San Beda College of Law
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“There is surely a future hope for you,
and your hope will not be cut off.”
Proverbs 23:18
PART 27
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Section 21. No person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute
a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.
WHAT
IS
THE
COMMON LAW
PRINCIPLE IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
● Non bis in idem – not twice for the
same
2 KINDS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY UNDER
SEC. 21
1. Double jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense
● Traditional type of double
jeopardy
2. Double jeopardy of punishment for
the same act
● Only applies when an act is
punishable by law and an
ordinance
WHY IS THERE A NEED TO PROVIDE
FOR A SECOND TYPE OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY? IS THE FIRST TYPE
INSUFFICIENT?
● The first type only applies when
the 2 offenses are either the same
or identical. There can be no
identity of offenses if one of the
offenses is punished by the
national government and the other
by an ordinance. Even if the
elements of the offenses are the
same, if the offense is punished by
law and the other by ordinance,
there can be no identity of
offenses. This is the reason why
there is a need to provide for the
second type of double jeopardy
(​People v. Relova​)
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PEOPLE v. RELOVA
FACTS: ​On 1 February 1975, members of
the Batangas City Police together with
personnel of the Batangas Electric Light
System, equipped with a search warrant
issued by a city judge of Batangas City,
searched and examined the premises of
the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold
Storage owned and operated by Manuel
Opulencia. The police discovered that
electric wiring, devices and contraptions
had been installed, without the necessary
authority from the city government, and
"architecturally concealed inside the walls
of the building" owned by Opulencia.
These electric devices and contraptions
were allegedly "designed purposely to
lower or decrease the readings of electric
current consumption in the electric
meter of the said electric [ice and cold
storage] plant." During the subsequent
investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted
in a written statement that he had caused
the installation of the electrical devices
"in order to lower or decrease the
readings of his electric meter."
On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City
Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the
City Court of Batangas City an
information against Manuel Opulencia for
violation of Ordinance 1, Series of 1974,
Batangas City. A violation of this
ordinance
was, under its terms,
punishable by a fine "ranging from P5.00
to P50.00 or imprisonment, which shall
not exceed 30 days, or both, at the
discretion of the court." Opulencia
pleaded not guilty to the information
filed.
On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to
dismiss the information upon the grounds
that the crime there charged had already
prescribed and that the civil indemnity
there sought to be recovered was beyond
the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court
to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976,
the Batangas City Court granted the
motion to dismiss on the ground of
prescription, it appearing that the offense
charged was a light felony which
prescribes 2 months from the time of
discovery thereof, and it appearing
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further that the information was filed by
the fiscal more than 9 months after
discovery of the offense charged in
February 1975. 14 days later, on 20 April
1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas
City filed before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Branch II, another
information against Manuel Opulencia,
this time for theft of electric power under
Article 308 in relation to Article 309,
paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code
(Criminal Case 266) before the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, Branch II.
Before he could be arraigned thereon,
Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated
5 May 1976, alleging that he had been
previously acquitted of the offense
charged in the second information and
that the filing thereof was violative of his
constitutional right against double
jeopardy. By Order dated 16 August 1976,
Judge Benjamin Relova granted the
accused's Motion to Quash and ordered
the case dismissed. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed but was denied
by the Judge in an Order dated 18
November 1976. On 1 December 1976, the
petition for Certiorari and Mandamus was
filed in the Supreme Court by the Acting
City Fiscal of Batangas City on behalf of
the People.
ISSUE: ​Whether under the information in
case 16443, Opulencia could — if he failed
to plead double jeopardy — be convicted
of the same act charged in case 16054, in
which he has already been acquitted.
HELD: ​The constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is not available
where the second prosecution is for an
offense that is different from the offense
charged in the first or prior prosecution,
although both the first and second
offenses may be based upon the same act
or set of acts. The second sentence of
Article IV (22) embodies an exception to
the
general
proposition:
the
constitutional protection, against double
jeopardy is available although the prior
offense charged under an ordinance be
different from the offense charged
subsequently under a national statute
such as the Revised Penal Code, provided
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that both offenses spring from the same
act or set of acts.
The Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds
of double jeopardy.
The first sentence of clause 20, section 1,
Article III of the Constitution, ordains that
"no person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense." The
second sentence of said clause provides
that "if an act is punishable by a law and
an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act."
Thus, the first sentence prohibits double
jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense,
whereas
the
second
contemplates
double
jeopardy
of
punishment for the same act. Under the
first sentence, one may be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment of the same act,
provided that he is charged with different
offenses, or the offense charged in one
case is not included in, or does not
include, the crime charged in the other
case.
The second sentence applies, even if the
offenses charged are not the same, owing
to the fact that one constitutes a violation
of an ordinance and the other a violation
of a statute. If the two charges are based
on one and the same act conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the
ordinance shall bar a prosecution under
the other. Incidentally, such conviction or
acquittal is not indispensable to sustain
the plea of double jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. So long as jeopardy
has attached under one of the
informations charging said offense, the
defense may be availed of in the other
case involving the same offense, even if
there has been neither conviction nor
acquittal in either case.
