Apple Valley Neg 1
C1:
Allies dislike NFU:
John R. Harvey, 7-5-2019, "Assessing the Risks of a Nuclear ‘No First Use’ Policy,"
War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/assessing-the-risks-of-anuclear-no-first-use-policy/ //Roy
Japan regularly seeks, both in official consultations and ongoing military cooperation,
assurances that America will continue to fulfill its security commitments to protect the
island nation. Some in South Korea have already pressed to explore an increased U.S.
nuclear presence in their country to further deter regional threats. Loss of confidence in
U.S. security commitments could cause some allies to seek accommodation with
regional adversaries in ways that run counter to U.S. interests. Moreover, both South
Korea and Japan, similar to many NATO allies, have latent nuclear weapons capabilities
characteristic of advanced industrial economies with commercial nuclear power. Any
perceived wavering of U.S. security commitments could cause allies to develop and field
their own nuclear weapons. Further, America’s allies have made their feelings about
America adopting a no-first-use policy known. U.S. officials consulted America’s allies
extensively in the lead up to the 2010 and 2018 nuclear posture reviews. This dialogue
has been rich and productive and, in some ways, surprising in its candor. For example, in
2009, Japanese officials briefed the Perry-Schlesinger Commission, established by
Congress to seek a bipartisan approach to the U.S. nuclear posture, on specific features
and capabilities of the U.S. nuclear deterrent that Japan viewed as critical to its security.
In related dialogue, many foreign counterparts to U.S. officials, including those of Japan,
have urged the United States not to adopt a no-first-use policy.
NFU is historically bad:
Payne Keith., 8-22-2016, "The dangers of no-first-use," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2016/08/the-dangers-of-no-first-use/ //Roy
US allies Japan, South Korea, Great Britain, and France reportedly have recently
informed the Obama administration that a no-first-use policy would be detrimental to
their security.
NFU hurts alliances:
Payne Keith., 8-22-2016, "The dangers of no-first-use," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2016/08/the-dangers-of-no-first-use/ //Roy
no-first-use would also severely shake allied confidence in our security guarantees
When U.S. nuclear guarantees cannot be trusted, nations who face significant
threats have no choice but to develop their own defense:
Raymund Jose, 9-22-2016, "No-first-use: Best to maintain ambiguity," Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/roundtable_entry/no-first-use-bestto-maintain-ambiguity/ //Roy
Declaring a no-first-use policy would also undermine the credibility of the nuclear
umbrella that the United States extends to its partners, and this could lead[ing] allies to
produce nuclear weapons of their own. Japan, if it decides to produce nuclear weapons,
has both the technology and the fissile material to do so easily. South Korea, with its
strong technology base and its large civilian nuclear energy sector, is also eminently
capable
Proliferation is devastating:
Thayer, Bradley A. “The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime.” Security Studies, vol. 4, no. 3, 1995, pp. 463–
519. JSTOR, doi:10.1080/09636419509347592. //Roy
nuclear proliferation increases the risks of nuclear inadvertence, that is, the possibility
that nuclear weapons may be used accidentally, without authorization, or by third
parties,
China’s path to hegemony is disrupting our alliances:
Hal Brands, Jake Sullivan, Foreign Policy, "China Has Two Paths to Global
Domination", May 22nd 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/22/chinasuperpower-two-paths-global-domination-cold-war/ //Roy
[to become] a regional hegemony. This does not mean physically occupying neighboring
countries (with the potential exception of Taiwan), as the Soviet Union did during the
Cold War. But it does mean that Beijing must make itself the dominant player in the
Western Pacific, out to the first island chain (which runs from Japan to Taiwan to the
Philippines) and beyond; it must gain an effective veto over the security and economic
choices of its neighbors; it must rupture America’s alliances in the region and push U.S.
military forces farther and farther away from China’s shores. If China cannot do this, it
will never have a secure regional base from which to project power globally.
