been married in Hong Kong. Moreover, on June
1993, her husband left their conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their
residence, and has since failed to render much needed financial support. In their defense, they
postulated that they were not lawyers as of yet when they committed the supposed immorality,
so as such, they were not guilty of a violation of Canon1, Rule 1.01.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Garrido’s and Valencia’s actions constitute a violation of Canon 1, Rule1.01 and
thus a good enough cause for their disbarment, despite the offense being supposedly committed
when they were not lawyers.
Held:
Yes. Membership in the Bar is a privilege, and as a privilege bestowed by law through
the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances show
the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers, be they academic or moral. In the
present case, the Court had resolved to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty.
Rowena P. Valencia for the reason of their blatant violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which commands that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Furthermore, The contention of respondent that they were
not yet lawyers when they got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions; good
moral character was already required as a condition precedent to admission to the
Bar. As a lawyer, a person whom the community looked up to, Atty. Garrido and Valencia wereshould
ered with the expectation that they would set a good example in promoting obedience to the
Constitution and the laws. When they violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal
needs and selfish motives, not only did their actions discredit the legal profession. Such actions by
themselves, without even including the fact of Garrido’s abandonment of paternal responsibility, to the
detriment of his children by the petitioner; or the fact that Valencia married Garrido despite knowing of
his other marriages to two other women including the petitioner, are clear indications of a lack of
moral values not consistent with the proper conduct of practicing lawyers within the country. As such,
their disbarment is affirmed.
Cruz v. Mijares
FACTS:
Ferdinand A. Cruz was the plaintiff in a civil case for Abatement of Nuisance pending in the sala of
respondent judge.
He sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf.
Claim anchored on Sec. 34, Rule 138: a non- lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his
litigation personally.
During the pre-trial, Judge Mijares required petitioner to secure written permission from the Court
Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself.
Counsel for the defendant filed a motion to dismiss.
Petitioner objected, alleging that an MTD is not allowed after the Answer has been filed.
Respondent judge remarked, “Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?”
Petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to inhibit: there was partiality on the part of respondent
judge as can be seen from her contumacious remarks.
Motion denied. MR denied.
Cruz’s appearance was also denied as he failed to submit the document
required by Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court.
MR: basis of his appearance was Rule 138, Sec. 34, not Rule 138-A.
138-applicable to any non-lawyer;
138-A–specifically for law students.
MR denied, still invoking Rule 138-A.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
ISSUES: Does the SC have jurisdiction to entertain the petition?
HELD: YES.
SC has concurrent jurisdiction with RTC and CA to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
and injunction.
This concurrence does not mean that the petitioner has absolute freedom to choose where the petition will be filed.
Still has to give due regard to the judicial hierarchy.
Thus, petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against RTCs should be filed with the CA.
Only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons may the SC take cognizance of petitions directly filed before it.
SC assumes jurisdiction over this petition as it concerns the interpretation of Sec. 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court.
Petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly with the SC.
What rule applies in the case of petitioner, Rule 138 or 138-A?
Rule 138.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs LEONCIO SANTOCILDES, JR.QUISUMBING,
Facts:
On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape of a girl less than nine (9) years
old, committed on December 28, 1991, in the town of Barangay San Luis, San Joaquin, Iloilo. Upon
arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and the prosecution presented as its
witnesses the victim, her mother, her six (6) year-old playmate, and the medico-legal officer who
examined the victim. The Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together its accessory penalty.
Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named Gualberto C. Ompong,
who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel and even conducted the direct examination and
cross-examinations of the witnesses. On appeal, however, appellant secured the services of a new
lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is actually not a
member of the bar. Further verification with the Office of the Bar Confidant confirmed this fact.
Appellant therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel should necessarily result in his
acquittal of the crime charged.
Issue: Is the petitioner entitled to a new trial?
Held: “This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a
criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer,
there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the
legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due
process.”
Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in
the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. The right of an accused to counsel is
guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against
the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. Such a right proceeds from the fundamental
principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person’s basic rights; it is not a mere
formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), Enrique Entila and Victoriano Tenazas vs.
Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, Court of Industrial Relations and Quintin Muning
FACTS:
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ORDERED REINSTATEMENT WITH BACKWAGES FOR
ENTILA AND TENAZAS.
Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of Entila and Tenazas filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to
30% of the total backwages.
i. Entila and Tenazas filed manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of
attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages
ii. Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20%
of the backwages. Opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates on the ground that he is not a lawyer.
a. Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for professional
services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:
i. Cipriano
10%
ii. Quintin Muning
10%
iii. Atanacio Pacis
5%
iii. CANON 34: condemns an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees,
whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers
Sec 5(b) of RA 875 that —No justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in
the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees
a. Duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on
behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.
b. Representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member does not entitle the representative to compensation for such
representation.
Sec 24, Rule 138 Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees:
i. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services.
a. Petition to take the Bar Exam in 1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar Examination.
b. His uncle, TAPEL, opposed the petition alleging that his nephew is not a person of good moral
character for having misrepresented, sometime in 1950, when he was 16 years old, that he was
eligible for 3rd year high school by utilizing the school records of his cousin and name-sake, Juan M.
Publico.
ii. PUBLICO has not completed Grade 4
iii. Tapel instituted an administrative case against his nephew for falsification of school
records or credentials.
PUBLICO PASSED THE BAR, took the lawyer's oath, and signed the Roll of Attorneys.
Legal Officer-Investigator, Ricardo Paras, Jr., investigated and reported:
September 1961, Dulcisimo Tapel dropped the complaint on the ground that his witnesses had turned
hostile.
i. Motion denied, his witnesses had already testified.
Recommended PUBLICO’s name to be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
i. Respondent falsified his school records
ii. Thereby violating the provisions of Sections 5 and 6, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
which require completion by a bar examinee or candidate of the prescribed courses in elementary,
high, pre-law and law school, prior to his admission to the practice of law.
11 years later, PUBLICO filed a Petition for Reinstatement alleging that he had never received, for
had he been informed, nor did he have any knowledge of the Resolution of the Court ordering the Bar
Division to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
He was advised to inquire into the outcome of the disbarment case against him.
He resigned from all his positions in public and private offices, and transferred to Manila.
Prayed that Court allow reinstatement taking into consideration his exemplary conduct from the time
he became a lawyer, his services to the community the numerous awards, resolutions and/'or
commendations he received,
i. Court denied the Petition.
ii. Petitioner moved for reconsideration was denied by the Court for lack of merit.
5th plea avers that his enrollment in Third Year High School in Manila was through the initiative of his
uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel who accompanied him to school and enrolled him in a grade level above
his qualifications in spite of his demonstrations
i. Misrepresentation committed was precipitated by his uncle; that being merely 16 year
old, he could not be expected to act with discernment as he was still under the influence of his uncle,
who later on caused his disbarment
ii. No opposition has been filed to any of the petitions.
ISSUE: May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered?
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be
voided in the present petition.
WON a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of some
of its members.
YES. It was PAFLU that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union
members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the
present petition. Their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.
HELD:
ORDERS UNDER REVIEW ARE SET ASIDE AS THEY ARE AWARDED 10% OF BACKWAGES AS
ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR MUNING. COSTS AGAINST MUNING.
Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he
cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with
PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.
Public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to
those possessing tested qualifications, for the ethics of the profession and for the protection of courts,
clients and the public.
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated:
Acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both,
Law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in violation of law
If were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to
consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that nonlawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures.
In response to UNION may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay
of some of its members:
YES because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial
court on behalf of its members
If an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved
party, under Sec 6, RA 875:
i. Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order
of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Usually, individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of litigations.
Five J Taxi and Juan Armamento v. NLRC, DomingoMaldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon
G.R. No. 111474. August 22, 1994
Facts:
Maldigan and Sabsalon were hired by the Five J Taxi as taxi driver. Nov. 1987 and June
1979, respectively.
a. T h e y w o r k e d f o r 4 d a y s w e e k l y o n a 2 4 h o u r shifting
schedule.
b. Aside
from
the
daily
“boundary”
of
P700.00
for
air co n d i t i o n e d t a x i o r P 4 5 0 . 0 0 f o r n o n - a i r - conditioned
taxi, they were also required to pay P 2 0 . 0 0 f o r c a r w a s h i n g , a n d t o
f u r t h e r m a k e a P 1 5 . 0 0 deposit to answer for any defiency in their
“boundary,” for every actual working day.
Subsequently, in less than 4 months after he was hired, Maldigan failed to report
to work for unknown reasons.
Sabsalon was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and stabbed
him. He was hospitalized and a f t e r h i s d i s c h a r g e , h e w e n t t o h i s h o m e p r o v i n c e t o
recuperate.
While Sabsalon was re-admitted to work by Five J Taxi, he was only required to work every
other day. However, on several instances, he also failed to report for work during his schedule.
Despite repeated requests for him to report to work, he refused.
In 1989, Maldigan requested Five J Taxi for the
reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but they told him that nothing was left of
his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent f o r t h e r e p a i r s o f t h e
t a x i h e w a s d r i v i n g . T h i s w a s allegedly the practice adopted by Five J Taxi to recoup
the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund
of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services.
Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected
when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
Maldigan
and
Sabsalon
then
filed
a complaint
with the
NLRC
for illegal dismissal and illegal deductions.
Comlaint was dismissed.
a. T h e f i l i n g o f t h e c a s e w a s a m e r e a f t e r t h o u g h t since it took them
two years to file the same. Such delay is unreasonable.
b. It was also discovered that Maldigan was working for another taxi
company called “Mine of Gold” and that Sabsalon was driving a taxi for
“Bulaklak
Company.”
Both
of
them
failed
to
controvert
the
evidence showing this and that they voluntarily left their jobs.
c. H o w e v e r , o r d e r e d F i v e J T a x i a n d A r m a m e n t o t o p a y M a l d i g a n
a n d S a b s a l o n t h e i r accumulated deposits and car wash payments.
Is s u e :
W h e t h e r o r N o t M a l d i g a n a n d S a b s a l o n ’ s d e p o s i t s a n d c a r wash payments should be
refunded.
Held:
YES.
1 . N L R C h e l d t h a t t h e P 1 5 . 0 0 d a i l y d e p o s i t s m a d e b y respondents to defray any
shortage in their “boundary” is covered by the general prohibition in LC 114 against requiring
employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor has recognized
the
same
as
a
“practice”
in
the
taxi
industry.
Therefore,
t h e d e p o s i t s m a d e w e r e i l l e g a l a n d t h e r e s p o n d e n t s must be refunded.
2.
It
can
be
deduced
that
the
LC114
provides
the
rule
on
d e p o s i t s f o r l o s s o r d a m a g e t o t o o l s , m a t e r i a l s o r equipment supplied by the
employer. Clearly the same does not a pply to or permit deposits not to defray any
d e f i c i e n c y w h i c h t h e t a x i d r i v e r m a y i n c u r i n t h e remittance of his “boundary.”
3 . F u r t h e r m o r e , w h e n M a l d i g a n a n d S a b s a l o n s t o p p e d working for Five J Taxi,
the alleged purpose for which the deposits were required no longer existed. As such, any
b a l a n c e d u e t o p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s a f t e r p r o p e r accounting must be returned to
them with legal interest.
G.R. No. 126625 September 18, 1997
KANLAON
CONSTRUCTION
ENTERPRISES
CO.,
INC.,
petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 5TH DIVISION, and BENJAMIN RELUYA, JR.,
EDGARDO GENAYAS, ERNESTO CANETE, PROTACIO ROSALES, NESTOR BENOYA,
RODOLFO GONGOB, DARIO BINOYA, BENJAMIN BASMAYOR, ABELARDO SACURA,
FLORENCIO SACURA, ISABELO MIRA, NEMESIO LACAR, JOSEPH CABIGKIS, RODRIGO
CILLON, VIRGILIO QUIZON, GUARINO EVANGELISTA, ALEJANDRO GATA, BENEDICTO
CALAGO, NILO GATA, DIONISIO PERMACIO, JUANITO SALUD, ADOR RIMPO, FELIPE ORAEZ,
JULIETO TEJADA, TEOTIMO LACIO, ONOFRE QUIZON, RUDY ALVAREZ, CRESENCIO FLORES,
ALFREDO PERMACIO, CRESENCIO ALVIAR, HERNANI SURILLA, DIOSDADO SOLON, CENON
ALBURO, ZACARIAS ORTIZ, EUSEBIO BUSTILLO, GREGORIO BAGO, JERRY VARGAS,
EDUARDO BUENO, PASCUAL HUDAYA, ROGELIO NIETES, and REYNALDO NIETES,
respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business nationwide with principal
office at No. 11 Yakan St., La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. In 1988, petitioner was contracted by
the National Steel Corporation to construct residential houses for its plant employees in Steeltown,
Sta. Elena, Iligan City. Private respondents were hired by petitioner as laborers in the project and
worked under the supervision of Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In 1989, the project
neared its completion and petitioner started terminating the services of private respondents and its
other employees.