Thus, where the offenses charged are
penalized either by different sections of
the same statute or by different statutes,
the important inquiry relates to the
identity of offenses charged: the
constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available only where an
identity is shown to exist between the
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earlier and the subsequent offenses
charged. In contrast, where one offense is
charged under a municipal ordinance
while the other is penalized by a statute,
the critical inquiry is to the identity of the
acts which the accused is said to have
committed and which are alleged to have
given rise to the two offenses: the
constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available so long as the acts
which constitute or have given rise to the
first offense under a municipal ordinance
are the same acts which constitute or
have given rise to the offense charged
under a statute. It is perhaps important to
note that the rule limiting the
constitutional protection against double
jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for
the same offense is not to be understood
with absolute literalness. The identity of
offenses that must be shown need not be
absolute identity: the first and second
offenses may be regarded as the "same
offense" where the second offense
necessarily includes the first offense or is
necessarily included in such first offense
or where the second offense is an attempt
to commit the first or a frustration
thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea
of double jeopardy to be available, not all
the technical elements constituting the
first offense need be present in the
technical definition of the second offense.
The law here seeks to prevent harassment
of an accused person by multiple
prosecutions for offenses which though
different
from
one
another
are
nonetheless each constituted by a
common set or overlapping sets of
technical elements. Acts of a person
which physically occur on the same
occasion and are infused by a common
intent or design or negligence and
therefore form a moral unity, should not
be segmented and sliced, as it were, to
produce as many different acts as there
are offenses under municipal ordinances
or
statutes
that an enterprising
prosecutor can find. It remains to point
out that the dismissal by the Batangas
City Court of the information for violation
of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the
ground that such offense had already
prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the
accused of that offense.
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Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code, "prescription of the crime" is one of
the grounds for "total extinction of
criminal liability." Under the Rules of
Court, an order sustaining a motion to
quash based on prescription is a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense.
HOW DO WE DETERMINE IF THERE IS
IDENTITY OF ACTS IN ORDER TO
CONSTITUTE DOUBLE JEOPARDY OF
PUNISHMENT FOR THE SAME ACT?
● By determining the location of the
series of acts so that if the acts are
impelled by single criminal design
then the acts are identical. If the
acts will give rise to violation of a
law and an ordinance then
conviction or acquittal on either
shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
(​People v. Relova​)
● Double jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense requires identity
of offenses.
TEST TO BE APPLIED TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THERE IS IDENTITY OF
OFFENSES
● Same Evidence Test - if the
evidence needed to convict an
accused for one offense is the
same evidence required for the
conviction of the accused on
another offense then the 2
offenses are identical
● The SC in ​Melo v. People said that
the Same Evidence Test is
inaccurate
because
Double
Jeopardy of Punishment for the
Same Offense does not require
similarity of offenses but what is
required by the Constitution is
only identity of offenses. There is
an identity of offense even if the
evidence for the conviction for one
offense is not the same as the
evidence needed to convict the
accused in the second offense as
long as one is an attempt or
frustration of the other or includes
or necessarily included in the
former charge or complaint.
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MELO v. PEOPLE
FACTS: ​Conrado Melo was charged in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, on 27
December 1949, with frustrated homicide,
for having allegedly inflicted upon
Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and
with intent to kill, several serious wounds
on different parts of the body, requiring
medical attendance for a period of more
than 30 days, and incapacitating him from
performing his habitual labor for the same
period of time.
On 29 December 1949, at 8:00 a.m., Melo
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged,
and at 10:15 p.m. of the same day Benjamin
Obillo died from his wounds. Evidence of
death was available to the prosecution
only on 3 January 1950, and on the
following day, 4 January 1950, an
amended information was filed charging
Melo with consummated homicide. Melo
filed a motion to quash the amended
information alleging double jeopardy,
motion that was denied by the court.
Melo filed the petition for prohibition to
enjoin the court from further entertaining
the amended information.
ISSUE: Whether the second information,
filed after the death of the victim, violates
the accused’s right against double
jeopardy.
HELD: Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph,
provides that "If it appears at any time
before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, the
court may dismiss the original complaint
or information and order the filing of a
new one charging the proper offense,
provided the defendant would not be
placed thereby in double jeopardy, and
may also require the witnesses to give bail
for their appearance at the trial." Under
this provision, it was proper for the court
to dismiss the first information and order
the filing of a new one for the reason that
the proper offense was not charged in the
former and the latter did not place the
accused in a second jeopardy for the
same or identical offense.
