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Asteroids
Asteroids maybe?
ICBMs are key to asteroid deflection --- only they can do it
Saitgarayev 16
Sabit Saitgarayev, Leading researcher of the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau, “Russia's improved
ballistic missiles to be tested as asteroid killers,” TASS. February 11, 2016.
http://tass.ru/en/science/855968
"Most rockets work on boiling fuel. Their fueling begins 10 days before the launch and, therefore, they
are unfit for destroying meteorites similar to the Chelyabinsk meteorite in diameter, which are detected
several hours before coming close to the Earth. For this purpose, intercontinental ballistic missiles can
be used, which requires their upgrade," the scientist said.
The improved missiles could be used as the killers of the Apophis asteroid, "which will come dangerously
close to the Earth in 2036," he added
Nuclear deflection against asteroids is key --- extinction
Cooper 13 Necia Grant Cooper, Los Alamos National Lab. “Killing Killer Asteroids”
https://www.lanl.gov/science/NSS/pdf/NSS_April_2013.pdf
Whew! We can all temporarily breathe a sigh of relief. However, the likelihood that one day a
killer asteroid will be on a collision course with Earth is very high. Under a 2005
congressional mandate, government-sponsored surveys using ground and space-based
telescopes have discovered 9,500 near-Earth objects; 1,300 of these, are deemed
potentially hazardous. New asteroids and comets can be expected to enter Earth’s
neighborhood as the gravitational pull of passing stars and collisions between asteroids
do their work to alter the orbits of these (mostly) Solar-system residents. Also, we know with
certainty from many fields of study that 63 million years ago, a 6-mile-diameter asteroid collided
with Earth, striking Mexico’s Yucatan peninsula, releasing 10 million megatons of energy,
creating a huge crater, and causing the extinction of the dinosaurs, a major change in
climate, and the beginning of a new geological age. Any near Earth object greater than a
half-mile in diameter can become a deadly threat, potentially causing a mass extinction of
us. Disrupting a Killer Asteroid These facts keep many professional and lay astronomers busy monitoring
the sky. Recognizing the risk, astrophysicists are working on ways to intercept a killer asteroid and
disrupt it in some way that will avert disaster. Los Alamos astrophysicist Robert Weaver is working on
how to protect humanity from a killer asteroid by using a nuclear explosive. Weaver is not worried about
the intercept problem. He would count on the rocket power and operational control already developed
by NASA to intercept a threatening object and deliver the nuclear device. NASA’s Dawn Mission has
been able to place a spacecraft in orbit around Vesta, a huge almost-planet-size asteroid in the asteroid
belt between Mars and Jupiter, and the NASA Deep Impact mission sent a probe into the nucleus of
comet 9P/Tempel. In other words, we have the technology to rendezvous with a killer object
and try to blow it up with a nuclear explosive. But will it work? Weaver’s initial set of
simulations on Los Alamos’ powerful Cielo supercomputer demonstrates the basic physics of how a
nuclear burst would do the job. The simulations suggest that a 1-megaton nuclear blast could
deter a killer asteroid the size of Apophis or somewhat larger. By far the most detailed of Weaver’s
calculations is a 3D computer simulation of a megaton blast on the surface of the potato-shaped
Itokawa asteroid. Visited by Japan’s Hayabusa asteroid lander back in 2005, Itokawa is a conglomerate
of granite rocks, a quarter of a mile long and about half as wide, held together by self-gravity (the
gravitational attraction among its constituents). Weaver used the most modern, sophisticated
Los Alamos codes to predict the progress of a megaton nuclear blast wave from the
point of detonation through the asteroid.
AT: Conventional Solve/Nukes key
Kinetic impactors fail for sufficiently large asteroids---nukes are key
Plait, 19 – Astronomer, author, and head science writer for Bill Nye
Phil Plait, “WHACK 'EM OR NUKE 'EM: HOW TO DEFLECT A KILLER ASTEROID,” SYFY. November 20, 2019.
https://www.syfy.com/syfywire/whack-em-or-nuke-em-how-to-deflect-a-killer-asteroid
A new paper just published by scientists from various NASA and the National Nuclear Security
Administration labs looks at the best way to prevent an impact from an asteroid headed toward Earth.
Their conclusion: Above a certain size, roughly 300 meters across or so, the best thing to do is nuke it.
Seriously! But not for the reason you think.
In (really terrible) movies and such, a nuclear weapon is planted onto an incoming asteroid, and the rock
is blown to smithereens. But this won't work! For one thing, you can't be sure what will happen with the
pieces. Instead of one big asteroid headed toward you, now you might have hundreds of slightly smaller
ones. Radioactive ones.
What you really want to do is have what's called a standoff detonation. You blow up the bomb at some
distance from the asteroid (generally 50–1,000 meters away from the surface). The goal isn't to shatter
it, but to heat it. A lot.
Even then, this isn't what you think! There's a thermal pulse from the bomb, a flash of heat, but that's
not the main way this works. Instead, the bomb generates a huge pulse of high-energy X-rays. These
penetrate the surface and are absorbed by the material there.
A model of asteroid deflection tests how one like the 500-meter wide Bennu would react to a 1megaton nuclear weapon (black dot) detonated just off the surface. Red areas vaporize and push the
asteroid off-course, other colors are where material is heated but not vaporized. Credit: LLNL
The pulse is so big that a lot of energy is deposited into the asteroid — like, a lot a lot — which vaporizes
the material. This happens so quickly (a fraction of a millisecond!) that the material expands violently.
You get a very large amount of gas expanding extremely rapidly… which is pretty much the description
of how a rocket works. This expanding gas pushes on the asteroid, creating a force that changes its
velocity a little bit. And by that I mean the scientific definition of velocity: Not just the speed but the
direction, too.
That's exactly what you want! Over time, even a small change in speed can cause the asteroid to miss
Earth. The amount of deflection depends on a lot of factors: The mass of the asteroid, its shape and size,
the material on the surface, the porosity of that material, its structural strength, the type of bomb, the
explosive yield of the bomb, and the standoff distance of the explosion. In fact that's what this research
was trying to figure out, how all those factors play into the amount of deflection.
They used extremely sophisticated computer models that take into account all these physical factors to
see how efficient the explosive mechanism is in moving a threatening asteroid. As a test subject they
chose Bennu, a 500-meter wide rocky rubble pile that is currently being scrutinized by NASA's OSIRISREx mission. The reason for this is that we have a lot of good numbers for it, including its shape, density,
and so on, but also because as the mission goes on we'll get even better numbers for it. It's a sample-
return mission, too, so scientists will be able to find the exact composition of the surface material, aiding
further models.
What they found is that surface vaporization via nuke works pretty well for an asteroid like Bennu,
giving a deflection of about 6 centimeters per second. That's not much — a housefly can outpace that —
but with a lead time of 13 years that'll do. In other words, if we have at least that long before impact, a
standoff nuclear detonation is sufficient to deflect it.
It gets better. Although they couldn't model this in detail, they note that the rapidly expanding
vaporized material will create a pretty big pressure wave, compressing the solid material below it. This is
similar to what happens, ironically, in an asteroid impact! This compression carves a crater into the
asteroid surface, and that material gets ejected too. This adds an extra kick, deflecting the asteroid even
more. They estimate that for asteroids like Bennu this can reduce the needed lead time to only 3 – 4
years. That's pretty good news.
They compare this to a kinetic impactor, literally slamming the asteroid as hard as you can with a rocket.
This will also change the speed and direction, like someone on the defensive team in American football
hitting the quarterback. They find that this works well up to an asteroid size of 300 meters, but bigger
than that and a nuke is more efficient.
There's still a lot of modeling to be done — while they ran through several physical parameters, there's
still a lot we don't know about asteroids. And there are issues with this method, including the Outer
Space Treaty, which specifically forbids detonating nuclear weapons in space. Now, if a 500-meter wide
asteroid has Earth in its crosshairs, I suspect the UN might be amenable to loosening that part of the
treaty for that specific case! But the politics of all this isn't something we can ignore, either. I wonder
how the public would react to this?
And it's more complicated than that. What if there's, say, a 20% chance it'll hit in 10 years? Those aren't
convincingly high odds, but are they high enough to risk launching a megaton-class nuclear weapon into
space? What if the detonation works, but instead of missing the Earth it just moves the impact site to a
different country? These are just examples, but I can easily imagine the actual situation being a lot
murkier than in the movies.
Maybe by the time we see a big enough asteroid to be threat heading our way, we'll have a bigger
presence in space, and there will be other opportunities to push it away. But for now that's not the case,
and love 'em or loathe 'em, the least we can do is investigate the possibility of different methods,
including using nuclear weapons. I hope it won't come to that, but if it does, we may all be glad for
research like this.
Nuke deflection is key to prevent asteroids
NASA 2007 , report to congress, “Near-Earth Object Survey and Deflection Analysis of Alternatives”,
March 2007 http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/171331main_NEO_report_march07.pdf
***PHOs = Potentially Hazardous Objects
In the impulsive category, the use of a
nuclear device was found to be the most effective means to deflect a PHO.
Because of the large amount of energy delivered, nuclear devices would require the least amount of
detailed information about the threatening object, reducing the need for detailed characterization. While
detonation of a nuclear device on or below the surface of a threatening object was found to be 10-100 times more efficient than detonating a
nuclear device above the surface, the standoff detonation would be less likely to fragment the target. A
nuclear standoff mission
could be designed knowing only the orbit and approximate mass of the threat, and missions could be
carried out incrementally to reach the required amount of deflection. Additional information about the
object’s mass and physical properties would perhaps increase the effectiveness, but likely would not be required to
accomplish the goal. It should be noted that because of restrictions found in Article IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, use of a nuclear device would
likely require prior international coordination. The study team also examined conventional
explosives, but found they were
ineffective against most threats.
Nuke Standoff solves and avoids fragmentation
Duncan Steel, Professor in Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at University of
Michigan Rogue Asteroids and Doomsday Comets: The Search for the Million Megaton Menace That
Threatens Life on Earth, 1995 p. 230
The preferred option of Ahrens and Harris is the third one. By
exploding a nuclear weapon about 0.4 times the diameter of an
object above its surface (that is, at 400 meters' altitude for a 1-kilometer asteroid; 4 kilometers for a 10-kilometer one) about 30% of its
surface would be bathed in the radiation from the explosion. In particular, the high neutron flux from a nuclear weapon would be absorbed in
the top 20 centimeters or so of the asteroid's surface layer. The
sudden heating of this surface layer would lead to its
being blown off at above the escape speed. The recoil force would be ample to induce the required
velocity change in the remnant, and because the force is spread over such a wide area, there would be
little chance of producing a major fragmentation. Other advantages of this method include the fact that less detailed
knowledge of the object's composition, topography, center of mass, and rotation state is required. Ahrens and Harris found that the required
explosive power ranges from about 100 kilotons for a 1-kilometer asteroid to 10 megatons for a 10-kilometer body, which is attainable using
present technologies, although radiation-efficient weapons are desirable. The "above-surface neutron irradiation" option seems to be the
appropriate one.
Nukes are key to large asteroids—there’s little risk of fragmentation
Mark Bucknam and Robert Gold “Asteroid Threat? The Problem of Planetary Defence” October 2008
Survival http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713659919
For objects larger than 1km, only nuclear explosions could deliver enough of a push to achieve the
necessary change in velocity, especially if little time were available to effect the needed change.
However, nuclear explosions and kinetic impactors risk breaking up a PHO, potentially making it more difficult to deal with. Because standoff nuclear explosions would reduce the chances of fragmenting the object, they would be, generally speaking,
preferable to nuclear blasts on or below the surface of a PHO. This benefit of using stand-off explosions would be purchased at the cost of a 10to 100-fold reduction in the energy imparted to the object by a given explosion. Thus, multiple stand-off explosions might be needed to achieve
the necessary change in PHO velocity. In extremis, attempting to fragment a PHO with a nuclear explosion might be the best available option –
perhaps mitigating the inevitable catastrophe without preventing it.
ICBMs Key
ICBMs are key to asteroid deflection --- only they can do it
Saitgarayev 16
Sabit Saitgarayev, Leading researcher of the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau, “Russia's improved
ballistic missiles to be tested as asteroid killers,” TASS. February 11, 2016.
http://tass.ru/en/science/855968
"Most rockets work on boiling fuel. Their fueling begins 10 days before the launch and, therefore, they
are unfit for destroying meteorites similar to the Chelyabinsk meteorite in diameter, which are detected
several hours before coming close to the Earth. For this purpose, intercontinental ballistic missiles can
be used, which requires their upgrade," the scientist said.
The improved missiles could be used as the killers of the Apophis asteroid, "which will come dangerously
close to the Earth in 2036," he added
ICBMs are key because of speed and fueling --- it solves the case by committing to only
a peaceful use of nukes
Walker 16
Robert Walker, Space technology writer, holds a first-class honors degree in Math from York University
and a master’s from York University, "How expensive would it be to convert all of the US's ICBMs into
Space Rocket Transportation to places like the Moon or even Mars?", https://www.quora.com/Howexpensive-would-it-be-to-convert-all-of-the-USs-ICBMs-into-Space-Rocket-Transportation-to-places-likethe-Moon-or-even-Mars
USE OF ICBMS FOR SMALL ASTEROID DESTRUCTION
Note that one Russian researcher has proposed an idea to use modified ICBMs as a last minute defense
against smaller asteroids. The big advantage for this is that they use solid fuel and are designed so that
they can be launched at a moment’s notice, unlike conventional rockets. If you had only a day or two, or
a few hours warning, you couldn’t even launch a conventional rocket in time, but could launch an ICBM
easily. However to blow up even a 50 meter diameter rock, I think they have nuclear detonations in
mind.
It could be a reason to develop or retain nuclear weapons in a peaceful civilization that would never
think to use them against its own citizens. Maybe many ETIs do have nuclear weapons for defense of
their planets. But not so sure it is a good idea for Earth. I don’t think it is strictly speaking against the
Outer Space Treaty myself, as what makes it a weapon of mass destruction is if it is intended for killing
humans in large numbers. If the only intent is to destroy an asteroid to save humans - is that a “weapon
of mass destruction”? It seems rather a “weapon for prevention of mass destruction” so long as it is
used as intended. And it wouldn’t be stationed in space, only launched at need.
Anyway this is the idea here: Russia Wants to Turn Old Missiles Into an Asteroid Defense System
The smallest nuclear weapon the US has acknowledged existed weighed only 23 kg and had up to 1
kiloton yield. So given that the Dneper can take 550 kg to the Moon, does seem you could probably get
ten 1 kiiloton nuclear weaons to an incoming asteroid on eacha ballistic missile. Special Atomic
Demolition Munition
They didn’t actually say that they planned to use nuclear weapons, and ICBMS converted to use
conventional explosives would be much less controversial. More speculations about the idea here Russia
to modify Cold War missiles to destroy asteroids
Only they can fire at a moment’s notice
Rogoway 16
Tyler Rogoway, Writer for Fox Trot Alpha, “Russians Want To Launch An ICBM At A Near-Earth Asteroid
And Nuke It In 2036,” February 12, 2016. https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/russians-want-to-launch-anicbm-at-a-near-earth-asteroi-1758697417
Basically he’s saying that solid-fueled ICBMs, designed to be launched at a moment’s notice in order to
send a pack of nuclear warheads across the globe, are much better suited for dealing with “surprise
asteroids” that pose a threat to mankind.
AT: Asteroids Re-Form
Their study is garbage
Andrews 19 [Robin George Andrews is a doctor of experimental volcanology, a full-time freelance
science journalist, a part-time photographer, a scientific consultant, an occasional lecturer, and public
speaker. MSci in geology, PhD.] “If We Blow Up an Asteroid, It Might Put Itself Back Together.” NY
Times. March 8, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/science/asteroids-nuclear-weapons.html
TG
The study has limitations. Both asteroids are modeled as simple, nonrotating chunks of rock, whereas
real asteroids are far more variable. In addition, the larger asteroid, despite featuring a starting
collection of cracks, did not have a history of multiple impacts as true asteroids would. A large space
rock smashing into a humongous space rock also differs from a missile onslaught, or an atomic bomb
exploding on or beneath an asteroid’s surface while a popular rock band plays.
AT: Bombers/Subs Solve
Bombers don’t solve --- they can’t fly up high enough into space to drop bombs on a
moving target
Subs don’t solve --They are low-yield
Miya 17
Eugene Miya, Former Aerospace Technologist at NASA, “Does the US have nuclear submarines in range
to hit Russia/Moscow?”, https://www.quora.com/Does-the-US-have-nuclear-submarines-in-range-tohit-Russia-Moscow
While the SLBMs have range, most of their yields are lower and better for soft targets whereas Moscow
likely has hardened underground targets, so I would tend to doubt that SLBMs were ever pointed at
Moscow except as a last resort. That’s all planner decisions, and I suspect they are vastly more arbitrary
than most people realize (like the original overkill factor was something like 60).
Only huge, high-yield nukes can deflect asteroids
Peebles 16
Curtis Peebles, Aerospace historian for the Smithsonian Institution, a researcher and historian for the
Dryden Flight Research Center, and the author of several books dealing with aviation and aerial
phenomena, “Asteroids: A History”, Google Books, 2016.
Several possible mission profiles were examined by the students, including a soft landing of a rocket on
Icarus that would change its orbit so it would miss Earth, implanting a nuclear weapon below the surface
of the asteroid to deflect it or break it up, disintegrating it with a high-speed nuclear-armed interceptor,
or using a high-speed interceptor to explode a nuclear weapon close to its surface to change the
asteroid's orbit. Ideally, any attempt to change the orbit of an asteroid should be made when it is
farthest from the Sun, at its aphelion, where the asteroid's speed is lowest. A small velocity change
(called Delta V) would result in a major change in the orbit. The conditions of the study put the aphelion
out of reach. To reach Icarus at its November 1967 aphelion, the launch would have to take place in
February 1967, i.e., a few weeks after the class started. A flyby mission could be launched as late as
October 1967, but even that was ruled out by time constraints. Thus, any defense of Earth would have
to be by a nuclear-armed, high-speed interceptor. The question then became whether to try to destroy
Icarus or to deflect its orbit. The best guess was that Icarus was between 2,600 and 5,000 feet in
diameter, with the most probable value being 4,200 feet. The mass estimates ranged between 380
million tons and 17 billion tons, depending on whether it was made of comet material or nickel-iron. The
most probable mass was 4.4 billion tons, based on the belief that it was similar to a stony meteor.
Destroying an asteroid of that size and mass was impractical, as the crater depth had to equal the
asteroid's diameter. This would require a nuclear weapon with a yield of 1 billion tons of TNT, far
beyond the state of the art of weapon design and the capability of any possible rocket to carry it.
Distributing the total yield among several nuclear weapons was ruled out by the timing of the
detonations; the first weapon to detonate would destroy the others before they were triggered. The
deflection profile had its own stringent demands, however. The farther from Earth the deflection was
made, the less Delta V was required. At a range of 20 million miles, a Delta V of about 20 feet per second
was required to cause a total deflection of 4,000 miles (one Earth radius). By the time Icarus was within
5 million miles of Earth, the figure had climbed to 100 feet per second. At a range of 2.5 million miles,
the Delta V would be 400 feet per second. Given the mass of Icarus, a very high yield nuclear weapon
was still required to provide the needed Delta V. The study assumed a 100-megaton weapon would be
carried by the interceptor. The only booster capable of carrying such a payload was the Saturn V. The
students looked at various advanced versions of the Saturn V, including launching two boosters and
docking the two S-N stages in orbit, as well as a Saturn V with a Centaur upper stage. These could
provide the maximum payload, but the short development time ruled them out.
A2: circumvention
1] no warrant - our counterplan text is very specific – countries will have barely any
nukes left since almost all ICBMs will be eliminated, the IAEA will monitor countries,
and even if countries wanted to use their nukes for other things they all are required
to ratify a nuclear no first use policy so there’s zero chance for a nuke war
2] fiat solves – they’re in a double bind – either fiat is real and the aff plan and neg
counterplan are implemented or fiat isn’t real and you vote neg on presumption since
the aff plan doesn’t pass and the aff does nothing
A2: other countries solve
1] the net benefit of the DA outweighs – every country must be alert for asteroids due
the extreme magnitude of one hitting us
2] this is a defensive argument – there’s no downside to India and Pakistan having
nukes to destroy asteroids and due to the specificity of the counterplan there’s no risk
of the aff advantage
AT: Weaponization Concerns
Existing hotlines solve weaponization concerns---empirics confirm they work
Gerrard and Barber, 97 – Gerrard is member of the adjunct faculties of Columbia Law School and
the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies. Barber is an associate in the New York office of
Arnold & Porter and was a Submissions Editor of the Yale Journal of Regulation.
Michael G. Gerrard and Ann W. Barger, “ASTEROIDS AND COMETS: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE LOWEST-PROBABILITY, HIGHEST I CONSEQUENCE RISK”, New York University Environmental Law
Journal, 6(1), 4-49, 1997. https://heinonlineorg.libproxy.berkeley.edu/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/nyuev6&id=12&men_ta
b=srchresults)
The second and third critical decision points arise when an Earth-bound NEO is discovered. Again, if time
allows, international consensus is preferable to unilateral action. The U.N, Security Council, given the
mandate of settling disputes between nations in the case of "dispute[s] ... likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security," 191 should be involved if the use of weapons of mass
destruction is contemplated. If there is very little advance warning, a nation may have to respond
without more than perfunctory consultation with other nations, perhaps through the Security Council.
The "hot line" system for communicating in the event of an accidental launch or other emergency could
be used for this purpose. After the Cuban missile crisis, Moscow and Washington established the hot
line to guard against miscommunication in stressful circumstances and reduce the risk of a nuclear
attack premised on misinformation. The original telegraph and radio links provided 24- hour
communication ports between the two capitals. The agreement was revised in 1971 to provide for more
reliable satellite links instead. Other safeguards such as the Nuclear Accidents Agreement of 1971192
and the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement of 1973193 clarified procedures in case of emergencies
or misunderstandings.
The hot line has been used several times, mainly during military crises such as the Arab-Israeli wars of
1967 and 1971, the 1971 Pakistan-India war, and the 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. 94 In
1987, the two superpowers took the step of establishing Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in each
country, which would serve to notify the other in the case of accidental missile deployment. A system
structured like the former U.S.- Soviet system, especially if it were expanded to include the other
members of the U.N. Security Council, which would facilitate contact with any other nation in the event
a NEO were headed in its direction, would be sufficient to handle the exceedingly unlikely
planetary defense emergency.
Weaponization of NEO tech also isn’t a threat to other countries – other forms of
weaponization actually exist
Wall 11 - Ph.D. in evolutionary biology from the University of Sydney, Australia, a
bachelor's degree from the University of Arizona, and a graduate certificate in science
writing from the University of California, Santa Cruz. His book about the search for alien
life, "Out There," was published on Nov. 13, 2018.
Mike Wall, “Why Asteroids Make Lousy Space Weapons”, Space.com, 11/13/11,
https://www.space.com/13515-asteroid-deflection-space-weapons.html
If you lie awake at night worrying about some supervillain steering giant asteroids toward your
hometown, you really should relax, experts say. It's not going to happen anytime soon. Humanity does
indeed have the technical skills to move space rocks around, and we may employ this know-how at
some point to avoid a catastrophic impact like the one that killed the dinosaurs 65 million years ago. But
the odds of any rogue state using asteroids to rain death down on its enemies are minuscule, experts
say. Advertisement "It's a lousy weapon," said former astronaut Rusty Schweickart, chairman of the
B612 Foundation, a group dedicated to predicting and preventing cataclysmic asteroid impacts on Earth.
"You get a chance to use one once every several hundred years," Schweickart said during a recent panel
discussion called "Moving an Asteroid" at the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena. "And even
then, you can only deflect it to hit someplace along a sort of arbitrary line across the Earth." [Top 10
Space Weapons] Serious spaceflight skills Changing the orbit of a massive asteroid hurtling through deep
space sounds like a daunting task, but our species knows how to do it. For example, we could launch a
spacecraft that would rendezvous with an asteroid, then travel alongside it for months or years. Over
time, the probe's modest gravity would tug on the space rock, pulling it into a different orbit,
Schweickart said. Given enough time to act, this so-called "gravity tractor" method could work in quite
precise and predictable ways. And we've demonstrated the skills necessary to make it happen. Multiple
missions have met up with asteroids in deep space. For example, NASA's Dawn spacecraft is currently in
orbit around Vesta, the second-largest object in the main asteroid belt between Mars and Jupiter. And
in 2005, Japan's Hayabusa probe rendezvoused with a space rock called Itokawa. The craft even scraped
some samples off Itokawa and sent them back to Earth for analysis. It's a good thing we possess these
potential asteroid-moving skills, Schweickart said, for they may save our bacon someday. Earth has been
pummeled by many dangerous asteroids throughout its history, and there's no reason to think the
barrage will stop in the future. Space rocks big enough to cause major damage and disruption to the
global economy and society (were they to strike a populated area today) have hit Earth, on average,
every 200 or 300 years, Schweickart said. An artist's impression of a giant space rock slamming into
Earth 65 million years ago near what is now Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula. A consortium of scientists now
says this was indeed what caused the end of the Age of Dinosaurs. An artist's impression of a giant space
rock slamming into Earth 65 million years ago near what is now Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula. A
consortium of scientists now says this was indeed what caused the end of the Age of Dinosaurs.(Image
credit: NASA/Donald E. Davis) Firing a weapon once every 300 years That bombardment rate is scarily
frequent to anyone worried about the long-term survival of human civilization. But it's not nearly
frequent enough to make asteroids good weapons of mass destruction, according to Schweickart. [5
Reasons to Care About Asteroids] "You're going to have an opportunity once every two or three
hundred years to go up and have a weapon to hit Baghdad," Schweickart said. "Of course, the problem is
that by that time, the Zambian space program is the world's premier space program, and Baghdad is a
buddy of yours." Potential asteroid wranglers also wouldn't be able to direct a space rock just anywhere
on Earth, he added. For the foreseeable future, we'll be able only to speed up or slow down an asteroid,
moving it in an "east-west" direction along its trajectory. Moving it in the "north-south" plane is not an
option. "If you do anything other than speed up or slow down the asteroid, it has almost no effect,"
Schweickart said. "You've got to go along that line; it's the only way physics lets you do it." So anyone
wishing to asteroid-bomb the United States would have to manipulate a space rock whose trajectory
already crossed American territory. The trick would be tweaking its velocity enough to ensure an impact
on American soil. In practice, therefore, the wait for a suitable asteroid weapon could be considerably
longer than 200 or 300 years. Protecting Earth Schweickart and other panelists argued that humanity
will need to deflect a killer asteroid away from Earth someday. It would be a shame, they said, if
unfounded fears about possible nefarious uses of asteroid-moving technology impeded its development.
"The public perception of asteroids can be pretty scary," Schweickart said. "There's going to be a lot of
scare stuff. It's already out there, it's going to get worse and that is going to be a very serious challenge
that we on the technical side will have to deal with." People worried about death from above should
focus their anxiety elsewhere, fellow panelist Bill Nye said. There are plenty of much more viable space
weapons than asteroids already up there. "Space is already pretty weaponized," said Nye, executive
director of the Planetary Society and former host of the science-themed TV show "Bill Nye the Science
Guy." "The global positioning system that we all know and love was designed to guide weapons. So using
an asteroid as a weapon is sort of coming late to the party." You can follow SPACE.com senior writer
Mike Wall on Twitter: @michaeldwall. Follow SPACE.com for the latest in space science and exploration
news on Twitter @Spacedotcom and on Facebook.
Verification checks
Rosenbaum and Donovan 19 – Eric Rosenbaum is an editor for CNBC.com and Donovan Russo is a
Strategic Content intern and former Assignment Desk intern for CNBC. In addition to CNBC, his work has
been published in NBC News, Yahoo Finance.
(Eric Rosenbaum, Donovan Russo, 3-17-2019, “China plans a solar power play in space that NASA
abandoned decades ago,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/15/china-plans-a-solar-power-play-inspace-that-nasa-abandoned-long-ago.html)
One of the concerns that has dogged the concept is the idea that these projects are really clandestine
efforts to develop a space-based laser cannon. Mankins said those fears are based in real physics, but
not supported by the reality of military equipment monitoring by the world’s powers. High frequency
lasers could be concentrated to serve as a weapon, but any equipment with that purpose would be
obvious in its construction, and that is construction that is easily monitored from the earth. “If you look
at armored vehicles with machine guns versus a Ford F150 pickup, the difference would be discernible
from the ground, even if there are some similarities,” Mankins said. “You would see something that
looked like a Hubble telescope.”
The US launches satellites that are WAY more offensive all the time
Foust 19 -- Jeff Foust writes about space policy, commercial space, and related topics for SpaceNews. He
earned a Ph.D. in planetary sciences from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a bachelor’s
degree with honors in geophysics and planetary science from the California Institute of Technology.
(Jeff Foust, "Rocket Lab launches three U.S. military satellites," SpaceNews, 5-5-2019,
https://spacenews.com/rocket-lab-launches-three-u-s-military-satellites/)
A Rocket Lab Electron rocket successfully launched three technology demonstration satellites for the
Defense Department May 5 as part of an effort by the military to demonstrate responsive launch.
The Electron rocket lifted off at 2:00 a.m. Eastern from Rocket Lab’s launch site on the Mahia Peninsula
of New Zealand’s North Island. The launch was delayed a day in order to perform additional checks of
the vehicle’s payload of three satellites. Those satellites were released by the rocket’s kick stage nearly
55 minutes after liftoff.
“Perfect flight, complete mission success, all payloads deployed!!” Peter Beck, chief executive of Rocket
Lab, tweeted shortly after payload deployment.
The rocket was flying a mission for the Defense Department’s Space Test Program called STP-27RD, in
cooperation with the Defense Innovation Unit. The three satellites had a combined mass of 180
kilograms, the heaviest payload launched by an Electron to date. The company said that conservative
margins for earlier missions, as well as launching to a lower inclination, enabled the heavier payload.
The largest of the three satellites is Harbinger, a 150-kilogram satellite built by York Space Systems for
the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command. The spacecraft will demonstrate synthetic aperture
radar imaging capability and high-bandwidth downlink capabilities in a small satellite. The satellite is the
first one built by York, a Denver-based smallsat manufacturer, to reach orbit.
Also on the launch is Space Plug and Play Architecture Research CubeSat-1 (SPARC-1), a six-unit cubesat
sponsored by the Air Force Research Laboratory in cooperation with the Swedish military to test
modular spacecraft avionics. The third satellite is the Air Force Academy’s Falcon Orbital Debris
Experiment (Falcon ODE), a one-unit cubesat that will release two stainless steel ball bearings that will
serve as calibrated radar and optical targets for ground-based space situational awareness sensors.
The launch is the first for the Air Force’s Rapid Agile Launch Initiative (RALI) program, an effort to make
use of commercial launch providers and rapid procurement to provide faster access to orbit for military
payloads. Air Force officials said last month they are planning to launch 21 payloads on five missions this
calendar year through RALI, including the STP-27RD flight as well as a launch later this year by Virgin
Orbit’s LauncherOne.
The STP-27RD launch, nicknamed “That’s a Funny Looking Cactus,” was the second Electron mission this
year and the sixth overall for Rocket Lab. Beck said in an interview last month that the company is
planning to move into a monthly cadence of launches for the rest of this year, including demonstrating
the ability to perform launches two weeks apart by the end of the year. He added that the company’s
2019 manifest is full.
AT: Weaponization – Deflect At Enemies
This isn’t a thing – the weapon comes across every few hundred years, isn’t reliable,
and can ONLY be moved east-west which makes it extremely unlikely to ever be useful
Wall ’11 - Ph.D. in evolutionary biology from the University of Sydney, Australia
Mike Wall, “Why Asteroids Make Lousy Space Weapons,” Space.com, November 4, 2011,
https://www.space.com/13515-asteroid-deflection-space-weapons.html.
If you lie awake at night worrying about some supervillain steering giant asteroids toward your
hometown, you really should relax, experts say. It's not going to happen anytime soon.
Humanity does indeed have the technical skills to move space rocks around, and we may employ this
know-how at some point to avoid a catastrophic impact like the one that killed the dinosaurs 65 million
years ago. But the odds of any rogue state using asteroids to rain death down on its enemies are
minuscule, experts say.
"It's a lousy weapon," said former astronaut Rusty Schweickart, chairman of the B612 Foundation, a
group dedicated to predicting and preventing cataclysmic asteroid impacts on Earth.
"You get a chance to use one once every several hundred years," Schweickart said during a recent panel
discussion called "Moving an Asteroid" at the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena. "And even
then, you can only deflect it to hit someplace along a sort of arbitrary line across the Earth." [Top 10
Space Weapons]
Serious spaceflight skills
Changing the orbit of a massive asteroid hurtling through deep space sounds like a daunting task, but
our species knows how to do it.
For example, we could launch a spacecraft that would rendezvous with an asteroid, then travel
alongside it for months or years. Over time, the probe's modest gravity would tug on the space rock,
pulling it into a different orbit, Schweickart said.
Given enough time to act, this so-called "gravity tractor" method could work in quite precise and
predictable ways. And we've demonstrated the skills necessary to make it happen.
Multiple missions have met up with asteroids in deep space. For example, NASA's Dawn spacecraft is
currently in orbit around Vesta, the second-largest object in the main asteroid belt between Mars and
Jupiter.
And in 2005, Japan's Hayabusa probe rendezvoused with a space rock called Itokawa. The craft even
scraped some samples off Itokawa and sent them back to Earth for analysis.
It's a good thing we possess these potential asteroid-moving skills, Schweickart said, for they may save
our bacon someday.
Earth has been pummeled by many dangerous asteroids throughout its history, and there's no reason to
think the barrage will stop in the future. Space rocks big enough to cause major damage and disruption
to the global economy and society (were they to strike a populated area today) have hit Earth, on
average, every 200 or 300 years, Schweickart said.
Firing a weapon once every 300 years
That bombardment rate is scarily frequent to anyone worried about the long-term survival of human
civilization. But it's not nearly frequent enough to make asteroids good weapons of mass destruction,
according to Schweickart. [5 Reasons to Care About Asteroids]
"You're going to have an opportunity once every two or three hundred years to go up and have a
weapon to hit Baghdad," Schweickart said. "Of course, the problem is that by that time, the Zambian
space program is the world's premier space program, and Baghdad is a buddy of yours."
Potential asteroid wranglers also wouldn't be able to direct a space rock just anywhere on Earth, he
added. For the foreseeable future, we'll be able only to speed up or slow down an asteroid, moving it in
an "east-west" direction along its trajectory. Moving it in the "north-south" plane is not an option.
"If you do anything other than speed up or slow down the asteroid, it has almost no effect," Schweickart
said. "You've got to go along that line; it's the only way physics lets you do it."
So anyone wishing to asteroid-bomb the United States would have to manipulate a space rock whose
trajectory already crossed American territory. The trick would be tweaking its velocity enough to ensure
an impact on American soil.
In practice, therefore, the wait for a suitable asteroid weapon could be considerably longer than 200 or
300 years.
Protecting Earth
Schweickart and other panelists argued that humanity will need to deflect a killer asteroid away from
Earth someday. It would be a shame, they said, if unfounded fears about possible nefarious uses of
asteroid-moving technology impeded its development.
"The public perception of asteroids can be pretty scary," Schweickart said. "There's going to be a lot of
scare stuff. It's already out there, it's going to get worse and that is going to be a very serious challenge
that we on the technical side will have to deal with."
People worried about death from above should focus their anxiety elsewhere, fellow panelist Bill Nye
said. There are plenty of much more viable space weapons than asteroids already up there.
"Space is already pretty weaponized," said Nye, executive director of the Planetary Society and former
host of the science-themed TV show "Bill Nye the Science Guy." "The global positioning system that we
all know and love was designed to guide weapons. So using an asteroid as a weapon is sort of coming
late to the party."
Only a risk the plan can make deflection effective and safe – tech advancements and
verification prevent weaponization
Drmola ’15 – PhD in Political Science at Masaryk University
Jakub Drmola and Miroslav Mareš is professor at the Divison of Security and Strategic Studies, Masaryk
University, Czech Republic., “Revisiting the Deflection Dilemma,” Astronomy & Geophysics 56, no. 5
(October 1, 2015): 5.15-5.18, https://doi.org/10.1093/astrogeo/atv167.
Policy implications
Considering these possible future dangers, it seems prudent to consider what to do about them sooner
rather than later. The most obvious “solution” would be a blanket ban on the development of any
technology that might lead to artificially inflected asteroids crashing into the Earth. However, such a ban
would be incompatible with the dream of increased presence of humans in the solar system. It would
stymie both scientific exploration and economic development here on Earth, which is increasingly
dependent on precious metals and spacebased technologies. Furthermore, this approach would leave us
more vulnerable to natural impacts which, in the long view, seems less than desirable.
Another approach might be similar to the current regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,
aiming to support peaceful civilian use of nuclear power while at the same time prohibiting the spread
of weapons of mass destruction. The regime mostly works (with caveats, see Wood et al. 2008) because
these applications require different infrastructures and fissile materials enriched to different levels of
purity. This makes it possible, at least in principle, to tell apart operations meant for the production of
electricity and those designed to create weapons. Unfortunately, the difference between legitimate and
hostile trajectory modification would lie only in the acceleration imparted on the asteroid and not in the
technical means to do it. As the spacecraft launched with the intent to cause impact with the Earth
might be identical to those sent off to retrieve resources, telling them apart would be nearly impossible,
until it was too late. And this approach makes no difference to the chances of an industrial accident.
If monitoring equipment on Earth is unhelpful, the focus changes to space. In other words, all asteroid
movement missions should be constantly monitored. For an attacker, it would make most sense to delay
the final course adjustment for as long as possible in order to give the least warning and make the
timeframe for reaction as short as possible. So an asteroid might head towards a safe orbit fit for
resource extraction for most of its altered flight time, but be further accelerated at the last possible
moment onto an impact trajectory, perhaps mere days before it hits a major city.
Our current programmes cataloguing NEOs (such as CSS or Pan-STARRS), which look for new, previously
unknown objects, are not ideally suited for the task of constantly tracking a number of different, already
known asteroids. New instruments would be needed to track them in order to immediately detect any
hazardous inflection, whether intentional or accidental. Once such a detection is made, emergency
measures to evacuate the population or, preferably, to “re-deflect” the incoming object can be executed
right away, regardless of the cause. Accidents and hostilities could be treated the same way and
countered by the same system (initially, at least). Such a system would be more akin to an air traffic
control than a non-proliferation regulation, offering security through vigilance, rather than absence.
Additionally, development of a system able to deflect incoming objects at relatively short notice would
be beneficial in case of an impending natural impact.
Legitimately, why the heck would any military actually want to do this?
Friend ’11 – staff writer at the New Yorker
Tad Friend, “Vermin of the Sky,” February 21, 2011,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/02/28/vermin-of-the-sky.
Deflection methods are freighted with symbolism: anything that smacks of nuclear vigilantism, or Bondvillain-style laser gizmology, could suggest that we’re militarizing space. Alarmists have even suggested
that the U.S. might seek to divert an asteroid just enough that it lands on our enemies. However, a
military figure familiar with the issue scoffs, “There are so many ways to kill people that precisionplowing an asteroid would be a preposterous way to spend money.” Also, few generals would be willing
to wait decades or even centuries for the necessary asteroid to come along.
AT: Nuking Bad
The best and most qualified studies prove – Livermore Labs agrees
Syal et. al 13
Megan, M.S in Geological Science from Brown University, David Dearborn, PhD, Physicist @ Livermore
National Labs, 1998 Shelby Fellow of the Australian Academy of Science, and has received two Pollock
awards for work in astronomy, has held positions at the Copernicus Institute in Warsaw, the Institute of
Astronomy in Cambridge, The California Institute of Technology, and Steward Observatory in Tucson,
and Peter Schultz, PhD, Professor of Planetary Geoscience @ Brown, “Limits on the use of nuclear
explosives for asteroid deflection”,
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/dffd/703e8a4a3ba6acec5c299a504efd22df7d4e.pdf
Conclusions Nuclear explosives comprise the only present technology capable of deflecting the most
catastrophic threats (4500 m) with a sufficient change in velocity to avert disaster. In the case of smaller
bodies, if alternate methods fail or the warning time is too short, the nuclear option provides
considerable mitigation when used only a few years prior to impact. Even for larger bodies, the payload
mass necessary for a successful nuclear burst-driven deflection is well within current launch vehicle
capabilities. We have now extended earlier simulations of nuclear deflection to examine the challenges
of a smaller body and potentially shorter warning times (years). We have also included microporosity to
begin to determine when this material property is a sensitive uncertainty. We find that a modest yield
standoff burst can fragment a nonporous rubble structure, but that 16% porosity resulted in a
substantially bound body. This result demonstrates that the non-porous case presents the highest risk of
fragmentation, but it also suggests that robustly fragmenting smaller bodies can be accomplished by
high yield standoff bursts, a strategy which reduces the extra mass requirements associated with
rendezvous missions. This is an approach that we will study in more detail in the future. Interestingly,
even when copious material is ejected, as long as the remaining bound material is imparted with a
reasonable speed change, the mitigation against an Apophis-sized object can be substantial (when done
a year before impact). Alternatively, very low yields or large heights of burst can deflect bodies of this
size when there are decades to impact. Despite NEO structural and compositional uncertainties, detailed
simulations show that nuclear explosives will provide considerable protection. While their use to
perturb a body some decades out remains the more desirable option, fragmenting the body remains a
viable back-up option with only a few years of lead-time.
Prefer them – nobody knows better about nuking asteroids
Weinstein 11
Adam Weinstein 11, M.S. from Columbia, US Navy veteran, former PAS in the Army, "Atomic Bombs Vs.
Asteroids, and Other Uses for Old Nukes", Mother Jones,
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/12/atomic-bombs-asteroids-nuclear-research/
Dearborn launched his anti-asteroid crusade on his own. For several years, he paid his own way to present his views at scientific conferences. “The lab has always encouraged scientists to become involved in research that’s outside of the narrowest programmatic views,” he says.
Only after the astronomy community took note did his bosses say, “Hey, maybe we should be funding
this.” Teams of researchers are now working on the problem at Livermore and Los Alamos its sister lab in
,
New Mexico Nobody’s better qualified to figure out how an atomic explosion would affect a space
objects hurling toward Earth
After all, “We have experience in making holes in the ground.”
.
, Dearborn says.
the low short-term probability of an asteroid collision with Earth, he concedes, “Probably we shouldn’t drop everything and pour a whole lot of resources into it.”
All the same, given
Nukes are key to asteroid deflection even if it can’t destroy it
Uttley 10
Caitlin Uttley 10, "Could we really blow up an incoming asteroid with a nuclear bomb?", HowStuffWorks,
https://science.howstuffworks.com/asteroid-nuclear-bomb1.htm
So a nuclear bomb would be essentially useless at disintegrating an asteroid several miles wide, but
scientists at NASA think that a nuclear weapon could be used in a different way to defend the planet. In
2005, U.S. Congress asked NASA to develop plans for preventing an asteroid-Earth collision. In 2007, the
space agency presented its ideas at the Planetary Defense Conference in Washington, D.C. (which
sounds like something out of a sci-fi flick). In its report, NASA outlined several options, a few of which
involved using nuclear explosives to deflect the asteroid away from Earth. The force from the explosions
would (hopefully) provide enough momentum to nudge the asteroid in a different direction, preventing
disaster. In the explosions category, NASA discovered that nuclear explosives are way more effective for
asteroid deflection than non-nuclear explosives, due to the sheer amount of energy they produce. NASA
tested four nuclear scenarios: a surface explosion, a delayed surface explosion, a subsurface explosion
and a standoff explosion (where the bomb doesn't come into contact with the asteroid). The surface and
subsurface explosions are the most effective, but there's a good chance of splitting the asteroid. In the
end, the space agency determined that a series of standoff nuclear explosions would be the most
effective way to deflect an asteroid headed for Earth.
But – even if an asteroid is too close to deflect – tech exists to safely break it into
pieces with a nuke
Strauss 15
Mark Strauss 15, citing Barbee, a flight dynamic engineer at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, and
Bong Wie, the founding director of the Asteroid Deflection Research Center at Iowa State University,
"Helpful Tips For Nuking An Asteroid", National Geographic News,
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/08/150803-space-nasa-asteroids-comets-nuclear-weaponsdefense/
The worst-case scenario might be if we discovered an asteroid only a couple of weeks away from
slamming into us. Brent Barbee, a flight dynamic engineer at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center,
believes he has the answer: an interplanetary ballistic missile. Barbee and Bong Wie, the founding
director of the Asteroid Deflection Research Center at Iowa State University, conducted a three-year
study on the feasibility of rapidly intercepting and nuking an incoming asteroid. In their scenario, we
don’t have time to deflect the asteroid. Their proposed solution: a ready-to-launch spacecraft—the
Hypervelocity Asteroid Intercept Vehicle (HAIV)—that would penetrate its surface. And, no, they didn’t
get the idea from Bruce Willis and his intrepid band of space oil riggers in the film Armageddon.
Previously published studies have examined the potential use of ground-penetrating nuclear weapons as
bunker busters here on Earth. One such study estimated that an underground nuclear explosion would
be at least 20 times more effective than a detonation very close to the surface. But the same research
also revealed a technological hitch: The bomb’s fusing mechanism would be destroyed if its impact
velocity were greater than 671 miles per hour (300 meters per second). Basically, the impact would
disarm the nuke. And in a scenario with an asteroid less than a few years away, the weapon would have
to travel much faster than that, from 22,000 to 67,000 miles per hour (10 to 30 kilometers per second)
relative to the target asteroid. As a result, no detonation upon impact. Barbee and Wie worked around
the problem by designing a two-piece spacecraft. The top craft, a kinetic interceptor, would smash into
the asteroid to create a crater. The second craft, containing the nuclear explosive, would then enter that
crater, detonating before hitting the bottom—Bruce Willis not required. Mounted atop an expendable
rocket, the HAIV becomes a missile that its designers say—with as little as three weeks' warning—could
intercept and destroy an asteroid as large as 140 meters in diameter, dispersing the fragments a safe
distance from Earth.
The National Academies agree too
NRC 10
National Research Council of the National Academies of Science, “Defending Planet Earth: Near-Earth
Object Surveys and Hazard Mitigation Strategies”,
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c178/d7c78e427d89c4fdd5dd434e5b41f2b1cbce.pdf
Nuclear explosives constitute a mature technology, with well-characterized outputs. They represent by
far the most mass efficient method of energy transport and should be considered as an option for NEO
mitigation. Nuclear explosives provide the only option for large NEOs (> 500 meters) when the time to
impact is short (years to months), or when other methods have failed and time is running out. The
extensive test history of nuclear explosives demonstrates a proven ability to provide a tailored output
(the desired mixture of x rays, neutrons, or gamma rays) and dependable yields from about 100 tons to
many megatons of TNT-equivalent energy. Coupled with this test history is an abundance of data on the
effects of the surface and subsurface blasts, including shock generation and cratering.
AT: No Extinction
They cause extinction --- nuking them is key
Farquhar 18
Peter Farquhar, Writer for Business Insider, “The White House is considering nuking asteroids, according
to a NASA report,” Business Insider. June 23, 2018. https://www.businessinsider.com/the-white-houseis-considering-plans-to-nuke-asteroids-2018-6?r=UK&IR=T
The US has an official strategy for dealing with Near-Earth Objects (NEOs) that threaten the planet —
and yes, it involves nukes.
You might know them as "asteroids", or "comets", but rocks and balls of ice and gas aren't the only
objects that could potentially destroy a chunk of life on Earth.
There's more detail on what an NEO is in the 20-page report prepared for the White House to look at,
along with things like "procedural actions", "international cooperation" and "computational tools".
But for now, let's cut straight to Goal 3 — "Develop Technologies for NEO Deflection and Disruption
Missions".
There are really only two options — deflection and disruption.
"Multiple technologies may be suitable for preventing NEO impacts that are predicted well in advance,"
the report states.
"While disruption via nuclear explosive device may be the only feasible option for NEOs that are very
large or come with short warning time."
Here are the technologies the White House is considering:
Concepts for rapid response NEO reconnaissance missions. Including "mission concepts in which the
reconnaissance spacecraft could also carry out deflection or disruption".
International launch vehicle infrastructure to support planetary defense missions. Including "processes
for accomplishing rapid response planetary defense space-lift".
Identify technologies required to prevent NEO impacts. This is the one which includes "kinetic
impactors, nuclear devices, and gravity tractors for deflection, and nuclear devices for disruption".
Let's stop there, at "kinetic impactors, nuclear devices and gravity tractors".
A kinetic impactor is simply smashing a spacecraft into the NEO in the hopes of deflecting it. A nuclear
device is obviously your straightforward, "call Bruce Willis" case scenario.
The gravity tractor is something NASA is a couple of years away from testing. It performs a little bit like this:
via GIPHY
Back in 2016, NASA announced its plan to target the 400-metre wide asteroid 2008 EV5 in 2021 with the gravity tractor technology.
Another important part of its mission, which the NEO white paper alludes to, is to grab a boulder off the surface of EV5:
via GIPHY
Because if we're going to blow up asteroids, it's important to know exactly what it's made of.
Best of all, we might not have to wait for a Armageddon-sized asteroid to threaten us before we get to blow it up. The White House paper also makes sure to mention that test runs on harmless NEOs are essential to make sure this
type of action will work.
It will, obviously, cost billions.
But what are the chances of a decent ROI on all that spending and cooperation?
For one, the NEO white paper mentions that any asteroid exploration and material testing can be done in partnerships with private industry, because asteroids can potentially be worth trillions.
Fortunately for private industrialists, in 2015, US Congress passed the SPACE Act, giving US space firms the rights to own and sell natural resources they mine from bodies in space.
But NASA has often referred to the fact there is "no record in modern times of any person being killed by a meteorite" and that even an asteroid 1.5 kilometres across only hits the Earth every million or so years.
"In fact, as best as we can tell, no large object is likely to strike the Earth any time in the next several hundred years," it says.
Here are a couple of reasons why the need for an official response playbook has escalated in the past few years. For starters, this is the damage an object the size of the Tunguska object could inflict on New York:
The object that exploded over Tunguska and destroying 2,000 square kilometres of forest was 40-60 metres across.
The asteroid that exploded over Chelyabinsk in Russia with the power of 20-30 atomic bombs, damaging
7,200 buildings and injuring 1,500 people, was just 20 metres across.
Here's the rise in NEOs we've spotted larger than 140 metres since US Congress directed NASA to really
start properly looking for them in 2005. We're up to 18,000 on just 3,500 since then:
NASA estimates there are over 10 million NEOs larger than the Chelyabinsk asteroid, and 300,000
objects larger than 40 metres, "that could pose an impact hazard and would be very challenging to
detect more than a few days in advance".
The big ones — larger than one kilometre across — are those that have the potential to severely disrupt
life on Earth as we know it.
The dinosaurs found out the hard way 65 million years ago when a 10-kilometre asteroid hit the Yucatan
peninsula.
But NASA says it's found and catalogued almost all of those, and none are on a collision course with
Earth.
NASA's NEOWISE survey, for example, has been tracking, and improved its ability to track, asteroids for
four years now:
That's where the other half of the report is focused — on improving tracking methods, data processing
and processes for identifying hazardous asteroids and the best way to deal with them.
Because while we are close to 100% certain that no extinction-level asteroids we've spotted are on a
collision course with Earth, we're not 100% sure we've spotted all the extinction-level asteroids.
As the NEO report admits, there is some chance that "large comets from the outer solar system could
appear and impact the Earth with warning times as short as a few months".
It creates hell on earth
Johnston 17
Ian Johnston, Environmental Correspondent for the Independent, “Asteroid that killed the dinosaurs
created endless night and 18-month winter as it rained fire,” The Independent. August 21, 2017.
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/asteroid-kill-dinosaurs-fifth-mass-extinction-endlessnight-winter-18-month-rain-fire-ice-age-a7904491.html
It is a vision of hell on Earth. The sun disappeared behind a cloud of smoke that encircled the planet,
turning day into night and causing temperatures to plummet as fire rained down from above.
And if that wasn’t bad enough, the massive asteroid that struck the planet 66 million years ago – wiping
out the dinosaurs and many other species in the fifth mass extinction of all life – set off earthquakes,
giant tsunamis and volcanoes.
Even after the dust cleared nearly two years later, chemical reactions in the upper atmosphere would
have wrecked the protective layer of ozone so that the sun’s rays would have irradiated anything left
alive by the strong ultraviolet light.
It seems extraordinary that life survived such an Armageddon-like event, which was laid bare by
researchers who used a sophisticated computer model to work out the effect of the 10km-wide asteroid
on the climate.
They said their work, supported by Nasa, could help work out how the atmosphere would be affected by
the detonation of large nuclear bombs and the chances of the feared “nuclear winter”.
But it is also worth considering other scientists’ warnings that human activity is ushering in the sixth
mass extinction of life on the planet, with the loss of animal life on a par with the astonishing
destruction revealed by the new research.
Animals in decline
One of the researchers, Dr Charles Bardeen, of the US National Centre for Atmospheric Research, said
the initial, devastating impact of the asteroid would have been just the start of the Earth’s troubles.
“The extinction of many of the large animals on land could have been caused by the immediate
aftermath of the impact, but animals that lived in the oceans or those that could burrow underground or
slip underwater temporarily could have survived,” he said.
“Our study picks up the story after the initial effects – after the earthquakes and the tsunamis and the
broiling.
“We wanted to look at the long-term consequences of the amount of soot we think was created and
what those consequences might have meant for the animals that were left.”
Read more
Humans could cause mass extinction of life in oceans, scientists warn
Is climate change the Great Filter of human extinction?
Humans may face extinction sooner than we thought, study finds
Many Americans think climate change will lead to human extinction
Previously scientists have estimated that about 15 million tons of fine soot was created and carried in
the wind around the world following the asteroid strike.
The researchers in the new study, described in an article in the journal Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, found that this would have reduced the amount of light during the day to about
the same as the night when there is a full moon.
This would have prevented plants from photosynthesising, causing major problems for all life on the
planet. Average temperatures would have fallen by about 28 degrees Celsius on land and 11C over the
oceans.
Definitely extinction
McGuire 2 (Bill, Professor of Geohazards at University College London and is one of Britain's leading
volcanologists, A Guide to the End of the World, p. 159-168)
The Tunguska events pale into insignificance when compared to what happened off the coast of
Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula 65 million years earlier. Here a 10-kilometre asteroid or comet—its exact
nature is uncertain—crashed into the sea and changed our world forever. Within microseconds, an
unimaginable explosion released as much energy as billions of Hiroshima bombs detonated
simultaneously, creating a titanic fireball hotter than the Sun that vaporized the ocean and excavated a
crater 180 kilometres across in the crust beneath. Shock waves blasted upwards, tearing the
atmosphere apart and expelling over a hundred trillion tonnes of molten rock into space, later to fall
across the globe. Almost immediately an area bigger than Europe would have been flattened and
scoured of virtually all life, while massive earthquakes rocked the planet. The atmosphere would have
howled and screamed as hypercanes five times more powerful than the strongest hurricane ripped the
landscape apart, joining forces with huge tsunamis to batter coastlines many thousandsof kilometres
distant. Even worse was to follow. As the rock blasted into space began to rain down across the entire
planet so the heat generated by its re-entry into the atmosphere irradiated the surface, roasting animals
alive as effectively as an oven grill, and starting great conflagrations that laid waste the world's forests
and grasslands and turned fully a quarter of all living material to ashes. Even once the atmosphere and
oceans had settled down, the crust had stopped shuddering, and the bombardment of debris from
space had ceased, more was to come. In the following weeks, smoke and dust in the atmosphere
blotted out the Sun and brought temperatures plunging by as much as 15 degrees Celsius. In the
growing gloom and bitter cold the surviving plant life wilted and died while those herbivorous dinosaurs
that remained slowly starved. global wildfires and acid rain from the huge quantities of sulphur injected
into the atmosphere from rocks at the site of the impact poured into the oceans, wiping out threequarters of all marine life. After years of freezing conditions the gloom following the so-called Chicxulub
impact would eventually have lifted, only to reveal a terrible Sun blazing through the tatters of an ozone
layer torn apart by the chemical action of nitrous oxides concocted in the impact fireball: an ultraviolet
spring hard on the heels of the cosmic winter that fried many of the remaining species struggling
precariously to hang on to life. So enormously was the natural balance of the Earth upset that according
to some it might have taken hundreds of thousands of years for the post-Chicxulub Earth to return to
what passes for normal. When it did the age of the great reptiles was finally over, leaving the field to the
primitive mammals—our distant ancestors—and opening an evolutionary trail that culminated in the
rise and rise of the human race. But could we go the same way1?To assess the chances, let me look a
little more closely at the destructive power of an impact event. At Tunguska, destruction of the forests
resulted partly from the great heat generated by the explosion, but mainly from the blast wave that
literally pushed the trees over and flattened them against the ground. The strength of this blast wave
depends upon what is called the peak overpressure, that is the difference between ambient pressure
and the pressure of the blastwave. In order to cause severe destruction thisnccds to exceed 4. pounds
per square inch, an overpressure that results in wind speeds that arc over twice the force of those found
in a typical hurricane. Even though tiny compared with, say, the land area of London, the enormous
overpressures generated by a 50-metre object exploding low overhead would cause damage
comparable with the detonation of a very large nuclear device, obliterating almost everything within the
city's orbital motorway. Increase the size of the impactor and things get very much worse. An asteroid
just 250 metres across would be sufficiently massive to penetrate the atmosphere; blasting a crater 5
kilometres across and devastating an area of around 10,000 square kilometres— that is about the size of
the English county of Kent. Raise the size of the asteroid again, to 650 metres, and the area of
devastation increases to ioo;ooo square kilometres—about the size of the US state of South Carolina.
Terrible as this all sounds, however, even this would be insufficient to affect the entire planet. In order
to do this, an impactor has to be at least 1 kilometre across, if it is one of the speedier comets, or 1.5
kilometres in diameter if it is one of the slower asteroids. A collision with one of these objects would
generate a blast equivalent to 100.000 million tonnes of TNT, which would obliterate an area 500
kilometres across say the size of England—and kill perhaps tens of millions of people, depending upon
the location of the impact. The real problems for the rest of the world would start soon after as dust in
the atmosphere began to darken the skies and reduce the level of sunlight reaching the Earth's surface.
By comparison with the huge Chicxulub impact it is certain that this would result in a dramatic lowering
of global temperatures but there is no consensus on just how bad this would be. The chances are,
however, that an impact of this size would result in appalling weather conditions and crop failures at
least as severe as those of the 'Year Without a Summer'; 'which followed the 1815 eruption of
Indonesia's Tambora volcano. As mentioned in the last chapter, with even developed countries holding
sufficient food to feed their populations for only a month or so, large-scale crop failures across the
planet would undoubtedly have serious implications. Rationing, at the very least, is likely to be die
result, with a worst case scenario seeing widespread disruption of the social and economic fabric of
developed nations. In the developing world, where subsistence farming remains very much the norm,
wide-spread failure of the harvests could be expected to translate rapidly into famine on a biblical scale
Some researchers forecast that as many as a quarter of the world's population could succumb to a
deteriorating climate following an impact in the 1—1.5 kilometre size range. Anything bigger and
photosynthesis stops completely. Once this happens the issue is not how many people will die but
whether the human race will survive. One estimate proposes that the impact of an object just 4kilometres across will inject sufficient quantities of dust and debris into the atmosphere to reduce light
levels below those required for photosynthesis. Because we still don't know how many threatening
objects there are out there nor whether they come in bursts, it is almost impossible to say when the
Earth will be struck by an asteroid or comet that will bring to an end the world as we know it. Impact
events on the scale of the Chicxulub dinosaur-killer only occur every several tens of millions of years, so
in any single year the chances of such an impact arc tiny. Any optimism is, however, tempered by the
fact that— should the Shiva hypothesis be true—the next swarm of Oort Cloud comets could even now
be speeding towards the inner solar system. Failing this, we may have only another thousand years to
wait until the return of the dense part of the Taurid Complex and another asteroidal assault. Even if it
turns out that there is no coherence in the timing of impact events, there is statistically no reason why
we cannot be hit next year by an undiscovered Earth-Crossing Asteroid or by a long-period comet that
has never before visited the inner solar system. Small impactors on the Tunguska scale struck Brazil in
1931 and Greenland in 1097, and will continue to pound the Earth every few decades. Because their
destructive footprint is tiny compared to the surface area of the Earth, however, it would be very bad
luck if one of these hit an urban area, and most will fall in the sea. Although this might seem a good
thing, a larger object striking the ocean would be very bad news indeed. A 500-metre rock landing in the
Pacific Basin, for example, would generate gigantic tsunamis that would obliterate just about every
coastal city in the hemisphere within 20 hours or so. The chances of this happening arc actually quite
high—about 1 per cent in the next 100 years—and the death toll could well top half a billion. Estimates
of the frequencies of impacts in the 1 kilometre size bracket range from 100,000 to 333,000 years, but
the youngest impact crater produced by an object of this size is almost a million years old. Of course,
there could have been several large impacts since, which cither occurred in the sea or have not yet been
located on land. Fair enough you might say, the threat is clearly out there, but is there anything on the
horizon? Actually, there is. Some 13 asteroids—mostly quite small—could feasibly collide with the Earth
before 2100. Realistically, however, this is not very likely as the probabilities involved arc not much
greater than 1 in io;ooo— although bear in mind that these arc pretty good odds. If this was the
probability of winning the lottery then my local agent would be getting considerably more of my
business. There is another enigmatic object out there, however. Of the 40 or so Near Earth Asteroids
spotted last year, one — designated 2000SG344—looked at first as if it might actually hit us. The object
is small, in the 100 metre size range, and its orbit is so similar to the earth that some have suggested it
may be a booster rocket that sped one of the Apollo spacecraft on its way to the Moon. Whether hunk
of rock or lump of man-made metal, it was originally estimated that 2000SG344 had a 1 in 500 chance of
striking the Earth on 21 September 2030. Again, these may sound very long odds, but they are actually
only five times greater than those recently offered during summer 2001 for England beating Germany 51 at football. We can all relax now anyway, as recent calculations have indicated that the object will not
approach closer to the Earth than around five million kilometres. A few years ago, scientists came up
with an index to measure the impact threat, known as the Torino Scale, and so far 2000SG2144 is the
first object to register a value greater than zero. The potential impactor originally scraped into category
1, events meriting careful monitoring. Let's hope that many years elapse before we encounter the first
category 10 event—defined as 'a certain collision with global consequences'. Given sufficient warning
we might be able to nudge an asteroid out of the Earth's way but due to its size, high velocity, and
sudden appearance, wc could do little about a new comet heading in our direction.
