INR4083: CONFLICT IN THE WORLD
Hypotheses on Misperception
Rational Decision Making (in brief)
• Rational national leaders
• Complete information & accurate perception
of international situation
• Cost-benefit analysis
• Best policy for national interests
Ex: Graham Allison’s Rational Actor Model
• Policy Makers: Unified National Actor
• Policy-Making: a Rational Choice
 Maximizing national interest
• Policy-Making Process
 Clarify FP Goals
 List Alternatives
 Estimate probable consequences of each option
 Choose the course of action
Limits of Rational Model
• FP Actors
 Not Unitary or Rational
 Interested in Organizational Interests
• Incomplete Information & Strategic Interaction
• Under Incomplete Information,
 Interpretation/perception on other’s intention/behavior
matters
 Suspicion & emotional response
Hypothesis 1: Theory vs. Data
• Hypothesis 1: Decision-makers tend to fit incoming
information into their existing theories and images
▫ The greater the ambiguity of data
▫ The higher the degree of confidence with which the
actor holds the theory
Hypothesis 2: Theory vs. Theory
• Two conflicting ideas/information
• Two ways to make mistakes
▫ 1. stick to the established view in the face of
conflicting information
▫ 2. too easily change their views/beliefs
▫ 1 is more common than 2
Hypothesis 3: Data vs. Data
• It is easier to integrate conflicting information
into your image if it comes bit-by-bit than if it
comes at once
▫ Misperception is greater when there is too much
information
Hypothesis 4: Missing Concept
• Misperception is more serious in the case of a
missing concept
▫ It is easier to correct misperception when there is a
recognized concept
Hypothesis 5: Different Backgrounds
• Misperception/misunderstanding is likely when
messages come from a different background of
concerns or information than is possessed by the
receiver.
Hypothesis 6: Sending Messages
• Decision-makers tend to believe that a message will
be clear to the receiver, if they spend much time
making a decision
Hypothesis 7: Actions vs. Outcomes
• Decision-makers often fail to realize that actions
intended to project a given image may not have the
desired effect because the actions themselves do not
turn out as planned.
Hypothesis 8: Hostile Images
Decision-makers tend to perceive other states as
more hostile than they are
Hypothesis 9: Opponent
• Decision-makers tend to believe that others are
more centralized, disciplined, and coordinated than
they are
Hypothesis 10
• Decision-makers tend to take the foreign office’s
position for the stand of the government as a whole
▫ A state gets most information about the other state’s
policies from the foreign office
Hypothesis 11
• When others act in accordance with our desires,
we tend to give too much credits to ourselves for
making them do so
▫ When others act against our desires, we tend to
believe it came from domestic desires
Hypothesis 12
• When actors have intention that they do not try to
conceal from others, they tend to assume that
others accurately perceive these intentions
Hypothesis 13
• If it is hard for decision-makers to believe that the
other can see them as a menace, it is often harder
for them to see that issues important to them are not
important to the other.
Misperception & War: Five Examples
• 1. Misperceiving the opponent as having more hostile
intentions and as undertaking more hostile activities
than is actually the case
• 2. Misperception of the relative balance of power
(perception that opponent is weaker or stronger than is
the case)
• 3. Perception that war is inevitable
Cont.
• 4. Perception that the war will be relatively
inexpensive and short
• 5. Misperception of the intensions/capabilities of
third states
Why Misperception? Two Answers
• Cognitive Approach (Robert Jervis)
 Human cognitive limitations
 Over-simplification of problems in information-processing
 Premature cognitive closure
• Motivational Approach (Irving Janis)
 Human beings are emotional (rather than rational calculation)
 Motivational impulse to maintain positive images of self
 For positive images, decision-makers employ threats of forces
 Under the expectation that the opponent will back down