There is identity between two offenses
not only when the second offense is
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exactly the same as the first, but also
when the second offense is an attempt to
commit the first or a frustration thereof,
or when it necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information. This rule
of identity does not apply, however, when
the second offense was not in existence
at the time of the first prosecution, for
the simple reason that in such case there
is no possibility for the accused, during
the first prosecution, to be convicted for
an offense that was then inexistent.
Further, when a person who has already
suffered his penalty for an offense, is
charged with a new and greater offense,
said penalty may be credited to him in
case of conviction for the second offense.
REQUISITES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY OF
PUNISHMENT FOR THE SAME OFFENSE
USUALLY ENUMERATED BY THE SC
1. There must be a valid complaint or
information
2. It must be filed before a
competent court
3. The accused had been arraigned or
pleaded to the charge
4. Had been convicted, acquitted or
the case against him is dismissed
without his express consent
ARE THESE THE REQUISITES OF
DOUBLE JEOPARDY OF PUNISHMENT
FOR THE SAME OFFENSE?
● No. There are only 3 requisites of
double jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense
1. a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the
second,
2. the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated,
and
3. a second jeopardy must be
for the same offense as that
in the first. (​People v.
Tampal​)
The requisites enumerated earlier are
the requisites of legal or first jeopardy.
There can only be double jeopardy
when either the prosecution appeals
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the acquittal
offense.
or
files
an identical
PEOPLE v. TAMPAL
FACTS: Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon,
Arsenio Padumon, Samuel Padumon,
Pablito Suco, Dario Suco and Galvino
Cadling were charged of robbery with
homicide and multiple serious physical
injuries in the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga
with
Hon.
Wilfredo
Ochotorena as presiding judge. However,
only private respondents, Luis Tampal,
Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon,
and Samuel Padumon were arrested,
while the others remained at large.
The case was set for hearing on July 26,
1991, but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Wilfredo
Guantero
moved
for
postponement due to his failure to
contact the material witnesses. The case
was reset without any objection from the
defense counsel. The case was called on
September 20, 1991 but the prosecutor
was not present. The respondent judge
considered the absence of the prosecutor
as unjustified, and dismissed the criminal
case for failure to prosecute. The
prosecution
filed
a
motion
for
reconsidereation, claiming that his
absence was because such date was a
Muslim holiday and the office of the
Provincial prosecutor was closed on that
day. The motion was respondent was
denied by respondent judge
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or Not the postponement is a
violation of the right of the accused to a
speedy disposition of their cases.
(2) Whether or Not the dismissal serves as
a bar to reinstatement of the case.
HELD: In determining the right of an
accused to speedy disposition of their
case, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number
of postponements of the scheduled
hearings of the case. What is violative of
the right of the accused to speedy trial
are unjustified postponements which
prolong trial for an unreasonable length
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of time. In the facts above, there was no
showing that there was an unjust delay
caused by the prosecution, hence, the
respondent judge should have given the
prosecution a fair opportunity to
prosecute its case.
The private respondents cannot invoke
their right against double jeopardy. In
several cases it was held that dismissal on
the grounds of failure to prosecute is
equivalent to an acquittal that would
baranother prosecution for the same
offense, but in this case, this does not
apply, considering that the rights of the
accused to a speedy trial was not violated
by the State. Therefore, the order of
dismissal is annulled and the case is
remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings.
SUPPOSING
PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR
FILED A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FOR
ADULTERY AGAINST A. TRIAL ENSUED.
AFTER TRIAL A WAS ACQUITTED.
KNOWING THAT UNDER THE RPC,
CONCUBINAGE AS WELL AS OTHER
PRIVATE OFFENSES CAN ONLY BE
INITIATED BY THE OFFENDED SPOUSE,
CAN THE OFFENDED SPOUSE FILE A
SECOND CRIMINAL COMPLAINT NOW
ON
HIS
BEHALF
AFTER
THE
ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED?
● Yes because there was no valid
complaint or information
● The accused was not placed in
jeopardy of being convicted in that
complaint.
● In private offense, the charge can
only be initiated by the offended
spouse.
SUPPOSING THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
FILED A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FOR
HOMICIDE AGAINST A IN MANILA AND
AFTER TRIAL IT WAS ESTABLISHED
THAT THE VICTIM WAS NOT KILLED IN
MANILA BUT IN QUEZON CITY.
BECAUSE OF THAT THE COMPLAINT
WAS DISMISSED AGAINST THE WILL
OF THE ACCUSED. CAN THE PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR FILE AN INFORMATION
NOW IN QC?
● Yes because Manila court is not a
competent court. The accused is
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not placed in jeopardy of being
convicted in Manila because
Manila court has no territorial
jurisdiction over the case
SUPPOSING THE ACCUSED PLEADED
GUILTY TO THE CHARGE. UNDER THE
RULES OF COURT, UPON THE PLEA OF
GUILTY, THE COURT MAY ALLOW THE
ACCUSED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH
MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES BUT INSTEAD OF
PRESENTING
IT,
THE
ACCUSED
PRESENTED EVIDENCE IN ORDER TO
PROVE
EXCULPATORY
CIRCUMSTANCES
OR
JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES
SUPPOSING
HE
PRESENTED EVIDENCE THAT HE
ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE. BELIEVING
ON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
ACCUSED, THE COURT ACQUITTED
THE
ACCUSED.