AT: Low Risk
The risk is high --- NASA has identified thousands that are close enough to Earth to
potentially become hazardous and it only takes one --- that’s Cooper
Risk is high and underestimated
Easterbrook 8
Gregg Easterbrook 8, Senior Fellow @ the Brookings Institute, M.A. from Northwestern, Editor of The
Atlantic and The New Republic, “The Sky is Falling,” June,
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200806/asteroids
Breakthrough ideas have a way of seeming obvious in retrospect, and about a decade ago, a Columbia
University geophysicist named Dallas Abbott had a breakthrough idea. She had been pondering the
craters left by comets and asteroids that smashed into Earth. Geologists had counted them and
concluded that space strikes are rare events and had occurred mainly during the era of primordial mists.
But, Abbott realized, this deduction was based on the number of craters found on land—and because 70
percent of Earth’s surface is water, wouldn’t most space objects hit the sea? So she began searching for
underwater craters caused by impacts rather than by other forces, such as volcanoes. What she has
found is spine-chilling: evidence that several enormous asteroids or comets have slammed into our
planet quite recently, in geologic terms. If Abbott is right, then you may be here today, reading this
magazine, only because by sheer chance those objects struck the ocean rather than land. Abbott
believes that a space object about 300 meters in diameter hit the Gulf of Carpentaria, north of Australia,
in 536 A.D. An object that size, striking at up to 50,000 miles per hour, could release as much energy as
1,000 nuclear bombs. Debris, dust, and gases thrown into the atmosphere by the impact would have
blocked sunlight, temporarily cooling the planet—and indeed, contemporaneous accounts describe dim
skies, cold summers, and poor harvests in 536 and 537. “A most dread portent took place,” the
Byzantine historian Procopius wrote of 536; the sun “gave forth its light without brightness.” Frost
reportedly covered China in the summertime. Still, the harm was mitigated by the ocean impact. When a
space object strikes land, it kicks up more dust and debris, increasing the global-cooling effect; at the
same time, the combination of shock waves and extreme heating at the point of impact generates nitric
and nitrous acids, producing rain as corrosive as battery acid. If the Gulf of Carpentaria object were to
strike Miami today, most of the city would be leveled, and the atmospheric effects could trigger crop
failures around the world. What’s more, the Gulf of Carpentaria object was a skipping stone compared
with an object that Abbott thinks whammed into the Indian Ocean near Madagascar some 4,800 years
ago, or about 2,800 B.C. Researchers generally assume that a space object a kilometer or more across
would cause significant global harm: widespread destruction, severe acid rain, and dust storms that
would darken the world’s skies for decades. The object that hit the Indian Ocean was three to five
kilometers across, Abbott believes, and caused a tsunami in the Pacific 600 feet high—many times
higher than the 2004 tsunami that struck Southeast Asia. Ancient texts such as Genesis and the Epic of
Gilgamesh support her conjecture, describing an unspeakable planetary flood in roughly the same time
period. If the Indian Ocean object were to hit the sea now, many of the world’s coastal cities could be
flattened. If it were to hit land, much of a continent would be leveled; years of winter and mass
starvation would ensue. At the start of her research, which has sparked much debate among specialists,
Abbott reasoned that if colossal asteroids or comets strike the sea with about the same frequency as
they strike land, then given the number of known land craters, perhaps 100 large impact craters might
lie beneath the oceans. In less than a decade of searching, she and a few colleagues have already found
what appear to be 14 large underwater impact sites. That they’ve found so many so rapidly is hardly
reassuring. Other scientists are making equally unsettling discoveries. Only in the past few decades have
astronomers begun to search the nearby skies for objects such as asteroids and comets (for
convenience, let’s call them “space rocks”). What they are finding suggests that near-Earth space rocks
are more numerous than was once thought, and that their orbits may not be as stable as has been
assumed. There is also reason to think that space rocks may not even need to reach Earth’s surface to
cause cataclysmic damage. Our solar system appears to be a far more dangerous place than was
previously believed. The received wisdom about the origins of the solar system goes something like this:
the sun and planets formed about 4.5 billion years ago from a swirling nebula containing huge amounts
of gas and dust, as well as relatively small amounts of metals and other dense substances released by
ancient supernova explosions. The sun is at the center; the denser planets, including Earth, formed in
the middle region, along with many asteroids—the small rocky bodies made of material that failed to
incorporate into a planet. Farther out are the gas-giant planets, such as Jupiter, plus vast amounts of
light elements, which formed comets on the boundary of the solar system. Early on, asteroids existed by
the millions; the planets and their satellites were bombarded by constant, furious strikes. The heat and
shock waves generated by these impacts regularly sterilized the young Earth. Only after the rain of space
objects ceased could life begin; by then, most asteroids had already either hit something or found stable
orbits that do not lead toward planets or moons. Asteroids still exist, but most were assumed to be in
the asteroid belt, which lies between Mars and Jupiter, far from our blue world. As for comets,
conventional wisdom held that they also bombarded the planets during the early eons. Comets are
mostly frozen water mixed with dirt. An ancient deluge of comets may have helped create our oceans;
lots of comets hit the moon, too, but there the light elements they were composed of evaporated. As
with asteroids, most comets were thought to have smashed into something long ago; and, because the
solar system is largely void, researchers deemed it statistically improbable that those remaining would
cross the paths of planets. These standard assumptions—that remaining space rocks are few, and that
encounters with planets were mainly confined to the past—are being upended. On March 18, 2004, for
instance, a 30-meter asteroid designated 2004 FH—a hunk potentially large enough to obliterate a
city—shot past Earth, not far above the orbit occupied by telecommunications satellites. (Enter “2004
FH” in the search box at Wikipedia and you can watch film of that asteroid passing through the night
sky.) Looking at the broader picture, in 1992 the astronomers David Jewitt, of the University of Hawaii,
and Jane Luu, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, discovered the Kuiper Belt, a region of
asteroids and comets that starts near the orbit of Neptune and extends for immense distances outward.
At least 1,000 objects big enough to be seen from Earth have already been located there. These objects
are 100 kilometers across or larger, much bigger than whatever dispatched the dinosaurs; space rocks
this size are referred to as “planet killers” because their impact would likely end life on Earth.
Investigation of the Kuiper Belt has just begun, but there appear to be substantially more asteroids in
this region than in the asteroid belt, which may need a new name. Beyond the Kuiper Belt may lie the
hypothesized Oort Cloud, thought to contain as many as trillions of comets. If the Oort Cloud does exist,
the number of extant comets is far greater than was once believed. Some astronomers now think that
short-period comets, which swing past the sun frequently, hail from the relatively nearby Kuiper Belt,
whereas comets whose return periods are longer originate in the Oort Cloud. But if large numbers of
comets and asteroids are still around, several billion years after the formation of the solar system,
wouldn’t they by now be in stable orbits—ones that rarely intersect those of the planets? Maybe not.
During the past few decades, some astronomers have theorized that the movement of the solar system
within the Milky Way varies the gravitational stresses to which the sun, and everything that revolves
around it, is exposed. The solar system may periodically pass close to stars or groups of stars whose
gravitational pull affects the Oort Cloud, shaking comets and asteroids loose from their orbital moorings
and sending them downward, toward the inner planets. Consider objects that are already near Earth,
and the picture gets even bleaker. Astronomers traditionally spent little time looking for asteroids,
regarding them as a lesser class of celestial bodies, lacking the beauty of comets or the significance of
planets and stars. Plus, asteroids are hard to spot—they move rapidly, compared with the rest of the
heavens, and even the nearby ones are fainter than other objects in space. Not until the 1980s did
scientists begin systematically searching for asteroids near Earth. They have been finding them in
disconcerting abundance. In 1980, only 86 near-Earth asteroids and comets were known to exist. By
1990, the figure had risen to 170; by 2000, it was 921; as of this writing, it is 5,388. The Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, part of NASA, keeps a running tally at www.neo.jpl.nasa.gov/stats. Ten years ago, 244 nearEarth space rocks one kilometer across or more—the size that would cause global calamity—were
known to exist; now 741 are. Of the recently discovered nearby space objects, NASA has classified 186
as “impact risks” (details about these rocks are at www.neo.jpl.nasa.gov/risk). And because most spacerock searches to date have been low-budget affairs, conducted with equipment designed to look deep
into the heavens, not at nearby space, the actual number of impact risks is undoubtedly much higher.
Extrapolating from recent discoveries, NASA estimates that there are perhaps 20,000 potentially
hazardous asteroids and comets in the general vicinity of Earth. There’s still more bad news. Earth has
experienced several mass extinctions—the dinosaurs died about 65 million years ago, and something
killed off some 96 percent of the world’s marine species about 250 million years ago. Scientists have
generally assumed that whatever caused those long-ago mass extinctions—comet impacts, extreme
volcanic activity—arose from conditions that have changed and no longer pose much threat. It’s a
comforting notion—but what about the mass extinction that occurred close to our era? About 12,000
years ago, many large animals of North America started disappearing—woolly mammoths, sabertoothed cats, mastodons, and others. Some scientists have speculated that Paleo-Indians may have
hunted some of the creatures to extinction. A millennia-long mini–Ice Age also may have been a factor.
But if that’s the case, what explains the disappearance of the Clovis People, the best-documented PaleoIndian culture, at about the same time? Their population stretched as far south as Mexico, so the
mini–Ice Age probably was not solely responsible for their extinction. A team of researchers led by
Richard Firestone, of the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, in California, recently announced the
discovery of evidence that one or two huge space rocks, each perhaps several kilometers across,
exploded high above Canada 12,900 years ago. The detonation, they believe, caused widespread fires
and dust clouds, and disrupted climate patterns so severely that it triggered a prolonged period of global
cooling. Mammoths and other species might have been killed either by the impact itself or by starvation
after their food supply was disrupted. These conclusions, though hotly disputed by other researchers,
were based on extensive examinations of soil samples from across the continent; in strata from that era,
scientists found widely distributed soot and also magnetic grains of iridium, an element that is rare on
Earth but common in space. Iridium is the meteor-hunter’s lodestar: the discovery of iridium dating back
65 million years is what started the geologist Walter Alvarez on his path-breaking theory about the
dinosaurs’ demise. A more recent event gives further cause for concern. As buffs of the television show
The X Files will recall, just a century ago, in 1908, a huge explosion occurred above Tunguska, Siberia.
The cause was not a malfunctioning alien star-cruiser but a small asteroid or comet that detonated as it
approached the ground. The blast had hundreds of times the force of the Hiroshima bomb and
devastated an area of several hundred square miles. Had the explosion occurred above London or Paris,
the city would no longer exist. Mark Boslough, a researcher at the Sandia National Laboratory, in New
Mexico, recently concluded that the Tunguska object was surprisingly small, perhaps only 30 meters
across. Right now, astronomers are nervously tracking 99942 Apophis, an asteroid with a slight chance
of striking Earth in April 2036. Apophis is also small by asteroid standards, perhaps 300 meters across,
but it could hit with about 60,000 times the force of the Hiroshima bomb—enough to destroy an area
the size of France. In other words, small asteroids may be more dangerous than we used to think—and
may do considerable damage even if they don’t reach Earth’s surface. Until recently, nearly all the
thinking about the risks of space-rock strikes has focused on counting craters. But what if most impacts
don’t leave craters? This is the prospect that troubles Boslough. Exploding in the air, the Tunguska rock
did plenty of damage, but if people had not seen the flashes, heard the detonation, and traveled to the
remote area to photograph the scorched, flattened wasteland, we’d never know the Tunguska event
had happened. Perhaps a comet or two exploding above Canada 12,900 years ago spelled the end for
saber-toothed cats and Clovis society. But no obvious crater resulted; clues to the calamity were subtle
and hard to come by. Comets, asteroids, and the little meteors that form pleasant shooting stars
approach Earth at great speeds—at least 25,000 miles per hour. As they enter the atmosphere they heat
up, from friction, and compress, because they decelerate rapidly. Many space rocks explode under this
stress, especially small ones; large objects are more likely to reach Earth’s surface. The angle at which
objects enter the atmosphere also matters: an asteroid or comet approaching straight down has a
better chance of hitting the surface than one entering the atmosphere at a shallow angle, as the latter
would have to plow through more air, heating up and compressing as it descended. The object or
objects that may have detonated above Canada 12,900 years ago would probably have approached at a
shallow angle. If, as Boslough thinks, most asteroids and comets explode before reaching the ground,
then this is another reason to fear that the conventional thinking seriously underestimates the
frequency of space-rock strikes—the small number of craters may be lulling us into complacency. After
all, if a space rock were hurtling toward a city, whether it would leave a crater would not be the
issue—the explosion would be the issue. A generation ago, the standard assumption was that a
dangerous object would strike Earth perhaps once in a million years. By the mid-1990s, researchers
began to say that the threat was greater: perhaps a strike every 300,000 years. This winter, I asked
William Ailor, an asteroid specialist at The Aerospace Corporation, a think tank for the Air Force, what he
thought the risk was. Ailor’s answer: a one-in-10 chance per century of a dangerous space-object strike.
Regardless of which estimate is correct, the likelihood of an event is, of course, no predictor. Even if
space strikes are likely only once every million years, that doesn’t mean a million years will pass before
the next impact—the sky could suddenly darken tomorrow. Equally important, improbable but
cataclysmic dangers ought to command attention because of their scope. A tornado is far more likely
than an asteroid strike, but humanity is sure to survive the former. The chances that any one person will
die in an airline crash are minute, but this does not prevent us from caring about aviation safety. And as
Nathan Myhrvold, the former chief technology officer of Microsoft, put it, “The odds of a space-object
strike during your lifetime may be no more than the odds you will die in a plane crash—but with space
rocks, it’s like the entire human race is riding on the plane.”
Generic nfu good
short
CP Text: States ought to adopt a policy of operational No First Use and abide by said
policy
A policy of No First Use results in a fundamental re-understanding of military policy,
including drastically reduced nuclear arsenals, change of rhetoric, altered war plans,
no-early-second-use, and gradual phase out.
Miller 17
Miller, Steven E.. “The Utility of Nuclear Weapons and the Strategy of No-First-Use.” Presentation,
November 15-17. SHS TG
If NFU is to be more than a declaratory policy, then it must be meaningfully reflected in the war planning
and force postures of the nuclear powers. Because the possibility of first use inheres in the possession of
a nuclear arsenal, it is not easy to create a posture that effectively displays genuine fidelity to the NFU
pledge. Because it is easy to proclaim NFU as a declaratory policy, little weight has been given in the
past to the NFU pledges made by various nuclear powers. It seems safe to say, for example, that the
United States and its NATO allies gave no credence whatsoever to the NFU commitment made by the
Soviet Union. What must nuclear-armed states do if they wish to genuinely adopt a strategy of no-firstuse? How might they make this a credible and reassuring step? How could they configure their forces so
as to reflect a real NFU policy? In the context of anything like present nuclear forces, it is not clear that
there is a wholly convincing answer to these questions - or at least, an answer that would be wholly
convincing to a suspicious adversary. But an implication of NFU is that the present force postures must
be left far behind. Then, as a general matter, the answer must be that a real NFU policy would have to
ripple through the entire military posture and preparations of the nuclear-armed state. And the end
result would need to be a doctrine that does not rely on first use and a nuclear force posture that has
little or no capacity to be used first. War planning. NFU cannot be real if militaries develop war plans
that include, or even depend upon, the expectation of first-use of nuclear weapons. It has long been a
commonplace to note the gap that often exists in nuclear powers between declaratory policy and
operation policy. The Soviet Union's NFU pledge, for example, coexisted with war plans for a European
war that called for substantial use of nuclear weapons from the outset of hostilities.25 A genuine
strategy of no-first use would need to be reflected in operational war plans. These would have to
assume an entirely non-nuclear character and to extirpate all scenarios in which recourse is made to the
first use of nuclear weapons. Eradicating the idea that nuclear first use is an option would have
enormous implications. It would alter the expectations of politicians and commanders. It would (or
should) influence military investment decisions - more conventional capability may be necessary, for
example.26 It could affect public articulations of defense policy and military doctrine. In the Soviet
period, Moscow's NFU pledge was undermined by a profusion of military writings that emphasized
nuclear preemption and warfighting and otherwise were in tension with NFU. But a genuine NFU
strategy would need to harmonize doctrinal expositions and political explanations of defense policy with
the constraints of the NFU commitment. Changes in public rhetoric alone will not be sufficient to
convince the world that a NFU strategy is firmly in place. But they could help send the message that NFU
was being taken seriously. NATO presently proclaims at every occasion that nuclear weapons are
essential and that nuclear first-use is an integral component of alliance military strategy. If NATO instead
were to proclaim that nuclear weapons are irrelevant to most of the alliance's security needs and that it
could not envision circumstances in which it would use nuclear weapons first, this would certainly set a
very different tone. War planning, of course, is not a public activity, though it has public outcroppings.
So though this is a necessary step if NFU is to be real, it must be coupled with other, more visible steps,
if others are to be convinced that NFU is more than declaratory policy. Exercises and training. Militaries,
goes the old aphorism, fight the way they train. Military organizations are honed through years training
and exercises to operate in certain ways with certain expectations. If exercises sometimes or routinely
involve scenarios that include nuclear first use, this will be visible to observers of the exercises and will
be have impact on the way the military thinks and behaves. NFU cannot be real if militaries are
practicing as if nuclear weapons will be used first. In the context of a strategy of NFU, exercises should
ingrain the idea that first-use is entirely out of the picture and should not figure at all in the calculations
of military commanders. Force Composition and Disposition. A strategy of NFU would require or permit
dramatic alterations in force posture. A purely deterrent force could be much smaller and simpler than
the present arsenals of the larger nuclear powers. There would be no need for emphasis on speed or
offensive readiness. (Readiness for survivability would, of course, remain desirable.) The force postures
most compatible with NFU, and most convincing to other powers, would possess little or no capability
for first-use. This proposition - that states should seek to minimize the first-use capacities of their
nuclear arsenals - has potentially profound implications for nuclear posture. It could lead far down a
road toward latent, residual, undeployed nuclear capabilities. In effect, this would entail the aggressive
pursuit of deep dealerting.27 In the context of a strategy of NFU, nuclear forces need only survive an
attack and be capable of retaliation. No other demands are placed upon them. This means that all
readiness measures associated with first use options are superfluous, unnecessary, and even
undesirable. Some categories of nuclear weapons - nonstrategic nuclear forces, for example - would
become expendable. Forward deployed weapons, such as the American nuclear capabilities deployed in
Europe, would be neither necessary nor appropriate. With offensive readiness no longer important,
there would be no reason to leave warheads routinely mated to delivery systems. There might be little
reason, indeed, to possess actively deployed nuclear weapons. There might be no compelling reason to
leave nuclear weapons in the custody of military organizations. So long as survivability could be assured,
there might be an argument for keeping few, if any, fully assembled nuclear weapons in the arsenal.
Following this logic still further, in this sort of nuclear environment, states might grow comfortable not
only with NFU, but with the notion of no-early-second-use - retaliation does not need to be prompt in
order to deter. The end point of this logic might be something like the capacities of present day Japan,
which might be regarded as a massively dealerted nuclear power. It possesses nuclear expertise,
delivery systems, and fissile material. In some weeks or months it could build nuclear weapons for
retaliation if it needed to. But no one fears its first use options. Thus, the premise of NFU, if taken
seriously, produces a logic that can lead in stunning directions. In short, once nuclear arsenals are
limited to purely deterrent purposes, it becomes possible to envision substantial alterations of force
posture that would give considerable reality to NFU commitments. For the larger nuclear powers, one
could imagine much smaller forces, deeply dealerted, incapable of rapid use, perhaps with warheads
unmated from delivery systems, perhaps with warheads withdrawn from regular deployment. This is a
very different nuclear force, far from anything presently in view, but one entirely compatible with a
world dominated by deterrence and NFU. CONCLUSION To truly embrace a strategy of NFU has
fundamentally important implications in terms of both purpose and posture. Nuclear-armed states must
be prepared to abandon the practice of exploiting nuclear weapons for the attainment of a variety of
different purposes. Only one purpose is compatible with NFU: the deterrence of nuclear attack. All other
purposes associated with nuclear weapons must be jettisoned or achieved by other means. This is the
crux of the issue. If nuclear weapon states were really prepared to limit themselves purely to nuclear
deterrence, not only would NFU be acceptable but many of the associated force posture alterations
would become palatable, if not congenial. However, most nuclear-armed states appear to have
objectives beyond nuclear deterrence that are thought to be served by their nuclear weapons, leading
to the embrace of first use doctrines and the retention of first use options. Above all, the sole
superpower has linked its nuclear capability to at least a handful of objectives other than nuclear
deterrence, and hence finds NFU to be entirely objectionable. Washington correctly appreciates that
NFU is incompatible with its present nuclear doctrine. So long as this remains the case, the genuine
strategy of NFU will make little headway in the corridors of power. If the time someday comes when the
nuclear powers are truly interested in a meaningful embrace of NFU, this will be a significant step
toward the marginalization of nuclear weapons. It will mean that their role in international politics and
national policy is much more circumscribed. Once nuclear weapons have been restricted to the narrow
purpose of neutralizing the nuclear weapons of others, a familiar logic comes into play: if the only
purpose for nuclear weapons is deterrence, then if no one has them no one needs them.
Hair trigger alert
Counterplan: States should:
-
implement a policy of operational no-first-use
take intercontinental ballistic missiles off hair-trigger alerts through a physical switch and retain all other
nuclear weapons
NFU creates a new regime of nuclear restraint- solves the aff
Tannenwald, 18 -- Director, International Relations Brown, Watson Institute for International Studies,
Brown University
[Nina, “The Great Unraveling: The Future of the Nuclear Normative Order,” MEETING THE CHALLENGES
OF THE NEW NUCLEAR AGE: EMERGING RISKS AND DECLINING NORMS IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION AND CHANGING NUCLEAR DOCTRINES, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2018, p.
27-29]
The cornerstone of a renewed regime of nuclear restraint would be strengthening the norm of non-use
of nuclear weapons through the adoption of a declared no-first-use policy by all the nuclear powers. There have been increasing numbers
of proposals for the United States to adopt a no-first-use policy in recent years, with compelling analyses. However, the case can be made more
strongly for common declared no-first-use policies as the linchpin of a renewed regime of nuclear restraint among the nuclear powers.
A no-first-use policy means that nuclear
powers would rely on nuclear weapons only to deter nuclear attacks.87
Adoption of no-first-use would not simply be “mere words,” but rather both doctrinal and operational issues would follow
from it.88 An operational no-first-use doctrine would eliminate first-strike postures, preemptive
capabilities, and other types of destabilizing warfighting strategies. It would induce restraint in targeting,
launch-on-warning, alert levels of deployed systems, procurement, and modernization plans. In other words, it
would help shape the physical qualities of nuclear forces in a way that renders them unsuitable for
missions other than deterrence of nuclear attacks.89 A no-first-use policy also would reduce the risk of accidental,
unauthorized, mistaken, or preemptive use. The removal of threats of a nuclear first strike would strengthen strategic
and crisis stability.90 It would also make absolute the boundary between nuclear and conventional
weapons. Finally, by reducing the overall risk of nuclear dangers, no-first-use policies would move toward addressing humanitarian concerns
and reducing the salience of nuclear weapons.91
no-first-use could be adopted unilaterally or as part of an international agreement. It would move Russia and
Pakistan away from their high-risk doctrines and reduce a source of Russia-NATO tensions. For Russia to consider noAs others have argued,
first-use, its concerns about U.S. ballistic missile defenses, imbalances in conventional forces, and issues of NATO enlargement would need to
be addressed. The United States would need to address the issue of extended deterrence with its allies and move toward conventional
extended deterrence.92 India and Pakistan would need a modus vivendi on Kashmir. The United States and North Korea would need a
nonaggression pact.
What are the prospects for this? Skeptics will object that the geopolitical preconditions are not ripe for a no-first-use policy at this time. Russia
and North Korea are hostile. The Obama administration choked at the last minute on declaring a no-first-use policy, largely because of
pushback from allies who are under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And restraint is not a word normally associated with President Trump, who
threat to defend allies such as South Korea and Japan with nuclear weapons these days is hardly
credible. In Europe, Russia is busy cutting military spending as its oil revenues shrink, with plans to cut the defense
budget by 30 percent.93 This is not the sign of a country poised to invade the Baltics. Trump could act on his desire for better
trades in excess. But the
relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin to begin rolling back both countries’ nuclear posturing in Europe. Adoption of a no-first-use
policy will require close consultation with allies, but the U.S. administration should begin this task.
The United States could unilaterally adopt a no-first-use policy, asking other nuclear-armed states to do the same. This
would constitute formal adoption of what is already essentially de facto U.S. policy.94 As even card-carrying realists such as the
“four horsemen” recognized, given overwhelming U.S. conventional capabilities on the battlefield, there
exists no plausible scenario in which nuclear first use would be in the interest of the United States. A U.S. nofirst-use policy would create political space for Russia to follow suit. A common no-first-use policy would also
help anchor the existing no-first-use policies of China and India and implicitly acknowledge their leadership in this area,
a virtue when middle-power states are feeling disenfranchised from the global nuclear order.
As an initial step on the way to no-first-use and a regime of nuclear restraint, the U.S. administration should consider the recent proposal by
Jeffrey Lewis and Scott Sagan that the United States should declare it will not use nuclear weapons “against any target that could be reliably
destroyed by conventional means.”95 This policy would not solve the larger problem of the unhappy entangling of conventional and nuclear
deterrence (for example, U.S. hypersonic weapons targeted against China). Nevertheless, it would represent an initial important declaratory
statement of nuclear restraint.
Switch maintains deterrence
Wright and Young 1 [David Wright is a nationally known expert on the technical aspects of nuclear weapon policy, a former
research analyst with the Federation of American Scientists, and a SSRC-MacArthur fellow and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.
Stephen Young is the former deputy director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, a senior analyst at the British American Security
Information Council, and a fellow in the State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights.] May 2015. “Taking Nuclear Missiles Off Hair-Trigger
Alert.” Union of Concerned Scientists. Accessed 12-10-2019 from https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/05/Hair-TriggerAlert-Policy-Brief.pdf. JLee.
Former military leaders in the United States and Russia have called on both countries to remove the option of launch-onwarning from their
nuclear plans. Moreover, they argue this step is most important in times of heightened tensions when “the likelihood of human and technical
error in control systems increases,” in part because leaders may be more likely to interpret an ambiguous warning as real (Cartwright and
Dvorkin 2015). The only reason for keeping missiles on hair-trigger alert is to allow them to be launched on warning of an attack. A
decision
to eliminate the launch-on-warning option would eliminate the reason for keeping missiles on hairtrigger alert. Taking silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) off high alert is an important step to
reduce the risk of nuclear use. (All U.S. ICBMs are in silos; Russia also deploys some mobile ICBMs.) Since silo-based missiles are at known, fixed
locations and are thus vulnerable to attack by nuclear weapons, if sensors detected an incoming attack, military and political leaders would be
under extreme time pressure to make a decision whether to launch these missiles before they could be destroyed. Even
if ICBMs were
taken off high alert, both countries would still retain a strong deterrent because both have nuclear
forces on submarines that cannot be attacked when they are hidden at sea. There are many ways to prevent the
rapid launch of silobased missiles. Our recommendation for U.S. missiles is a particularly simple one. U.S. ICBM silos
contain a “safety control switch” that is used to prevent missile launches when maintenance work is being done on the
silos. The switch can be used to “safe” U.S. ICBMs so they cannot be fired until a worker physically enters
the silo and returns the switch to its operational position.
Solves case—miscalc, accidents, and hacking.
Wright and Young 2 [David Wright is a nationally known expert on the technical aspects of nuclear weapon policy, a former
research analyst with the Federation of American Scientists, and a SSRC-MacArthur fellow and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.
Stephen Young is the former deputy director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, a senior analyst at the British American Security
Information Council, and a fellow in the State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights.] May 2015. “Taking Nuclear Missiles Off Hair-Trigger
Alert.” Union of Concerned Scientists. Accessed 12-10-2019 from https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/05/Hair-TriggerAlert-Policy-Brief.pdf. JLee.
Some argue that taking missiles off high alert could be destabilizing: If one country put its missiles back onto hair-trigger alert in a visible way
during a crisis, that could lead to a “re-alerting race” between the two countries that could further increase tensions. However, removing
the option of launch-on-warning from war plans means there would be no reason to have missiles on
prompt-launch status, and therefore no reason to return them to high alert during a crisis. With no need to
re-alert, there would be no re-alerting race. Ending launch-on-warning and taking missiles off hair-trigger alert
would eliminate the risk of a mistaken launch based on erroneous or misinterpreted warning. It would
also essentially eliminate the risk of accidental or unauthorized launches. While security would be most enhanced if
both the United States and Russia removed their silo-based missiles from hair-trigger alert, the United States should not wait for Russia to act.
Taking U.S. land-based missiles off alert would be in the best interest of the United States: it would reduce the risk of unintended or mistaken
U.S. launches, which could lead to a retaliatory strike against the United States. And a U.S. decision to take this step could encourage Russia to
reciprocate.
**1NC Addons**
1NC
Counterplan: <<Insert Country Name>> should implement a policy of operational nofirst-use.
NFU creates a new regime of nuclear restraint- solves the aff
Tannenwald, 18 -- Director, International Relations Brown, Watson Institute for International Studies,
Brown University
[Nina, “The Great Unraveling: The Future of the Nuclear Normative Order,” MEETING THE CHALLENGES
OF THE NEW NUCLEAR AGE: EMERGING RISKS AND DECLINING NORMS IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION AND CHANGING NUCLEAR DOCTRINES, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2018, p.
27-29]
The cornerstone of a renewed regime of nuclear restraint would be strengthening the norm of non-use
of nuclear weapons through the adoption of a declared no-first-use policy by all the nuclear powers. There have been increasing numbers
of proposals for the United States to adopt a no-first-use policy in recent years, with compelling analyses. However, the case can be made more
strongly for common declared no-first-use policies as the linchpin of a renewed regime of nuclear restraint among the nuclear powers.
A no-first-use policy means that nuclear
powers would rely on nuclear weapons only to deter nuclear attacks.87
Adoption of no-first-use would not simply be “mere words,” but rather both doctrinal and operational issues would follow
from it.88 An operational no-first-use doctrine would eliminate first-strike postures, preemptive
capabilities, and other types of destabilizing warfighting strategies. It would induce restraint in targeting,
launch-on-warning, alert levels of deployed systems, procurement, and modernization plans. In other words, it
would help shape the physical qualities of nuclear forces in a way that renders them unsuitable for
missions other than deterrence of nuclear attacks.89 A no-first-use policy also would reduce the risk of accidental,
unauthorized, mistaken, or preemptive use. The removal of threats of a nuclear first strike would strengthen strategic
and crisis stability.90 It would also make absolute the boundary between nuclear and conventional
weapons. Finally, by reducing the overall risk of nuclear dangers, no-first-use policies would move toward addressing humanitarian concerns
and reducing the salience of nuclear weapons.91
no-first-use could be adopted unilaterally or as part of an international agreement. It would move Russia and
Pakistan away from their high-risk doctrines and reduce a source of Russia-NATO tensions. For Russia to consider noAs others have argued,
first-use, its concerns about U.S. ballistic missile defenses, imbalances in conventional forces, and issues of NATO enlargement would need to
be addressed. The United States would need to address the issue of extended deterrence with its allies and move toward conventional
extended deterrence.92 India and Pakistan would need a modus vivendi on Kashmir. The United States and North Korea would need a
nonaggression pact.
What are the prospects for this? Skeptics will object that the geopolitical preconditions are not ripe for a no-first-use policy at this time. Russia
and North Korea are hostile. The Obama administration choked at the last minute on declaring a no-first-use policy, largely because of
pushback from allies who are under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And restraint is not a word normally associated with President Trump, who
threat to defend allies such as South Korea and Japan with nuclear weapons these days is hardly
credible. In Europe, Russia is busy cutting military spending as its oil revenues shrink, with plans to cut the defense
budget by 30 percent.93 This is not the sign of a country poised to invade the Baltics. Trump could act on his desire for better
trades in excess. But the
relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin to begin rolling back both countries’ nuclear posturing in Europe. Adoption of a no-first-use
policy will require close consultation with allies, but the U.S. administration should begin this task.
The United States could unilaterally adopt a no-first-use policy, asking other nuclear-armed states to do the same. This
would constitute formal adoption of what is already essentially de facto U.S. policy.94 As even card-carrying realists such as the
“four horsemen” recognized, given overwhelming U.S. conventional capabilities on the battlefield, there
exists no plausible scenario in which nuclear first use would be in the interest of the United States. A U.S. nofirst-use policy would create political space for Russia to follow suit. A common no-first-use policy would also
help anchor the existing no-first-use policies of China and India and implicitly acknowledge their leadership in this area,
a virtue when middle-power states are feeling disenfranchised from the global nuclear order.
As an initial step on the way to no-first-use and a regime of nuclear restraint, the U.S. administration should consider the recent proposal by
Jeffrey Lewis and Scott Sagan that the United States should declare it will not use nuclear weapons “against any target that could be reliably
destroyed by conventional means.”95 This policy would not solve the larger problem of the unhappy entangling of conventional and nuclear
deterrence (for example, U.S. hypersonic weapons targeted against China). Nevertheless, it would represent an initial important declaratory
statement of nuclear restraint.
--solves accidental use
Operational NFU solves – strengthens strategic stability and ends re-altering pressures
Bruce Blair, Research Scholar, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, former U.S. Air Force Minuteman launch control
officer, former Project Director, U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, former Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program,
Brookings Institution, Co-Founder, Global Zero, and former Member, International Security Advisory Board, U.S. Secretary of State, Jessica
Sleight, Senior Policy Analyst, Global Zero and Emma Claire Foley, Research and Policy Asstiant, Global Zero, THE END OF NUCLEAR
WARFIGHTING: MOVING TO A DETERRENCE-ONLY POSTURE: AN ALTERNATIVE U.S. NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW, Program on Science and Global
18, p. 49-52.
Security, Princeton University, 9—
The current U.S. (and Russian) nuclear force posture is on a hair trigger. Land-based missiles on launch-ready alert—95 percent of the deployed
force of 400 missiles—will fire immediately upon receiving a short stream of computer code. The computers aboard U.S. missiles may be
accessed through underground cables (30,000 miles of cable interconnecting the missiles with underground launch centers) and radio antennas
linked to airborne launch centers.78 Both the cables and the antennas represent potential access points and apertures for unauthorized cyber
infiltration. The missiles cannot distinguish between a valid launch code from an authorized source and one from an unauthorized source. The
launch crews are also hypervigilant, ready to carry out the launch process a minute or so after receiving a valid and authentic launch order.
They will accept and implement such an order regardless of its original or immediate source. The higher-level commanders are also primed to
react very rapidly to a deteriorating security environment or indications of imminent or apparent actual attack. Crisis procedures call for rapidly
putting off-alert forces on alert, and, subject to presidential approval, launching the alert forces on warning of an attack that is imminent or in
progress. These operations relegate the actions of the president and hundreds of subordinates throughout the chain of command to
splitsecond choices and short checklists. Instead of pressing the president to make fateful decisions in minutes or even seconds, the U.S.
posture should afford the president and senior advisers ample time, measured in hours or days, to consider the best course of action.
Furthermore, the posture should not project a sudden first-strike threat that exerts intense pressure on Russia or any other nuclear-armed
potential adversary to decide in minutes whether to launch on warning during the 15- to 30-minute flight time of incoming U.S. nuclear
warheads lofted by submarine and land-based ballistic missiles, respectively. Projecting
a constant threat of massive attack
only increases the risk that the United States will be on the receiving end of an attack triggered by false
warning, misjudgment, panic, or unauthorized acts. Currently, Russia’s posture reflects this dangerous time sensitivity; it
requires a presidential launch decision within two to four minutes after ground radars pick up missiles or warheads in flight and enables
Moscow-based senior military commanders to fire their dispersed remote silo-based missile forces in 20 seconds.79 Steps should be taken to
reduce the U.S. and Russian bias toward prompt launch and shift it toward second-strike retaliation in order to preserve the president’s sole
launch authority, increase his or her warning and decision time, and generally strengthen stability and safety. One
critical step
discussed in detail below is for both sides to abandon their deterrence-plus-warfighting strategies,
whose successful execution depends heavily on preemption and launch on warning. Another step is to
adopt NFU and make it operationally credible and transparent. The option to execute a sudden large-scale decapitation
strike against Russia involving more than 300 U.S. warheads should be eliminated by progressively de-alerting the U.S. nuclear missile forces.
The United States should institute near-term de-alerting measures requiring 24–72 hours to reverse, such as “safing” silo-based missiles to
block launch circuits.80 Reversing that step requires maintenance crews to reenter the silos and switch on the launch circuitry. Another step
would be removing warheads or other critical components from missiles and storing them at their home base or other locations, such as the 50
empty Minuteman silos in Montana. By 2028, the de-alerted Minuteman force should be fully dismantled and permanently retired and its
replacement program canceled. All
U.S. SSBNs at sea should be placed on “modified alert” status. The handful that
today routinely patrol at their launch stations in the North Atlantic and western Pacific Oceans and the
Norwegian Sea ready to fire within 15 minutes of receiving an order to do so would adopt a less taut
posture. The current strict requirements of speed, depth, navigation, and communications would be
relaxed. The current requirement for alert submarines to maintain continuous communications and
readiness to fire in minutes would be extended to 24–72 hours as is currently the case with U.K. ballisticmissile submarines.81 In addition to reducing the risks of an unintended nuclear launch, this step would
provide greater freedom to train and exercise at sea. Other measures, such as the removal and onboard storage of
“inverters,” which permit electricity to flow to the explosives that propel submarine missiles out of their launch tubes, are among the many dealerting steps to be considered to reinforce the new timeline requirement. Regarding
U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, the
forward-based bombs in Europe assigned to U.S. and NATO dual-capable aircraft (DCA) currently reside in their
collocated storage vaults and bunkers in peacetime, with warhead uploading and other re-alerting steps requiring days to many months for
different portions of the force.82 These
nuclear-capable warplanes are highly vulnerable and have little or no
military utility. The United States should seek NATO approval to withdraw the tactical nuclear weapons, of which there are about 180,
back to U.S. central storage locations as a confidence-building measure on the condition that Russia reciprocates on a comparable scale.83 A
portion of Russia’s approximately 800 forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons, located at a dozen or so bases on the European
continent—with warheads/bombs stored separately but near to the missiles and warplanes—would be relocated to Russia’s central storage
sites. These
changes, if fully adopted by Russia as well as the United States, would significantly reduce the
risks of premature, mistaken, unauthorized, and accidental use of their tactical nuclear weapons and
could help improve the security environment in Europe. It would extend warning and decision time by at
least 24 hours in one of the current nuclear flashpoint regions of the world. The overall effect would be
to greatly strengthen strategic stability. The United States should also strike an agreement with Russia that steadily decreases the
number of strategic weapons on alert, particularly silo-based “use or lose” missiles. A worthwhile goal would be a seven-year phased and
verifiable de-alerting regime resulting in a total peacetime force of 200–250 warheads on alert on each side, with no more than 100 warheads
on land-based missiles. The remaining forces of all types would require 24–72 hours to return to alert. Off-alert units would periodically rotate
back to alert to relieve units rotating off alert. The goal beyond the next seven years would be to stand down the entire alert force on both
sides and eliminate the option of prompt launch from their operational arsenals. The
United States could take all its forces off
of launch-ready alert independent of Russia’s alert posture without weakening its deterrence-only
posture. The U.S. Defense Department has often expressed unfounded concern that a crisis would spark
a frenzied re-alerting race that destabilizes a confrontation. In its view, such a race would court
misperception of intentions and could well tempt the faster racer to strike preemptively. But this
argument ignores the basic fact that no such incentives would exist as long as survivable second-strike
forces remain on both sides, capable of delivering a devastating blow in response to an attack, even if
delayed by a day or more. There would be no advantage gained by either side, whether by racing to realert or by striking preemptively. Any putative lead in a re-alerting race would be meaningless compared
to the catastrophic punishment that could be assuredly meted out by the opponent’s retaliation. The
Defense Department has lost sight of its own core principle that a credible threat of devastating
retaliation is the bedrock of nuclear deterrence. Survivability, not alert status, is the necessary and
sufficient condition of its effectiveness. Any re-alerting fears would be further allayed if both the United
States and Russia would shift from their current deterrence-plus-warfighting strategies inclined toward
preemption to deterrence-only strategies geared to second strike responses. A fleet of five survivable atsea U.S. SSBNs in a deterrence-only posture would be more stabilizing and less prone to re-alerting
pressures than today’s deterrence-plus-warfighting posture.
--solves signaling
-- about US
Operational NFU creates clear redlines that resolve Trump’s unpredictable signaling
Bruce Blair 18, Ph.D. from Yale in operations research, research scholar at the program on science and
global security at Princeton, Jan/Feb 18, “Strengthening Checks on Presidential Nuclear Launch
Authority,” Arms Control Today,
https://www.armscontrol.org/sites/default/files/files/ACT/ACT_JanFeb18_Blair_Prepublication.pdf
A six-minute deadline for deliberation and decision is ridiculous. The president needs much more warning and decision time to rationally cope
with indications of a nuclear attack on the United States or its allies. He must no longer be jammed to authorize what could be a civilization
ending response to attack indications that may be false. The
risks of miscalculation and irrational decision-making
leading to incoherent operations and further escalation are unacceptably high.
This terrifying reality has been ignored for decades. Reform is long overdue. This means that the current prompt launch posture must be
drastically altered. Use-or-lose forces such as the silo-based missile force should be eliminated. Launch on warning should be eliminated.
Reducing the vulnerability of command, control, and communications to kinetic attack and cyberattack should be the top priority of the nuclear
modernization plan, even if it means cutting spending on replacement forces in the pipeline. The submarine force has already become the
premier leg of the strategic triad, the central component of U.S. deterrence policy. This force can patiently wait for months for direction from
higher authority.
Equally overdue
is the adoption of a policy that eschews the first use of nuclear weapons. A clear marker
would be established in limiting the president’s leeway to initiate a first strike.17 If taken seriously, the
operational plans would also be modified in ways that would hamstring any effort to order the use of
nuclear weapons without apparent cause.
Congress has considerable legal standing to pass legislation that prohibits first use. A recent bill introduced by
Representative Adam Smith (D-Wash.) is a step in this direction,18 but a law would draw real redlines around the policy.
Crossing them would make the president accountable and even impeachable.
Finishing 1AC
The Trump administration appears
to be heading in the opposite direction. Its nuclear review in the works is
leaning toward the deployment of smaller-yield nuclear weapons (e.g., a primary-only warhead on Trident missiles)
that will make them more usable in both first- and second-use scenarios. It is also leaning toward widening the
conditions under which nuclear weapons may be used first in response to non-nuclear strategic
aggression and toward revoking Obama era assurances given to non-nuclear countries that the United States
would never attack them with nuclear weapons. The key challenge is moving to a true retaliatory posture that allows the
president and his successors to provide enduring command and control over the submarine force. The nuclear protocol would thus place
priority on their quick and safe evacuation to survivable and enduring command centers.
--solves deterrence
It solves deterrence -- even latent nuclear capability sufficiently deters conflict.
Fuhrmann 18 (Matthew, professor of polisci at Texas A&M. “The Logic of Latent Nuclear Deterrence” February 4, 2018)
Nuclear deterrence is central to international relations theory and practice. Most
people assume that countries must possess
nuclear weapons in order to reap deterrence benefits from their nuclear programs. This article shows, however, that
latent nuclear powers - nonnuclear states that possess the capacity to make weapons - can deter
aggression, despite their lack of assembled warheads. Latent nuclear deterrence works because states that
possess the technology needed to produce bombs can threaten to initiate or accelerate nuclear
weapons programs if they are attacked. A fixed effects regression analysis that includes 170 countries
from 1946 to 2010, using data compiled by the author on the global spread of sensitive nuclear
technology, provides evidence consistent with three of the theory’s testable predictions. First, switching
from non-latency to latency reduces the probability of being targeted in a violent military dispute in a given
year by 3.32 percentage points. Second, having nuclear latency does not deter less serious, nonviolent disputes.
Third, the development of non-sensitive nuclear technology that does not provide states with latent
nuclear capacity is not associated with a lower likelihood of being attacked. A qualitative analysis of Iran’s nuclear
activities from 2002 to 2015 illustrate these statistical findings. This evidence has lessons for the debate about nuclear disarmament: most
scholars and policymakers are skeptical that the prospect of nuclear rearmament in a disarmed world could deter serious international
disputes, but the case for latent nuclear deterrence is stronger than critics would lead us to believe.
Much ink has been spilled on the subject of nuclear deterrence.1 Most scholarship assumes, at least
implicitly, that nuclear technology has little value for deterrence unless countries can immediately
retaliate with nuclear weapons. In this view, a nuclear arsenal provides an effective deterrent because it can swiftly destroy an
opponent’s dearest possessions, such as cities. Without providing the capacity to launch a nuclear strike, nuclear technology cannot deter
military conflict and may actually invite it by providing adversaries with incentives to launch preventive wars.
The conventional view of nuclear deterrence may understate the strategic benefits of nuclear
technology. Nuclear weapons are indeed valuable deterrents, but the mere capacity to produce a nuclear bomb could limit military
aggression as well. Countries with nuclear latency - nonnuclear states that have developed the capacity to
make weapons - might be able to deter attacks even though they are incapable of immediate nuclear
retaliation. How is nuclear deterrence without bombs possible?
States with dual-use nuclear technology possess the potential foundation for a nuclear weapons program. When
states build
sensitive nuclear plants they send a warning to others: “we have come this far and we can go further, if
necessary.” The development of nuclear latency, then, resembles a shot across the bow. If a latent nuclear
power perceives that its interests are threatened, it might begin a nuclear weapons program or accelerate an existing one. The prospect
of fomenting nuclear proliferation may induce caution among the latent state’s potential adversaries,
leading to less military conflict. I call this means of influence latent nuclear deterrence.
Some practitioners appear to embrace the notion that nuclear latency bolsters deterrence. In 2011, Shigeru Ishiba, a former Japanese defense minister, put it this
way: “I don’t think Japan needs to possess nuclear weapons, but it’s important to maintain our commercial reactors because it would allow us to produce a nuclear
warhead in a short amount of time.” Having nuclear latency, he added, serves as “a tacit nuclear deterrent.”2 Pakistani officials, particularly those in the Army, also
hold an “enduring belief” that the country’s latent nuclear capacity deterred military conflict in the 1980s - before it assembled a warhead or carried out a nuclear
test.3
Does latent nuclear deterrence work? If so, under what conditions? We know surprisingly little about the efficacy of deterrence without bombs. This is unfortunate
given the practical significance of this issue. More than 30 states - three times as many as built nuclear weapons - have developed sensitive dual-use nuclear
technology over the last 70 years. There are
indications that this number could increase: Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries have publicly asserted that they will develop latent nuclear
capabilities, though it remains to be seen whether that objective will materialize.4 Moreover, as this article will make clear, latent
nuclear
capacity carries implications for the study of nuclear proliferation and military deterrence in scholarship.
This article unpacks the logic of latent nuclear deterrence. It revisits the fundamentals of deterrence theory to identify the basic requirements
for success, and then evaluates whether having nuclear latency helps states meet those requirements. The theory holds that latent nuclear
deterrence is more effective than other research would lead us to believe. In this paper, I test three of the theory’s empirical predictions using
existing data on military conflict and the newly-released Nuclear Latency (NL) dataset, which contains information on sensitive nuclear
technology - specifically uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing (ENR) activities - in all countries from 1939 to 2012.5 The analysis
produces evidence consistent with latent nuclear deterrence theory. First, developing nuclear latency lowers the likelihood that a state will be
targeted in violent military disputes. Second, latent nuclear capabilities do not appear to deter less serious, nonviolent conflicts. Third, nuclear
programs do not significantly bolster deterrence when countries engage in non-sensitive activities but fail to achieve a state of nuclear latency.
There are good reasons to expect that nuclear weapons also bolster deterrence. How
do latent nuclear forces compare to
nuclear arsenals? Some evidence suggests that nuclear latency is less beneficial for deterring military
disputes than nuclear weapons. However, there is considerable uncertainty about this relationship. We
cannot rule out the possibility, based on my analysis, that latent nuclear forces are superior to nuclear
arsenals.
In his 1984 book The Abolition, the disarmament advocate Jonathan Schell popularized the concept of weaponless deterrence.6 Schell desired a
world in which nuclear powers dismantled their warheads but retained the capacity to reconstitute their arsenals. In the event of war, countries
such as the United States could quickly rearm, putting themselves in a position to retaliate with nuclear strikes. Weaponless deterrence, then,
works just like traditional nuclear deterrence except that there is a short delay between the aggressor’s military provocation and the defender’s
ability to carry out a nuclear response. Subsequent work characterized this form of deterrence as a system of “virtual nuclear arsenals (VNAs).”7
However, most international relations scholars and nuclear strategists are skeptical that
latent nuclear deterrence can work.8 As Kenneth Waltz put it, “a latent nuclear force is at best a shaky deterrent.”9 Colin Gray calls the idea of a latent deterrent
“appallingly poor.” “The idea of virtual nuclear arsenals,” he writes, “is such a bad one that even many among the Western opinion leaders who routinely will
endorse propositions for policy that staple together disarmament, anti-nuclear action, and clever-sounding theory are unlikely to be seduced.”10 For these scholars,
the delay between an attack and punishment renders latent nuclear forces feeble.11 There is little hope, based on this view, for latent nuclear deterrence to work as
well as deterrence with operationally deployed arsenals.
My findings suggest that weaponless deterrence is more viable than critics suggest. Historically, based on my analysis, developing
latent
nuclear capacity resulted in countries being targeted in violent disputes at a lower rate. Proponents of VNAs
actually understate the deterrence benefits of nuclear latency. These scholars focus on one particular type of nuclear latency: a situation in
which a former a nuclear power could reconstitute an arsenal and quickly deliver retaliatory strike. Throughout the nuclear age, however, very
few countries could do this. Even Japan, a prototypical latent nuclear power, would probably take six months to produce a bomb following a
political decision, possibly longer. Others that carried out sensitive nuclear activities - including Spain, Sweden, and Taiwan - were likely one or
more years from being able to carry out a nuclear attack at the height of their efforts. VNA
advocates do not seriously consider
that these countries may have benefited from having a latent nuclear capacity because their focus is on
rapid nuclear rearmament by former nuclear powers. My analysis shows that far less advanced nuclear
programs can help countries deter military disputes, at least under certain conditions.
At the same time, there is some truth to the critical view of VNAs. The conditions for successful latent nuclear deterrence may not always hold.
One can point to cases - the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, for instance - where it failed. Critics
go too far when they characterize
latent nuclear forces as “at best ... shaky,” but there are clear limits to deterring military conflict with
nuclear latency. If one’s goal is to make violent conflict impossible, they are likely to find latent nuclear
forces wanting. Moreover, when it comes to reducing the risk of violent conflict, a latent nuclear deterrent is better than nothing but it
might not be as beneficial as possessing a nuclear arsenal. The evidence on this front is mixed, though, and the difference between arsenals and
latency for deterrence is smaller than what VNA skeptics would expect.
See, for example, Waltz (1997), Roberts (1997), Cohen & Pilat (1998), Payne (1998), Gray (1999), and Ford (2011).
8
Waltz (1997, 155).
9
Gray (1999, 117).
10
Critics also reject VNAs on the grounds that pursuing nuclear disarmament is impractical and would produce instability because there would be strong incentives
to surreptitiously rearm.
11
3
Nuclear latency has long been suspected of heightening global and regional insecurity. In particular, scholars
and practitioners draw a connection between dual-use nuclear technology and preventive war. One
state’s development of dual-use nuclear technology, the argument goes, causes a rival to fear that the
developer intends to build bombs, leading the rival to take military action before it is too late. Israel’s
12
attacks against nuclear plants in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007), as well as the contemporary crisis over Iran’s nuclear program, appear to support
this line of thinking. The
theory and evidence presented here, however, show that latent nuclear capacity
deters - not provokes - violent military disputes more often than not. Nuclear programs can indeed lead to war but
the conditions under which they are likely to do so are rarer than most studies acknowledge.
1nc—extra solvency
NFU good – multiple warrants and solves the aff
Gerson 10
[Michael S. Gerson, Michael S. Gerson is an independent consultant in Atlanta, Georgia. He was
previously a division lead, project director, and senior analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, where
his research focused on nuclear and conventional deterrence, nuclear strategy, and arms control. From
2011–2012 he was appointed to the office of the secretary of defense and in 2009–2010 he was a staff
member on the Nuclear Posture Review. He has published numerous articles and book chapters on
nuclear issues, co-chaired a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)-funded commission on
the future of US-Russia nuclear arms control, and served as a committee member of a CSIS-funded
commission on US-China nuclear relations. “No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy.”
Quarterly Journal: International Security, vol. 35. no. 2. (Fall 2010): 7-47 MM]
For the United States and its allies, NFU has several military and political benefits. First, and most
important, NFU would enhance crisis stability. A credible NFU policy will help decrease an opponent’s
trepidations about a U.S. First strike, thereby decreasing the possibility that nuclear weapons are used
accidentally, inadvertently, or deliberately in a severe crisis. Second, by removing the option to use
nuclear weapons first, the United States would have a consistent and inherently credible nuclear policy.
Although some states might question U.S. political resolve to use nuclear weapons first—in which case
the NPR’s decision to retain the option in many circumstances does not contribute to
deterrence—current and potential adversaries cannot dismiss the possibility of a nuclear response after
U.S. interests have been attacked with nuclear weapons. 105 The threat to use nuclear weapons in
response to a nuclear attack is highly credible, and it is a threat that U.S. political leaders should want to
execute if deterrence fails. In fact, NFU could further strengthen the credibility of nuclear deterrence by
signaling that the United States retains nuclear forces only for retaliation to a nuclear attack, which, in
the mind of the adversary, could increase the likelihood that nuclear retaliation would indeed come if it
crosses the nuclear threshold.106An NFU declaration would be a kind of commitment tactic that would
increase the credibility of nuclear deterrence by seemingly binding U.S. decisionmakers to use nuclear
weapons for the one mission they have been assigned in the event of a nuclear attack.107 Third, NFU
places primary emphasis on U.S. conventional forces. By relegating nuclear weapons to the sole mission
of retaliation for nuclear attacks, the United States would make conventional forces the sole instrument
of war fighting absent an opponent’s nuclear escalation. Given U.S. advantages in conventional power,
this is precisely the level where it should want to fight. NFU would place a necessary and important
burden on the Defense Department to maintain superior conventional forces and power-projection
capabilities against any conceivable threat. This responsibility would ensure that political and military
leaders would not again be tempted, as they were in the early period of the Cold War, to rely on the
threat of nuclear escalation as a cost-efficient alternative to expending the effort and resources to
maintain conventional superiority. Fourth, NFU could help assuage some of the recent criticisms of U.S.
missile defense and nuclear stockpile maintenance initiatives. NFU could help assure states that might
be threatened by U.S. missile defense efforts that they are for purely defensive purposes. NFU could
help alleviate concerns that missile defenses might be used to complement offensive operations, such
as providing a “safety net” for any remaining weapons launched in retaliation after a U.S. counterforce
first strike against a state’s nuclear capabilities. An NFU policy might also score political points with
domestic opposition to efforts by the United States to update its aging nuclear stockpile, which has been
criticized because of the potential negative impact on U.S. nonproliferation efforts. A nu-clear doctrine
that de-emphasized nuclear weapons by relegating them only to deterrence of a nuclear attack could
help ease domestic and international concerns that efforts to update and enhance the safety and
security features of the U.S. nuclear arsenal might inadvertently signal that the United States views
nuclear weapons as militarily useful. Fifth, an NFU declaration might also provide an incentive to other
nuclear powers to revise their nuclear policies. Although changes in U.S. declaratory policy might not
affect North Korean and Iranian nuclear decisions, there is some evidence suggesting that changes in
U.S. nuclear policy can influence other nuclear states. India, for example, revised its nuclear policy in
January 2003 to include the option to use nuclear weapons in response to CW or BW at-tacks,
apparently in an effort to more closely align its policies with the United States and other nuclear powers.
Following the U.S. disclosure in May 2010 of the exact size of its nuclear stockpile, the United Kingdom
followed suit, ex-plaining, “[T]he time is now right to be more open about the weapons we hold.” In
addition, the U.K. government stated, “[W]e have decided that the time is right to look again at our
[nuclear] policy, as the U.S. has done in the recent Nuclear Posture Review, to ensure that it is fully
appropriate for the political and security context in 2010 and beyond.”109 Finally, because NFU would
be an important departure from the past six de-cades of U.S. nuclear policy, it would provide the United
States with important political benefits in its efforts to lead the nonproliferation regime and encourage
greater international support for nonproliferation initiatives. Retaining the option to use nuclear
weapons first undermines the NPT regime by signaling that even the world’s most affluent and powerful
nation continues to believe that nuclear weapons are important instruments of national power. This
perception contributes to international claims of American nuclear hypocrisy, as the United States seeks
to both retain its nuclear weapons and lead the NPT regime to prevent others from acquiring them.110
Although it is unlikely that other nations would make such politically and economically important
decisions about whether to build or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons based on what the United
States says or does with its nuclear arsenal—if anything, U.S. conventional superiority is more likely to
affect states’ strategic calculations—recalcitrant countries have nevertheless blamed or at least referred
to U.S. nu-clear precedents to defend and justify their nuclear decisions.111North Korea, for example,
claimed that the first-use option in the 2010 NPR “proves that the present U.S. policy toward the DPRK is
nothing different from the hostile pol-icy pursued by the Bush administration....As long as the U.S.
nuclear threat persists, the DPRK will increase and update various type[s] of nuclear weapons as its
deterrent in such a manner as it deems necessary in the daysahead.”112 For nonnuclear NPT member
states, especially members of the Nonaligned Movement, NFU would satisfy a long-standing desire for
the United States to show a tangible commitment to Article 6 of the NPT, which commits the five
declared nuclear weapons states under the treaty to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament.” Several nonnuclear NPT states have said that a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons
in U.S. security policy such as NFU, rather than simple reductions in the number of weapons in the U.S.
arsenal, would be a clear and convincing demonstration of the U.S. commitment to eventual
disarmament.113These states have often based their lack of support for U.S.-led multilateral
nonproliferation initiatives, including support for sanctions against proliferate regimes at the UN
Security Council, on the grounds that the United States has not done enough to fulfil its Article6
obligations. Thus, NFU, by symbolizing an important step toward realizing Article 6, would remove a
significant roadblock to greater support for and participation in the NPT regime among nonnuclear NPT
member states. NFU would therefore have an important, albeit indirect, effect on nonproliferation by
encouraging greater multilateral alignment with U.S.-led nonproliferation efforts. At the very least, an
NFU policy would help expose states that use the U.S. commitment to Article 6 as an excuse not to
vigorously support nonproliferation.
1nc – nuclear terror
No First Use allows retaliatory strikes that deter nuclear terrorism
Blair 18
Blair, Bruce G. "The End Of Nuclear Warfighting: Moving To A Deterrence-Only Posture". Program On Science And Global Security, Princeton
University Global Zero, Washington, DC, September 2018, 2018, Accessed 31 Dec 2019. SHS TG
Strengthening the security of nuclear weapons and weapon-grade materials during transportation as well as storage is a top priority to guard
against terrorist capture or theft. But it has also become apparent that guarding against state or nonstate cyberattacks that could disrupt
nuclear operations is a rising priority. The posture changes recommended by this report address this concern. The nuclear C3 and early-warning
networks should receive better cyber protection, and the time required to launch Minuteman III missiles should be increased by taking them off
alert. Minuteman missiles must not continue to be technically configured to fire instantly upon receiving a short stream of computer signals
whose source may be unauthorized actors who have succeeded in hacking the network. U.S.
nuclear weapons have no role in
directly countering nuclear terrorism. However, they have a role in deterring states from deliberately
enabling terrorists to obtain or employ nuclear weapons against the United States or its allies. The 2018
U.S. Nuclear Posture Review asserts that any state that is complicit in such a nuclear terrorist attack will
be considered a nuclear aggressor and will be held accountable for it by any means necessary.161 This
makes sense if the 161 NPR, XVI. state sponsor can be positively identified and its intention is clear. For
deterrence purposes, the United States should reserve the right to respond in kind against the
sponsoring state. However, the United States possesses ample conventional tools for responding to statesponsored nuclear (or
biological) terrorism. A non-nuclear response may be the prudent choice in many circumstances.
1nc—movements
Spurs grassroots anti-nuclear weapons movement
Piper 19
[Kelsey Piper, Kelsey is a Staff Writer for Vox's new vertical with a focus on the global poor, animal
welfare, and risks affecting a stable future for our world. She previously worked as the head of the
writing team at Triplebyte, and ran Stanford Effective Altruism during college. (Feb 11, 2019) Elizabeth
Warren wants to ban the US from using nuclear weapons first - Vox. Retrieved December 12, 2019, from
https://www.vox.com/2019/2/11/18216686/elizabeth-warren-ban-nuclear-weapons-no-first-use MM]
Two weeks ago, a major national security bill was introduced in both houses of Congress — and hardly anyone noticed. That bill, introduced by Sen. Elizabeth
Warren and House Armed Services Committee Chair Adam Smith, was the No First Use Act, and it aims to transform US nuclear weapons policy. The
text of
the bill is a single sentence: “It is the policy of the United States to not use nuclear weapons first.” But that
single sentence might be a really big deal. Proponents argue that it’s the first step toward a better nuclear posture that will reduce the risk of an
accident killing hundreds of thousands or spiraling into a global catastrophe. Nuclear weapons remain one of the biggest threats to human life. But opponents argue
that it could instead destabilize international nuclear policy, driving arms races in countries that currently count on the US to protect them. Taking either side at face
value, it seems like one of the most important conversations we can be having. But nuclear security policy hasn’t featured much in mainstream politics, no matter
how significant its implications — or maybe because they’re so significant, they feel a little ridiculous to engage with. A nuclear war could kill billions. Nuclear
weapons have nearly been deployed by mistake, more than once. Yeah, sure, the Cold War’s over. But the conversation about safe nuclear policy really, really
shouldn’t be. The No First Use Act won’t do much by itself, but if it’s a sign we’re ready to have a real conversation about how US policy can reduce the risk of a
nuclear war, it’s a welcome one. The roots of No First Use The one time the United States used nuclear weapons in war, it was to end a conflict being fought with
conventional weapons. Since then, we’ve stopped thinking of nuclear weapons as just another tool in our toolbox in a
conventional fight. “When we initially had the bomb, there were lots of questions about whether this was just something you could integrate into your arsenal,”
Alex Wellerstein, who studies the history of nuclear weapons at the Stevens Institute of Technology, told me. As the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear
capabilities, and as expanding capabilities and early speculation about nuclear winter made it more obvious that the use of nuclear weapons could wipe out both
countries, it stopped making any sense to treat nuclear weapons like just a bigger bomb. That’s when people first started pressing for US commitments not to use
the bomb except in retaliation, if the Soviet Union bombed us. During the Cold War, this was a fringe stance. “People have advocated since the 1960s that people
adopt a no first use policy,” Wellerstein said. “It’s usually been groups from outside the mainstream of policy.” The mainstream stance was — and still is — that
we’d use nuclear weapons under extreme circumstances. It’s a deliberately nebulous position. Some experts worry that if we clarified, then enemies would feel
emboldened to plan attacks, knowing our retaliation would be restrained to conventional weapons. Historically, we’ve also planned to use nuclear weapons in
response to biological weapons. In the famous tapes released of his private White House conversations, President Nixon was uncommonly candid on why we can
sign bioweapons treaties: “We’ll never use the damn germs. So what good is biological warfare as a deterrent? If someone uses germs on us, we’ll nuke ’em.” When
the Cold War ended, that posture didn’t change. “There were efforts in the ’80s, the ’90s, the Obama administration to push the US toward a no first use policy,”
Wellerstein said. The closest we came was under Obama, who put unusual emphasis on nuclear policy for a post-Cold-War president. But his administration ended
up deciding against no first use. “That had more to do with acclimating allies to the idea,” Alexandra Bell, the senior policy director at the Center for Arms Control
and Non-Proliferation, told me. Even if the Obama administration’s strategists thought that no first use was the way to go, nuclear policy is so fraught that it’s
important to have world leaders on board, and that takes some time. So the administration didn’t go that far. The one-sentence bill that might change everything —
or nothing Is changing US nuclear policy really as straightforward as passing a one-sentence bill declaring, “It is the policy of the United States not to use nuclear
weapons first”? Well, no. On its own, a declaration about US nuclear policy won’t be taken that seriously by anyone. In fact, critics of the bill argue, it might be taken
seriously by our allies (making them nervous) and not by our enemies (making them bolder), which would be the worst of all possible worlds. Proponents of the bill
agree that it won’t be taken seriously on its own. (The bill has been introduced before, and died without much discussion.) But they say that a
change in
official US policy would lead, down the road, to changes in which nuclear weapons we build and how we
deploy them. That, unlike the bill itself, will be taken seriously. “It’s a political commitment,” Bell told me. “It
signals to the world about where we want to go toward a deterrent-based posture. You need the policy
and the force behind it.” But some worry that passing the bill won’t lead to the real changes — and, as a result, could actually cause harm. “A
declaration, without any attendant changes to the US’s ability to actually use nuclear weapons promptly, absent changes to the actual posture, alert levels, etc. —
your adversaries won’t believe it,” Vipin Narang, an associate professor of political science at MIT, argued. “There’s a real concern here that your allies might. A big
nonproliferation tool we’ve had at our disposal is extended deterrence. And for our allies, at least, not declaring one way or another that we might use nuclear
weapons in their defense in a conventional attack against them may help reassurance at the margins,” he added. To
proponents of no first use, all
of that means it’s finally time to make it happen. “We’ve come to a place where the US can adopt this
kind of policy,” Bell told me. And, perhaps more importantly, we’ve come to a place where the public is perhaps
interested in thinking about nuclear security again. To a significant extent, interest in nuclear weapons as a topic died when the Cold War
ended. The public doesn’t rank nuclear security among their top considerations. It rarely gets much consideration in political campaigns or party platforms. Nuclear
weapons could still kill us all — we just don’t think about this much. Having Donald Trump in the White House might have changed that. “No one can stop President
Trump from using nuclear weapons. That’s by design,” Wellerstein pointed out at the Washington Post three weeks after Trump was elected. That’s always been
true, of course. Any US president has the authority to order a nuclear strike on their own, though some experts argue that the military would disobey an illegal
order. But with the president historically unpopular, and regarded by many as erratic, this longstanding truth has suddenly seemed especially troubling. “The silver
lining of the Trump administration,” Bell told me, “is that people are reengaging in the conversation” about what the best policy for use of US nuclear weapons is.
“We’re resurrecting an old conversation that has never really gotten that far,” Wellerstein said. “And we’re doing it not
to address an old problem — Can we lower the tensions of the arms race? — but to address a new problem, which is that we aren’t sure we can trust the US to do
the right thing with its nukes.” In other words, many conversations about nuclear policy assumed that our own leadership would be thoughtful and careful, and that
we would use nuclear weapons only under the right circumstances. We’ve historically treated the important considerations in nuclear policy to be the reactions of
our allies and adversaries. We haven’t put as much thought into how our nuclear policy could be better designed to hold our own leadership back from a terrible
mistake. Stopping a president from using nuclear weapons too soon Of course, if our real goal is reining in our own leadership, there might be even better ways to
get there than no first use. No
first use has a few major advantages as a national security stance. The first is its sheer
simplicity — the bill is one sentence long. It reflects the understanding of US policy that many people already have — we don’t expect our government to be
the first to escalate a conflict to nuclear weapons. It’s a starting point for “trying to get the legislative branch back in the
business of nuclear policy,” Bell told me, and it’s particularly well-suited to that. But the policy with the best odds of getting traction probably isn’t
the same as the ideal policy, and there are probably policies that address what Wellerstein calls the “bad president problem” better than no first use. If your aim is
to prevent misuse, it might make more sense to add oversight — taking away the authority of the president to unilaterally launch nuclear weapons. It might make
sense to explicitly set conditions — to decide, as a society, under what conditions we’d accept the use of nuclear weapons, and embed them into law. But if those
are unachievable — and they certainly look it — then we might realistically need to answer the question of whether no first use is better than nothing. If we can
convince our allies that it doesn’t reflect a decrease in the American commitment to their safety — a real challenge, and the one that held Obama back from
pursuing it — I think it could be. It represents one fewer way our world could descend into a nuclear war. Ultimately, a national security policy like our current one,
which aims to confuse people about when we’ll use nuclear weapons, is one that might result in our using nuclear weapons when our adversaries didn’t mean to
escalate that far and when there were other options on the table. Taking that possibility away is not without downsides, but it’s also easy to underestimate the
upsides — better odds that, in a shocking catastrophe of merely conventional scale, no one makes the mistake of turning the fight into a nuclear one.
International support spills over to worldwide adoption
Gerson 10
[Michael S. Gerson, Michael S. Gerson is an independent consultant in Atlanta, Georgia. He was
previously a division lead, project director, and senior analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, where
his research focused on nuclear and conventional deterrence, nuclear strategy, and arms control. From
2011–2012 he was appointed to the office of the secretary of defense and in 2009–2010 he was a staff
member on the Nuclear Posture Review. He has published numerous articles and book chapters on
nuclear issues, co-chaired a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)-funded commission on
the future of US-Russia nuclear arms control, and served as a committee member of a CSIS-funded
commission on US-China nuclear relations. “No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy.”
Quarterly Journal: International Security, vol. 35. no. 2. (Fall 2010): 7-47 MM]
Arguments for a U.S. policy of no first use have traditionally been met with fierce resistance from some
elements of the defense and foreign policy communities. Policymakers and defense planners are always
reluctant to deprive the commander in chief of any potential military options. Yet a fundamental tenet
of deterrence theory, first articulated and popularized by Thomas Schelling, is that limiting one’s options
can be beneficial for deterrence and strategic stability. 123 By foreclosing the U.S. option to use nuclear
weapons first, NFU would enhance crisis stability, bolster conventional deterrence, and provide the
United States with renewed political legitimacy and leverage as the leader of the global nonproliferation
regime. For the United States, the continued threat to use nuclear weapons first is either militarily
useless or potentially destabilizing, and the actual use of nuclear weapons first is politically untenable
and militarily dangerous. The appeal of NFU appears to be catching on. Japan has traditionally been a
strong opponent of NFU, but statements by high-ranking Japanese officials suggest that this sentiment
might be changing. According to Katsuya Okada, Japan’s foreign minister, “We cannot deny the fact that
we are moving in the direction of no first use of nuclear weapons. We would like to discuss the issue
with Washington.”124 India, too, recently called for an international NFU policy as part of its support for
global nuclear disarmament.125In addition, the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation
and Disarmament, a multi-nation initiative sponsored by Australia and Japan, advocated in its re-cent
report that the nuclear powers adopt NFU by 2025.126I f the United States is committed to reducing
nuclear dangers, NFU should be at the top of the list of necessary changes in U.S. nuclear policy.
1nc—deterrence
Nukes are still needed for deterrence but NFU solves potential harms
Cartwright and Blair 16
[James E. Cartwright And Bruce G. Blair, James Edward "Hoss" Cartwright[2] (born September 22, 1949)
is a retired United States Marine Corps four-star general who last served as the eighth Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff from August 31, 2007, to August 3, 2011. He previously served as the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, from September 1, 2004, to August 10, 2007, and as Acting
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command from July 9, 2004, to September 1, 2004. He retired from the
Marine Corps on August 3, 2011, after nearly 40 years of service. (August 14, 2016) Opinion | End the
First-Use Policy for Nuclear Weapons - The New York Times. Retrieved December 12, 2019, from
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/15/opinion/end-the-first-use-policy-for-nuclear-weapons.html
MM]
Throughout the nuclear age, presidents have allowed their senior commanders to plan for the first use
of nuclear weapons. Contingency plans were drawn to initiate first strikes to repel an invasion of Europe
by the Soviet Union, defeat China and North Korea, take out chemical and biological weapons and
conduct other missions. After the end of the Cold War, which coincided with revolutionary advances in our nonnuclear military capacities, the range
of these missions steadily narrowed to the point where nuclear weapons today no longer serve any purpose beyond
deterring the first use of such weapons by our adversaries. Our nonnuclear strength, including economic
and diplomatic power, our alliances, our conventional and cyber weaponry and our technological
advantages, constitute a global military juggernaut unmatched in history. The United States simply does
not need nuclear weapons to defend its own and its allies’ vital interests, as long as our adversaries
refrain from their use. Using nuclear weapons first against Russia and China would endanger our and our
allies’ very survival by encouraging full-scale retaliation. Any first use against lesser threats, such as
countries or terrorist groups with chemical and biological weapons, would be gratuitous; there are alternative
means of countering those threats. Such use against North Korea would be likely to result in the blanketing of Japan and possibly South Korea with deadly
radioactive fallout. But beyond reducing those dangers,
ruling out first use would also bring myriad benefits. To start, it
would reduce the risk of a first strike against us during global crises. Leaders of other countries would be
calmed by the knowledge that the United States viewed its own weapons as deterrents to nuclear
warfare, not as tools of aggression. The policy would also reduce costs by gutting the rationale for retaining the large arsenal of land-based
strategic missiles in silos across the Midwest and the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Those missiles are mainly for first-use; they are a risky option for
second-use because they are highly vulnerable to enemy attack. Eliminating these weapons entirely would be the best option. Phasing out land-based missiles and
shifting to a reliance on submarines and bombers would save about $100 billion over the next three decades. The elimination of smaller, tactical nuclear weapons
would save billions more. President Obama could begin the phaseout of land-based missiles before he left office by instructing the Department of Defense to
remove 550 weapons from the operationally deployed category and transfer them to long-term storage, thereby reducing the operationally deployed inventory to
about 1,000 strategic warheads. These missiles are surplus weapons no longer needed for deterrence. A
no-first-use policy would also reduce
the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. By scrapping the vulnerable land-based
missile force, any need for launching on warning disappears. Strategic bombers can be sent aloft on
warning of an apparent incoming attack, which may or may not be a false alarm, and stay up until the situation
clarifies. Strategic submarines are extremely survivable and exert no pressure on decision-makers to fire them quickly. They can patrol for months waiting for
instructions. Both bombers and submarines are also less vulnerable to cyberwarfare than the strategic missiles on land. Finally, no-first-use would help ensure that
democratically elected officials maintained control over nuclear weapons. Savings from reducing the nuclear force could be invested in fortifying command centers
and communications networks, which would better protect the president and ensure the continuity of government during a crisis. This would not only fortify
deterrence but also reduce the current possibility of a president’s losing control over nuclear operations at an early stage of conflict. Beyond
those
benefits, we believe a no-first-use policy could catalyze multilateral negotiations to reduce nuclear arms,
discourage nonnuclear states from developing them and reinforce the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Although a no-first-use policy would limit the president’s discretion by imposing procedural and physical
constraints on his or her ability to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, we believe such checks on the
commander in chief would serve the national interest. President Obama has an opportunity to further delegitimize nuclear weapons
by adopting no-first-use as a core principle of United States security policy on the grounds that first-use is unnecessary and a threat to national survival and
humanity itself. We could still maintain a robust nuclear umbrella to protect ourselves and our allies. China and India adopted this policy long ago, and the American
people overwhelmingly support it, according to a recent survey. In that poll, two-thirds say the United States should use nuclear weapons only in response to a
nuclear attack or not at all, while just 18 percent think that first-use may be justified sometimes. President
Obama would be wise to follow
China’s example. As commander in chief, he can adopt no-first-use overnight and lead the way in
establishing it as a global norm among all of the nine countries with nuclear weapons. The next
president ought to stay that course. Our nation, our allies and indeed the world will be better and safer
for it.
NFU necessary for deterrence
Rajagopalan 19
Rajagopalan, Rajesh. "The Strategic Logic Of The No First Use Nuclear Doctrine | ORF". ORF, 2019,
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/strategic-logic-no-first-use-nuclear-doctrine-54911/. SHS TG
To be clear, it is not being suggested that India’s security managers, present or past, have rethought the
strategic logic of NFU, which remains the bedrock of India’s nuclear doctrine. If there is a threat to
India’s NFU policy, it comes more from the ideological opposition it faces, not from any careful
reassessment of its strategic logic. The central reason behind India’s NFU was the recognition that
nuclear weapons served only a very limited purpose, that of ensuring national survival. The only real
threat to such survival was a nuclear attack. Nuclear weapons are unique because unlike any other
weapon, they could wreak so much destruction in such a short time that they could potentially end an
entire society in an afternoon. The only way to prevent such destruction is to threaten similar
destruction on any potential adversary, thus deterring them from pursuing such a course of action.
Threatening retaliation is the only solution because there is no defence against these weapons. Though
there were attempts by deterrence theorists in other parts of the world to consider the use of nuclear
weapons for more limited tactical purposes than national survival, most Indian nuclear strategists were
rightly skeptical of such possibilities. This drove some of the strongest proponents of India’s nuclear
weapon programme to be also deeply critical of the kind of elaborate nuclear doctrines and arsenals
being developed by other countries, especially the two Cold War superpowers. It was not a logic that
they wanted India to follow because it made little sense for anyone, and definitely not for India. NFU
was the outcome of this strategic logic. (The other corollary was a limited nuclear arsenal). If the primary
purpose — indeed, the only purpose — of nuclear weapons was deterrence of other nuclear weapons,
then threatening retaliation was the only manner in which these weapons could be used. The threat of
retaliation is of course the essence of deterrence: preventing someone from taking an action by
threatening to punish them if they did. Retaliation, by definition, could only be for an action that was
already taken, in this case, a nuclear attack that has already happened. Deterrence and retaliation
automatically meant that there was no logic to using nuclear weapons first: hence, no first use.
Additional benefits also accrue from NFU: tighter political command over nuclear weapons, a much
more relaxed command and control regime and a much safer nuclear arsenal.
1nc—PTX voters support
Voters support a NFU policy
Union of Concerned Scientists 11/4
"Voters Strongly Support A “No First Use” Nuclear Policy". Union Of Concerned Scientists, 2019,
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/voters-strongly-support-no-first-use-nuclear-policy. SHS TG
The choice to use nuclear weapons is the most momentous decision a president could ever take, with
the fate of millions at stake. Just one bomb could kill hundreds of thousands of people, while a full-scale
exchange could end life as we know it. Currently, the United States reserves the right to use nuclear
weapons first in a conflict, and the authority to launch nuclear weapons lies solely with the president.
Adoption of a "No First Use" (NFU) policy means the United States would commit to never initiating a
nuclear conflict. A NFU policy would reduce the risk of other countries using nuclear weapons against
the United States and contribute to global stability through leading by example. UCS commissioned polls
in several states and has found strong support for a US NFU policy, and even stronger support for the
idea that the presidential candidates should be talking about nuclear weapons issues on the campaign
trail. New Hampshire (University of New Hampshire poll, March 2019) Residents who believe the United
States should never use nuclear weapons first: 73% Residents who believe it is important for
presidential candidates to give their views on nuclear weapons: 84% Iowa (Zogby Analytics poll, April
2019) Residents who believe the United States should never use nuclear weapons first: 57% Residents
who believe it is important for presidential candidates to give their views on nuclear weapons: 82%
Michigan (Zogby Analytics poll, July 2019) Residents who believe the United States should never use
nuclear weapons first: 67% Residents who believe it is important for presidential candidates to give their
views on nuclear weapons: 82% Ohio (Zogby Analytics poll, October 2019) Residents who believe the
United States should never use nuclear weapons first: 65% Residents who believe it is important for
presidential candidates to give their views on nuclear weapons: 84% Georgia (Zogby Analytics poll,
October 2019) Residents who believe the United States should never use nuclear weapons first: 61%
Residents who believe it is important for presidential candidates to give their views on nuclear weapons:
86%
2NR – Defense of US Deterrence
AT: Otherization/Onto-Security
We’ve impact turned the drive for onto-security --- deterrence creates a mutual
vulnerability that reduces the structural likelihood of violence --- that link turns their
Ks of Otherization
Lupovici 8
Amir Lupovici, Post-Doctoral Fellow Munk Centre for International Studies University of Toronto, “Why
the Cold War Practices of Deterrence are Still Prevalent: Physical Security, Ontological Security and
Strategic Discourse” http://cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf)
Since deterrence can become part of the actors’ identity, it is also involved in the actors’ will to achieve
ontological security, securing the actors’ identity and routines. As McSweeney explains, ontological
security is “the acquisition of confidence in the routines of daily life—the essential predictability of
interaction through which we feel confident in knowing what is going on and that we have the practical
skill to go on in this context.” These routines become part of the social structure that enables and
constrains the actors’ possibilities (McSweeney, 1999: 50-1, 154-5; Wendt, 1999: 131, 229-30). Thus,
through the emergence of the deterrence norm and the construction of deterrence identities, the actors
create an intersubjective context and intersubjective understandings that in turn affect their interests
and routines. In this context, deterrence strategy and deterrence practices are better understood by the
actors, and therefore the continuous avoidance of violence is more easily achieved. Furthermore, within
such a context of deterrence relations, rationality is (re)defined, clarifying the appropriate practices for a
rational actor, and this, in turn, reproduces this context and the actors’ identities. Therefore, the
internalization of deterrence ideas helps to explain how actors may create more cooperative practices
and break away from the spiral of hostility that is forced and maintained by the identities that are
attached to the security dilemma, and which lead to mutual perception of the other as an aggressive
enemy. As Wendt for example suggests, in situations where states are restrained from using
violence—such as MAD (mutual assured destruction)—states not only avoid violence, but
“ironically, may be willing to trust each other enough to take on collective identity”. In such
cases if actors believe that others have no desire to engulf them, then it will be easier to trust them and
to identify with their own needs (Wendt, 1999: 358-9). In this respect, the norm of deterrence, the trust
that is being built between the opponents, and the (mutual) constitution of their role identities may all
lead to the creation of long term influences that preserve the practices of deterrence as well as the
avoidance of violence. Since a basic level of trust is needed to attain ontological security,21 the
existence of it may further strengthen the practices of deterrence and the actors’ identities of deterrer
and deterred actors. In this respect, I argue that for the reasons mentioned earlier, the practices of
deterrence should be understood as providing both physical and ontological security, thus refuting that
there is necessarily tension between them. Exactly for this reason I argue that Rasmussen’s (2002: 3312) assertion—according to which MAD was about enhancing ontological over physical security—is only
partly correct. Certainly, MAD should be understood as providing ontological security; but it also
allowed for physical security, since, compared to previous strategies and doctrines, it was all about
decreasing the physical threat of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the ability to increase one dimension
of security helped to enhance the other, since it strengthened the actors’ identities and created more
stable expectations of avoiding violence.
AT: Drags US Into Conflict
Current US nuclear politics create a global order than minimizes violent intervention
Beckley 15
Michael Beckley is a research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs., “The Myth of Entangling Alliances Michael Beckley
Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts”, http://live.belfercenter.org/files/IS3904_pp007048.pdf)
I test these competing perspectives by analyzing the extent of U.S. entanglement in all postwar U.S.
military conflicts. Specifically, I examine every militarized interstate dispute (MID) in which the United
States participated from 1948, the year it signed its first standing alliance, to 2010 and ask a basic
question: To what extent was U.S. involvement driven by formal alliance commitments?
Admittedly, this is a limited ambition, as I evaluate only the frequency of past cases of U.S.
entanglement, not the current level of U.S. entanglement risk. Moreover, I do not account for other
potential costs of maintaining alliances, such as higher levels of military spending or poorer diplomatic
relations with non-allied countries. Nevertheless, entanglement is arguably the most important cost of
alliances, and providing a systematic account of past cases is an important step in gauging the United
States’ current level of entanglement risk.
The results of this analysis strongly support freedom of action theory. Over a sixty-two-year period in
which the United States maintained more than sixty alliances, I find only five ostensible episodes of U.S.
entanglement—the 1954 and 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crises, the Vietnam War, and the interventions in
Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. Even these cases are far from clear-cut, because in each there were
other important drivers of U.S. involvement; U.S. policymakers carefully limited support for allies; allies
restrained the United States from escalating its involvement; the United States deterred adversaries and
allies from escalating the conflict; or all of the above.
To be sure, the United States has intervened on the side of allies on numerous occasions. In most cases,
however, U.S. actions were driven by an alignment of interests between the United States and its allies,
not by alliance obligations. In fact, in many cases, U.S. policymakers were the main advocates of military
action and cajoled reluctant allies to join the fight.
In addition, there are many cases in which alliances restrained the United States, or in which the United
States restrained its allies or sidestepped costly commitments. I examine only cases of military conflict
and therefore cannot evaluate fully the prevalence of such cases of nonconflict. Even within my biased
sample, however, there are at least four cases in which alliances prevented U.S. escalation, and another
seven cases in which the United States reneged on security commitments, restrained an ally from
attacking a third party, or both.
At worst, therefore, alliances have had a mixed effect on U.S. involvement in military conflicts—some
alliances at some times have encouraged U.S. military involvement; others have discouraged it; and
some have simply been ignored by U.S. policymakers. The only way to build a powerful case for
entanglement theory is to commit serious methodological errors. For example, one could spin
correlation as causation by characterizing cases in which the United States backed allies for self-
interested reasons as cases of entanglement. One also could select on the dependent variable by
highlighting evidence of entanglement while ignoring instances in which the United States shirked
alliance commitments or in which alliances restrained the United States or prevented conflicts from
breaking out in the first place. Such practices are common in the existing literature, but they are flawed
and feed an exaggerated fear of entangling alliances in American society.
But the wars that result from a US nuclear paradigm are orders of magnitude smaller
than the scenario they trigger – temptation to intervene exists with or without US
primacy, so there’s only a risk that giving it up creates a nuclear power transition that
kills billions
Brooks et al 12
John Ikenberry, Ph. D in Political Science from Chicago, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at
the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, CoDirector of Princeton’s Center for International Security Studies; William Wohlforth, Ph. D in Political
Science from Yale, Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College; Stephen Brooks, Ph. D in
Political Science from Yale, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Senior Fellow at
the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University; “Don’t Come Home,
America”, http://www.carlanorrlof.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/DontComeHomeAmerica.pdf)
For many advocates of retrenchment, the mere possession of peerless, globe-girdling military
capabilities leads inexorably to a dangerous expansion of U.S. definitions of national interest that then
drag the country into expensive wars.64 For example, sustaining ramified, long-standing alliances such
as NATO leads to mission creep: the search for new roles to keep the alliance alive. Hence, critics allege
that NATO’s need to “go out of area or out of business” led to reckless expansion that alienated Russia
and then to a heedless broadening of interests to encompass interventions such as those in Bosnia,
Kosovo, and Libya. In addition, peerless military power creates the temptation to seek total, nonClausewitzian solutions to security problems, as allegedly occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan.65 Only a
country in possession of such awesome military power and facing no serious geopolitical rival would fail
to be satisfied with partial solutions such as containment and instead embark on wild schemes of
democracy building in such unlikely places. In addition, critics contend, the United States’ outsized
military creates a sense of obligation to use it if it might do good, even in cases where no U.S. interests
are engaged. As Madeleine Albright famously asked Colin Powell, “What’s the point of having this
superb military you’re always talking about, if we can’t use it?”
Undoubtedly, possessing global military intervention capacity expands opportunities to use force. If it
were truly to “come home,” the United States would be tying itself to the mast like Ulysses, rendering
itself incapable of succumbing to temptation. Any defense of deep engagement must acknowledge that
it increases the opportunity and thus the logical probability of U.S. use of force compared to a grand
strategy of true strategic disengagement. Of course, if the alternative to deep engagement is an overthe-horizon intervention stance, then the temptation risk would persist after retrenchment. The main
problem with the interest expansion argument, however, is that it essentially boils down to one case:
Iraq. Sixty-seven percent of all the casualties and 64 percent of all the budget costs of all the wars the
United States has fought since 1990 were caused by that war. Twenty-seven percent of the causalities
and 26 percent of the costs were related to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. All the other
interventions—the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, the subsequent airstrike campaigns in Iraq, Somalia,
Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Libya, and so on—account for 3 percent of the casualties and 10 percent of the
costs.66 Iraq is the outlier not only in terms of its human and material cost, but also in terms of the
degree to which the overall burden was shouldered by the United States alone. As Beckley has shown, in
the other interventions allies either spent more than the United States, suffered greater relative
casualties, or both. In the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, for example, the United States ranked fourth in
overall casualties (measured relative to population size) and fourth in total expenditures (relative to
GDP). In Bosnia, European Union (EU) budget outlays and personnel deployments ultimately swamped
those of the United States as the Europeans took over postconflict peacebuilding operations. In Kosovo,
the United States suffered one combat fatality, the sole loss in the whole operation, and it ranked sixth
in relative monetary contribution. In Afghanistan, the United States is the number one financial
contributor (it achieved that status only after the 2010 surge), but its relative combat losses rank fifth.67
In short, the interest expansion argument would look much different without Iraq in the picture. There
would be no evidence for the United States shouldering a disproportionate share of the burden, and the
overall pattern of intervention would look “unrestrained” only in terms of frequency, not cost, with the
debate hinging on whether the surge in Afghanistan was recklessly unrestrained.68
How emblematic of the deep engagement strategy is the U.S. experience in Iraq? The strategy’s
supporters insist that Iraq was a Bush/neoconservative aberration; certainly, there are many supporters
of deep engagement who strongly opposed the war, most notably Barack Obama. Against this view,
opponents claim that it or something close to it was inevitable given the grand strategy. Regardless, the
more important question is whether continuing the current grand strategy condemns the United States
to more such wars. The Cold War experience suggests a negative answer. After the United States
suffered a major disaster in Indochina (to be sure, dwarfing Iraq in its human toll), it responded by
waging the rest of the Cold War using proxies and highly limited interventions. Nothing changed in the
basic structure of the international system, and U.S. military power recovered by the 1980s, yet the
United States never again undertook a large expeditionary operation until after the Cold War had
ended. All indications are that Iraq has generated a similar effect for the post–Cold War era. If there is
an Obama doctrine, Dominic Tierney argues, it can be reduced to “No More Iraqs.”69 Moreover, the
president’s thinking is reflected in the Defense Department’s current strategic guidance, which asserts
that “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”70 Those
developments in Washington are also part of a wider rejection of the Iraq experience across the
American body politic, which political scientist John Mueller dubbed the “Iraq Syndrome.”71
Retrenchment advocates would need to present much more argumentation and evidence to support
their pessimism on this subject.
2NR Defense of Realism
Realism is true --- deterrence is effective and key in an anarchic international
environment defined by revisionism
--at: states are defensive realists
Matthew Kroenig 18, Associate Professor in Department of Government and the Walsh School of
Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow at the Brent Sowcroft Center on
International Security at the Atlantic Council, “The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic
Superiority Matters,” Oxford University Press, pp. 151-153, 2018, accessed through Georgetown
Libraries
If an adversary state is able and willing to match US nuclear capabilities and it designs its forces to match
or beat Washington, then an arms race may very well occur. But it does not follow that the arms race is
a cost of a robust US nuclear posture. Rather, it may be a benefit. Indeed, competing in and winning
arms races is sometimes a necessary, if undesirable, part of international politics.
Then–US President Elect Donald Trump generated controversy in December 2016, when he responded
to critics who feared that his proposed policies risked (p.152) starting an arms race with Russia and
China by saying, “Let it be an arms race . . . we will outmatch them at every pass and outlast them all.”41
His response only further outraged his critics, but Trump had a point.
The canonical spiral model is only one theory of arms competitions. In the alternative “deterrence
model,” prevailing in an arms race is necessary in order to deter an aggressive rival.42 According to this
model, strategic competitions, including arms races, are not the result of mutual suspicions and arms
spirals, but are rather caused by fundamental conflicts of interests between states, such as contested
territorial claims or ideological disagreements. Faced with a revisionist, or so-called greedy, adversary,
states must arm themselves to deter the threat from their expansionist rival. Failing to do so would give
the greedy adversary a free pass and risk sacrificing vital interests in the face of enemy expansion. If the
enemy is seeking to challenge one’s interests and is building up its military forces to do so, then one
must arm in order to defend oneself. Moreover, in addition to augmenting deterrence, the devotion of
scarce resources to military expenditures can serve as a costly signal of resolve to stand firm on the
issues in dispute.43 In this way, arms races can “substitute” for war by helping to eliminate uncertainty
over power and resolve. If one is facing an aggressive adversary building up capabilities to threaten
one’s interests, then, as Trump defiantly and correctly responded, “let it be an arms race.”
According to international relations theories of arms racing, therefore, there is a prior question to
answer before predicting whether a robust US nuclear posture will provoke an unwanted arms race,
namely: does Washington find itself in the spiral or deterrence model? In other words, one must ask
whether America’s nuclear-armed adversaries are “security seeking” or “greedy.” If US adversaries are
merely “security seeking,” then critics of a robust US nuclear force are correct and a dangerous and
unnecessary arms spiral might very well result from US modernization or other force enhancements. If
on the other hand, US adversaries are “greedy,” then an arms race may very well occur, but this is not a
reason for the United States to opt out. Quite the contrary, if US adversaries are greedy, then the United
States must enter into an arms race if it hopes to protect its interests. Competing in and winning the
arms race in this environment is necessary to deter aggressive challengers. In other words, contrary to
popular discourse, arms racing is not necessarily a problem. Sometimes, it is the best policy.
During the Cold War, for example, the Soviet Union would almost certainly have posed a greater threat
to US global interests had it not been for America’s containment policy and the effort to meet attempts
at Soviet expansion with the threat of sufficient military force.44 And, as we discuss in more detail in
what follows, there is reason to believe that America’s nuclear-armed adversaries today are also
“greedy” states that must be deterred. As Brad Roberts writes, “each of (p.153) these regimes [Russia,
China, and North Korea] is inherently revisionist in character. Putin’s slogan ‘new rules or no rules’
illustrates this point.”45 If this is the case, then US nuclear modernization and perhaps even
participation in a future nuclear arms race may be a necessary and desirable step to defend America’s
interests.
2NR Yes Russian Revisionism
Rhetoric, documents and action all confirm revisionism – signals of weakness
greenlight aggression
Natsios 17 (Andrew, Director of the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs Bush School of
Government, Texas A&M University, “Putin’s New Russia: Fragile State or Revisionist Power?,” 5-15,
https://www.press.jhu.edu/news/blog/putin%E2%80%99s-new-russia-fragile-state-or-revisionistpower)
John Mearsheimer, the international relations scholar, argues Russia’s aggressiveness towards its neighbors stems from western efforts to
extend NATO membership to former members of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. According to this view, traditional national
interest drives Russia’s behavior, and NATO extension has been seen by Putin as a threat to Russia’s vital national security interests. From this
perspective, the western democracies helped create Vladimir Putin’s Russia by impinging on its “sphere of influence” along its borders; thus,
Russia is not what international relations scholars call a “revisionist power”—one which seeks to overthrow the existing international
order—but a traditional state protecting what it sees as its equities and vital national interests. Other analysts, such as Anne Applebaum, argue
Putin’s policies are not part of a grand strategy, but are evidence of an improvised foreign policy. Thus, Russia’s
aggression in Georgia,
Ukraine, Syria, and its threats to the Baltic States, may be seen not as a carefully designed and executed
strategy of conquest, but as symptomatic of Putin’s ad hoc, opportunistic foreign policy. He probes for
Western weakness, irresolution, and indecision, and then, if there is no resistance, he intervenes to
extend Russia’s reach by absorbing more territory. Putin has sought to return Russia to great power
status by weakening other competing powers or annexing neighboring states rather than risking reforms that
could be destabilizing in the short term, but would strengthen Russia as a nation state over the long term. The immediate objectives
of Russian foreign policy are not mysterious if one examines Putin’s government’s public rhetoric, its
published documents, and its actions. One of Putin’s greatest strengths has been the aggressive and
systematic pursuit of these strategic objectives which include: efforts to regain military parity with the
United States (they are nowhere near achieving this) the neutralization of the NATO alliance the end of the European Union as
one of the most powerful economic blocs in the world the creation of an alternative anti-liberal, authoritarian,
reactionary governance model of statehood for which Russia is trying to gain adherents among far right and far left parties wing in
Europe the reconstruction of the historic Russian sphere of influence through annexation of parts of neighboring
states and the projection of Russian power to other regions of the world such as the Middle East and Afghanistan If Putin’s
strategic objective was to minimize or reduce external threats to Russia, the invasion of Ukraine was a major strategic blunder as it has slowly
begun to mobilize the previous docile and distracted Western Alliance to counter the new threat. NATO officials have now begun publicly
raising the alarm bells. Sweden and Finland, which never joined NATO, are now engaged in a public discussion about joining the Alliance, which
has broad public support. Putin’s Grand Bargain with the Russian People: Surrendering Freedom for Guns, Butter, and the dream of lost Russian
Grandeur Putin’s legitimacy as a ruler has been based on a tacit agreement with the Russian people that trades individual freedom, democracy,
and the rule of law for economic security. Since the severe economic contraction after mid-2014, that tacit agreement ended. Putin has now
reformulated the grand bargain with the Russian people. He is promising to bring back the glorious days of the Soviet Union and earlier Tsarist
Empires in exchange for the Russian public’s acceptance of his autocratic rule and a lower living standard. Since the drop-in oil prices beginning
in the summer of 2014 when they peaked at $128 a barrel, the central government has been shoring up the fragile banking system. Despite the
balance sheet’s visual appeal, Russia under Vladimir Putin faces a much greater risk of internal implosion than many in Western capitals
understand. This is due to the cuts in public services and pensions, growing unrest among the Russian elites with Putin’s policies, and the
Russian military’s discomfort with Putin’s strategic gambling in Ukraine and earlier in Georgia. Anne Applebaum argues in her essay that Putin
has either infiltrated, co-opted, corrupted, intimidated, or shut down most of the nascent institutions of Russian democratic pluralism that
developed during the 1990’s and early 2000’s such as non-governmental organizations, religious institutions such as the Russian Orthodox
Church, think tanks, and universities. Russia has neither rule of law nor an independent court system, and its police are corrupt and a tool of
repression rather than law enforcement. Russia has evolved into what Russians call a “managed democracy,” a democracy in appearance, not
reality. Russian institutional weakness may be found in the retarded level of internal development and the dysfunctional characteristics of its
governance structure. Russia’s current social, health, demographic, and economic indicators show a country in what could be permanent and
irreversible decline, as documented in Nick Eberstadt’s essay. These weaknesses suggest Russia is a declining power, and certainly not a rising
power such as China. Russia’s Military and Cyber Warfare Build Up One of the few elements of Russian national power now on the ascendency
is its military. Putin had been rearming Russia at a rapid rate until 2017 when revenues could not continue to support the increases. Putin has
invested in the modernization of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and the development of new and more advanced conventional weapons, even as
Russia faces a depressing demographic future with high rates of drug addiction and alcoholism among young men. Perhaps the greatest risk to
Putin’s strategic buildup may be this dependence on oil, gas, and mineral revenues. To minimize the effect of declining revenue on the defense
buildup, Moscow has made a series of strategic decisions to choose guns over butter: cutting back public services such as education, health,
and pensions they had formerly funded. Disposable income for the average Russian family declined by 15% between 2014 and 2016, even as
the military budget has been increasing. At the end of 2016, for the first time in seven years, Russian families were spending more than half
their income on food and “the percentage of Russians who had any savings fell from 72% in 2013 to 29% in 2016,” reported The Washington
Post. The rising Russian military threat was on display in Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, but he miscalculated in several
critical respects. According to Moscow, a corrupt and illegitimate government had taken power through street demonstrations while Putin’s
democratically-elected ally in Kiev was driven from office by mob rule funded by billionaire George Soros and western civil society groups. Putin
expected to be greeted by at least half of Ukraine as a Slavic liberating hero because eastern Ukraine has historically been more oriented
towards Russia. Instead, Russia met Ukrainian resistance, and united what had been a divided country now mobilized to oppose the Russian
invasion. Russia’s new cyberwarfare capabilities were used in 2016 in a highly visible way during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, the Dutch
and French elections, and German parliament hacking incidents. Putin interfered in the U.S. elections per the U.S. intelligence agencies, when
the Russian cyber-warfare agencies hacked into the Democratic National Committee email system and accessed Clinton campaign advisor John
Podesta’s emails. The Ideology and Mythology of the Putin State Putin
has positioned himself and Russia as a reactionary
alternative to western secular liberal democracies. This world view is described in Project Russia, which
is a curious, if alarming, collection of essays published in five-volumes as a semi-official government publication
that describes the political ideology of the Putin’s and his circle of oligarchs world view. These essays form a
strange amalgam of anti-democratic and ultra-nationalist attacks on western democratic values, combined with an unhealthy dose of
conspiracy theories, paranoia, xenophobia, and a defense of autocratic government. The
five volumes of Project Russia may
represent Putin’s blueprint for Russia’s grand strategy, evidence of a revisionist power seeking to
overthrow the existing international order.
Russia’s revisionist --- geopolitics and the past 20 years prove it --- this isn’t up for
debate
Richey 18
Mason Richey, Associate professor of international politics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies,
“Contemporary Russian revisionism: understanding the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare and the strategic and
tactical deployment of disinformation,” Asia Eur Journal (2018).
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10308-017-0482-5.pdf
Introduction
After a 20-year, post-Cold War expansion of liberal internationalism, Europe is experiencing the return
of the primacy of realist geopolitics.1 No set of events illustrates this more than Russia’s rhetorical and
kinetic belligerence in Ukraine and Syria. More broadly, Russia’s dealings with these states—as well as
the EU and its member states, selected Balkan states and even Turkey—have revealed President
Vladimir Putin’s revisionist powerplay in an arc stretching from Europe’s eastern flanks through the
Black Sea and Caspian Sea basins and into southwest Asia. Russia’s interactions with these states are
now characterized by parlous diplomacy, interference in their domestic politics, and kinetic action
privileging hybrid warfare—all with the goal of recovering international power lost at the Cold War’s
end. Even East Asia and the USA have been affected. To wit, the 2014 downing of Malaysia Airlines flight
MH-17 was Bcollateral damage^ in the Russian-Ukraine conflict, while a Kremlin-led disinformation
effort during the 2016 US presidential election contributed decisively to the victory of Donald Trump,
whose unpredictability has undermined the credibility of US-led alliances in East Asia and Europe (both
the EU and NATO).
Indeed, the common thread running through all of these states of affairs is Russia’s use of information
warfare—disinformation, in particular—as well as Putin’s strongman self-aggrandizement. The famed
Bfour Ds^ of disinformation campaigns—Dismiss/Deny, Distort, Distract, Dismay—work especially well
in hybrid warfare environments.2 In particular, Putin’s Kremlin has employed these techniques
extensively in Ukraine, Syria, and Georgia: Russia denied/dismissed reports that unmarked soldiers in
eastern Ukraine were Russian elite forces,3 distorted the role of non-terrorist Syrian rebels by claiming
that they are ISIS affiliates, 4 distracted from the international community’s focus on Donbas by positing
conspiracy theories about the downing of MH-17,5 and sowed dismay by evoking dangerous escalation
should the USA and Europe push for reincorporation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Georgia.6
Meanwhile, the Kremlin has used a similar disinformation playbook in Moldova (concerning separatist
Transnistria) and Montenegro, whose government Russia tried to topple when Montenegro was
negotiating the country’s accession to NATO.7
In this policy brief, after an account of the historical-political context of Russia’s recent aggressive actions, I examine the objectives, strategy,
and tactics of Russia’s information warfare, particularly as concerns eastern Europe and Syria, although also against selected western European
states and the USA. Of special interest is the notion that Russia’s disinformation is potent because it does not necessarily establish falsehoods
as true, but rather pollutes political discourse such that news information consumers are led to doubt the very concepts of truth and objective
political facts. I conclude by (a) discussing the impact this strategy has had—and will continue to have—on Europe’s domestic politics, as well as
on the global liberal order, and then (b) broaching policy ideas for countering Russian disinformation.
Putin’s post-cold war revisionism: the context for Russia’s current information warfare campaigns
The keys to understanding why Putin’s Russia has acted as an increasingly aggressive revisionist
power over the last decade are (a) political geography and (b) timing:
(a) Many Russian leaders—Putin included—detested the fourth (1999) and fifth (2004) rounds of NATO expansion, as well as the EU’s eastern/central European enlargements in 2004 and 2007. These events brought former Warsaw Pact countries into a military alliance and political union that occupied former USSR territory, extending to Russia’s western border. Moreover, Russia
maintained that NATO expansion broke an alleged US promise—ostensibly made in 1990 during negotiations over Germany’s fate—not to extend NATO into eastern Europe.8 More importantly, from their perspective, Russian decision-makers had strategic reasons to dislike NATO and EU expansion: the West’s eastward creep unsettled balance-of-power stability in Eurasia,
challenged Russia’s Bgreat power right^ to a sphere of influence in its near abroad, and dramatically weakened Russia’s politico-military strategic situation. In particular, it meant major degradation to defense-in-depth, loss of routes/bases/support for conventional power projection, and new offensive and defensive vulnerability in the strategic nuclear weapon realm.
Parallel to these developments, the Bcolor^ revolutions in Georgia (rose, 2003) and Ukraine (orange, 2004) replaced Moscow-oriented governments with leaders turned toward the West. From the Kremlin’s perspective, these states are qualitatively different than others—they are considered vital to Russia, both economically and strategically. Georgia, straddling the Caucuses
between the Caspian and Black Seas, is a crucial hub for oil/gas pipelines distributing hydrocarbons from the Caspian basin and Central Asia toward the West (Figs. 1 and 2). As such, Georgia is directly connected to the heart of Russia’s export-based, energy commodity economy. Moreover, Georgia is critical to Russian land access to southwest Asia.
For its part, Ukraine is also a critical transit state for Russian-controlled hydrocarbons (including also those sourced from Central Asia) bound for consumers in the European Union (Figs. 1, 2, and 3). As importantly, Ukraine, throughout history, has occupied an indispensable role in Russian/Soviet defense doctrine. Russia is a huge country with few natural defenses (mountains, large
bodies of water, etc.) and therefore has relied on defense-in-depth, i.e., ceding territory to advancing armies in exchange for time and degraded momentum and logistics by the adversary, which is then eventually overwhelmed by a counter-offensive when it is weakened, exposed, overstretched, and cut off from re-supply. As a bulwark against invasion defense-in-depth is imperfect
(i.e., results in huge casualties), but in the Russian/Soviet case, it has been effective. For confirmation, one need only ask Napoleon or Hitler.
Thus, the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine represented a strategic threat to Russia. This was exacerbated by both countries’ new leaders’ expressions of desire to join the EU and NATO. Moscow considered the latter to be especially alarming, with Ukraine reaching the stage of applying formally for NATO membership in 2008. The Kremlin insisted, moreover, that the color
revolutions were the product of agitators backed by the USA as part of deliberate meddling in Georgian and Ukrainian internal politics in order to prise them from Russia’s orbit. Thus, one must not overlook that from Moscow’s perspective the geopolitical changes that occurred left Russia as the legitimately aggrieved party.
(b) Putin’s tenure as Russian president began inauspiciously, as domestic politicomilitary disasters compelled the neophyte leader to focus on crisis management rather than revanchism. The proximate cause of the dire situation was Boris Yeltsin, who resigned unexpectedly in December 1999, leaving behind an impoverished and shambolic country.
The second Chechen War had just started in August 1999, and, following an air campaign, in early 2000, the Russian army began an offensive that culminated in a siege of Grozny. Although Kremlin-directed mop-up operations succeeded in dismantling organized Chechen resistance by December 2000, Chechnya was hardly pacified, even following the installation of Akhmad Kadyrov
as pro-Russian, strongman head of the republic. Islamist insurgents carried out a guerilla war for independence and remained a military and political problem until 2009.9 In the end, 7,000 Russian troops and 16,000 Chechen militants were officially killed in combat, a minimum of 30,000 civilians perished, Grozny was destroyed, and both domestic and international political opinion
about the Chechen war ranged from exhaustion to horror.
With the Chechen war still ongoing, Putin’s Russia also faced enormous challenges to its competence and authority due to the fallout from the Kremlin’s response to the Kursk submarine disaster. In August 2000, during an exercise in the Barents Sea, the pride of Russia’s northern fleet exploded and sank to the sea floor, killing the entire crew of 118 sailors and hurting both domestic
and international perception of Moscow’s military prowess. As president, Putin had the difficult task of handling the aftermath: managing search/rescue missions, expressing the state’s grief and accountability, and restoring confidence in the Russian military. Putin largely failed at these tasks, and consequently suffered withering criticism by both the public and domestic and foreign
media.
Following Putin’s re-election in 2004, the Kremlin faced another major crisis, the Beslan school siege. In a reaction to Moscow’s subduing of Chechnya, Islamic Chechen and Ingush terrorists under the command of warlord Shamil Basayev stormed a school in North Ossetia and took more than 1,100 hostages, including 777 children. The Kremlin-directed response was more militarystyle assault than hostage-rescue operation, and consequently, 330 hostages were killed, including 184 children. Many of the hostage deaths were attributed to fire from Russian forces. In addition to facing public and media criticism for the botched operation, the Kremlin was accused of censoring media coverage of the crisis, engaging in a disinformation campaign both domestically
and internationally, and exploiting the massacre in order to curtail civil liberties and tighten political control over the federated republics.
Parallel to these crises, which required damage control vis-à-vis domestic and international sentiment, Putin had two other major difficulties: political maneuvering to secure a domestic support base following the vacuum left with Yeltsin’s resignation, and economic rebuilding in the wake of inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption that plagued Russia’s economy. On the
political side, Putin’s crucial challenge was subjugating the Yeltsin-era Boligarchs^ by striking a grand-bargain: they kept much of their wealth in exchange for support for Putin’s government. Those who resisted were replaced, exiled, and/or prosecuted. 10 Over time, Putin methodically introduced a phalanx of loyalists—Boligarchs^ and old acquaintances from Putin’s time in the KGB
(later FSB) and the Saint Petersburg municipal administration—to key government, judicial, business, and (crucially) media posts in Moscow and the republics. The result was that Putin consolidated domestic political power by 2007, with his party (United Russia) achieving a large majority in the 2007 state Duma election.
Repairing the Russian economy after Yeltsin’s misrule—(in)famous for government nonpayment of wages, ruble devaluation, cronyism, and other dysfunctions—was as arduous as politico-military crisis management or domestic power consolidation. Major changes involved tax reform, cutting the size of government, and dealing with the effects of the currency crisis that had begun
in 1997. There is mixed evidence about the efficacy of Putin’s economic plan, but the performance of Russia’s economy during his presidency was widely celebrated until the contagion effects of the global economic crisis (emanating from the USA in 2008) reached Russia. During the 2000–2007 period, annual Russian GDP growth was 7%, living standards rose, the ruble stabilized,
and foreign-direct investment increased. Of course, Putin had the fortune to become president during a time of rising energy commodity prices, which both allowed the Kremlin to obscure other economic and budget problems, and provided an opportunity for engaging with the world (and especially Russia’s neighbors) through a mixture of economic diplomacy, statecraft, and
coercion. Putin duly set about exploiting the Russian oil/gas relationship with Europe, with the most visible symbol of this being the Gazprom-led Nordstream tie-up Putin engineered with German counterpart Gerhard Schroeder,11 to the dismay of eastern/central EU member states (and Ukraine) who served as transit countries for Russian natural gas shipped to consumers in
western Europe.
Russian hybrid warfare: lethality, disinformation, and perception dominance
Russian leadership deeply deplored the 15-year strategic humiliation that followed the breakup of the
Soviet Union, but was incapable of taking measures to roll back, or even stanch, the adverse
developments of NATO expansion and EU enlargement—Russia was simply too weak to mount a
challenge. This circumstance began to change by the mid-2000s, and in 2006, Putin began maneuvering
his geostrategic pawns into position. He did so from a position of strength, as Russia’s economy was
booming along with global energy prices, 12 the Chechnya situation was increasingly under control, the
world security community in general (and particularly the USA) was distracted by the catastrophes in
Iraq and Afghanistan, Putin was reinforced following the crushing or co-optation of domestic political
threats, and the Kremlin’s campaign to bridle the media had succeeded in turning them into
government mouthpieces.
Putin’s opening gambits concerned oil/gas pipelines. During winter 2005/2006, Gazprom escalated a
natural gas dispute with Ukraine. The crux came when Gazprom lowered pipeline pressure and reduced
supply entering Ukraine for domestic consumption and transit to EU countries. This was considered by
many analysts to be a reaction to the orange revolution and a Bshot across the bow^ of both Ukraine
and the EU, signaling that Russia would henceforth be more assertive in advancing its regional
geopolitical interests. Russia’s messaging—through, inter alia, English-language channels such as RT, a
disinformation outlet—persistently argued that Kiev was responsible for the crisis because it was
unwilling to pay market prices and was illegally siphoning natural gas intended for EU end-users.
Whatever the truth, Russia succeeded in beginning to sow doubt about the wisdom of Ukraine as a
NATO or EU member.
The Russia-Ukraine gas crisis was repeated in January 2009, during the period of the Binterregnum,^ in which Dimitry Medvedev was Russian
President and Putin Prime Minister (2008–2012). The 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis halted almost all gas deliveries to Gazprom customers in
the EU for 3 weeks. This crisis was also accompanied by a sustained Russian campaign to blame Ukraine. On the one hand, this succeeded to
the extent that the EU and the USA were forced to finally recognize how anathema Ukraine’s EU and NATO aspirations were to the Kremlin and
therefore recalibrate their risk tolerance for supporting Kiev. On the other hand, the 2009 gas crisis marked a moment of recognition that EU
member states needed to reduce natural gas supply and transit risk, which implied reducing exposure to Russia.
Between the Russia-Ukraine gas crises, Russia’s irredentist intervention into the disputed territory of
South Ossetia was also intimately intertwined with geopolitics and hydrocarbon transit routes. The
Bfrozen^ conflict with Georgia over the self-proclaimed republic thawed during a diplomatic crisis in
April 2008 before transforming in August into the Russo-Georgian war. Georgia claimed the beginning of
the fighting was an unprovoked attack on its sovereign territory by South Ossetian separatists acting on
Moscow’s orders, while Russia declared its involvement a Bpeace enforcement operation^ following
Georgian aggression against peace-keepers and ethnic Russians in South Ossetia.
The result of the war was an overwhelming defeat of Georgia, which lost its already tenuous control
over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Moreover, the country suffered diplomatically, as its vulnerability and
proximity to a revanchist Russia dimmed chances of Georgian accession to NATO, while EU membership
also evaporated. Russia, on the other hand, gained several strategic victories: keeping Georgia formally
out of the orbit of the EU and the USA (and halting one of the color revolutions), demonstrating to the
EU and the USA its capability to threaten vital non-Russian oil/ gas pipelines from the Caspian basin
(notably the BTC pipeline running through Tblisi), and sending a message to the EU and the USA that
Kremlin decision-makers were prepared to escalate conflicts to defend and advance Russian interests in
areas of perceived vital strategic value.
Seen in the cold light of morning in Donbas or Crimea, or from the rubble of a bombed-out Aleppo souk,
the Kremlin’s message of aggressive revisionism now seems unmistakable. The Russian annexation of
parts of Ukraine has clear irredentist intent coupled with strategic implications (access to Sevastopol’s
port, control of territory for defense-in-depth). Russian deadly intervention to aid Assad in Syria’s civil
war is likewise understandable, as the Kremlin has fought to keep its last major southwest Asian ally in
power and secure continued access to the important Tartus base/port. Russia has flexed its revisionist
muscles in other ways also: veiled threats against the Baltic states, violation of Swedish territorial waters
by submarine, fighter aircraft incursions into other states’ airspace, fighter aircraft brinksmanship in
proximity to other states’ military planes, the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH-17 by Russian-
backed Ukrainian separatists,13 a 2016 cyber-attack that shut down part of Kiev’s power grid,
interference in EU and Balkan states’ domestic political affairs (e.g., supporting extremist parties), cyberespionage against the OSCE,14 and interference in the US presidential election (including cyberespionage against US political campaigns).
One constant throughout these hybrid conflicts and provocations has been information warfare focused
on ensuring that Moscow’s messaging dominates the perception of its actions among target groups. To
this end, Russia’s 400mnUSD (annually) propaganda and disinformation capabilities have grown
increasingly sophisticated, and now work across platforms/channels and on multiple levels (both
domestically and internationally). Domestically, the Kremlin controls the news media, which allows it to
manipulate nationalist sentiment to support overseas operations. Internationally, Russia’s flagship
channel, RT, is a 24-h broadcaster competing with CNN and the BBC in some markets. Russia also
deploys legions of hackers and internet trolls (and troll bots) who turn online news into a mire of
spurious social media and Bfake news.^ 15
Russian information warfare demonstrates patterns in terms of objectives, strategy, and tactics. Especially in a hybrid-war context, Russian
disinformation and propaganda serve at least four objectives: (a) dissuading rival political entities, especially the USA and Europe, from
challenging Russian kinetic action; (b) generalizing cynicism about domestic and international politics, discrediting the idea of global governance
based on international law and norms, and popularizing Russian policy agendas within international populations; (c) legitimating artificially
constructed Bfacts on the ground^; (d) causing dissension within and among states allied against a given Russian action.
The strategies and tactics supporting these objectives are manifold:
Dissuading rivals from challenging Russian revisionism requires strategic use of media to create
narratives depicting Russia as a powerful state capable of defending/ advancing its interests and
damaging adversaries. Mostly, these practices do not directly target leaders of states interested in
counteracting Moscow. Rather, Russia’s information warfare works by raising the Baudience costs^ and
thus public constraints that other states’ leaders face (vis-à-vis their citizens) when threatening Russia
with punitive measures. This is a critical point to understand, as traditionally governments in the West
focused on Russia’s state-to-state official diplomacy, overlooking the effects of Russian state-to-people
public diplomacy.
--AT: Reps Ks
We don’t demonize Russia – best analysis is through a realist lens
Adomanis 11/22/11
http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2011/11/22/two-recent-examples-of-russia-as-a-nonideological-power/2/
A native Philadelphian and reluctant Washingtonian, I have been lucky enough to be educated first at
Harvard and then at Oxford (though one should not judge those fine educational institutions for the
inevitable typos in my posts) and received instruction from some of the finest teachers one could ask
for. I've written for a number of student-run publications, blogged at True/Slant before its acquisition by
Forbes, write a weekly column for INOSMI, and occasionally appear on RT.
I’ve* long thought that this is all a lot of hogwash, and that if you look at the totality of post-2000
Russian foreign policy it is hard to ascertain any sort of consistency whatsoever beside a persistent and
robust defense of Russia’s interests. Indeed compared to the increasingly shrill and incoherent ideology of
American foreign policy, what strikes me about Russia’s foreign policy is the near-total absence of
ideology and the overwhelming precedence of old-school realism.
Russia, of course, tends to polarize people and the battle lines on this particular issue, as on most others
relating to the country, have long been drawn and have hardened and calcified over time in much the
same way that the Western Front did in the First World War.
Well, while I was doing my quick early-morning scan of the headlines I happened upon two articles that,
I think, show quite nicely how Russia’s foreign policy is a highly flexible, adaptable, and decidedly nonideological one.
The first is from the Associated Press:
In a boost to Israel, Russia joined the U.S. and Britain on Tuesday in backing the Jewish state’s view
that the Middle East cannot be turned into a nuclear arms-free zone without progress on regional
peace.
The three nations — who are charged with registering new members to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty — also blunted Arab efforts to get them involved creating such a zone, telling an International
Atomic Energy Agency meeting that was the sole responsibility of countries in the region.
The three-nation statement was made at a rare venue — a meeting bringing Israel and the Arab states
together for a discussion of how to work toward establishing a Mideast nuclear-arms free zone. While
nearly 100 nations attended the forum, it was primarily meant to allow those two opposing camps to
exchange views on the issue — one of many dividing Israel from its Arab neighbors.
This certainly doesn’t mean that Russia has suddenly become vehemently pro-Israel, but it also pretty
clearly shows that it has no real stake in being deliberately “pro-Arab” either. Unlike the US, which has a
public commitment to keeping Israel more militarily powerful than any other country in the region and
which has expended endless diplomatic resources to defend its conduct, Russia will back either the
Israelis or the Arabs depending on where its interests lie on a particular issue. Indeed, Russia reiterated
it’s longstanding opposition to Israeli settlements in Jerusalem just last week but has, in the not too
distant past, signed a military cooperation deal and bought $400 million worth of UAVs. Russia’s policy is
a lot of things, but it’s obviously not straightforward (just try to keep track of its constant back-and-forth
over Iran) and it’s not based on a particular “pro-autocracy” ideology.
The other example comes from Tajikistan, where a Russian and Estonian pilot were released after
Moscow exerted extraordinarily heavy, and brash, diplomatic pressure:
A Tajik court has freed a Russian and an Estonian pilots whose jailing this month led to a major row
with Moscow. Russia’s Vladimir Sadovnichy and Alexei Rudenko from Estonia were jailed for eight-anda-half years for smuggling and illegally crossing the border. But the men, who both denied the charges,
have now been released at the request of the prosecutor and following heavy pressure from the
Kremlin.
Many Tajik migrants were rounded up in Moscow after the initial guilty ruling.
And in another, apparently tit-for-tat, move, Russia’s chief medical officer last week expressed
concern about whether ethnic Tajik workers in Russia were carrying the HIV virus that causes Aids.
Migrant work in Russia is a vital source of income for many nationals from Tajikistan, the poorest former
Soviet Republic.
As another news report indicated: ”About 1 million Tajik nationals — nearly every seventh Tajik citizen
— are engaged in seasonal jobs in Russia, and the remittances they send back to their impoverished
homeland contribute greatly to Tajikistan’s economy.”
I would note that Tajikistan is part of Russia’s “near-abroad” and that it is (to put things mildly) neither
democratic nor pro-Western. Yet here we can clearly see that Russia, which places a very heavy
rhetorical and practical emphasis on “protecting its citizens,” played a pretty vicious game of hardball.
I’m not defending Russia’ conduct in this instance, I think it’s pretty clearly unethical to punish random
Tajik migrant workers for the actions of their unelected and unaccountable government, merely pointing
out that Russia acts irascibly to defend its interests independent of whether a country is democratic or
not.
This might all seem rather basic and even self-evident, but one does not need to search very far to find
examples of prominent journalists and analysts arguing that Russia’s rather brusque treatment of the
Baltics and Georgia is evidence of the Kremlin’s hateful ideological predisposition against democracy.
Well judging by the extremely harsh treatment of Tajikistan over what is, in the grand scheme of things,
a rather minor diplomatic disagreement, I don’t think that analysis stands up to any scrutiny.
One can (accurately, I think) argue that Russia’s foreign policy is somewhat overbearing,
uncompromising, and overly harsh, but it seems impossible to find any consistent ideological
motivation. Compared to the insane and insistent ideology that emanated from the Soviet Union until
the very end, this is something for which we can be thankful.
* I am hardly alone in this belief and am not arguing that I am. Daniel Larison, among many other writers
more talented and erudite than me, has long persuasively argued that Russia’s foreign policy is best
understood through a realist lens.
2NR Yes China Revisionism
China is revisionist and creating aggression in the SCS through military buildups --only scrapping the INF can effectively deter
Brookes 18
Peter Brookes, Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs, “Trump Right to Consider Pulling Out of INF
Treaty,” Heritage. October 28, 2018. https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/trumpright-consider-pulling-out-inf-treaty
That changed slightly in 2014, when the Obama State Department finally called out Russia for its
ongoing violations of the INF Treaty after reports that it had tested a land-based cruise missile, the SSC8.
Unfortunately, Washington’s accusatory rhetoric at the time had no effect on Moscow’s course of action
on the arms control agreement. Indeed, by last year, the Russians had reportedly deployed at least one
operational SSC-8 military unit.
The other problem with the INF Treaty, beyond Russia’s violations of it, is China. Beijing isn’t party to the
U.S.-Russia INF Treaty and therefore isn’t constrained by any of the arms control restrictions set forth on
intermediate range missiles in the agreement.
As such, China has developed and deployed a significant conventional and nuclear ballistic and cruise
missile arsenal as part of its rising superpower status in the international system and its efforts to assert
its interests in the Pacific region—and beyond.
Today, China has the world’s second largest military budget and is involved in a significant buildup of its
military, which in some cases threatens important American interests in the Pacific—for instance, its
claims of sovereignty over much of the South China Sea.
A senior U.S. military commander asserted last year that 95 percent of China’s land-based
missiles—which, without question, add a potent punch to Beijing’s military might—would be restricted
under the INF Treaty, an agreement that Moscow and Washington are currently bound to uphold.
As challenges arise in the Pacific involving China and potentially North Korea, the INF Treaty prevents
the United States from being able to freely develop and deploy our military capabilities to the fullest
extent possible in support of our national security interests.
It would be both risky and unsound for the U.S. to ignore concerns over Russia’s violations of the INF
Treaty, as well as China and its growing missile arsenal, which threatens U.S. forces and interests in Asia.
As this is being written, the Trump administration hasn’t formally provided notice that it’s leaving the INF Treaty. Indeed, National Security
Advisor John Bolton’s visit to Moscow this week likely involves serious discussions with his Russian counterparts on the future of the treaty.
Beijing has expressed its view—not surprisingly—that Washington shouldn’t leave the INF Treaty. China is also very unlikely to sign onto the
existing treaty or some sort of negotiated expansion of the treaty, as doing so would diminish its missile muscle.
The Russians could certainly come back into compliance with the treaty to our satisfaction, but if they
decide to continue to violate it—which seems likely—there are a number of very good reasons for us to
drop the treaty entirely.
China represents a revisionist challenge to the military and economic order—weak
American responses embolden Chinese aggression and prompt global wars
Choi 18
Ji Young Choi, Associate professor in the Department of Politics and Government and affiliated professor
in the International Studies Program and East Asian Studies Program at Ohio Wesleyan University.
“Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the Rise of China: Long Cycles, Power Transitions, and
China's Ascent,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 42, Issue 1, January-March 2018, pages 61-84.
I have explored in light of historical and theoretical perspectives whether China is a candidate to
become a global hegemonic power. The next question I will address is whether the ascent of China will
lead to a hegemonic war or not. As mentioned previously, historical and theoretical lessons reveal that a
rising great power tends to challenge a system leader when the former's economic and other major
capabilities come too close to those of the latter and the former is dissatisfied with the latter's
leadership and the international rules it created. This means that the rise of China could produce
intense hegemonic competition and even a global hegemonic war. The preventive motivation by
an old declining power can cause a major war with a newly emerging power when it is combined with
other variables (Levy 1987). While a preventive war by a system leader is historically rare, a newly
emerging yet even relatively weak rising power at times challenges a much more powerful system
leader, as in the case of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 (Schweller 1999). A historical lesson is
that "incomplete catch-ups are inherently conflict-prone" (Thompson 2006, 19). This implies that even
though it falls short of surpassing the system leader, the rise of a new great power can produce
significant instability in the interstate system when it develops into a revisionist power. Moreover, the
United States and China are deeply involved in major security issues in East Asia (including the North
Korean nuclear crisis, the Taiwan issue, and the South China Sea disputes), and we cannot rule out the
possibility that one of these regional conflicts will develop into a much bigger global war in which the
two superpowers are entangled. According to Allison (2017), who studied sixteen historical cases in
which a rising power confronted an existing power, a war between the United States and China is not
unavoidable, but escaping it will require enormous efforts by both sides. Some Chinese scholars (Jia
2009; Wang and Zhu 2015), who emphasize the transformation of China's domestic politics and the
pragmatism of Beijing's diplomacy, have a more or less optimistic view of the future of US-China
relations. Yet my reading of the situation is that since 2009 there has been an increasing gap between
this optimistic view and what has really happened. It is premature to conclude that China is a revisionist
state, but in what follows I will suggest some important signs that show China has revisionist aims at
least in the Asia Pacific and could develop into a revisionist power in the future.
Beijing has concentrated on economic modernization since the start of pro-market reforms in the late
1970s and made efforts to keep a low profile in international security issues for several decades. It
followed Deng Xiaoping's doctrine: "hide one's capabilities, bide one's time, and seek the right
opportunity." Since 2003, China's motto has been "Peaceful Rise" or "Peaceful Development," and
Chinese leadership has emphasized that the rise of China would not threaten any other countries.
Recently, however, Beijing has adopted increasingly assertive or even aggressive foreign policies in
international security affairs. In particular, China has been adamant about territorial issues in the East
and South China Seas and is increasingly considered as a severe threat by other nations in the Asia
Pacific region. Since 2009, for example, Beijing has increased naval activities on a large scale in the area
of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. In 2010, Beijing announced that just like Tibet and
Taiwan, the South China Sea is considered a core national interest. We can identify drastic rhetorical
changes as well. In 2010, China's foreign minister publicly stated, "China is a big country . . . and other
countries are small countries and that is just a fact" (Economist 2012). In October 2013, Chinese leader
Xi Jinping also used the words "struggle and achieve results," emphasizing the importance of China's
territorial integrity (Waldron 2014, 166-167). Furthermore, China has constructed man-made islands in
the South China Sea to seek "de facto control over the resource-rich waters and islets" claimed as well
by its neighboring countries (Los Angeles Times 2015). As of now, China's strategy is to delay a direct
military conflict with the United States as long as possible and use its economic and political prowess to
pressure smaller neighbors to give up their territorial claims (Doran 2012). These new developments and
rhetorical signals reflect significant changes in China's foreign policies and signify that China's peaceful
rise seems to be over.
A rising great power's consistent and determined policies to increase military buildups can be read as
one of the significant signs of the rising power's dissatisfaction with the existing order and its willingness
to do battle if it is really necessary. In the words of Rapkin and Thompson (2003, 318), "arms buildups
and arms races . . . reflect substantial dissatisfaction on the part of the challenger and an attempt to
accelerate the pace of military catchup and the development of a relative power advantage." Werner
and Kugler (1996) also posit that if an emerging challenger's military expenditures are increasing faster
than those of a system leader, parity can be very dangerous to the international political order. China's
GDP is currently around 60 percent of that of the United States, so parity has not been reached yet.
China's military budget, however, has grown enormously for the past two decades (double-digit growth
nearly every year), which is creating concerns among neighboring nations and a system leader, the
United States. In addition to its air force, China's strengthening navy or sea power has been one of the
main goals in its military modernization program. Beijing has invested large financial resources in
constructing new naval vessels, submarines, and aircraft carriers (Economist 2012). Furthermore, in its
new defense white paper in 2015, Beijing made clear a vision to expand the global role for its military,
particularly its naval force, to protect its overseas economic and strategic interests (Tiezzi 2015).
Sea power has special importance for an emerging great power. As Mahan (1987 [1890]) explained
cogently in one of his classic books on naval strategy, Great Britain was able to emerge as a new
hegemonic power because of the superiority of its naval capacity and technology and its effective
control of main international sealanes. Naval power has a special significance for China, a newly
emerging power, as well as for both economic and strategic reasons. First, its economy's rapid growth
requires external expansion to ensure raw materials and the foreign markets to sell its products.
Therefore, naval power becomes crucial in protecting its overseas business interests and activities.
Second, securing major sea-lanes becomes increasingly important as they will be crucial lifelines for the
supply of energy, raw materials, and other essential goods should China become involved in a
hegemonic war or any other major military conflict (Friedberg 2011). In light of this, it is understandable
why China is so stubborn over territorial issues in the South China and East China Seas. In fact, history
tells us that many rising powers invested in sea power to expand their global influence, and indeed all
the global hegemons including Great Britain and the United States were predominant naval powers.
Another important aspect is that Beijing is beginning to voice its dissatisfaction with the existing
international economic order and take actions that could potentially change this order. The Chinese
economy has overall benefited from the post-World War II international liberal order, but the Bretton
Woods institutions like the IMF and the World Bank have been dominated by the United States and its
allies and China does not have much power or voice in these institutions. Both institutions are based in
Washington, DC, and the United States has enjoyed the largest voting shares with its veto power. Along
with other emerging economies, China has called for significant reforms, especially in the governing
system of the IMF, but reform plans to give more power to China and other emerging economies have
been delayed by the opposition of the US Congress (Choi 2013). In response to this, Beijing recently took
the initiative to create new international financial institutions including the AIIB. At this moment, it is
premature to say that these new institutions would be able to replace the Bretton Woods institutions.
Nonetheless, this new development can be read as a starting point for significant changes in global
economic and financial governance that has been dominated by the United States since the end of
World War II (Subacchi 2015).
History proves --- China is revisionist and seeks regional dominance
Choi 18
Ji Young Choi, Associate professor in the Department of Politics and Government and affiliated professor
in the International Studies Program and East Asian Studies Program at Ohio Wesleyan University.
“Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the Rise of China: Long Cycles, Power Transitions, and
China's Ascent,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 42, Issue 1, January-March 2018, pages 61-84.
China's historical legacies reinforce the view that China has a willingness to become a global hegemon.
From the Ming dynasty in the late fourteenth century to the start of the first Opium War in 1839, China
enjoyed its undisputed hegemonic position in East Asia. "Sino-centrism" that is related to this historical
reality has long governed the mentality of Chinese people. According to this hierarchical world view,
China, as the most advanced civilization, is at the center of East Asia and the world, and all China's
neighbors are vassal states (Kang 2010). This mentality was openly revealed by the Chinese foreign
minister's recent public statement that I quoted previously: "China is a big country . . . and other
countries are small countries and that is just a fact" (Economist 2012). This view is related to Chinese
people's ancient superiority complex that developed from the long history and rich cultural heritage of
Chinese civilization (Jacques 2012). In a sense, China has always been a superpower regardless of its
economic standing at least in most Chinese people's mind-set. The strong national or civilizational pride
of Chinese people, however, was severely damaged by "the Century of Humiliation," a period between
the first Opium War (1839) and the end of the Chinese Civil War (1949). During this period, China was
encroached on by the West and invaded by Japan, experienced prolonged civil conflicts, and finally
became a semicolony of Great Britain while its northern territory was occupied by Japan. China's
economic modernization is viewed as a national project to lay an economic foundation to overcome this
bitter experience of subjugation and shame and recover its traditional position and old glory (Choi
2015). Viewed from this perspective, economic modernization or the accumulation of wealth is not an
ultimate objective of China. Rather, its final goal is to return to its traditional status by expanding its
global political and military as well as economic influence. What it ultimately desires is recognition
(Anerkennung), respect (Respekt), and status (Stellung). These are important concepts for
constructivists who see ideational motives as the main driving forces behind interstate conflicts (Lebow
2008). This reveals that constructivist elements can be combined with long cycle and power transition
theories in explaining the rise and fall of great powers, although further systematic studies on it are
needed.
Considering all this, China has always been a territorial power rather than a trading state. China does not seem
to be satisfied only with the global expansion of international trade and the conquest of foreign markets.
It also wants to broaden its (particularly maritime) territories and spheres of influence to recover its
traditional political status as the Middle Kingdom. As emphasized previously, the type or nature and goals or ideologies of a
rising power matter. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan (territorial powers) experienced rapid economic expansion and sought to expand their
territories and influence in the first half of the twentieth century. For example, during this period Japan's goal was to create the Japanese
empire in East Asia under the motto of the East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. On the other hand, democratized Germany and Japan (trading
powers) that enjoyed a second economic expansion did not pursue the expansion of their territories and spheres of influence in the post-World
War II era. Twentiethcentury history suggests that political regimes predicated upon nondemocratic or nonliberal values and cultures (for
instance, Nazism in Germany and militarism in Japan before the mid-twentieth century, and communism in the Soviet Union during the Cold
War) can pose significant challenges to democratic and liberal regimes. The empirical studies of Lemke and Reed (1996) show that the
democratic peace thesis can be used as a subset of power transition theory. According to their studies, states organized similarly to the
dominant powers politically and economically (liberal democracy) are generally satisfied with the existing international rules and order and they
tend to be status quo states. Another historical lesson is that economic interdependence alone cannot prevent a war for hegemony. Germany
was one of the main trade partners of Great Britain before World War I (Friedberg 2011), and Japan was the number three importer of
American products before its attack on Pearl Harbor (Keylor 2011). A relatively peaceful relationship or transition is possible when economic
interdependence is supported by a solid democratic alliance between a rising great power and an existing or declining one.
History and empirics prove revisionism --- and naval dominance is key to their strategy
--- but deference solves it
Dyer 14
Geoff Dyer covers US foreign policy and is a former Beijing bureau chief for the FT. “US v China: is this
the new cold war?” Financial Times. February 20, 2014. https://www.ft.com/content/78920b2e-99ba11e3-91cd-00144feab7de
To the list of industries now dominated by China, there is one surprising new entry: Miss World. Beauty contests were banned in China by Mao Zedong as one of the
worst forms of western decadence but their bland internationalism appeals to modern China’s desire to be included. Of the last 10 Miss World pageants, five have
been held at the seaside resort of Sanya, on subtropical Hainan island, off China’s south coast. While the Miss World show is in town, the swimsuit photo shoots
take place across the road, at the Sheraton Sanya Resort, which looks out on to the white sands of Yalong Bay, a crescent-shaped cove lined with palm trees. With a
Ritz-Carlton on one side and a Marriott on the other, Yalong Bay is a transplant of multinational tourism on China’s southernmost point. The resort has become
hugely popular with prosperous Chinese families and on the day I visited, the hotel was hosting a corporate retreat for the Chinese subsidiary of Syngenta, the
Switzerland-based company which sells genetically modified seeds. The hundred or so Chinese employees spent the afternoon playing games on the beach. As they
enjoyed themselves, they barely looked up when a Chinese Type 054 frigate sailed casually across the bay, in plain view of the tourists. Yalong Bay, it turns out, has
a double life. The brand-name hotels occupy only one half of the beach; at the other end lies China’s newest and most sophisticated naval base. Tourists in Sanya,
Hainan, also home to one of China’s naval bases Yalong Bay is where the two sides of China’s rise now intersect: its deeply connected economy and its deep-seated
instinct to challenge America – globalisation China and great-power China vying for a spot on the beach. Celebrating their success in the China market, the Syngenta
employees at the Sheraton all wore T-shirts emblazoned with the English-language slogan for their event: “Step Up Together”. Yet right next door to their party was
one of the most striking symbols of China’s great-power ambitions. Ideally situated for quick access to the busy sea lanes of the South China Sea, the base in Hainan
is one of the principal platforms for an old-fashioned form of projecting national power: a navy that can operate well beyond a country’s coastal waters. For the past
couple of decades, such power politics seemed to have been made irrelevant by the frictionless, flat world of globalisation. Yalong Bay demonstrates a different
reality. It is one
of the launch pads for what will be a central geopolitical tussle of the 21st century: the new era
of military competition in the Pacific Ocean between China and the US. … The historic meeting between Richard Nixon and
Mao Zedong in 1972, which marked the resumption of relations between the two powers Asia’s seas have become the principal arteries of the global economy yet
two very different visions of Asia’s future are now in play. Since
the defeat of Japan in 1945 – and especially since the end of
the cold war – the US Navy has treated the Pacific almost as a private lake. It has used that power to
implement an international system in its own image, a rules-based order of free trade, freedom of
navigation and, when possible, democratic government. That Pax Americana was cemented when the US and China resumed
relations in 1972. The four decades since Richard Nixon met Mao Zedong have been the most stable and prosperous in Asia’s modern history. Under the agreement,
the US endorsed China’s return to the family of nations and China
implicitly accepted American military dominance in Asia.
This unwritten understanding between Beijing and Washington on America’s role in Asia is crumbling.
China now wishes to recast the military and political dynamic in the region to reflect its own traditional
centrality. Great powers are driven by a mixture of confidence and insecurity. China wants a return to the leadership position it
has enjoyed so often in Asian history. It also frets about the security of its seaborne commerce,
especially in the area it calls the “Near Seas” – the coastal waters that include the Yellow, East China and
South China Seas. The Yalong Bay naval base on Hainan is one part of the strategy that China is starting to put in place to exert control over the Near Seas,
pushing the US Navy ever farther out into the western Pacific. In the process, it is launching a profound challenge to the US-led order that has been the backbone of
the Asian economic miracle. For
the past 20 years China has been undergoing a rapid military build-up, and the
navy has been given pride of place. More important, China has been investing in its navy in a very specific way.
American strategists sometimes talk about a Chinese “anti-navy” – a series of warships, silent submarines
and precision missiles, some based on land, some at sea, which are specifically designed to keep an
opposing navy as far away as possible from the mainland. The implication of the investment plan is that China is trying to
prevent the US Navy from operating in large areas of the western Pacific. According to Dennis Blair, the former Pacific
commander who was head of the US intelligence services early in the Obama administration: “Ninety per cent of their time is spent on
thinking about new and interesting ways to sink our ships and shoot down our planes.” China’s new navy
is both an expression of power and a means to a diplomatic end. By weakening the US naval presence in
the western Pacific, China hopes gradually to undermine America’s alliances with other Asian countries,
notably South Korea, the Philippines and maybe even Japan. If US influence declines, China would be in a
position to assume quietly a leadership position in Asia, giving it much greater sway over the rules and
practices in the global economy. Through its navy, China hopes to reshape the balance of power in Asia.
The naval competition in the western Pacific will set the tone for a large part of global politics in the
coming decades. Japanese and Chinese boats sail past one of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands last
year While these pressures have built up quietly over the past few years, they have burst into the open
in recent months, especially with the tense stand-off between China and Japan over disputed islands in the East China Sea – which the Japanese call the
Senkaku and the Chinese the Diaoyu. Almost every day, Chinese aircraft fly near the islands, prompting a response from Japanese jets, while Chinese vessels also
patrol near the islands, which are administered by Japan. The
world’s second and third largest economies are playing a game
of military chicken, with the world’s largest economy, the US, committed by treaty to defend Japan. China’s stepped-up claim over the
islands is one part of its push for greater control of the surrounding seas but it is also a central part of the growing contest
for influence with the US. China’s turn to the seas is rooted in history and geography in a manner that transcends its current political system. It was from
the sea that China was harassed during its “century of humiliation” at the hands of the west. China was one of
the most prominent victims of 19th-century gunboat diplomacy, when Britain, France and other colonial powers used their naval supremacy to exercise control over
Shanghai and a dozen other ports around the country. The
instinct to control the surrounding seas is partly rooted in the
widespread desire never to leave China so vulnerable again. “Ignoring the oceans is a historical error we
committed,” says Yang Yong, a Chinese historian. “And now even in the future we will pay a price for this error.” This
besiegement looks even worse on a map. Chinese talk about the “first island chain”, a perimeter that stretches along the western Pacific
from Japan in the northeast, through Taiwan, to the Philippines in the south – all allies or friends of the US. This is both a geographical barrier, in
that it creates a series of channels that a superior opponent could block in order to bottle up the Chinese
navy, and a political barrier controlled by countries close to Washington. Chinese strategists talk about
“breaking through the thistles”: the development of a naval capability that will allow it to operate
outside the first island chain. The USS George Washington in Hong Kong When China looks out to sea, it also quickly sees the US. In the decades
when China had little more than a coastguard, it was largely unaware that the US Navy was patrolling waters near its shores. But now that its capabilities are more
advanced, it
witnesses on a daily basis that the American navy is superior and operating only a few miles
from many of China’s major cities. “For them, this is a major humiliation that they experience every single
day,” says Chu Shulong, an academic at Tsinghua University in Beijing who spent a number of years in the Chinese military. “It is humiliating that
another country can exercise so close to China’s coasts, so close to the base in Hainan. That is the reason
the navy wants to do something to challenge the US.” Anxieties about history and geography have meshed with broader concerns
about economic security. One of the key turning points in China’s push to the high seas took place when it started to import oil for the first time, in 1993. By 2010,
China had become the second-biggest consumer of oil, half of which is now imported. New great powers often fret that rivals could damage their economy with a
blockade. For every 10 barrels of oil that China imports, more than eight travel by ship through the Strait of Malacca, the narrow sea channel between Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore, which is patrolled by US ships. Fifteenth-century Venetians used to warn, “Whoever is the Lord of Malacca has his hand on the throat of
Venice.” Hu Jintao echoed these sentiments when he warned in a 2003 speech that “certain major powers” are bent on controlling this crucial sea lane. Until now,
China’s maritime security has been guaranteed largely by the US Navy. But, like aspiring great powers before it, China
has been forced to
confront a central geopolitical dilemma: can it rely on a rival to protect the country’s economic lifeline? …
In 2005, the American writer Robert Kaplan wrote a cover story for The Atlantic entitled “How We Would Fight China”. I can remember receiving a copy in my office
in Shanghai and tossing it angrily on to a pile of papers, the plastic wrapper still on the magazine. This was the high point of the debacle in Iraq and the idea of
talking up a war with China at that moment seemed the height of neoconservative conceit. But when I did eventually read Kaplan’s article, I began to realise that
the question he raised was a crucial one. China does not have a grand imperial plan to invade its neighbours, in the way the Soviets did. But in any country with a
rapidly growing military – one that is flexing its muscles and is involved in a score of unresolved territorial disputes – there is always the risk that its leaders might be
tempted by some sort of military solution, the lure of a quick win that would reorder the regional balance. If
China and its neighbours all
believe that the US has a credible plan for a conflict, this both deters any eventual Chinese
adventurism and reduces the risk that anxious Asians will start their own arms races with
Beijing. Or, as TX Hammes, the American military historian, puts it: “We need to make sure no one in the Chinese military is
whispering in their leaders’ ears: ‘If you listen to me, we can be in Paris in just two weeks.’” US aircraft carrier
Carl Vinson in Hong Kong in 2011 The US has not lost an aircraft carrier since the Japanese sank the Hornet in 1942. Both
practically and symbolically, the aircraft carrier has been central to American power projection over the six
decades during which it has dominated the Pacific. But it is those same vessels that are now potentially under threat from China’s vast
new array of missiles. The loss of a carrier would be a massive psychological blow to American prestige and
credibility, a naval 9/11. The mere prospect that carriers might be vulnerable could be enough to restrict
their use. Even if the US Navy commanders thought their carriers would probably survive in a conflict,
they might be reluctant to take the risk. As a result, the US needs a Plan B. In the bowels of the Pentagon, that new plan has been taking
shape. It is not actually described as a plan – instead, Pentagon officials call it a new “concept” for fighting wars. But it does have a name, AirSea Battle, which
echoes the military doctrine from the later stages of the cold war called AirLand Battle, when the massive build-up in Soviet troops appeared to give the USSR the
capacity to over-run western Europe. Many of the details about AirSea Battle remain vague. But the few indications that have been made public suggest an
approach that, if pushed too far, could be a manifesto for a new cold war. One senior Pentagon official insisted to me, “This is not an anti-China battle plan.” But
when the Pentagon starts to describe the threats it is facing – long-range, precision-strike missiles that can restrict the movements of its ships, advanced submarines
and expertise in cyberwar – it becomes clear that AirSea Battle is primarily about China. The hypothetical threat that the Pentagon planners outline describes
accurately the precise strategy that China has been developing to restrict US access to the western Pacific. No wonder US military officers sometimes refer to China
as “Voldemort” – in the Pentagon’s new battle plan, China is the enemy whose name they dare not speak. Ninety
per cent of China’s time is
spent on thinking about new and interesting ways to sink our ships and shoot down our planes Dennis Blair,
former US Pacific commander Amid the military jargon there lies an idea that – if taken to its logical conclusion – is fraught with peril. In early 2012, the Pentagon
released a document called “Joint Operational Access Concept” (known in the building as Joac). In the event of a conflict, the paper says, the US should “attack the
enemy’s cyber and space” capabilities. At the same time, it should attack the enemy’s anti-access forces “in depth”. The clear implication of this advice is that, if war
ever were to break out, the US should plan to launch extensive bombing raids across mainland China. China’s “anti-navy” of missile bases and surveillance
equipment is based at facilities spread across the country, including in many built-up areas. The basic idea behind AirSea Battle leads to a fairly uncompromising
conclusion that, in the early stages of a conflict with Beijing, the US should destroy dozens of military sites. It is the navy’s version of “shock and awe” for 21stcentury Asia. There are several reasons why this would be a dangerous way to think about a conflict with China. For a start, it is a recipe for rapid escalation. Given
that two nuclear powers are involved, there should be big incentives to leave room for diplomats to try and find a way to resolve the situation. Yet, in calling for US
forces to take out China’s missile batteries at an early stage, the Pentagon’s ideas could intensify any conflict quickly. The Chinese might well conclude that the US
was also targeting its nuclear weapons. Using AirSea Battle’s ideas against China is an all-or-nothing battle plan. If commanders quickly order bombing raids across
China, there is little scope to create space for diplomacy. Short of complete Chinese capitulation, it is difficult to see how such a war would end. AirSea Battle would
be expensive, too. It would require the Pentagon to fast-track a lot of weapons projects, such as a new generation of stealth bomber, at a time when budgets are
under pressure. It is not only the usual critics of the military-industrial complex who fear this is part of the hidden agenda of AirSea Battle. Towards the end of the
cold war, the arms race ultimately bankrupted the Soviet Union before the pressures of defence spending began seriously to undermine the US. But if a deeper
arms race were to develop between China and the US, it is not at all clear that Washington would be starting from a stronger financial footing. Then there are the
allies. Asian governments are keen on a US military that can push back against Chinese aggression and are eager to enlist US help in this regard. But some allies
might balk at the prospect of a plan to attack deep into mainland China, especially if it involved launching bombing raids from their territory. Ben Schreer, an
Australian military strategist, says AirSea Battle is suited to “a future Asian cold war scenario”. Rather than providing assurance, Washington’s new battle plan could
easily rattle some of its friends and allies. … All these objections create one final problem with AirSea Battle: is such an approach politically viable? Given the risks,
especially the chance of nuclear escalation, it is not at all clear that a US president would endorse a war plan that involved such a rolling bombing campaign.
Successful deterrence relies on being able to demonstrate a military threat that is credible and realistic. Pentagon planners hope the Chinese military will be cowed
by the mere thought of an American military strategy based on AirSea Battle. But, equally, the Chinese might come to see it as a one great big bluff. At the very
least, AirSea Battle concentrates the mind. It is prompting a much broader debate in the US about how to respond to the Chinese challenge. With its superiority
now under threat, Washington faces a choice: it can try to retain its primacy at all costs or it can shift to a more defensive approach that is geared towards
preventing another power from ever controlling the region. Deterrence
is not always the same as dominance. The US can use
some of China’s own logic against it. Together with its allies, it can develop defensive arrangements that
take advantage of the region’s geography and which would make it almost impossible for China to seize
contested areas – and to hold on to those islands if it were to try. By making clear the high penalties that would be
involved in any attempt to snatch disputed islands, it can ensure that China cannot change the region’s
status quo. Such a goal would be both much cheaper to achieve and much less confrontational than planning for mainland air strikes. The American naval
historians Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes suggest that the US partly focuses on what they call “war limited by contingent” – smaller-scale operations which
prevent dramatic escalation but make life difficult for the Chinese navy. They draw the analogy of Wellington’s campaign in Spain and Portugal in 1807-14, which in
military terms was a sideshow to the broader conflict with France but which Napoleon complained gave him “an ulcer”. The geography along the first island chain
provides many strategic locations which can be used to construct small-scale facilities with missile batteries that could create havoc for a rival navy. Submarines and
mines would add to the deterrent effect against any land-grabs. “The ideas that China is pursuing about denying access can work both ways,” Holmes told me.
“There
are many ways to give China an ulcer, which could be one of the best ways of deterring
aggression before it ever happens.” For the more pessimistic observers, the US and China are doomed to repeat the intense security
competition of the cold war. John Mearsheimer, the University of Chicago scholar, argues that the rivalry could be even more volatile than with the Soviet Union
because there are more potential disputes. He also says he would not be surprised if China and Japan “start shooting at each other” at some stage over the next five
years. Such bleak outcomes are not inevitable, of course – powerful economic connections narrow the space for reckless behaviour. Yet a previous era of
globalisation failed to prevent the UK and Germany from going to war. Shinzo Abe, the Japanese prime minister, is not alone in comparing the current situation in
Asia to Europe in 1914. Asian militaries lack the meticulous war plans that helped push Europe into conflict then but the region offered a familiar mixture of
nationalism and the potential for miscalculations that can spin out of control. The western Pacific may now be the cockpit of the world economy but it is also
turning into one of its most dangerous flashpoints.
--AT: Pan
Pan is reductionist and the alt fails
Jones 14
David Martin Jones, Professor of Politics at University of Glasgow, PhD from LSE, Australian Journal of
Political Science, February 21, 2014, 49:1, "Managing the China Dream: Communist Party politics after
the Tiananmen incident ", Taylor and Francis Online
Notwithstanding this Western fascination with China and the positive response of former Marxists, such
as Jacques, to the new China, Pan discerns an Orientalist ideology distorting Western commentary on
the party state, and especially its international relations (6). Following Edward Said, Pan claims that such
Western Orientalism reveals ‘not something concrete about the orient, but something about the
orientalists themselves, their recurring latent desire of fears and fantasies about the orient’ (16). In
order to unmask the limits of Western representations of China’s rise, Pan employs a critical
‘methodology’ that ‘draws on constructivist and deconstructivist approaches’ (9). Whereas the ‘former
questions the underlying dichotomy of reality/knowledge in Western study of China’s international
relations’, the latter shows how paradigmatic representations of China ‘condition the way we give
meaning to that country’ and ‘are socially constitutive of it’ (9). Pan maintains that the two paradigms of
‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’ in Western discourse shape China’s reality for Western ‘China
watchers’ (3). These discourses, Pan claims, are ‘ambivalent’ (65). He contends that this ‘bifocal
representation of China, like Western discourses of China more generally, tell us a great deal about the
west itself, its self -imagination, its torn, anxious, subjectivity, as well as its discursive effects of othering’
(65). This is a large claim.
Interestingly, Pan fails to note that after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, Chinese new left scholarship
also embraced Said’s critique of Orientalism in order to reinforce both the party state and a burgeoning
sense of Chinese nationalism. To counter Western liberal discourse, academics associated with the
Central Party School promoted an ideology of Occidentalism to deflect domestic and international
pressure to democratise China. In this, they drew not only upon Said, but also upon Foucault and the
post-1968 school of French radical thought that, as Richard Wolin has demonstrated, was itself initiated
in an appreciation of Mao’s cultural revolution. In other words, the critical and deconstructive
methodologies that came to influence American and European social science from the 1980s had a
Maoist inspiration (Wolin 2010: 12–18).
Subsequently, in the changed circumstances of the 1990s, as American sinologist Fewsmith has shown,
young Chinese scholars ‘adopted a variety of postmodernist and critical methodologies’ (2008: 125).
Paradoxically, these scholars, such as Wang Hui and Zhang Kuan (Wang 2011), had been educated in the
USA and were familiar with fashionable academic criticism of a postmodern and deconstructionist hue
that ‘demythified’ the West (Fewsmith 2008: 125–29). This approach, promulgated in the academic
journal Dushu (Readings), deconstructed, via Said and Foucault, Western narratives about China. Zhang
Kuan, in particular, rejected Enlightenment values and saw postmodern critical theory as a method to
build up a national ‘discourse of resistance’ and counter Western demands regarding issues such as
human rights and intellectual property.
It is through its affinity with this self-strengthening, Occidentalist lens, that Pan’s critical study should
perhaps be critically read. Simply put, Pan identifies a political economy of fear and desire that informs
and complicates Western foreign policy and, Pan asserts, tells us more about the West’s ‘selfimagination’ than it does about Chinese reality. Pan attempts to sustain this claim via an analysis, in
Chapter 5, of the self-fulfilling prophecy of the China threat, followed, in Chapters 6 and 7, by exposure
of the false promises and premises of the China ‘opportunity’. Pan certainly offers a provocative insight
into Western attitudes to China and their impact on Chinese political thinking. In particular, he
demonstrates that China’s foreign policy-makers react negatively to what they view as a hostile
American strategy of containment (101). In this context, Pan contends, accurately, that Sino–US
relations are mutually constitutive and the USA must take some responsibility for the rise of China
threat (107). This latter point, however, is one that Australian realists like Owen Harries, whom Pan cites
approvingly, have made consistently since the late 1990s. In other words, not all Western analysis
uncritically endorses the view that China’s rise is threatening. Nor is all Western perception of this rise
reducible to the threat scenario advanced by recent US administrations.
Pan’s subsequent argument that the China opportunity thesis leads to inevitable disappointment and
subtly reinforces the China threat paradigm is, also, somewhat misleading. On the one hand, Pan notes
that Western anticipation of ‘China’s transformation and democratization’ has ‘become a burgeoning
cottage industry’ (111). Yet, on the other hand, Pan observes that Western commentators, such as
Jacques, demonstrate a growing awareness that the democratisation thesis is a fantasy. That is, Pan, like
Jacques, argues that China ‘will neither democratize nor collapse, but may instead remain politically
authoritarian and economically stable at the same time’ (132). To merge, as Pan does, the
democratisation thesis into its authoritarian antithesis in order to evoke ‘present Western
disillusionment’ (132) with China is somewhat reductionist. Pan’s contention that we need a new
paradigm shift ‘to free ourselves from the positivist aspiration to grand theory or transcendental
scientific paradigm itself’ (157) might be admirable, but this will not be achieved by a constructivism
that would ultimately meet with the approval of what Brady terms China’s thought managers (Brady: 6).
Our depictions of China are accurate
Blumenthal et al 11 ( Dan Blumenthal is a current commissioner and former vice chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, where he directs efforts to monitor, investigate, and provide recommendations on the national security implications of the
economic relationship between the two countries. “Avoiding Armageddon with China”
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/09/06/avoiding_armageddon_with_china?wpisrc=obinsite)
The balancing and hedging strategy should involve options to avoid what Traub rightfully describes as
"Armageddon." We call for a myriad of conventional options short of striking the nuclear-armed PRC, in the hope that such a strategy enhances deterrence
in the first place and avoids Armageddon should deterrence fail. The strategy aims to slow escalation rather than quicken it. The idea of a selffulfilling prophecy -- of turning China into an enemy by treating it as one -- is like a unicorn; it is a make believe creature that
still has its believers. The United States has done more than any other country to "turn China into a
friend" by welcoming it into the international community. Alas, China has not fulfilled this U.S.
"prophesy of friendship." Instead China has built what all credible observers call a destabilizing military
that has changed the status quo by holding a gun to Taiwan's head even as Taiwan makes bold attempts
at peace, by claiming ever more territory in the South China Sea, and by attempting to bully and
intimidate Japan. Traub asks whether our allies and partners will be willing to participate in an "anti-Chinese coalition," as he describes it. As the paper
says, all allies, partners, and potential partners are already modernizing their militaries in response to
China. And they will continue to do so regardless of whether the U.S. pursues what Traub would see as
an "anti-China" strategy. Even laid-back Australia has plans to double its submarine fleet -- it is not doing so to defend against Fiji. The paper argues
that it is time for the United States to offer more serious assistance so that matters do not get out of hand. A strong U.S. presence and commitment to the
region's security can help avoid a regional nuclear arms race, for example. The United States can be a
force multiplier by providing the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that only Washington possesses, and by
training, and equipping our allies and friends. This strategy is one way of beginning to put Asia back in balance as China changes the status quo. Not doing
so, we fear, would lead to Armageddon.
Reps don’t shape reality in the China debate
Goddard 9/18/15
Stacie E. Goddard is the Jane Bishop ’51 Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College,
Ronald R. Krebs is Beverly and Richard Fink Professor in the Liberal Arts and Associate Professor of
Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Duck of Minerva, September 18, 2015, “Securitization
Forum: The Transatlantic Divide: Why Securitization Has Not Secured a Place in American IR, Why It
Should, and How It Can”, http://duckofminerva.com/2015/09/securitization-forum-the-transatlanticdivide-why-securitization-has-not-secured-a-place-in-american-ir-why-it-should-and-how-it-can.html
* modified for ableist language
But there are (good) substantive and (not so good) sociological reasons that securitization has failed to
gain traction in North America. First, and most important, securitization describes a process but leaves
us well short of (a) a fully specified causal theory that (b) takes proper account of the politics of
rhetorical contestation. According to the foundational theorists of the Copenhagen School, actors,
usually elites, transform the social order from one of normal, everyday politics into a Schmittian world
of crisis by identifying a dire threat to the political community. They conceive of this “securitizing move”
in linguistic terms, as a speech act. As Ole Waever (1995: 55) argues, “By saying it [security], something
is done (as in betting, a promise, naming a ship). . . . [T]he word ‘security’ is the act . . .” [emphasis
added]. Securitization is a powerful discursive process that constitutes social reality. Countless articles
and books have traced this process, and its consequences, in particular policy domains.
Securitization presents itself as a causal account. But its mechanisms remain obscure, as do the
conditions under which it operates. Why is speaking security so powerful? How do mere words twist and
transform the social order? Does the invocation of security prompt a visceral emotional response? Are
speech acts persuasive, by using well-known tropes to convince audiences that they must seek
protection? Or does securitization operate through the politics of rhetorical coercion, silencing potential
opponents? In securitization accounts, speech acts often seem to be magical incantations that upend
normal politics through pathways shrouded in mystery.
Equally unclear is why some securitizing moves resonate, while others fall on deaf ears [are ignored].
Certainly not all attempts to construct threats succeed, and this is true of both traditional military
concerns as well as “new” security issues. Both neoconservatives and structural realists in the United
States have long insisted that conflict with China is inevitable, yet China has over the last 25 years been
more opportunity than threat in US political discourse—despite these vigorous and persistent
securitizing moves. In very recent years, the balance has shifted, and the China threat has started to
catch on: linguistic processes alone cannot account for this change. The US military has repeatedly
declared that global climate change has profound implications for national security—but that has hardly
cast aside climate change deniers, many of whom are ironically foreign policy hawks supposedly
deferential to the uniformed military. Authoritative speakers have varied in the efficacy of their
securitizing moves. While George W. Bush powerfully framed the events of 9/11 as a global war against
American values, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a more gifted orator, struggled to convince a skeptical
public that Germany presented an imminent threat to the United States. After thirty years as an active
research program, securitization theory has hardly begun to offer acceptable answers to these
questions. Brief references to “facilitating conditions” won’t cut it. You don’t have to subscribe to a
covering-law conception of theory to find these questions important or to find securitization’s answers
unsatisfying.
A large part of the problem, we believe, lies in securitization’s silence on [disregard of] the politics of
security. Its foundations in speech act theory have yielded an oddly apolitical theoretical framework. In
its seminal formulation, the Copenhagen school emphasized the internal linguistic rules that must be
followed for a speech act to be recognized as competent. Yet as Thierry Balzacq argues, by treating
securitization as a purely rule-driven process, the Copenhagen school ignores the politics of
securitization, reducing “security to a conventional procedure such as marriage or betting in which the
‘felicity circumstances’ (conditions of success) must fully prevail for the act to go through” (2005:172).
Absent from this picture are fierce rhetorical battles, where coalitions counter securitizing moves with
their own appeals that strike more or less deeply at underlying narratives. Absent as well are the public
intellectuals and media, who question and critique securitizing moves sometimes (and not others),
sometimes to good effect (and sometimes with little impact). The audience itself—whether the mass
public or a narrower elite stratum—is stripped of all agency. Speaking security, even when the
performance is competent, does not sweep this politics away. Only by delving into this politics can we
shed light on the mysteries of securitization.
We see rhetorical politics as constituted less by singular “securitizing moves” than by “contentious
conversation”—to use Charles Tilly’s phrase. To this end, we would urge securitization theorists, as we
recently have elsewhere, to move towards a “pragmatic” model that rests on four analytical wagers:
that actors are both strategic and social; that legitimation works by imparting meaning to political
action; that legitimation is laced through with contestation; and that the power of language emerges
through contentious dialogue.
View the debate through a lens of specificity – rigid rejection of “China threat” gets
warped into a new orthodoxy and fuels extremism. Recognizing plural interpretations
and linkages is more productive.
Callahan 5 (William A., Professor of Politics – University of Manchester, “How to Understand China:
The Dangers and Opportunities of Being a Rising Power”, Review of International Studies, 31)
Although ‘China threat theory’ is ascribed to the Cold War thinking of foreigners who suffer from an
enemy deprivation syndrome, the use of containment as a response to threats in Chinese texts suggests
that Chinese strategists are also seeking to fill the symbolic gap left by the collapse of the Soviet Union,
which was the key threat to the PRC after 1960. Refutations of ‘China threat theory’ do not seek to
deconstruct the discourse of ‘threat’ as part of critical security studies. Rather they are expressions of a
geopolitical identity politics because they refute ‘Chinese’ threats as a way of facilitating the production
of an America threat, a Japan threat, an India threat, and so on. Uniting to fight these foreign threats
affirms China’s national identity. Unfortunately, by refuting China threat in this bellicose way – that is by
generating a new series of threats – the China threat theory texts end up confirming the threat that they
seek to deny: Japan, India and Southeast Asia are increasingly threatened by China’s protests of
peace.43 Moreover, the estrangement produced and circulated in China threat theory is not just among
nation-states. The recent shift in the focus of the discourse from security issues to more economic and
cultural issues suggests that China is estranged from the ‘international standards’ of the ‘international
community’. After a long process of difficult negotiations, China entered the WTO in December 2001.
Joining the WTO was not just an economic or a political event; it was an issue of Chinese identity.44 As
Breslin, Shih and Zha describe in their articles in this Forum, this process was painful for China as WTO
membership subjects the PRC to binding rules that are not the product of Chinese diplomacy or culture.
Thus although China enters international organisations like the WTO based on shared values and rules,
China also needs to distinguish itself from the undifferentiated mass of the globalised world. Since 2002,
a large proportion of the China threat theory articles have been published in economics, trade,
investment, and general business journals – rather than in international politics, area studies and
ideological journals as in the 1990s. Hence China threat theory is one way to differentiate China from
these international standards, which critics see as neo-colonial.45 Another way is for China to assert
ownership over international standards to affirm its national identity through participation in
globalisation.46 Lastly, some China threat theory articles go beyond criticising the ignorance and bad
intentions of the offending texts to conclude that those who promote China threat must be crazy: ‘There
is a consensus within mainland academic circles that there is hardly any reasonable logic to explain the
views and practices of the United States toward China in the past few years. It can only be summed up
in a word: ‘‘Madness’’ ’.47 Indians likewise are said to suffer from a ‘China threat theory syndrome’.48
This brings us back to Foucault’s logic of ‘rationality’ being constructed through the exclusion of a range
of activities that are labelled as ‘madness’. The rationality of the rise of China depends upon
distinguishing it from the madness of those who question it. Like Joseph Nye’s concern that warnings of
a China threat could become a self-fulfilling prophesy, China threat theory texts vigorously reproduce
the dangers of the very threat they seek to deny. Rather than adding to the debate, they end up policing
what Chinese and foreigners can rationally say. Conclusion The argument of this essay is not that China
is a threat. Rather, it has examined the productive linkages that knit together the image of China as a
peacefully rising power and the discourse of China as a threat to the economic and military stability of
East Asia. It would be easy to join the chorus of those who denounce ‘China threat theory’ as the
misguided product of the Blue Team, as do many in China and the West. But that would be a mistake,
because depending on circumstances anything – from rising powers to civilian aircraft – can be
interpreted as a threat. The purpose is not to argue that interpretations are false in relation to some
reality (such as that China is fundamentally peaceful rather than war-like), but that it is necessary to
unpack the political and historical context of each perception of threat. Indeed, ‘China threat’ has never
described a unified American understanding of the PRC: it has always been one position among many in
debates among academics, public intellectuals and policymakers. Rather than inflate extremist positions
(in both the West and China) into irrefutable truth, it is more interesting to examine the debates that
produced the threat/opportunity dynamic.
Neg stuff
Cbw (chem/bio weapons)
Eliminating strategic ambiguity emboldens adversaries to use non-nuclear
weapons—specifically, incentivizes bioattacks
Payne 16
Keith B. Payne, President of the National Institute for Public Policy, the head of the Graduate
Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University-Washington Campus, and a
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Once Again: Why a ‘No First Use’ Nuclear Policy Is a Very
Bad Idea: It would reduce the potential cost of using conventional, chemical, and biological attacks for
would-be aggressors, National Review, July 6, 2016,
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/437510/no-first-use-nuclear
The Obama administration reportedly is seriously considering adopting a “no first use” (NFU) nuclearweapons policy. A prospective NFU policy would be a U.S. commitment never to be the first to use
nuclear weapons — as opposed to existing policy, which retains some ambiguity regarding when and if
the U.S. would use nuclear weapons. An NFU policy would eliminate that ambiguity for U.S. adversaries.
It sounds warm and progressive and has long been a policy proposal of disarmament activists. NFU has,
however, been rejected by all previous Democratic and Republican administrations for very sound
reasons, most recently by the Obama administration in 2010. The most important of these reasons is
that retaining a degree of U.S. nuclear ambiguity helps to deter war, while adopting an NFU policy would
undercut that deterrence. How so? Under the existing policy of ambiguity, potential aggressors such as
Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran must contemplate the reality that if they attack us or our allies,
they risk possible U.S. nuclear retaliation. There is no doubt whatsoever that this risk of possible U.S.
nuclear retaliation has deterred war and the escalation of conflicts. In fact, the percentage of the world
population lost to war has fallen dramatically since U.S. nuclear deterrence was established after World
War II. That is a historic accomplishment. The fatal flaw of the warm and progressive-sounding NFU
proposal is that it tells would-be aggressors that they do not have to fear U.S. nuclear retaliation as
long as they attack us or our allies with advanced conventional, chemical, and/or biological weapons.
They would risk U.S. nuclear retaliation only if they attack with nuclear weapons. Numerous historical
case studies demonstrate without a doubt that some aggressors look for such openings to undertake
military moves they deem critical. They do not need to see a risk-free path to pursue aggression, only a
path that allows them some vision of success, however improbable that vision may seem to others. The
U.S. nuclear deterrent helps to shut down the possibility that would-be aggressors will contemplate
such paths. A U.S. NFU policy would be particularly dangerous at a time when Russia and China may be
armed with chemical and biological weapons and are pursuing expansionist policies in Europe and
Asia, respectively. Russia is by far the strongest military power in Europe. It has moved repeatedly
against neighboring states since 2008, forcibly changing established borders in Europe for the first time
since World War II and issuing explicit nuclear first-use threats in the process. Only several months ago,
Russia reportedly rehearsed the invasion of Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark in a military
exercise involving 33,000 troops. In Asia, China is the strongest military power and is expanding its reach
against U.S. allies, with tactics that include building and militarizing islands in the South China Sea. At a
time when key U.S. allies face unprecedented threats from powerful neighbors, the U.S. should not
reduce the calculation of risks that Russia and China must confront in their respective expansionist
drives by adopting an NFU policy. Indeed, this is a breathtaking understatement in a world in which
aggressors still exist, as do advanced conventional, chemical, and possibly biological weapons, and in
which another world war using “only” such modern non-nuclear weapons could cause death levels far
beyond the 80 to 100 million lost in World Wars I and II. In addition, the Obama administration declares
nuclear nonproliferation to be its highest nuclearpolicy goal. Yet U.S. adoption of an NFU policy would
mean that the United States could no longer reassure allies with its nuclear umbrella. No more would
their foes confront the risk of U.S. nuclear retaliation when considering a devastating attack on U.S.
allies and partners. Pulling down the U.S. nuclear umbrella would compel some allies and partners who
have forgone nuclear weapons in the past, on the basis of the promised U.S. nuclear-deterrence
umbrella, to consider acquiring their own nuclear weapons. This could include South Korea and Japan.
For this reason, additional nuclear proliferation is virtually an inevitable consequence of a U.S. NFU
policy. Now is not the time for U.S. adoption of an NFU policy. The risks of doing so are too great. Such
was the unanimous conclusion of the bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission in its 2009
report: The United States “should not abandon calculated ambiguity by adopting a policy of no-firstuse,” because doing so “would be unsettling to some U.S. allies. It would also undermine the potential
contributions of nuclear weapons to the deterrence of attack by biological weapons.” In 2010, the
Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review explicitly agreed with this conclusion. Why change
now? Since then, global security threats facing the United States and its allies have only increased — as,
correspondingly, have the reasons for continuing the decades-long Republican and Democratic
consensus against an NFU policy.
The tradeoff is direct --- they cause bioweapon acquisition
Horowitz ’14 – professor of political science and the associate director of Perry World House at the
University of Pennsylvania. NDT Champ (Michael, Neil Narang is Assistant Professor in the Department
of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. In 2015-2016, he served as a Senior
Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy on a Council on Foreign Relations
International Affairs Fellow, “Poor Man's Atomic Bomb? Exploring the Relationship between "Weapons
of Mass Destruction"” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 58, No. 3, Special Issue: Nuclear Posture,
Nonproliferation Policy, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24545650)
Finally, we turn to estimating the effect of both nuclear and chemical weapons pur suit and acquisition
on the risk of initiating biological weapons pursuit in models 5 and 6. These results are equally
interesting because they provide support for the notion that biological weapons (in addition to chemical
weapons) can also be appro priately considered a "poor man's nuclear bomb." Similar to the impact of
posses sing nuclear weapons on the probability a state pursues chemical weapons, nuclear weapons
possession has a strong negative effect on biological weapons pursuit in both models 5 and 6. After
holding the underlying level of demand constant in model 6, simply possessing a nuclear weapon
appears to decrease the instantaneous risk that a state will pursue biological weapons to virtually zero
(1.44 χ 10~7). This is consistent with the understanding of nuclear weapons as so powerful that they
make the possession of other types of WMDs less relevant. Even before countries such as the United
States abandoned their chemical weapons programs, for example, they aban doned their biological
weapons program. The United States eliminated its offensive BW program under a Nixon administration
order in 1969 and had shut down the pro gram by the time it signed the BWC in 1972. France and Great
Britain similarly elim inated their offensive BW programs. Russia stands in stark contrast to this
argument, however. Evidence revealed after the cold war demonstrated that the Soviet Union
maintained a vibrant offensive BW program at the Biopreparat complex through the end of the cold
war. This demonstrates that grouping CBWs into a single category may not accurately represent the way
countries actually think about them. Biological weap ons, given their greater theoretical destructive
capacity, may be considered somewhat differently. This is a potential path for future research.
Uniquely causes extinction
Casadevall 12
Arturo Casadevall, MD, PhD, Bloomberg Distinguished Professor of Molecular Microbiology &
Immunology and Infectious Diseases at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, The future
of biological warfare, Microb. Biotechnol, September 2012, 5(5): 584–587
It is an axiom of human history that whatever technology is available will be applied in warfare as one
side or the other seeks to gain an advantage. Humans are unique among the species in their capacity for
fighting prolonged conflicts where the nature of the war reflects the types of technologies available.
Stone, metal, leather, wood, domesticated animals, wheels, etc. were each exploited by ancient
societies in warfare. In late antiquity the adoption of the stirrup in Western Europe transformed warfare
by enhancing the fighting capacity of the mounted warrior, which eventually led to the emergence and
prominence of the knightly class. More recently gunpowder, steam engines, aircraft, chemicals,
electronics and nuclear physics were employed in warfare. In each epoch, the technologies available had
enormous influence on the strategy and tactics used. Biological warfare is ancient but its applicability to
the battlefield has been limited by its unpredictability, blowback possibility and uncertain efficacy.
However, the biological revolution that began in the mid‐20th century has led to the development of
powerful technologies that could potentially be used to generate new biological weapons of
tremendous destructive power. Although biological warfare is currently prohibited by the 1972
Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) a review of prior attempts to limit the use of certain
weapons such as the medieval crossbow, and more recently gas warfare, provides little encouragement
for the notion that a technology that is useful in war can be limited by treaty. Furthermore, the BTWC
restrictions apply only to signatory nation states and are irrelevant to terrorist organizations or lone
wolves type of terrorists. Given the human track record for conflict and the potential power of biological
warfare we are led to the sad conclusion that biological warfare has a future, and that society must
prepare for the eventuality that it will used again by either nations or individuals. In this essay I will try
to peek into the far horizon to identify some general themes that might be helpful in protecting against
future horrors fully aware that the nature of technological change is so rapid and profound that any
such view must necessarily be myopic. Existential threats to humanity In considering the importance of
biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At
this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large‐scale
thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious
disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three
existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the
second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction
(Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have provided unequivocal
evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although
infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the
finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species
(Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a
cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that
some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not
apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such
as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the
pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its
natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental
microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic
microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001),
especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural
evolution or bioengineering.
1NC – Bioweapon DA
The tradeoff is direct --- a shift away from nuclear weapons cause bioweapon
acquisition
Horowitz ’14 – professor of political science and the associate director of Perry World House at the
University of Pennsylvania. NDT Champ (Michael, Neil Narang is Assistant Professor in the Department
of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. In 2015-2016, he served as a Senior
Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy on a Council on Foreign Relations
International Affairs Fellow, “Poor Man's Atomic Bomb? Exploring the Relationship between "Weapons
of Mass Destruction"” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 58, No. 3, Special Issue: Nuclear Posture,
Nonproliferation Policy, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24545650)
Finally, we
turn to estimating the effect of both nuclear and chemical weapons pur suit and acquisition on
the risk of initiating biological weapons pursuit in models 5 and 6. These results are equally interesting because they
provide support for the notion that biological weapons (in addition to chemical weapons) can also be appro
priately considered a "poor man's nuclear bomb." Similar to the impact of posses sing nuclear weapons on the probability a
state pursues chemical weapons, nuclear weapons possession has a strong negative effect on biological weapons
pursuit in both models 5 and 6. After holding the underlying level of demand constant in model 6, simply possessing a nuclear
weapon appears to decrease the instantaneous risk that a state will pursue biological weapons to
virtually zero (1.44 χ 10~7). This is consistent with the understanding of nuclear weapons as so powerful that
they make the possession of other types of WMDs less relevant. Even before countries such as the United States
abandoned their chemical weapons programs, for example, they aban doned their biological weapons program. The United States eliminated
its offensive BW program under a Nixon administration order in 1969 and had shut down the pro gram by the time it signed the BWC in 1972.
France and Great Britain similarly elim inated their offensive BW programs. Russia stands in stark contrast to this argument, however. Evidence
revealed after the cold war demonstrated that the Soviet Union maintained a vibrant offensive BW program at the Biopreparat complex
through the end of the cold war. This demonstrates that grouping CBWs into a single category may not accurately represent the way countries
actually think about them. Biological weap ons, given their greater theoretical destructive capacity, may be considered somewhat differently.
This is a potential path for future research.
Uniquely causes extinction
Casadevall 12
Arturo Casadevall, MD, PhD, Bloomberg Distinguished Professor of Molecular Microbiology &
Immunology and Infectious Diseases at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, The future
of biological warfare, Microb. Biotechnol, September 2012, 5(5): 584–587
It is an axiom of human history that whatever technology is available will be applied in warfare as one side
or the other seeks to gain an advantage. Humans are unique among the species in their capacity for fighting prolonged conflicts where the
nature of the war reflects the types of technologies available. Stone, metal, leather, wood, domesticated animals, wheels, etc. were each
exploited by ancient societies in warfare. In late antiquity the adoption of the stirrup in Western Europe transformed warfare by enhancing the
fighting capacity of the mounted warrior, which eventually led to the emergence and prominence of the knightly class. More recently
gunpowder, steam engines, aircraft, chemicals, electronics and nuclear physics were employed in warfare. In each epoch, the technologies
available had enormous influence on the strategy and tactics used. Biological
warfare is ancient but its applicability to the battlefield
has been limited by its unpredictability, blowback possibility and uncertain efficacy. However, the biological
revolution that began in the mid‐20th century has led to the
development of powerful technologies that could potentially be
used to generate new biological weapons of tremendous destructive power. Although biological warfare is
currently prohibited by the 1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) a review of prior attempts to limit the
use of certain weapons such as the medieval crossbow, and more recently gas warfare, provides little
encouragement for the notion that a technology that is useful in war can be limited by treaty. Furthermore,
the BTWC restrictions apply only to signatory nation states and are irrelevant to terrorist organizations or lone wolves type of terrorists. Given
the human track record for conflict and the potential power of biological warfare we are led to the sad conclusion that biological warfare has a
future, and that society must prepare for the eventuality that it will used again by either nations or individuals. In this essay I will try to peek
into the far horizon to identify some general themes that might be helpful in protecting against future horrors fully aware that the nature of
technological change is so rapid and profound that any such view must necessarily be myopic. Existential threats to humanity In
considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the
known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large‐scale
thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious
disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the
first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid
impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As
to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have
provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire
species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed
by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian
species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a
cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some
proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are
acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For
those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species
without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of
existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than
the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001),
especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural
evolution or bioengineering.
Cyber attacks
And triggers strategic-scale cyberattacks
Panda 18
Ankit Panda, Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Defense Posture Project at the Federation of American
Scientists, Senior Editor at The Diplomat, Contributor for the Council on Foreign Relations, ‘No First Use’
and Nuclear Weapons, 17 July 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/no-first-use-and-nuclearweapons
Most states with nuclear weapons maintain policies that would permit their first use in a conflict.
Pledges to only use these weapons in retaliation for a nuclear attack—or a no-first-use (NFU) policy—are
rare. Where these pledges have been made by nuclear states, their adversaries generally consider them
not credible. Strategic planners for nuclear weapons powers see the credible threat of the first use of
nuclear weapons as a powerful deterrent against a range of significant nonnuclear threats, including
major conventional, chemical, and biological attacks, as well as cyberattacks. Even states with
significant conventional military forces, such as the United States, consider it necessary to retain nuclear
first use as an option. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, under the administration of President Donald J.
Trump, retains the option of nuclear first use. What is an NFU pledge? A so-called NFU pledge, first
publicly made by China in 1964, refers to any authoritative statement by a nuclear weapon state to
never be the first to use these weapons in a conflict, reserving them strictly to retaliate in the aftermath
of a nuclear attack against its territory or military personnel. These pledges are a component of nuclear
declaratory policies. As such, there can be no diplomatic arrangement to verify or enforce a declaratory
NFU pledge, and such pledges alone do not affect capabilities. States with such pledges would be
technically able to still use nuclear weapons first in a conflict, and their adversaries have generally not
trusted NFU assurances. Today, China is the only nuclear weapon state to maintain an unconditional
NFU pledge. What is the U.S. declaratory nuclear use policy? During the Cold War and even today, the
credible threat of the United States using its nuclear weapons first against an adversary has been an
important component of reassuring allies. At the height of the Cold War, the threat of U.S. tactical
nuclear use was conceived of as a critical bulwark against a conventional Soviet offensive through the
Fulda Gap, a strategically significant lowland corridor in Germany that would allow Warsaw Pact forces
to enter Western Europe. A nuclear first-use policy was thought to be a cornerstone of the defensive
posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), given the large number of bases of Warsaw
Pact conventional military forces. Accordingly, NATO has always opposed a U.S. NFU declaration and has
never ruled out U.S. first use under its “flexible response” posture since 1967. Today, U.S. allies in East
Asia and Europe alike rely on credible commitments from the United States to use nuclear weapons first
to deter major nonnuclear threats against them. The United States has considered but has never
declared an NFU policy and remains the only country to have ever used nuclear weapons in war—twice
against Japan, in 1945. The Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review expands the range of
significant nonnuclear strategic scenarios in which the United States may contemplate nuclear weapons
use. Notably, it does not rule out the first use of nuclear weapons in response to cyberattacks. The
2010 Nuclear Posture Review, under the administration of President Barack Obama, reiterated an
assurance in place since 1978 that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against compliant
members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The Obama administration still maintained the
option to use nuclear weapons first while stating that the role of these weapons to deter and respond to
nonnuclear attacks had declined and that it would continue to reduce that role. It additionally
emphasized that the “fundamental” role of U.S. nuclear weapons was to deter nuclear use against the
United States and its allies. In 2002, during the administration of President George W. Bush, the
classified Nuclear Posture Review emphasized the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in deterring nonnuclear
threats, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and large conventional military forces, ostensibly
through nuclear first use. What is the debate in the United States on NFU? Though the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review did not include an NFU pledge, the Obama administration considered the idea during its
second term. It ultimately left U.S. nuclear declaratory policy unchanged from its 2010 iteration, which
stated that the United States reserved the right to use nuclear weapons to deter nonnuclear attacks
while strengthening conventional capabilities to gradually reduce the role of nuclear weapons to that of
solely deterring nuclear attacks. Nevertheless, the Obama administration’s final year in office saw
animated debate among proponents and opponents of an NFU declaration. Arguments in favor of a U.S.
NFU pledge. Proponents of a U.S. NFU declaration have argued that not only does the United States
already maintain a de facto NFU policy but that U.S. superiority in conventional weapons is sufficient to
deter significant nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional threats. Additionally, as Kingston Reif of
the Arms Control Association has argued, “a clear U.S. no-first-use policy would reduce the risk of
Russian or Chinese nuclear miscalculation during a crisis by alleviating concerns about a devastating U.S.
nuclear first-strike.” In nuclear strategy, a first strike refers to a nuclear attack that seeks to disarm a
nuclear-armed enemy before it can employ its weapons. Other proponents pointed to an NFU policy
declaration being a necessary step on the road to global nuclear disarmament, an aspirational goal of
the Obama administration and a requirement for all recognized nuclear weapon states under Article VI
of the NPT. Proponents also argue that U.S. resistance to an NFU declaration has harmed U.S.
nonproliferation efforts. Arguments against a U.S. NFU pledge. Critics, meanwhile, have suggested that
U.S. allies in East Asia and Europe alike would not accept a unilateral U.S. NFU declaration, because it
could encourage adversaries to attack with conventional weapons or to use chemical, biological, or
cyber weapons. Russian conventional military advantages over U.S. allies in Europe have amplified these
concerns. Critics argue that such a declaration could undercut allied commitments and encourage U.S.
allies to develop their own nuclear weapons. Within the Obama administration in 2016, Secretary of
State John Kerry, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, and Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz opposed an
NFU declaration, primarily along these lines. These officials shared the view of NFU skeptics that a U.S.
declaration would embolden adversaries, weaken allied commitments, and invite brinkmanship.
That triggers accidental collapse of US society, global economy, and war—Only strong
and clear deterrence of nation-states can solve
Knake 17
Robert K. Knake, Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow for Cyber Policy—Council on Foreign Relations and
Senior Research Scientist—Northeastern University’s Global Resilience Institute, A Cyberattack on the
U.S. Power Grid, Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 31 from the Center for Preventive Action,
https://www.cfr.org/report/cyberattack-us-power-grid
The U.S. power grid has long been considered a logical target for a major cyberattack. Besides the
intrinsic importance of the power grid to a functioning U.S. society, all sixteen sectors of the U.S.
economy deemed to make up the nation’s critical infrastructure rely on electricity. Disabling or
otherwise interfering with the power grid in a significant way could thus seriously harm the United
States. Carrying out a cyberattack that successfully disrupts grid operations would be extremely difficult
but not impossible. Such an attack would require months of planning, significant resources, and a team
with a broad range of expertise. Although cyberattacks by terrorist and criminal organizations cannot be
ruled out, the capabilities necessary to mount a major operation against the U.S. power grid make
potential state adversaries the principal threat. Attacks on power grids are no longer a theoretical
concern. In 2015, an attacker took down parts of a power grid in Ukraine. Although attribution was not
definitive, geopolitical circumstances and forensic evidence suggest Russian involvement. A year later,
Russian hackers targeted a transmission level substation, blacking out part of Kiev. In 2014, Admiral
Michael Rogers, director of the National Security Agency, testified before the U.S. Congress that China
and a few other countries likely had the capability to shut down the U.S. power grid. Iran, as an
emergent cyber actor, could acquire such capability. Rapid digitization combined with low levels of
investment in cybersecurity and a weak regulatory regime suggest that the U.S. power system is as
vulnerable—if not more vulnerable—to a cyberattack as systems in other parts of the world. An
adversary with the capability to exploit vulnerabilities within the U.S. power grid might be motivated to
carry out such an attack under a variety of circumstances. An attack on the power grid could be part of
a coordinated military action, intended as a signaling mechanism during a crisis, or as a punitive
measure in response to U.S. actions in some other arena. In each case, the United States should
consider not only the potential damage and disruption caused by a cyberattack but also its broader
effects on U.S. actions at the time it occurs. With respect to the former, a cyberattack could cause
power losses in large portions of the United States that could last days in most places and up to several
weeks in others. The economic costs would be substantial. As for the latter concern, the U.S. response
or non-response could harm U.S. interests. Thus, the United States should take measures to prevent a
cyberattack on its power grid and mitigate the potential harm should preventive efforts fail. The
Contingency The U.S. power system has evolved into a highly complex enterprise: 3,300 utilities that
work together to deliver power through 200,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines; 55,000
substations; and 5.5 million miles of distribution lines that bring power to millions of homes and
businesses. Any of the system’s principal elements––power generation, transmission, or
distribution––could be targeted for a cyberattack. In the Ukraine case, attackers targeted substations
that lower transmission voltages for distribution to consumers. Lloyd’s of London, an insurance
underwriter, developed a plausible scenario for an attack on the Eastern Interconnection—one of the
two major electrical grids in the continental United States—which services roughly half the country. The
hypothetical attack targeted power generators to cause a blackout covering fifteen states and the
District of Columbia, leaving ninety-three million people without power. Other experts have concluded
that an attack on the system for transmitting power from generation to end consumers would have
devastating consequences. In one scenario, disruption of just nine transformers could cause widespread
outages. Many experts are now also concerned that smart grid technologies, which use the internet to
connect to power meters and appliances, could allow an attacker to take over thousands—if not
millions—of unprotected devices, preventing power from being delivered to end users. State actors are
the most likely perpetrators of a power grid attack. Regardless of which part of the power grid is
targeted, attackers would need to conduct extensive research, gain initial access to utility business
networks (likely through spearphishing), work to move through the business networks to gain access to
control systems, and then identify targeted systems and develop the capability to disable them. Such
sophisticated actions would require extensive planning by an organization able to recruit and coordinate
a team that has a broad set of capabilities and is willing to devote many months, if not years, to the
effort. State actors, therefore, are the more likely perpetrators, and given these long lead times, U.S.
adversaries have likely already begun this process in anticipation of conflict. It is doubtful that a terrorist
organization would have both the intent and means to carry out such an attack successfully. In the
future, however, criminal groups could pose a real threat. They are growing in sophistication and in
some cases rival, if not exceed, the capabilities of nation states. Payments for ransomware—malicious
software that encrypts data and will not provide a code to unlock it unless a ransom has been paid—by
some estimates have topped $300 million. This funding could allow criminal groups to purchase more
sophisticated capabilities to carry out the ultimate ransomware attack. The likelihood that an attack
carried out by a determined and capable adversary would be thwarted by security measures is low.
While some U.S. utilities might block attempts by an adversary to gain initial access or might be able to
detect an adversary in their systems, many might not have the necessary tools in place to detect and
respond. Efforts to improve data sharing that could enable detection by one company to block access
across the entire industry are in their infancy. In the Lloyd’s scenario, only 10 percent of targeted
generators needed to be taken down to cause a widespread blackout. Short of outright conflict with a
state adversary, several plausible scenarios in which the U.S. power grid would be subject to cyberattack
need to be considered: Discrediting Operations. Given the importance of electricity to the daily lives of
Americans, an adversary may see advantage in disrupting service to undermine public support for a U.S.
administration at a politically sensitive time. Distracting Operations. A state contemplating a diplomatic
or military initiative likely to be opposed by the United States could carry out a cyberattack against the
U.S. power grid that would distract the attention of the U.S. government and disrupt or delay its
response. Given the fragility of many industrial control systems, even reconnaissance activity risks
accidentally causing harm. Retaliatory Operations. In response to U.S. actions considered threatening by
another state, such as the imposition of economic sanctions and various forms of political warfare, a
cyberattack on the power grid could be carried out to punish the United States or intimidate it from
taking further action with the implied threat of further damage. There are many plausible circumstances
in which states that possess the capability to conduct cyberattacks on the U.S. power grid––principally
Russia and China, and potentially Iran and North Korea––could contemplate such action for the reasons
elaborated above. However, considerable potential exists to miscalculate both the impact of a
cyberattack on the U.S. grid and how the U.S. government might respond. Attacks could easily inflict
much greater damage than intended, in good part because the many health and safety systems that
depend on electricity could fail as well, resulting in widespread injuries and fatalities. Given the fragility
of many industrial control systems, even reconnaissance activity risks accidentally causing harm. An
adversary could also underestimate the ability of the United States to attribute the source of a
cyberattack, with important implications for what happens thereafter. Thus, an adversary’s
expectations that it could attack the power grid anonymously and with impunity could be unfounded.
Warning Indicators A series of warning indicators would likely foretell a cyberattack on the U.S. power
grid. Potential indicators could include smaller test-run attacks outside the United States on systems
that are used in the United States; intelligence collection that indicates an adversary is conducting
reconnaissance or is in the planning stages; deterioration in relations leading to escalatory steps such as
increased intelligence operations, hostile rhetoric, and recurring threats; and increased probing of
electric sector networks and/or the implementation of malware that is detected by more sophisticated
utilities. Implications for U.S. interests A large-scale cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could inflict
considerable damage. The 2003 Northeast Blackout left fifty million people without power for four days
and caused economic losses between $4 billion and $10 billion. The Lloyd’s scenario estimates economic
costs of $243 billion and a small rise in death rates as health and safety systems fail. While darker
scenarios envision scarcity of water and food, deterioration of sanitation, and a breakdown in security,
leading to a societal collapse, it would be possible to mitigate the worst effects of the outage and have
power restored to most areas within days. At this level of damage, the American public would likely
demand a forceful response, which could reshape U.S. geopolitical interests for decades. Traditional
military action, as opposed to a response in kind, would be likely. In addition to the direct
consequences of a cyberattack, how the United States responds also has implications for its
management of the situation that may have prompted the attack in the first place, the state of relations
with the apparent perpetrator, the perceived vulnerability of the United States, and the evolution of
international norms on cyberwarfare. How the U.S. government reacts will determine whether a
cyberattack has a continuing impact on geopolitics. How the U.S. government reacts, more than the
actual harm done, will determine whether the cyberattack has a continuing impact on geopolitics. If the
incident reveals a U.S. vulnerability in cyberspace that can be targeted to deter the United States from
taking action abroad, the implications of the incident would be profound. If, on the other hand, the
U.S. government shows firm resolve in the face of the attack and does not change its behavior in the
interest of the attacker, the event is unlikely to have significant consequences for the role of the
United States abroad. On the domestic front, a highly disruptive attack would likely upend the model of
private sector responsibility for cybersecurity. As was done with aviation security after 9/11, Congress
would likely move quickly to take over responsibility for protecting the grid from cyberattack by either
creating a new agency or granting new authorities to an existing agency such as U.S. Cyber Command.
Such a move would likely reduce the efficiency of grid operations and open the door to expanding
government’s role in protecting other sectors of the economy. A devastating attack might also prompt
calls to create a national firewall, like China and other countries have, to inspect all traffic at national
borders. However, the experience of other countries and the technical reality of the internet suggest
that these firewalls are ineffective for cybersecurity but well suited to restricting speech online and
censoring information. Preventive Options Preventing an attack will require improving the security of
the power grid as well as creating a deterrence posture that would dissuade adversaries from attacking
it. The goal of such a strategy should be to secure the power grid to make it defensible, to detect
attempts to compromise the security of the grid, and to provide certainty to adversaries that the
United States will be able to attribute the attack and respond accordingly.
Turkey
Eliminating the arsenal requires elimination of US tactical nuclear weapons from
Turkey- that disrupts NATO relations and causes Turkish prolif
Pomper 10/23
http://theconversation.com/why-the-us-has-nuclear-weapons-in-turkey-and-may-try-to-put-the-bombs-away-125477 Why the US has nuclear
weapons in Turkey – and may try to put the bombs away October 23, 2019 4.35pm EDT Author Miles A. Pomper- Senior Fellow, James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury //qlsms
During the Cold War, the U.S. stationed B-61 nuclear bombs in Turkey, among other NATO countries. Formally,
the U.S. controlled the weapons during peacetime, but the host countries’ forces trained and equipped planes so they could drop the bombs
with U.S. support in the case of war. The idea was
to deter Soviet ground forces and reassure U.S. allies by making
clear that the U.S. would be willing to risk nuclear war to block a Soviet invasion of a country hosting
the bombs.
In addition, in the years before the U.S. developed intercontinental ballistic missiles, they presented a way for
NATO to demonstrate it could act quickly to respond to a Soviet attack.
The 50 bombs still at Incirlik Air Base, in southern Turkey – and others in Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands – are the last nuclear
remnants of that Cold War strategy. The U.S. began pulling nuclear bombs out of NATO countries after the Cold War ended, and since 2000 has
removed 40 bombs from Turkey.
Two decades ago, the Turkish Air Force stopped equipping its planes to drop B-61s.
Now the bombs at Incirlik could only be
used if U.S. pilots first flew nuclear-weapon-capable planes there to load them up. The bombs were left in
Turkey even after a 2016 coup attempt raised serious concerns about their safety. After that event, the U.S. Defense and Energy departments
began planning how to remove them – but didn’t actually bring them back to the U.S.
How secure are they?
U.S. nuclear weapons are stored in hardened bunkers, protected by electronic systems and heavily
armed U.S. troops. The Pentagon has recently reinforced both of those methods of defense.
The bombs themselves also require 12-digit codes to activate them, However, those protections are only strong enough to delay unauthorized
If those barriers were overcome, U.S forces could disable the weapons by
destroying electrical components or detonating their chemical high explosive without causing a nuclear
release. In the worst case, they could blow up the weapons or the facilities at Incirlik.
use, rather than actually prevent it.
Still the U.S. procedures are not designed to prevent skilled attacks or sabotage, especially from an ally. With enough time, Turkey could make
use of the nuclear material – if not to detonate in an actual nuclear explosion, then to “release disastrous and deadly radiation.”
What’s wrong with removing them?
Taking the weapons out of Turkey carries some physical risks. The bombs aren’t terribly heavy – roughly 700 pounds
each – but moving nuclear material requires significant security. In addition, the Turkish government
would have to help – or at least not stand in the way – of landing transport planes or sending cargo
convoys by land or sea.
The greater risks are likely to be political. Those concerns have discouraged previous U.S.
administrations from removing the bombs, even though Turkey’s defense community isn’t particularly interested in using
them.
One U.S. concern is that Turkey
closer ties with Russia.
could perceive the move as a push away from NATO. That could lead to Turkey seeking
In addition, pulling the nuclear weapons out of Turkey could prompt requests to remove other bombs
from Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, where they are publicly unpopular.
A new worry just arose, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently mused whether
perhaps Turkey should leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and develop its own nuclear
arsenal. U.S. officials have long feared that pulling the American nuclear bombs out could encourage
Ergodan to try to turn that bluster into reality.
Unintentionally, Trump’s efforts to provide reassurance may have made this challenge more difficult.
The presence of B-61s in the five countries is an open secret, confirmed by independent observers.
But it has nonetheless been NATO policy not to acknowledge the deployments, giving local politicians
and the U.S. a shield from parliamentary and public oversight.
Trump has raised the political stakes should he try to remove
them, and made it more difficult for the United States and Turkey to strike a quiet deal to that effect.
By publicly confirming that the weapons were in Turkey,
1NC- Alliance DA
Maintenance of the nuclear arsenal signals protection to US allies and checks back
global instability
Vergun 19
U.S. Nuclear Umbrella Extends to Allies, Partners, Defense Official Says A P R I L 2 4 , 2 0 1 9 | B Y D A V I D V E R G U N ,
D E F E N S E . G O V https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1822953/us-nuclear-umbrella-extends-to-allies-partnersdefense-official-says/ // ms
Allies and partners around the world should and do take comfort in the fact that the U.S. has both the
will and the means to use its nuclear weapons, if necessary, to protect them from aggression, the deputy
undersecretary of defense for policy said here today.
In a speech at the Brookings Institution, David J. Trachtenberg said
nuclear deterrence underwrites all diplomacy and
dissuades adversaries from even the thought of employing nuclear weapons — including tactical
nuclear weapons — as a means to coerce, he added.
“We continue to engage with allies and partners so they understand our commitment to extend
deterrence to them,” he said.
Trachtenberg added that it was therefore no surprise to allies and partners that an emphasis of that commitment was reflected in the language
of the fiscal year 2020 defense budget request, the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the Nuclear Posture Review and
the Missile Defense Review.
An important aspect of this strategy, he said, is keeping adversaries such as Russia and China guessing
whether the U.S. would ever employ its nuclear weapons. That’s why this and previous administrations have refused to
countenance the promise to not use nuclear weapons as a first-strike option, Trachtenberg noted.
Important Steps Being Taken
The Defense Department has taken action to assure allies and partners through demonstration of its
commitment to strengthening nuclear deterrence, he said.
$25 billion request in the 2020 defense budget to modernize the nuclear
triad, sharing nuclear strategy and nuclear deployment capability with NATO partners and forwarddeploying U.S. nuclear weapons to Europe.
As examples, Trachtenberg cited the
U.S. coordinates nuclear deployments with France and the United Kingdom, which also
have nuclear weapons.
He noted that the
throughout the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. works closely with allies and
partners who feel threatened by an increasingly belligerent China. Over the last 10 years, much more
robust discussions with them have been taking place regarding U.S. commitments, he said, including
extending the nuclear umbrella.
And finally, Trachtenberg said,
Without US hegemony in Europe- the global order gets ceded to Russia causes chaos
and power imbalances
Economist 19
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2019/03/14/what-would-happen-if-america-left-europe-to-fend-for-itself What would happen if
America left Europe to fend for itself? Time to start thinking the unthinkable Mar 14th 2019 edition
Why, a strategist from Mars might wonder, do Europeans
doubt their ability to defend themselves against Russia
without American help? The total gdp of nato’s European members is more than ten times that of Russia, which has an economy
about the size of Spain’s. They spend three-and-a-half times as much on defence as Russia, which has lately had to cut its budget sharply
because of a broader squeeze on its economy. True, Russia has 13 times as many nuclear warheads as western Europe has, but surely Britain
For decades Europeans did not need to
worry about the Martian’s question, because America’s commitment to their defence was not in doubt.
and France, the two nuclear powers, have more than enough to deter an attack?
That has changed. “The times when we could unconditionally rely on others are past,” Angela Merkel told the European Parliament in
November. She echoed the call of France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, for “a true European army”. In January the two leaders signed a
treaty between France and Germany which includes a mutual-security pledge similar to nato’s Article 5 (as well as Article 42.7 of the European
Union’s Lisbon treaty). Get our daily newsletter Upgrade your inbox and get our Daily Dispatch and Editor's Picks. This is sensitive territory.
Mr Macron’s talk of a European army, and of “strategic autonomy”, irritates Americans. It is only prudent for Europeans to start hedging their
bets against over-reliance on America,
but hedging can be costly, and they have to be careful lest the hedge
become a wedge, as François Heisbourg of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, a think-tank, pithily puts it.
Still, Mr Trump’s
ambivalence about allies is almost an invitation to think through the implications of an end to Pax Americana. Suppose one morning a tweet
announces that the United States is leaving nato. Under Article 13 of the alliance’s founding treaty, a country can cease to be a member one
year after notifying the government of the United States. So, bizarrely, Mr Trump would be serving notice on himself. An optimistic version
of what happens next, apart from howls of protest, is that Europe makes a concerted effort to organise
its own defence. Call it Europe United. The conventional wisdom on Europe’s ability to protect its
interests may be too defeatist, suggests Kori Schake of the iiss. The middle powers, in which she includes
countries like Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlands, have been talking themselves into “exquisite
uselessness”, but they have impressive capabilities. And, she argues, “the high-end American way of war is not the only way of war.” A
pale shadow Yet the Europeans would immediately face institutional hurdles. Compared with Russia’s
top-down system, command and control is hard enough in consensus-bound nato. It would be a bigger
challenge for Europeans alone, especially if they did not inherit nato’s command structure. The eu may
want to take the lead, but military thinking is not in its dna. Besides, an eu-only alliance would be a pale shadow of nato:
after Brexit, non-eu countries will account for fully 80% of nato defence spending. There would be gaps in capabilities, too.
How bad these were would depend on the mission, and how many operations were under way at the
same time. The European-led interventions in Libya and Mali exposed dependence on America in vital
areas such as air-to-air refuelling and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. A detailed look at the sort of
scenarios Europe might face would help to identify other gaps, and what it would take to fill them. Bastian Giegerich of the iiss, who is starting
to work on such assessments, reckons that realistically the gap-filling could take 15 years or so. That is a long time for places like Poland and the
Baltic countries that feel under threat. Fear and mistrust could quickly conspire to make narrow national interests trump efforts to maintain
European unity. Hence a second, perhaps likelier, version of what might follow an American withdrawal: Europe Divided. Jonathan Eyal of the
Royal United Services Institute in London imagines a frenzy of activity, a cacophony of summits—and a renationalisation of defence strategies.
Lots of countries would seek bilateral deals. In central Europe he would expect an alliance between Poland and Romania to
guarantee the eastern border. The Russians and Chinese would not sit idly by, he says, but would play their
own games with the Greeks, Hungarians and others. It is these games of mistrust that the American
security guarantee has largely helped to avoid. They could all too easily resurface. “Establishing a
purely European defence”, warns Michael Rühle, a long-time nato official, “would overwhelm the Europeans
politically, financially and militarily.” That is why a third way forward for Europe looks more attractive: what might be called
Europe Upgraded. This would involve the Europeans doing a lot more to improve their capacity in defence, but in ways that would help
persuade the Americans to stay in: less loose talk about a European army, more effort to develop capabilities currently lacking. Europe
Upgraded sounds like an easy option, but it is not. It would demand cash, creativity and care. A serious push to plug the gaps in Europe’s
capabilities would not be cheap. European governments, especially the big ones, would have to find a way to sell far larger defence budgets to
their voters. As for creativity, the European Intervention Initiative, championed by Mr Macron and launched last year, is an example of the sort
of innovation that could help. It is inclusive: its ten members include Finland, not part of nato, and Britain, soon to be out of the eu. The aim is
to foster a common strategic culture that will help Europe respond more nimbly to crises in its neighbourhood without calling for American
help. The care is needed to make sure a more robust Europe is seen as supporting nato rather than undermining it. America is suspicious of any
duplication of nato’s efforts, such as the creation of rival headquarters. And bigger spending on defence could trigger disputes over industrial
protectionism, especially if broader trade rows between Europe and America rumble on. Even as the allies grapple with different visions of the
future, a nuclear elephant has entered the room. Last October America declared (without warning the Europeans) that it was leaving
the inf treaty, claiming a blatant violation by Russia, and served formal notice in February. Russia has since responded by pulling out too,
threatening to develop new missiles.
To make matters worse, the New start treaty, which limits strategic nuclear
warheads and has strong verification provisions, is up for renewal in 2021. A new nuclear-arms race
would be a nightmare for nato. In Berlin, Claudia Major is “enormously worried” that arguments over inf could divide Germany,
Europe and the transatlantic alliance. Radek Sikorski fears that Russia’s missiles will leave Europe “defenceless” if it lacks a proportionate
response to a first use of nuclear weapons by Russia, giving the Russians time to get where they want to by using conventional forces. nato has
been here before. In the 1980s concern that Russian ss-20 intermediate-range missiles would “decouple” the European allies from America led
to a dual-track approach: pursuit of arms control along with deployment of American cruise and Pershing II missiles in several European
countries. The deployment went ahead despite mass protests, but the inf treaty signed in 1987 resulted in their removal and a long period of
America is keen to maintain alliance solidarity, and officials say there are no plans to
deploy intermediate-range missiles. There are other tools in the kit to keep Europe coupled. These include submarine-launched
relative nuclear calm.
nuclear cruise missiles, currently in development, and new low-yield warheads for existing Trident missiles. A strengthening of missile defences
would ramp up tensions with Russia. The abandonment of the inf treaty is the most urgent reason to ask questions about the nuclear future.
But the broader doubts about the strength of America’s commitment to defend Europe are also stirring things up. Like it or not, for the first
time this century Europeans are having to brace themselves for a serious debate about the role of nuclear weapons on their continent. Taboos
could tumble. In a paper last November for the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, a French expert, Bruno Tertrais, suggested a range of
“realistic” scenarios for expanding French and British nuclear protection, with or without nato. Maximilian Terhalle, of the University of
Winchester, and Mr Heisbourg recently argued that France should extend its nuclear umbrella to its European partners, including Germany.
They acknowledge that “great leadership skills” would be needed to win support for this at home
while not “prompting the withdrawal of us nuclear weapons from Europe”. The context for this debate extends
far beyond Europe. Russia’s deployment of its 9m729 missiles is in part a response to the growing muscle of other countries, notably China,
which is not bound by the inf treaty. President Trump has floated the idea of broader arms-control efforts also involving China and others,
though there is little sign of Chinese interest. The inf question is an early indicator of how China’s rise might affect the future of the alliance.
Nato stability k2 counterterror- signaling uncertainty emoboldens enemies and causes
nuclear terror / middle east prolif
Stoltenberg 16
Opinion Nato Now is not the time for the US to abandon Nato – nor should its European allies go it
alone-“We need strong American leadership and Europeans to shoulder their share of the burden – but
above all, we must recognise the value of our partnership” Jens Stoltenberg - Jens Stoltenberg is Nato
secretary general and former prime minister of Norway. Sat 12 Nov 2016 17.00 ESTLast modified on Fri 9
Feb 2018 14.01 EST https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/12/us-must-not-abandonnato-europe-go-alone-jens-stoltenberg // qlsms
We face the greatest challenges to our security in a generation. This
is no time to question the value of the partnership
between Europe and the United States.
For 67 years this partnership has been the bedrock of peace, freedom and prosperity in Europe. It enabled
us successfully to deter the Soviet Union and bring the cold war to an end. And it made possible the integration of Europe and laid the
foundation for the unprecedented peace and prosperity we enjoy today. European leaders have always understood that when
it comes
to security, going it alone is not an option.
At the same time,
American leaders have always recognised that they had profound strategic interest in a
stable and secure Europe. And throughout the last 67 years America has had no more steadfast and reliable partner.
The only time Nato has invoked its self-defence clause, that an
attack on one is an attack on all, was in support of the United
States after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This was more than just a symbol. Nato went on to take charge of the
operation in Afghanistan. Hundreds of thousands of European soldiers have served in Afghanistan
since. And more than 1,000 have paid the ultimate price in an operation that is a direct response to an
attack against the United States. Today of all days, we remember them.
On both sides of the Atlantic leaders have always understood that a
stronger, safer and more prosperous Europe means a
stronger, safer and more prosperous United States. This partnership between Europe and the United
States, embodied in the Nato alliance, remains essential for both.
In the last few years
we have seen a dramatic deterioration of our security, with a more assertive Russia and
turmoil across north Africa and the Middle East. Nato allies have responded together. We have implemented
the biggest reinforcement of our collective defence since the cold war. And the United States has significantly strengthened
its commitment to European security, deploying a new armoured brigade to eastern Europe and
delivering equipment and supplies to support future reinforcements if needed.
This is deterrence, not aggression. We do not seek to provoke a conflict, but to prevent a conflict. Nato
battalions numbering thousands of troops cannot be compared with Russian divisions numbering tens of
thousands just across the border. Our response is defensive and proportionate. But it sends a clear and
unmistakable message: an attack against one will be met by a response from all.
Nato also continues to play a crucial role in the fight against terrorism. Ever]y Nato ally is part of the
US-led coalition against Islamic State, our Awacs surveillance aircraft support coalition air operations, and Nato is
training Iraqi officers to better fight Isis. We also work with a range of partners throughout north
Africa and the Middle East to help them fight instability and improve their security.
The partnership between Europe and America is founded on deeply shared interests and common values. At the same time, a
viable
partnership depends on all contributing their fair share. The United States currently accounts for
almost 70% of Nato defence spending, and has rightly called for a more equitable sharing of the burden.
At the 2014 Wales summit,
every Nato ally pledged to stop cuts and increase defence spending to 2% of GDP
within a decade. Since then, European allies have delivered, with the United Kingdom showing significant
leadership. This year, 22 Nato allies will increase defence spending, leading to a total of 3% increase in real terms. And I expect that next
year we will see the third consecutive year of increased defence spending in Europe.
We are an alliance of 28 democracies. Free-flowing debate is part of our DNA. Naturally, we have our differences. But leaders on both sides of
the Atlantic, and across the political spectrum, have always recognised the unique ties that bind us. Our proud history is one of common
challenges overcome together.
It is all too easy to take the freedoms, security and prosperity we enjoy for granted. In these uncertain times we
need strong
American leadership, and we need Europeans to shoulder their fair share of the burden. But above all we
need to recognise the value of the partnership between Europe and America. It remains indispensable. So rather than deepening our
differences, we need to nurture what unites us, and find the wisdom and foresight to work together for common solutions. Going
is not an option, either for Europe or for the United States.
it alone
Accidents
ICBM’s are key to deterring adversaries like Russia – they hedge against tech
breakthroughs that obviate the sea leg of the triad
Kroenig 18
Matthew Kroenig, associate professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University and
deputy director for strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council,
“The Case for the US ICBM Force,” 50 Strategic Studies Quarterly, Fall 2018,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-3/Kroenig.pdf
To be sure, even if an enemy attempted such an attack, the United States would retain a retaliatory
nuclear force. The enemy might fail to destroy every target and US nuclear submarines on deterrence
patrol would survive. This remaining force, however, would be diminished. Moreover, the enemy could
attempt to combine the nuclear first strike with an antisubmarine warfare campaign, missile defense
intercepts, and other efforts intended to deny America’s retaliatory capability. In this condition, the
enemy might be tempted to conduct an attack and use its remaining nuclear forces to “deter our
deterrent.”41 While an intentional enemy nuclear first strike on the United States would remain highly
unlikely, it would undoubtedly be easier to plan and execute in the absence of a US ICBM force.
Some ICBM critics, including Fred Kaplan, recognize the value of ICBMs as a warhead sink, but they
maintain that such a function could be served at much lower numbers, such as one dozen ICBMs.42 This
is a subject worth more serious discussion. Greatly reducing ICBM numbers, however, would begin to
undermine the ICBM’s deterrence function. Reducing numbers would make an enemy first strike more
effective, allow larger adversaries to consider a nuclear first strike while holding a larger nuclear force in
reserve, and place a first strike within reach for smaller powers, such as North Korea. Most importantly,
deep ICBM reductions conflict with another important US goal: achieving its objectives if deterrence
fails.
In addition, eliminating the US ICBM force may also weaken deterrence by encouraging adversaries to
initiate or escalate crises against the United States and its allies, thus increasing the risk of a nuclear
crisis and nuclear war. The debate continues over whether nuclear superiority is useful for deterrence
and coercion—with many scholars arguing superiority does not matter. Recently one side of the
argument finds that nuclear superior states are more likely to initiate militarized compellent threats
against other nuclear-armed states and more likely to achieve their goals in high-stakes crises.43 If the
United States were to unilaterally eliminate its ICBM force, as some ICBM critics advocate, it would cede
a large nuclear advantage to Russia, possibly increasing Moscow’s willingness to challenge the United
States and its allies in dangerous militarized disputes.44
Finally, the nuclear force envisioned in the current round of modernization efforts will need to last
decades. Modern ICBMs will help ensure against potential technological breakthroughs that could soon
make the seas more transparent, calling into question the survivability of the seabased leg.45 It would
be unwise, therefore, for US nuclear strategy to depend on the assumption that nuclear-armed
submarines will always be survivable. In sum, the US ICBM force strengthens nuclear deterrence, but not
only for the US.
Nuclear preemption is only rational if we eliminate ICBMs
--Makes it possible for an adversary to reliably hit all targets and have a secure second-strike left over
Kroenig 18
Matthew Kroenig, associate professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University and
deputy director for strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, The
Case for the US ICBM Force, 50 Strategic Studies Quarterly, Fall 2018,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-3/Kroenig.pdf
ICBMs Under Renewed Attack Plans to maintain or modernize the ICBM force have come under
renewed attack in recent years, despite ICBMs’ long pedigree and broad bipartisan political support.
Prominent critics charge that ICBMs are unnecessary for deterrence, that they undermine nuclear
strategic stability, and that their modernization costs are unaffordable. Unnecessary for Deterrence Tom
Collina, policy director for the Ploughshares Fund, argues that the ground-based strategic deterrent is
redundant and unnecessary for nuclear deterrence since the United States already has “enough nukes
on subs to deter any potential attacker.”19 He and other critics argue that because the other two legs of
the triad are sufficient to deter any enemy nuclear attack, the ICBM force is expendable. They maintain
that since a new strategic bomber will be necessary for conventional missions, its modernization is
guaranteed.20 They further stipulate that submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), deployed on
submarines at sea, are survivable. ICBMs, on the other hand, located in fixed and known locations, are
vulnerable to an enemy nuclear first strike.21 Moreover, since ICBMs contain an older guidance system
than SLBMs, they are also less accurate, rendering them less useful for counterforce targeting and
increasing the potential for unnecessary collateral damage.22 Finally, they maintain, SLBMs and
bombers can carry sufficient nuclear firepower to impose unacceptable costs on an adversary. Given
these considerations, critics conclude that the ICBM force is unnecessary. As journalist Fred Kaplan put
the argument in Foreign Affairs, “the case for land-based ICBMs today is extremely weak.”23
Undermine Nuclear Strategic Stability The second charge against the ICBM force is that it undermines nuclear strategic stability and increases the risk of accidental nuclear war. For decades, the United States has maintained a launch under attack (LUA) The Case for the US ICBM Force Strategic Studies Quarterly Fall 2018 55 option.24 Since ICBMs in fixed silos are potentially vulnerable to an enemy nuclear first strike, the United States announces that it will not wait to have its missiles destroyed but, instead, reserves the right to launch ICBMs upon receiving warning of an
incoming attack. The LUA option is meant to contribute to deterrence by making it clear to adversaries they cannot count on destroying the US ICBMs in their silos, even if they strike first. However, ICBM critics charge—pointing to historical near misses—that this policy could lead to accidental nuclear war.25 As Perry argues, “These missiles are some of the most dangerous weapons in the world. They could even trigger an accidental nuclear war.”26 And Perry and Cartwright aver that these are “higher risks of accidental war that, fortunately, we no longer need to
bear.”27 A false alarm could cause a US president to launch a nuclear war under the mistaken belief that a nuclear war has already begun. To avoid this danger altogether, therefore, ICBM critics advocate eliminating ICBMs. Since submarines at sea are less vulnerable to a nuclear first strike and bombers can be sent into the air in a crisis, the pressures to “use them or lose them” are less intense. Detractors maintain that the risks of having ICBMs on “hairtrigger alert” are simply too great.28 Unaffordable The final argument for eliminating the US ICBM force is that they are
too expensive. Again, as Perry and Cartwright believe, “we are safer without these expensive weapons, and it would be foolish to replace them.”29 The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the price tag of modernizing America’s nuclear triad over the coming 30 years will come to over $1 trillion.30 This is a large sum, and those opposed to nuclear modernization argue that the United States can save money by scaling back its plans, including delaying modernization of, or scrapping altogether, the ICBM force.31 In addition, critics argue that allocating large sums to
nuclear forces takes away from investment in other more useable conventional military capabilities. For example, Collina argues that “avoiding production of a new ICBM would save tens of billions.”32 Perry maintains that the US modernization plan “is needlessly oversized and expensive” and will “crowd out the funding needed to sustain the competitive edge of our conventional forces and to build the capacities needed to deal with terrorism and cyberattacks.”33 Instead, Perry and Matthew Kroenig 56 Strategic Studies Quarterly Fall 2018 Cartwright maintain,
Washington “should cancel plans to replace its ground-based ICBMs, which would save $149 billion.”34
The Case for the ICBM Force Contrary to the above claims, ICBMs are a necessary part of US nuclear
strategy. They contribute to US nuclear strategy, do not undermine strategic stability, and are
affordable. The analysis below shows that ICBMs should continue to occupy an important role in US
nuclear posture. ICBMs Are Necessary for US Nuclear Strategy ICBMs possess a number of unique
attributes that strengthen nuclear deterrence overall. They not only provide deterrence against attack
on the United States, but they also contribute to other roles and missions, including assuring allies and
achieving US objectives if deterrence fails. Launching a successful nuclear first strike on a United States
armed with hundreds of ground-based ballistic missiles in hardened silos spread throughout the interior
of the country would be a near-insurmountable task. Without ICBMs such a first strike would be
much easier to contemplate. This fact has long been recognized and has sometimes been described as
the “sponge” or “warhead sink” argument for ICBMs.35 The existence of an ICBM force greatly raises
the opening ante for a nuclear first strike on the United States. Major nuclear powers, like Russia and
the United States, include counterforce nuclear targeting in their war plans.36 In other words, they plan
to use their nuclear weapons to destroy an enemy’s nuclear weapons. The more enemy nuclear
weapons that can be destroyed, the fewer that will land in retaliation on one’s own territory. An
adversary plotting a counterforce nuclear first strike on the United States would need to target at least
455 sites on the US mainland. This list of targets includes three strategic bomber bases in Louisiana,
Missouri, and North Dakota and two strategic submarine bases in Georgia and Washington state.37
Finally—and most importantly—the enemy would need to target and attempt to destroy 450 separate
ICBM silos spread across hundreds of miles in Wyoming, North Dakota, and Montana. There are many
other targets an enemy might also seek to destroy in a first strike, including those related to nuclear
command and control, missile defense sites, war-sustaining industries, and others. But the bare
minimum for a splendid first strike on US nuclear forces at present requires destroying at least 455
targets. That is a daunting, if not impossible, objective, even for a major nuclear power like Russia. The
attempt would require an adversary to expend much of its nuclear arsenal. To ensure the destruction of
a target, it is believed that states would want to allocate more than one warhead to each aim point; a
common rule of thumb is two warheads per target.38 An enemy nuclear strike on 450 hardened ballistic
missile silos in the United States, therefore, would require the enemy to generate an offensive force
package of approximately 900 nuclear warheads. Such an operation is simply not possible for two of
America’s three nuclear adversaries. China and North Korea are believed to possess arsenals numbering
around 260 and 30–60 nuclear warheads, respectively.39 While feasible for Russia, with its larger
number of nuclear weapons, it would still require Moscow to expend roughly two-thirds of its deployed,
strategic nuclear arsenal in a bid to destroy US ICBMs.40 It is difficult to imagine an adversary deciding
to intentionally launch a nuclear first strike on the United States under these conditions. The attack
would require detonating nearly one thousand nuclear weapons on hundreds of sites spread throughout
the US homeland. It would be impossible to keep such a strike limited. There is a reasonable chance it
would not succeed in destroying every target, and a US president would be compelled to respond. These
considerations strengthen nuclear deterrence. Subtract the ICBMs from this equation, however, and the
picture greatly changes. Adversaries could concentrate their efforts on the remaining two legs of the
triad. The opening ante for a nuclear attack on the United States plummets to only five sites. The
number of nuclear weapons needed to cover these targets collapses to a mere 10 nuclear warheads.
This greatly lowers the bar for nuclear deterrence. With a target set this small, Russia and China could
conduct a first strike and still hold hundreds of nuclear warheads in reserve. Even a minimally
armed rogue state such as North Korea could contemplate such an attack.
Stability now, but de-alerting makes preemption against US nukes rational
Chilton 18
Gen Kevin P. Chilton, Fmr. USAF four-star General and Commander of STRATCOM, Senior Fellow with
the National Defense University, Defending the Record on US Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26333874
“We Do Not Need a Triad” The critical question to ask in response to the claim that we do not need a
triad is, so which leg do you want to eliminate? The submarine leg provides the only stealth force we
have—in essence, our assured response. The bombers are the flexible force that can signal our
adversaries and assure our allies while encouraging them not to build their own nuclear deterrent. The
ICBM is the most stabilizing leg of the triad. Stability, in this context, is defined as a state in which
adversaries are never tempted to strike first. If in the future we eliminated all our ICBMs and deployed
only a dyad, as has been proposed by some, that would leave only six targets that Russia or China would
have to hold at risk in the United States to eliminate our entire nuclear arsenal save for the handful of
submarines deployed at sea that day. After destroying those six targets with just six warheads of the
1,550 accountable warheads they are permitted to deploy by the New Start Treaty, Russia would have
1,544 warheads remaining and the US would only have a small subset of its force remaining. Eliminating
or even de-alerting the ICBM leg of the triad would yield an unstable relationship with Russia because
the resulting vulnerability of our posture in this scenario could very conceivably “invite” a first strike
upon the US. The value in the triad is that it complicates the adversary decision calculus. Every day we
want Vladimir Putin or some future Russian to know it is going to take two or more warheads per silo to
eliminate our ICBM force. That requires at least 800 of the 1,550 available to them dedicated to targets
in remote sections of North Dakota, Montana, Colorado, and Wyoming. Significantly, he must consider
that more than half his offense would be required to go after missiles that might not be there when the
warheads arrive because of our ability to launch under attack. He must conclude that a first strike would
not only fail to achieve his objectives but also would be suicidal. Again, this is the definition of strategic
stability: when an adversary understands that no day is a good day to go to war with the United
States—nor is he ever tempted to launch first. When people say a dyad is a good idea and eliminating
the ICBMs is a good idea because it makes for a safer America, recognize that they do not properly
understand this concept of strategic stability. The United States should never want to invite a first strike
by decreasing the number of targets an adversary must attack. Deterrence works because the ICBMs
are on alert and strategic stability is maintained because the adversary knows missiles can launch on
warning. “Nuclear Forces Are on Hair-Trigger Alert” In the era of “good cowboy versus bad cowboy” TV
shows and movies, “hair-trigger” was used to describe a gun with a filed-down firing mechanism that
was so sensitive it just might discharge whether the holder desired it to fire or not. Critics of our ICBM
alert posture use this terminology as a scare tactic. People who described our ICBMs as being on “hairtrigger” alert either do not know what they are talking about or are intentionally attempting to frighten
the uninformed into calling for the de-alerting of the ICBM leg. Here is a more accurate analogy that
better captures reality: There is a gun, and it has a really big round in the chamber. But the gun is in a
holster and that holster has two locks on it. Now the person wearing the holster does not know the
combination to either lock—only the president of the United States has the combinations. If the
president tells this person to shoot he will, but he cannot do it alone. So nuclear forces are not on hairtrigger alert. They certainly are on alert and at the ready, and this is necessary to provide the strategic
stability described above.
This is just false
Mel Deaile & Al Mauroni 15, both work at the U.S. Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons
Studies, “THE NEED FOR NUCLEAR ALERTS,” War on the Rocks, May 6, 2015,
https://warontherocks.com/2015/05/the-need-for-nuclear-alerts/
One of the arguments presented against alert is that these missiles are on a “hair-trigger” — a term
used seven times in the Global Zero report. This gives the impression that missiles stand at the ready
and all a launch officer has to do is press some red button and nuclear Armageddon occurs. As Gen.
Cartwright understands better than almost anyone, this is utterly ridiculous. First, the president is the
only person authorized to order the release of a nuclear weapon. The suggestion that the president has
less than a few minutes to make a decision for a full-out strategic response based on a tenuous launch
warning is a straw man. There is no demand for the president to make a decision within minutes — if
there is any doubt, the decision could be to wait until there is clear evidence prior to any retaliation.
Secondly, no one individual can launch a nuclear missile. As with all things in nuclear operations, two
people must give consent (aside from, of course, the president) before an action can occur. No one
person has knowledge of all nuclear codes; therefore, an insider threat is mitigated. Furthermore, crews
are directed by relatively short encrypted messages. While the notion of hacking into the nuclear
command and control system would make for a great Hollywood movie, the truth is that all messages go
through sophisticated levels of encryption so it would be impossible to duplicate an actual message.
While the ICBM force has had some bad press recently, none of the infractions ever compromised the
integrity of the launch codes or the nuclear command structure.
The Global Zero report states that the risk of the outbreak of nuclear conflict has not decreased
proportionally with the significant reductions of nuclear weapons since the height of the Cold War. They
insist that a “hair-trigger” alert could result in a nuclear exchange during this period of high acrimony on
the international stage. By doing so, they ignore geopolitical context. While tensions between the
United States and Russia are undoubtedly higher than we’d like, we are not facing anything approaching
the massive competition for global dominance that was the Cold War and the tensions that came along
with it. This argument and the others advanced by Global Zero commission reveal their effort as just
another excuse for taking nuclear weapon systems offline.
Nuclear hotlines solve hair trigger alert
Suri 18
Jeremi Suri, Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs and Professor of History
and Public Affairs-UT Austin, What’s a Nuclear Hotline Good For Anyway?, 2018,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/09/whats-a-nuclear-hotline-good-for-anyway/
The history of previous nuclear hotlines offers important perspective. Their uses have been infrequent
and often quite trivial, but their existence has discouraged rash behavior and encouraged confidence
that crises can be managed short of war. Hotlines have facilitated signaling between adversarial states,
and they have reduced the likelihood of dangerous miscalculations. They are valuable tools for
diplomacy, especially in regions — like the Korean Peninsula — locked in conflict. The Cuban missile
crisis inspired the creation of the first nuclear hotline. During the two weeks in October 1962 when the
United States and the Soviet Union approached the precipice of thermonuclear war, U.S. President John
F. Kennedy and Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev struggled to control events. Khrushchev
famously warned Kennedy: “If we succeeded in finding a way out of a dangerous situation this time,
next time we might not safely untie the tightly made knot.” The absence of direct communications
between the two leaders tightened the knot as they struggled to understand each other’s motives and
actions.The absence of direct communications between the two leaders tightened the knot as they
struggled to understand each other’s motives and actions. Technological limitations, security concerns,
and hostile Cold War attitudes made a point-to-point telephone line from the White House to the
Kremlin impossible at that time. Instead, Kennedy and Khrushchev had to rely on intermediaries,
including their ambassadors, who were underinformed and distrusted. They created special “back
channels” to open new lines of negotiation, but these were often unreliable. Most significant unplanned
events during the crisis, including the shoot-down of an American U-2 aircraft over Cuba, threatened to
trigger major miscalculations and escalation. Leaders had long relied on diplomats, spies, and other
intermediaries for their communications with adversaries. The difference in 1962 was that the speed
and depth of potential destruction in a thermonuclear world reduced the time for deliberation and
increased the dangers of miscalculation. Kennedy and Khrushchev felt that they needed to talk with
more urgency and sobriety than their predecessors. They began by exchanging letters after the moment
of acute crisis had passed. Then, in March 1963, the United States proposed “the establishment of direct
and more secure communications” between American and Soviet leaders. On June 20, the two
governments signed a memorandum of understanding in Geneva — the first arms control agreement of
the Cold War — to create “a direct communications link” and “take the necessary steps to ensure
continuous functioning of the link and prompt delivery to its head of government of any
communications received by means of the link from the head of government of the other party.”
Implementation came quickly, reflecting the eagerness of leaders in both capitals. On July 13, 1963, the
first Soviet-American hotline became operational. It consisted of two pairs of Teletype machines, linked
by dedicated telegraph wires routed through Europe and under the Atlantic Ocean. The receivers sat in
the Pentagon and the Soviet Communist Party Headquarters, where they were continuously manned to
receive messages and send them immediately to the White House and Kremlin. The communication
between leaders was still textual and indirect, but the time required was reduced from days and hours
to minutes, and the possibilities for distortion were minimized. In 1967, the White House added a
terminal, connected to the Pentagon receivers, and over the next four decades the technology was
updated to include satellite communications, facsimile equipment, and eventually, in 2008, email. The
superpowers communicated through the hotline during numerous crises, beginning with the
assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963, when Washington assured Moscow of political
stability within the United States. The first extended exchange occurred during the 1967 Six-Day War,
when American and Soviet leaders reassured one another that they would not intervene directly and
would mutually sue for peace in the region. Similar communications during the Indo-Pakistani War of
1971, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and the Cyprus crisis of 1974 clarified the lines of deterrence in
conflicts that could have expanded beyond their regions. Communications during the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979 and the Polish Solidarity crisis of 1981 were less successful in defusing conflict
between Washington and Moscow, but the exchange of messages limited possible miscalculations as
Cold War tensions increased. A direct voice link between the White House and Kremlin was possible by
the 1990s, and it has largely replaced the textual hotline, although the latter still exists. American
presidents now call allies and adversaries frequently, particularly during crises.. In the last decade, they
have begun to use cell connections in addition to landlines. Mobile technology, coupled with secure
long-distance capabilities, facilitates reliable voice communications as never before. For leaders in
Washington, the notion of a hotline has become more diffuse — there are many “hotlines.” They remain
essential for clarifying motives and actions during terrorist attacks, civil wars, and invasions — as well as
a growing list of economic, health, and climactic crises. They also ensure confidential dialogue, free from
the public posturing that makes crisis de-escalation difficult. Leaders must trust the sincerity of one
another’s words for these connections to be meaningful, but their very existence deepens trust among
those who use them. Despite a decade of deteriorating relations between Russia and the United States,
the leaders of the two countries continue to speak directly in moments of high tension, as Kennedy and
Khrushchev could not during the Cuban missile crisis. Meanwhile, other countries have developed their
own hotline technologies, modeled on the Soviet-American Cold War link. France and the United
Kingdom built direct connections to Moscow in the late 1960s. In 1998, China established hotlines with
Russia and the United States, followed by similar links with South Korea, India, and Vietnam after 2008.
These links have received far less attention than the initial Soviet-American connection, but they are
considered essential for clarifying intentions and maintaining stability in the many rivalries surrounding
the Chinese mainland. Two hotlines that have helped manage explosive rivalries, often on the edge of
war, run between India and Pakistan and between the two Koreas. Modeled on the Soviet-American
link, and encouraged by Washington, the India-Pakistan link provides secure communications between
the two nations’ foreign secretaries “to prevent misunderstandings and reduce risks relevant to nuclear
issues.” The India-Pakistan hotline has operated since 2004, and it has facilitated numerous moments of
crisis de-escalation, assuring both sides that war is not imminent. The United States has facilitated the
maintenance of this connection. The same is true for the two Koreas, where the Red Cross (with
American assistance), installed the first system in the early 1970s to assist with delivering aid and
defusing recurring crises. The Korean hotline has kept the two governments talking, even in moments of
acute conflict. It provides voice connections for military leaders on both sides, who otherwise have no
method for exchanging messages directly.
No accidents --- checks are built into the system
Kehler 17 (C. ROBERT KEHLER, retired US Air Force General appearing before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on the authority to use nuclear weapons, November 14, 2017,
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111417_Kehler_Testimony.pdf, accessed 7/18/18)
US nuclear forces operate under strict civilian control. Only the President of the
United States can authorize the use of US nuclear weapons, and the President’s ability to exercise that
authority and direction is ensured by the people, procedures, facilities, equipment, and communications
capabilities that comprise the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS). The NCCS has been designed
with resilience, redundancy, and survivability to ensure that an adversary cannot hope to neutralize our
deterrent by successfully attacking any of its elements and thereby “disconnecting” the President and
other civilian and military leaders from one another or from the nuclear forces—even in the most
stressing scenarios. These features enhance deterrence and contribute to crisis stability. NCCS
capabilities and procedures are designed to enable the authorized use of nuclear weapons while also preventing their unauthorized,
accidental, or inadvertent use. Operations and activities involving US nuclear weapons are surrounded by
layers of safeguards. While many of the specifics are highly classified, general methods range from
personnel screening and monitoring to codes and use controls. In addition, sensors and communications links
that contribute to nuclear decision making are specially certified, and tests and exercises are frequently
held to validate the performance of both systems and people. Before I retired in late 2013, we had also begun to
evaluate networks and systems for potential or actual cyber intrusions. Other factors contribute to the
Nuclear Command and Control (NC2)
prevention of unauthorized, inadvertent, or accidental use. “Today’s triad of nuclear forces is far smaller
and postured much less aggressively than its Cold War ancestor”. ii Not only are the long-range bombers
and supporting aerial tankers no longer loaded and poised to take off with nuclear weapons (unless
ordered back into a nuclear alert configuration), but ballistic missiles are aimed at open areas of the
ocean. Also, while the possibility of a massive surprise nuclear attack still exists (and must be deterred), decision time is longer in many other
potential nuclear scenarios that may prove more likely in today’s global security environment. As I mentioned
earlier, the decision to employ nuclear weapons is a political decision requiring an explicit order from the
President. The process includes “assessment, review, and consultation…(via) secure phone and video
conferencing to enable the President to consult with his senior advisors, including the Secretary of
Defense and other military commanders.”iii Once a decision is reached, the order is prepared and
transmitted to the forces using “procedures…equipment, and communications that ensure the President’s nuclear control orders are received and properly
implemented…”.iv The law of war governs the use of US nuclear weapons. Nuclear options and orders are no different in this regard than any other weapon. Here, US policy as articulated in
the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) provided important context regarding the consideration of US nuclear use (i.e., extreme circumstances when vital national interests are at stake). The
2010 NPR also restated the “negative security guarantee” (i.e., the US will not consider using nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons state that is party to the Nuclear
the legal principles of military necessity, distinction,
and proportionality also apply to nuclear plans, operations, and decisions. Legal advisors are deeply
involved with commanders at all steps of the deliberate and crisis action processes to offer perspective
on how force is to be used as well as the decision to use force. The decision to use nuclear weapons is
not an all or nothing decision. Over the years, successive Presidents have directed the military to prepare a range of
options designed to provide flexibility and to improve the likelihood of controlling escalation if
deterrence fails. Options are clearly defined in scope and duration and the President retains the ability
to terminate nuclear operations when necessary. Military members are bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) to follow orders provided they are legal and come from appropriate command authority. They are
equally bound to question (and ultimately refuse) illegal orders or those that do not come from appropriate
authority. As the commander of US Strategic Command, I shared the responsibility with the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior military and
Nonproliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations). In addition,
civilian leaders to address and resolve any concerns and potential legal issues on behalf of the men and women in the nuclear operating forces during the decision process. It was our duty to
pose the hard questions, if any, before proceeding with our military advice. Nuclear crew members must have complete confidence that the highest legal standards have been enforced from
target selection to an employment command by the President.
Use or lose empirically wrong --- BUT, if they win it, that just proves the turn
Deterrence DA is true by making preemptive strikes against the US rational!
Alexander Lanoszka, Department of International Politics at the University of London, and Thomas
Leo Scherer, formerly in the Department of Politics at Princeton University, now a researcher at UCSD
Center for Peace and Security Studies, February 6, 2018, Nuclear ambiguity, no-first-use, and crisis
stability in asymmetric crises, The Non Proliferation Review
The use-it-or-lose-it pathway confronts the same logical problem as the downward-spiral pathway in
terms of the assertions made by NFU supporters. If nuclear weapons are unnecessary for the major
power to prevail, as some NFU supporters claim, and if AFU lacks credibility such that the adversary
disregards it, then why would that same adversary feel pressure to “use it or lose it” against an NFU
state and not an AFU state?39 The argument that AFU is unnecessary contradicts the argument that AFU
is dangerous. The weak state is ultimately choosing between likely annihilation if it does not attack first
and certain annihilation if it does. Why would it ever choose the certain suicide of the latter remains
unclear.40
We may suppose that if a weaker adversary believes that it is about to be hit first with nuclear weapons
and wiped out, then it may take a chance on striking first to try to inflict pain on the major power in
order to compel that major power to back down. But why would the major power back down if the
adversary has already expended its arsenal, making it more vulnerable to a devastating riposte? There
are cases where the weak state tried to impose costs against a stronger opponent to compel the major
power to back down, such as Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, as we discuss later. However, in these cases, the
weaker state does not attempt to impose costs until after the major power has initiated the conflict.
Once the conflict has started, the adversary indeed has nothing to lose by attacking, but until then the
adversary will have much to lose.
These points raise an interesting question: might a weak state choose to attack first and sacrifice the
possibility of better material outcomes for some emotional or psychological utility gained by imposing
costs on the major power. Though plausible, such an assump- tion raises the additional question of
whether the state can enjoy this immaterial benefit if it has successfully self-destructed. Similarly, in the
event that the state somehow survives the conflict, would it still receive the same benefits?
The use-it-or-lose-it pathway is thus empirically very rare. One study finds that pre- emptive wars—that
is, wars either fought to exploit military advantages before they disap- pear or caused by fear of surprise
attack—“almost never happen.”41 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, cases that seem prima
facie to have been pre-emptive wars were World War I, China’s entry into the Korean War, and the 1967
Arab–Israeli War. Although World War I does not meet the asymmetrical conditions that our analysis
emphasizes, it suggests that use-it-or-lose-it pressures embodied by mobilization sche- dules can exist in
a purely conventional world, where nuclear doctrines are absent.
Still, the case of the United States and China in 1950 better approximates the asymmetrical con- ditions
explored by our analysis. According to the pre-emptive-war version of events, China intervened in the
Korean War out of concern that the US-led forces moving toward the Yalu River were striving to reunify
the peninsula under non-Communist control. By taking over all of Korea, these forces would pose an
imminent threat to China’s security.42 Yet Chinese decision makers were not necessarily facing a use-itor- lose-it conundrum even in this case. Other motivations—promoting the world Commu- nist
revolution and forestalling an indefinite US presence on the border—were also present.43 To be sure,
China did go on to acquire nuclear weapons, but the evidence suggests that it did so in order to be selfreliant following its dissatisfaction with the support it was receiving from the Soviet Union during the
1950s.44
Of course, just because something has not happened before does not mean that it could never happen.
Nevertheless, if we believe that the use-it-or-lose-it pathway is possible, then the fundamental
inconsistency in the argument that AFU is dangerous remains. We must believe that the adversary’s
incentives to strike first under AFU will reverse if the United States declares NFU, as in the instance
where the adversary believes that its armaments could survive a conventional first strike but not a
nuclear first strike. Though that is possible, it again goes against arguments made by NFU advocates that
the first use of nuclear weapons would provide no tactical benefit to the United States.45 Indeed, when
other scholars discuss the adversary’s use-it-or-lose-it incentives, the adver- sary is presumed to fear a
result of any likely US first strike or effort toward regime change, regardless of whether nuclear
weapons are used.46 Nuclear weapons may even be a moot point if the strong state is unwilling to use
them for normative reasons but maintains its conventional military superiority.
Arms Racing
It’s a huge double turn --- they said on the first page that CPGS is threatening to other
countries --- Russia would freak out because it would threaten their survivable second
strike so they’d arms race more!!
They said Russia’s realist on the other page --- they’d just let the US eliminate and
then continue building up arms
Russia nuke expansion is driven by other factors AND ensures damage limitation in
escalating conflicts
Matthew Kroenig 18, Associate Professor in Department of Government and the Walsh School of
Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow at the Brent Sowcroft Center on
International Security at the Atlantic Council, “The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic
Superiority Matters,” Oxford University Press, pp. 155-157, 2018, accessed through Georgetown
Libraries
The Russian case is the most challenging to the central argument of this chapter. For some, Russia–US
relations are the prototypical example of the spiral model.49 Indeed, many academic theories of arms
racing were inspired by the Cold War nuclear arms race. According to this interpretation, both the
United States and the Soviet Union were security-seeking states. In a foolish search for absolute
security, they spent astronomically on nuclear arsenals, and, in the end, they were both more vulnerable
than where they started, with tens of thousands of nuclear warheads pointed at each other. As Paul
Warnke famously argued, the two superpowers were like “apes on a treadmill.”50
Upon closer examination, however, there is reason to doubt the central tenets of the spiral model
interpretation. First, Moscow’s arms expansions were driven by a mix of factors, and it is not at all clear
that it was responding to Washington in a dysfunctional action-reaction cycle. The Soviet Union was
intent on developing a robust nuclear force regardless of US actions. (Recall Secretary Brown’s quote,
cited previously.) The history behind the development of the thermonuclear weapon provides an
example of this dynamic. Analysts in the United States argued for years that the US test of a
thermonuclear weapon had provoked Moscow to respond, but we now know that the Soviet Union was
committed to developing the “super” either way and did not require additional motivation from the
United States.51 Moreover, newly declassified evidence released since the end of the Cold War provides
further support for this interpretation. As (p.156) referenced earlier, May, Steinbruner, and Wolfe
conclude that they were unable to find evidence of an action-reaction spiral in Moscow’s procurement
decisions.
The idea that Moscow’s nuclear posture decisions are not heavily influenced by those made in
Washington receives further support when looking at Russia’s current nuclear posture. Russia maintains
nuclear capabilities, including tactical naval nuclear weapons, such as torpedoes, mines, and depth
charges, which the United States has long since shed. Furthermore, Putin continues to expand Russia’s
nuclear capabilities into new areas with no prompting from the West, developing, for example, an
undersea nuclear-armed drone, and testing an intermediate-range GLCM. As Secretary Carter explained
in the quote cited earlier, the evidence does not support the idea that America’s nuclear posture is
prompting an arms buildup in Russia.
Second, even if there was a Cold War nuclear arms race (which the above discussion at least calls into
question) it was likely necessary to defend the United States’ core interests. If this is the case, then it
cannot be considered a regrettable cost of a robust US nuclear posture, but one of its most persuasive
justifications. As George Kennan explained in the famous long telegram, Communist Russia counted on
the continued spread of workers’ revolutions in order to sustain its legitimacy.52 Kennan argued that if
Russian expansion could be contained, the system would collapse from within due to the system’s
internal contradictions. This containment strategy formed the basis of the US approach to the Soviet
Union for 50 years and ultimately proved successful. By the 1980s, the United States was winning the
arms race, and this, combined with the Soviet Union’s internal governance and economic problems,
eventually convinced Mikhail Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders to unilaterally opt out of the
competition.53 Similarly today, analysts debate whether Putin’s aggressive actions and nuclear threats
are a defensive response to NATO expansion in eastern Europe, or a new round of aggression motivated
by imperial ambition.54 There is considerable evidence to support the latter view. Putin has argued that
the collapse of the Soviet Union is the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century” and that
he is intent on resurrecting a “greater Russia” in eastern Europe.55 Recall also, Putin’s above motto of
“new rules or no rules.” A new arms competition may be in the making, therefore, but if so, it may be
the type of arms race in which the United States must compete and win in order to protect itself and its
allies.
Finally, and providing the strongest support for the argument of this book, despite Moscow’s massive
nuclear capabilities, the United States has consistently been able to achieve meaningful nuclear
advantages. From 1945 until the mid-1970s, the United States possessed a clear strategic superiority
over the Soviet Union. By the middle of that decade, the Soviets had achieved quantitative parity, which
was locked in through a series of arms control agreements, (p.157) but the United States continued to
look for a qualitative edge, developing more sophisticated warheads and delivery systems.
Furthermore, even though Washington does not currently enjoy a quantitative nuclear advantage over
Russia, it has been able to maintain significant damage limitation capabilities against it. As we saw in
chapter 2, if the United States had not fostered these capabilities, it would be much more vulnerable to
a hypothetical nuclear exchange with Russia, across a full range of scenarios, than it is today. Far from
futile, therefore, America’s robust nuclear posture provides it with meaningful damage limitation
against Russia, which Moscow has not been able to negate.
While not as clear-cut as the China and North Korea cases, therefore, the Russia case still provides
evidence supportive of the central argument of this chapter. Russia expanded its military capabilities for
reasons that were only partly to do with the United States. Deterring Russian aggression during the Cold
War and at present with sufficient military force was likely vital to defending American national
interests. And, finally, the pursuit of a robust nuclear posture has provided the United States with
meaningful damage limitation capabilities, rendering it less vulnerable to nuclear war with Russia and
enhancing nuclear deterrence.
No impact to arms races or use it or lose it pressure, and no pre-emptive strikes
Cohen 17 (Michael, Ph.D. at the University of British Columbia in April 2012 Assistant Professor in the
Department of Political Science and Public Management at the University of Southern Denmark "How
nuclear proliferation causes conflict: the case for optimistic pessimism" The Nonproliferation Review
Volume 23, 2016 - Issue 3-4: Twenty years of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty)
Sagan has argued that the dangers caused by preventive-war motivations did not disappear in
1990 with India's and Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons, because future deployment of US
national missile defenses would likely cause China to increase the size and readiness of its own missile
force, encouraging India to increase its own missile deployments and defense technology, which in turn
threatens Pakistan's smaller nuclear arsenal. According to Sagan, this would “inevitably reopen the
window of opportunity for preventive war considerations.”29 Pakistani nuclear posture has indeed
given a larger role to nuclear weapons.30 But even if the United States, China, and India increase
their missile forces, the logic that has almost always ensured that preventive-war
considerations do not come to fruition will likely prevail. Arms races usually do not cause
war.31 The scenario of a general gaining supreme political power and ordering a preventive
strike due to pressures created by missile defenses on a “better-now-than-later logic” when
the consequences might be the loss of several cities has not occurred. Pakistani fears of attacks
on their nuclear arsenal during the 2001–02 South Asian standoff say nothing about whether India was
actually planning such attacks.32 After the December 13, 2001, terrorist attacks, Indian Army General
Sundararajan Padmanabhan stated that “if we go to war, jolly good,” though whether Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee seriously considered striking Pakistani nuclear facilities is unclear.
Almost all states do not move beyond considering preventive attacks against their
adversary's nuclear weapon facilities. The only cases where preventive-war motivations led
to strikes are the Israeli, US, and UK attacks against Iraq in 1981, 1993, and 1998, and these
strikes did not escalate to war. Proliferation pessimist scholars have not explained why the rise
of new nuclear powers might lead not only to preventive-war motivations but also actual
strikes. There are strong reasons why few strikes occur and these do not escalate to war. Military
biases and preferences for preventive strikes hardly ever become realized. Cases of strikes
authorized by civilian leaders are rare. Given the near-absence of preventive strikes, and
notwithstanding the rare strikes that nonetheless fail to escalate conflict further, it is clear
that the dangers of preventive strikes associated with nuclear proliferation have been
exaggerated.
PGS
PGS triggers global instability. They cause accidents, arms races, etc.
Wavell Room, 12/5 – Peer reviewed British National Security Non-Profit. (Hypersonic Weapons: A
Threat to Stability, 2018, https://wavellroom.com/2018/12/05/will-new-and-emerging-hypersonicweapons-increase-or-decrease-relative-stability-and-security-between-states-andalliances/?utm_content=bufferce48f&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=b
uffer)
‘A particular urgency attaches to defence at this very moment, for the
weapons are now being tested may determine
America’s ability to survive.’ William Borden’s words from 1946 that reflect his thoughts and concerns about the V2 would sit
comfortably inside the pages of the latest US National Defence Strategy which also links technological advances as threats to prevailing security
threats. Borden believed the V2 would quicken the tempo of war and magnify the advantage of the attacker over the defender.2Forty years
earlier, in a fictional look into the future, H.G. Wells’ ‘War in the Air’described how America’s North Sea Fleet was attacked and destroyed in
short order by German airships which bore down on a nation that was ‘unwarned and unprepared’.3Technology can be seductive, especially to
those who believe in quick victories and winnable wars and the lure of hypersonic weapons may well prove to be irresistible to those who
believe in and seek that particular ‘silver bullet’. This
paper will argue that although there is a compelling
technological case for suggesting that hypersonic weapons will affect the existing stability between
states and alliances, they will fail to do. As seductive as it is, Freedman points out, technology’s influence on warfare has
invariably been shaped by the political context at the time.4We must also be mindful of man’s ability to adapt and
innovate when faced by any threat, be that asymmetric methods or using technology of their own.
Hypersonic weapons are already taking their place on a noteworthy and lengthy list of weapons that promised to revolutionise warfare; it is a
list that already includes Wells’ airships and the V2. Since the Second World War, the security and stability of states and alliances have operated
against a backdrop of nuclear deterrence, but this has not prevented proxy wars from taking place at either the state or sub-state level.
Initiatives such as America’s Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) are not new but have been given a new lease of life by hypersonic
weapons. Before examining the prevailing factors that are likely to limit their impact, this paper will consider two types of hypersonic weapons:
glide vehicles (HGV) and cruise missiles (HCM) which have different capabilities, but both have the potential to impact on the relative security
between states.5 Hypersonic speeds have been a reality for several decades through intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and
experimental aircraft such as the X-15.6Hypersonic
weapons are at the very top of the technological food chain
and even though the current technology readiness level is 6, meaning prototype demonstration,
progress is expected to be rapid.7The generation of hypersonic weapons under development reach speeds in excess of Mach 5 and
travel at altitudes between 10 and 100km. Their speed and manoeuvrability, which threaten to make existing anti-missile defences at best
ineffective or at worse redundant, are already causing organisations as the RAND Group to call for arms limitations agreements to be put in
place.8 It is the
HVG’s combination of manoeuvrability and high speed that make them a real game
changer.9Although existing ICBMs reach hypersonic speeds, they follow a ballistic trajectory with little, or no, ability to manoeuvre and antimissile defences and radars are designed to act against their predictable flight path. HGVs operate in the lower atmosphere
where their flight surfaces allow them to change direction and manoeuvre against static defences and,
of course, to change target in its terminal phase. Marrying this ‘target ambiguity’ with reduced warning
times means that should their potential be realised, HGVs could make existing anti-missile technologies
redundant.10The fact HGVs, such as China’s DF-17, are mounted on top of a conventional missile gives
further cause for concern as their initial launch signature could be mistaken for that of a ballistic
missile attack. An ambiguous launch process coupled with compressed warning times, means that
HGVs could well cause protagonists to ‘launch on warning’ whereby a retaliatory attack is initiated
before incoming missiles have reached their targets.11Fear, according to Thucydides, is one of the enduring human
characteristics that has been the cause of many wars throughout history. The fear of a nation rising up and threatening the
status quo of another Great Power can itself be sufficient to trigger conflict.12The nuclear age has already had its
share of fear-induced crises. It was fear that almost had disastrous consequences in 1983 when America sought to improve the credibility of its
nuclear forces in 1983 using a command post exercise codenamed Able Archer where the then Soviet Union misinterpreted America’s actions
as intimidation rather than deterrence.13 The characteristics of HGVs mean they form
an integral element of America’s CPGS
which is seen as a way of deterring adversaries by striking high value targets at the very outset of any
conflict. The concept of CPGS first appeared during the 2001 Bush Administration; today’s Department of Defence is tasked by the current
Congress with delivering an initial capability by September 2022.14With its focus on the nuclear arena, it is perfectly understandable that
America’s Nuclear Policy Review (NPR) does not reference the CPGS Programme, but the synergies would seem obvious. Indeed, Putin’s recent
announcement of Russia’s intent to develop a nuclear-capable missile with an ‘unlimited’ range that was capable of eluding air defence systems
suggests Russia is already thinking along those lines.15Threats such as this from either Russia or elsewhere will have a further destabilising
effect on security as the NPR makes it clear that the role of the American nuclear capability is to protect the United States as well as its allies
and partners.16 The nuclear age meant that more than ever before, any
plan to conquer an opponent would have to
gamble everything on a successful first strike.17The potential for hypersonic weapons to reduce the
relevance of existing ballistic missile defences means that the nuclear stand-off that took the world
through the cold war and beyond is now being challenged. Hypersonic weapons could conceivably
challenge the present notion of nuclear deterrence.18 By operating at the strategic level with the ability to launch both
conventional and nuclear strikes, HGVs present a real risk to the relative stability between states and alliances.
The same can also be said of shorter-ranged HCMs which can still have a coercive effect on opponents at the operational level. HCMs such as
Russia’s SS-N-33 Zircon, are designed to travel several hundred miles at speeds much faster than existing cruise missiles such as Britain’s Storm
Shadow or America’s Tomahawk. They also present existing defences the same challenges as HGVs – target ambiguity, reduced warning times
and manoeuvrability. The technology level for HCMs is still very much cutting edge but they offer relative simplicity and affordabilitywhen
compared to HGVs and can be launched from conventional platforms such as aircraft, ships or submarines. Proliferation
is almost
inevitable with such weapons and lesser nations that acquire them may see HCMs as a deterrent against
greater power intervention. HCMs provide a number of characteristics that appeal to the military in that they can strike at range
whilst evading existing defences; this would include target sets that are difficult to hit using subsonic weapons. HCMs are likely to form an
important element of any anti-access area denial (A2AD) strategy designed to either deny an opponent’s access to a particular region or restrict
their ability to manoeuvre. HCMs could, for example, force US Carrier Strike Groups to operate further out to sea or threaten key locations such
as the UK’s forward mounting base in Cyprus. In the context of the OODA Loop, HCMs also ‘compress’ the time available for a commander to
engage or act.19Whilst the presence of HCMs in an inventory is itself is unlikely to trigger military conflict, they may embolden nations or
regimes to pursue potentially destabilising regional agendas in parts of the world such as the Middle East or in the Sea of Japan and in this
respect, they can certainly reduce the stability between states and alliances. The drive
to develop new technologies is
relentless and is embracing more actors, both state and non-state, all of whom are presented with lower
entry requirements.20Whilst Freedman acknowledges technology as the main agent of change in warfare, he is quick to point out that
its influence has invariably been shaped by the political context at the time.21For all of technology’s seductiveness, it does not operate in a
vacuum. McMaster believes that those who believe technology will make the ‘next war’ fundamentally different to the previous one are
neglecting its political and human dimensions. They are also rather conveniently forgetting that wars are invariably fought against determined
and elusive opponents who will seek to adapt and overcome.22Insurgents operating in conjested cities in Iraq to counter coalition air power or
swarms of light attack craft in the congested seas of the Middle East are recent examples. Over 100 years ago, the French Navy’s ‘Jeune Ecole’
movement espoused the use of emerging technology in the shape of torpedoes and torpedo boats to overcome more powerful enemy capital
ships.23Who is to say that other emerging technologies will not blunt or even erase the threat of hypersonic weapons? Politicians and indeed
the military both focus on new technologies and concepts that promise fast, cheap and efficient victories. Look no further than Pearl Harbour,
Baghdad 2003 or the Schlieffen Plan to witness the appeal of the short war where a decisive knock-out blow is the silver bullet to anyone
charged with taking the military initiative.24McMaster also believes the Revolution in Military Affairs and Shock and Awe tactics are further
examples of what he calls a ‘Vampire Fallacy’ where the lure of a rapid and decisive victory is a difficult concept to kill off and it keep on reappearing. Hypersonic weapons will also have to compete against and could be potentially neutralised by other disruptive technologies such as
big data analytics, robotics, directed energy and artificial intelligence that the US National Defence Strategy considers areas that must be
mastered to ‘fight and win the wars of the future’.25If technology cannot be relied upon to deliver as advertised, predicting the future muddies
the water further. Only six years ago, the then Major General McMaster admitted “We have a perfect record in predicting future wars…and
that record is zero percent.”26 The
imminent arrival of hypersonic weapons would appear to herald another step
change in technology’s ability to influence the level of security between states and alliances. The HGV’s
ability to marry rapid and perhaps unstoppable global reach with a nuclear warhead will no doubt cause
major powers to re-think the validity of nuclear deterrence. At the operational level, the relative accessibility of
HCMs may well allow either major powers to enhance their A2AD programmes of lesser powers to flex
their political aspirations in areas of the world already experiencing varying degrees of tension. Those who
worship at the altar of technology may well have found their promised land – as long as, of course, the other disruptive technologies also
bursting onto the scene, do not blunt or even negate the seductive lure of hypersonic weapons. Stepping away out of the technological arena
for a moment, a common thread that weaves its way around the complexity of any new weapon system or strategy is man’s ability to adapt.
The world has been here before. Although the speed and manoeuvrability of hypersonic weapons would
suggest they may well be about to bring McMaster’s vampire back to life, they cannot be considered in
isolation. It is not the ability of hypersonic weapons to win the next war that will decrease stability
between nations and alliances, it is their false promise of a quick and bloodless victory that has the
potential to prove fatal to commanders and politicians alike. History would suggest that their allure will be blunted by
the constraints and conditions that this new type of weapon find itself operating in. Hypersonic weapons are not a zero-sum game, as history
has shown us – it is more complicated than that.
PGS shift causes space weaponization---undermines stability AND, renders PGS
ineffective.
Nayef Al-Rodhan 18. Honorary Fellow of St. Antony's College at Oxford University; Senior Fellow and
Head of the Geopolitics and Global Futures Programme at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.
“Weaponization and Outer Space Security.” Global Policy. 3/12/2018.
https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/12/03/2018/weaponization-and-outer-space-security.
Space weaponization is not a new phenomenon. However, a large number of technological developments over the past few decades have
led to a drastic acceleration in the destructive potential of space warfare. In 2016, the Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister Sergey Ryabkov voiced his concerns about the possibility of weapons being deployed in space. His
statement followed advancements in technological endeavours such as the Prompt Global Strike program, a project within which
the United States started developing hypersonic glide vehicles in secret in the mid-2000s.¶ Such hypersonic glide vehicles are
different from conventional ballistic missiles in three ways. First, they have a longer range, and can travel over more
than half of the Earth circumference. Second, they can approach their target from a direction opposite to the
expected trajectory of a typical ballistic missile, and do so on a low altitude gliding trajectory within the atmosphere. Third, they can
be extremely precise, with terminal guidance systems enabling them to strike with an accuracy of a few
meters. These characteristics make such vehicles nearly impossible to detect. Though it will take many more years and billions more dollars
to complete the project, upon completion such missiles could effectively decimate a country’s nuclear and military arsenals in a few tens of
minutes, using low-yield nuclear weapons or even conventional explosives. During the Cold War, Russia
and the US avoided serious
nuclear escalations because the involved weapons on both sides could inflict severe damage on the
entire world. However, the precision of hypersonic weapons eradicates this deterrent. Russia has already
responded by creating the Aerospace Defence Forces in 2015, tasked with protecting the country against the Prompt Global Strike.¶ As other
countries start to consider the US’s weaponization programmes threatening – the US military space budget is
estimated at $25 billion and possibly even at more than $40billion – they are taking steps to defend themselves.
Hypersonic missiles rely on satellites to function properly and for this reason both Russia and China are
increasingly developing the capacity to destroy US satellites. Destroying a satellite could render the US military both blind
and deaf, subsequently obscuring the precise targeting capabilities of hypersonic missiles for moving
targets, which require a steady stream of data.
PGS fails---lack of intel.
James M. Acton 15. Senior Associate and Co-Director Nuclear Policy Program Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace; Ph.D. in theoretical physics. “Prompt Global Strike: American and Foreign
Developments.” Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.
12/8/2015. https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/20151208/104276/HHRG-114-AS29-WstateActonJ-20151208.pdf.
Enabling capabilities are critical to the effectiveness of CPGS weapons, but appear to have been neglected.¶
Without the right enabling capabilities—command and control; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and battle
damage assessment—CPGS weapons could prove unusable. So far these support systems appear to have
received insufficient attention.¶ Current deficiencies are clearly illustrated by the difficulty of destroying
mobile targets, such as road-mobile missiles. All of the potential missions for CPGS weapons could present this
challenge. Locating and tracking mobile targets is very difficult, as the United States learned during the 1991
Gulf War, when it failed to achieve a single confirmed kill of an Iraqi Scud launcher in almost 1,500
sorties.¶ Today, the most plausible means of detecting and tracking mobile targets would be through manned
and unmanned surveillance aircraft operating from within or close to the theater of operations. Using these
assets to provide targeting data for CPGS weapons would, however, make little sense. If the battlespace permitted the
use of aircraft for surveillance, then it would be more effective and cheaper to outfit those same aircraft
with strike weapons and use them for offensive operations than to develop a CPGS capability.¶ Acquiring
CPGS weapons to attack mobile targets would make military sense only if the United States also developed a reliable means of
remotely locating and tracking these targets. Plans for such a capability—notably, a globe-spanning
network of satellite-based radars—have repeatedly been canceled, and to my knowledge, no program is
currently in the works. Given that this capability would probably cost an order of magnitude more than the
CPGS weapons themselves, deficiencies in current enabling capabilities merit immediate attention.¶ Probably more worrying
than specific gaps in enabling capabilities are apparent organizational deficiencies within the Department of
Defense that may cause this issue to receive insufficient attention. A 2008 report by the Government
Accountability Office expressed concern that major Department of Defense studies did not analyze what enabling
capabilities would be required but instead simply “assumed that certain needed improvements…would
be available when any future [weapon] system is fielded.” Remarkably, the GAO reported that, in one of
these studies—the Prompt Global Strike Analysis of Alternatives—enabling capabilities were not considered because,
among other reasons, “the study staff lacks the special access clearances required to obtain information on all [Department of
Defense] efforts for improving enabling capabilities.” If such deficiencies still persist—as I believe they do—they severely threaten
the viability of any future CPGS weapon system.
PGS doesn’t solve terror---lack of intel.
Şafak Oğuz 17. Professor, Gazi University; PhD. “Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS): A
Conventional or A Nuclear Weapon?” Journal of International Crisis and Policy Studies 1.3, 31-53.
http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/391828.
However, no
one has articulated exactly what these “time-urgent targets” might be. Examples given by analysts,
such as “picking off Osama bin Laden in a cave, if the right one could be found; taking out a North
Korean missile while it is being rolled to the launch pad; or destroying an Iranian nuclear site all without crossing
the nuclear threshold,”37 do not sound credible. The statement in Senate testimony by Brian Green, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities, that CPGS capabilities might be necessary to prevent WMD transfers
to terrorists, disrupt missile launches by rogue states, and hit targets protected by anti-access
capabilities,38 has similarities with other statements but still lacks details as to how these goals would be achieved.
Additionally, it should be noted that this kind of operation would need, first of all, “very convincing intelligence”39
and very good and coordinated communication between intelligence resources and the launch center of
the missile.
ICBM
Eliminating ICBMs doesn’t solve warhead ambiguity—CPGS gets mistaken for SLBMs
and SSBNs
Acton PhD 13 [Theoretical Physics from Cambridge, member of the Trilateral Commission on Challenges
to Deep Cuts and was co-chair of the Next Generation Working Group on U.S.-Russian Arms Control,
senior associate of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]
“Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2013 RE
Congress has expressed particular concern about the possibility of warhead ambiguity resulting from
basing CPGS systems at sea.33 These concerns originated with the planned Conventional Trident
Modification, which would have seen conventional warheads placed on a delivery system that is
exclusively associated with nuclear weapons. Similarly, there is concern about the use of SSGNs for CPGS
because these submarines used to carry nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. One problem with this
argument is that it ignores the nuclear ancestry of other potential basing modes. In particular, landbased concepts might use former ICBMs and SLBMs as launch vehicles. By contrast, some sea-based
concepts, such as a newly designed intermediate-range ballistic missile launched from Virginia-class
attack submarines, could be entirely free from nuclear ancestry. But to complicate matters further,
having an association with nuclear weapons can actually be positive from the perspective of mitigating
warhead ambiguity. Precisely because SSBNs carry nuclear weapons and SSGNs used to, they are
covered by an arms control inspection regime, which could be helpful in demonstrating to Russia, and
perhaps China, that CPGS weapons were indeed conventionally armed. CPGS weapons that are seabased could also be launched from areas where nuclear weapons are deployed. This is a real
disadvantage, but it must be weighed against the other factors that might exacerbate or mitigate
warhead and destination ambiguity. For example, it is far from obvious that the ambiguity risks
associated with observable and predictable sea-launched ballistic missiles would be less than the risks
associated with unobservable and unpredictable land-based boostglide systems, even though the latter
were deployed in areas separate from nuclear weapons. In short, there is no persuasive case to be made
that sea-based systems would be inherently more risky than all other basing modes; specific concepts
need to be assessed on their merits.
ICBMS are key to deterrence, and the plan causes tech buildup to target
subs, which collapses the triad entirely and incentivizes worse attacks
because of fewer targets and capacity cuts
Baroudos 16. (Constance Baroudos is Vice President of the Lexington Institute. Her current
research interests include ballistic-missile defense, nuclear strategy, European security, and the
Greek financial crisis. Baroudos has been interviewed, published or quoted by the Associated
Press, Washington Post, CBS, NBC, ABC, CCTV, Voice of America, Defense News, Air Force
Times, and RealClear Defense. ICBMs: America's Nuclear 911 Force Remains Crucial to
Deterrence. April 14, 2016. nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/icbms-americas-nuclear-911force-remains-crucial-deterrence-15786)
The only defense the United States has against a Russian nuclear attack is the threat of
retaliation. To keep that threat credible, the military maintains a “triad” of land-based missiles,
sea-based missiles and bombers that would be nearly impossible to destroy in a surprise attack. Minuteman III intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) stationed in the central U.S. that make up part of the American nuclear
deterrent remain critical to national security. Eliminating ICBMs as some have proposed would weaken
America’s nuclear deterrent that protects its homeland and allies from a nuclear first strike.
ICBMs are deployed in underground silos at three U.S. bases. Current weapons were fielded in 1970 with a
planned service life of 10 years, but have lasted over 40 years because they have been refurbished many times. The U.S. cannot continue to sustain
its Cold War ICBM force any longer because it is antiquated and hard to maintain. Thus, the Air Force will develop a new missile as part of the groundbased strategic deterrent program that will be deployed in the 2027 timeframe. The Air Force’s initial proposal calls for 642 missiles of which 400 would
be operationally deployed until the 2070s. But the ICBM force is facing controversy because funding for its modernization will take place
simultaneously with replacements of other legs of the Cold War triad. While modernizing ICBMs is not cheap, they are
the least
expensive component of the nuclear deterrent, and they provide many benefits that the other
legs do not. ICBMs are on constant alert which shortens execution of a president’s decision to launch weapons in response to a
surprise attack. If ICBMs were eliminated, an enemy would only need to strike a small number
of targets to degrade the U.S. strategic posture since there are only three bases for
nuclear-capable bombers and two bases for ballistic-missile submarines. In contrast, each
hardened ICBM silo would have to be targeted separately. While nuclear submarines are
undetectable in the ocean today, a technological breakthrough could occur that would make the
oceans less opaque. The sea-based leg might be weakened and could be at risk of being
destroyed by conventional forces. Thus, the land leg would increase in significance.
Eliminating ICBMs might motivate potential adversaries to try even harder to develop the
capability to locate nuclear submarines underwater. Consider what countries are doing in other parts of the world
today to understand the importance of ICBMs to security. Moscow is modernizing its ICBM force to carry 10
nuclear warheads each. Beijing tested its newest road-mobile ICBM twice last year – road
mobile ICBMs increase survivability because they do not have set locations for an enemy to target. North Korea recently launched
its sixth long-range rocket test that placed a satellite into orbit (testing rockets through
satellite launches provides invaluable data for potential future ICBMs). Deterrence is effective
because it causes the enemy to fear a massive retaliatory response; ICBMs in particular ensure
an adversary’s objectives are beyond reach because they are on alert and cannot be destroyed by
conventional forces. A new ICBM is an expensive but essential investment that will prevent a potential aggressor from launching a nuclear first
strike and ensure these fearsome weapons are never used.
No ICBMs bad impacts – inconsistent logic, empirics disprove accidental
launch risks
Kroenig, 2018 (Matthew, Associate professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University, deputy director
for strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, “The Case for the US ICBM Force”, Strategic
Studies Quarterly, Fall 2018, pp. 50-69)//JBS
ICBMs Do Not Undermine Nuclear Strategic Stability
Not only do ICBMs contribute to US nuclear strategy, they also do not undermine nuclear strategic
stability as critics claim. Above, we saw how ICBMs contribute to the deterrence of US adversaries and,
therefore, to strategic stability. To be sure, there is always some risk of accident involved with nuclear weapons, but the
United States practices a number of safeguards to reduce the risks of an accidental nuclear launch.
For example, the United States practices broad open ocean targeting, which would reduce the implications of any accident.58 On
balance, therefore, there is good reason to believe that ICBMs
do more to contribute to stability than to
undermine it.
But critics have recently argued that ICBMs increase the risk of accidental nuclear war, are destabilizing in the event of an
impending nuclear attack, and therefore should be eliminated. This claim, however, rests
on a logical contradiction
and is inconsistent with decades of empirical evidence. Critics maintain that a US president would want to launch
ICBMs before they could be wiped out in an enemy first strike. This pressure to act quickly increases the risk that the president
could launch an accidental nuclear war due to a false alarm. But this argument raises the question: why
is the president so
eager to use ICBMs before they can be eliminated? Presumably, because the president
believes that using ICBMs is critical for the United States to achieve its objectives. Indeed, this
unstated objective must be fairly important if the president is willing to run a possible risk of launching an accidental nuclear war to
achieve it. If,
launching ICBMs is so crucial to US strategy, then it does not make sense for the
United States to eliminate them.
If, on the other hand, the critics are correct and the United States can safely eliminate ICBMs,
then there is no reason why a president should be so eager to use ICBMs early in a crisis
before they can be wiped out. If the United States can afford to eliminate its nuclear weapons now, in peacetime, then a
US president can also afford to wait and ride out any attack on the ICBM force in the event of hostilities. If ICBMs are truly
expendable, then there is no reason to risk an accidental nuclear war just to avoid losing them.
In sum, one can hold two logically coherent positions. First, one can maintain that US ICBMs are necessary for US nuclear strategy,
but they carry some inherent risk of accidental nuclear use. Second, one can hold that ICBMs are unnecessary for US nuclear
strategy and there is, therefore, no reason for a US president to launch them early in a crisis. But, the critics’ position contains a
logical contradiction. They maintain that ICBMs are both unnecessary and so essential that a US president would feel great
pressure to use them early in a crisis.
Moreover, the
argument that ICBMs increase the risk of nuclear war is not supported by the
empirical evidence. The United States, Russia, and China have all possessed silo-based ICBMs
for decades without an accidental nuclear launch. Critics such as Perry have argued that there have been scares
and close calls, a debatable proposition, but the fact is, ICBMs have never been launched due to a false alarm
or accident.59 Further, those in a position of authority have consistently decided that the benefits of ICBMs outweigh the risks.
The United States built and possessed ICBMs for decades and US adversaries are building and modernizing ICBMs today.
Deterrence DA
1NC - US
US nuclear flexibility underpins deterrence and stops inevitable Russian and Chinese
adventurism
Payne 18
Keith B. Payne, President of the National Institute for Public Policy and adjunct professor at
Georgetown University, “Nuclear deterrence in a new age,” Comparative Strategy, 2018.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495933.2018.1419708?needAccess=true
Introduction: On deterrence
Carl von Clausewitz writes that the nature of war has enduring continuities, but its characteristics
change with different circumstances.1 Similarly, the fundamental nature of deterrence has endured for
millennia: a threatened response to an adversary’s prospective provocation causes that adversary to
decide against the provocation i.e., the adversary is deterred from attack because it decides that the
prospective costs outweigh the gains. The character of deterrence, however, must adapt to different
circumstances. In one case, the necessary deterrent threat may be to punish the adversary; in another,
to deny the adversary its objectives; in yet another, a combination of punishment and denial threats
may be necessary to deter. Such specific characteristics of deterrence—its goals, means and
application—change, but the fundamental threat-based mechanism of deterrence endures.
The introduction of nuclear weapons in 1945 dramatically expanded both potential threats and the
corresponding means of deterrence, as was recognized almost immediately by some at the time. The
contemporary emergence of new types of threats, such as cyber and modern biological weapons, will
again affect the character of deterrence. But its nature endures, and the fundamental questions about
deterrence remain as elaborated by Raymond Aron and Herman Kahn during the Cold War: who deters
whom, from what action, by threatening what response, in what circumstances, in the face of what
counterthreats?2
Despite the continuity in the basic nature of deterrence, significant geopolitical, doctrinal and
technological developments now demand that we again adapt our deterrence goals, means and
applications to a new strategic landscape. During the Cold War, US nuclear deterrence strategies had to
adapt to the relatively slow changes and enduring continuities of a bipolar strategic environment, and
thereafter to the dramatic systemic transformation brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union and
Warsaw Pact. A basic task now is to understand how a third and dramatically different new strategic
environment must again reshape the character of our deterrence strategy—its necessary means and
application, particularly including the role of nuclear weapons.
Effective deterrence and extended deterrence for US allies requires that US deterrence capabilities be
sufficiently credible, as perceived by diverse adversaries, to cause them to decide against the
provocations we have identified as unacceptable, now and in the future. Doing so now demands that we
be capable of adapting our deterrence strategies and capabilities to shifting circumstances, including
future adversaries and contexts that are not now obvious. This is a task of uncertain dimensions and
unpredictable demands.
The rapid pace of technological innovation and proliferation has magnified the scope of change and
uncertainty in the emerging threat environment. Adversaries and potential adversaries are improving
familiar capabilities and acquiring new and unprecedented instruments of coercion and warfare. Some
appear willing to employ or abide by the employment of weapons that have, until recently, been
deemed outside supposedly global norms, such as chemical weapons. Improvements in ballistic and
cruise missiles, missile defenses, anti-access and area denial measures, hypersonic, cyber and space
weapons have or will open new domains for threat and warfare, and, correspondingly, pose new
challenges for US deterrence strategies.
This new strategic environment is very different from that of the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold
War period. As we consider how to adapt deterrence to the realities of this period we first need to
understand the necessary deterrence roles for our nuclear weapons given the emerging spectrum of
adversaries and potential adversaries who are pursuing external goals that threaten us, our allies and
the existing post-Cold War order in general. Effective nuclear deterrence is increasingly important in this
new strategic environment characterized by severe, coercive nuclear threats against us and our allies,
and the increasing prospect for adversary employment of nuclear weapons, and possibly other WMD.
Deterring adversaries and potential adversaries in the new post-Cold War era
During the Cold War, our deterrence focus was primarily on the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent on the People’s Republic of China. With the
end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a striking reduction in the generally perceived level of nuclear threat from
Russia and China, and a corresponding reduction in the generally perceived value of US nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. Following
9/11, the United States moved further away from interest in nuclear weapons, focusing heavily on defeating terrorism for almost two decades.
Washington paid limited attention to nuclear weapons, save for consideration of how to reduce their salience and pursue their numeric
reduction; the Obama administration in particular highlighted nonproliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons as the priority goals of
US nuclear policy.3
Yet, over the past decade, US adversaries and potential adversaries have moved in a wholly different
direction, emphasizing the roles of nuclear weapons and expanding their arsenals. For example, Moscow
clearly feels that it must correct an unacceptable loss of position supposedly imposed on it by the West
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unsurprisingly, Moscow is pursuing Great Power competition
aggressively, with a revanchist agenda backed by coercive nuclear threats. Its explicit nuclear threats to
the West surpass even those of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and its nuclear programs,
according to Gen. Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the Russian General Staff, already have resulted in the
modernization of three-fourths of Russia’s “ground, air and sea strategic nuclear forces.”4
In addition, during the Cold War and the decades immediately thereafter, the United States devoted
immense time and treasure into the negotiation of, and compliance with arms control treaties and
agreements. Now, however, Russia engages in continuing, willful noncompliance with many, perhaps
most of its arms control commitments, most notably the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty (INF),5 and China avoids transparency and arms control in favor of strategic ambiguity.
Chinese leaders feel that they must overturn a “century of humiliation,” and, in doing so are provoking
US allies severely as Beijing seeks to overturn the existing order in Asia. Its illegal expansionism and
rapidly growing military capabilities, nuclear and non-nuclear, pose a direct threat to US allies and
interests.
These Russian and Chinese goals and worldviews are important to US considerations of deterrence
strategies because cognitive studies that were not available in the 1960 s or 1970 s indicate that
decision makers typically are willing to accept greater risks to recover that which they perceive to be
rightfully theirs, but are denied.6 Western deterrence goals to preserve an international order which
these Great Powers now seek to overturn will be particularly challenging as they seek to recover what
they believe to be rightfully theirs, but now is denied them by Western opposition. Russia’s illegitimate
occupation of Crimea and China’s illegal expansion into the East and South China Seas certainly appear
to reflect this dynamic.
North Korea’s extreme nuclear threats and long-range means of delivery now pose a clear and present
danger to the United States and allies. At this point, North Korea may be merely months away from the
capability to launch nuclear armed missiles at US cities.7 It is imperative that the United States
effectively deter this eccentric rogue power.
Iran seeks hegemony in the Middle East and threatens US allies and friends in the process. Iranian
leaders correspondingly express extreme hostility toward us and our allies—most recently labeling the
United States Iran’s “number one” enemy.8 Despite the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
apparently, Iran could acquire nuclear capabilities quickly if it decides to do so, and it continues to
pursue robust missile programs, including the development of long-range missiles. Protecting US allies
and interests in the region may become an increasingly challenging goal given Iran’s goals and potential
capabilities.
While terrorist organizations continue to threaten us and our allies, we must now recognize the reality
of both Great Power and Rogue aggressive nuclear threats and possible employment. This reality is a far
cry from the hope and even expectation of the past two decades that such concerns belonged to the
past, never to return.9 Over the past two decades, this belief—that with the passing of the Cold War,
interstate nuclear threats were largely gone and US nuclear requirements greatly eased—has been at
the heart of virtually every argument against US efforts to modernize aging, “legacy” US nuclear forces
and the aged US nuclear scientific and industrial infrastructure. To realists, this belief was an obvious
illusion. But it was peddled by a professional anti-nuclear lobby and embraced by those captured by the
hubris and feel-good emotion of it all.
Despite the now manifest fact that significant interstate nuclear threats are again a prominent characteristic of the international environment,
the claim continues to be repeated that because the Cold War is over, US nuclear deterrence requirements are minimal. For example:
Thankfully those days are over. The Soviet Union disappeared 25 years ago. Current Russian belligerence, although worrisome, does
not constitute a renewed Cold War … Our submarines alone give us an assured deterrence … The United States does not need to
arm its bombers with a new generation of nuclear-armed cruise missiles … Similarly, the United States should cancel plans to replace
its ground-launched ICBMs. …10
The 20th Century Cold War is over; that is self-evident. But the claim that US nuclear requirements thus
are minimal, and correspondingly that, “our submarines alone give us an assured deterrence,” is a
highly-speculative non sequitur presented as if a known, self-evident fact. It is, instead, an outdated,
imprudent basis for US nuclear policy—a subject area that demands the greatest prudence.
Indeed, the contemporary nuclear threat environment poses more diverse and severe challenge to US
deterrence strategy than were operative during the Cold War, with greater uncertainties about the
future. No one, regardless of their position or experience, can claim with any credibility to know that
some relatively modest set of US nuclear capabilities provides “an assured deterrence” vis-à-vis a broad
spectrum of known and now-unknown opponents and contingencies, particularly for the many future
decades in which US nuclear deterrence capabilities are expected to function.
The number and character of states and terrorist organizations that may join the array of adversaries
and potential adversaries is uncertain. But new adversaries and nuclear threats undoubtedly will emerge
over the multi-decade lifetimes of the fledgling US nuclear programs initiated by the Obama
Administration to replace the aging US nuclear triad of strategic bombers, sea-based and land-based
missiles.
Deterring a diverse array of recognized adversaries and potential adversaries is complicated by their widely divergent worldviews, values, goals,
priorities, risk tolerances, determination, and perceptions of US credibility. Deterring future adversaries not yet recognized is, by definition, a
challenge for which we must prepare without knowing the precise dimensions of the threats they will pose or the requirements for deterrence.
During the Cold War, the number of deterrence variables was much more limited, and during the immediate post-Cold War era the need for
nuclear deterrence supposedly was coming to an end. Now, however, the spectrum of potential opponents and conflict scenarios ranges from
the relatively familiar to the largely unfamiliar; the stakes at risk now differ widely; our ability to communicate credible deterrence threats now
is less certain; and, our ability to predict when and how deterrence will function increasingly is stretched.
These realities drive the US need to be able to tailor deterrence strategies across an expanding spectrum
of opponents and threat contexts, nuclear and non-nuclear. Russia, for example, now emphasizes the
role of nuclear coercion and the value of limited nuclear first-use as a tool of statecraft, and to backstop
its non-nuclear military expansion. Its notions of “escalate-to-de-escalate” essentially envision nuclear
weapons as instruments of coercion to defeat the West’s will and capability to respond in strength to
Russian expansionism. Moscow appears to expect that its nuclear threats, or limited first-use if
necessary, will compel Western capitulation in crises or conflict.11 Effective deterrence now requires
that the West dispel such destabilizing Russian expectations.
In addition, with the ultimate goal of unifying the Korean Peninsula under its rule, North Korea is
expanding its nuclear capabilities and often issues coercive nuclear threats. From the 1990 s to the
mid2000 s, North Korea used its nuclear program to extort diplomatic concessions, economic assistance,
and food aid from us and our allies. Secretary of Defense James Mattis has stated that North Korea now
has the capability to strike, “everywhere in the world, basically.”12 With an emerging capability to
threaten the United States with nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the prospect is
for even greater demands and coercive nuclear threats by the “shakedown state.”13
Effective deterrence now demands much greater attention to the deterrence requirements posed by
diverse adversaries and contexts, and the force flexibility needed to adapt our deterrence strategies and
capabilities accordingly. In particular, we must understand how to deter Great Powers and
nucleararmed Rogues from exploiting limited nuclear threats and/or escalation for coercive purposes in
support of their respective goals to change established orders and boarders in Europe, Asia, and
prospectively the Middle East. To do so, we must first understand and address the reasons why some
now perceive the freedom to engage in repeated nuclear threats against us, our allies and friends.
Why, for example, might Moscow perceive potential success in a nuclear strategy that includes its escalation to limited nuclear first use. What
“gaps” does Moscow perceive in Western deterrence strategies, and how can those perceptions be corrected?14 The same questions must be
answered for all adversaries that follow a similar script, now and in the future.
In this new environment, the range of possibilities and uncertainties has expanded regarding plausible answers to the enduring deterrence
questions posed by Aaron and Kahn: whom must we deter, from what action, by threatening what response, in what circumstances, in the face
of what counterthreats?
Implications for US deterrence strategies and capabilities
The basic nature of deterrence endures. We do not require a new theory of deterrence, but rather we
must pursue the hard work of understanding how to apply deterrence effectively in dramatically new
and different circumstances. To wit, we must understand how to deter a more diverse set of adversaries
and potential adversaries, from a wider array of specific actions, in a similarly wider array of plausible
circumstances, while also hedging against the unknown and unexpected.
Several points may be made now in this regard. First, the set of adversaries and potential adversaries,
their goals and capabilities, are far from fixed or familiar, and they will shift over time. So too, the range
of US deterrence goals and the nuclear requirements needed to support those goals, now and into the
future, can never be considered fixed. Instead, we can be certain our deterrence goals and requirements
too will shift over time with the changing threat environment.
Consequently, the existing US policy of “no new” nuclear capabilities, which might have been
compatible with an era in which nuclear deterrence requirements were expected to continue fading, is
ill-suited to contemporary realities. The United States must be able to adapt its nuclear deterrence
strategies and related capabilities to shifting threats; “new” nuclear capabilities may very well be
needed and the United States must be able to field those capabilities as necessary to deter.
Second, Clausewitz’ emphasis on the extreme value of “prudence” in defensive war applies equally to
deterrence in this new strategic environment.15 It simply is prudent to recognize the need for the US
capacity to adapt and tailor US deterrence strategies and capabilities as rapidly as possible across a wide
spectrum of plausible threat and conflict conditions—some that are now recognized, others that are not
now apparent, but surely will emerge. Prudence calls for highly-flexible and resilient US deterrence
strategies and capabilities, nuclear and non-nuclear, to deter the much broader spectrum of known and
plausible threats and contingencies of this new post-Cold War era. The resilience and flexibility of our
deterrence strategies and forces, including nuclear, is essential to our capacity to tailor US deterrence
strategies and capabilities to diverse and shifting adversaries, threats, and contexts.
To be sure, since the early years of the Cold War, successive presidents have demanded more flexible deterrence strategies and nuclear forces.
The sense behind that demand is ever more apparent with the need for deterrence strategies and forces that must be tailored to an expanding
number of potential adversaries and threat scenarios—and prospectively to threats now unknown.
Third, the great value of the US nuclear triad is the resilience and flexibility inherent in the diversity of the triad’s platforms and weapons. That
value is not fading, as was claimed often during the immediate post-Cold War years. It is increasing, as has the urgency of the fledgling
programs underway to replace all three legs of the US triad reaching the ends of their already-extended service lives.16 The nuclear
infrastructure enabling US nuclear capabilities has suffered decades of very limited investment, and its recapitalization now demands
comparable urgency.
Fourth, effective US deterrence now requires that the United States work to deny Moscow’s apparent
confidence that it can defeat US and NATO deterrence strategy via threats of nuclear escalation, or
actual nuclear first-use in crisis or conflict.
To address the “gap” in the US deterrence strategy as perceived by Moscow presupposes that we can
identify the reasons why Moscow believes it has the freedom to threaten nuclear escalation or actually
engage in limited nuclear escalation. This is a difficult intelligence challenge because it requires getting
inside the minds of senior Russian civilian and military leaders to understand what they think and why,
not simply their forces and operations. Nevertheless, on the basis of open Russian writings, it is
reasonable to suggest that the reasons underlying Russia’s perceptions of nuclear license include
Moscow’s perceptions of advantages in both will and theater nuclear force numbers and options.
Consequently, NATO must work to close Moscow’s disdain for NATO’s will and cohesion. Efforts to do so may be seen in the recent public statement by NATO General Secretary, Jens Stoltenberg: “We are sending a very clear
message: NATO is here, NATO is strong and NATO is united.”17 NATO activities that reinforce that message by demonstrating alliance cohesion and military capability are likely to be critical.
If the “gap” includes Moscow’s perception of advantage stemming from Russia’s much greater theater nuclear capabilities and options, then the United States must determine the most efficient way to close that perceived “gap.”
The easy response that undoubtedly will be preferred by many in Washington is to assert condescendingly that Moscow simply should not be so primitive in its thinking as to believe that greater theater nuclear numbers and
options bestow an exploitable advantage. That easy, scolding response, however, may well not convince Moscow leaders of the error in their thinking.
Closing that possible gap almost certainly will not necessitate mimicking the extraordinary Russian theater nuclear arsenal, but it will likely demand an expansion of Western nuclear options with a focus on their credibility in
Russian perception. Getting this right will be one of the most important deterrence challenges of the coming decade for the United States and NATO. Parallel efforts in Asia in support of Asian allies also will likely be critical.
Fifth, for decades the US has been devoted to the process of nuclear arms control. Most discussions of deterrence and nuclear forces must pay homage to the goal of negotiated nuclear reductions lest they seem unsophisticated.
Unsurprisingly, there are calls now for further arms control efforts to solve the deterrence challenges that have been created intentionally, indeed eagerly, by foes, including the mounting North Korean nuclear threat and the great
theater nuclear force asymmetry in Russia’s favor.18
Arms control can, in principle, contribute to US security by establishing mutual restraints on forces and threatening behavior. However, to be helpful, arms control agreements must be prudent, implemented mutually, and
enforced if there is non-compliance. Agreements with negotiating partners who are very likely to violate those agreements, such as Russia and North Korea, carry the serious potential to harm US and allied security rather then
help. Unenforced, even well-negotiated agreements are likely to offer only a feel-good illusion of security.
In short, expecting arms control with foes and potential foes to solve the US security problems they have purposefully created is naïve in the absence of: 1) serious US enforcement efforts and mechanisms; and, 2) the types of
incentive that make agreements and compliance the opponent’s preferred choice, i.e., to gain relief from feared US capabilities. We learned this lesson with the INF Treaty. As then-Secretary of State George Schultz has stated: “If
the West did not deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles, there would be no incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously for nuclear reductions,” and, “strength was recognized as crucial to diplomacy.”19
For over a decade now, however, the United States has often expected nuclear arms control returns without the necessary investment to warrant Russian interest. The reality that “strength” is necessary for diplomacy was
replaced by the idealistic expectation that US restraint would be mimicked by others because that is what others should do. The result of this US lapse into idealism is contemporary Russian disdain for US arms control enthusiasm,
as reflected in the statement by then-Russian Presidential Chief of Staff, Sergei Ivanov: “When I hear our American partners say: ‘Let’s reduce something else,’ I would like to say to them: ‘Excuse me, but what we have is relatively
new.’ They [the U.S.] have not conducted any upgrades for a long time. They still use Trident [missiles.]”20 The lessons of the past should once again inform US arms control expectations and actions in this new era of intense Great
Power competition.
Finally, the roles for US ballistic missile defense (BMD) will take on considerably greater importance in this new era. Given the proliferation of nuclear weapons and means of long-range delivery to countries such as North Korea and
potentially Iran, the value of US defensive forces capable of defeating the missile attacks of rogue states, now and in the future, is of paramount importance. US defenses may also be extremely valuable to protect against any
accidental or unauthorized missile launches. This is a capability that is growing in importance as missile proliferation continues and if, as has been reported, some established nuclear powers consider a policy of launching their
nuclear forces “immediately upon detecting an incoming attack.”21 US defensive capabilities may also be valuable to promote deterrence stability by degrading the confidence any potential adversary might have in the coercive or
strategic value of limited nuclear first use.
Conclusion
The international threat environment is in the midst of a significant transition from the immediate
postCold War period to an era that is much more challenging. During the initial decades following the
Cold War, many Western leaders anticipated a “new world order” in which nuclear weapons would play
an ever-declining role because nuclear threats had, supposedly, become a thing of the past. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the US security focus was on regional conflicts and countering terrorism,
missions for which nuclear weapons seemed to have little or no role. Correspondingly, the question of
nuclear deterrence and the US forces and infrastructure required for nuclear deterrence was not a high
priority; indeed, to the extent that US policy focused nuclear weapons, it was largely on reducing their
salience and numbers as milestones toward their elimination.
However, the expected “new world order” never arrived, and potential foes never embraced the US goal
of reducing the salience and number of nuclear weapons as milestones toward nuclear disarmament.
Indeed, over the past decade and more, they have instead moved in wholly contrary directions in
support of their efforts to change established orders in Europe, Asia, and prospectively the Middle East.
Consequently, the new security environment of the 21st Century is characterized by: intensified Great
Power competition; the renewed prominence of nuclear threats against the West by Great Powers and
rogues; and, profound uncertainties about the future. There is little or no apparent evidence of
movement in fundamentally more benign directions.
Given these harsh realities, the basic nature of deterrence endures, but the character of US deterrence
strategies must adapt to a new era. This demands a departure from many of the nuclear policy
directions that emerged, on a bipartisan basis, over the past two decades in the expectation of an
increasingly benign future. In short, despite serious efforts to leave nuclear deterrence, forces and
thinking in the dustbin of history, the United States must once again confront the world as it is and
invest in the thinking, nuclear capabilities and infrastructure critical to the deterrence or defeat of
strategic attacks, nuclear and non-nuclear.
Deterrence still effective and key to a slew of hotspots—the alternative is WW3
Royal 17
Todd Royal, Todd Royal, M.P.P. is the Managing Partner for Energy development, Oil & Gas, and
Renewables for Ascendance Strategies, a global threat assessment and political consulting firm that is
based in Los Angeles, California, Deterrence Works and We Need to Get It Back, January 17, 2017,
https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/deterrence-works-and-we-need-to-get-it-back/
During the Cold War and World War II (WW II), the world was safe because of deterrence. A balance of
power existed between aligned nations cloaked in vibrant, robust militaries ready to defend their
countries. The enemies of peaceful nations knew the costs, as President John F. Kennedy echoed that
sentiment during his famous inaugural address about defending freedom and defeating foes. Those days
are now gone, however, they can be revived again using deterrence that keeps worldwide war at bay.
We are living in treacherous times, and war could break out anywhere on the seven continents across
the world. Our current predicaments are beginning to make the early 1930s look pale in comparison to
what is happening today, because deterrence has been allowed to linger and stall since the collapse of
the Soviet Union. Collectively, we seem to have thought that history has stopped since the East and
West German divide came down; but instead, we are witnessing a sharp upticks in wars, constant
belligerence from the Middle East, the South China Sea dispute, and Mexico’s unending drug war. New
threats are doing away with the resources to cope with refugee problems, the spread of terrorism, but
most importantly the embrace of negative constructivism to resolve conflict. Foreign Affairs magazine
describe ten hotspots for 2017, or flashpoints globally that if not dealt with swiftly and even harshly
could lead to war. Interestingly enough, Foreign Affairs didn’t mention China, North Korea, Russia or
Iran. It can be argued that North Korea claiming they can fire an ICBM anytime and outgoing Secretary
Kerry saying, “the U.S. may need more forceful ways of dealing with North Korea,” is a hotter spot than
Ukraine. Deterrence is the best answer for dealing with those nations. The type of deterrence at the
forefront of the Cold War, which had far-reaching geopolitical implications, otherwise the future is
cloaked in profoundly destabilizing actions by those four nations. Gambling with the four abovementioned nations without proper deterrence won’t work, but if done forcefully, then the other ten
described foreign policy unknowns can be solved. If not, then jittery states from Europe to East Asia will
begin to parse out safe real estate for their citizens if someone doesn’t step up. Historically that has
been the United States (U.S.) since World War II. The U.S. structured a system based upon mutually
agreed upon principles between major powers to keep World War III at bay. Certainly that order has
been was in flux recently, and disagreements rage about how this new discombobulating order began.
There isn’t a correct answer. Moreover, add in the Rwanda genocide, the Yugoslavia breakup, and
leaving Iraq after a brutal, tentative victory was achieved, and still there aren’t answers, which is the
problem. But this cooperative, championed order, leading to unprecedented prosperity and peace, is
suffering its share of dire crisis unless deterrence is restored. And Washington’s and NATO’s
retrenchment is only leading to what will eventually see Japan, South Korea, and the Sunni coalition led
by the Saudis join the nuclear club. Let’s also not forget about India and Pakistan, who play a daily
nuclear cat and mouse game in Kashmir. If Kashmir explodes, then does the U.S. intervene? China has an
interest, and believes they can overtake India quickly. If China commits troops would other countries in
the region follow suit? Another dangerous tightrope situation without a net while the basics of
geopolitics continue forward wondering who will do the heavy lifting to sustain the international
system. Furthermore, will it be U.S. hard power or European soft power that restores deterrence? The
perceived threats that the Iran nuclear deal were supposed to buffer haven’t kept the Islamic Republic
from buying uranium and keeping oil prices low by taking advantage of OPEC’s weakness to boost their
market share. The Russians have seen fit to meddle in U.S., European, and former Soviet satellite
elections at will while still threatening Ukraine. If Ukraine goes back to the Russians and out of NATO’s
orbit then Europe will have to grow NATO and American troop presence more than it has in recent
years. The echoes of Russian aggression will have returned to Cold War levels, but it’s the correct move
for deterrence to work, moving troops into Poland and Norway. The world wants peace, and this is a
perfect example of military moves bolstering deterrence without a single shot being fired. The
European structure is being shaken as never before, and while some see a messy Brexit, that’s not what
the facts say. Recently it was reported Britain has the number one growing advanced economy in the
world. Yet what happens if Germany, the Netherlands and France leave the EU based upon these facts?
Can the world afford to lose the European voice, its large economy, and its reliance upon soft power?
Will Europe become splintered and fractured at best, and at worst, allow regional historical rivalries to
return, sparking conflicts that could make the proxy wars taking place in Syria, Iraq and Yemen seem
tame. The balance Europe brings can’t afford to be lost. Here’s why the international system needs
robust deterrence without war. Terrorism is the pretense of a common enemy, but that model can’t
sustain itself. It is an illusion for nations to endlessly fight without a tactic to define a strategy. World
War II was decisive, because there was a common, definable enemy that allowed for tactics and strategy
leading to victory. Today’s terrorism fight has none of those modalities in place. Thriving on chaos will
not lead to building blocks for a stable future. This type of tactical bargaining has no long-term strategy
or common values within their policies. Maybe a Turkish-Russian rapprochement holds promise, but
historical enmity more than likely will win over long-term solutions being offered in Syria through this
false promise. Considering Beijing’s war-like posture towards East Asia, the incoming Trump
administration, Africa, and Latin America – what the world needs is overwhelming deterrence when
dealing with China. Chaos can be managed, but only through deterrence. Realpolitik and deal-making
isn’t a guide to stable long-term solutions. Economic sanctions were crippling Iran until they were
removed, and can work again if world powers have the vision to do what is necessary. That is a great
example of soft power deterrence backed by hard power. Yet deals, like fluid relationships, can be
broken, and our world is now made up of diverse states with globalized, vested interests. It can’t be
stated enough that someone has to step up and keep the order with military-powered deterrence or
with crippling economic sanctions to pull these nonstate actors and proxies off the world stage. Many
would say no single power could have singularity when it comes to controlling major powers or events.
Manipulation can take place in the case of Libya when NATO, led somewhat by the U.S., bombed them
into a fractured society. But real deterrence with military hard power had brought Gadhafi to his senses.
He was working with the Americans, Europeans, and democratized Asian countries to denounce his
nuclear program and terrorism. That only came about because he saw what happened to Saddam
Hussein. That was lethal deterrence in force, and not a sanitized environment that brought Gadhafi to
his senses. Here’s what should immediately happen for deterrence to be restored. First, build a large,
lethal blue-water navy, as the incoming U.S. administration is proposing. Iran, Russia, China, and North
Korea have to be checked globally, and a fully equipped naval presence from freedom-loving nations
accomplishes that task. Next, other NATO alliance members should follow the example of Norway, and
their policy of burden sharing toward Europe’s collective defense. They pay their fair share when so
many others don’t. NATO led by the U.S. has to demand every alliance member dedicates 2% of their
budget to their military, which assists keeping the NATO alliance intact. Economically, push
infrastructure and energy portfolios led by fossil fuel with renewables in the background while they
overcome their problems. If developing nations pushed natural gas as soft power deterrence, and
worked on infrastructure bottlenecks delivering inexpensive natural gas from the Marcellus shale in the
U.S. to exporting LNG across the globe then the most basic component of modern life – cheap, scalable
energy – is secured. Nations that thrive economically are less willing to interrupt their prosperity with
war and hostility towards other nations. Not every deterrence-issue has to have the big impact of a
weapon to be effective. No major, world power, such as the U.S., or China can single-handedly control
world events. NATO, the U.S., the IMF, World Bank, and other post WW II conflict-negating entities can’t
contain every fire, but with deterrence they can keep sparks from igniting into flames. Our globalized,
messy world is now a fact, and deterrence is the best tool to keep our world from entering World War
III.
Even short of nuclear war, those kill hundreds of millions---only credible nuclear
deterrence can prevent great power wars
OSD 18
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, https://fas.org/wpcontent/uploads/media/2018-Nuclear-Posture-Review.pdf
III. Why U.S. Nuclear Capabilities? “Our nuclear deterrent underwrites all courses of diplomacy and
every military operation…there is a direct line between a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear
deterrent…and our responsibility as global defenders of freedom.” U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, General
David Goldfein, 2017 The fundamental reasons why U.S. nuclear capabilities and deterrence strategies
are necessary for U.S., allied, and partner security are readily apparent. As Secretary of Defense Mattis
has observed, “a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent is there to ensure a war that can never be
won, is never fought.” The deterrence effects they provide are unique and essential to preventing
adversary nuclear attacks, which is the highest defense priority of the United States. U.S. nuclear
capabilities cannot prevent all conflict or provocations, and should not be expected to do so. But, the
U.S. triad of strategic bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs, supplemented by dual-capable aircraft (DCA),
overshadows any adversary’s calculations of the prospective benefits of aggression and thus
contributes uniquely both to deterring nuclear and non-nuclear attack and to assuring allies and
partners. The triad and DCA are essential for these purposes, and will be so for the foreseeable future.
As the Bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission—led by former Defense Secretaries
William Perry and James Schlesinger—emphasized in 2009, “The conditions that might make possible
the global elimination of nuclear weapons are not present today and their creation would require a
fundamental transformation of the world political order.” That fundamental transformation has not
since taken place, nor is it emerging. For centuries prior to the era of nuclear deterrence, periodic and
catastrophic wars among Great Powers were the norm, waged with ever more destructive weapons
and inflicting ever higher casualties and damage to society. During the first half of the 20th century and
just prior to the introduction of U.S. nuclear deterrence, the world suffered 80—100 million fatalities
over the relatively short war years of World Wars I and II, averaging over 30,000 fatalities per day. Since
the introduction of U.S. nuclear deterrence, U.S. nuclear capabilities have made essential
contributions to the deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear aggression. The subsequent absence of
Great Power conflict has coincided with a dramatic and sustained reduction in the number of lives lost
to war globally, as illustrated by Figure 2. Non-nuclear forces also play essential deterrence roles. Alone,
however, they do not provide comparable deterrence effects, as reflected by the periodic and
catastrophic failures of conventional deterrence to prevent Great Power wars throughout history.
Similarly, conventional forces alone do not adequately assure many allies and partners. Rather, these
states place enormous value on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, which correspondingly is also key to
non-proliferation. Properly sustained U.S. nuclear deterrence helps prevent attacks against the United
States, allies, and partners and the return to the frequent Great Power warfare of past centuries. In the
absence of U.S. nuclear deterrence, the United States, allies, and partners would be vulnerable to
coercion and attack by adversaries who retain or expand nuclear arms and increasingly lethal nonnuclear capabilities. Until the “fundamental transformation of the world political order” takes place, U.S.
nuclear weapons remain necessary to prevent war and safeguard the Nation.
Only our offense---the nuclear deterrent creates a taboo that makes actual use
unthinkable
Moody, 19 – Lecturer in defence studies at King’s College London, specialising in the history of
strategic thought
Simon J. Moody, “Have nuclear weapons helped to maintain global peace?” HistoryExtra. August 2,
2019. https://www.historyextra.com/period/20th-century/have-nuclear-weapons-helped-to-maintainglobal-peace/
Simon J Moody: In my judgement, the closest nuclear weapons have come to destabilising world peace
was during the first decade of the Cold War, from the late 1940s, when the United States had nuclear
superiority. If decision-makers had heeded the arguments for nuclear release – to support outnumbered
UN forces during the Korean War, or to help relieve the beleaguered French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in
Vietnam in 1954 – then today’s situation, in which the non-use of nuclear weapons is seen as normal,
might never have been established. It is the taboo nature of nuclear weapons use that helps to
stabilise weapons of such appalling power within an anarchic international system.
Arms racing and instability is denied by the past 7 decades---BUT empirics prove nukes
do stabilize
Pelopidas et al, 19 – professor, junior chair of excellence in security studies, and scientific director of
the masters programme in international security at Sciences Po
Benoît Pelopidas and Malcolm Craig, “Have nuclear weapons helped to maintain global peace?”
HistoryExtra. August 2, 2019. https://www.historyextra.com/period/20th-century/have-nuclearweapons-helped-to-maintain-global-peace/
Has the aspiration of non-nuclear powers to gain nuclear weapons been a destabilising factor around
the world?
BP: The spread of nuclear weapons is dangerous. It increases the risk of nuclear detonations, either
deliberate or accidental, by state and possibly non-state actors. But, once again, to fully answer your
question one would need to know what the development of nuclear weapons programmes does to the
governance of a polity. A research programme addressing this very issue is starting.
The assumption of the inevitability of a desire to acquire nuclear weapons has also been very
destabilising. It has justified non-proliferation policies, including violent ones, neglecting the fact that
most states never had any interest in developing such weapons, and that, among the few who did, most
gave up before crossing the nuclear threshold.
In other words, giving up nuclear weapons ambitions is not only the result of an absence of capabilities
(think Sweden), the presence of the weapons of a protector (think South Africa) or the success of the
use of force (think Iraq in the 1980s or Libya after 1986). Ignoring or denying the clear reasoning for such
non-nuclear security strategies may embolden those who argue nuclear weapons are necessary or
helpful for maintaining security.
MC: One of the remarkable things about nuclear proliferation is that, despite consistently alarmist
assessments of ‘tipping points’ and ‘cascades’, few countries have chosen to attain full nuclear
capability. Nations such as Argentina, Sweden and South Korea all had at least partial nuclear
programmes at some point since the 1950s, but chose to abandon their ambitions. There were many
reasons: internal politics, outside influence, leaders’ psychology, and so on. In some ways this tells us
that the reasons not to go for full nuclearisation are more popular than the reasons to do so.
However, nuclear weapons are an issue in the tension between India and Pakistan. Pakistan has ‘the
bomb’ as a fundamental part of its strategy in the event of major war with India. Any potential
battlefield use of tactical nuclear weapons could escalate a conflict to the strategic nuclear scale, with
horrific regional and global consequences.
SJM: Nuclear proliferation is not inherently destabilising, and there is a logical argument, rooted in
deterrence theory, that the emergence of more nuclear states might in fact bring greater stability to
certain regions. India and Pakistan are both new nuclear states and, though some form of limited
military conflict between the two rivals is a distinct possibility, the risks of a costly and unrestricted
conventional conflict has largely been nullified by the presence of nuclear armouries.
Likewise, Israel is another example: though its status as a nuclear power has not been officially declared,
the possibility of such states acquiring nuclear weapons might have reduced the existential threat of
invasion by one or more of its openly hostile neighbours.
1NC – All
Nukes prevent great power war in multiple hotspots
Ferdinande ’16 – Consulate General of Belgium In Shanghai, Masters from Vrije Universiteit Brussel
(Arnaud, FACULTY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SCIENCES & SOLVAY BUSINESS SCHOOL, “Nuclear
Deterrence in the 21st Century: Can it Provide Stability”
https://www.scriptiebank.be/sites/default/files/thesis/201610/Ferdinande_Arnaud_0098007_Master%20Politieke%20Wetenschappen.pdf)
This paper started by presenting an overview of the concept of nuclear deterrence. The paucity of
empirical and measurable data, and the inability of testing deterrence, means deterrence theory is
frankly speaking, of a speculative nature. As a consequence, it has to rely on logical arguments and a
coherent framework. By and large, effective deterrence depends on credibility and capability. The
enemy must believe that the threat made by the deterrer is credible, and that the deterrer is capable of
executing the threat. The logic behind deterrence is sound. Even when faced with a challenge such as
the notion that different countries have a different image of rationality and might assess threats
differently, deterrence theory appears to be solid. It supersedes cultural and national differences
because it appeals to basic instincts like fear and survival.
In the debate section we addressed some critiques of nuclear deterrence. Firstly, Wilson’s claim that
nuclear deterrence is ineffective for deterrence purposes; and secondly the use of conventional
deterrence as an alternative to nuclear deterrence. Wilson’s claim that deterrence does not work is
based on faulty reasoning and erroneously equating deterrence with compellence. Moreover, he ignores
the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons and the lack of credible defensive measures against
such weapons. As a result, Wilson’s arguments do not support his original claim.
An additional issue that we addressed in the debate section was directed at proponents of nuclear
abolitionists. If we eliminate all nuclear weapons, and by extension nuclear deterrence, on what
alternative can we rely to provide security and stability? The only possible alternative would be
conventional deterrence. However, conventional deterrence is unlikely to be sufficient unless it is
incredibly strong. This would require an exorbitant amount of military spending; a burden few countries
can carry. In contrast, a small nuclear deterrent enables smaller countries to deter larger and more
powerful countries. Moreover, it can do it at a relatively small cost. Conventional deterrence will also
face more problems with respect to the cost-benefit analysis. Countries are prone to making
overestimations and miscalculations in their cost-benefit analysis. Facing a conventional deterrent, they
might still think that they have a reasonable chance of success in achieving their goal and that they can
achieve that goal swiftly. Nuclear weapons offer almost absolute clarity in the cost-benefit analysis. The
immediate prospect for utter destruction leaves no room for miscalculations. Accordingly, it will be
much more effective in avoiding large-scale conventional wars. While conventional deterrence may be
more appropriate for lower levels of conflict, it is not a viable alternative for deterring large
conventional wars.
Our case study section started off with Russian-American/NATO case. Despite deteriorating relations
and a tenser environment, deterrence is very likely to ensure stability. Thanks to nuclear sharing and a
comprehensive multilateral alliance, Russia will refrain from belligerent activities against a NATO state.
Nuclear deterrence will force both parties to behave cautiously. Because of the danger of escalation,
limited conflict also seems unlikely to break out. Nevertheless, both parties should be mindful of
encroachments on each other’s sphere of influence and the possibility of accidents happening during
moments of heightened tension.
The Sino-American extended deterrence case is more complex. Unlike the first case, this region has a
higher probability of conflict due to territorial disputes over island in the SCS and ECS. Extended
deterrence is also less credible in this case because of the absence of nuclear sharing and a multilateral
alliance framework. Moreover, China’s power is growing at fast pace. Nonetheless, we argue that China
will most likely be deterred from resorting to high levels of violence. Howbeit, it will not be deterred
solely by virtue of nuclear deterrence. Instead, deterring China requires a mix of both extended
conventional and extended nuclear deterrence, so that escalation dominance can be maintained at any
level. Yet as China will continue to grow, the US’ extended deterrence will become less credible, unless
The US will bolster its security guarantees by building an alliance framework comparable to that of
NATO in Europe. If it fails to do so, countries in China’s vicinity might proliferate themselves. This would
result in even more hands on more nuclear triggers.
The Indo-Pakistani case is the most intense of the three case studies. The region is rife with border
conflicts and Pakistan’s revisionist tendencies and use of sub-conventional tactics form a constant
threat. Despite all these gloomy indicators neither India nor Pakistan have used nuclear weapons or
escalated conflicts into full blown wars. Up until now, the region has seen a considerably high degree of
nuclear stability. Be that as it may, it is questionable how long India will stand for Pakistani belligerence.
Pakistan’s asymmetric escalation posture has been able to prevent Indian conventional counterattacks
to date, but if it continues to launch sub-conventional attacks the situation might escalate. Furthermore,
India has gradually moved away from its unequivocal no-firstuse doctrine. Despite increasing tensions,
we argue that nuclear deterrence is likely to provide stability. Additionally, the Indo-Pakistani case is
subject to third-party intervention which further decreases the likelihood of escalation. In the absence
of nuclear deterrence, it would also be more likely that limited conflicts escalate into large-scale wars.
Ultimately, the question boils down to this: would the world be a safer place without nuclear weapons?
It is completely understandable that people consider these weapons to be morally abhorrent. Yet from a
strategic perspective, this paper argues that nuclear deterrence provides a high degree of stability. It is
likely that in the absence of nuclear deterrence, the world would see more great power wars. For the
moment, there seems to be no viable alternative to nuclear deterrence. That being said, nuclear
deterrence does require constant vigilance in order to prevent accidents. Additionally, countries should
increase the role of diplomatic dialogue and mediation. But if that fails, nuclear deterrence will act as
the ultimate guarantor of security and stability.
Even short of nuclear war, those kill hundreds of millions---only credible nuclear
deterrence can prevent great power wars
OSD 18
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, https://fas.org/wpcontent/uploads/media/2018-Nuclear-Posture-Review.pdf
III. Why U.S. Nuclear Capabilities? “Our nuclear deterrent underwrites all courses of diplomacy and
every military operation…there is a direct line between a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear
deterrent…and our responsibility as global defenders of freedom.” U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, General
David Goldfein, 2017 The fundamental reasons why U.S. nuclear capabilities and deterrence strategies
are necessary for U.S., allied, and partner security are readily apparent. As Secretary of Defense Mattis
has observed, “a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent is there to ensure a war that can never be
won, is never fought.” The deterrence effects they provide are unique and essential to preventing
adversary nuclear attacks, which is the highest defense priority of the United States. U.S. nuclear
capabilities cannot prevent all conflict or provocations, and should not be expected to do so. But, the
U.S. triad of strategic bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs, supplemented by dual-capable aircraft (DCA),
overshadows any adversary’s calculations of the prospective benefits of aggression and thus
contributes uniquely both to deterring nuclear and non-nuclear attack and to assuring allies and
partners. The triad and DCA are essential for these purposes, and will be so for the foreseeable future.
As the Bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission—led by former Defense Secretaries
William Perry and James Schlesinger—emphasized in 2009, “The conditions that might make possible
the global elimination of nuclear weapons are not present today and their creation would require a
fundamental transformation of the world political order.” That fundamental transformation has not
since taken place, nor is it emerging. For centuries prior to the era of nuclear deterrence, periodic and
catastrophic wars among Great Powers were the norm, waged with ever more destructive weapons
and inflicting ever higher casualties and damage to society. During the first half of the 20th century and
just prior to the introduction of U.S. nuclear deterrence, the world suffered 80—100 million fatalities
over the relatively short war years of World Wars I and II, averaging over 30,000 fatalities per day. Since
the introduction of U.S. nuclear deterrence, U.S. nuclear capabilities have made essential
contributions to the deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear aggression. The subsequent absence of
Great Power conflict has coincided with a dramatic and sustained reduction in the number of lives lost
to war globally, as illustrated by Figure 2. Non-nuclear forces also play essential deterrence roles. Alone,
however, they do not provide comparable deterrence effects, as reflected by the periodic and
catastrophic failures of conventional deterrence to prevent Great Power wars throughout history.
Similarly, conventional forces alone do not adequately assure many allies and partners. Rather, these
states place enormous value on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, which correspondingly is also key to
non-proliferation. Properly sustained U.S. nuclear deterrence helps prevent attacks against the United
States, allies, and partners and the return to the frequent Great Power warfare of past centuries. In the
absence of U.S. nuclear deterrence, the United States, allies, and partners would be vulnerable to
coercion and attack by adversaries who retain or expand nuclear arms and increasingly lethal nonnuclear capabilities. Until the “fundamental transformation of the world political order” takes place, U.S.
nuclear weapons remain necessary to prevent war and safeguard the Nation.
Only our offense---the nuclear deterrent creates a taboo that makes actual use
unthinkable
Moody, 19 – Lecturer in defence studies at King’s College London, specialising in the history of
strategic thought
Simon J. Moody, “Have nuclear weapons helped to maintain global peace?” HistoryExtra. August 2,
2019. https://www.historyextra.com/period/20th-century/have-nuclear-weapons-helped-to-maintainglobal-peace/
Simon J Moody: In my judgement, the closest nuclear weapons have come to destabilising world peace
was during the first decade of the Cold War, from the late 1940s, when the United States had nuclear
superiority. If decision-makers had heeded the arguments for nuclear release – to support outnumbered
UN forces during the Korean War, or to help relieve the beleaguered French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in
Vietnam in 1954 – then today’s situation, in which the non-use of nuclear weapons is seen as normal,
might never have been established. It is the taboo nature of nuclear weapons use that helps to
stabilise weapons of such appalling power within an anarchic international system.
Arms racing and instability is denied by the past 7 decades---BUT empirics prove nukes
do stabilize
Pelopidas et al, 19 – professor, junior chair of excellence in security studies, and scientific director of
the masters programme in international security at Sciences Po
Benoît Pelopidas and Malcolm Craig, “Have nuclear weapons helped to maintain global peace?”
HistoryExtra. August 2, 2019. https://www.historyextra.com/period/20th-century/have-nuclearweapons-helped-to-maintain-global-peace/
Has the aspiration of non-nuclear powers to gain nuclear weapons been a destabilising factor around
the world?
BP: The spread of nuclear weapons is dangerous. It increases the risk of nuclear detonations, either
deliberate or accidental, by state and possibly non-state actors. But, once again, to fully answer your
question one would need to know what the development of nuclear weapons programmes does to the
governance of a polity. A research programme addressing this very issue is starting.
The assumption of the inevitability of a desire to acquire nuclear weapons has also been very
destabilising. It has justified non-proliferation policies, including violent ones, neglecting the fact that
most states never had any interest in developing such weapons, and that, among the few who did, most
gave up before crossing the nuclear threshold.
In other words, giving up nuclear weapons ambitions is not only the result of an absence of capabilities
(think Sweden), the presence of the weapons of a protector (think South Africa) or the success of the
use of force (think Iraq in the 1980s or Libya after 1986). Ignoring or denying the clear reasoning for such
non-nuclear security strategies may embolden those who argue nuclear weapons are necessary or
helpful for maintaining security.
MC: One of the remarkable things about nuclear proliferation is that, despite consistently alarmist
assessments of ‘tipping points’ and ‘cascades’, few countries have chosen to attain full nuclear
capability. Nations such as Argentina, Sweden and South Korea all had at least partial nuclear
programmes at some point since the 1950s, but chose to abandon their ambitions. There were many
reasons: internal politics, outside influence, leaders’ psychology, and so on. In some ways this tells us
that the reasons not to go for full nuclearisation are more popular than the reasons to do so.
However, nuclear weapons are an issue in the tension between India and Pakistan. Pakistan has ‘the
bomb’ as a fundamental part of its strategy in the event of major war with India. Any potential
battlefield use of tactical nuclear weapons could escalate a conflict to the strategic nuclear scale, with
horrific regional and global consequences.
SJM: Nuclear proliferation is not inherently destabilising, and there is a logical argument, rooted in
deterrence theory, that the emergence of more nuclear states might in fact bring greater stability to
certain regions. India and Pakistan are both new nuclear states and, though some form of limited
military conflict between the two rivals is a distinct possibility, the risks of a costly and unrestricted
conventional conflict has largely been nullified by the presence of nuclear armouries.
Likewise, Israel is another example: though its status as a nuclear power has not been officially declared,
the possibility of such states acquiring nuclear weapons might have reduced the existential threat of
invasion by one or more of its openly hostile neighbours.
US
US nuclear deterrence is key to check back against Chinese aggression.
Payne et al 17, Keith B. [The National Institute for Public Policy devotes its agenda to assessing U.S.
foreign and defense polices in this new environment. Founded in 1981, National Institute is a non-profit
public education organization that focuses on a wide spectrum of rapidly evolving foreign policy and
international issues. High-quality, cogent analysis is the hallmark of the National Institute studies, books,
and articles. National Institute published products emphasize the qualitative factors that have a
significant impact on the U.S. position in the world and on making careful researched prescriptions on
the necessary adaptations in U.S. policy. The key to the depth and quality of National Institutes work is
personnel. National Institute attracts experienced professional staff members with diverse skills. Leading
U.S. and foreign scholars and officials also participate in many of the National Institute’s projects.] A
New Nuclear Review For A New Age. National Institute Press, 2017, pp. 11–12, A New Nuclear Review
For A New Age.//CHS PK
Asia continues to constitute a highly-dynamic security environment. With regard to US nuclear policy
and posture, four imperatives stand out. A nuclear- and missile-armed North Korea must be countered.
This is a considerable challenge since—during the plausible time horizon of the forthcoming NPR—the
DPRK reportedly could emerge with a nuclear force of between 60-100 weapons, deployed on a mix of
short- and 12 A New Nuclear Review for a New Age long-range delivery systems. Meanwhile, the
country continues to be led by an eccentric, opaque and unpredictable dynastic regime. US nuclear
capabilities have long played a central role in the deterrence of North Korean aggression and the
assurance of Asian allies, and will continue to do so. Forward-deployable strategic weapons in the US
triad provide essential support for these goals—to signal US resolve to North Korea and to allies, and to
help limit escalation in the event of conflict. Additional US nuclear capabilities—DCA hosted at Japanese
and South Korean bases—may be important for deterrence of the DPRK. In addition, the United States
should retain the ability to deploy nuclearcapable bombers in the region and demonstrate the capability
for stand-off attack with stealthy delivery systems such as the LRSO. A low-yield nuclear weapon that
could be delivered promptly against defended North Korean airspace also should be considered. Finally,
as discussed previously, US and allied missile defenses must help counter North Korean missile threats
and defend against missile attack if deterrence fails. Chinese expansion at the expense of US and allied
interests must be deterred. China’s assertiveness in declaring control of contested islands and a
widening swath of ocean has occurred in recent years alongside the expansion and modernization of its
nuclear force. While China remains the least transparent of the P-5 nuclear powers, its historical reliance
on a small fleet of silo-based ICBMs clearly has given way to a mix of silo-based and mobile ICBMs and
seabased SLBMs, as well as a possible role for a nuclear bomber. This shift will give China more nuclear
options, and more discriminate nuclear options to deter and coerce the United States and allies in its bid
for regional hegemony. China’s growing assertiveness, expanding nuclear posture, and uncertainties
about its future course may well create new nuclear requirements for the United States and the
corresponding need to determine whether, when, and how to deploy additional capabilities. The United
States must sustain capabilities with the requisite flexibility and resilience to deter China at many
possible levels of escalation, and limit damage should deterrence fail. The assurance of US allies in Asia
remains of vital importance. Assurance is based on allied confidence that the regional deterrence
strategies of the United States, Japan and South Korea are credible and supported by the necessary US
and allied capabilities. Formal extendeddeterrence dialogues begun by the United States in 2010 have
had a positive impact in this regard and should be continued. The United States should consider going
further to implement “NATOlike” nuclear consultation with Northeast Asian allies. The United States
also should continue to press Japan and South Korea for trilateral cooperation, which would likely have a
powerful effect signaling resolve against potential Chinese and DPRK aggression, and thus contribute to
deterrence.
Deterrence decreases the chances of conflict and war – studies prove.
Cohen 17 (Michael D., PoliSci@BritishColumbia, SeniorLecturerSecurityStudies@Macquarie, “How nuclear proliferation causes conflict:
the case for optimistic pessimism,” The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 23, Issue 3-4) BSPK
But there is a systematic effect of experience with nuclear weapons on the conflict propensity of states.
The Soviet Union stopped challenging the status quo in Berlin and Cuba after 1963. The number of fatalities from terrorist violence in Kashmir
in 2012 was almost that of 1989.83 Mao never again challenged Soviet forces after the 1969 Zhenbao conflict. Recent
quantitative
studies have also concluded that experience with nuclear weapons moderates the conflict propensity of
new nuclear powers. Most quantitative scholarship concludes that nuclear proliferation does not lead to
conventional conflict because quantitative tests showed no relationship between these variables.84 States
that develop nuclear weapons are highly conflict prone, so a high propensity for conflict likely causes nuclear-weapon development and further
conflict.85 But statistical research has ignored the role of experience with nuclear weapons. Temporally disaggregating the effect of nuclear
proliferation on state conflict uncovers a robust correlation between nuclear-weapon proliferation, experience, and international dispute
behavior.
University of Pennsylvania’s Michael Horowitz conducted
a statistical analysis and found that the probability of new
nuclear states reciprocating disputes quickly increases and then decreases over time.
The probability that a nuclear state will reciprocate a dispute with a non-nuclear state drops from .53 one year after developing nuclear
weapons to .23 in year 56. Two new nuclear powers are 67 percent more likely to reciprocate a dispute than two average non-nuclear states.
Two experienced nuclear powers are 65 percent less likely to reciprocate than two average non-nuclear
states. The probability of dispute reciprocation between an experienced and new nuclear power is 26 percent greater than two non-nuclear
states, and the probability of a very experienced state and a somewhat experienced state reciprocating is 42 percent less than two non-nuclear
states.86
University of California-San Diego’s Erik Gartzke conducted a similar statistical test when the dependent variable was dispute initiation rather
than reciprocation and found similarly robust results.87 Gartzke found that, while the overall effect of nuclear proliferation on conflict
propensity is neutral, there is variation in the effect of proliferation over time. Nuclear proliferation influences the timing, rather than the
occurrence, of disputes. While
new nuclear states are prone to initiate militarized disputes, over time they
moderate their policies and become as likely to initiate disputes as they were before nuclear
proliferation.88 These effects wash out in statistical tests that do not control for experience with nuclear weapons. In short, if Iran
and North Korea develop nuclear weapons and challenge their regional status quo, the historical record
suggests that they will not do so for long. Thus James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations recently
claimed that a nuclear Iran would be most dangerous “at first, when it would likely be at its most reckless.” But, “like other nuclear aspirants
before them, the guardians of the theocracy might discover that nuclear bombs are simply not good for diplomatic leverage or strategic
aggrandizement.” 89
Conclusion: proliferation pessimism, Iran, and North Korea
Three of the four mechanisms long alleged to make nuclear
proliferation cause interstate conflict find little to no
empirical support when the endogeneity, omitted-variable bias, and conceptual-confusion issues
addressed above are recognized and applied to the evidence. Preventive-war motivations,
nonsurvivable arsenals, and organizational logics that lead to accidents do not cause armed conflict. The
only mechanism that has systematically led to conflict is conventional aggression by weak revisionists after nuclear proliferation, but a few
years of experience with nuclear weapons moderates the conflict propensity of new nuclear states. By failing to specify how frequently we
should observe preventive motivations, their effect on nonsurvivable arsenals, or how organizational logics lead to conflict, accidents, and
nuclear war, proliferation pessimist claims are unfalsifiable. Pessimist scholars need to specify how much longer we should
observe them not leading to conflict before concluding that their threat has been greatly exaggerated.
The undesirability of nuclear use has prevented scholars from coming to terms with what a more careful and systematic reading of the
historical record suggests about the relationship between these mechanisms and conflict. Sagan has argued that proliferation fatalism and
deterrence optimism reduce incentives to combat proliferation.90 But these same dynamics have led scholars
to vastly exaggerate
the number of threats posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. If the greatest danger posed by nuclear proliferation is
conventional aggression in the short-term, scholars need to rediscover how deterrence can moderate the high conflict propensity of new
nuclear states.91 Arguments about the frequency of nuclear escalation, however, say nothing about its cost. Isn’t the possibility of nuclear
escalation on the Korean peninsula, for example, evidence against the arguments made throughout this paper? A few cases of accidental,
unintentional, or deliberate nuclear escalation could show that the mechanisms offered by pessimist scholars linking nuclear proliferation and
conflict survive the criticisms leveled at them here. A lower bar for the proliferation-pessimist theory to pass might be one case of nuclear
escalation. But after
addressed here.
seventy years, nuclear weapons have not once led to conflict through the mechanisms
This is not the place for a lengthier treatment of how the United States and its allies should deal with the challenges posed by a North Korean
(or possible Iranian) nuclear bomb. But the historical record suggests that Israeli, South Korean, and others’ preventive motivations to strike will
not lead to military action, and that any strike would likely not escalate to conflict unless the United States or its allies decide to topple the
regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang. The nonsurvivability of an Iranian or North Korean arsenal will not tempt others to strike. The arguments
made here have contrasting findings for preventive-strike considerations. On the one hand, strikes are less costly than many believe because
they rarely cause escalation. On the other hand, strikes are less necessary than many believe because the costs of nuclear proliferation are
much lower than usually assumed. Nuclear accidents may occur, but these will likely only cause conventional or nuclear escalation if Tehran or
Pyongyang have already attempted to revise their status quo. The historical record also suggests that a few years of experience with the bomb
will teach Tehran and Pyongyang the limits of nuclear coercion and that any conflict will stop short of nuclear escalation.
Future research should further refine proliferation pessimism and integrate it with optimist perspectives through addressing what causes new
nuclear states to moderate their aggression and what policies by the United States and its allies might cause this. An optimistic pessimism
toward the spread of nuclear weapons can better come to terms with how and when they lead to interstate conflict and form the basis for
better policies to reduce the dangers.
US nuclear arsenal effectively deters war – solves extinction.
A robust US nuclear arsenal is crucial to the effectiveness of deterrence – that
solves extinction.
Heinrichs 19 (Rebeccah, MA National Security, senior fellow at Hudson Institute, and adjunct professor at Institute of World Politics,
8-15-2019, "A More Logical Approach to Nuclear Weapons: Review of Kroenig’s The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy," Providence,
https://providencemag.com/2019/08/more-logical-approach-nuclear-weapons-book-review-matthew-kroenig-logic-of-american-nuclearstrategy/)
BSPK
Dr. Matthew Kroenig’s book The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy provides an immensely important and forceful rebuttal to those nuclear
scholars who have gained influence among average American citizens as well as within the walls of the Pentagon where nuclear strategy is
conceived and carried out. In doing so, if I may note, the central theme in Logic also exposes the vacuity of the moral “arguments” mainline
Christian “thought leaders” have pushed in the name of US disarmament advocacy. Kroenig boldly grapples with this disconnect between
theorists and practitioners, and he effectively argues the following thesis: in
crisis situations where countries find themselves
in irreconcilable conflicts, the country with the superior nuclear arsenal will possess greater resolve, and
as a result it will win in a contest of wills, securing that superior nuclear power’s primary objective. He
points to historical examples when nuclear powers did escalate nuclear threats in an attempt to secure a military objective, and in each
example the country with numerical nuclear superiority won. Most readers will find one example Kroenig provides quite
familiar: the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. At the time, the United States possessed nuclear superiority with roughly 25,540 nuclear warheads,
while the USSR possessed roughly 3,346. Additionally, the US had far more delivery systems in positions that could reach the Soviet homeland.
The Soviets sought to correct this imbalance by placing medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, which could reach anywhere
in the United States. President Kennedy’s goal was to compel Premier Nikita Khrushchev to withdraw his missiles from Cuba, prompting the 13-
day standoff. In
the end, by escalating the crisis with an embargo, President Kennedy compelled the Soviets
to withdraw the missiles, bringing the crisis to a favorable end for the United States. Kroenig ably provides
ample evidence that the US nuclear superiority at the time was a driving consideration for both nations. He
writes: For example, during the Crisis, General Maxwell Taylor, who by then had replaced Lemnitzer as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
wrote in a memo to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, “we have the strategic advantage in our general war capabilities…this is no time to
run scared.” Similarly, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said to the members of the EXCOMM [Executive Committee of the National Security
Council], including President Kennedy, “One thing Mr. Khrushchev may have in mind is that…he knows that we have a substantial nuclear
superiority…he also knows that we don’t really live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent…that he has to live under ours.” […]
According to C. Douglas Dillon, a cabinet adviser to President Kennedy during the Crisis, the answer is straight forward: “Our nuclear
preponderance was essential. That’s what made the Russians back off.” Kroenig also effectively dismantles the persistent myth that “nobody
wins a nuclear war.” Certainly, responsible nations should do everything within their power to deter the most catastrophic kinds of war,
especially those that could involve weapons of mass destruction. Anticipating his critics’ complaints, Kroenig repeats this clarification
throughout the book. (No reader should come away from the book believing Kroenig is arguing in favor of fighting nuclear wars. But no doubt,
some will.) But it simply isn’t true that wars that involve such terrible weapons are unwinnable. As Kroenig bluntly writes, “While even a single
nuclear weapon detonated in the United States would be a tragedy of historic proportions, it is also the case that twenty nuclear detonations
would be far worse.” This borrows from the Cold War nuclear strategist Herman Khan, who powerfully argues that even when one thinks of the
potential costs of a nuclear war, 10 million dead is awful, but one can distinguish it from 100 million dead and even prefer it. Kroenig is right.
Simply putting the idea of winning nuclear wars out of a nuclear strategist’s mind, when he or she is tasked with devising strategies for
America’s nuclear force, is a dereliction of duty. Taking Kroenig’s logic (and Khan’s), one
can draw another important
conclusion: preparing to fight and win a nuclear war—especially with nations that show a propensity to
lower the nuclear threshold for when they might consider a first strike (think Russia)—bolsters the US
nuclear deterrent’s credibility and therefore its effectiveness in deterring war in the first place. The
more effective the US deterrent is, the less likely the US ever has to employ nuclear weapons at all. These
issues are often not intuitive to most Americans—even those who are well-informed and morally concerned. Busy American Christians often
look to the heads of their churches for a quick take on the issues of the day. Public opinion can shift when leaders in the mainline churches,
including the Catholic Church, adopt the views of many prominent nuclear weapons scholars who favor disarmament to the lowest possible
number of nuclear weapons “necessary for deterrence.” Well-intentioned Americans can unfortunately misunderstand that their views actually
increase the chances of a failure in deterrence, and those views can be manifested in polices of elected government officials. To illustrate this
danger, President Obama’s view, although in line with many scholars, offered a significant departure from the assumptions that had
underpinned US nuclear strategies, regardless of the governing political party. In 2009 President Obama called for a renewed commitment to
seek a world without nuclear weapons and then began a plan to do just that. For example, he committed to pursuing the ratification of a global
ban on nuclear testing. (President George H.W. Bush placed a unilateral ban on US nuclear testing, and every subsequent president has
maintained it.) He negotiated the New START Treaty with the Russians, which capped the number of both nations’ deployed strategic nuclear
weapons. This agreement had the effect of cutting US numbers while Russia was already below the threshold; Russia has, in fact, built up its
deployed strategic weapons. The Obama nuclear policy document, the Nuclear Posture Review, explicitly stated the intent to reduce the role of
nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. And, even when faced with evolving nuclear threat challenges, the administration chose not
to pvolvingdditional nuclear capabilities. To the Obama administration’s credit, it backed off on furthering its disarmament agenda after Russia
invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea. Furthermore, Republicans in the Senate refused to ratify the New START Treaty until the president
assured them that he would cooperate on nuclear modernization of the remaining force, which he did. Even President Obama, so ideologically
committed to leading the world down the path to zero nuclear weapons, was persuaded that the existing threats required the United States to
maintain a nuclear force of thousands of nuclear weapons, and that it had to seriously consider upgraded capabilities in the event it really had
to use them in a nuclear conflict with peer competitors. The Trump administration’s approach to nuclear deterrence is much more in line with
the thesis of Kroenig’s book, which is good news for Americans. Although, there is much work to be done to bolster the US nuclear posture to
provide an overwhelmingly obvious nuclear advantage against the Russians, as they seem to believe they have an advantage via tactical nuclear
weapons. Upon reading Logic, one note of caution is that no nuclear strategist should take too much comfort in America’s previous and
seemingly current nuclear superiority. Many factors are built into any national leader’s calculus about his or her country’s interests and what it
is willing to risk in their pursuit, including the degree to which it participates in nuclear brinksmanship. A far inferior nuclear power like North
Korea, for example, could quite possibly be willing to escalate a conflict in the pursuit of objectives it deems important, counting on the more
humane and responsible American public to resist responding. Then the North may foolishly provoke a nuclear exchange with the United States
that results in millions of lives lost. But, underscoring the central theme of Logic, even if deterrence breaks down in this horribly regrettable
scenario, North Korea stands zero chance of winning a nuclear exchange with the United States. Anyone
who desires the United
States to succeed in its international pursuits and reads Kroenig’s book should conclude that the US must
maintain a robust nuclear arsenal that is superior to those of all other nations. The downsides of doing
so simply pale in comparison to the great upsides, the greatest one being the very survival of the United
States of America.
Conventional forces are insufficient with the combination of nuclear weapons.
Chilton 18 (Kevin P., MSc mechanical engineering @ Columbia and former commander of US Strategic Command – responsible for
operations of all US forces concerning deterrence and DoD space/cyber operations, Spring 2018 Volume, "Defending the Record on US Nuclear
Deterrence" Air University Press, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26333874) BSPK
Another argument presented to reduce or eliminate the US nuclear deterrent is the notion that our
conventional overmatch in quality and size is adequate for the deterrence mission. What was in essence a
promise for the future, the Reagan buildup of the mid-1980s is instructive. The United States was to have a 600-ship Navy; today we sail 275.
The Air Force was to grow to 40 combat air wings; we have fewer than 20 today. And the Army planned for 18 armored divisions but never
achieved that level. Some might argue if given the Reagan build-up level of forces (which is far greater than what we have in our armed forces
today), no one would dare challenge us. But, let’s
assume for a moment each service had the planned Reagan force
levels. In addition, let’s assume there is no sequestration and the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines have all of the necessary operations,
training, and maintenance funds to field a 100 percent trained and ready force. Then, in this unimaginably powerful
conventional force scenario let’s take away all US nuclear weapons and give Venezuelan Pres. Nicolas
Maduro 30 nuclear weapons with 30 missiles that can range 30 different cities in the United States.
Now, who defers to whom in the Western Hemisphere? When economics, trade, or diplomacy are
discussed, who has more influence? Who has the greater ability to deter or, worse yet, coerce? This hypothetical
scenario highlights the reality that every dollar spent on a conventional force without the underpinnings of a
credible nuclear deterrent is wasted. There is simply no conventional weapon equivalency to the power
and deterrent effects of nuclear weapons. The checkered history of conventional deterrence among “great powers” over the
centuries in contrast to the absence of great power war since 1945 may be a coincidence, but it has important implications. The record since
then presents historical evidence that nuclear weapons
should the US spend its first dollar on defense? On the triad.
contribute uniquely to the deterrence calculus. So where
Indian and Pakistani nukes effectively deter rapid escalation.
Trenin 19 (Dmitri, PhD @ Russian Academy of Sciences and director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, 3-21-2019, "Strategic Stability in the
Changing World," Carnegie Moscow Center, https://carnegie.ru/2019/03/21/strategic-stability-in-changing-world-pub-78650) BSPK
Reliable communication lines between the major powers can prevent armed conflicts or stop their
escalation. But there are no technological guarantees that can completely rule out the use of force by
rational actors in such cases. And it’s impossible to prevent political conflicts that may lead to armed clashes without a system of
inclusive security communities, which is unlikely to be created in the foreseeable future. Hope hinges, then, on the very
possibility that knowing a local conflict could escalate into a regional war will restrain geopolitical
adversaries from becoming enemies in combat. This dynamic is already on display between Russia and
NATO. It’s hard to imagine a nuclear-armed state attacking any member of an alliance headed by another nuclear power. It’s equally hard to
imagine a large-scale NATO attack on nuclear-armed Russia. Neither actor can be completely confident that it could enjoy a conventional
military advantage, local or general, without the risk of incurring a nuclear counterstrike. Therefore,
nuclear deterrence between
Russia and the United States fully extends to Washington’s allies in NATO. In some ways, the situation
between China and the United States and its allies is similar to Russia’s relationship with NATO. China
attacking Japan is as improbable as U.S. aggression against China. At the same time, a number of developments in the Asia Pacific lack such
obvious clarity, such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea or the possibility of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. nuclear umbrella
doesn’t extend that far, and the risk of escalation is fully present in both situations. Channels
of communication between the
U.S. and Chinese military headquarters, as well as appropriate political contacts between Beijing and Washington, are
necessary to prevent escalation. Relations between China and India already include an element of
nuclear deterrence. This doesn’t eliminate the possibility of military conflict between Beijing and New Delhi, but it deters both
sides from the use of nuclear weapons and, by extension, reduces the likelihood of a large-scale war.
Since they acquired nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan have learned how to coexist under conditions
of nuclear deterrence. The relationship between New Delhi and Islamabad is far from stable, but India and Pakistan haven’t
gone to war since 1999. The most recent serious military incident between the two countries, in
February 2019, was swiftly de-escalated. Functioning communication channels between top military commanders and a toplevel political dialogue may further strengthen regional stability in South Asia.
A robust US nuclear arsenal is crucial to the effectiveness of deterrence – that
solves extinction.
Heinrichs 19 (Rebeccah, MA National Security, senior fellow at Hudson Institute, and adjunct professor at Institute of World Politics,
8-15-2019, "A More Logical Approach to Nuclear Weapons: Review of Kroenig’s The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy," Providence,
https://providencemag.com/2019/08/more-logical-approach-nuclear-weapons-book-review-matthew-kroenig-logic-of-american-nuclearstrategy/)
BSPK
Dr. Matthew Kroenig’s book The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy provides an immensely important and forceful rebuttal to those nuclear
scholars who have gained influence among average American citizens as well as within the walls of the Pentagon where nuclear strategy is
conceived and carried out. In doing so, if I may note, the central theme in Logic also exposes the vacuity of the moral “arguments” mainline
Christian “thought leaders” have pushed in the name of US disarmament advocacy. Kroenig boldly grapples with this disconnect between
theorists and practitioners, and he effectively argues the following thesis: in
crisis situations where countries find themselves
in irreconcilable conflicts, the country with the superior nuclear arsenal will possess greater resolve, and
as a result it will win in a contest of wills, securing that superior nuclear power’s primary objective. He
points to historical examples when nuclear powers did escalate nuclear threats in an attempt to secure a military objective, and in each
example the country with numerical nuclear superiority won. Most readers will find one example Kroenig provides quite
familiar: the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. At the time, the United States possessed nuclear superiority with roughly 25,540 nuclear warheads,
while the USSR possessed roughly 3,346. Additionally, the US had far more delivery systems in positions that could reach the Soviet homeland.
The Soviets sought to correct this imbalance by placing medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, which could reach anywhere
in the United States. President Kennedy’s goal was to compel Premier Nikita Khrushchev to withdraw his missiles from Cuba, prompting the 13day standoff. In
the end, by escalating the crisis with an embargo, President Kennedy compelled the Soviets
to withdraw the missiles, bringing the crisis to a favorable end for the United States. Kroenig ably provides
ample evidence that the US nuclear superiority at the time was a driving consideration for both nations. He
writes: For example, during the Crisis, General Maxwell Taylor, who by then had replaced Lemnitzer as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
wrote in a memo to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, “we have the strategic advantage in our general war capabilities…this is no time to
run scared.” Similarly, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said to the members of the EXCOMM [Executive Committee of the National Security
Council], including President Kennedy, “One thing Mr. Khrushchev may have in mind is that…he knows that we have a substantial nuclear
superiority…he also knows that we don’t really live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent…that he has to live under ours.” […]
According to C. Douglas Dillon, a cabinet adviser to President Kennedy during the Crisis, the answer is straight forward: “Our nuclear
preponderance was essential. That’s what made the Russians back off.” Kroenig also effectively dismantles the persistent myth that “nobody
wins a nuclear war.” Certainly, responsible nations should do everything within their power to deter the most catastrophic kinds of war,
especially those that could involve weapons of mass destruction. Anticipating his critics’ complaints, Kroenig repeats this clarification
throughout the book. (No reader should come away from the book believing Kroenig is arguing in favor of fighting nuclear wars. But no doubt,
some will.) But it simply isn’t true that wars that involve such terrible weapons are unwinnable. As Kroenig bluntly writes, “While even a single
nuclear weapon detonated in the United States would be a tragedy of historic proportions, it is also the case that twenty nuclear detonations
would be far worse.” This borrows from the Cold War nuclear strategist Herman Khan, who powerfully argues that even when one thinks of the
potential costs of a nuclear war, 10 million dead is awful, but one can distinguish it from 100 million dead and even prefer it. Kroenig is right.
Simply putting the idea of winning nuclear wars out of a nuclear strategist’s mind, when he or she is tasked with devising strategies for
America’s nuclear force, is a dereliction of duty. Taking Kroenig’s logic (and Khan’s), one
can draw another important
conclusion: preparing to fight and win a nuclear war—especially with nations that show a propensity to
lower the nuclear threshold for when they might consider a first strike (think Russia)—bolsters the US
nuclear deterrent’s credibility and therefore its effectiveness in deterring war in the first place. The
more effective the US deterrent is, the less likely the US ever has to employ nuclear weapons at all. These
issues are often not intuitive to most Americans—even those who are well-informed and morally concerned. Busy American Christians often
look to the heads of their churches for a quick take on the issues of the day. Public opinion can shift when leaders in the mainline churches,
including the Catholic Church, adopt the views of many prominent nuclear weapons scholars who favor disarmament to the lowest possible
number of nuclear weapons “necessary for deterrence.” Well-intentioned Americans can unfortunately misunderstand that their views actually
increase the chances of a failure in deterrence, and those views can be manifested in polices of elected government officials. To illustrate this
danger, President Obama’s view, although in line with many scholars, offered a significant departure from the assumptions that had
underpinned US nuclear strategies, regardless of the governing political party. In 2009 President Obama called for a renewed commitment to
seek a world without nuclear weapons and then began a plan to do just that. For example, he committed to pursuing the ratification of a global
ban on nuclear testing. (President George H.W. Bush placed a unilateral ban on US nuclear testing, and every subsequent president has
maintained it.) He negotiated the New START Treaty with the Russians, which capped the number of both nations’ deployed strategic nuclear
weapons. This agreement had the effect of cutting US numbers while Russia was already below the threshold; Russia has, in fact, built up its
deployed strategic weapons. The Obama nuclear policy document, the Nuclear Posture Review, explicitly stated the intent to reduce the role of
nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. And, even when faced with evolving nuclear threat challenges, the administration chose not
to pvolvingdditional nuclear capabilities. To the Obama administration’s credit, it backed off on furthering its disarmament agenda after Russia
invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea. Furthermore, Republicans in the Senate refused to ratify the New START Treaty until the president
assured them that he would cooperate on nuclear modernization of the remaining force, which he did. Even President Obama, so ideologically
committed to leading the world down the path to zero nuclear weapons, was persuaded that the existing threats required the United States to
maintain a nuclear force of thousands of nuclear weapons, and that it had to seriously consider upgraded capabilities in the event it really had
to use them in a nuclear conflict with peer competitors. The Trump administration’s approach to nuclear deterrence is much more in line with
the thesis of Kroenig’s book, which is good news for Americans. Although, there is much work to be done to bolster the US nuclear posture to
provide an overwhelmingly obvious nuclear advantage against the Russians, as they seem to believe they have an advantage via tactical nuclear
weapons. Upon reading Logic, one note of caution is that no nuclear strategist should take too much comfort in America’s previous and
seemingly current nuclear superiority. Many factors are built into any national leader’s calculus about his or her country’s interests and what it
is willing to risk in their pursuit, including the degree to which it participates in nuclear brinksmanship. A far inferior nuclear power like North
Korea, for example, could quite possibly be willing to escalate a conflict in the pursuit of objectives it deems important, counting on the more
humane and responsible American public to resist responding. Then the North may foolishly provoke a nuclear exchange with the United States
that results in millions of lives lost. But, underscoring the central theme of Logic, even if deterrence breaks down in this horribly regrettable
scenario, North Korea stands zero chance of winning a nuclear exchange with the United States. Anyone
who desires the United
States to succeed in its international pursuits and reads Kroenig’s book should conclude that the US must
maintain a robust nuclear arsenal that is superior to those of all other nations. The downsides of doing
so simply pale in comparison to the great upsides, the greatest one being the very survival of the United
States of America.
Nuclear deterrence in Indopak has eliminated war.
Hagerty 20 (Devin T., PhD Polisci @ UPenn and Prof. Polisci @ UMaryland, "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability in South Asia,"
Springer, https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-21398-5) BSPK
Overall, after nearly 20 years of an overtly nuclear South Asia, there was a broad consensus that Indian
and Pakistani nuclear weapons have deterred major war between New Delhi and Islamabad. Stephen Cohen
calls this the “reality of [nuclear] deterrence” on the Subcontinent. Ashley Tellis writes: “Pakistan’s construction
of a large, diversified, and ever-expanding nuclear arsenal … serves to prevent any significant Indian D. T.
HAGERTY 51 retaliation against Pakistan’s persistent low-intensity war for fear of sparking a nuclear
holocaust.” This represents an “insidious kind of ‘ugly stability’ over the past few decades.” After the 2008 Mumbai episode, Kenneth Waltz
wrote: “Both countries know that a serious conventional conflict risks a resort to nuclear weapons. Given
that neither India nor Pakistan can know whether its opponent will resort to nuclear use, either
inadvertently or on purpose, both are disincentivized from beginning a conventional conflict at all as the
anticipated result is simply disastrous.” Also after Mumbai, Krepon wrote: “Nuclear weapons have played a
significant part in previous crises on the subcontinent. As deterrence optimists argue, nuclear weapons
may well have reinforced caution and helped to forestall escalation across the nuclear threshold.” For
Narang, the Kargil, Twin Peaks, and Mumbai episodes “reveal that Pakistan’s asymmetric escalation posture means that major conventional
war—even in retaliation—is no longer a viable option for India … Pakistan’s … posture inhibited Indian leaders from executing militarily
effective retaliatory options that might have otherwise been on the list of choices for fear of triggering Pakistani nuclear use.” In George
Perkovich’s view, expressed just after the Uri attack, “mutual nuclear deterrence has made leaders on both sides conclude that major warfare
between the two states would be suicidal.” But, the Pakistan-generated “low-intensity conflict can escalate,” leading to what he calls an
“unstable equilibrium.” The bottom line, however, is that: “The leaders of India and Pakistan understand that they have more to lose than to
gain by military conflict. They both have interests in avoiding escalation, in part due to the shadow of potential nuclear war if escalation did
occur.” Perkovich and Toby Dalton write: “Reviewing
the record of conflicts and crises in South Asia since 1990
through a prism of escalation dominance indicates that the threat of any conflict becoming nuclear has
had a dampening effect on Indian strategy and decisionmaking … The possibility of escalation drove
India to limit the geographic scope of its airstrikes during the 1999 Kargil crisis. It was also a major
element of the decision calculus that led India to mobilize forces but not cross the border during the
2001–2002 crisis, and to limit responses to economic and diplomatic means following the attacks in
Mumbai in 2008.” Rajesh Rajagopalan observes that the “fear of nuclear escalation prevented India from responding to terror attacks on
… the Indian Parliament [2001], on Indian military establishments, and on Mumbai, as well as many other less serious attacks.”
US nuclear arsenal effectively deters war – solves extinction.
Heinrichs 19 (Rebeccah, MA National Security, senior fellow at Hudson Institute, and adjunct professor at Institute of World Politics,
8-15-2019, "A More Logical Approach to Nuclear Weapons: Review of Kroenig’s The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy," Providence,
https://providencemag.com/2019/08/more-logical-approach-nuclear-weapons-book-review-matthew-kroenig-logic-of-american-nuclearstrategy/)
BSPK
Dr. Matthew Kroenig’s book The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy provides an immensely important and forceful rebuttal to those nuclear
scholars who have gained influence among average American citizens as well as within the walls of the Pentagon where nuclear strategy is
conceived and carried out. In doing so, if I may note, the central theme in Logic also exposes the vacuity of the moral “arguments” mainline
Christian “thought leaders” have pushed in the name of US disarmament advocacy. Kroenig boldly grapples with this disconnect between
theorists and practitioners, and he effectively argues the following thesis: in
crisis situations where countries find themselves
in irreconcilable conflicts, the country with the superior nuclear arsenal will possess greater resolve, and
as a result it will win in a contest of wills, securing that superior nuclear power’s primary objective. He
points to historical examples when nuclear powers did escalate nuclear threats in an attempt to secure a military objective, and in each
example the country with numerical nuclear superiority won. Most readers will find one example Kroenig provides quite
familiar: the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. At the time, the United States possessed nuclear superiority with roughly 25,540 nuclear warheads,
while the USSR possessed roughly 3,346. Additionally, the US had far more delivery systems in positions that could reach the Soviet homeland.
The Soviets sought to correct this imbalance by placing medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, which could reach anywhere
in the United States. President Kennedy’s goal was to compel Premier Nikita Khrushchev to withdraw his missiles from Cuba, prompting the 13day standoff. In
the end, by escalating the crisis with an embargo, President Kennedy compelled the Soviets
to withdraw the missiles, bringing the crisis to a favorable end for the United States. Kroenig ably provides
ample evidence that the US nuclear superiority at the time was a driving consideration for both nations. He
writes: For example, during the Crisis, General Maxwell Taylor, who by then had replaced Lemnitzer as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
wrote in a memo to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, “we have the strategic advantage in our general war capabilities…this is no time to
run scared.” Similarly, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said to the members of the EXCOMM [Executive Committee of the National Security
Council], including President Kennedy, “One thing Mr. Khrushchev may have in mind is that…he knows that we have a substantial nuclear
superiority…he also knows that we don’t really live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent…that he has to live under ours.” […]
According to C. Douglas Dillon, a cabinet adviser to President Kennedy during the Crisis, the answer is straight forward: “Our nuclear
preponderance was essential. That’s what made the Russians back off.” Kroenig also effectively dismantles the persistent myth that “nobody
wins a nuclear war.” Certainly, responsible nations should do everything within their power to deter the most catastrophic kinds of war,
especially those that could involve weapons of mass destruction. Anticipating his critics’ complaints, Kroenig repeats this clarification
throughout the book. (No reader should come away from the book believing Kroenig is arguing in favor of fighting nuclear wars. But no doubt,
some will.) But it simply isn’t true that wars that involve such terrible weapons are unwinnable. As Kroenig bluntly writes, “While even a single
nuclear weapon detonated in the United States would be a tragedy of historic proportions, it is also the case that twenty nuclear detonations
would be far worse.” This borrows from the Cold War nuclear strategist Herman Khan, who powerfully argues that even when one thinks of the
potential costs of a nuclear war, 10 million dead is awful, but one can distinguish it from 100 million dead and even prefer it. Kroenig is right.
Simply putting the idea of winning nuclear wars out of a nuclear strategist’s mind, when he or she is tasked with devising strategies for
America’s nuclear force, is a dereliction of duty. Taking Kroenig’s logic (and Khan’s), one
can draw another important
conclusion: preparing to fight and win a nuclear war—especially with nations that show a propensity to
lower the nuclear threshold for when they might consider a first strike (think Russia)—bolsters the US
nuclear deterrent’s credibility and therefore its effectiveness in deterring war in the first place. The
more effective the US deterrent is, the less likely the US ever has to employ nuclear weapons at all. These
issues are often not intuitive to most Americans—even those who are well-informed and morally concerned. Busy American Christians often
look to the heads of their churches for a quick take on the issues of the day. Public opinion can shift when leaders in the mainline churches,
including the Catholic Church, adopt the views of many prominent nuclear weapons scholars who favor disarmament to the lowest possible
number of nuclear weapons “necessary for deterrence.” Well-intentioned Americans can unfortunately misunderstand that their views actually
increase the chances of a failure in deterrence, and those views can be manifested in polices of elected government officials. To illustrate this
danger, President Obama’s view, although in line with many scholars, offered a significant departure from the assumptions that had
underpinned US nuclear strategies, regardless of the governing political party. In 2009 President Obama called for a renewed commitment to
seek a world without nuclear weapons and then began a plan to do just that. For example, he committed to pursuing the ratification of a global
ban on nuclear testing. (President George H.W. Bush placed a unilateral ban on US nuclear testing, and every subsequent president has
maintained it.) He negotiated the New START Treaty with the Russians, which capped the number of both nations’ deployed strategic nuclear
weapons. This agreement had the effect of cutting US numbers while Russia was already below the threshold; Russia has, in fact, built up its
deployed strategic weapons. The Obama nuclear policy document, the Nuclear Posture Review, explicitly stated the intent to reduce the role of
nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. And, even when faced with evolving nuclear threat challenges, the administration chose not
to pvolvingdditional nuclear capabilities. To the Obama administration’s credit, it backed off on furthering its disarmament agenda after Russia
invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea. Furthermore, Republicans in the Senate refused to ratify the New START Treaty until the president
assured them that he would cooperate on nuclear modernization of the remaining force, which he did. Even President Obama, so ideologically
committed to leading the world down the path to zero nuclear weapons, was persuaded that the existing threats required the United States to
maintain a nuclear force of thousands of nuclear weapons, and that it had to seriously consider upgraded capabilities in the event it really had
to use them in a nuclear conflict with peer competitors. The Trump administration’s approach to nuclear deterrence is much more in line with
the thesis of Kroenig’s book, which is good news for Americans. Although, there is much work to be done to bolster the US nuclear posture to
provide an overwhelmingly obvious nuclear advantage against the Russians, as they seem to believe they have an advantage via tactical nuclear
weapons. Upon reading Logic, one note of caution is that no nuclear strategist should take too much comfort in America’s previous and
seemingly current nuclear superiority. Many factors are built into any national leader’s calculus about his or her country’s interests and what it
is willing to risk in their pursuit, including the degree to which it participates in nuclear brinksmanship. A far inferior nuclear power like North
Korea, for example, could quite possibly be willing to escalate a conflict in the pursuit of objectives it deems important, counting on the more
humane and responsible American public to resist responding. Then the North may foolishly provoke a nuclear exchange with the United States
that results in millions of lives lost. But, underscoring the central theme of Logic, even if deterrence breaks down in this horribly regrettable
scenario, North Korea stands zero chance of winning a nuclear exchange with the United States. Anyone
who desires the United
States to succeed in its international pursuits and reads Kroenig’s book should conclude that the US must
maintain a robust nuclear arsenal that is superior to those of all other nations. The downsides of doing
so simply pale in comparison to the great upsides, the greatest one being the very survival of the United
States of America.
2nr – Amitoj
Deterrence DA works on two ways:
1. It proves the affirmatives impacts don’t happen. Empirical examples such as the
Kargil Crisis prove. The only reason Kargil conflict didn’t escalate was solely due
to nuclear arsenalds serving a deterrent effect.
2. Proves that the negative impact of conventional war does happen - Outweighs on
a. Magnitude it affects the whole region of india and pakistan and draws in
allies which wreaks havoc and kills hundreds of millions of people.
b. Scope and cyclicality: Affect millions of people – wars continuously happen
c. Probability – Past conventional wars would have happened. Nuclear
Arsenals are uniquely key.
XT Sasikumar 18: The only reason India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons is to
maintain a deterrent effect serving as a check against each other. This ensures that
conflicts never escalate and things like great power wars between China, India, and
Pakistan never happen.
XT Ahmed 16: Pakistan’s TNWs are a prime example of how nuclear arsenals serve as a
deterrent effect. Without this weapon, conventional war is an extremely likely event
which results in the mass death of millions of innocent civilians. Prefer our ev on
timeframe and probability. We have had nukes for 75 years and no nuclear war has
happened. Conventional war has happened many times but hasn’t escalated due to
nukes. The affirmative changes that and creates a situation of millions of innocent
civilians to be killed.
AT: Conventional Small/No Escalate
Deterrence solves conventional great power war --- extinction --- try or die for prolif
Tripathi ’15 – Ph.D. Scholar, Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi
(Maneesha, “Nuclear Deterrence: More Nukes for Stable Peace?” Journal for Studies in Management
and Planning, Vol 1, Issue 3,
https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/45338154/Nuclear_Deterence_More_Nukes_for
__Stable_Peace_PDF.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1527110151&Signature
=vDOxtVRDyeXifcy%2BfBtxhlGrLm4%3D&response-contentdisposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DJournal_for_Studies_in_Management_and_Pl.pdf)
Deterrence has been considered a major impediment to the achievement nuclear disarmament. The
desire to eliminate such weapons forever is understandable, given their incredible destructive power;
most plausible uses of nuclear weapons would in fact be inhumane and illegitimate. But it is war itself
that is most inhumane, and war targeting civilians through whatever means is the fundamental moral
blight we should be trying to eliminate.13
Realists argue nuclear weapons cannot be dis invented so we have no choice but learn to live with
them.14 This argument cannot be negated. Moreover disarmament cannot eliminate the potential for
destruction. Shelling (1962) argues “the most primitive war can be modernized by rearmament as it
goes along. Nations now suspect each other of contemplating war; we have to suppose that they might
suspect each other of contemplating rearmament. If nations are willing to risk war, or to threaten it,
they certainly might risk rearming or threatening to rearm. Nations thought capable now of being
panicked into war might be panicked into rearmament.”15
The past 65 years demonstrate Great War is preventable. But its prevention begins precisely with this
recognition that war is always possible, that it is always “thinkable.” War in a conventional world was
and would be a matter of calculations of foreseeable risks and perceptible gains and losses. This is
because there would always be situations in which a state could see the serious possibility of gaining
more through war than it would lose, often justifiably. While catastrophic wars would always be possible
and thus serve as deterrents, situations would continually arise in which decision makers could assess
that their expected benefits would outweigh the possibility of such disaster. These assessments would
often be reasonable or at least defensible. States from the beginning can take actions to make war
unlikely. Even with their bellicose instincts and incentives, men, especially those who rise to positions of
authority, are rarely madmen. Humans value survival and the preservation of what they have and love.
Threatening these things can serve to turn an adversary away from war. This a combination of the
exploitation of fear and interest on the one hand and the redirection of warlike instincts toward other
endeavors can combine to lessen substantially the probability of war. These are the fundamental
principles of deterrence. 16
A world without nuclear weapons would be indeed great, but is idealist at the same time. The
international system is essentially anarchic due to lack of a supranational authority that can apply the
international laws on sovereign states. Till the situation is such possibility of war cannot be eliminated. If
war is a probability, devastation caused by nuclear weapons plays an effective deterrent. The knowledge
of nuclear weapons cannot be unlearned. Nations need to exercise their role as nuclear power with
responsibility. Deterrence is thus, a potent tool of modern diplomacy.
Conventional war escalates fast and ensures massive lethality
Peniston ‘16
Bradley Peniston is deputy editor of Defense One, citing Lt. Gen Joseph Anderson, Maj. Gen. William Hix.
October 4. “Army Warns that Future War with Russia or China Would Be ‘Extremely Lethal and Fast’”
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2016/10/future-army/132105/
To envision the wars of the future, first remember those of the distant past, with their soul-numbing
artillery barrages and unstinting waves of conventional enemy forces. Then speed up that mental
newsreel and imagine a ground war accelerated by artificial intelligence and precision munitions, nested
in a larger strategic sphere where everything is moving at Internet velocity.
That’s the picture that Army leaders are working from as they try to prepare their force to deter and
defeat America’s enemies over the next few decades.
The nation faces existential threats from “modern nation-states acting aggressively in militarized
competition,” said Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, Army deputy chief of staff for operations, plans, and
training. “Who does that sound like? Russia?” He spoke on a future-of-the-Army panel at the annual
meeting of the Association of the U.S. Army in Washington on Tuesday.
China is a growing threat as well, if not one that can project force globally yet. Together, these two
powers are mustering conventionally massive militaries that are increasingly technological — and
forcing the Pentagon to contemplate and prepare for “violence on the scale that the U.S. Army has not
seen since Korea,” said Maj. Gen. William Hix, Anderson’s deputy. “A conventional conflict in the near
future will be extremely lethal and fast. And we will not own the stopwatch.”
By that, Hix meant that wars will start with minimal notice, and grind through forces more quickly than
has been the case in the recent counterterrorism operations. So the Army has to find ways to keep
readiness high, and to learn how to replenish them more quickly.
Interface design will play a key role in that, said Katharina McFarland, acting assistant Army secretary for
acquisition, logistics, and technology.
“You travel all over the world, don’t you?” McFarland asked the gathered audience of soldiers, Army
civilians, and industry reps. “You can pretty much get in a car anywhere and drive it.”
The Army’s future weapons and vehicles need those kinds of intuitive, familiar controls. In the heat of
future war, a soldier must be able to quickly learn to fly, say, three different variants of helicopters. Or
move easily from a tank’s gunnery controls to an artillery console.
“How do I get TRADOC to decrease cycle time?” she said. “As an engineer, I think in terms of a simple
interface — no matter what helicopter, you can get in and operate it.”
Even more revolutionary will be the impact of artificial intelligence and autonomic systems on the
battlefield. “The speed of events are likely to strain our human abilities,” Hix said. “The speed at which
machines can make decisions in the far future is likely to challenge our ability to cope, demanding a new
relationship between man and machine.”
All this, he said, will make the coming decades fundamentally different from the past 25 years.
Only our offense --- nuclear use will only happen from escalating conventional war –
credible deterrence checks
Colby ’16 – fellow at the Center for a New American Security and co-editor of the book Strategic
Stability: Contending Interpretation(Elbridge, August 4, “Nuclear Weapons Aren’t Just For the Worst
Case Scenario” http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/04/nuclear-weapons-arent-just-worst-case-scenariofirst-use-china-obama-trump/)
Nuclear weapons are horrible instruments of destruction, but they are also associated with the longest
period of major-power peace in human history. And they only work because potentially ambitious states
believe their use is plausible enough that starting a war or escalating one against a nuclear-armed state
or its allies would just be too risky to countenance. The point of reserving the right to use nuclear
weapons first (which, it must be emphasized, is different from a policy of preemption or heavy reliance
on them) is not to convey a madman’s itchy trigger finger on the button. Rather, its purpose is to
communicate clearly to any potential aggressor that attacking one’s vital interests too harshly or
successfully — even without resorting to nuclear weapons — risks prompting a devastating nuclear
response, something that, at scale, is far more costly than any realistic gains.
A no-first-use pledge would undermine this pacifying logic. If the policy were believed, then it would
make the world safe for conventional war. Since potential aggressors would write the risk of nuclear use
down to zero, they would feel they could safely start and wage fierce conventional wars.
Conventional wars can be small, quick, and decisive, which is why they can also be appealing — just ask
Napoleon, James Polk, Otto von Bismarck, or Moshe Dayan. But they can also escalate dramatically and
unpredictably, especially when major powers are involved. Thus, the most likely route to nuclear use is
via a nasty conventional war, as happened in World War II. In such circumstances, high-minded pledges
made in peacetime may well seem foolish or too burdensome.
Prolif’s conflict-dampening effects are NET BETTER for the international order, even
with accidents calculated in
Press 9
Daryl, “Kenneth Waltz”, Associate Professor in the Department of Government, Dartmouth College. He
received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a B.A. from the
University of Chicago.
http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2489/kenneth-waltz
People often criticize the Waltz argument with two responses, which I think are both incorrect. You
allude to them in your post. 1)I don’t think it’s correct to say that Waltz has to be right every time for his
view to trump Sagan. If, for example, the existence (or even spread) of nuclear weapons prevents 1
great power war per century (on average), or several regional wars per century, and the cost of that
deterring effect is 1-2 Sagan-esque accidents per 100 years, this would presumably be a very good
tradeoff from the stand point of humanity and international order. Major conventional wars have killed
so many people that vastly reducing their likelihood is potentially worthwhile even if there are
accidents. The devil is in the details — how likely are those wars absent nuclear deterrence, how reliable
will the deterrence be, and how ghastly will the accidents be? Are the accidents of the “accidental
detonation” type, which might kill a 100-200 k people (or far fewer if it occurred in a remote location)?
Are the accidents of the type that would release contamination, with perhaps smaller lethal effects? Or
are the mishaps the triggering of accidental nuclear exchanges, which could be mind-bogglingly bad. In
my mind, this mixed-Waltz-Sagan analysis (wars deter powerfully and some accidents will likely happen)
lead to a pragmatic view toward proliferation in which one judges how good/bad a new proliferant
would be depending on how good a job they will likely do as stewards (as well as how responsible their
government is).
AT: Compellence
Reject evidence about war time compellence – proliferation provides deterrence
during peacetime
Ferdinande ’16 – Consulate General of Belgium In Shanghai, Masters from Vrije Universiteit Brussel
(Arnaud, FACULTY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SCIENCES & SOLVAY BUSINESS SCHOOL, “Nuclear
Deterrence in the 21st Century: Can it Provide Stability”
https://www.scriptiebank.be/sites/default/files/thesis/201610/Ferdinande_Arnaud_0098007_Master%20Politieke%20Wetenschappen.pdf)
1 st counterargument: Wilson’s examples are set during war, which means that another costbenefit
calculation applies. It is indeed true that history provides ample evidence that a country’s population
can endure severe hardships and that they will not easily be coerced, even when facing horrific
punishment. One must however distinguish a situation where two opponents are already at war and a
situation where an opponent may possibly go to war. In a setting where two parties are already at war,
the costs are already high. That is to say, there is already a lot of destruction and death going on. The
situation is different when two countries are not yet at war, but one of the countries is contemplating if
it should go to war. Therefore, when faced with the prospect of nuclear retaliation, the costs of going to
war rise exponentially. Wilson seems to forget that nuclear deterrence aims primarily to prevent war,
not to win a war. The claim that leaders and civilians will not easily be coerced by the threat of a nuclear
strike during a war is at the very least debatable.
However, it is a different case all together when a country is faced with the threat of nuclear destruction
if it does choose to go to war. It is highly unlikely that the population will exhibit the same level of
determination and resilience in this case. How could the benefits ever outweigh the costs in this
instance? What could the country in question possibly have to gain from going to war? Wilson’s
argument is flawed because it equates a situation where a country is already at war with a situation in
which a country is calculating if it should go to war. Moreover, upon further examination it becomes
quite evident that Wilson’s examples can be categorized as compellence rather than deterrence. He is in
fact arguing that compellence with nuclear weapons does not work well, and again this is a debatable
statement. As a consequence, Wilson’s equation of deterrence and compellence leads to an erroneous
reasoning about the deterrent role of nuclear weapons.
AT: Conventional Weapons Solve Deterrence
Conventional weapons can’t provide deterrence – not sufficiently powerful or quick
Ferdinande ’16 – Consulate General of Belgium In Shanghai, Masters from Vrije Universiteit Brussel
(Arnaud, FACULTY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SCIENCES & SOLVAY BUSINESS SCHOOL, “Nuclear
Deterrence in the 21st Century: Can it Provide Stability”
https://www.scriptiebank.be/sites/default/files/thesis/201610/Ferdinande_Arnaud_0098007_Master%20Politieke%20Wetenschappen.pdf)
2 nd Counterargument: Wilson underestimates the enormous and uniquely destructive power of
nuclear weapons. One ICBM can achieve the same results as hundreds of aerial bombing campaigns.
Arguably, countries such as the US or China could probably completely annihilate certain countries with
their conventional weapons. But this is not the point. The point is that nuclear weapons are uniquely
powerful. The largest conventional weapons, such as the ‘bunker buster’, have a destruction capacity of
10 tons of TNT (Sauer, 2011: 7). ‘Little Boy’ had a destruction capacity of 14 000 tons or 14 kilotons of
TNT (Sauer, 2011: 7). Modern nuclear weapons are far more powerful than the rudimentary atomic
bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The W-76 is on average at least ten times more
powerful, while the W-88 Trident II D-5 MK-5 SLBM contains 475 kilotons of TNT (Sauer, 2011: 7). The
amount of destruction such weapons could cause is almost impossible to comprehend.
Additionally, conducting large-scale, aerial city bombing campaigns requires considerable efforts in
logistics and mobilization of aircraft, navy and troops. In contrast, firing nuclear weapons, to put it
bluntly, requires entering a code and pushing a button. Furthermore, ICBMs have a range of at least 5
500 km (Quinlan, 2009: 93). Standard Chinese, Russian and US ICBMs all have a range of over 10 000 km.
In combination with their SLBMs, this means virtually any spot on earth can be targeted quite easily.
Besides the ability of reaching virtually any spot on the globe, ICBMs are also able to do this at an
incredible speed. The total flight time of an ICBM is approximately 30 minutes, but at its apex, an ICBM
can reach up to Mach 20 or 15 000 mph12 (Gibson & Kemmerly, 2009: 236). According to Krepinevich
and Cohn (2016: 12), the two superpowers during the Cold War were left with an attack warning time of
about 20 to 30 minutes. With multiple NWSs sharing borders in this day and age, the attack warning
time is further reduced due to geographical proximity. For instance, Krepinevich and Cohn (2016: 12)
estimate that the attack warning time would be as little as 5 to 6 minutes in the Indo-Pakistani case. In
conclusion, nuclear weapons can cause much more destruction than conventional weapons, and they
can do it faster and without the need for massive mobilization of military resources.
AT: Irrationality
No such thing as irrational leaders – even if there were, nukes check
Forsyth ’17 – dean of Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He earned his PhD at
the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver (James Wood, “Nuclear Weapons
and Political Behavior” Strategic Studies Quarterly Fall 2017,
http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-3/Forsyth.pdf)
Critics will contend that the kind of restraint noted above rests on a level of rationality not found in the
real world. In fact, the opposite is the case: it is more difficult to find an example of an irrational state
leader in the real world than a rational one. What is an irrational actor? Is it a state that violently
disagrees with the policies of the United States? If that is the case, there are precious few. Perhaps
North Korea fits this description. On the other hand, it could be someone who fits the literal meaning of
the word irrational. An actor is said to be irrational if he or she demonstrates an inability to reason;
however, as previously mentioned, in international politics those actors are hard to find. Instead, what
we find “out there” are fairly reasonable actors who formulate decisions based on their interpretation of
the world around them. Nothing shapes the world around them more than nuclear weapons, which is
why nuclear-armed leaders behave cautiously when staring into the face of another nuclear-armed
leader.23 It should be noted that policies based on that sort of reasoning are neither rational nor
irrational, but merely reasonable.
Untrue – empirics prove even crazy leaders are stable with nukes
CATO ’17 – (CATO HANDBOOK FOR POLICYMAKERS, 8TH EDITION (2017), “Nuclear Weapons:
Proliferation and Terrorism” https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policymakers-8th-edition-2017/nuclear-weapons)
Although proliferation has so far had little consequence, that is not because the only countries to get
nuclear weapons have had rational leaders. Large, important countries that acquired the bomb were run
at the time by unchallenged — perhaps certifiably deranged — monsters. Consider Joseph Stalin, who,
in 1949, was planning to change the climate of the Soviet Union by planting a lot of trees, and Mao
Zedong, who, in 1964, had just carried out a bizarre social experiment that resulted in an artificial
famine in which tens of millions of Chinese perished.
New nuclear powers are the most rational – every new nuclear power has exercised
overwhelming restraint
Basrur ‘15
Rajesh is Professor of International Relations in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at
Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. “Nuclear Stability and Polarity in Post–Cold War Asia”
Roundtable: Approaching Critical Mass: Asia’s Multipolar Nuclear Future.
http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/Free/ap19/AsiaPolicy19_CriticalMass_January2015.pdf
Rationality. It is frequently said that new nuclear powers may not possess the “mature” and “rational”
qualities that brought a measure of stability to the Cold War, and may be inclined to take undue risks. In
fact, decision-makers in all nuclear-powered states have regularly worried that their adversaries may not
be rational. Some Americans feared this about the Soviet Union, Americans and Russians worried
likewise about China, and Indians have periodically expressed the same sentiment about Pakistan.7
Moreover, high rhetoric and risk-taking have always been part of hostile relationships between nucleararmed states, as is evident from history. It is harder to refute the opposite argument: that the chief
antagonists of the Cold War exhibited less-than-rational thinking in producing some 63,000 nuclear
warheads by 1986, whereas the new powers have been relatively circumspect in adopting low-profile
postures and have not exhibited the pace of arms racing that was characteristic of the Cold War
A more balanced comparison of the two periods reveals that in several ways the post–Cold War era is
more stable than the preceding period, though there is room for caution in each respect. First, there is
no massive, high-voltage arms racing today. The only arms race currently visible is between India and
Pakistan, which is at a comparatively low level and likely to remain so because neither side has the
financial capacity to build a large arsenal. The nuclear force modernizations under way in China, India,
and Pakistan are primarily consolidations. However, optimism on this score should not be undiluted. The
ubiquitous and untenable notion that the bottom line for deterrence is the capability for “assured
retaliation” tends to facilitate competitive open-ended acquisitions. Second, the younger nuclear
powers do not practice Cold War–type deployments with hair-trigger alerts. On the contrary, China,
India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea employ a more restrained recessed deployment posture.8 There
is no guarantee, however, that this will not change, which points to a need for reassurance and
confidence building on all sides.
AT: Multipolarity Unstable
Nuclear multipolarity is stable – crises are bilateral and their evidence is all hype
Basrur ‘15
Rajesh is Professor of International Relations in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at
Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. “Nuclear Stability and Polarity in Post–Cold War Asia”
Roundtable: Approaching Critical Mass: Asia’s Multipolar Nuclear Future.
http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/Free/ap19/AsiaPolicy19_CriticalMass_January2015.pdf
It is often argued that the post–Cold War era is less stable than the Cold War period. Some of these
arguments, however, turn out to be untenable upon closer examination.
Polarity. It is frequently claimed that the Cold War period was bipolar and therefore more predictable
and conducive to management than the multipolar world today.6 This is wrong on two counts. First, as
noted above, the two periods have been similar in the number of poles or nuclear powers. Even small
nuclear powers have been able to exercise a high degree of strategic autonomy, which is why China,
with its minimal arsenal, was a pole during the Cold War. Second, and more importantly, there is no
evidence that nuclear multipolarity is inherently unstable. All the major crises that have occurred
through both periods have been bilateral.
Cold war deterrence examples prove stability in multipolarity – nuclear politics were
still multipolar pre 1989
Basrur ‘15
Rajesh is Professor of International Relations in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at
Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. “Nuclear Stability and Polarity in Post–Cold War Asia”
Roundtable: Approaching Critical Mass: Asia’s Multipolar Nuclear Future.
http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/Free/ap19/AsiaPolicy19_CriticalMass_January2015.pdf
The third reputed difference is that the Cold War era was “bipolar,” whereas the post–Cold War period
is “multipolar.” This is incorrect. If we take 1989 as the year when the Cold War began to wind down
with the dismantling of Communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe, then the number of nucleararmed states before and after remains the same. Before 1989, there were nine nuclear powers: the
United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, South Africa, India, and
Pakistan.1 After 1989, South Africa denuclearized, and the only new state that developed nuclear
weapons capabilities was North Korea. It may be objected that the U.S. and Soviet arsenals were so far
removed from the rest in magnitude that the term multipolarity does not really apply. But then, the
difference between the big two and the rest remains enormous even today. More importantly,
conventional notions of balance do not apply to nuclear weapons given that very small arsenals have
regularly deterred very large ones.2 Moreover, strategic politics among the nuclear-armed states in the
pre-1989 period was often multipolar: for example, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China were
hostile toward each other in the 1960s, and the United States and China were antagonistic toward the
Soviet Union in the 1970s and the 1980s. There were also strategic dyads centered on South Asia, with
India and the Soviet Union loosely aligned against China and Pakistan.
AT: Small Arsenals Insufficient
Small arsenals sufficient to deter aggression and force socialization
Forsyth ’17 – dean of Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He earned his PhD at
the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver (James Wood, “Nuclear Weapons
and Political Behavior” Strategic Studies Quarterly Fall 2017,
http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-3/Forsyth.pdf)
Strategists have long recognized that throwing more men into battle may increase the carnage but not
necessarily procure victory. The same holds true for nuclear weapons states. With nuclear weapons,
state power tops out quickly. Simply put, large arsenals buy statesmen little. The fact that a state may
have a nuclear weapon or seek to acquire one is enough to condition statesmen to act cautiously. This
begs the question: how many nuclear weapons does a state need? That is a big question for which there
is, theoretically speaking, a small solution: one an adversary might be able to take out with a first strike
and one that it knows it cannot. Since deterrence and dissuasion hold as a result of a viable secondstrike
capability, the number of aggregate weapons need not be large.
This cannot be overstated: one 300-kiloton weapon is more than enough to destroy a city the size of
London. If a bomb of that size were detonated above Trafalgar Square on a workday, approximately
240,000 people would die instantly and 410,000 casualties would be sustained. Nearly everything within
a 3 km radius would be destroyed, with burn victims reaching out as far as Victoria Park. The same bomb
detonated above Mumbai on a workday would kill over one million people and produce more than two
million casualties.25 Even if one were to assume the worst, a “bolt from the blue” where a state loses 50
percent of its nuclear capability to a first strike, a reasonably small force of several hundred weapons
would allow that state to strike back over 100 times before it had to negotiate. No state on the planet
could withstand that sort of punishment, and no sane leader would run that sort of risk.26
Yet suppose an adversary were contemplating a first strike. What do you think the second question put
to the leader would be? It would have to be: and which city of ours are you willing to give up in
exchange? The example is illustrative for two reasons. First, strategy is not contingent upon the first
move but on the following ones.27 Second, in high-stakes games like nuclear war, there are no viable
second or third moves. Everything turns on preventing the first move, which makes the game relatively
easy to understand. Moreover, leaders—socialized to the dangers of nuclear weapons—understand that
while numbers count, a small number of nuclear weapons is more than enough to dissuade the
staunchest of rivals, even ones with comparably large numbers. Again, China’s behavior is instructive.
Small arsenals deter
Barsur 8
Rajesh, Do Small Arsenals Deter? Rajesh M. Basrur is Associate Professor at RSIS. He has obtained his
MA and M Phil degrees in History (Delhi) and MA and PhD in Political Science (Bombay). Earlier, he was
Director, Centre for Global Studies, Mumbai, India (2000-2007) and taught History and Politics at the
University of Mumbai (1978-2000). He has engaged in post-doctoral research at RSIS (2006-07), Stanford
University (2002-2003), Sandia National Laboratories (2002), the Brookings Institution (2001-2002), the
Henry L. Stimson Center (2001),
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v032/32.3basrur.html
How Different are Nuclear Risks from Second Tier Arsenals Nuclear dangers are often cited more in the
context of regional powers. In fact, after India and Pakistan brought their nuclear capabilities into the
open in May 1998, the Western officialdom and strategic analysts were quick to describe the region as a
nuclear powder keg 77 Though some analysts make a subtle distinction between NRRMs, nuclear
confidence building measures (NCBMs) and nuclear arms control, this paper uses these terms
interchangeably. Manpreet SETHI 62 that could be shrouded in the mushroom cloud any moment.
Pakistan further fuelled these fears by exploiting every opportunity to draw attention to the fragility of
the Indo-Pak situation by projecting a low nuclear threshold that could be breached easily by an Indian
conventional offensive. The presence of nuclear weapons, therefore, was believed to have made the
security environment in South Asia more complex because of the addition of new uncertainties and an
increased volatility in an already fragile relationship. Small arsenals and rudimentary command and
control (C2) in countries, anyway prone to war because of unsettled historical disputes, are perceived to
create incentives for pre-emptive action, result in problems of error in judgment, or lead to accidents as
a result of inadequate safety measures. In the case of the Superpowers, it is claimed, nuclear deterrence
was more stable and secure because it was between nations geographically far apart, thus granting
them more time for confirming launch and averting an accidental response. Also, since they had
elaborate surveillance systems, capable of early warning – assets that India, Pakistan, and even China,
despite its head start, are yet in the process of building – it was assumed that the chances of false alarm
between the US and USSR were few. However, these assumptions that attribute stability or instability to
a nuclear relationship require a deeper investigation. Geographical Proximity and History of Dispute The
first factor that is deemed to heighten nuclear dangers in the case of the two dyads under study is
geographical proximity and a history of conflict. Located next to one another and sharing disputed
boundaries, it is feared that any major breakout of conventional hostilities between India-Pakistan or
India-China could increase the pressures for a pre-emptive strike or a nuclear attack being launched
without proper confirmation. Moreover, since the missile flight times would only be between 8-13
minutes for missile ranges of 600-2000 kms, it would not allow either side to even use the hotline (ass
ng these were functional) to confirm the veracity (deliberate or accidental) or nature (conventional or
nuclear) of launch. Haunted by the thought that the country that waited to use its nuclear assets might
end up losing them to a disarming first strike would cause near immediate nuclear retaliation engulfing
the nations in a mindless nuclear exchange. This assumption, however, is open to question since
physical proximity also compels uneasy neighbours to be extra cautious and restrained in their approach
on issues as sensitive as the use of nuclear weapons. It may be recalled that the two ideologically
divided, but geographically contiguous East and West Germany did live with mobilized militaries and
tactical Occasional Paper N°25 63 nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert during the long years of the Cold
War. These too were uneasy neighbours separated by a bitter ideological divide and the danger of their
slipping into a nuclear exchange inadvertently was ever existent. However, the fact that such an
eventuality was avoided may be attributed as much to good fortune as to the effort made by both sides
to consciously work at maintaining deterrence stability. Kenneth Waltz suggests that caution becomes
the defining principle of nuclear-armed powers.78 And this, in the case of the Cold War protagonists, is
believed to have kept nuclear deterrence in place. The same caution was on display between India and
Pakistan during the Kargil conflict and Operation Parakram, as explained in the second chapter of this
monograph. However, there is a glaring difference in the Indo-Pak relationship that does seem to
heighten the nuclear dangers. In fact, Waltz’s conclusion that nuclear powers tend to err on the side of
caution, is exploited by Islamabad to foist a provocative sub-conventional conflict on India. It assumes
that the presence of nuclear weapons and the associated risk of inadvertent escalation would impose
caution on Indian actions, thereby providing it greater room for mischief-making at the lower levels of
conflict. To some extent, Pakistan is right in ass ng so, because India’s military options are constrained
by the presence of nuclear weapons. Even though Kargil demonstrated the types of conventional
responses that can still be crafted to foil Pakistan’s designs, the risk of escalation spinning out of control
cannot be completely obviated. As it turns out, the India-Pakistan relationship has ended up in a state
where the danger of escalation to the nuclear level is highly over-emphasized by Pakistan, even as it is
casually dismissed by India. Both positions are compelled by their national interests. But, the truth
actually lies somewhere in between and perhaps more likely than not, India and Pakistan do realize the
dangers of inadvertent and unwanted nuclear escalation that underlie their behaviour. It is for this
reason that Pakistan does not display a wanton abandon in its policy of nuclear brinkmanship. For
instance, the total number of terrorists pumped into India at any one particular time has never
exceeded 2,500-3000 so as not to breach India’s level of tolerance.79 Also, Pakistan’s nuclear rhetoric
on its low nuclear threshold has mostly been heard during the stages of build-up of a crisis or towards its
end. During the period of actual danger of escalation in the midst of a crisis, there is far greater caution
in tone and action.80 Similarly, India’s exercise of caution in responding to Pakistan-fomented terrorism
is illustrative of its desire to steer clear of any inadvertent escalation. Both realize the high costs that a
nuclear exchange would impose on them. In fact, for all of Pakistan’s nuclear flamboyance and the low
threshold bluster, Islamabad does realize that the impact of destruction would be far greater on the
state and society of Pakistan, whose recoverability, in terms of dealing with the human and economic
disaster of such a scale, would be less than that of India. This should be deterrent enough to force
Pakistan to reconsider what possible tangible political gains might be achieved at the cost of risking a
nuclear war. Would the loss of Lahore or Karachi be worth the acquisition of Kashmir? In fact, can there
ever be any concievable political, military or strategic objective for which a country would resort to the
nuclear use in the knowledge that it would be sure to lose some of its own cities? Therefore, as long as
rational and reasonable leaderships are in charge of nations (though the measure of their rationality and
reasonableness may not exactly match), physical proximity between nations, even when riddled with
historical border/territorial conflicts, does not pose an additional danger of nuclear use. Rather,
geographical closeness also imposes an additional limitation since a nuclear catastrophe inflicted by one
on the other cannot be expected to remain confined in space to only the adversary’s side of the border.
Of course, one could well argue that by the time the nations take the extreme decision to use the
weapon, they would be well past the stage of being bothered by any effects of radioactive fallout, and
more worried instead about the enemy’s nuclear strike. Nevertheless, while thinking about nuclear
weapons during ‘crisis-free’ times, this certainly is a variable that weighs on the mind of geographically
contiguous nations.
AT: Doesn’t Prevent Aggression/Conventional
History proves --- the nuclear deterrent is key
Payne 16 (Keith B. Payne, Keith Payne is Professor and Head of the Graduate Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Washington Campus). Dr. Payne is also President and
co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, a nonprofit research center located in Fairfax,
Virginia.Dr. Payne served in the Department of Defense as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Forces Policy. July 6, 2016, “Once Again: Why a ‘No First Use’ Nuclear Policy Is a Very Bad Idea”
https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/07/no-first-use-nuclear/, Accessed 8/13/18)
The Obama administration reportedly is seriously considering adopting a “no first use” (NFU) nuclearweapons policy. A prospective NFU policy would be a U.S. commitment never to be the first to use nuclear weapons — as opposed
to existing policy, which retains some ambiguity regarding when and if the U.S. would use nuclear
weapons. An NFU policy would eliminate that ambiguity for U.S. adversaries. It sounds warm and progressive and has long
been a policy proposal of disarmament activists. NFU has, however, been rejected by all previous Democratic and Republican
administrations for very sound reasons, most recently by the Obama administration in 2010. The most important of these reasons
is that retaining a degree of U.S. nuclear ambiguity helps to deter war, while adopting an NFU policy
would undercut that deterrence.
How so? Under
the existing policy of ambiguity, potential aggressors such as Russia, China, North Korea,
and Iran must contemplate the reality that if they attack us or our allies, they risk possible U.S. nuclear
retaliation. There is no doubt whatsoever that this risk of possible U.S. nuclear retaliation has deterred
war and the escalation of conflicts. In fact, the percentage of the world population lost to war has fallen dramatically since U.S.
nuclear deterrence was established after World War II. That is a historic accomplishment.
The fatal flaw of the warm and progressive-sounding NFU proposal is that it tells would-be aggressors that they do not have to fear U.S. nuclear
retaliation as long as they attack us or our allies with advanced conventional, chemical, and/or biological weapons. They would risk U.S. nuclear
retaliation only if they attack with nuclear weapons
RELATED: Underestimating Nuclear Missile Threats from North Korea and Iran
Numerous historical case studies demonstrate without a doubt that some aggressors look for such
openings to undertake military moves they deem critical. They do not need to see a risk-free path to
pursue aggression, only a path that allows them some vision of success, however improbable that vision
may seem to others. The U.S. nuclear deterrent helps to shut down the possibility that would-be
aggressors will contemplate such paths.
Deterrence prevents catstrophic conventional war – inevitable risk of conflict means
its try or die for prolif
Tripathi ’15 – Ph.D. Scholar, Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi
(Maneesha, “Nuclear Deterrence: More Nukes for Stable Peace?” Journal for Studies in Management
and Planning, Vol 1, Issue 3,
https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/45338154/Nuclear_Deterence_More_Nukes_for
__Stable_Peace_PDF.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1527110151&Signature
=vDOxtVRDyeXifcy%2BfBtxhlGrLm4%3D&response-contentdisposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DJournal_for_Studies_in_Management_and_Pl.pdf)
Deterrence has been considered a major impediment to the achievement nuclear disarmament. The
desire to eliminate such weapons forever is understandable, given their incredible destructive power;
most plausible uses of nuclear weapons would in fact be inhumane and illegitimate. But it is war itself
that is most inhumane, and war targeting civilians through whatever means is the fundamental moral
blight we should be trying to eliminate.13
Realists argue nuclear weapons cannot be dis invented so we have no choice but learn to live with
them.14 This argument cannot be negated. Moreover disarmament cannot eliminate the potential for
destruction. Shelling (1962) argues “the most primitive war can be modernized by rearmament as it
goes along. Nations now suspect each other of contemplating war; we have to suppose that they might
suspect each other of contemplating rearmament. If nations are willing to risk war, or to threaten it,
they certainly might risk rearming or threatening to rearm. Nations thought capable now of being
panicked into war might be panicked into rearmament.”15
The past 65 years demonstrate Great War is preventable. But its prevention begins precisely with this
recognition that war is always possible, that it is always “thinkable.” War in a conventional world was
and would be a matter of calculations of foreseeable risks and perceptible gains and losses. This is
because there would always be situations in which a state could see the serious possibility of gaining
more through war than it would lose, often justifiably. While catastrophic wars would always be possible
and thus serve as deterrents, situations would continually arise in which decision makers could assess
that their expected benefits would outweigh the possibility of such disaster. These assessments would
often be reasonable or at least defensible. States from the beginning can take actions to make war
unlikely. Even with their bellicose instincts and incentives, men, especially those who rise to positions of
authority, are rarely madmen. Humans value survival and the preservation of what they have and love.
Threatening these things can serve to turn an adversary away from war. This a combination of the
exploitation of fear and interest on the one hand and the redirection of warlike instincts toward other
endeavors can combine to lessen substantially the probability of war. These are the fundamental
principles of deterrence. 16
A world without nuclear weapons would be indeed great, but is idealist at the same time. The
international system is essentially anarchic due to lack of a supranational authority that can apply the
international laws on sovereign states. Till the situation is such possibility of war cannot be eliminated. If
war is a probability, devastation caused by nuclear weapons plays an effective deterrent. The knowledge
of nuclear weapons cannot be unlearned. Nations need to exercise their role as nuclear power with
responsibility. Deterrence is thus, a potent tool of modern diplomacy.
1. Fear – psychological research proves prolif forces moderation and decreases
emboldenment
Cohen ‘18
Michael D is a senior lecturer in security studies at Macquarie University in Australia. Not the Michael D
Cohen you’re thinking of. “Fear and Loathing: When Nuclear Proliferation Emboldens.” Journal of Global
Security Studies, 3(1), 2018, 56–71.
https://watermark.silverchair.com/ogx021.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3
qfKAc485ysgAAAaAwggGcBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggGNMIIBiQIBADCCAYIGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQ
MEAS4wEQQMdBglMHNdG1PNU07MAgEQgIIBUw5_SKUZyzl8kdInUEakLtDpOCqAm7RngR4C38rkwjnY7k
yQPTIqSGwIiGUQO8g1ZqmKv8ayyUvpKYpXgWA2Z5Dq5H31vcXuf83IDIloFfBps3_512u46FLB7A50o8OtX5roAH6iYXKZ9KYtphyGuoeeJk_qvXZNof_ifN35SgK29FJVok
wM41mpSU4XaMjxym0OGzCykY_wqkzn0bmiJrxVLEYComys6gGEUJR4xG2ntT2GfOz_eDrW_ANnkgTr1Ln
nRf2_zv_0iymo461nUXaY86JdID1SY3mzxKIFs_5BVJ6hWCsscn8au8E3myEFDcm5m5J0eZcj_YmBpHyDVoC
iSII7bwsz9LAeP7PVi06pnIrT0OWLVUmm3upIcsEQRT7jT7O2odMpdZnJfIeCnOxO5rIu1fxWq_5QFaksqmix8ipEQ4gU7F3gtR2i_Tahmp8Q
Thoughts of danger that are cognitively accessible exacerbate fear, defined as “dread of impending
disaster that tends to cause intense urges to defend oneself by escaping a situation” (Ohman 2008, 710).
Fear is different from anxiety, defined as “an ineffable and unpleasant feeling of foreboding.” Fear in
general causes risk-averse choices and judgements (Lerner and Keltner 2001). Fear of imminent nuclear
escalation— distinct from disutility or a general respect for the dangers associated with nuclear
weapons—is highly cognitively available and should cause leaders to assess the benefits of nuclear
assertion as marginal. Leaders who experience fear of imminent nuclear war should avoid policies that
exacerbate its source. They will worry about losing control over a crisis that could escalate to nuclear
war and prefer restrained foreign policies toward their primary nuclear adversary. Fearful leaders should
authorize restrained policies even when the subjective probability and cost of nuclear escalation remain
constant.
Fear has affective as well as cognitive influences on decision-making; the two are tightly interlinked.
When the brain detects a threat, it triggers fear that causes an immediate fight-or-flight response. This
process is quick and subconscious and can cause similar reactions in the distant future in the face of
similar phenomena. According to Mercer (2010, 11), “feeling is believing because emotion is evidence.”
The core insight here is that, when leaders believe that the nuclear escalation is imminent, they will use
this emotional response as a basis for avoiding the assertive foreign policies that created the fear in the
first place.
From a rational perspective, a specific fear of imminent nuclear war should not impact one’s
assessments of risk any more than a general sense of danger, and risk estimates in one situation should
not influence estimates of logically unrelated situations. Stated differently, fear should not rationally
cause risk aversion when the subjective probability of nuclear escalation and its costs remain constant.
However, psychological research has shown that these rational expectations are incorrect. People that
experience fear will perceive greater risk across current and new situations. Strikingly, “the same
patterns for fear and for anger appeared across tasks assessing risk perception, risk preferences and
one’s comparative chances of experiencing a variety of positive and negative events.” (Lerner and
Keltner 2001, 155; Lerner et al. 2003; Fischhoff et al. 2005) and have been extensively replicated (Skitka
et al. 2006). Västfjäll, Peters, and Slovic (2008), for example, find that people reminded about recent
tsunamis believed that the risk of future negative events was higher than that of positive events. Fear
“motivates risk-aversive behavior, including actions aimed at prevention and protection, conciliatory
acts, hiding, and flight” (Brader and Marcus 2013, 178).
This body of research suggests that approaching the nuclear brink should cause leaders to authorize
restrained foreign policies. Lerner et al. (2003, 144) concluded that “emotions elicit specific cognitive
appraisals that, although tailored to help the individual respond to the event that evoked the emotion,
persist beyond the eliciting situation and become an implicit perceptual lens for interpreting subsequent
situations.” LeDoux and Debiek (2004, 815) similarly conclude that “defensive reactions to stimuli
previously associated with physical threat, even if weakened by experiences throughout life, can recover
spontaneously or in the face of stressful events.” Fear of imminent nuclear escalation should cause
leaders to authorize restrained foreign policies long after their nuclear crisis because it reduces the risk
of nuclear escalation.
2. Socialization – spread of nuclear weapons promotes caution among states in
anarchy
Forsyth ’17 – dean of Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He earned his PhD at
the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver (James Wood, “Nuclear Weapons
and Political Behavior” Strategic Studies Quarterly Fall 2017,
http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-3/Forsyth.pdf)
Nuclear weapons, more so than any other weapon, “hold power at bay,” as Bernard Brodie so aptly put
it; they inhibit statesmen from “launching a career of aggression by socializing them to the dangers of
nuclear war.”3 As Kenneth Waltz pointed out, statesmen do not want to be part of a system that
constrains them; however, that is the kind of system that results among nuclear powers. Each is
socialized to the capabilities of the other, and the relationship that emerges is one tempered by caution
despite the composition, goals, or desires of its leaders.4 In short, nuclear weapons deter and dissuade
statesmen from behaving recklessly. Since deterrence and dissuasion play such critical roles in this line
of reasoning, it is important to be clear about their meanings.
Deterrence puts the target state on notice: “don’t do this, or else.” It involves “setting the stage—by
announcement, by rigging the trip-wire, by incurring the obligation—and waiting” (emphasis in
original).5 Dissuasion is not announced, nor does it put the target state on notice. There are no trip
wires or obligations, no waiting or threats. Where deterrence is specific, dissuasion is general. For
deterrence to work, “one must dig in or lay a mine field.”6 For dissuasion to take hold, one need only
possess mines, albeit nuclear ones.7 In either case, statesmen are not sensitive to the number of nuclear
weapons a state might possess; they are sensitive to whether a state has them at all.
To explain this sensitivity, a brief discussion on the role of structure in international politics is warranted.
Structural analysis addresses the positioning of actors in social and political systems, the properties and
relations that make them parts of a system.8 Within the field of international politics, most scholars
accept Waltz’s tripartite conception of structure (functional differentiation, ordering principles, and
power distribution). In the standard Waltzian account, international systems are largely
undifferentiated—and pretty much all the same. States are assumed to be “like units” made different
only by their position among other states—strong states being privileged over weak ones. Anarchy is the
ordering principle of international systems, meaning there is no higher authority for states to appeal to
reconcile differences or ensure their survival. Power is distributed unevenly throughout the system, so
states are unequal—making international systems unequal. To say structural theory provides a
positional picture of international politics is to say that states can be measured in terms of relative
power and how they stack up against one another.
Few things affect this “stacking up” more than nuclear weapons, which is why statesmen pay attention
to who has them and if they might be used against them. In this regard, nuclear weapons play a
socialization role. Since socialization is important to this discussion, we must be clear about its
meaning.9 Socialization refers to a relationship between at least two parties where A influences B. B,
affected by A’s influence, then influences A. As Waltz explained, “Each is not just influencing the other;
both are being influenced by the situation their interactions create.” Moreover, the behavior of the pair
cannot be “apprehended by taking a unilateral view of either member.”10 Each acts and reacts in
accordance with the other.
No one tells all the states in the world to behave themselves, yet most of them do most of the time.
States are socialized to this idea by interacting with other states, particularly the great powers—whose
role it is to set and enforce the rules of the game. In both instances, socialization is “a process of
learning to conform one’s behavior to societal expectations” and a “process of identity and interestformation.”11 Socialization draws members of a group into conformity with its norms and also
encourages similarities in behavior. Analogically speaking, political relationships among nuclear powers
are like economic markets in that both are about self-help. They are also “individualist in origin,
spontaneously generated, and [may even be] unintended.”12 However, unlike markets, which
theoretically can be left to their own devices to self-correct in times of disequilibrium, nuclear
relationships must be corrected by leaders in times of crisis. This can be explained in terms of structural
theory and the socializing effect of the survival motive. Because no higher authority exists to protect
states from the harmful intentions of others, statesmen must pay attention to survival. Nothing
threatens survival more than the threat of nuclear war, which is why statesmen are so highly sensitive to
it. China’s behavior is instructive.
China’s nuclear numbers remain small compared with those held by Russia and the United States. Yet
despite these rather large nuclear inequities, China continues to extend its influence throughout the
region. It reasoned that a small nuclear arsenal is sufficient to allow internal and external freedom of
action and ensure survival, while socializing rivals to the dangers of war. Unless a rival is willing to
significantly raise the stakes, there is little they can do, militarily, to prevent China from pursuing its
strategy. But it might be a mistake to suggest China is actively deterring the United States or Russia with
their nuclear weapons or vice versa. Instead, it might be more accurate to conclude that the three
countries have tacitly entered into a period of mutual dissuasion. Although nothing official has been
declared, all know the stakes are too high for anyone to engage the other militarily.13
Nuclear powers quarrel, threaten, and even fight proxy wars against one another. Yet they rarely, if
ever, fight wars against one another, and when they do, those conflicts are restrained. Why? The risks of
nuclear war compel statesmen to consider survival; they must act with deliberate restraint, devising
their courses of action in terms of how others might react, even if they prefer not to.14 From this, might
we conclude that nuclear relations are law-like?
All human conduct is shaped in some measure by what individuals believe to be general laws. In science,
laws establish relations between variables; however, in international politics, there are precious few
laws that operate with Newtonian fidelity. Instead, there are softer, law-like relationships and such
relationships are not based on a linkage that has been found, but on one that has been found
repeatedly. To assert that democracies do not fight wars against one another is to make a law-like
statement.15 Moreover, states, like humans, respond to signals and interpret them by putting them into
some general category thought to be law-like. As mathematician Jacob Bronowski noted, “We then
assume that the future will have some general likeness with futures we have met before which followed
this kind of signal, and this is the kind of future we prepare for.”16 It might be premature to assert
nuclear relations are law-like, but nothing sends a stronger signal to nuclear statesmen than the threat
of nuclear war.
3. Quantitative studies prove nuclear deterrence stabilizes international order
Velizarov ’17 – PhD student at Universiteit Leiden (Gabriel, Masters Thesis, “INTERNATIONAL
STABILITY THROUGH NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: RETHINKING THE REALIST NUCLEAR PEACE
PROPOSITION”
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/52112/Repository.pdf?sequence=1)
If one perceives great powers as the states possessing nuclear weapons and moves away from the
parochialism that this type of multipolar power arrangement presupposes by employing a layered
approach, which distinguishes between regional and global power arrangements, an argument can be
made that the contemporary international system resembles a multi-level power structure. From this
perspective, the commonly affirmed statement that nuclear deterrence is incapable of assuring
international order, due to the transition from a bipolar international realm to an intricate world order
where distinct axes of power cannot be easily delineated, is no longer valid.
As demonstrated by the evidence presented in the quantitative case study, once the notion of Nuclear
Peace Hypothesis is analyzed through the prism of multi-level nuclear polarity, it can be inferred that
there is an interrelation amidst the enactment of strategies based upon nuclear weapons and the
decrease of interstate conflict. Except in the case of India and Pakistan, where the proliferation of
nuclear weapons made no significant impact on the rivalry between the two regional powers, aside from
diminishing the intensity of the confrontations from wars to minor squirmishes, in the other two
scrutinized instances interstate hostilities have been either prevented from occurring or halted. While a
claim could be made that the relatively peaceful relations between North and South Korea can be
credited to the existence of a heavily guarded by NATO forces buffer zone between the North and the
South Korean border also referred to as the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), in the case of Israel and
its neighbors, the correlation is undeniable. Even though both the quantity and intensity of interstate
conflict have diminished, as illustrated in the secondary charts depicting the overall conflict in the
region, including non-state military activities, it cannot be denied that, as pointed out by Rauchhaus, the
dissemination of nuclear weapons tends to “[shift] conflict to the lower end of the spectrum”
(Rauchhaus 2009, 260).
Aside from ‘shifting conflict to the lower end of the spectrum,’ due to the discrepancy in the results
amongst the examined case studies, the validity of the theoretical underpinnings of the multi-level
nuclear polarity cannot be conclusively established. From a theoretical standpoint, multi-level polarity is
in essence a more complex form of a multipolar power arrangement and relies on excessive levels of
uncertainty in the system to establish peace and order. Building upon this idea, it is logical for the
uncertainty inherent in multipolarity to diminish the negative impact of regional nuclear asymmetries
and at the same time foster a further decrease in interstate conflict where nuclear symmetries are the
norm. Nevertheless, the evidence presented in the empirical inquiry suggests the opposite is true. Two
rationales can possibly account for this discrepancy. Firstly, the disparity can be attributed to the small
sample of cases, which is a key drawback of the quantitative study. However, this cannot be easily
resolved, as few cases exist where there are antagonistic relations between states and at least one of
them is nuclear capable. Secondly, while excessive uncertainty may cause peace, the number of nuclear
capable actors in the overarching system of multipolarity is not great enough to decrease the “critical
attention ratio” of state actors, which Deutsch and Singer maintain is the key factor accountable for the
diminution of conflict under conditions of power disequilibrium (Deutsch and Singer 1964, 394).
Despite of these deficiencies, the central research question posed in this research, namely can multilevel nuclear polarity successfully diminish interstate conflict and, thus, be used as an effective tool for
promoting international peace and stability, has arguably been answered. Stemming from the
qualitative and quantitative evidence provided in the study, it can be concluded that by examining
Waltz’s original nuclear peace theory through the prism of multi-level polarity, deterrence does in fact
decrease interstate conflict and thereby advance international order, even if that is at the expense of
larger amounts of small, localized squirmishes involving non-state actors. Nonetheless, considering the
limitations of this study, in order for the relevance of the theory of nuclear peace to be reestablished in
the academic field of IR, further scrutiny into the effects of uncertainty and power disequilibrium under
conditions of nuclear proliferation and deterrence are required.
AT will just use TNWs to attack
The range is too short – it can only deter
Kristensen and Korda 19 [Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda (2019) Tactical nuclear weapons, 2019,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:5, 252-261, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2019.1654273] //AAA
Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons
Pakistan is unique among the smaller nuclear-armed states because it the only one that has explicitly
and publicly embarked on a program to develop tactical nuclear weapons. The decision is largely a
reaction to India’s so-called Cold Start doctrine, which establishes the capability to rapidly launch
retaliatory, large-scale, conventional strikes against Pakistani forces and territory–at a scale below
Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. Because Pakistan believed it lacked the conventional forces capable of
repelling such an Indian attack, it decided it needed tactical nuclear weapons.
As General Khalid Kidwai, a retired member of Pakistan’s National Command Authority, stated at the
2015 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, “This was a Pakistani defensive, deterrence
response to an offensive doctrine.” He continued: “I strongly believe that by introducing the variety of
tactical nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s inventory […], we have blocked the avenues for serious military
operations by the other side” (Kidwai 2015, 4–5).
The cornerstone of Pakistan’s tactical nuclear arsenal is the NASR (Hatf-9) short-range ballistic missile–a
short-range, solid-fuel missile originally with a range of only 60 kilometers (37 miles) that has recently
been extended to 70 kilometers (43 miles). With a range too short to attack strategic targets inside
India, the Nasr appears to solely be intended for battlefield use against invading Indian troops and tanks.
According to the Pakistani government, the NASR “carries nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with
high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes” and was developed as a “quick response system” to “add
deterrence value” to Pakistan’s strategic weapons development program “at shorter ranges” in order
“to deter evolving threats” (ISPR 2011, 2017).
The four-axle, road-mobile transporter erector launcher (TEL) for the NASR appears to use a snap-on
system that can carry two or more launch-tube boxes. The system has been tested in the past using a
road-mobile quadruple box launcher. The US intelligence community has listed the NASR as a deployed
system since 2013, and with a total of 15 tests reported so far, the weapon system appears to be welldeveloped. Potential deployment locations include Army garrisons in Gujranwala, Okara, and Pano Aqil
(Kristensen 2016).
In addition to the NASR, Pakistan also maintains a stockpile of other nuclear-capable missiles that have
characteristics similar to what could be considered tactical. This includes short-range ballistic missiles
like the Hatf-2 (Abdali) and Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi), Hatf-7 (Babur) ground-launched cruise missile, and Hatf-8
(Ra’ad) air-launched cruise missile, all of which could be used to target India’s conventional forces on
the battlefield. However, given the relatively small size of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, it would likely
need to use up an estimated 60 percent of its nuclear stockpile in order to disable a large-scale Indian
advance of 1,000 tanks (Nayyar and Mian 2010, 9).
AT s-400 (Indian BMD)
Pakistan can already destroy Indian BMDs
Akbar 19 [Ammar Akbar, “Pakistan’s missile technology: The perfect antidote for India’s S-400
purchase”, 12/15/2019, Global Village Space, https://www.globalvillagespace.com/pakistans-missiletechnology-the-perfect-antidote-for-indias-s-400-purchase/] //AAA
What’s interesting is how the Pakistani missile technology was also designed to penetrate the defenses
of the S-400 system. It’s not a surprise that Pakistan’s indigenous cruise missiles have the capability to
beat the layered defense shield of S-400 and hit its target with pinpoint accuracy. Babur, Raad, and
Ababeel cruise missiles, the crowns of Pakistan’s cruise missile technology all have the defensive
features to safeguard the borders.
So much so that even International defense experts have labeled Babur as the Pakistani version of
Tomahawk. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, a senior American national security expert, has identified the
unique similarities between the two cruise missiles. Technically, the technological edge of the cruise
over ballistic missile is the maneuverability of the former.
And when it comes to conquering S-400, the Pakistani cruise missiles with multiple stealth capabilities
totally dilute the pride of the enemy’s confidence in its defense systems. The ingenuity of Pakistani
scientists in missile technology is remarkable. Not only do they accomplish to penetrate the current
Indian Ballistic Missile Defence but also have the technology to undermine the abilities of over-hyped S400.
Even our adversaries have long agreed on the superiority of the Pakistani missile technology. For
instance, Lt Gen Sarath Chand, Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS) of Indian Army, had already
commended the brilliance and technical advancement of Pakistan’s defense industry.
The first line of defense against any misadventure in case of miscalculation and over-reliance on S-400
defense systems by India will be Babur. The cruise missile Babur is an all-weather nuclear capable land,
sea and air launch capable missile. With a range of 700km and other distinct features such as Terrain
Contour Matching (TERCOM) and all-time Digital Scene Matching and Area Co-relation (DSMAC)
technologies, which facilitate it to engage in different types of targets with pinpoint accuracy even in the
absence of GPS navigation makes it impossible for S-400 batteries stationed across the border to
interpret the subsonic missile.
Technically speaking, it’s low-flying, terrain-hugging missile and its flight capability of less than 5km over
sea level makes it easy to evade the radar coverage of S-400. Russian defense sources have already
disclosed that the maximum engagement attitude for S-400 interceptor missiles is between 15-20km.
The nuclear-capable Babur missile even has an advantage over the current Indian missile defense
system as it can beat the interception in the endo-atmospheric stage.
The second missile, which has the ability to neutralize the enemy’s defense, is Raad. Raad, which is also
known as Hatf VIII, is similar to Babur in technology but is a far more advanced air-launched cruise
missile (ALCM). Due to limited information on the missile’s full capabilities, the opacity surrounding its
stealth technology is to leave the enemy defense systems unprepared and S-400 is one of those
systems.
With an official disclosed the range of 350km, the missile is loaded with self-navigating technology and
can fly on a non-ballistic very low altitude trajectory in order to avoid radar detection. Furthermore, its
land and sea launch capabilities have included Pakistan in the League of Nations, which has both land
and sea strategic standoff capability.
Bipolarity
1NC – DA – Short
The massive number of nuclear weapons owned by the US and Russia ensures
bipolarity, which uniquely deters first strikes and prevents miscalculation better than
conventional forces
Waltz 81, Waltz, Kenneth. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”. Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Strategies). 1981.
http://home.sogang.ac.kr/sites/jaechun/courses/Lists/b6/Attachments/39/5.%20The%20spread%20of%20nuclear%20weapons.pdf // Sage AA
[Summary of Quals: Leading IR theorist of last half century, Wrote Theory of International Politics that defined IR for the next decade, B.A. from
Oberlin College and Ph.D. from Columbia University, Ford Professor of Political Science at Berkeley, Member of Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of
War and Peace Studies at Columbia, President of American Political Science Association, Honorary Doctorate from 6 colleges]
[Full Quals: Waltz was a towering figure in the field of international politics, arguably the leading international relations theorist of the last half century. He established himself as a prominent scholar early in his career with
the publication of his first book in 1959. Man, the State, and War is still in print–indeed a digital version is now available–and it continues to be a mainstay of undergraduate courses. Waltz’s lasting contribution was to provide a
typology for the causes of war which helped to organize the then nascent discipline. First-image explanations locate the causes of war within man. Hans Morgenthau, for example, attributed war to man’s desire for power. Secondimage accounts explain war in terms of the structure of states, e.g., democracies versus authoritarian states, capitalist versus socialist. Henry Kissinger makes this kind of argument when he links international instability to
revolutionary states. So do those who argue that democracies do not go to war against each other. Going back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s stag hunt, third-image explanations find the causes of war to lie in the international system
itself and, more specifically, in international anarchy. Even if every individual and every state were good, conflicts of interest would still arise. After all, conflicts or, more politely, differences in taste or circumstance make gains from
trade possible. But in the anarchy of international politics, there is nothing to prevent a state from trying to resolve these differences through the use of force. Theory of International Politics, published in 1979, further defined the
field for the next decade. Whether agreeing or disagreeing with Waltz, virtually every other international relations scholar began by locating his or her work in terms of Waltz. Long before game-theoretic models made the
approach common place, Waltz conceived of the international system in terms of the basic motivations of states and the strategic environment in which states interact in pursuit of their goals. He thought in terms of incentives and
constraints. The most important factor defining the states’ environment and affecting the stability of the international system for Waltz was the distribution of power. The broad patterns of relations among states are largely
determined by their position in the hierarchy of power. Many were amazed that France and Germany found peace after the Second World War given their long history of violent conflict. Waltz was not. Both had fallen from the
ranks of the great powers, and the primary axis of conflict had shifted to the two poles of the bi-polar world. That made the European Community and later the European Union possible. Waltz argued famously and controversially that nuclear proliferation or,
as he preferred to say, the spread of nuclear weapons makes major war less likely. Nuclear-armed states – be they the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, India and Pakistan during the 1999 Kargil War, or a nuclear-armed Iran and its rivals in a future conflict – are less likely to fight a major war against each other than they would be if they did not have nuclear
weapons. The obvious reading for Waltz of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the Kargil conflict was that “the presence of nuclear weapons prevented escalation from major skirmish to full-scale war.” A strong belief that both sides had a second-strike capability was enough to deter. More weapons and more nuclear options did not make things safer or more dangerous; they only
wasted money. An active scholar until the end of his life, Waltz reasoned in “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb” in Foreign Affairs a few months before he died that a nuclear-armed Iran, rather than being the worst possible outcome of the conflict, would probably be the outcome “most likely to restore stability to the Middle East.” By reducing imbalances of power, new nuclear states
Born and raised in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Waltz received his B.A. from Oberlin College and his Ph.D. from Columbia
University in 1954, after serving in the United States Army during the Second World War and the Korean conflict. He taught at Columbia until 1957 when he left for Swarthmore College and then Brandeis University. He joined the
Berkeley faculty in 1971 as the Ford Professor of Political Science. A scholar in great demand, he also lectured and taught at the London School of Economics, the Australian National University, Peking University, Fudan University,
the United States Air Force Academy, and the University of Bologna. He returned to New York and joined the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia after retiring from Berkeley in 1994. A dedicated
teacher, he continued to offer a graduate seminar until 2010 while dividing his time between homes in Manhattan and Harborside, Maine. Waltz was President of the American Political Science Association (1987-1988) and
received honorary doctorates from Copenhagen University, Oberlin College, Nankai University, Aberystwyth University, and most recently from the University of Macedonia in Saloniki, Greece, which he accepted in person in
the spring of 2011. Married for 59 years, Waltz’s beloved wife, Helen “Huddie” Waltz, died in 2008. He was predeceased by a son, Michael, and is survived by two sons, Daniel and Kenneth Jr., and four grandchildren, Sarah Grace,
typically bring more rather than less regional and international stability. In the fall of 2002, Waltz joined a group of other international relations scholars in opposing the coming war with Iraq.
Constantine, Thomas and Thomas Leonidas.]
-
-
Nukes k2 bipolarity --- (a) right now, only us and russia have control over nukes and no one can catch up, and (b) any other system
makes international politics a help-others system instead of a self-help system since there’s no ultimate deterrent
Bipolarity prevents miscalc --- great powers only have to gauge their relative strength to the other party instead of guessing the
strengths of a multitude of opposing coalitions
Nukes prevent miscalc --- (a) you can’t be oblivious to how much damage nukes do, but leaders have empirically concluded
conventional wars have greater benefits than costs, (b) nukes can be a defense to any attack by another country, which
disincentivizes the first strike in the first place
Bipolarity ensures prolif is safe and secure --- spillover effect of cautious handling of nuclear weapons to these smaller powers
What will a world populated by a larger number of nuclear states look like? I have drawn a picture of such a world that accords with experience
throughout the nuclear age. Those
who dread a world with more nuclear states do little more than assert that
more is worse and claim without substantiation that new nuclear states will be less responsible and less capable of self-control than the
old ones have been. They express fears that many felt when they imagined how a nuclear China would behave. Such fears have
proved un-rounded as nuclear weapons have slowly spread. I have found many reasons for believing that with more
nuclear states the world will have a promising future. I have reached this unusual conclusion for six main reasons.
First, international politics is a self-help system, and in such systems the principal parties do most to
determine their own fate, the fate of other parties, and the fate of the system. This will continue to be
so, with the United States and the Soviet Union filling their customary roles. For the United States and
the Soviet Union to achieve nuclear maturity and to show this by behaving sensibly is more important
than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.
Second, given the massive numbers of American and Russian warheads, and given the impossibility of
one side destroying enough of the other side’s missiles to make a retaliatory strike bearable, the
balance of terror is indestructible. What can lesser states do to disrupt the nuclear equilibrium if even
the mighty efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union cannot shake it? The international
equilibrium will endure.
Third, at the strategic level each of the great powers has to gauge the strength only of itself in relation
to the other. They do not have to make guesses about the strengths of opposing coalitions, guesses
that involve such imponderables as the coherence of diverse parties and their ability to concert their
efforts. Estimating effective forces is thus made easier. Wars come most often by miscalculation.
Miscalculation will not come from carelessness and inattention in a bipolar world as it may in a
multipolar one.
Fourth, nuclear weaponry makes miscalculation difficult because it is hard not to be aware of how
much damage a small number of warheads can do. Early in this century Norman Angell argued that wars could not
occur because they would not pay. But conventional wars have brought political gains to some
countries at the expense of others. Germans founded a state by fighting three short wars, in the last of which France lost Alsace.
Lorraine. Among nuclear countries, possible losses in war overwhelm possible gains. In the nuclear age Angell’s
dictum, broadly interpreted, becomes persuasive. When the active use of force threatens to bring great losses, war
become less likely. This proposition is widely accepted but insufficiently emphasized. Nuclear
weapons have reduced the chances of war between the United States and the Soviet Union and
between the Soviet Union and China. One may expect them to have similar effects elsewhere. Where
nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense, who will dare to start them? Nuclear
weapons make it possible to approach the deterrent ideal.
Fifth, nuclear weapons can be used for defence as well as for deterrence. Some have argued that an apparently
impregnable nuclear defence can be mounted. The Maginot Line has given defence a bad name. It nevertheless remains true that the
incidence of wars decreases as the perceived difficulty of winning them increases. No one attacks a
defence believed to be impregnable. Nuclear weapons may make it possible to approach the
defensive ideal. If so, the spread of nuclear weapons will further help to maintain peace.
Sixth, new nuclear states will confront the possibilities and feel the constraints that present nuclear
states have experienced. New nuclear states will be more concerned for their safety and more mindful
of dangers than some of the old ones have been. Until recently, only the great and some of the major powers have had
nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons have spread, conventional weapons have proliferated. Under these circumstances, wars have been
fought not at the centre but at the periphery of international politics. The
likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and
defensive capabilities increase. Nuclear weapons, responsibly used, make wars hard to start. Nations
that have nuclear weapons have strong incentives to use them responsibly. These statements hold for
small as for big nuclear powers. Because they do, the measured spread of nuclear weapons is more to
be welcomed than feared.
Yes, US and Russia are still dominating the nuke race --- the chart shows US and Russia
together have 10x more nukes than everyone else combined!
Davenport and Reif 7/3, Davenport, Kelsey [Summary: Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, Lead
author of the P4+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert newsletter, Co-author of a series of seven reports assessing the impact of the Nuclear Security
Summits on efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow, term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, member
of the National Committee on North Korea, serves on the Board of Directors for the Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellowship]. Kingston, Reif A.
[Summary: Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association, Director of Nuclear-Nonproliferation at the
Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation and Council for a Livable World, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow, Dr. Morton Halperinâ's
research assistant on the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, Deputy Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, B.A. in International
Relations from Brown University, 2014 Truman National Security Project Fellow, 2018 Shawn Brimley Next Generation National Security
Leaders Fellow]. “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance”. Arms Control Association, 3 July 2019.
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat // Sage AA
[Davenport Full Quals: Kelsey Davenport is the Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, where she focuses on the nuclear and missile programs in Iran, North Korea, India, and Pakistan and on
international efforts to prevent proliferation and nuclear terrorism. She also reports on developments in these areas for Arms Control Today and runs the Arms Control Association’s project assessing the effectiveness of
multilateral voluntary initiatives that contribute to nonproliferation efforts. She is the lead author of the P4+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert newsletter, which assesses developments related to the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran,
and the North Korea Denuclearization Digest, which tracks efforts to negotiate with North Korea over its nuclear weapons program. Kelsey is also the co-author of a series of seven reports assessing the impact of the Nuclear
Security Summits on efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism. Kelsey joined the Arms Control Association in August 2011 as a Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow. Kelsey has been quoted in numerous publications, including the
Washington Post, The New York Times, Foreign Policy, Newsweek, Reuters, Christian Science Monitor, Vox, and The Guardian and has provided commentary on NPR, CBC, CNN, ABC, MSNBC, Fox News, al-Jazeera, and C-Span. She
has published opeds in various outlets, including TIME, Reuters, CNN, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and Defense One. Kelsey is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the National Committee on
North Korea. She was selected to the CSIS Mid-Career Cadre in 2018 and serves on the Board of Directors for the Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellowship. Prior to joining the Arms Control Association, Kelsey worked a think tank in
Jerusalem researching Middle East security issues. She holds a masters degree in peace studies from the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame and a bachelor of arts summa cum laude in
international studies and political science from Butler University.]
[Reif Full Quals: Kingston A. Reif is the Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association, where his work focuses on nuclear disarmament, deterrence, and arms control, preventing nuclear
terrorism, missile defense, and the defense budget. Reif is an expert on the legislative process and closely monitors Congressional action on these issues. Prior to joining the Arms Control Association, Reif was the Director of
Nuclear-Nonproliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation and Council for a Livable World. Reif originally came to the Center in 2008 as a Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow. From September 2008 until May
2009 he served as Dr. Morton Halperinâ's research assistant on the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission. Reif returned to the Center in May 2009 as the Deputy Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Reif holds a B.A. in
International Relations from Brown University. He spent two years in the U.K. as a British Marshall Scholar where he received a MSc. in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a
M.Litt. in International Security Studies from the University of St. Andrews. He is a 2014 Truman National Security Project Fellow and a 2018 Shawn Brimley Next Generation National Security Leaders Fellow. Reif has published
articles and op-eds in various outlets, including the Washington Post, Foreign Policy, DefenseOne, Time, Defense News, and the Hill. He has been quoted in such publications as The Economist, The New York Times, Time, Defense
News, National Journal, FoxNews.com, and US News and World Report. He has also been interviewed on TV and radio outlets, including C-SPAN's Washington Journal program, CNN's The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer, and AlJazeera.
1NC – DA – Long
The massive number of nuclear weapons owned by the US and Russia ensures
bipolarity, which uniquely deters first strikes and prevents miscalculation better than
conventional forces
Waltz 81, Waltz, Kenneth. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”. Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Strategies). 1981.
http://home.sogang.ac.kr/sites/jaechun/courses/Lists/b6/Attachments/39/5.%20The%20spread%20of%20nuclear%20weapons.pdf // Sage AA
[Summary of Quals: Leading IR theorist of last half century, Wrote Theory of International Politics that defined IR for the next decade, B.A. from
Oberlin College and Ph.D. from Columbia University, Ford Professor of Political Science at Berkeley, Member of Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of
War and Peace Studies at Columbia, President of American Political Science Association, Honorary Doctorate from 6 colleges]
[Full Quals: Waltz was a towering figure in the field of international politics, arguably the leading international relations theorist of the last half century. He established himself as a prominent scholar early in his career with
the publication of his first book in 1959. Man, the State, and War is still in print–indeed a digital version is now available–and it continues to be a mainstay of undergraduate courses. Waltz’s lasting contribution was to provide a
typology for the causes of war which helped to organize the then nascent discipline. First-image explanations locate the causes of war within man. Hans Morgenthau, for example, attributed war to man’s desire for power. Secondimage accounts explain war in terms of the structure of states, e.g., democracies versus authoritarian states, capitalist versus socialist. Henry Kissinger makes this kind of argument when he links international instability to
revolutionary states. So do those who argue that democracies do not go to war against each other. Going back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s stag hunt, third-image explanations find the causes of war to lie in the international system
itself and, more specifically, in international anarchy. Even if every individual and every state were good, conflicts of interest would still arise. After all, conflicts or, more politely, differences in taste or circumstance make gains from
trade possible. But in the anarchy of international politics, there is nothing to prevent a state from trying to resolve these differences through the use of force. Theory of International Politics, published in 1979, further defined the
field for the next decade. Whether agreeing or disagreeing with Waltz, virtually every other international relations scholar began by locating his or her work in terms of Waltz. Long before game-theoretic models made the
approach common place, Waltz conceived of the international system in terms of the basic motivations of states and the strategic environment in which states interact in pursuit of their goals. He thought in terms of incentives and
constraints. The most important factor defining the states’ environment and affecting the stability of the international system for Waltz was the distribution of power. The broad patterns of relations among states are largely
determined by their position in the hierarchy of power. Many were amazed that France and Germany found peace after the Second World War given their long history of violent conflict. Waltz was not. Both had fallen from the
ranks of the great powers, and the primary axis of conflict had shifted to the two poles of the bi-polar world. That made the European Community and later the European Union possible. Waltz argued famously and controversially that nuclear proliferation or,
as he preferred to say, the spread of nuclear weapons makes major war less likely. Nuclear-armed states – be they the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, India and Pakistan during the 1999 Kargil War, or a nuclear-armed Iran and its rivals in a future conflict – are less likely to fight a major war against each other than they would be if they did not have nuclear
weapons. The obvious reading for Waltz of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the Kargil conflict was that “the presence of nuclear weapons prevented escalation from major skirmish to full-scale war.” A strong belief that both sides had a second-strike capability was enough to deter. More weapons and more nuclear options did not make things safer or more dangerous; they only
wasted money. An active scholar until the end of his life, Waltz reasoned in “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb” in Foreign Affairs a few months before he died that a nuclear-armed Iran, rather than being the worst possible outcome of the conflict, would probably be the outcome “most likely to restore stability to the Middle East.” By reducing imbalances of power, new nuclear states
Born and raised in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Waltz received his B.A. from Oberlin College and his Ph.D. from Columbia
University in 1954, after serving in the United States Army during the Second World War and the Korean conflict. He taught at Columbia until 1957 when he left for Swarthmore College and then Brandeis University. He joined the
Berkeley faculty in 1971 as the Ford Professor of Political Science. A scholar in great demand, he also lectured and taught at the London School of Economics, the Australian National University, Peking University, Fudan University,
the United States Air Force Academy, and the University of Bologna. He returned to New York and joined the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia after retiring from Berkeley in 1994. A dedicated
teacher, he continued to offer a graduate seminar until 2010 while dividing his time between homes in Manhattan and Harborside, Maine. Waltz was President of the American Political Science Association (1987-1988) and
received honorary doctorates from Copenhagen University, Oberlin College, Nankai University, Aberystwyth University, and most recently from the University of Macedonia in Saloniki, Greece, which he accepted in person in
the spring of 2011. Married for 59 years, Waltz’s beloved wife, Helen “Huddie” Waltz, died in 2008. He was predeceased by a son, Michael, and is survived by two sons, Daniel and Kenneth Jr., and four grandchildren, Sarah Grace,
typically bring more rather than less regional and international stability. In the fall of 2002, Waltz joined a group of other international relations scholars in opposing the coming war with Iraq.
Constantine, Thomas and Thomas Leonidas.]
-
-
Nukes k2 bipolarity --- (a) right now, only us and russia have control over nukes and no one can catch up, and (b) any other system
makes international politics a help-others system instead of a self-help system since there’s no ultimate deterrent
Bipolarity prevents miscalc --- great powers only have to gauge their relative strength to the other party instead of guessing the
strengths of a multitude of opposing coalitions
Nukes prevent miscalc --- (a) you can’t be oblivious to how much damage nukes do, but leaders have empirically concluded
conventional wars have greater benefits than costs, (b) nukes can be a defense to any attack by another country, which
disincentivizes the first strike in the first place
Bipolarity ensures prolif is safe and secure --- spillover effect of cautious handling of nuclear weapons to these smaller powers
What will a world populated by a larger number of nuclear states look like? I have drawn a picture of such a world that accords with experience
throughout the nuclear age. Those
who dread a world with more nuclear states do little more than assert that
more is worse and claim without substantiation that new nuclear states will be less responsible and less capable of self-control than the
old ones have been. They express fears that many felt when they imagined how a nuclear China would behave. Such fears have
proved un-rounded as nuclear weapons have slowly spread. I have found many reasons for believing that with more
nuclear states the world will have a promising future. I have reached this unusual conclusion for six main reasons.
First, international politics is a self-help system, and in such systems the principal parties do most to
determine their own fate, the fate of other parties, and the fate of the system. This will continue to be
so, with the United States and the Soviet Union filling their customary roles. For the United States and
the Soviet Union to achieve nuclear maturity and to show this by behaving sensibly is more important
than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.
Second, given the massive numbers of American and Russian warheads, and given the impossibility of
one side destroying enough of the other side’s missiles to make a retaliatory strike bearable, the
balance of terror is indestructible. What can lesser states do to disrupt the nuclear equilibrium if even
the mighty efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union cannot shake it? The international
equilibrium will endure.
Third, at the strategic level each of the great powers has to gauge the strength only of itself in relation to the other. They do not have to make
guesses about the strengths of opposing coalitions, guesses that involve such imponderables as the coherence of diverse parties and their
ability to concert their efforts. Estimating effective forces is thus made easier. Wars come most often by miscalculation. Miscalculation will not
come from carelessness and inattention in a bipolar world as it may in a multipolar one.
Fourth, nuclear weaponry makes miscalculation difficult because it is hard not to be aware of how
much damage a small number of warheads can do. Early in this century Norman Angell argued that wars could not
occur because they would not pay. But conventional wars have brought political gains to some
countries at the expense of others. Germans founded a state by fighting three short wars, in the last of which France lost Alsace.
Lorraine. Among nuclear countries, possible losses in war overwhelm possible gains. In the nuclear age Angell’s
dictum, broadly interpreted, becomes persuasive. When the active use of force threatens to bring great losses, war
become less likely. This proposition is widely accepted but insufficiently emphasized. Nuclear
weapons have reduced the chances of war between the United States and the Soviet Union and
between the Soviet Union and China. One may expect them to have similar effects elsewhere. Where
nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense, who will dare to start them? Nuclear
weapons make it possible to approach the deterrent ideal.
Fifth, nuclear weapons can be used for defence as well as for deterrence. Some have argued that an apparently
impregnable nuclear defence can be mounted. The Maginot Line has given defence a bad name. It nevertheless remains true that the
incidence of wars decreases as the perceived difficulty of winning them increases. No one attacks a
defence believed to be impregnable. Nuclear weapons may make it possible to approach the
defensive ideal. If so, the spread of nuclear weapons will further help to maintain peace.
Sixth, new nuclear states will confront the possibilities and feel the constraints that present nuclear
states have experienced. New nuclear states will be more concerned for their safety and more mindful
of dangers than some of the old ones have been. Until recently, only the great and some of the major powers have had
nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons have spread, conventional weapons have proliferated. Under these circumstances, wars have been
fought not at the centre but at the periphery of international politics. The
likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and
defensive capabilities increase. Nuclear weapons, responsibly used, make wars hard to start. Nations
that have nuclear weapons have strong incentives to use them responsibly. These statements hold for
small as for big nuclear powers. Because they do, the measured spread of nuclear weapons is more to
be welcomed than feared.
Yes, US and Russia are still dominating the nuke race --- the chart shows US and Russia
together have 10x more nukes than everyone else combined!
Davenport and Reif 7/3, Davenport, Kelsey [Summary: Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, Lead
author of the P4+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert newsletter, Co-author of a series of seven reports assessing the impact of the Nuclear Security
Summits on efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow, term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, member
of the National Committee on North Korea, serves on the Board of Directors for the Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellowship]. Kingston, Reif A.
[Summary: Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association, Director of Nuclear-Nonproliferation at the
Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation and Council for a Livable World, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow, Dr. Morton Halperinâ's
research assistant on the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, Deputy Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, B.A. in International
Relations from Brown University, 2014 Truman National Security Project Fellow, 2018 Shawn Brimley Next Generation National Security
Leaders Fellow]. “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance”. Arms Control Association, 3 July 2019.
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat // Sage AA
[Davenport Full Quals: Kelsey Davenport is the Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, where she focuses on the nuclear and missile programs in Iran, North Korea, India, and Pakistan and on
international efforts to prevent proliferation and nuclear terrorism. She also reports on developments in these areas for Arms Control Today and runs the Arms Control Association’s project assessing the effectiveness of
multilateral voluntary initiatives that contribute to nonproliferation efforts. She is the lead author of the P4+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert newsletter, which assesses developments related to the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran,
and the North Korea Denuclearization Digest, which tracks efforts to negotiate with North Korea over its nuclear weapons program. Kelsey is also the co-author of a series of seven reports assessing the impact of the Nuclear
Security Summits on efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism. Kelsey joined the Arms Control Association in August 2011 as a Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow. Kelsey has been quoted in numerous publications, including the
Washington Post, The New York Times, Foreign Policy, Newsweek, Reuters, Christian Science Monitor, