SUBJECT MATTER
A. EXISTING, FUTURE AND CONTINGENT
LUIS PICHEL VS PRUDENCIO ALONZO (G.R. No. L-36902 Jan. 30, 1982)
FACTS: Alonzo was awarded by the Government a parcel of land in Basilan City in
accordance with RA 477. The award was cancelled by the Board of Liquidators on the
ground that, previous thereto, plaintiff was proved to have alienated the land to another, in
violation of law. In 1972, plaintiff's rights to the land were reinstated.
Alonzo and his wife sold to Luis Pichel all the fruits of the coconut trees which may be
harvested in the land in question for the period, September 15, 1968 to January 1, 1976, in
consideration of P4,200.00. Even as of the date of sale, however, the land was still under
lease to Ramon Sua, and it was the agreement that part of the consideration of the sale, in
the sum of P3,650.00, was to be paid by Pichel directly to Ramon Sua so as to release the
land from the clutches of the latter.
Pending said payment Alonzo refused to allow the Pichel to make any harvest. Later, Pichel
for the first time since the execution of the deed of sale in his favor, caused the harvest of
the fruit of the coconut trees in the land.
Pichel filed for the annulment of the contract on the ground that it violated the provisions of
R.A. 477, which states that lands awarded under the said law shall not be subject to
encumbrance or alienation, otherwise the awardee shall no longer be entitled to apply for
another piece of land. RTC ruled that although the agreement in question is denominated by
the parties as a deed of sale of fruits of the coconut trees found in the vendor's land, it
actually is, for all legal intents and purposes, a contract of lease of the land itself.
ISSUE: 1. WON the subject matter of the sale is valid.
2. WON the sale of the coconut fruits violated RA 477.
HELD:
1st issue: YES. The Deed of Sale is precisely what it purports to be. It is a document
evidencing the agreement of herein parties for the sale of coconut fruits of the lot, and not
for the lease of the land itself as found by the lower Court. In clear and express terms, the
document defines the object of the contract thus: "the herein sale of the coconut fruits are
for an the fruits on the aforementioned parcel of land during the years ...(from) SEPTEMBER
15, 1968; up to JANUARY 1, 1976."
Moreover, as petitioner correctly asserts, the document in question expresses a valid
contract of sale. It has the essential elements of a contract of sale as defined under Article
1485 of the New Civil Code which provides thus:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer
the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price
certain in money or its equivalent. A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
The subject matter of the contract of sale in question are the fruits of the coconut trees on
the land during the years from September 15, 1968 up to January 1, 1976, which subject
matter is a determinate thing. Under Article 1461 of the New Civil Code, things having a
potential existence may be the object of the contract of sale. And in Sibal vs. Valdez, 50 Phil.
512, pending crops which have potential existence may be the subject matter of the sale.
According to Mechem, a valid sale may be made of a thing, which though not yet actually in
existence, is reasonably certain to come into existence as the natural increment or usual
incident of something already in existence, and then belonging to the vendor, and the title
will vest in the buyer the moment the thing comes into existence.
2nd issue: NO. The contract was clearly a "sale of the coconut fruits." The vendor sold,
transferred and conveyed "by way of absolute sale, all the coconut fruits of his land,"
thereby divesting himself of all ownership or dominion over the fruits during the seven year
period. The possession and enjoyment of the coconut trees cannot be said to be the
possession and enjoyment of the land itself because these rights are distinct and separate
from each other, the first pertaining to the accessory or improvements (coconut trees)
while the second, to the principal (the land). A transfer of the accessory or improvement is
not a transfer of the principal. It is the other way around, the accessory follows the
principal. Hence, the sale of the nuts cannot be interpreted nor construed to be a lease of the
trees, much less extended further to include the lease of the land itself.
The grantee of a parcel of land under R.A. No. 477 is not prohibited from alienating or
disposing of the natural and/or industrial fruits of the land awarded to him. What the law
expressly disallows is the encumbrance or alienation of the land itself or any of the
permanent improvements thereon. While coconut trees are permanent improvements of a
land, their nuts are natural or industrial fruits which are meant to be gathered or severed
from the trees, to be used, enjoyed, sold or otherwise disposed of by the owner of the land.
Herein respondents, as the grantee of Lot No. 21 from the Government, had the right and
prerogative to sell the coconut fruits of the trees growing on the property.
B. LICIT
MARTINEZ VS CA (G.R. L-31271 April 29, 1974)
FACTS: The spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez, are the registered owners of two
(2) parcels of land, both parcels of land are fishponds and the property involved in this case
is the 2nd parcel of land.
The disputed property was originally owned by one Paulino Montemayor, who secured a
"titulo real" over it way back in 1883. After the death of Paulino the said property passed to
his successors-in-interest, Maria and Donata Montemayor, who in turn, sold it, as well as the
first parcel, to a certain Potenciano Garcia.
Because Potenciano was prevented by the then municipal president of Lubao from restoring
the dikes constructed on the contested property, the former, filed with the CFI against
municipal president to restrain the latter in his official capacity from molesting him in the
possession of the lot.
The Court, by decision promulgated the preliminary injunction and the dikes around the
property in question remained closed until a portion thereof was again opened just before
the outbreak of the Pacific War. Garcia applied for the registration of both parcels of land in
his name and the CFI granted the registration. Thereafter, the ownership of these properties
changed hands until eventually they were acquired by the herein appellee spouses.
To avoid any untoward incident, the petitioners agreed to refer the matter to the Committee
on Rivers and Streams. Said Sub-Committee submitted its report, which said that the subject
property was not a public river but a private fishpond owned by the herein spouses
ISSUE: WON the subject property belongs to the petitioners.
HELD: NO, IT IS A PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION. The ruling of the Court of Appeals that
the lot of the petitioners-appellants is a public stream and that said title should be cancelled
and the river covered reverted to public domain, is assailed by the petitioners-appellants as
being a collateral attack on the indefeasibility of the Torrens title originally issued in 1925
in favor of the petitioners-appellants' predecessor-in-interest, Garcia, which is violative of
the rule of res judicata. It is argued that as the decree of registration issued by the Land
Registration Court was not re-opened through a petition for review filed within one (1) year
from the entry of the decree of title, the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto in favor of
the appellants for the land covered thereby is no longer open to attack under Section 38 of
the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and the jurisprudence on the matter established by this
Tribunal.
Section 38 of the Land Registration Act cited by appellants expressly makes a decree of
registration, which ordinarily makes the title absolute and indefeasible.
At the time of the enactment of Section 496, one right recognized or existing under the law
is that provided for in Article 339 of the old Civil Code which reads as follows:
Property of public ownership is:
1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges
constructed by the State, and banks shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.
(Par. 1)
The above-mentioned properties are parts of the public domain intended for public use, are
outside the commerce of men and, therefore, not subject to private appropriation.
A simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not necessarily
make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains
title under the Torrens system which includes by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot
be registered under the Torrens system, he does not by virtue of said certificate alone
become the owner of the land illegally included.
It is useless for the appellant now to allege that she has obtained certificate of title No. 329
in her favor because the said certificate does not confer upon her any right to the creek in
question, inasmuch as the said creek, being of the public domain, is included among the
various exceptions enumerated in Section 39 of Act 496 to which the said certificate is
subject by express provision of the law.
Torrens certificate of title does not operate when the land covered thereby is not capable of
registration.
It is, therefore, clear that the authorities cited by the appellants as to the conclusiveness and
incontestability of a Torrens certificate of title do not apply here. The Land Registration
Court has no jurisdiction over non-registerable properties, such as public navigable rivers
which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in
favor of a private applicant.
C. DERTERMINE OR AT LEAST DETERMINABLE
SCHUBACK & SONS VS. CA
FACTS: On October 16, 1981, defendant submitted to plaintiff the list of bus spare parts he
wanted to purchase to its counterpart in Hamburg. Plaintiff sent an offer on the items listed.
On December 4, 1981, defendant informed plaintiff that he preferred genuine to
replacement parts, and requested a 15% discount. On December 17, plaintiff submitted its
formal offer. On December 24, defendant submitted a purchase order, and submitted the
quantity on December 29. Plaintiff immediately ordered the items from Schuback Hamburg,
which thereafter ordered the same from NDK, a supplier in Germany
Plaintiff sent a pro-forma invoice to be used in applying for letter of credit. On February 16,
1982, plaintiff reminded defendant to open a letter of credit to avoid delay in shipment.
Defendant mentioned the difficulty he was encountering in procuring the same. Plaintiff
continued receiving invoices and partial deliveries from NDK. On October 18, 1982, plaintiff
again reminded the defendant to open a letter of credit. Defendant replied that he did not
make a valid purchase order and that there was no definite contract between him and the
plaintiff. Plaintiff sent a rejoinder explaining that there is a valid Purchase.
Order and suggesting that defendant either proceed with the order and open a letter of
credit or cancel the order and pay the cancellation fee of 30% of F.O.B. value, or plaintiff will
endorse the case to its lawyers. Demand letters sent to defendant by plaintiff's counsel
dated March 22, 1983 and June 9, 1983 were to no avail. Consequently, petitioner filed a
complaint for recovery of actual or compensatory damages, unearned profits, interest,
attorney's fees and costs against private respondent.
ISSUE: WON the contract of sale has been perfected between the parties
HELD: Article 1319 of the Civil Code states: "Consent is manifested by the meeting of the
offer and acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The
offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a
counter offer." The facts presented to us indicate that consent on both sides has been
manifested. The offer by petitioner was manifested on December 17, 1981 when petitioner
submitted its proposal containing the item number, quantity, part number, description, the
unit price and total to private respondent. On December 24, 1981, private respondent
informed petitioner of his desire to avail of the prices of the parts at that time and
simultaneously enclosed its Purchase Order. At this stage, a meeting of the minds between
vendor and vendee has occurred, the object of the contract: being the spare parts and the
consideration, the price stated in petitioner's offer dated December 17, 1981 and accepted
by the respondent on December 24, 1981.
D. OBLIGATION TO TRANSFER OWNERSHIP
CONCHITA NOOL and GAUDENCIO ALMOJERA vs. CA
FACTS: One lot formerly owned by Victorino Nool has an area of 1 hectare. Another lot
previously owned by Francisco Nool has an area of 3.0880 hectares. Spouses (plaintiffs)
Conchita Nool and Gaudencio Almojera alleged that they are the owners of the subject lands.
They are in dire need of money, they obtained a loan at DBP , secured by a real estate
mortgage on said parcels of land, which were still registered in the names of Victorino and
Francisco Nool, at the time, since the plaintiffs failed to pay the said loan, the mortgage was
foreclosed; that within the period of redemption, the plaintiffs contacted Anacleto Nool for
the latter to redeem the foreclosed properties from DBP, which the latter did; and as a
result, the titles of the 2 parcels of land in question were transferred to Anacleto; that as
part of their arrangement or understanding, Anacleto agreed to buy from Conchita the 2
parcels of land , for a total price of P100,000.00, P30,000.00 of which price was paid to
Conchita, and upon payment of the balance of P14,000.00, the plaintiffs were to regain
possession of the 2 hectares of land, which amounts spouses Anacleto Nool and Emilia
Nebre failed to pay. Anacleto Nool signed the private writing, agreeing to return subject
lands when plaintiffs have the money to redeem the same; defendant Anacleto having been
made to believe, then, that his sister, Conchita, still had the right to redeem the said
properties.
ISSUE: Is the purchase of the subject lands to Anacleto valid?
HELD: “Nono dat quod non habet”, No one can give what he does not have; Contract of
repurchase inoperative thus void.
Article 1505 of the Civil Code provides that “where goods are sold by a person who is not
the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with consent of the
owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner
of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell.”
Jurisprudence, on the other hand, teaches us that “a person can sell only what he owns or is
authorized to sell; the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the seller can
legally transfer.” No one can give what he does not have — nono dat quod non habet. In the
present case, there is no allegation at all that petitioners were authorized by DBP to sell the
property to the private respondents.
Further, the contract of repurchase that the parties entered into presupposes that
petitioners could repurchase the property that they “sold” to private respondents. As
petitioners “sold” nothing, it follows that they can also “repurchase” nothing. In this light,
the contract of repurchase is also inoperative and by the same analogy, void.