CAN
THE
PROSECUTION
APPEAL
THE
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL?
● The acquittal of the accused will
not bar the filing of an appeal of
the judgment of acquittal because
there was no first jeopardy yet
because there was no valid plea.
Since there was no valid plea, the
accused was not placed in the risk
of being convicted in the first
complaint. (​People v. Balisacan​)
PEOPLE v. BALISACAN
FACTS: Aurelio Balisacan was charged
with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte.
Upon being arraigned, he entered into a
plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted
by counsel. At his counsel de officio, he
was allowed to present evidence and
consequently testified that he stabbed the
deceased in self-defense. In addition, he
stated that he surrendered himself
voluntarily to the police authorities. On
the basis of the testimony of the accused,
he was acquitted. Thus, the prosecution
appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal placed
the accused in double jeopardy.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that it is
settled that the existence of plea is an
essential requisite to double jeopardy.
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The accused had first entered a plea of
guilty but however testified that he acted
in complete self-defense. Said testimony
had the effect of vacating his plea of
guilty and the court a quo should have
required him to plead a new charge, or at
least direct that a new plea of not guilty
be entered for him. This was not done.
Therefore, there has been no standing of
plea during the judgment of acquittal, so
there can be no double jeopardy with
respect to the appeal herein.
This is one of the few cases where the
SC reversed the judgment of acquittal.
Ordinarily, judgments of acquittal are
final decisions. Another case where the
SC reversed the judgment of acquittal is
the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan
THE LAST REQUISITE OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY IS THAT THE ACCUSED
MUST BE EITHER BE CONVICTED,
ACQUITTED OR THE CASE AGAINST
HIM
DISMISSED
WITHOUT
HIS
EXPRESS CONSENT. AS TO DISMISSAL
WITHOUT THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF
THE ACCUSED, WHY DOES DISMISSAL
WITH THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE
ACCUSED WOULD NOT SET IN MOTION
DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
● Since the dismissal was made at
the instance of the accused, the
sister requirement of waiver and
estoppel precludes the accused
from invoking his right against
double
jeopardy.
When the
dismissal of the complaint is made
at the instance of or with the
express consent of the accused, it
is an express waiver of his right
against double jeopardy (​People v.
Obsania​)
PEOPLE v. OBSANIA
FACTS: ​The accused was charged with
Robbery with Rape before the Municipal
Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He
pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for
the dismissal of the charge for failure to
allege vivid designs in the info. Said
motion was granted. From this order of
dismissal the prosecution appealed.
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ISSUE: Whether or Not the present
appeal places the accused in Double
Jeopardy.
HELD: In order that the accused may
invoke double jeopardy, the following
requisites must have obtained in the
original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b)
competent court, c) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was
acquitted or convicted or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal
was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the
defendant's motion to dismiss. The
“doctrine of double jeopardy” as
enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit
when the case is dismissed with the
express consent of the defendant, the
dismissal will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense because
his action in having the case is dismissed
constitutes a waiver of his constitutional
right/privilege for the reason that he
thereby prevents the Court from
proceeding to the trial on the merits and
rendering a judgment of conviction
against him.
In essence, where a criminal case is
dismissed provisionally not only with the
express consent of the accused but even
upon the urging of his counsel there can
be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule
113, if the indictment against him is
revived by the fiscal.
ORDINARILY THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY
OF PUNISHMENT FOR THE SAME
OFFENSE PRESUPPOSES THAT THE
ACCUSED
IS
CHARGED
FOR
2
IDENTICAL OFFENSES - AFTER HE WAS
CONVICTED, ACQUITTED OR HIS CASE
AGAINST
HIM
WAS
DISMISSED
WITHOUT HIS EXPRESS CONSENT. CAN
THERE BE DOUBLE JEOPARDY OF
PUNISHMENT FOR THE SAME OFFENSE
EVEN IF THE ACCUSED IS ONLY
CHARGED WITH ONE OFFENSE?
● Yes in case of appeal of judgment
of acquittal
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INSTANCES
WHEN
DOUBLE
JEOPARDY MAY BE INVOKED
1. When the accused is charged with
the same offense in two separate
pending cases, or
2. When the accused is prosecuted
anew for the same offense after he
had been convicted or acquitted of
such offense, or
3. When the prosecution appeals
from a judgment in the same case.
(​Philippine Savings Bank v.
Bermoy​)
● When the prosecution appeals to
the judgment of the trial court,
even if there is only one offense
because the offense being elevated
to the appellate court is the same
offense filed with the trial court
there is only one offense. The SC
said there is double jeopardy of
punishment
because of the
principle of right of repose or the
finality of an acquittal rule.