Allies turn to China:
Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, "The Trump factor: Asian allies question America’s
reliability | Financial Times", June 14, 2020,
https://www.ft.com/content/74576c3a-6303-4ba0-bbe3-15b563ce6019 //Roy
countries traditionally aligned with the US could drift towards China if they conclude
that Washington neither respects their economic interests nor protects their security.
Chinese hegemony is devastating:
Yeisley Mark, xx-xx-2011, "Full text of "DTIC ADA569650: Bipolarity, Proxy Wars,
and the Rise of China"," No Publication,
https://archive.org/stream/DTIC_ADA569650/DTIC_ADA569650_djvu.txt //Roy
[a] bipolar [world] system wherein nuclear annihilation was possible led to peace
between the great powers, it increase[s] the incidence of subnational proxy conflict via
two complementary mechanisms. It [as proxies] provided the superpowers a means to
achieve geostrategic goals without the risk of nuclear war
C2:
The PLA is becoming more aggressive:
David Lague, 1-17-2013, "Breakout: Inside China's military buildup," Reuters,
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/china-military/ //Roy
increasingly hawkish rhetoric coming from senior officers in the People’s Liberation
Army. At issue these days are the disputed islands known as the Diaoyu (in China) or
Senkaku (in Japan) and a string of islets in the South China that China is contesting with
various Southeast Asian nations. But the combative streak speaks to profound shifts in
Chinese politics and foreign policy that transcend the heat of the moment. The more
provocative of these officers call for “short, sharp wars” to assert China’s territorial
sovereignty. Others urge Beijing to “strike first”, “prepare for conflict” or “kill a chicken
to scare the monkeys”. The Air Force Colonel, Dai Xu, is renowned for his regular calls to
arms. With China in dispute for much of last year with Japan in the East China Sea and
Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea, Dai argued a short, decisive war,
like China’s 1962 border clash with India, would deliver long-term peace. He also said
Washington would not risk war with China over these territorial spats.“Since we have
decided that the U.S. is bluffing in the East China Sea, we should take this opportunity to
respond to these empty provocations with something real,” he wrote in an August 28
commentary published in the Chinese-language edition of the Global Times, a
nationalistic tabloid published by the Communist Party organ, the People’s Daily. “This
includes Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, who are the three running dogs of the
United States in Asia,” added Dai, a researcher at Beijing University’s China Centre for
Strategic Studies. “We only need to kill one, and it will immediately bring the others to
heel.”
Right now, China is acting provocatively and violently:
Jamie Seidel, Oct 11, 2020 , "China’s aggressive move in South China Sea,"
NewsComAu, https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/southchina-sea-chinas-aggressive-move-against-taiwan/newsstory/fdb3833c4a5c801241d673cf64bc190a //Roy
[there is] an undeclared war of attrition designed to run Taiwan’s troops and equipment
into the ground. Taipei says it has spent $1.3 billion scrambling its fighters against the
most intense Chinese aggression in 30 years. Every day for more than two weeks,
China’s combat aircraft have breached Taiwan’s air defence identification zone.
Because Chinese officials have been pushing sharply for the U.S. to adopt NFU,
affirming now sends the signal that not only will Chinese aggression be
tolerated, it will be met with concessions:
Gregory Kulacki, 5-xx-2016, "," Union of Concerned Scientists,
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-withChina.pdf //EZG
Obama administration considered and rejected the possibility of committing the United
States to a no-first-use policy, most of the U.S. par- ticipants in the dialogues view
continued PRC re- quests for this commitment as an obstacle to pro- gress. PRC
participants have responded by suggest- ing an alternative: an assurance from the
United States that it would not seek to negate China’s abil- ity to retaliate with nuclear
weapons if struck first. Some U.S. officials, such as former National Security Advisor
Brent Scowcroft and former Secre- tary of Defense William Perry, appear willing to grant
the PRC this assurance; in their view, it is “not a policy choice to be embraced or
rejected, but rather a strategic fact to be managed with priority on stra- tegic stability”
(CFR 2009). However, some experts express concern that, while true, acknowledging
this fact could undermine extended deterrence guaran- tees the United States has made
to China’s neigh- bors. Other U.S [because]. officials worry that the PRC’s communist
leaders would interpret acquiescence on this point as a sign of appeasement, increasing
the probability of PRC military aggression
U.S. NFU signals reduced commitment to allies:
Ta Minh, 11-10-2016, "US no-first-use: The view from Asia," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/roundtable/us-no-first-use-the-viewfrom-asia/ //Roy
US adoption of a no-first-use policy would likely undermine confidence in Taipei that
Washington would come to its aid in time of need. No-first-use would send a misleading
signal that the United States no longer had the will to stand up to China. The hawkish
Chinese leadership could be emboldened by perceived US weakness to engage in
military adventures in Taiwan.
War would be catastrophic:
David C. Gompert, xx-xx-2014, "," RAND Corporation,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR700/RR768/
RAND_RR768.pdf //EZG
China sensors, submarines, and land-based missiles, they might believe that a sharp but
limited use of force against Vietnam, in this example, would produce no more than a
U.S. rebuke. In a matter more important to China than to the United States and with no
U.S. obligation to act, U.S. aversion toward conflict with China would prevail—or so
Beijing might think. The actual U.S. decision model in this case could be quite different
from that inferred by China. U.S. decisionmakers might conclude that failure to respond
would embolden the Chinese, undermine U.S. credibility in the region, weaken the
resolve of Southeast Asian states to resist Chinese pressure, and set in motion a chain of
incidents leading to virtual Chinese control of the South China Sea. Knowing that it has
military-operational superiority, the United States might decide that this is the right
time and the right place to show that China cannot have its way by threatening or using
force. The lack of a security obligation to Vietnam might enter into U.S. thinking but not
dominate it. U.S. decisionmakers might also believe that the Chinese would not risk
armed conflict with the United States, especially with local military inferiority. Indeed,
they might think that the Chinese would not have dared use force against Vietnam if
they expected the United States to intervene. It follows, according to the U.S. decision
model, that threatening and if need be inserting forces into the conflict in support of
Vietnam would cause China to back down. In sum, it is not hard to imagine that China
and the United States would each assume it has the upper hand in a South China Sea
crisis—China by virtue of having greater will to prevail, and the United States by virtue
of having greater capability to prevail. Given the disparity in capabilities, the Chinese
would be making a blunder that could lead to military defeat and a risk of wider conflict
China-U.S. war goes nuclear:
Caitlin Talmadge, Spring-xx-2017, "Would China Go Nuclear?: Assessing the Risk
of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States"
International Security, MIT Press, https://cpb-use1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/b/1590/files/2018/07/Talmadge-IS-2017y16c9h.pdf //EZG
Chinese fears that the United States might be attempting conventional counterforce, or
considering or preparing for nuclear counterforce, could lead China to engage in limited
nuclear escalation to gain military advantage
Tensions decrease trade volumes:
Quingping Meng, xx-xx-2018, "[PDF] The Impact of Political Tensions on Trade
Flows : A Case Study of China and Its Neighbors," No Publication,
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Impact-of-Political-Tensions-onTrade-Flows-%3A-A-Meng/29c7997eb7502c6df278a3f1ae3fe12b5762b5d7?p2df
//EZG
a 1 per cent rise in the tension[s] score results in a 0.05 per cent decline in trade
volume.
SCS trade is vital:
Clive Schofield, 8-15-2016, "Fishing, not oil, is at the heart of the South China Sea
dispute," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/fishing-not-oil-is-at-theheart-of-the-south-china-sea-dispute-63580 //Roy
the resources really at stake are the fisheries of the South China Sea and the marine
environment that sustains them. For a relatively small (around 3 million square
kilometres) patch of the oceans, the South China Sea delivers an astonishing abundance
of fish. The area is home to at least 3,365 known species of marine fishes, and in 2012,
an estimated 12% of the world’s total fishing catch, worth US$21.8 billion, came from
this region. These living resources are worth more than money; they are fundamental to
the food security of coastal populations numbering in the hundreds of millions.