In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner before Sub-Regional
Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. Numbering forty-one (41) in all, they claimed that petitioner paid
them wages below the minimum and sought payment of their salary differentials and thirteenth-month
pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named co-respondents.
The preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by Engineers Estacio and
Dulatre and private respondents. At the conference of June 11, 1990 before Arbiter Siao, Engineer
Estacio admitted petitioner’s liability to private respondents and agreed to pay their wage differentials
and thirteenth-month pay on June 19, 1990. As a result of this agreement, Engineer Estacio allegedly
waived petitioner’s right to file its position paper. 1 Private respondents declared that they, too, were
dispensing with their position papers and were adopting their complaints as their position paper.
Extension was denied by the LA Siao and ordered the employer company to pay the employees.
Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission. It alleged that it was denied
due process and that Engineers Estacio and Dulatre had no authority to represent and bind petitioner.
NLRC affirmed the decisions of the Labor Arbiters.
RULING:
It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic corporation with principal address in
Quezon City. The complaints against petitioner were filed in Iligan City and summons served on
Engineer Estacio in Iligan City. The question now is whether Engineer Estacio was an agent and
authorized representative of petitioner.
Under the Revised Rules of Court, 7 service upon a private domestic corporation or partnership must
be made upon its officers, such as the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its
directors. These persons are deemed so integrated with the corporation that they know their
responsibilities and immediately discern what to do with any legal papers served on them.
In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer Dulatre, managed and supervised the
construction project. 9 According to the Solicitor General and private respondents, Engineer Estacio
attended to the project in Iligan City and supervised the work of the employees thereat. As manager,
he had sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served on
him and to relay the same to the president or other responsible officer of petitioner. Summons for
petitioner was therefore validly served on him.
Engineer Estacio’s appearance before the labor arbiters and his promise to settle the claims of
private respondents is another matter.
The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear before the labor arbiter and respondent
Commission in cases before them. The Labor Code and the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
nonetheless, lists three (3) exceptions to the rule, viz:
Sec. 6. Appearances. — . . . .
A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if:
(a)
he
represents
himself
as
party
to
the
case;
(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that he shall be made to present written
proof
that
he
is
properly
authorized;
or
(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of
Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter. . . . 10
A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if: (a) he represents himself as
a party to the case; (b) he represents an organization or its members, with written authorization from
them: or (c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department
of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred to by the latter. 11
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they duly-accredited members of a
legal aid office. Their appearance before the labor arbiters in their capacity as parties to the cases
was authorized under the first exception to the rule. However, their appearance on behalf of petitioner
required written proof of authorization. It was incumbent upon the arbiters to ascertain this authority
especially since both engineers were named co-respondents in the cases before the arbiters. Absent
this authority, whatever statements and declarations Engineer Estacio made before the arbiters could
not bind petitioner.
Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty. Abundiente were authorized to appear
as representatives of petitioner, they could bind the latter only in procedural matters before the
arbiters and respondent Commission. Petitioner’s liability arose from Engineer Estacio’s alleged
promise to pay. A promise to pay amounts to an offer to compromise and requires a special power of
attorney or the express consent of petitioner. The authority to compromise cannot be lightly presumed
and should be duly established by evidence.
Sec. 7. Authority to bind party. — Attorneys and other representatives of parties shall have authority
to bind their clients in all matters of procedure; but they cannot, without a special power of attorney or
express consent, enter into a compromise agreement with the opposing party in full or partial
discharge of a client’s claim.
After petitioner’s alleged representative failed to pay the workers’ claims as promised, Labor Arbiters
Siao and Palangan did not order the parties to file their respective position papers. The arbiters
forthwith rendered a decision on the merits without at least requiring private respondents to
substantiate their complaints. The parties may have earlier waived their right to file position papers
but petitioner’s waiver was made by Engineer Estacio on the premise that petitioner shall have paid
and settled the claims of private respondents at the scheduled conference. Since petitioner reneged
on its “promise,” there was a failure to settle the case amicably. This should have prompted the
arbiters to order the parties to file their position papers.
Sec. 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. — Should the parties fail to agree upon an
amicable settlement, in whole or in part, during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter shall issue an
order stating therein the matters taken up and agreed upon during the conferences and directing the
parties to simultaneously file their respective verified position papers.
VARGAS vs. IGNES
FACTS:
Apr 16, 2007 Atty. Michael Ignes was hired by Koronadal Water District (KWD) as private legal counsel for one
year; the Office of Gov’t. Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and Commission on Audit (COA) consented
Dec. 28, 2006
- Dela Pena (DP) Board filed a case to annul the appointment of two directors who will allegedly
connive with Director Allan Yapchockun who is against the present Board of Directors (the Dela Pena
Board)
Jan. 18, 2007
- DP Board appointed respondents Atty. Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr. And Atty. Buentipo Mann as private
counsels for all cases of KWD and its Board of Directors, under Atty. Ignes’s supervision
Feb. 9 and 19they filed cases “KWD represented by Gen. Manager Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba vs Efren V Cabucay” and
“KWD vs. Rey J. Vargas”
Feb. 16, 2007
- OGCC approved retainership contract of Atty. Benjamin Cunanan as new legal counsel of KWD and
stated that the retainership contract of Ignes had expired on Jan.14, 2007
March 2, 2007
- OGCC addressed Eleanor P. Gomba’s insistence that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes will
expire on April 17, 2007. The OGCC stated that as stipulated, the KWD or OGCC may terminate the
contract anytime without need of judicial action; that OGCC’s grant of authority to private counsels is
a privilege withdrawable under justifiable circumstances; and that the termination of Atty. Ignes’s
contract was justified by the fact that the Local Water Utilities Administration had confirmed the
Yaphockun board as the new Board of Directors of KWD and that said board had terminated Atty.
Ignes’s services and requested to hire another counsel. Alleging that respondents acted as counsel
for KWD without legal authority, complainants filed a disbarment complaint against the respondents
before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline-Investigating Commissioner recommended that
the charge against Atty. Ignes be dismissed for lack of merit. The Investigating Commissioner held
that Atty. Ignes had valid authority as counsel of KWD for one (1) year, from April 2006 to April 2007,
and he was unaware of the pre-termination of his contract when he filed pleadings-IBP Board
of Governors reversed the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissed the
case for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Did the IBP Board of Governors err in dismissing the case? Are the respondents liable for
appearing as attorneys for a party to a case without authority to do so?
HELD:
Yes, the IBP Board of Governors erred in dismissing the case; and YES, the respondents
are administratively liable. Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of the Admin Code of 1987 says
that the OGCC shall act as the principal law office of all Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations(GOCCs); Sec. 3 of Memo Circular No. 9: in exceptional cases, the written conformity
and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may
be, and the written concurrence of the COA shall first be secured before the hiring or employment of
a private lawyer or law firm.-Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann had no valid authority to appear as
collaborating counsels of KWD in SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799. Nothing in the
records shows that Atty. Nadua was engaged by KWD as collaborating counsel.-In the case of Attys.
Viajar, Jr. and Mann, their appointment as collaborating counsels of KWD under Resolution No. 009
has no approval from the OGCC and COA.-In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as counsel of
KWD without authority, after his authority as its counsel had expired. True, the OGCC and COA
approved his retainership contract for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006. But even if we assume as
true that he was not notified of the pre-termination of his contract, the records still disprove his claim
that he stopped representing KWD after April 17, 2007
Sps.Agbulos vs. Gutierrez, GR No. 176530, June 16, 2009
FACTS:
On October 16, 1997, respondents, Dr. Nicasio G. Gutierrez, Josefa Gutierrez de Mendoza and
Elena G. Garcia, through their counsel, Atty. Adriano B. Magbitang, filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a complaint against petitioners, spouses Constante Agbulos and
Zenaida Padilla Agbulos, for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance and
damages. The complaint alleged that respondents inherited from their father, Maximo Gutierrez, an
eight-hectare parcel of land located in Callos, Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-123790 in the name of Maximo Gutierrez. Through fraud and deceit,
petitioners succeeded in making it appear that Maximo Gutierrez executed a Deed of Sale on July 21,
1978 when, in truth, he died on April 25, 1977. As a result, TCT No. NT-123790 was cancelled and a
new one, TCT No. NT-188664, was issued in the name of petitioners. Based on the notation at the
back of the certificate of title, portions of the property were brought under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and awarded to Lorna Padilla, Elenita Nuega and Suzette Nuega
who were issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the appeal despite the undisputed fact that
Atty. Magbitang filed the notice of appeal without respondents knowledge and consent;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal despite the fact that
Atty. Magbitangs appellants brief failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section
13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court regarding the contents of an appellants brief; and
3. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC (Regional Trial Court), not the
DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) or the PARAD/RARAD
(Provincial/Regional Agrarian Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator), has jurisdiction over
respondents complaint.
HELD:
The CA did not err in giving due course to the appeal, on both procedural and substantive
grounds.
A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is presumed to represent such client
before the appellate court. Section 22 of Rule 138 creates this presumption, thus:
SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on
appeal. An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be
presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition
withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.
A reading of respondent Elena Garcias letter to the RTC would show that she did not actually
withdraw Atty. Magbitangs authority to represent respondents in the case. The letter merely stated
that there was, as yet, no agreement that they would pursue an appeal.
In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either
expressly or impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyers first appearance and validates
the action taken by him. Implied ratification may take various forms, such as by silence or
acquiescence, or by acceptance and retention of benefits flowing therefrom. Respondents silence or
lack of remonstration when the case was finally elevated to the CA means that they have acquiesced
to the filing of the appeal.
Moreover,
a
lawyer
is
mandated
to
serve
his
client
with
competence
and
diligence. Consequently, a lawyer is entreated not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him;
otherwise, his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. In light of such mandate,
Atty. Magbitangs act of filing the notice of appeal without waiting for her clients to direct him to do so
was understandable, if not commendable.
The CA was likewise correct in holding that the case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, not
the DARAB.
For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a tenancy relationship between
the parties. It is, therefore, essential to establish all the indispensable elements of a tenancy
relationship, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that
the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6)
that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. Respondents complaint did not contain any allegation that would, even in the slightest,
imply that there was a tenancy relation between them and the petitioners. We are in full agreement
with the following findings of the CA on this point:
x x x A reading of the material averments of the complaint reveals that the principal
relief sought by plaintiffs-appellants is for the nullification of the supposedly forged deed
of sale which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. NT-188664 covering their 8-hectare
property as well as its reconveyance, and not for the cancellation of CLOAs as claimed
by defendants-appellees. Moreover, the parties herein have no tenurial, leasehold, or
any other agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under
the ambit of the agrarian reform laws. Neither were the CLOA awardees impleaded as
parties in this case nor the latters entitlement thereto questioned. Hence, contrary to the
findings of the RTC, the herein dispute is purely civil and not agrarian in nature falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial courts.
On the alleged deficiency of the appellants brief filed before the CA by the respondents, suffice
it to state that the requirements in Section 13, Rule 44 are intended to aid the appellate court in
arriving at a just and proper resolution of the case. Obviously, the CA found the appellants brief
sufficient in form and substance as the appellate court was able to arrive at a just decision. We have
repeatedly held that technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not to suppress,
substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules may, thus, be allowed in order to
attain this prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence
of courts.
Manangan vs. CFI, GR No. 82760, Aug. 30, 1990; Lapena 2009
FACTS:
On 7 November 1977, petitioner, representing himself as a lawyer, was appointed Legal Officer I of
the Bureau of Lands in Region II (p. 98, Rollo).
On 30 June 1978, Criminal Case No. 639 entitled "People v. Filemon Manangan alias Andres
Culanag" (Annex D, Petition, Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 20) was filed before the then Court of First Instance
of Nueva Vizcaya, First Judicial District, Bayombong, charging petitioner with "Execution of Deeds by
Intimidation" under Article 298 of the Revised Penal Code (the Criminal Case, for short). Apparently,
the Director of Lands had given his imprimatur to the charge.
On the same date, an Order of Arrest was issued by then Judge Gabriel Dunuan of respondent Court
(Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 21).
On 18 April 1979, petitioner filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus
with Writ of Preliminary Injunction entitled "Filemon de Asis Manangan v. Court of First Instance, et
al.," in UDK No. 3906, assailing the jurisdiction of respondent Court to try the criminal case and
seeking to stay the Order of Arrest of 30 June 1978. The petition was dismissed on 7 May 1979 for
non-payment of legal fees (p. 99, Rollo).
On 10 and 18 July 1978, the dates set for preliminary investigation, petitioner did not show up and, in
fact, disappeared for about a year.
On 31 July 1978, a Second Amended Information was filed (Comment, Solicitor General, p.
61, Rollo), this time Identifying the accused as "Andres Culanag (alias Andres M. Culanag, Filemon
Manangan Atty. Filemon A. Manangan and Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan)."
On 8 July 1979, petitioner surfaced and, through counsel, posted a bailbond with the Municipal Circuit
Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur (Resolution of the RTC, Nueva Vizcaya, 25 March 1983,
Annex B, Petition, p. 2).
On 19 July 1979, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was by Judge Gabriel Dunuan. It is this Alias Warrant
that is challenged herein.
On 12 September 1979, petitioner filed an ex-parte Motion to Dismiss the Criminal Case, which was
denied by respondent Court (see CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP, p. 2).
Petitioner then resorted to a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 11588-SP entitled "Filemon Manangan v. Director of Lands and CFI of Nueva Vizcaya." The
Petition sought to (1) nullify the decision of the Director of Lands, dated 27 March 1980, finding
petitioner guilty of extortion, impersonation and abandonment of office and ordering his dismissal
from the service; and (2) "require respondent CFI of Nueva Ecija to dismiss Criminal Case No. 639
pending in its Court." In a Decision, promulgated on 27 February 1981, the Appellate Court dismissed
the Petition for "absolute lack of legal and factual basis" and holding, among others, that "the nonwithdrawal of the Information for execution of deeds by intimidation . . . is not covered by mandamus"
(hereinafter, the German Decision).
On 30 October 1981, before respondent Court, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner,
ostensibly through counsel, Atty. Benjamin Facun, asking that the Criminal Case be dismissed on the
ground that the accused had already died on 29 September 1971 such that respondent Court had not
acquired jurisdiction over his person. The Motion was denied.
On 22 February 1982, erroneously construing the German Decision as a final judgment of conviction,
respondent Court reset the promulgation to 19 April 1982 and ordered the bondsmen to produce the
body of the accused on said date (Annex A, Petition). Realizing the mistake, on 9 July 1982,
respondent Court vacated said order and ruled that "the warrant of arrest issued by this Court through
Judge Gabriel Dunuan on 19 July 1979, shall remain in full force and effect" (Annex F, Petition).
On 25 June 1982, petitioner again resorted to the Court of Appeals in another Petition
for Certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP-14428) filed by one Atty. Benjamin Facun as counsel for petitioner,
this time praying for the annulment of the proceedings in the Criminal Case "on the ground that the
accused was already dead when the decision finding him guilty of the crime . . . was rendered." The
pleading alleged "that petitioner is of age, Filipino, deceased, but has come to this Honorable Court
through counsel. . . ." In a Decision promulgated on 29 November 1982, Certiorari was denied for
being devoid of merit inasmuch as "there is nothing on record to show that such dismissal had been
sought before the decision was rendered" (briefly, the Kapunan Decision). (Actually, no judgment has
been rendered by respondent Court).
Unfazed by the adverse Kapunan Decision, the supposed heirs of the accused, on 10 February 1983,
filed a Manifestation before respondent Court asking for the dismissal and termination of the Criminal
Case on the same ground that the accused had allegedly died.
On 25 March 1983, Judge Quirino A. Catral of respondent Court refused to declare the case closed
and terminated inasmuch as the accused was alive on 8 July 1979 when he posted his bailbond
(citing the Kapunan Decision) and reiterated that the "alias warrant issued by the Court on July 19,
1979 which up to the present has not yet been served upon the accused as in full force and effect."
For the third time, the case was elevated to the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. SP00707, entitled "Heirs of the Deceased Filemon Manangan v. Hon. Quirino A. Catral, etc." The
Petition sought to annul the Order of Judge Catral of 25 March 1983 denying the closure and
termination of the Criminal Case.
On 28 May 1983, the then IAC, after quoting at length from the Kapunan Decision and the Catral
Order, dismissed the Petition (hereinafter, the Aquino Decision) holding, inter alia, that "whether or
not its denial of the motion to dismiss that case constitutes a grave abuse of discretion, was already
passed upon by this Court in CA-G.R. No. SP-14428 (Kapunan Decision), hence, it is res adjudicata.
It may not be litigated anew, no matter what form the action for that purpose may take."
On 28 June 1984, before the respondent Court, petitioner-accused filed an Omnibus Motion with
Motion for New Trial, which was denied for lack of merit in the Order of 19 November 1984. In the
same Order, respondent Court ordered the case archived until such time that the accused is brought
to the Court.
On 19 June 1986, counsel for petitioner-accused filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that: "(1) the
court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused; and
(2) the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense
charged."
ISSUES:
Whether or not He is guilty of continued fraudulent misrepresentation and highly improper conduct
tending directly to impede, obstruct, degrade, and make a mockery of the administration of justice.
HELD:
In the German Decision, it was additionally pointed out that petitioner had also committed
imprisonation when, representing himself as Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan, he filed a petition with this
Court praying that his right to practice law be affirmed (Misc. Bar-I and Misc. Bar-2). In those cases,
we ruled that petitioner Filemon Manangan is "really Andres Culanag, an impostor;" dismissed the
petitions; and directed Andres Culanag to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt
for filing the two false petitions (In re: Andres Culanag, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 26). He
explained that "he thought this Court would not discover that he is a poseur, for which reason he
apologizes to the Court promising that he would not commit the same act if he is excused and given
another chance." On 12 November 1971, after finding his explanation unsatisfactory, we adjudged
him guilty of indirect contempt of Court under Rule 71, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for six (6) months.
Parenthetically, we also take judicial notice of Bar Matter No. 190, entitled "In Re Andres
Culanag alias Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan" and Bar Matter No. 206, entitled "Eriberto H. Decena vs.
Andres Culanag" wherein, on 9 October 1984, this Court Resolved "to direct that petitioner be
subjected to mental examination by a doctor from the National Mental Hospital" after noting that
petitioner was suffering from some kind of mental alienation. This mitigates somewhat petitioner's
present liability for contempt.
It is the height of chicanery, indeed, that despite the foregoing antecedents, petitioner still has the gall
to claim that he is, in truth and in fact, Filemon Manangan. The evidence on hand, without need for
more, and with petitioner having been sufficiently heard, amply establishes that petitioner Filemon
Manangan, is an impostor. He is guilty of continued fraudulent misrepresentation and highly improper
conduct tending directly to impede, obstruct, degrade, and make a mockery of the administration of
justice (Rule 71, Sec. 3 [d]).
While it may be that some pronouncements in the pertinent decisions allude to Filemon Manangan
and that Andres Culanag is just an alias of Filemon Manangan, those statements actually refer to the
person of Andres Culanag and not to the real Filemon Manangan, long since dead.
The action for contempt has not prescribed since it is apparent that the contumacious acts continue to
this day.
Lemoine vs. Atty. Balon Jr., AC No. 5829, Oct 28, 2003
FACTS:
Lemoine, the petitioner, is a French national who filed an insurance claim with
Metropolitan Insurance.
His friend, Jesus Garcia, arranged for the engagement of Atty. Balon’s services as his counsel
Balon advised Lemoine that he was charging 25% of the actual amount to being recovered
payable upon successful recovery. Lemoine never gave his consent as to the fee.
Since he was leaving the country, Lemoine signed an undated Special Power of Attorney authorizing
Balon to bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of Lemoine’s claim
as well as to negotiate, sign, compromise, encash and receive payments.
Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle Lemoine’s claim and Balon confirmed his
acceptance of the offer.
December 1998, Metropolitan Insurance issued a China Bank check payable to Lemoine in the
amount of P525,000 which was received by Balon.
When Lemoine asked Balon as to the status of the case, Balon answered that
Metropolitan Insurance was offering P350,000 for settlement which Lemoine suggested that Balon
accept to avoid litigation.
December 1999, Lemoine visited the office of Metropolitan Insurance to ask on the status of the case
and it answered that the case was long settled via a check given to Balon.
Balon acknowledge that he is in possession of the check and that he is keeping the check as
attorney’s lien pending Lemoine’s payment of his attorney’s fee equivalent to 50% of the entire
amount collected. He also threatened Lemoine that he will not hesitate to make proper representation
with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, DOLE and BIR if L e m o i n e w i l l m a k e a n y
t r o u b l e t o B a l o n a n d t h a t h e h a s g o o d n e t w o r k w i t h t h e mentioned agencies.
Balon later claimed that he gave P233,000 to Garcia on the representation of Lemoine, however, he
gave no evidence to such turnover .
Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Held:
There is a conflict of interest if there is an inconsistenc y in the interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for
an issue or claim but it is his dut y to oppose it for the other client. In short, if he argues
for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.
the reasons proffered by respondent are hardly persuasive to excuse his clear r
epresentation of conflicting interests.
first, the investigating commissioner observed that the name “Gamaliel Abaqueta” is not a common
name. once heard, it will surely ring a bell in one’s mind if he came across the name again.
Second, assumingarguendothat respondents memory was indeed faulty, still it is incredible
that he could not recall that complainant was his client, considering that Mrs. Charito
Baclig, who was complainants attorney-in-fact and the go-between of complainant and respondent in
Special Proceedings, was the same person who brought Milagros Yap Abaqueta to him.
Lastly, the fact that the subject matter of Civil Case and Special Proceedings are the same
properties could not have escaped the attention of respondent.
PEOPLE VS. GODOY
G.R. Nos. 115908-09 (December 6, 1995)
FACTS:
Godoy was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious
illegal detention, and sentencing him to the maximum penalty of death in both cases by the Regional
Trial Court.
The private complainant Mia Taha allegedly said that her teacher Danny Codoy(Appellant) by means
of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and by means of deceit, have carnal Knowledge with
her and kidnap or detained her, for a period of five (5).
The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired.
His defense was that they were lovers, as evidenced by the letters wrote by the complainant (Mia
Taha) to the accused and the same was corroborated by the testimonies of the defense witnesses.
ISSUES:
Can Godoy be convicted of rape and kidnapping with illegal detention?
RULING:
No. They were in fact lovers.
This notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the
nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt
as to any material element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence, the
prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt and the accused must be acquitted.
There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence
presented in a prosecution for the crime of rape. These are: (1)while rape is a most detestable crime,
and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation
easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though
innocent;(2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) that the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably convince
this Court that there was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and that the charge of
rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress of an actual
wrong.
The challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court below made no serious effort
to dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence for the prosecution in spite of the
teaching in various rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of the offended party must not be
accepted with precipitate credulity. In finding that the crime of rape was committed, the lower court
took into account only that portion of the testimony of complainant regarding the incident and
conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly, there would be reason to believe that she was indeed
raped. But if we are to consider the other portions of her testimony concerning the events which
transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or unwittingly failed or declined to
appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily exposed.
It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactor was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. In the present charge for that crime, such
intent has not at all been established by the prosecution. Prescinding from the fact that the Taha
spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which they themselves instituted, several grave and
irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on
the guilt of appellant.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are
strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their
reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character
humiliates their entire families.80 It could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted to save face
in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's
indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the
scenario of this rape drama.
In the matter of the application for Habeas Corpus of Maximino Gamido vs. New Bilibid Prison, GR
No. 146783, July 29, 2002
FACTS:
Before us is the Motion for Relief filed on January 17, 2002 by Espiridion J. Dela Cruz, of Suite 416
William Liyao Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila, who styles himself as counsel for petitioner Maximino B.
Gamido.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there has been a violation of the rule against forum-shopping; and
2. Whether or not Espiridion J. Dela Cruz may appear as counsel for petitioner in this case,
considering allegations that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar.
HELD:
It appearing that earlier the petitioner himself filed under date of February 12, 2001, personally his
Motion to Withdraw Petition, and that the Court in its Resolution dated March 12, 2001, granted the
withdrawal of his petition for habeas corpus, the Court hereby RESOLVES that the instant Motion for
Relief, which was filed without authority of the petitioner and clearly without merit, should be and is
hereby DENIED.
Further, considering representations by the self-styled counsel for petitioner that he, Espiridion J.
Dela Cruz, is a lawyer with a law office bearing his name at Suite 416 William Liyao Bldg., Rizal
Avenue, Manila, and for this purpose he used the title of attorney and indicated in his pleadings filed
before this Court an IBP number, which turned out to be spurious, it having been shown and admitted
by him that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified by the Office of the Bar Confidant,
after he was made to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for appearing as
counsel in this case without license to practice law, and although he asked the Court for forgiveness
for the wrong he had done, the Court RESOLVED to declare ESPIRIDION J. DELA CRUZ GUILTY of
indirect contempt of this Court.
Halili v CIR (136 SCRA 112)
Facts:
The cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than five hundred bus drivers and
conductors of Halili Transit. Litigation initially commenced with the filing of a complaint for overtime
with the CIR. The disputes were eventually settled when the contending parties reached an
Agreement where the Administratrix would transfer to the employees the title to a tract of land in
Caloocan, Rizal. The parcel of land was eventually registered in the name of the Union.
The Union, through Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE) requesting for authority to sell and dispose of the property. Union President
Amado Lopez, in a letter, informed J.C. Espinas and Associates that the general membership of the
said Union had authorized a 20% contingent fee for the law firm based on whatever amount would be
awarded the Union.
Atty. Jose C. Espinas, (the original counsel) established the award of 897 workers' claim. When Atty.
Pineda appeared for the Union in these cases, still an associate of the law firm, his appearance
carried the firm name B.C. Pineda and Associates," giving the impression that he was the principal
lawyer in these cases.
Atty. Pineda joined the law firm of Atty. Espinas in 1965 when these cases were pending resolution.