● The
fundamental
philosophy
highlighting the finality of an
acquittal by the trial court cuts
deep into "the humanity of the
laws and in a jealous watchfulness
over the rights of the citizen, when
brought in unequal contest with
the State x x x x" Thus, Green [v.
United States] expressed the
concern that "(t)he underlying
idea, one that is deeply ingrained
in at least the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence, is that the
State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to
make repeated attempts to convict
an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment,
expense
and
ordeal and compelling him to live
in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though
innocent, he may be found guilty."
(​Philippine Savings Bank v.
Bermoy​)
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PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK v.
BERMOY
FACTS​: Based on a complaint filed by
petitioner
Philippine Savings Bank
(“petitioner”), respondents Pedrito and
Gloria Bermoy (“respondent spouses”)
were charged with estafa thru falsification
of a public document in the Regional Trial
Court.
Upon arraignment, respondent spouses
pleaded “not guilty” to the charge and the
case was set for trial.
After the prosecution rested its case, the
defense filed, with leave of court, a
demurrer to evidence on the ground that
the prosecution failed to identify
respondent spouses as the accused. The
trial court dismissed the case.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. The CA denied
petition holding that the trial court was
correct in granting the demurrer to
evidence for insufficiency of evidence on
account of lack of proper identification of
the accused. But even assuming that the
trial court erred, the acquittal of the
accused can no longer be reviewed either
on appeal or on petition for certiorari for
it would violate the right of the accused
against double jeopardy.
Thus this petition. The Solicitor General
contends that the trial court’s dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion thus,
double jeopardy does not apply in this
case.
ISSUE: W/N Double Jeopardy
applicable in the case at bar?
is
HELD: YES. For double jeopardy to apply,
Section 7 requires the following elements
in the first criminal case:
(a) The complaint or information or other
formal charge was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction;
(b) The court had jurisdiction;
(c) The accused had been arraigned and
had pleaded; and
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(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the
case was dismissed without his express
consent.
On the last element, the rule is that a
dismissal with the express consent or
upon motion of the accused does not
result in double jeopardy. However, this
rule is subject to two exceptions, namely,
if the dismissal is based on insufficiency
of evidence or on the denial of the right
to speedy trial. A dismissal upon
demurrer to evidence falls under the first
exception. Since such dismissal is based
on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal.
As the Court of Appeals correctly held,
the elements required in Section 7 were
all present in Criminal Case No. 96154193. Thus, the Information for estafa
through falsification of a public document
against respondent spouses was sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a
conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction
over the case and the persons of
respondent spouses. Respondent spouses
were arraigned during which they
entered “not guilty” pleas. Finally,
Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, the right not to be placed
twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense became vested on
respondent spouses.
Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court
provides that “[a]ny party may appeal
from a final judgment or order, except if
the accused would be placed thereby in
double jeopardy.”
Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21
April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal Case
No. 96-154193 for insufficiency of
evidence. It is in effect appealing from a
judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the
Constitution and Section 7, the courts are
barred from entertaining such appeal as it
seeks an inquiry into the merits of the
dismissal.
WHAT IS THE FINALITY OF ACQUITTAL
RULE?
● If there would be no limit to
attempts to convict the accused
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there would come a time that the
accused would just give up
because of frustration and he may
be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he is already
tired to defend himself. The
government cannot start from the
highest and then down to the
lowest and vice versa in the hope
that at some point the accused will
be tired to defend himself already
DOES THE FINALITY OF AN ACQUITTAL
RULE ALSO PROHIBIT THE FILING OF
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION?
● Yes
because
Motion
for
Reconsideration also opens the
Decision of acquittal. Since it has
the effect of revisiting again the
judgment of acquittal, it will violate
the Finality of an Acquittal Rule.
(​Lejano v. People​)
LEJANO v. PEOPLE
FACTS: On June 30, 1991 Estrellita
Vizconde and her daughters Carmela,
nineteen years old, and xxx, seven, were
brutally slain at their home in Parañaque
City.
Following
an
intense
investigation,the police arrested a group
of suspects, some of whom gave detailed
confessions. But the trial court smelled a
frame-up and eventually ordered them
discharged. Thus, the identities of the real
perpetrators
remained
a
mystery
especially to the public whose interests
were aroused by the gripping details of
what everybody referred to as the
Vizconde massacre.
Four years later in 1995, the National
Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced
that it had solved the crime. It presented
star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its
informers, who claimed that she
witnessed the crime. She pointed to
accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio
"Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong"
Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio
"Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel
"Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the
culprits. She also tagged accused police
officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory
after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's
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testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public
prosecutors filed an information for rape
with homicide against Webb, et al.
The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
City, presided over by Judge Amelita G.
Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused
since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart
remained at large.
The prosecution presented Alfaro as its
main
witness
with
the
others
corroborating her testimony. These
included the medico-legal officer who
autopsied the bodies of the victims, the
security
guards
of
Pitong
Daan
Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of
the Webb’s household, police officer
Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G.
Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.
Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since
he claimed that he was then across the
ocean in the United States of America. He
presented the testimonies of witnesses as
well as documentary and object evidence
to prove this. In addition, the defense
presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad
reputation for truth and the incredible
nature of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed
narration of the crime and the events
surrounding it, the trial court found a
credible witness in her. It noted her
categorical,
straightforward,
spontaneous, and frank testimony,
undamaged
by
grueling
cross-examinations.
On January 4, 2000, after four years of
arduous hearings, the trial court rendered
judgment, finding all the accused guilty as
charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and
Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate
prison term of eleven years, four months,
and one day to twelve years. The trial
court also awarded damages to Lauro
Vizconde.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s decision, modifying the
penalty imposed on Biong to six years
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minimum and twelve years maximum and
increasing the award of damages to Lauro
Vizconde.
The appellate court did not agree that the
accused were tried by publicity or that
the trial judge was biased. It found
sufficient evidence of conspiracy that
rendered
Rodriguez,
Gatchalian,
Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty
with those who had a part in raping and
killing Carmela and in executing her
mother and sister.
others in committing the crime.
3. Whether or not the Court should acquit
him outright, given the government’s
failure to produce the semen specimen
that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver,
thus depriving him of evidence that would
prove his innocence; and
4. Whether or not Webb, acting in
conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura,
and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and
put to death her mother and sister.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial
deliberation in this case, the Court issued
a Resolution granting the request of
Webb to submit for DNA analysis the
semen specimen taken from Carmela’s
cadaver, which specimen was then
believed still under the safekeeping of the
NBI.
HELD: The Right to Acquittal Due to Loss
of DNA Evidence Webb claims, citing
Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to
outright acquittal on the ground of
violation of his right to due process given
the State’s failure to produce on order of
the Court either by negligence or willful
suppression the semen specimen taken
from Carmela.
The Court granted the request pursuant
to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence
to give the accused and the prosecution
access to scientific evidence that they
might want to avail themselves of, leading
to a correct decision in the case.
When Webb raised the DNA issue, the
rule governing DNA evidence did not yet
exist, the country did not yet have the
technology for conducting the test, and
no Philippine precedent had as yet
recognized its admissibility as evidence.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI
informed the Court that it no longer has
custody of the specimen, the same having
been turned over to the trial court. The
trial record shows, however, that the
specimen was not among the object
evidence that the prosecution offered in
evidence in the case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to
file an urgent motion to acquit on the
ground that the government’s failure to
preserve such vital evidence has resulted
in the denial of his right to due process.
Consequently, the idea of keeping the
specimen secure even after the trial court
rejected the motion for DNA testing did
not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor
his co-accused brought up the matter of
preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court
denied Webb’s application for DNA
testing, he allowed the proceeding to
move on when he had on at least two
occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals
or the Supreme Court to challenge
alleged arbitrary actions taken against
him and the other accused.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as
eyewitness, describing the crime and
identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two
others as the persons who committed it,
is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented
sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and
rebut Alfaro’s testimony that he led the
They raised the DNA issue before the
Court of Appeals but merely as an error
committed by the trial court in rendering
its decision in the case. None of the
accused filed a motion with the appeals
court to have the DNA test done pending
adjudication of their appeal. This, even
when the Supreme Court had in the
meantime passed the rules allowing such
test. Considering the accused’s lack of
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interest in having such a test done, the
State cannot be deemed put on
reasonable notice that it would be
required to produce the semen specimen
at some future time.
Alfaro had been hanging around at the
NBI since November or December 1994 as
an "asset." She supplied her handlers with
information against drug pushers and
other criminal elements. Some of this
information led to the capture of
notorious drug pushers like Christopher
Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s
tip led to the arrest of the leader of the
"Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer.
Because of her talent, the task force gave
her "very special treatment" and she
became its "darling," allowed the privilege
of spending nights in one of the rooms at
the NBI offices.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for
sometime, however, they teased her
about it and she was piqued. One day, she
unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she
knew someone who had the real story
behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing
showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring
that someone to the NBI to tell his story.
When this did not happen and Sacaguing
continued to press her, she told him that
she might as well assume the role of her
informant.
Among the accused, Webb presented the
strongest alibi through (a) the travel
preparations; (b) the two immigration
checks; (c) details of US sojourn; (d) the
second immigration check; and (e) alibi
versus positive identification; and (f) a
documented alibi.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove
by positive, clear, and satisfactory
evidence that (a) he was present at
another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it
was physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals
expressed marked cynicism over the
accuracy of travel documents like the
passport as well as the domestic and
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foreign records of departures and arrivals
from airports. They claim that it would
not have been impossible for Webb to
secretly return to the Philippines after he
supposedly left it on March 9, 1991,
commit the crime, go back to the U.S.,
and openly return to the Philippines again
on October 26, 1992. Travel between the
U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower
courts took only about twelve to fourteen
hours.
