Supreme Court of Minnesota
STATE of Minnesota, Petitioner, Appellant, v.
Sandra Sylvia STARFIELD, Respondent.
481 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 1992)
There may be circumstances where operability of a vehicle is relevant on the issue of whether a
person has physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. In this case
failure to give a supplementary instruction on physical control factors was not requested, nor was
it error not to have given such an instruction. The “physical control” conviction is, therefore,
reinstated and the court of appeals' decision vacating such conviction is reversed.
On February 24, 1989, at around 1:47 a.m., Ramsey County deputy sheriffs responded to a report
of a car in the ditch in Gem Lake. The car was stuck in a snow-filled ditch. The headlights were
on, but the motor was not running. Deputy Lopez approached the driver's side of the car and
testified he found defendant Sandra Starfield sitting in the driver's seat. Through a closed
window, Lopez asked Starfield if she was okay. Starfield replied that she was not hurt. Lopez
then testified he opened the car door and asked for Starfield's driver's license. Starfield could not
find it in her purse. From the odor of alcohol and bloodshot eyes, Lopez believed that Starfield
was intoxicated. Lopez noticed the keys were not in the ignition, so he asked for them. Starfield
replied that the keys were “in the car,” but Lopez could not find them.
Minutes later more deputies arrived. A pick-up truck came by and the driver offered to pull
Starfield's car out of the ditch, but the offer was not accepted. After being given an implied
consent advisory, Starfield refused to submit to a blood alcohol test. While in the squad car,
when asked if she was operating the car, she replied, “Nope,” but did not elaborate. At the
Ramsey County Jail, a set of car keys was found in Starfield's coat pocket. While being booked,
Starfield contended she was not driving the car; but she never mentioned that she was waiting in
the car for her son.
Eventually, Starfield's car was removed from the ditch by a tow truck. One of the deputies
testified that the car was stuck in the snow, and that Starfield could not have driven the car out of
the snow.
.. .
Defendant was charged under Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(a) (Supp.1989), making it a crime to
“drive, operate, or be in physical control of any motor vehicle * * * when the person is under the
-- 14 --
[1]
Starfield's motion to acquit on the charge of “driving” under the influence of alcohol, reasoning
that the evidence was insufficient to support such a conviction. Consequently, the case went to
the jury solely on the question whether Starfield was in “physical control” of a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol.
Defense counsel requested the following instruction on physical control:
The purpose behind Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1 is to deter drunken individuals from getting
into their vehicles except as passengers. The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Defendant was at or near her vehicle for the purpose of operating it or controlling it. Further, the
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant's car was capable of being
operated.
The trial court denied the requested instruction and instead gave an instruction based on 10A
Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 29.02 (3d ed. 1990):
A person is in physical control of a motor vehicle when he or she is present in a vehicle and is in
a position to either direct the movement of the vehicle or keep the vehicle from moving. It is not
necessary for the engine to be running in order for a person to be in physical control of a motor
vehicle.
While deliberating, the jury returned with the following written question: “Does the car have to
be able to be moved for a person to have physical control of the vehicle?” (Emphasis in the
original.) The trial judge responded by repeating his earlier instruction. The jury returned a
verdict of guilty.
[. The prior version states, in relevant part:
It is a crime for any person to drive, operate, or be in physical control of any motor vehicle within this state or upon
the ice of any boundary water of this state under any of the following circumstances:
1. (a) whenthepersonisundertheinfluenceofalcohol;
2. (b) whenthepersonisundertheinfluenceofacontrolledsubstance;
3. (c) whenthepersonisundertheinfluenceofacombinationofanytwoormoreoftheelements
named in clauses (a), (b), and (g);
(g) whenthepersonisknowinglyundertheinfluenceofahazardoussubstancethataffectsthe
nervous system, brain, or muscles of the person so as to substantially impair the person's ability to
drive or operate the motor vehicle; Minn. Rev. Stat. § 169.121. - S]
-- 15 -On appeal, the court of appeals vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial. State v.
Starfield, 472 N.W.2d 143 (Minn.App.1991). For there to be “physical control,” the court
concluded, the prosecution must show the defendant drove the car to the location or into the
predicament in which it was found, or that the driver had the ability to continue on an inebriated
journey at any moment. Because the trial court had dismissed the “driving” charge, the court of
appeals assumed Starfield to be a passenger in her own car, and as a passenger, she was entitled
to an instruction on operability. The appeals panel declined to suggest an appropriate instruction,
but noted that in fashioning an instruction the trial court should take into account evidence that
Starfield was merely a passenger in a disabled vehicle. Id. at 148. We granted the State's petition
for further review.
Arguably, the evidence was sufficient to have submitted to the jury the charge of “driving” under
the influence; however, this is not what happened. The only charge here is having “physical
control” of a motor vehicle. The issue then becomes whether the physical control contemplated
by the statute includes a motor vehicle so stuck in a snow-filled ditch that it cannot move. In the
following discussion, we will use the terms “inoperable” or “disabled” to refer either to a
mechanical breakdown of the car or to the car being in some predicament where it cannot move,
such as being out of gas or stuck in the snow or mud.
The term “physical control” is more comprehensive than either “drive” or “operate.” State v.
Harris, 295 Minn. 38, 43, 202 N.W.2d 878, 881 (1972). In State v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316,
319 (Minn.1981), the last time we spoke on the subject, we said that the term “physical control”
should be given “the broadest possible effect” and that the intent was to deter inebriated persons
from getting into vehicles except as passengers. Juncewski did not involve, however, a disabled
vehicle. Since then the court of appeals has been *837 faced with a variety of fact situations
involving disabled vehicles.
The court of appeals has found physical control where the vehicle had a flat tire, State v.
Woodward, 408 N.W.2d 927 (Minn.App.1987); a dead battery, Abeln v. Commissioner of Public
Safety, 413 N.W.2d 546 (Minn.App.1987); and where the car was stuck in a snow-filled ditch,
State v. Duemke, 352 N.W.2d 427 (Minn.App.1984). The State stressed the disabilities in these
three cases were all temporary disabilities. A flat tire can be changed; a dead battery can be
jump-started; and a car can be towed from a snow-filled ditch.
The court of appeals in this appeal, however, relied on two of its prior decisions where “physical
control” was not found. In State v. Pazderski, 352 N.W.2d 85 (Minn.App.1984), the defendant
was found asleep in the front seat of his car parked in his driveway. Defendant claimed he had
driven home but not gone inside the house because he wished to avoid a domestic dispute.
Because he was at his destination and not going anywhere, the appeals panel reversed his
conviction. In Roberts v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 371 N.W.2d 605 (Minn.App.1985),
review denied, Oct. 11, 1985, the defendant, after passing out from drinking, had been placed by
friends in the front seat of his car parked in a dance hall parking lot; the keys were left on the
-- 16 -dashboard but the friends pulled the coil wire to the ignition so defendant could not drive off.
The appeals panel affirmed the trial court's ruling that defendant was not in physical control of
the vehicle. While the appeals panel noted that the car was mechanically inoperable, at least
temporarily, the decision also suggests that the defendant had a passenger status because he had
been placed in the car without his knowledge.
Both Pazderski and Roberts have been somewhat limited by subsequent court of appeals'
decisions. Pazderski has been limited to cases where the defendant is in his or her driveway.
When the vehicle is located elsewhere, the appeals court has found physical control because the
intoxicated individual might proceed on his journey and attempt to get home. See Martin v.
Commissioner of Public Safety, 358 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Minn.App.1984) (car located in front of a
house, not his own, and defendant could at any time begin to drive); Palme v. Commissioner of
Public Safety, 366 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Minn.App.1985) (defendant found asleep in pick-up truck
next to a bar claimed his friend had put him there; keys on the seat next to the defendant, so
defendant could at any time start the pick-up and attempt to go home), review denied, June 24,
1985. And as we have seen, both Abeln (dead battery) and Woodward (flat tire) suggest that
mechanical inoperability as noted in Roberts (disconnected coil wire) may not be enough to
exclude physical control. See also State v. Thurmer, 348 N.W.2d 776, 779 (Minn.App.1984)
(defendant admitted driving car found stuck in snow-filled ditch; court found physical control
because keys were in the ignition and defendant admitted he drove the car there).