He always held office in the firm's place at Puyat Building, except in 1966 to 1967 when he
transferred to the Lakas ng Manggagawa Offices. During this one-year stint at the latter office, Atty.
Pineda continued handling the case with the arrangement that he would report the developments to
the Espinas firm. When he rejoined the law firm in 1968, he continued working on these cases and
using the Puyat Building office as his address in the pleadings.
When Atty. Pineda rejoined the Espinas firm in 1968, he did not reveal to his partners (he was made
the most senior partner) that he had a retainer's contract. He stayed with the law firm until 1974 and
still did not divulge the 1967 retainer's contract. Only the officers of the Union knew of the contract.
The alleged retainer's contract between Atty. Pineda and the Union appears anomalous and even
illegal as well as unethical considering that1. The contract was executed only between Atty. Pineda and the officers of the Union chosen by
about 125 members only. It was not a contract with the general membership.
2. The contingent fee of 30% for those who were still working with Halili Transit and the 45% fee for
those who were no longer working worked to the prejudice of the latter group who should and were
entitled to more benefits. Thus, too, when the alleged retainer's contract was executed in 1967, the
Halili Transit had already stopped operations in Metro Manila. By then, Atty. Pineda knew that all the
workers would be out of work which would mean that the 45% contingent fee would apply to all.
3. The contract which retroactively took effect on January 1, 1966, was executed when Atty. Espinas
was still handling the appeal of Halili Transit in the main case before the Supreme Court.
4. When Atty. Pineda filed his motion for approval of his attorney's lien with Arbiter Valenzuela on
February 8, 1983, he did not attach the retainer's contract.
5. The retainer's contract was not even notarized.
A prospective buyer, the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. objected in view of PD 1529 which
requires no less than an order from a court of competent jurisdiction as authority to sell property in
trust.
Atty. Pineda, without authority from the Supreme Court but relying on the earlier authority given him
by the Ministry of Labor, filed another urgent motion, praying that the Union be authorized to sell the
lot. The sale was finally consummated, resulting in the execution of an escrow agreement.
When Atty. Jose C. Espinas (herein movant and alleged original counsel for the Union) learned of the
sale and apportionment of the proceeds from past Union president Amado Lopez, he requested
Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela to allow him to look into the records of the case. The latter,
however, told him that the records of the case were missing. Thereupon, Atty. Espinas requested
Director Pascual Reyes of the NLRC to locate the records.
Issue:
a. Whether or not Atty. Pineda and Arbiter Valenzuela should be held in contempt.
b. Whether or not Atty. Pineda should be disbarred.
Held:
a. YES. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct
as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or
prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order
in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and
consequently, to the due administration of justice.
In the Slade Perkins case, "the exercise of the power to punish contempt has a twofold aspect,
namely (1) the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court or its order; and (2)
to compel his performance of some act or duty required of him by the court which he refuses to
perform. Due to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them, contempts are
classified as civil or criminal.
A civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit
of the opposing party therein.
A criminal contempt, is conduct directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge, as
in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly
forbidden act.
b. YES. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.—A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corrupt or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the
confidence and trust which characterize the attorney and client relations, and the practice of law
before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence.
In the case, the expeditious manner by which Arbiter Valenzuela granted Atty. Pineda's motion for
such authority to sell the property make the entire transaction dubious and irregular.
Significantly Atty. Pineda's act of filing a motion praying for authority to sell was by itself an admission
on his part that he did not possess the authority to sell the property. He could not and did not even
wait for valid authority but instead previously obtained the same from the labor arbiter whom he knew
was
not
empowered
to
so
authorize.
The 45% attorney's lien on the award of those union members who were no longer working and the
30% lien on the benefits of those who were still working as provided for in the alleged retainer's
contract are also very exorbitant and unconscionable.
*Atty. Pineda is found guilty of indirect contempt of court for which he is sentenced to imprisonment
and directed to show cause why he should not be disbarred.
Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234
FACTS:
Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar represented
Montecillo and he successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower court. Del Mar was even able to win
their counterclaim thus the lower court ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the adjudged moral damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where the latter court reversed the
same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a veiled threat against the
Court of Appeals judges intimating that he thinks the CA justices “knowingly rendered an unjust
decision” and “judgment has been rendered through negligence” and that the CA allowed itself to be
deceived.
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone with the court. Del
Mar then filed a second MFR where he again made threats. The CA then ordered del Mar to show
cause as to why he should not be punished for contempt.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter which he sent to the President of the
Philippines asking the said justices to consider the CA judgment. But the CA did not reverse its
judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case against the three justices of the CA before a Cebu lower
court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason of a compromise agreement where del
Mar agreed to pay damages to the justices. Eventually, the CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from
practice.
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension as well as
the CA decision as to the Montecillo case. The SC denied both and this earned the ire of del Mar as
he demanded from the Clerk of the Supreme Court as to who were the judges who voted against him.
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to why he should not be
disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation instead tried to justify his actions even stating that had he not
been “convinced that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will be fruitless” he would have continued
with the civil case against the CA justices. In his explanation, del Mar also intimated that even the
Supreme Court is part among “the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice”.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge who handled the
case dismissed the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts. As an officer of
the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem
and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy
ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by
claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with
intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.
Nuñez vs. Ibay, AM No. RTJ-06-1984, June 30, 2009
FACTS:
The administrative case stemmed from the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Valeriano F. Nuňez, filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 135, Makati City with gross abuse of authority. The complaint involved an incident in the Makati
City Hall basement parking lot for which respondent judge cited complainant in contempt of court
because complainant parked a government vehicle which he was driving at the parking space
reserved for respondent judge.
Complainant apologized and explained that he did not intend to park in respondent Judge’s space,
and that he did not that such space was reserved for respondent Judge. However, respondent judge
refused to accept complainant’s apology and, instead, found the latter guilty of direct contempt of
court for using the former’s parking space, sentencing complainant to five (5) days imprisonment and
a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00). Respondent then ordered the jail guard to bring
complainant to the City Jail in Fort Bonifacio, where the father was incarcerated for two days. On April
5, 2005, complainant was released after filing a Motion for Reconsideration and paying the fine of
P1,000.00.
In his Comment. Respondent Judge claimed that on the date and time of incident, he was set to
dispose a criminal case, and over the weekend, had even conceptualized the matter on how to
administer the proceedings to accomplish the requirements of that criminal case. However, the
inconsiderate and improper parking of complainant disturbed his train of thought as to the intended
disposition of his cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of grave abuse of authority.
HELD:
Yes, The Supreme Court held that the exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges and
designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge
himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in
disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary itself.
By the time the instant complaint was filed, respondent Judge had already cited six persons in
contempt, including herein complainant. Worse, respondent Judge immediately detained
complainant, thereby preventing him from resorting to the remedies provided under the law. Such
abusive behavior on the part of respondent Judge fails to show his integrity, which is essential not
only to the proper discharge of the judicial office, but also to his personal demeanor.
In addition, Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary state that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived
to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
The court believes that the frequency of his offenses already constitutes gross misconduct. “Gross”
has been defined as flagrant and shameful, while “misconduct” means a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior.
Tan vs. Balajadia
Facts:
Respondent Balajadia was charged for contempt by the petititioners, Tan, et al.
Before that, the respondent filed a criminal case against the petitioners with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. In his complaint-affidavit, the respondent asserted
that he is a “practicing lawyer” based in Baguio City. However, certifications issued by
the OBC and the IBP showed that the respondent was admitted to the Bar.
Respondent asserted that the allegation that he was a practicing lawyer is an
honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the
complaint-affidavit patterned after Atty. Aquino’s affidavit. Liza Laconsay, Atty.
Aquino’s secretary, admitted the mistake of copying Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit
and instead of stating that Respondent Balajadia is a businessman, he was erroneously
referred to as a practicing lawyer.
Issue:
Whether not the respondent is liable for direct contempt.
Ruling:
The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the mistake in drafting the complaintaffidavit conforms to the documentary evidence on record and the allegation was indeed
a result of inadvertence and doesn’t establish intent to make him liable for indirect
contempt.
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega
loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution
declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors
and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held
where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition
with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as
mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the
alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against
respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former Pres.
Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former
Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and
counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently
acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The
motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The
prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”
HELD
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it
is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of
respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists
a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing
respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of
“intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent
Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with
the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court
held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
“matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion
No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall
within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do
with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the
sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and
liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter
different from the matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the
“intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it
is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be
remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be
considered as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the
intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court
gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of
justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a
proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of
government.
Petition
assailing
the
Resolution
of
the
Sandiganbayan
is
denied.
Relevant
Dissenting
Opinion
of
Justice
Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once
held public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept
employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such
office
or
employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or
advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as
a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held
public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the
government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the service.
People vs. Villanueva, GR No. L-19450, May 27, 1965
FACTS:
In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the municipality of Alaminos in Laguna. In
said case, the private offended party asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to prosecute said case.
Apparently, Fule was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the opposed the appearance of Fule
as counsel for the offended party as he said that according to the Rules of Court when an attorney
had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified,
by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.
HELD:
No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public
for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. In the case
at bar, Fule is not being compensated but rather he’s doing it for free for his friend who happened to
be the offended party. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise. Further, the fact that the Secretary of Justice approved Fule’s appearance for his friend
should be given credence.
Noriega vs. Sison, GR No. L-24548, Oct. 27, 1983
FACTS:
In 1981, Noriega filed a disbarment case against Sison. Noriega alleged that Sison as a hearing
officer of the Securities and Exchange Commission is not allowed to engage in the private practice of
law; yet Noriega alleged that Sison has created another identity under the name “Manuel Sison” in
order for him to engage in private practice and represent one Juan Sacquing before a trial court in
Manila.
Sison, in his defense, argued that he is in fact representing Juan Sacquing but the same is with the
permission of the SEC Commissioner; that he never held himself out to the public as a practicing
lawyer; that he provided legal services to Sacquing in view of close family friendship and for free; that
he never represented himself deliberately and intentionally as “Atty. Manuel Sison” in the Manila
JDRC where, in the early stages of his appearance, he always signed the minutes as “Atty.
Emmanuel R. Sison”, and in one instance, he even made the necessary correction when the court
staff wrote his name as Atty. Manuel Sison”; that due to the “inept and careless work of the clerical
staff of the JDRC”, notices were sent to “Atty. Manuel Sison”.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment case should prosper.
HELD:
No. The arguments of presented by Sison is well merited and backed by evidence. The allegations in
the complaint do not warrant disbarment of the Sison. There is no evidence that Sison has committed
an act constituting deceit, immoral conduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer, willful disobedience of
any lawful order of the court, or corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney to a part to a case
without attorney to do so. His isolated appearance for Sacquing does not constitute private practice of
law, more so since Sison did not derive any pecuniary gain for his appearance because Sison and
Sacquing were close family friends. Such act of Sison in going out of his way to aid as counsel to a
close family friend should not be allowed to be used as an instrument of harassment against him.
LIM SANTIAGO VS SAGUCIO
EN BANC[ A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006 ]
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, RESPONDENT
Facts:
Complainant charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent,
being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat
very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case
filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of
the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to
support the complaint.
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while
working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent
received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February 1995, another P10,000 for
the months of April and May 1995, and P5,000 for the month of April 1996.
Issue:
whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with respondent’s role as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor
Whether or not respondent is engaged in the practice of law
Ruling:
1. The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (“Code”). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. Respondent
committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 (“RA 6713”).
Canon 6 provides that the Code “shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official duties.” A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition “not [to] represent
conflicting interests.” However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent
conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all
concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship
exists. Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member
of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative
penalty.
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in “unlawful x x x conduct.”
Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to “engage
in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions.”
2. “Private practice of law” contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was
not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit
because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as
long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal
knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term “practice of law.”
Catu vs. Rellosa [A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008]
16AUG
Ponente: CORONA, J.
FACTS:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located in
Manila. His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio
Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises.
Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay.
Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties
failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the
appropriate action in court.Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the
(subsequent ejectment) case. Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that
respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as
counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings
between the litigants as punong barangay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent suspended for six (6) months.
RATIO:
[R]espondent was found guilty of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and
Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the
disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission
of the head of the department concerned in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules.
Respondent was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
PENTECOSTES VS MARASIGAN
SECOND DIVISION[ A.M. No. P-07-2337 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-2060-P), August 03,
2007
ROLLY
]
PENTECOSTES,
COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. HERMENEGILDO MARASIGAN, CLERK OF COURT VI, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF
COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, KABACAN, NORTH COTABATO, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
The administrative case against respondent stemmed from a sworn affidavit-complaint filed by Rolly
Pentecostes, the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which was recovered by members of the PNP of
M’lang, North Cotabato from suspected carnappers against whom a criminal case for carnapping,
was lodged at RTC.
On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of M’lang, North Cotabato turned over the
motorcycle to respondent who acknowledged receipt thereof.
After the conduct of hearings to determine the true owner of the motorcycle, the trial court issued an
Order for its release to Pentecostes.
Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release the motorcycle to him. Respondent, however,
told him to wait and come back repeatedly from 2001 up to the filing of the complaint.
Issue:
On the topic of good moral character
Ruling:
,Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, provides:
SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. – The clerk shall safely keep all record, papers, files, exhibits and
public property committed to his charge, including the library of the court, and the seals and furniture
belonging to his office.
From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the RTC, Kabacan, respondent was
charged with the custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes’ motorcycle, and to keep it until the
termination of the case, barring circumstances that would justify its safekeeping elsewhere, and upon
the prior authority of the trial court.
No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for turning over the motorcycle. But whatever
the reason was, respondent was mandated to secure prior consultations with and approval of the trial
court.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential and ranking officers of our
judicial system who perform delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice.
Their duties include the efficient recording, filing and management of court records and, as previously
pointed out, the safekeeping of exhibits and public property committed to their charge.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action; more particularly, it is an
unlawful behavior by the public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be
proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple, as in this case.
Father Ranhilio C. Aquino et al vs. Atty. Edwin Pascua A.C. No.5095, November 28, 2007
FACTS:
Father Aquino as the Academic head of Philippine Judicial Academy, filed a complaint against Atty.
Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public for violation of the Notarial Practice Law. He alleged that Atty. Pascua
falsified two documents wherein both documents had “Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243. Book III, Series
of 1998” and both are dated on December 10, 1998. It was shown by the Clerk of Court of RTC –
Tuguegarao that none of these entries appear in the National Register of Atty. Pascua. In his
comment, Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents on December 10, 1998, but
they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary. Complainant
maintains that Atty. Pascua’s omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of falsification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Pascua violated the Notarial Practice Rule
HELD:
Yes, under the notarial law, “the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the
nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing,
swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument. Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or
entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner requested by law is a ground for
revocation of his commission.”
Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever
is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the
documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is
bound by the acts of his staff.
Furthermore, the claim of Atty. Pascua of simple inadvertence is untenable. The photocopy of his
notarial register shows that the last entry which he notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document No.
1200 on Page 240. On the other hand, the two affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on December
10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively, under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr.
Ranhilo and the other complainants are correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned
fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a
Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.
A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his professional or private
capacity. The Court has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who were found guilty of
dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their duties.
Atty. Pascua is declared guilty of misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law for 3 months
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial
commission is revoked.
Administrative case filed against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, JBC No.013, August 22, 2007
FACTS: Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 10, Davao City on May 17, 2003. Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) received confidential information that administrative and criminal charges were filed against
Judge Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM), Regional Office 11, Davao City, as a result of which he was dismissed from the
service per Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated April 10, 1995.
In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) submitted to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) on
November 26, 2001, Judge Quitain declared that there were five criminal cases (Criminal Cases Nos.
18438, 18439, 22812, 22813, and 22814) filed against him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all
dismissed. No administrative case was disclosed by Judge Qutain in his PDS.
To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Christopher
O. Lock (now Court Administrator) requested from the Sandiganbayan certified copies of the Order(s)
dismissing the criminal cases. On even date, letters were sent to the NAPOLCOM requesting for
certified true copies of documents relative to the administrative complaints filed against Judge
Quitain, particularly A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 dismissing him from the service. Likewise,
DCA Lock required Judge Quitain to explain the alleged misrepresentation and deception he
committed before the JBC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Judge is guilty of grave misconduct.
HELD:
We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of all those who are
in the service of the Judiciary. We have often stressed that the conduct required of court personnel,
from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk of court, must always be beyond reproach and
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that
may taint the Judiciary. We condemn, and will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on
the part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
Considering the foregoing, Judge Quitain is hereby found guilty of grave misconduct. He
deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal. Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was
accepted by the Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant
administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and its consequent
acceptance without prejudice by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency of this
case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the
charges against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications. Indeed, if innocent, the respondent official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to
receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.
Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty Ismael F. Mejia, Adm Case No.2984, August 31, 2007
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with plea for reinstatement in
the practice of law filed by Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who is already seventy-one years old and barred
from the practice of law for fifteen years.
On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of
law. On July 6, 1999, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution denying the petition for
reinstatement.
On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with
a plea for reinstatement in the practice of law. No comment or opposition was filed against the
petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent
on the sound discretion of the Court.
2. whether or not the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial
administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicants reentry as a
counselor at law.
HELD:
The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of
good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will take into consideration
the applicants character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the
charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.
In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession. Fifteen years had already
elapsed since Mejias name was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At the age of seventy-one, he is
begging for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and
he has suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and
redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment.
After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication containing his religious and social
writings. He also organized a religious organization and named it El Cristo Movement and Crusade
on Miracle of Heart and Mind.
The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has passed since Mejia was punished
with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejias
disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the
age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment
are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the
rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to
him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his
punishment has lasted long enough. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its
erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served
its purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct
offenders.
We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements
for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
GSIS vs. Hon. Vicente A. Pacquing, AM No. RTJ-04-1831,February 2, 2007
FACTS:
In 1971, Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (Bengson) borrowed P4,250,000 from petitioner
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), secured by real estate and chattel mortgages. When
Bengson defaulted in the payment of the amortizations, petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgaged properties and sold them at public auction where it emerged as the highest bidder.
In 1977, Bengson filed an action in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union,
Branch 26 to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure. The trial court, through Judge Antonio Fineza,
declared the foreclosure void and directed petitioner to restore to Bengson the foreclosed properties,
pay damages and costs of suit.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed with
modification the trial courts decision and remanded the case for reception of evidence on the costs of
suit and determination of the replacement value of the properties should petitioner fail to return them.
The CA decision became final and executory on February 10, 1988.
When petitioner failed to return the foreclosed properties, the new presiding judge of Branch
26, respondent Judge Vicente A. Pacquing, ordered it to pay Bengson the equivalent value of the
foreclosed properties. Thereafter, Bengson moved that it be permitted to present evidence on the
costs of suit. On April 6, 1995, the trial court directed petitioner to pay Bengson P31 million as costs
of suit. This order became final on April 24, 1995.
Petitioner filed an urgent omnibus motion with the court a quo stating that its counsel, Atty.
Rogelio Terrado, went on AWOL and never informed it of respondent judges order. This motion,
treated as petition for relief from judgment by respondent judge, was dismissed on January 16, 1997.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge acted administratively liable for ignorance of the law.
HELD:
For a judge to be administratively liable for ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must
be gross or patent. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, such acts must not only be contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence but also motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty. That
certainly does not appear to be the case here as petitioners complaint was spawned merely by the
honest divergence of opinion between petitioner and respondent judge as to the legal issues and
applicable laws involved. Petitioner also proffered no evidence that respondent judges acts were
imbued with malice or bad faith.
In the same vein, we hold that respondent judge was neither biased nor partial against
petitioner when he issued the alias writ of execution. Petitioners assertion that respondent judge
precipitately issued the alias writ is not supported by the records. On the contrary, the records
indicate that the writ was issued more than three years from the finality of the order directing
petitioner to pay Bengson P31 million as costs of suit. Its issuance was not all tainted with undue
haste. In the exercise of his judicial discretion, respondent judge believed that the issuance of the
alias writ had become forthwith a matter of right following the finality of said order. The rule is that
once a judgment becomes final, the winning party is entitled to a writ of execution and the issuance
thereof becomes a courts ministerial duty.
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that respondent judge erred in issuing the alias writ, his act
would still not merit administrative sanction absent malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply
connote poor or flawed judgment; it imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity or conscious doing
of a wrong.
Furthermore, for allegations of bias and partiality to stand, petitioner should have
demonstrated that respondent judges decisions and orders came from extrajudicial sources or from
some bases other than what he had learned from his study of the case. Decisions formed in the
course of judicial proceedings, although they appear erroneous, are not necessarily partial as long as
they are culled from the arguments and evidence of the parties. The party who alleges partiality must
prove it with clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner failed in that aspect
The filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for correcting the actions of a
judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient remedy exists. The
actions against judges should not be considered as complementary or suppletory to, or substitute for,
the judicial remedies which can be availed of by a party in a case.
Regarding the accusations against respondent Atty. Baez, the Court finds no basis to hold him
liable for executing the assailed writ at that time. Undeniably, the most difficult phase of any
proceeding is the execution of judgment. Charged with this task, he must act with considerable
dispatch to administer justice. Otherwise, a judgment, if not executed at once, would just be an empty
victory on the part of the prevailing party. In executing the writ, Atty. Baez merely carried out a
ministerial duty. He had no discretion to implement the writ or not.
Velez vs De Vera
496 SCRA 345 [ÀC No. 6697 July 25, 2006]
Facts:
An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed
then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving
Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the
elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because the latter
was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty.
de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal
account; The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be
suspended from the practice of law for three years; Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar
which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California. Atty. de Vera vehemently insists
that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his client’s funds as the latter’s father
(the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did
not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he
“expected de Vera might use the money for a few days. Petitioner claims that such information was
concealed by the respondent. Such and other circumstances which the IBP board deems that
respondent is not fit to be a member of the board, hence his removal was sought.
Issue:
Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign
jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be
sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign
jurisdiction.
Held:
No. We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was
admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and against
whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case
of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera
despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law
before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.
In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign
jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts
giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction.
Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of
suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court’s action includes any of the grounds
for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign
court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a
contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due
notice in the foreign forum.
In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie
evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the
facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he
must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.
A.C. No. 7204
March 7, 2007
CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent
Facts:
The case is a disbarment case against respondent on the ground of gross immorality. It
was alleged that sometime in December 2004, complainant seek for legal advice from petitioner
regarding her collectibles from a travel company. Respondent sent Demand Letter and sometime in
February 2005, they met at Zensho Restaurant to discuss the possibility of filing complaint against the
travel company because the latter failed to settle the accounts. That after that said meeting, the
respondent "held her arm and kissed her on the cheek while embracing her very tightly."
The two met again to finalize the draft for the complaint and while on their way home after
the said meeting, the respondent suddenly stopped the car and things went out of hand. Thus she
decided to refer the case to another lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly immoral which would warrant
the disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
Held:
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON I – x x x
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
The SC held that lawyers are expected to abide the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but all throught out their legal career as lawyers belong to an exclusive and
honored fraternity. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the legal profession and
should adhere to the unwaveringly to the highest standard of morality. The respondent admitted to
the act of kissing the complainant on the lips as evidenced as well of his asking for apology from
complainant in his text message. Regardless of the fact that the respondent admitted that he kissed
the complainant but the Court held that this was not accompanied by malice because the respondent
immediately asked for forgiveness after sensing the annoyance of the respondent after texting him.
Thus the Court held that this is not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible which will warrant
disbarment or suspension. But the Court reprimanded respondent to be more prudent and cautious.
In re: Petition to disqualify Atty. Leonardo De Vera, AC No.6052, December 11, 2003
FACTS:
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) was set on April 26, 2003, a month
prior to the IBP National Convention scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The election was so set in
compliance with Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By Laws, which reads:
SECTION 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. At least one month before the national
convention, the delegates from each region shall elect the governor of their region, the choice of
which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
Later on, the outgoing IBP Board, in its Resolution No. XV-2003-99 dated April 16, 2003, reset
the elections to May 31, 2003, or after the IBP National Convention.
Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter in
Eastern Mindanao, along with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, sent
a letter dated 28 March 2003, requesting the IBP Board to reconsider its Resolution of April 6, 2003.
Their Motion was anchored on two grounds viz. (1) adhering to the mandate of Section 39 of the IBP
By Laws to hold the election of Regional Governors at least one month prior to the national
convention of the IBP will prevent it from being politicized since post-convention elections may
otherwise lure the candidates into engaging in unacceptable political practices, and; (2) holding the
election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the outgoing IBP Board from resolving protests
in the election for governors not later than May 31, 2003, as expressed in Section 40 of the IBP By
Laws, to wit:
SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two days
after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a
written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition, the President shall
forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the protest,
with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not later than
the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.
On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for reconsideration in its Resolution No. XV2003-162.
On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been adjourned in the afternoon of May
24, 2003, the petitioners filed a Petition dated 23 May 2003 before the IBP Board seeking (1) the
postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the second or third week of June 2003; and
(2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected Regional Governor for Eastern
Mindanao Region.
ISSUE:
(1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy;
(2) whether petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera, the determination
of which in turn requires the resolution of two sub-issues, namely:
(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper remedy under
the IBP By-Laws; and
(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit;
(3) whether the present Petition is premature;
(4) assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present petition is not
premature, whether respondent De Vera is qualified to run for Governor of the IBP
Eastern Mindanao Region;
HELD:
Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera contends that the Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction on the present controversy. As noted earlier, respondent De Vera submits
that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those
who want to serve the IBP, is purely an internal matter and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
IBP.
The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on the
Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP, thus:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)
Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including
the election of its officers.
The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in the 1935 Constitution. Section
13, Art. VIII thereof granted the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law. It reads:
SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same.
The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitution and the similarly worded
provision in the intervening 1973 Constitution through all the years have been the sources of this
Courts authority to supervise individual members of the Bar. The term Bar refers to the collectivity of
all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. Pursuant to this power of supervision, the
Court initiated the integration of the Philippine Bar by creating on October 5, 1970 the Commission on
Bar Integration, which was tasked to ascertain the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. Not long
after, Republic Act No. 6397 was enacted and it confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar. Finally, on January 1, 1973, in the per curiam Resolution of this
Court captioned In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar to the Philippines, we ordained the
Integration of the Philippine Bar in accordance with Rule 139-A, of the Rules of Court, which we
promulgated pursuant to our rule-making power under the 1935 Constitution.
The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De Vera in asserting IBP independence
from the Supreme Court, ironically recognizes the full range of the power of supervision of the
Supreme Court over the IBP. For one, Section 77 of the IBP By-Laws vests on the Court the power to
amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws, either motu propio or upon recommendation of the Board
of Governors of the IBP. Also in Section 15, the Court is authorized to send observers in IBP
elections, whether local or national. Section 44 empowers the Court to have the final decision on the
removal of the members of the Board of Governors.
On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the Supreme Court looked into the
irregularities which attended the 1989 elections of the IBP National Officers. In Bar Matter No. 491
entitled In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines the
Court formed a committee to make an inquiry into the 1989 elections. The results of the investigation
showed that the elections were marred by irregularities, with the principal candidates for election
committing acts in violation of Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws. The Court invalidated the elections and
directed the conduct of special elections, as well as explicitly disqualified from running threat the IBP
members who were found involved in the irregularities in the elections, in order to impress upon the
participants, in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the
stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the
IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering.
The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws. First, it removed direct
election by the House of Delegates of the (a) officers of the House of Delegates; (b) IBP President;
and (c) Executive Vice-President (EVP). Second, it restored the former system of the IBP Board
choosing the IBP President and the Executive Vice President (EVP) from among themselves on a
rotation basis (Section 47 of the By-Laws, as amended) and the automatic succession by the EVP to
the position of the President upon the expiration of their common two-year term. Third, it amended
Sections 37 and 39 by providing that the Regional Governors shall be elected by the members of
their respective House of Delegates and that the position of Regional Governor shall be rotated
among the different chapters in the region.
The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the Supreme Court over the IBP and
establish without doubt its jurisdiction to hear and decide the present controversy.
In support of its stance on the second issue that the petitioners have no cause of action against
him, respondent De Vera argues that the IBP By-Laws does not allow petitions to disqualify
candidates for Regional Governors since what it authorizes are election protests or post-election
cases under Section 40 thereof which reads:
SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two days
after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a
written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition, the President shall
forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the protest,
with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not later than
the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.
Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which sanctions the disqualification of
candidates for IBP governors. The remedy it provides for questioning the elections is the election
protest. But this remedy, as will be shown later, is not available to just anybody.
Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the disqualification of nominees for the
position of regional governor. This was carefully detailed in the former Section 39(4) of the IBP ByLaws, to wit:
SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings. - Any question relating to the eligibility of a candidate
must be raised prior to the casting of ballots, and shall be immediately decided by the Chairman. An
appeal from such decision may be taken to the Delegates in attendance who shall forthwith resolve
the appeal by plurality vote. Voting shall be by raising of hands. The decision of the Delegates shall
be final, and the elections shall thereafter proceed. Recourse to the Board of Governors may be had
in accordance with Section 40.
The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on nomination and election of the Board
of Governors. Before, members of the Board were directly elected by the members of the House of
Delegates at its annual convention held every other year. The election was a two-tiered process.
First, the Delegates from each region chose by secret plurality vote, not less than two nor more than
five nominees for the position of Governor for their Region. The names of all the nominees, arranged
by region and in alphabetical order, were written on the board within the full view of the House, unless
complete mimeographed copies of the lists were distributed to all the Delegates.Thereafter, each
Delegate, or, in his absence, his alternate voted for only one nominee for Governor for each
Region. The nominee from every Region receiving the highest number of votes was declared and
certified elected by the Chairman.
In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the 1989 IBP elections, this Court deemed
it best to amend the nomination and election processes for Regional Governors. The Court localized
the elections, i.e, each Regional Governor is nominated and elected by the delegates of the
concerned region, and adopted the rotation process through the following provisions, to wit:
SECTION 37: Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by
a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in
Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one Governor for each region to be
elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor
should be rotated among the different chapters in the region.
SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors. - At least one (1) month before the national
convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of
which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it less
controversial. The grounds for disqualification were reduced, if not totally eradicated, for the pool from
which the Delegates may choose their nominees is diminished as the rotation process operates.
The simplification of the process was in line with this Courts vision of an Integrated Bar which is
non-political and effective in the discharge of its role in elevating the standards of the legal profession,
improving the administration of justice and contributing to the growth and progress of the Philippine
society.
The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to remove the provision on
disqualification proceedings. Consequently, under the present IBP By-Laws, the instant petition has
no firm ground to stand on.
Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the aforequoted Section 40 of the IBP ByLaws, petitioners are not the proper persons to bring the suit for they are not qualified to be
nominated in the elections of regional governor for Eastern Mindanao. He argues that following the
rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP By-Laws as amended, only IBP members from Agusan del
Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated.
Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the present petition, petitioners
are not the proper parties to bring the suit. As provided in the aforesaid section, only nominees can
file with the President of the IBP a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. As claimed by
respondent De Vera, and not disputed by petitioners, only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and
Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated and elected at the election for the 16th Regional
Governor of Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in the aforequoted
Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the
other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Consequently, the
petitioners are not even qualified to be nominated at the forthcoming election.
On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present petition.
This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the petitioners to seek
the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected IBP Governor for the Eastern Mindanao
Region. Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for the post. In this case,
respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has
been made yet by the members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too,
assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination.
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really
from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paranaque and he was originally a member of
the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his
ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that
in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19 Article II, a lawyer included
in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his
preference or choice, thus:
Section 19. Registration. ....
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be
considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where
his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be
a member of more than one Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)
It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer
will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the
discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does
not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he
resides or maintains his office. The only proscription in registering ones preference is that a lawyer
cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of
IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:
SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all members registered in its membership roll.
Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated on any of the grounds set
forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his membership to another Chapter as
certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the transfer is made not less than three months
immediately preceding any Chapter election.
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less
than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan
del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a
letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon
J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent De Veras
transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is a
substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that De
Veras transfer was made effective sometime between August 1, 2001 and September 3, 2001. On
February 27, 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the
Philippines, as mandated by Section 29-12.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of
Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other
year. Between September 3, 2001 and February 27, 2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This
makes respondent De Veras transfer valid as it was done more than three months ahead of the
chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.
Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified because he is not morally fit to
occupy the position of governor of Eastern Mindanao.
We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements provided in
the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred. The basic qualifications for one who wishes to be elected
governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a member in good standing of the IBP; 2) he is included
in the voters list of his chapter or he is not disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of the Chapter to which he belongs; (3) he does not belong to a
chapter from which a regional governor has already been elected, unless the election is the start of a
new season or cycle; and (4) he is not in the government service.
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he
can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a
candidates lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based
on each members standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the
latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a
candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral
turpitude.
Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera on the basis of the alleged sanction
imposed by the Supreme Court during the deliberation on the constitutionality of the plunder law, is
apparently referring to this Courts Decision dated 29 July 2002 in In Re: Published Alleged Threats
Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera. In this
case, respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect contempt of court and was imposed a fine in
the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for his remarks contained in two newspaper
articles published in the Inquirer. Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of the report, with De
Veras statements written in italics.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday, November 6, 2001
Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers
Plunder Law
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed by
Estradas lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.
De Vera said he and his group were greatly disturbed by the rumors from Supreme Court insiders.
Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the Plunder Law,
with two other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said Plunder Watch, a coalition
formed by civil society and militant groups to monitor the prosecution of Estrada.
We are afraid that the Estrada camps effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices- considering that
it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May-will most likely result in a proEstrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either unconstitutional or vague, the group said.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Monday, November 19, 2001
SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes
Xxx
People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally charged. said lawyer Leonard De Vera of
the Equal Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign movement.
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law unconstitutional
would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to People Power II.
Xxx
De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the jueteng scandal that led to People Power II if the rumor
turned out to be true.
People wouldnt just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong. Sovereignty must
prevail.
In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted to have made said
statements but denied to have uttered the same to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in
it and to bring it into disrepute. He explained that he was merely exercising his constitutionally
guaranteed right to freedom of speech.
The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the statements were aimed at
influencing and threatening the Court to decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for which he
was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.
In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines cited in Villaber v. Commission on Elections, the Court
defines moral turpitude as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals. The determination of whether an act involves moral turpitude is a factual issue and frequently
depends on the circumstances attending the violation of the statute.
In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing ones opinion on a public interest issue
can be considered as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity. Respondent De Vera did not bring
suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced his views on the Plunder
Law. Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative case as evidence of
respondent De Veras alleged immorality.
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still
practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California
Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the
discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the
case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic
rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case, the
petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Veras moral
fitness to run for governor.
Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the delegates from
Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their support for his candidacy, again petitioners
did not present any proof to substantiate the same. It must be emphasized that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court.
Soriano v. Dizon, A.C. No. 6792. January 25, 2006.
Per Curiam
FACTS:
While driving on his way home, a taxi driver (herein complainant) overtook the car driven by herein
respondent. Incensed, respondent tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn. An
altercation resulted therefrom that got to the point that the respondent fired and shot complainant
hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the respondent so the latter pushed him out and sped
off.
ISSUE:
WON respondent’s guilt warrants disbarment.
RULING:
Yes. Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” It
is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to satisfy
his civil liabilities.
AGUIRRE VS RANA
EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT
Facts:
Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled mass oathtaking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled
date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in
an election.
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government
employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent
is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting
as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging respondent’s
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation
of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar
Ruling:
the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to
practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons
of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this
privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even
public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be
withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is
the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a
lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
[ G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES,
RESPONDENTS
Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, where
his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court
En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts
as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with
the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to
be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear
as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in
conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take
precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation
of trial.
Issue:
whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party litigant
Ruling:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues
and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal
capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of
an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.
In re: Atty. MarcialEdillion, AM 1928, August 3, 1978
FACTS:
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of
the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the
membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required
to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted
for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety
and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The
respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as
the Court Rule) — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
ISSUE:
1. whether or not a lawyer can compel to be a member of the Integrated Bar.
2. Whether or not a lawyer is mandated to pay the monthly fees.
3. Whether or not the practice of law is a property right.
HELD:
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to
become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of
his constitutional freedom to associate.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does
is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and in cohesive
group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring
payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court,
under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice
of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which
power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of
a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under
the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure
is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and
as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities.
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo Jr. BM 1370, May 9, 2005
FACTS:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues
filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter, dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in
the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that
after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from
July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement
in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was
working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones
profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was
working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment stating inter alia: that membership in the
IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of
Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member
is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by
the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the
validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an
Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from
payment of dues is but an implementation of the Courts directives for all members of the IBP to help
in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the
exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary
termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to
inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP
could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged
that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an
inactive status for its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will
exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues.
ISSUE: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time
that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986
and he was working abroad from 1986-2003
HELD: We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to
all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a
code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason
for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population.
This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the
practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to foster the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional
legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the
integration of the Philippine Bar - which power required members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine
Bar, thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting
to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a
revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an
integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does
not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far
outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual
dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is
exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the
member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues.
At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar
of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have
been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the
process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their
dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to
pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder
of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that
under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to practice law before the courts of this country should
be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty
may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and
as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers
public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails
the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
Santos, Jr. vs. Atty. Llamas, AC 4749
23JUL
FACTS:
Atty. Francisco Llamas was complained of not paying his IBP dues. He was also cited in the
complaint as not paying his professional tax or PTR as it was intermittently indicated in his pleadings
filed in court. It was also an alleged falsity when he included his “IBP-Rizal 259060” where in fact he
was not in good standing. Petitioner cited that Atty. Llamas was dismissed as Pasay City Judge. But
later revealed that the decision was reversed and he was subsequently promoted as RTC Judge of
Makati. He also had criminal case involving estafa but was appealed pending in the Court of Appeals.
In the numerous violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he expressed willingness to
settle the IBP dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, or until he has paid his
IBP dues.
Donton vs. Dr. Tansingco, AC No. 6057, June 27, 2006
FACTS:
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal
complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A.
Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury against
complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me
under the following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33
Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own
real property in his name – agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr.
Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that
would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer
of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing
Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and business operations.
The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr.
Donton.
Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name,
constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that
respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in
carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment
case against him upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan, because
respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay.
Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its
genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent violates the canon 1 and rule 1.02 of the code.
HELD:
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the
laws which he is bound to uphold and obey. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or
who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning
real property.Yet, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted that he caused the transfer
of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly
rectified his act and transferred the title in complainant’s name. But respondent provided "some
safeguards" by preparing several documents, including the Occupancy Agreement, that would
guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainant’s
name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition
against foreign ownership of lands by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he
prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of
lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts
to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.
In 2005, Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino
alleging that Atty. Tolentino, through his paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, “pirated” a client of Atty.
Linsangan. Said client later executed an affidavit in support of Atty. Linsangan’s allegations.
Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Labiano’s calling card which appears as follows:
FRONT
NICOMEDES
TOLENTINO
LAW OFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe
Marie
Paralegal
L.
Labiano
BACK
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO
OVERSEAS
SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing Labiano. He also denied authorizing the printing of
such calling cards.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached upon the professional services of Atty.
Pedro Linsangan.
2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper calling card of Labiano.
HELD:
1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer should
not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service,
good result or reduced fees for his services. By recruiting Atty. Linsangan’s clients, Atty.
Tolentino committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal practice.
2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Although Atty. Tolentino initially denied knowing Labiano, he admitted he actually
knew her later in the proceedings. It is thus clear that Labiano was connected to his law
office. Through Labiano’s actions, Atty. Tolentino’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were
enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that Atty. Tolentino could produce
a more favorable result.
Labiano’s calling card is improper. The card made it appear that the law office will finance legal
actions for the clients. The rule is, a lawyer shall not lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the
client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to
the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject
matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may lead the
lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may
take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided
fidelity to the client’s cause.
The phrase in the calling card which states “w/ financial assistance“, was clearly used to entice
clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their
legal actions.
However, since there is no substantial evidence to prove that Atty. Tolentino had a personal and
direct hand in the printing of said calling cards, he cannot be punished with severity. At any rate, for
all the infractions Atty. Tolentino committed, he was suspended by the Supreme Court for one year.
Atty. Vitriolo et al vs. Atty. Dasig, AC No. 4984, April 01, 2003
FACTS:
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, an official of the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in
violation of the Attorneys Oath for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the
detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent,
while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officerin-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a
teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the
amount of P20,000.00 and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application
for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of
her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition,
Respondent even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full knowledge of
the existence of a prior registration
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of
Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she
demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was
subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for
facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs
Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer
who shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for correction of
name.
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven
(11) baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City, which were subsequently dismissed.
ISSUE:
whether or not the respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal Services, CHED,
may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of filing
of the complaint, was Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of
Programs and Standards, CHED
HELD:
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as
OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre,
Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on
their pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the
respondents failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the
CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer,
she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money
as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation
thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorneys Oath
imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is
further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondents demands for
sums of money to facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests before her office
violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions
likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations.
Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to
govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government
service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who
owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance
of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before
her office are violative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits
members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts.
Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government
service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be
affected by the functions of his office. Respondents conduct in office falls short of the integrity and
good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office. For
a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the
legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said,
a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of
social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.
For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 1 and Rule
6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well
as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the
penalty of three years suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off
the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.
Jonar Santiago vs. Atty. Edison V. Rafanan, A.C. No. 6252, October 5, 2004
Facts:
Atty. Edison V. Rafanan, was allegedly notarized several documents on different dates and failed to: a) make the
proper notation regarding the Community Tax Certificate (CTC) of the complainant; b) enter the details of the notarized
documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the
documents he had notarized.
On the other hand, Atty. Rafanan admitted having administered the oath but believed that non-notation of the
Resident Certificates as well as not entering the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register was allowed.
Notation of Resident Certificates are applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not
mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government offices. He further asserted that
this was a popular practice among notaries public in Nueva Ecija, some of whom were older practitioners.
Issues:
What is the rule on registry of notarial documents?
Held:
The court ruled in the negative. The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of
notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before
them has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to
enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification. They are also required to
maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to give to
each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the
one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is
recorded. Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as
notaries public.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of
importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into
their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.
It is intolerable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because
others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable justification
for breaking the law.
Disbarment, however, cannot be granted considering the nature of the infraction and the
absence of deceit on the part of Atty. Rafanan. A fine of P3, 000 is imposed with a warning that
similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Khan Jr. vs Atty. Simbillo AC No. 5299, August 19, 2003
FACTS:
An advertisement in Philippine Daily Inquirer came out which reads: “ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
SPECIALIST 532-4333/521-2667.”
SC ordered its staff to call the number and ask some information.
Espeleta called the number and the wife of Atty. Rizalino Simbillo answered who said that his husband
was an expert in handling annulment cases and guarantees a court decree within 4-6 month. The
services of Atty. Simbillo is for P48,000. half of which is payable at the filing of the case and the
balance after the decision has been rendered.
Similar advertisement also appeared in The Philippine Star and Manila Bulletin.
Khan, Assist. Court Administrator, filed a case against Simbillo for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Rule 2.03 and 3.01.
Simbillo admitted that he caused the advertisement but he argued that solicitation and advertisement is
not prohibited per se and that it is about time to change our views about the prohibition on advertising
and solicitation. He also said that the interest of the public is not served by the prohibition and
suggested that the ban be lifted.
IBP recommended that Simbillo be suspended for 1 year and that repetition of similar act will be dealt
with more severely.
While the case was being investigated upon by the court, Simbillo again advertised his legal services, for
2 times, in the Buy & Sell Free Ads Magazine.
ISSUE: W/N Simbillo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD:
YES. Rule 2.03 provides a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business while Rule 3.01 states that a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding
his qualifications or legal services.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which the
duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. The gaining of livelihood should be a
secondary consideration.
Aside from advertising himself as an “Annulment of Marriage Specialist,” his assurance of his clients that
an annulment may be obtained in 4-6 months from the filing of the case encourages people, who
might other have 2nd thought, to dissolve their marriage.
Solicitation of legal business is not proscribed. However, solicitation must be compatible with the dignity
of the legal profession. The use of simple signs stating the name/s of the lawyers, the office and
residence address and the fields of expertise, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing
the same brief data, are permissible.
The use of calling cards is now acceptable.
BR Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. vs CA GR No. L-41862, February7, 1992
FACTS:
Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for damages against the Director of Public Works
and BR Sebastian Enterprises. Trial court found B.R. Sebastian liable for damages but absolved
other defendants. B.R. Sebastian, thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas, Alberto and Associates,
timely appealed the adverse decision to the respondent Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the
appeal, Eulogio B. Reyes died and was substituted by his heirs. On February 1974, B.R Sebastian,
thru its counsel of record, received notice to file Appellant’s Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof;
however, it failed to comply. Court of Appeals issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show
cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Appellant’s Brief within the
reglementary period. On September 1974, Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. On September
1974, petitioner, this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas, senior
partner in the law firm. Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who handled this case in the trial court and
who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the Appellant’s Brief but failed to submit it
through oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm. Court denied the motion for
reconsideration. No action was taken by petitioner from within the period to file a petition for review,
the same became final and executory, and the records of the case were remanded. Trial court issued
a writ of execution. But on November 1975, petitioner filed with Court of Appeals a Motion to
Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction but was subsequently
denied. Petitioner filed prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary injunction with the
Supreme Court to Court of Appeals denial of petitioner’s motion. SC required them to comment and
soon after, some amendments were made. Ultimately, the petition was denied. But on May 1976,
petitioner filed a motion for its reconsideration claiming that since it was deprived of the right to
appeal without fault on its part, the petition should be given due course. Supreme Court reconsidered
and required both parties to submit simultaneously their respective Memoranda.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s
motion to reinstate its appeal, previously dismissed for failure to file the Appellant’s Brief
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that no fraud is involved in the present case. What was present was
simple negligence on the part of petitioner’s counsel, which is neither excusable nor unavoidable.
Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea.
Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that had been dismissed is included in or
implied from the power or discretion to dismiss an appeal, still such power or discretion must be
exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient cause, in like manner as the power or discretion
vested in the appellate court to allow extensions of time for the filing of briefs. There must be such a
showing which would call for, prompt and justify its exercise. Otherwise, it cannot and must not be
upheld. The “confusion” in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a
valid justification for its failure to file the Brief. With Baizas’ death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto
and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their
appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of Court. The law firm should have re-assigned the
case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules
of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer. The rule is settled that
negligence of counsel binds the client. Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it
failed to make inquiries from counsel regarding its case.
Diana Ramos vs. Atty. Jose R. Imbang, AC No. 6788, August23, 2007
FACTS:
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R.
Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. She
gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly,
respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would
then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and
rescheduled. This happened six times and for each appearance in court, respondent charged
her P350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired
about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Bian and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to
learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed
in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.
HELD:
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More specifically, lawyers in
government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to
public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity
to public service.
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this
reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee
and are hereby declared unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote
themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.
In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15,
1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship. Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant
and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the
complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still
a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the
purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants. Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book
V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. xxx
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal
assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasijudicial cases.
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this
was inconsistent with the office's mission. Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal
fees other than his salary.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the observance of the abovementioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases
and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's
acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the
complainant's counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees,
respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint
against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the
complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear
that the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his appearance fees for hearings
that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any
falsehood.
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all
lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to
refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened
with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but
accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an
amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client) nor was it
given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail
bond). Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not
entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.
Huyssen vs. Gutierrez
A.C.
No.
6707,
March
24,
(Legal
2006
Ethics)
FACTS
Respondent Atty. Gutierrez, a Bureau of Immigration and Deportation officer, received US$20,000
from complainant Huyssen. Accused of falsely representing that it was needed in complainant’s
application for visa and failing to return the same, respondent denied misappropriating the said
amount, claiming that he gave it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in
their
application
for
visa.
He
failed
however
to
substantiate
such
denial.
Atty. Gutierrez had many alibis on why the money could not immediately be returned to the
complainant, and promised her several times that he would repay her out of his personal funds. He
even
issued
personal
post-dated
checks
on
this,
but
which
later
bounced.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent’s conduct violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and merits the
penalty
of
disbarment?
RULING
Yes,
the
respondent
should
be
disbarred.
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not convincing. It is settled that denial, which is
inherently a weak defense, to be believed must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability.
The evidence, respondent’s letters to the complainant, shows that he made it appear that the
US$20,000 was officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. If this is true,
how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by respondent to complainant to prove his receipt
of the said sum and official receipts therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why would
respondent issue his personal checks to cover the return of the money to complainant if said amount
was really officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to
the inescapable conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and appropriated
the
same
for
his
personal
use.
Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have more restrictions than
lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who
holds
a
responsible
public
office.
Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his position with
the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more
reprehensible as it has caused damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted
that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
reads:
"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private
interests,
nor
allow
the
latter
to
interfere
with
his
public
duties."
Also, the act of issuing a bouncing check shows moral turpitude. Respondent's acts are more
despicable, for not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he had the gall to
prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up his misdeeds.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special
privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally.
A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at
large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. More importantly, possession of good
moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict
demands and high standards of the legal profession. Section 27 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for, among other acts, gross
misconduct in office.
Ali vs Atty. Bubong, AC No. 4018, March 8, 2005
FACTS:
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41
adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondents dismissal from
government service. Respondent subsequently questioned said administrative order before this Court
through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition claiming that the Office of the President
did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that
respondents in that petition violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V.
Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he
abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition for failure on the part of
petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the questioned order. Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied with
finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994.
On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking
the disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had
proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney and that he poses a serious
threat to the integrity of the legal profession.
In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT
No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both lawand jurisprudence support
his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on
applications for land registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In
the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted
suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for
violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latters codefendants. Respondent explains that his participation in said case was a result of the two
subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the
various land titles involved in said dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case
by the Secretary of Justice was based solely on the evidence presented by the parties. Complainants
allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified.
ISSUE: whether or not respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in
the employ of the government. We resolve this question in the affirmative
HELD:
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he
has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules
governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to
affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a
member of the bar on such grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a
government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a
violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.
Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, we ordered the disbarment of
respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government service because of grave misconduct.
Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared
[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon him his
responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders rests the grave
responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice.
As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the
only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its
nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are
expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty,
and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries, have
been compendiously described as moral character.
Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig, this Court found sufficient basis to
disbar respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of
Legal Services of the Commission on Higher Education. As we had explained in that case
[A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the
legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise
said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree
of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.
In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President
and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage
of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules
governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his
unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the
bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:
Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance
his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the peoples confidence in the public office he used to
occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge
of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting for the
withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature
cannot be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. As we have previously
explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or
the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administrative of justice.
Olazo vs. Justice Tinga, AM No. 10-5-7-SC, December 07, 2010
FACTS:
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated
in Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part
of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2476, issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No. 172, issued on October 16,
1987.
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate,
and make a recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands declared open for disposition.
The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the
Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987
to 1998); the respondents district includes the areas covered by the proclamations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their
profession during their incumbency.
HELD:
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their
profession during their incumbency. By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the
practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized
by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his
or her official functions. The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In
case of lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2)
of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with
any matter before the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits
lawyers, after leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is the term intervene which we previously interpreted to
include an act of a person who has the power to influence the proceedings. Otherwise stated, to fall
within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have
accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had
previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered
with the sales application covering Manuels land when the former was still a member of the
Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was
engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was
limited only in the preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., we specifically
described private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.
In any event, even granting that respondents act fell within the definition of practice of law, the
available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before
the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are
matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against
the respondents favor.
Violation of Rule 1.01
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the
above discussion, we already struck down the complainants allegation that respondent engaged in an
unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainants claim that the respondent
violated paragraph 4(1) of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The
matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots covered
by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the
decision dated April 3, 2004, when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the
subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this finding.
As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the
President, the Court of Appeals and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11,
2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by
the complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible error was committed by the Court of
Appeals in its decision.
All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers. The respondent generally is under no obligation
to prove his/her defense, until the burden shifts to him/her because of what the complainant has
proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense.
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the
complainants failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical
infractions warranting the exercise of the Courts disciplinary power.
Que vs. Atty. Revilla Jr. AC No. 7054,December 4, 2009
FACTS:
In a complaint for disbarment, Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing the following violations of the provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
(1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of title
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment before
the RTC and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC
(collectively, subject cases) to assail and overturn the final judgments of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) and RTC in the unlawful detainer case rendered
against the respondents clients. The respondent in this regard, repeatedly raised the
issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well that these courts
have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly
attacked the complainants and his siblings titles over the property subject of the
unlawful detainer case;
(2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order
to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own
personal gain and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to execute
the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case;
(3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts by
resorting to falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due
administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by
fabricating an imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in open court which
allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case. The
complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his lack of preparation;
the respondent also deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the
above falsehood.
(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed
the good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the
previous counsel of the respondents clients.
(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court in the
petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already
deceased;
(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for
annulment of title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines without being
authorized to do so.
Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52) litigants in
Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to him.
ISSUE:
whether or not the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical infractions and
professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should carry.
HELD:
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional
misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the
Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law
should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of
suspension for two (2) years.
Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the
nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over
concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of
this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any
significant role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to
the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the
interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the
integrity of the profession and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor
tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents first ethical infraction of
the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio
E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and
processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal
practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6)
months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson
from his past experience and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to
the respondents professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of
justice.
People vs. Hon Maceda, GR No. 89591-96, January 24, 2000
FACTS:
On September 8, 1999, we denied the Peoples motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13,
1990 decision in these cases. In said resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody
over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
12, San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why private respondent Javellana should not be
detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial courts order specifically provided for private
respondents detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to
be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as detention prisoner in said residence.
This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not
detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free
man, including engaging in the practice of law. Despite our resolution of July 30, 1990 prohibiting
private respondent to appear as counsel in Criminal Case No. 4262, the latter accepted cases and
continued practicing law.
ISSUE:
(1) Does the resolution of this Honorable Court dated July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty.
Javellana from appearing as counsel refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262?
(2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the custodian of Atty. Javellana?
and
(3) Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never really held and detained
Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not Atty. Javellana considered an escapee or a
fugitive of justice for which warrant for his arrest should forthwith be issued?
HELD:
In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.
After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed hearing
Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motion seeking the revocation of the trial courts custody
order and the imprisonment of private respondent Javellana in the provincial jail.
On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an urgent motion
seeking to clarify whether the June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved the motion for
clarification filed by the State Prosecutor on April 7, 1997.
Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By
such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias
del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation "to hold and detain" him in
Atty. del Rosarios residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional trial court.
Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of
accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same
undertaking.
In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelanas life no longer exist. Thus, the trial
courts order dated August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be recalled, and
he shall be detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not
allowed to practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner.
The trial courts order was clear that private respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to roam around
but is to be held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to practice law referred not only to Criminal
Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except in cases where private respondent would
appear in court to defend himself. Spped
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the
custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer
for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case
against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be
stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
Consequently, all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial
Jail of Antique.
Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than ten
(10) years, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered
to continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all deliberate dispatch and to avoid further delay.
Zeta vs. Malinao, AM No. P-220, December 20, 1978
FACTS:
Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao court interpreter of the Court of First Instance of
Catbalogan, Samar charging as follows:
l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — MR. Malinao has been appearing in the
municipal court of this town for parties like attorney when he is not an attorney. Reliable
information also says he has been appearing in the municipal courts of Daram,
Zumarraga, Talalora and even Sta. Rita. He is not authorized to do so we believe. He
makes it his means of livelihood as he collects fees from his clients. He competes with
attorneys but does not pay anything. We believe that his doing so should be stopped for
a good government. These facts can be checked with records of those municipal courts.
2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. — Being employed in the Court of First
Instance he would instigate persons, especially in his barrio to grab land rob or coerce.
In fact he has cases in the municipal court in this town involving himself and his men.
He incite them telling them not to be afraid as he is a court employee and has influence
over the judges. Those persons being ignorant would believe him and so would commit
crimes. This act of Mr. Malinao is contrary to good order and peace as he is using his
supposed influences to urge persons to commit crimes.
3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information has it that he is unfaithfully filing his
time record in the CFI. Even he has been out practicing in the municipal courts
sometimes he would fill his time record as present. He receives salary for those absent
days. This can be checked with time record he has submitted and if he has any
application for leave. He may try to cure it by submitting application for leave but this
should not be allowed as he has already committed crime.
4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-WE have
reliable information it is prohibited for a civil service employee to engage in private
practice any profession or business without permission from the Department Head. Mr.
Malinao we are sure has not secured that permission because he should not be allowed
to practice as he is not an attorney. If that were so, he violated that Executive Order and
Civil Service Law and we are urgently and earnestly requesting the Commissioner of
Civil Service to investigate him on this. If warranted he should be given the
corresponding penalty as dismissal because we believe he deserve it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Department of Justice had jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD:
We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find the conclusions of fact of the Investigator to be
amply supported by the evidence, particularly the documents consisting of public records and the
declarations of the judges before whom respondent had appeared. It is clear to Us that respondent,
apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts without prior permission of his superiors
in violation of civil service rules and regulations, falsified his time record of service by making it
appear therein that he was present in his office on occasions when in fact he was in the municipal
courts appearing as counsel, without being a member of the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes
illegal practice of law. We, therefore, adopt the above findings of fact of the Investigator.
The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they
could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality"
cannot, even if true, carry the day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so
without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record of service to conceal his
absence from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the number of times that respondent acted
as counsel under the above circumstances would indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice
obviously for considerations other than pure love of justice.
In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent is grave, hence it
warrants a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa. We find no
alternative than to separate him from the service, with the admonition that he desist from appearing in
any court or investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to practice.
Tan and Pagayokan vs. Balajadia, GR No. 169517, March 14,2006
FACTS:
Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal case against them with the Office
of the City of Prosecutor of Baguio City for usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation of city
tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of parking fees by petitioners from respondent. In
paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent asserted that he is a "practicing lawyer based in
Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio
City." However, certifications issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines showed that respondent has never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners
claim that respondent is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.
In his Comment, respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit that he
is a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino
prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. It
appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-affidavit against petitioners involving the
same subject matter.
Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the same secretary; one for the May
5, 2005 parking incident at 10:00 o’clock in the morning and another for the parking incident on the
same date but which occurred at 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon. Respondent insists that the complaintaffidavit regarding the 1:00 o’clock parking incident correctly alleged that he is "a businessman with
office address at Room B-204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City." However, the
complaint-affidavit regarding the 10:00 o’clock parking incident, which is the subject of the instant
petition, erroneously referred to him as a practicing lawyer because Atty. Aquino’s secretary copied
verbatim paragraph 5 of Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. Hence, it was inadvertently alleged that
respondent is a "practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez
Building, Session Road, Baguio City," which statement referred to the person of Atty. Aquino and his
law office address.
Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquino’s secretary, executed an affidavit admitting the mistake in the preparation
of the complaint-affidavit. Respondent alleged that he did not read the complaint-affidavit because he
assumed that the two complaint-affidavits contained the same allegations with respect to his
occupation and office address. Respondent claims that he had no intention of misrepresenting
himself as a practicing lawyer.
In their Reply, petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made liable for indirect contempt for
having made untruthful statements in the complaint-affidavit and that he cannot shift the blame to
Atty. Aquino’s secretary.
ISSUE:
Whether OR not respondent is liable for indirect contempt
HELD:
we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an attorney and acting as such
without authority constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.
The liability for the unauthorized practice of law under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in
the nature of criminal contempt and the acts are punished because they are an affront to the dignity
and authority of the court, and obstruct the orderly administration of justice. In determining liability for
criminal contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element, and no one can be
punished unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.
In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondent’s claim that he never intended to
project himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of
Atty Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that gave rise to the
mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary evidence on record.
Taken together, these circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondent’s
complaint-affidavit was, indeed, the result of inadvertence.
Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the result of
inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In the
cases where we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of law, the party was guilty of some
overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of his client; appearing before court hearings as an
attorney; manifesting before the court that he will practice law despite being previously denied
admission to the bar; or deliberately attempting to practice law and holding out himself as an attorney
through circulars with full knowledge that he is not licensed to do so.
In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney or that
he intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt
considering his lack of intent to illegally practice law.
However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondent’s deliberate intent to misrepresent
himself as an attorney and act as such without authority, he is hereby warned to be more careful and
circumspect in his future actions.
Lijauco vs. Atty. Terrado AC No. 6317, August 31, 2006
FACTS:
On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint was filed by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco
against respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct
unbecoming of an officer of the court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite
receipt of payment representing attorney’s fees.
According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime in January 2001 for
P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati
branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed house and lot located in
Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No. T-402119 in
the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession then pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.
Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the hearing for the
issuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests in the Compromise Agreement
which she subsequently entered into to end LRC Case No. B-2610.
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he received from
complainant was payment for legal services for the recovery of the deposit with Planters
Development Bank and did not include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Biñan, Laguna.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. On September 21, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his report
finding respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provide:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 9.02 – A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except:
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter’s death,
money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to the persons specified in the
agreement; or
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is
based in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing arrangement.
In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Investigating Commissioner opined that:
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must be established by convincing
proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by the
Supreme Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done as well as of the
motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated. x x x.
In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent that the Php70,000.00 legal fees
is purely and solely for the recovery of the Php180,000.00 savings account of complainant
subsequent acts and events say otherwise, to wit:
1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too high;
2.) Respondent actively acted as complainant’s lawyer to effectuate the compromise agreement.
By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as commission/referral fees
respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to
practice law. Worst, by luring complainant to participate in a compromise agreement with a false and
misleading assurance that complainant can still recover after Three (3) years her foreclosed property
respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which says a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law
HELD:
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office; 3)
grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyer’s
oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party without authority.
In Santos v. Lazaro and Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr., we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics. When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants
that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that degree of
vigilance and attention makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and
makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his client’s case. Once he agrees to handle
a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to
his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer should accept only as much cases as he can efficiently handle in
order to sufficiently protect his clients’ interests. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the
qualification to handle the legal matter; he must also give adequate attention to his legal work. Utmost
fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take the cudgels for his client’s cause.
In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six months is warranted.
In addition, he is directed to return to complainant the amount he received by way of legal fees
pursuant to existing jurisprudence.
Plus Builders Inc. vs. Revilla, Jr. 578 SCRA 431
Facts:
The Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) rendered a decision in favor of Plus Builders, Inc.and
against the tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, et.al, who were the clients of respondent, Atty.
Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that respondent’s clients were mere tenants and not rightful
possessors/owners of the subject land. The case was elevated all the way up to the Supreme Court,
with this Court sustaining Plus Builders Inc.’s rights over the land.
Respondent was found to have committed intentional falsehood; and misused court processes with
the intention to delay the execution of the decision through the filing of several motions, petitions for
temporary restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet title despite the finality of the decision.
Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law – holding
themselves out as his partners/associates in the law firm. Respondent maintains that he did not
commit the acts complained of and that the courses of action he took were not meant to unduly delay
the execution of the DARAB Decision.
Issue: WON respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
Held:
It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his full attention, diligence, skill
and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free.
A lawyer’s devotion to his client’s cause not only requires but also entitles him to deploy every honorable
means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to
enable the latter’s cause to succeed.
In this case, respondent may not be wanting in this regard. On the contrary, it is apparent that the
respondent’s acts complained of were committed out of his over-zealousness and misguided desire to
protect the interests of his clients who were poor and uneducated. Taking the cudgels from the former
lawyer in this case is rather commendable, but respondent should not forget his first and foremost
responsibility as an officer of the court. In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty
to present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law. This obligation, however, is not to
be performed at the expense of truth and justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from
unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.
However, the Court also knows how to show compassion and will not hesitate to refrain from
imposing the appropriate penalties in the presence of mitigating factors, such as the respondent’s
length of service, acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family
circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, and respondent’s advanced age, among
other things, which have varying significance in the Court’s determination of the imposable penalty.
Therefore, a suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law is sufficient in this case.