Webb’s documented alibi altogether
impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only
with respect to him, but also with respect
to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian,
Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court
accepts the proposition that Webb was in
the U.S. when the crime took place,
Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together.
Webb’s participation is the anchor
ofAlfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence
against the others must necessarily fall.
In our criminal justice system, what is
important is, not whether the court
entertains doubts about the innocence of
the accused since an open mind is willing
to explore all possibilities, but whether it
entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt
as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious
mistake to send an innocent man to jail
where such kind of doubt hangs on to
one’s inner being, like a piece of meat
lodged immovable between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend
the rest of their lives in prison on the
testimony of an NBI asset who proposed
to her handlers that she take the role of
the witness to the Vizconde massacre
that she could not produce?
The Supreme Court REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the Decision dated December 15,
2005 and Resolution dated January 26,
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accusedappellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb,
Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez,
Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the
crimes of which they were charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are
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ordered immediately RELEASED from
detention unless they are confined for
another lawful cause.
SUPPOSING
AN
ADMINISTRATIVE
CHARGE IS FILED AGAINST A JUDGE
FOR RENDERING UNJUST JUDGMENT.
THE SC AFTER HEARING DISMISSED
THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE OF LACK OF
EVIDENCE. UPON THE DISMISSAL OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE, THE
COMPLAINANT FILED A CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT BEFORE THE OFFICE OF
OMBUDSMAN, IS THERE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY IN THAT CASE?
● Double jeopardy requires that the
identical offenses are criminal in
nature. The dismissal of the
administrative charge does not set
in double jeopardy even if the
criminal complaint is based on the
same act or omission constituting
the
administrative
complaint.
(​Icasiano v. Sandiganbayan​)
ICASIANO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Acting Municipal Trial Court
Judge of Naic, Cavite, Aurelio G. Icasiano,
Jr. issed 2 orders of detention dated 18
and 27 November 1986 against Romana
Magbago for contempt of court because
of her continued refusal to comply with a
fifth alias writ of execution. Magbago filed
an administrative complaint dated 17
February 1987 with the Supreme Court
against Judge Icasiano. After evaluating
the allegations of the complaint,
Icasiano's comment thereon and the
Court Administrator's recommendation,
the Supreme Court dismissed the
administrative complaint for lack of merit
in an en banc resolution dated 2 February
1988.
Meanwhile, on 17 March 1987, Magbago
also filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman the same letter- complaint
earlier filed with the Supreme Court; this
time, she claimed violation by Judge
Icasiano, Jr. of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA 3019, sec. 3 par. [e]) in
TBP-87-00924. After considering Judge
Icasiano's answer, in a resolution dated
April 1988 Special Prosecutor Evelyn
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Almogela-Baliton recommended dismissal
of the complaint for lack of merit. The
recommendation was approved by then
Special Prosecutor/Tanodbayan Raul M.
Gonzales. It appears from the records of
the Tanodbayan, which were forwarded
to the Supreme Court, upon order of the
Court in connection with this case, that
the resolution dismissing the complaint
was released on 14 April 1988. The office
of the Tanodbayan received another
complaint from the same Romana
Magbago (TBP-87-01546).
The exact date of filing of the second
complaint is not stated but the records of
the case were allegedly among those
transmitted to the then newly created
office of the Ombudsman; unfortunately,
the transmitted records did not contain
the earlier resolution of dismissal in TBP87-00924. Special Prosecutor Nicanor
Cruz, Jr. who was assigned to investigate
the
case (TBP-87-01546) appeared
completely unaware of the earlier case,
TBP-87-00924.
The
corresponding
information
against
Icasiano
was
thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan
(Criminal Case 14563). After said
information was filed on 21 March 1990,
Icasiano (as accused) filed a motion for
reinvestigation. Icasiano's motion for
reinvestigation was denied in the 29 June
1990 resolution of the Sandiganbayan.
Icasiano then moved to quash the
information on the grounds, among
others, that the accused shall be placed in
double jeopardy insofar as the resolution
of the Hon. Supreme Court in
Administrative Case RTJ 87-81. The
Sandiganbayan denied the motion to
quash. A motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. Icasiano filed the petition
for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the
administrative proceeding in the Supreme
Court bars the subsequent filing of a
criminal case against the accused in the
Sandiganbayan.
HELD: After a closer look at the records
of the case, the Court is of the view that
the distinction between administrative
and criminal proceedings must be upheld,
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and that a prosecution in one is not a bar
to the other. It is, therefore, correct for
the Sandiganbayan to hold that double
jeopardy does not apply in the present
controversy because the Supreme Court
case (against Judge Icasiano) was
administrative in character while the
Sandiganbayan case also against Judge
Icasiano is criminal in nature. When the
Supreme Court acts on complaints
against judges or any of the personnel
under its supervision and control, it acts
as personnel administrator, imposing
discipline and not as a court judging
justiciable controversies. Administrative
procedures need not strictly adhere to
technical rules. Substantial evidence is
sufficient to sustain conviction. Criminal
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan,
on the other hand, while they may involve
the
same
acts
subject
of
the
administrative case, require proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. To avail of the
protection against double jeopardy, it is
fundamental that the following requisites
must have obtained in the original
prosecution:
(a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) a competent court;
(c) a valid arraignment;
(d) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and
(e) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
All these elements do not apply vis- a-vis
the administrative case, which should
take care of Judge Icasiano's contention
that said administrative case against him
before the Supreme Court, which was
dismissed, entitled him to raise the
defense of double jeopardy in the criminal
case in the Sandiganbayan. The charge
against Judge Icasiano before the
Sandiganbayan is for grave abuse of
authority,
manifest
partiality
and
incompetence in having issued 2 orders of
detention against complaining witness
Magbago.
Ordinarily,
complainant's
available remedy was to appeal said
orders of detention in accordance with
the Rules. It is only when an appellate
court reverses the lower court issuing the
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questioned orders can abuse, partiality or
incompetence be imputed to the judge.
Here no appeal from the questioned
orders of the issuing judge (Icasiano) was
taken:
instead,
administrative
and
criminal cases were filed against the judge
for issuing the orders. It is precisely for
this reason, among others, that the
administrative case against Judge Icasiano
was dismissed by the Supreme Court for
lack of merit; and yet, it cannot be
assumed at this point that Judge Icasiano
is not criminally liable under RA 3019, par.
3(e) for issuing the questioned orders of
detention. In fact, the Ombudsman has
found a prima facie case which led to the
filing of the information. In any case, the
dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first
complaint cannot bar the present
prosecution, since double jeopardy does
not apply. As held in Cirilo Cinco, et al. vs.
Sandiganbayan and the People of the
Philippines, a preliminary investigation
(assuming one had been conducted in
TBP-87-00924) is not a trial to which
double jeopardy attaches.
SUPPOSING THE COMPLAINANT FILED
A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AGAINST THE
JUDGE BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN. AFTER PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION, THE OMB DISMISSED
THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF
EVIDENCE. AFTER DISMISSAL, THE
COMPLAINANT FILED A 2ND CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT AGAINST THE SAME
JUDGE BASED ON THE SAME ACT OR
OMISSION.
IS
THERE
DOUBLE
JEOPARDY?
● No. There is no double jeopardy in
preliminary investigation because
in order to constitute double
jeopardy there must be a legal
jeopardy and legal jeopardy
requires that there must be an
acquittal,
conviction
or the
dismissal of the complaint without
the express consent of the
accused. Secondly, in order to
constitute legal jeopardy, the
accused must have been arraigned.
In preliminary investigation, the
respondent will not be arraigned.
In that regard, double jeopardy will
not
set
in
in
preliminary
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investigations.
SUPPOSING
A
CRIMINAL
INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE WAS
FILED AGAINST A FOR KILLING B. A
WAS ARRAIGNED AND TRIAL ENSUED.
DURING
THE
TRIAL,
THE
PROSECUTION FILED A SECOND
CRIMINAL INFORMATION AGAINST A
FOR MURDER FOR KILLING B. IS THERE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
● No. Mere pendency of two
criminal information for the same
or identical offense will not set in
motion double jeopardy. There
must be previous conviction,
acquittal or the dismissal of the
first complaint without the express
consent of the accused. (​People v.
Pineda​)
REMEMBER WE SAID EARLIER IN THE
CASE OF PSB v. BERMOY, THE SC SAID
THAT THERE ARE 3 INSTANCES WHEN
DOUBLE JEOPARDY MAY BE INVOKED
AND THE FIRST CIRCUMSTANCE IS
WHEN THE ACCUSED IS CHARGED
WITH THE SAME OFFENSE IN 2
SEPARATE PENDING CASES. HOW DO
WE RECONCILE THIS STATEMENT OF
THE SC IN PSB v. BERMOY TO THE
RULING OF THE SC IN THE CASE OF
PEOPLE v. PINEDA?
● The statement of the SC in ​PSB v.
Bermoy to the effect that double
jeopardy applies when the accused
is charged with the same offense
in 2 separate pending cases is only
an obiter dictum because in said
case the main issue there is the
appeal of the demurrer to
evidence. While in the case of
People v. Pineda this is the main
issue in that case, whether the
filing of multiple complaints
against the same accused based on
the same act or omission for
identical
offenses
constitute
double jeopardy. The SC said no
because double jeopardy requires
legal jeopardy and to constitute
legal jeopardy there must be
previous conviction, acquittal, or
dismissal of the case without the
express consent of the accused.
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