Insofar as “physical control” refers to something other than “driving” or “operating,” the
foregoing cases suggest that physical control is meant to cover situations where an inebriated
person is found in a parked vehicle under circumstances where the car, without too much
difficulty, might again be started and become a source of danger to the operator, to others, or to
property. In Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d at 320, we indicated that the purpose of the physical control
offense is to act as a preventive measure to deter the drunk driver from again driving. The danger
addressed by the physical control offense is the concern that the intoxicated person “could have
at any time started the automobile and driven away.” Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023, 1024
(Okla.Cr.1975). Or as stated in State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d 338, 339 (1954), the purpose
of the offense is to “enable the drunken driver to be apprehended before he strikes.”
Alcoholic behavior can be unpredictable. A person may get or be put into a car to “sleep it off,”
but then decide to drive away. It is, of course, no crime for an intoxicated person to be in a motor
*838 vehicle as a passenger. A passenger, by definition, is someone who is merely along for the
ride. When, however, only one person is found in or about a stopped car, the question arises
whether that person is a passenger or a person in physical control of the motor vehicle. Mere
presence in or about the vehicle is not enough for physical control; it is the overall situation that
is determinative.
. . . Although the trial court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that Starfield had driven the car into the ditch, this does not necessarily mean
-- 17 -that Starfield was a passenger in her car as a matter of law. But even putting aside any remaining
inference that Starfield drove the car into the ditch, the jury could find beyond a reasonable
doubt from the circumstantial evidence—Starfield behind the wheel, in her own car, keys in her
pocket, towing assistance likely available—that Starfield was in physical control of the car when
it was in the ditch.
This brings us, then, to the question of operability. There was evidence from which the jury
could have found that the snow-stuck car was incapable of immediate self-powered mobility.
While stuck in the ditch, the car was not a danger to anyone, and, arguably, whatever physical
control Starfield had over the car was ineffectual and, therefore, noncriminal. Consequently,
Starfield argues she cannot be convicted of a crime for sitting in a car incapable of going
anywhere and a hazard to nobody. And while the State also charged Starfield with driving under
the influence of alcohol, she points out it was unable to prove that charge, and this should end the
matter.
The fact remains, however, that a car incapable of immediate self-propelled mobility may still be
a potential traffic hazard, and it is this potential for harm, as we have seen, that the “physical
control” offense is meant to encompass. The person in physical control may, while still
inebriated, correct the disability and meander down the road. Here, for example, Starfield might
have enlisted the aid of a passerby to extricate her car from the ditch (indeed, such a driver came
along after the deputies arrived) and, even if one of the tires was flat (we have only the son's
word for this), the car could have been driven on the highway with the flat tire or the flat tire
could have been changed. In other words, temporary inoperability does not necessarily preclude
criminal liability. See also State v. Smelter, supra (car out of gas, but a gas station nearby).
Other courts have held, and we agree, that the state does not need to prove operability of the
motor vehicle. State v. Garber, 587 A.2d 404 (Vt.1991); *839 Lathane v. State, 707 P.2d 941,
943 (Alaska App.1985); City of Toledo v. Voyles, 14 Ohio App.3d 419, 471 N.E.2d 823, 824
(1984). Operability does not appear in our statute as an element of physical control. One court at
least has indicated that inoperability may, in certain circumstances, be treated as an affirmative
defense to a prosecution for a physical control offense. Jones v. State, 510 So.2d 1147, 1149
(Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1987). We do not, however, think that treating inoperability as an affirmative
defense is appropriate either.
Drunk-driving cases, especially those where the officer comes upon a stationary car with an
inebriated person inside, seem to provoke a remarkable variety of explanations to test the
factfinder's credibility-determining powers. Inoperability or, more precisely, the nature and
duration of any inoperability, is simply a factor or circumstance to be evaluated with all the
surrounding facts and circumstances by the jury in determining whether the situation gives rise to
physical control.
-- 18 -In a case where the State is claiming “physical control” of a disabled motor vehicle, we think the
standard JIG instruction on physical control might appropriately be supplemented by an
instruction along the following lines:
In considering whether or not the defendant was in physical control of the motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol, you may consider defendant's location in or by the vehicle, the
location of the ignition keys, whether the defendant had been a passenger in the vehicle before it
came to rest, who owned the vehicle, the extent to which the vehicle was inoperable, and
whether the vehicle if inoperable might have been rendered operable so as to be a danger to
persons or property. You may consider these as well as any other facts or circumstances bearing
on whether or not the defendant was then in physical control of a motor vehicle which was or
reasonably could become a danger to persons or property while the defendant was under the
influence of alcohol.
Ordinarily, instructions drawing attention to particular kinds of evidence should be avoided in
criminal cases. State v. Olson, 482 N.W.2d 212 (Minn.1992). In this instance, however, directing
the jury's attention in nonargumentative fashion to a number of relevant factors bearing on
physical control could be helpful by providing focus to the arguments of counsel and the
deliberations of the jurors. Cf. Olson, supra. An instruction along the foregoing lines should be
given if requested in cases where inoperability is involved.
In this case, the defendant requested an instruction which would have been error to give.
Operability of the motor vehicle is not an element of the crime of being in physical control of a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and the State did not—contrary to the
requested instruction—have a duty to prove operability beyond a reasonable doubt. Neither must
the State prove that the defendant was in the vehicle for the purpose of operating the motor
vehicle, as defendant's instruction also requested. An intent to operate is not an element of the
criminal offense; if it were, defendants found in a drunken stupor behind the wheel could argue
they lacked any intent to move the vehicle. A drunken intent is highly problematic and too easily
manipulated after the fact. Indeed, an attempt to make lack of intent an affirmative defense was
defeated in the 1989 legislature. See S.F. 223, Journal of the Senate, p. 1633, for April 13, 1989.
Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's requested instruction. Nor can we
say it was reversible error for the trial court not to have given a supplementary instruction on
relevant facts to consider for physical control in the absence of counsel's request for the
instruction. *840 Under the standard JIG instruction that was given, the parties were free to
argue, and did argue, the conflicting inferences to be drawn from the fact that defendant's car was
stuck in the snow-filled ditch.
-- 19 -We reverse and reinstate the conviction.
Reversed.
TOMLJANOVICH, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the majority's result but respectfully dissent as to one section of its opinion. Contrary
to the majority's assertion, inoperability is never relevant to the issue of whether a defendant was
in control of a motor vehicle. Operability is relevant to only one question: whether the thing at
issue is, in fact, a motor vehicle.
The statute makes it a crime to “be in physical control of any motor vehicle * * * when the
person is under the influence of alcohol.” I would not read the word “operable” into the statute to
permit the jury to require physical control of an operable motor vehicle.
Operability has nothing to do with control, and allowing the defense to raise it needlessly
complicates what should be a straightforward determination. If defendants can claim, and juries
can consider, inoperability, police officers will be forced to test drive every car they stop and
parties will be forced to bring in automotive experts to testify. In the end, any trial involving this
issue is what will be inoperable.
The real question being raised here is factual impossibility. The defense argument appears to be
that a driver cannot possibly cause harm while in control of an inoperable vehicle. But factual
impossibility is never a valid defense in a case like this one. C. Torcia, 1 Wharton's Criminal
Law § 76 (14th ed. 1978).
I respectfully dissent from the court's conclusion that inoperability is potentially relevant.
-- 20 -Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division One.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v.
John David SLAVENS, Appellant
375 S.W.3d 915 (Mo. App. 2012)
Opinion
WILLIAM W. FRANCIS, JR., J.
John David Slavens (“Slavens”) appeals his conviction by the trial court for one count of the
class B misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated (“DWI”), a violation of section 577.010.1 In
his sole point relied on, Slavens argues the trial court erred in convicting him of DWI because
the incident which led to his conviction was the result of a “dirt bike” accident on his private
property. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Factual and Procedural Background
The parties stipulated to the facts and evidence in this case. Slavens was operating a motor
vehicle, referenced by both parties as a “non street legal” “dirt bike,” in his own yard when he
had an accident that necessitated the response of medical personnel, as well as the Missouri State
Highway Patrol. Upon arrival of the Highway Patrol officer, Slavens admitted to drinking and
consented to having a blood sample drawn to determine his blood alcohol content. The result of
that testing indicated Slavens' blood alcohol content was 0.226 percent. He was then charged and
convicted of the aforementioned offense of DWI and fined $500.
At issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in convicting Slavens under section
577.010, when he was on his private property operating his dirt bike—a motor vehicle, which as
stipulated by the parties, was not primarily designed for use on a roadway. He argues that such a
conviction was error in that section 577.010 does not specifically “make it a crime to operate a
motor vehicle, which is primarily designed for off-road use, in your own yard while intoxicated.”
The specific issue for our determination is whether Slavens can be convicted of violating section
577.010 for operating a “non street legal” “dirt bike” on his own private property.
-- 21 -Standard of Review
We note that neither Slavens, nor the State, set forth the applicable standard of review in their
briefs. Given the issue presented in this point, we necessarily are called upon to interpret section
577.010. “ ‘Statutory interpretation is a question of law, and questions of law are reviewed de
novo.’ ” *917 State v. Downing, 359 S.W.3d 69, 70 (Mo.App. W.D.2011) (quoting State v.
Pesce, 325 S.W.3d 565, 575 (Mo.App. W.D.2010)). As such, “the lower court's ruling on a
question of law is not a matter of judicial discretion.” State v. Laplante, 148 S.W.3d 347, 348
(Mo.App. S.D.2004). “Absent an erroneous declaration or application of the law, however, we
will sustain the judgment of the trial court.” Id. at 349.
Analysis
Section 577.010.1 provides that a “person commits the crime of ‘[DWI]’ if he operates a motor
vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged condition.” “‘Thus, the elements of the offense of
[DWI] are twofold: that the defendant operated a motor vehicle and that he did so while in an
intoxicated or drugged condition.’” State v. Tyler, 285 S.W.3d 353, 354 (Mo.App. S.D.2009)
(quoting State v. Ball, 113 S.W.3d 677, 679 (Mo.App. S.D.2003)). The term “motor vehicle” is
not defined in section 577.010. As the dispute in the present matter hinges on whether Slavens'
dirt bike is considered to be a motor vehicle for purposes of the DWI statute when it was being
operated on his private property as opposed to a public roadway, this Court is called upon to
carefully parse that term.
The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and give effect
to that intent as it is reflected in the plain language of the statute. State v. Lewis, 188 S.W.3d
483, 487 (Mo.App. W.D.2006). “Where the legislative intent is made evident by giving the
language employed in the statute its plain and ordinary meaning, we are without authority to read
into the statute an intent, which is contrary thereto.” State v. Brushwood, 171 S.W.3d 143, 147
(Mo.App. W.D.2005). However, “where the language is ambiguous or will lead to an illogical
result, we look beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute.” State v. Daniel, 103
S.W.3d 822, 826 (Mo.App. W.D.2003).
With these guiding principles in mind, we turn to the phrase “motor vehicle,” which has not been
defined in connection with section 577.010, in order to determine if a dirt bike is a motor vehicle
for purposes of that statute. We are directed in our examination by Fainter v. State, 174 S.W.3d
718, 719 (Mo.App. W.D.2005). In Fainter, a post-conviction relief matter, the defendant pled
guilty to the felony of stealing a lawn mower under section 570.030.3(3)(a), which makes it a
crime to steal “[a]ny motor vehicle, watercraft or aircraft[.]” Id. at 719; § 570.030.3(3)(a).
Fainter then argued in his post-conviction motion that there was an insufficient factual basis for
his plea because a riding lawn mower is not a motor vehicle such that he should be granted an
-- 22 -evidentiary hearing. Id. His request for an evidentiary hearing was denied along with his request
for post-conviction relief. Id. at 719–20. He then appealed. Id.
The reviewing court in Fainter, began its examination of the issue by noting not only did the
statute the defendant was charged under provide no definition for “motor vehicle,” but there
were myriad statutes that defined “motor vehicle” in numerous different ways:
The [Stonger v. Riggs, 85 S.W.3d 703, 708 (Mo.App. W.D.2002),] court expressly noted ... that
‘several statutes separately define ‘motor vehicle’ for various purposes, and what may be
considered a ‘motor vehicle’ for one statute may not be considered a ‘motor vehicle’ for another.'
Indeed, the Supreme Court, in Trailiner Corporation v. Director of Revenue, 783 S.W.2d 917,
921 (Mo. banc 1990), noted that its ‘perusal of the statutes' found that the General Assembly had
defined ‘motor vehicle’ ‘no less than *918 ten times through the various chapters.’ According to
the Trailiner court, each definition ‘differs to meet the discrete goals addressed during adoption
of the several statutes.’
Fainter, 174 S.W.3d at 721 (internal citation omitted). The court set out that while the State's
argument was that the term “ ‘any motor vehicle’ ” “should be read to mean ‘every motor
vehicle, including riding lawn mowers, golf carts, tractors, or even Zambonis[,]” based on the
fact that the purpose of the stealing statute was to punish and deter thefts of such items, it had
been noted by the Supreme Court in Trailiner, 783 S.W.2d at 921, that “the distinct identity of a
motor vehicle is its primary designed function to transport persons and things.” See also State v.
Harper, 353 Mo. 821, 184 S.W.2d 601, 605 (1945). As such, the Fainter court stated that
“[a]lthough a riding lawn mower is designed to transport a person, its primary function is to cut
grass.” Fainter, 174 S.W.3d at 721. In reversing the decision of the motion court, the court
applied the rule of lenity, which
mandates that all ambiguity in a criminal statute be resolved in a defendant's favor. Under this
rule, we are to construe a criminal statute strictly against the government and liberally in a
defendant's favor. ‘Any doubt as to whether the act charged and proved is embraced within the
prohibition must be resolved in favor of the accused.’ The rule of lenity applies to interpretation
of statutes only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, we can make no more
than a guess as to what the legislature intended.
-- 23 -Id. at 721 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, Fainter concluded that “[b]ecause the
legislature chose not to define ‘motor vehicle’ for the purpose of the stealing statute, we are left
to guess whether it intended to include a riding lawn mower within the term ‘motor vehicle [,]’ ”
such that “[i]n view of the rule of lenity and the Supreme Court's recognition that the primary
function of a motor vehicle is to transport people and things, a strict construction of the statute
leads us to the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to include a riding lawn mower
within the term ‘motor vehicle’ in [s]ection 570.030.3(3)(a).” Id.
The same conclusion can be reached in the present matter as it relates to section 577.010. In
reaching that determination, this Court reviewed numerous cases involving non-traditional
vehicles being operated on public roadways that fell within the definition of “motor vehicle” in
several statutes. See Covert v. Fisher, 151 S.W.3d 70 (Mo.App. E.D.2004) (holding that
operation of a golf cart on a public highway led it to fit the definition of “motor vehicle” found in
sections 302.010(9) and 302.010(23)); Stonger, 85 S.W.3d at 707 (holding a lawn mower being
operated on a public roadway was a “motor vehicle” as that term is defined in section 304.012);
State v. Powell, 306 S.W.2d 531, 533–34 (Mo.1957) (finding that a farm tractor being operated
on a public highway was a “motor vehicle” for purposes of the DWI statute); Laplante, 148
S.W.3d at 350–51 (holding that a “motorized bicycle” or “mini-bike” was a “motor vehicle” for
purposes of the DWI statute where it was operated on a city street). What we have in the present
matter differs from the aforementioned cases in that we have a dirt bike, a non-traditional vehicle
in terms of its intended operation on trails and tracks, being operated on a defendant's private
property as opposed to a public roadway or highway. Like the lawn mower in Fainter, 174
S.W.3d at 721, which had a primary purpose of cutting grass in addition to being able to
transport people, the dirt bike in the present matter was *919 intended to ride through mud, jump
piles of dirt and debris, and navigate mountainous off-road terrain in addition to having the
ability to transport people. See Mitchell v. Dir. of Revenue, 255 S.W.3d 12, 15 (Mo.App.
S.D.2008) (holding that for purposes of section 302.505.1 “an off-road bike, or dirt bike” “does
not fit the category of a motor vehicle as that term is defined in the applicable definition section,
302.010(9) and (23), in that it was not designed primarily for use on highways nor was it used on
a highway by petitioner.”). The legislature chose not to define motor vehicle in the DWI statutes
such that this Court is left with the question of whether it intended section 577.010 to apply to
non-traditional vehicles operated—not on the roads of this State—but on private property.
“‘The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to effectuate legislative intent through reference
to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language.’” State v. Ondo, 232 S.W.3d 622,
628 (Mo.App. S.D.2007) (quoting State v. Graham, 204 S.W.3d 655, 656 (Mo. banc 2006)). The
rule of lenity is a rule of statutory construction which “‘gives a criminal defendant the benefit of
a lesser penalty where there is an ambiguity in the statute allowing for more than one
interpretation.’”2 Id. (quoting State v. Rowe, 63 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Mo. banc 2002)); see State v.
Severe, 307 S.W.3d 640, 646 n. 2 (Mo. banc 2010). The rule of lenity “mandates that all
-- 24 -ambiguity in a criminal statute be resolved in the defendant's favor[,]” but “for it to apply, an
ambiguity must be present.” State v. Bouse, 150 S.W.3d 326, 331 (Mo.App. W.D.2004). Here,
there appears to be an ambiguity in section 577.010—not necessarily in its wording—but in its
potential application to situations such as the present one involving the operation of a non-street
legal, motorized mode of conveyance on private property. As worded, with no definition of
“motor vehicle” referenced and no mention of whether operation on public property is a
requirement, “the statute allow[s] for more than one interpretation.” Rowe, 63 S.W.3d at 650. As
such, the rule of lenity is applicable in this case and it requires this Court to resolve any
ambiguities in favor of Slavens.
Further, even if application of the statute to the present matter were not ambiguous, we are
mindful of the fact that in examining such statutes “we are to presume a logical result, as
opposed to an absurd or unreasonable one.” State v. Kinder, 122 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Mo.App.
E.D.2003); see State v. Davis, 988 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Mo.App. W.D.1999). We are always led to
“avoid statutory ‘interpretations that are unjust, absurd, or unreasonable.’” State v. Carroll, 165
S.W.3d 597, 602 (Mo.App. S.D.2005) (quoting Benoit v. Missouri Hwy. and Transp. Comm'n,
33 S.W.3d 663, 673 (Mo.App. S.D.2000)). It is clear in the present matter that a finding that
Slavens' operation of his dirt bike on private property exposed him to prosecution under the DWI
statute would lead to an illogical result and would open a Pandora's Box of potential locations
and situations which would subject people to new criminal liability. Under the reading of the
statute urged by the State, every citizen who consumes alcoholic beverages *920 while on a golf
course, then operates a golf cart upon that private property, would be potentially subjected to
DWI sanctions. This goes for every person who imbibes spirits and then mows his own lawn
with a riding lawn mower, as well as people who operate motorized wheelchairs. In fact, the
State in this case agreed that prosecution of an operator of a motorized wheelchair, within the
confines of the operator's home, would be possible if this conviction stands. Such unreasonable
and absurd results cannot have been intended in the drafting of the statute by the legislature.
Also, it is important to note the “DWI statute is a criminal statute, and the rule of strict
construction requires courts to construe criminal statutes strictly against the [S]tate.” Laplante,
148 S.W.3d at 349; Daniel, 103 S.W.3d at 826. “Strict construction does not require courts to
ignore legislative intent, however, and our construction must also embrace common sense and
evident statutory purpose.” Laplante, 148 S.W.3d at 349. Common sense clearly dictates that in
the present matter, Slavens' dirt bike was not a motor vehicle under the DWI statute in that it was
not designed for use on a public roadway or highway and was not being operated on one at the
time of the accident, which resulted in his DWI charge. Such a finding does not improperly add
an additional element to the DWI statute as urged by the State in its brief and at oral argument.
Instead, it more accurately punctuates the purpose and policy of the DWI statute by further
defining the factual scenarios in which criminal liability attaches to public actions.
-- 25 -As such, the application of section 577.010 to the present matter would clearly work an illogical
result as it would be at odds with the legislature's purpose for the statute, it would defy common
sense, and it would newly criminalize a raft of behaviors that occur on private property on any
given day. The term “motor vehicle,” under the facts before the Court in this matter, does not
include the situation where a dirt bike, that was designed for off-road use only and operated on
private property, can be used to subject a defendant to criminal DWI liability. We hold Slavens
cannot be convicted of violating section 577.010 for operating a “non street legal” “dirt bike” on
his own private property. The trial court erroneously declared and applied the law in the present
case in convicting Slavens under section 577.010. Laplante, 148 S.W.3d at 349. Point granted.
The trial court's judgment is reversed.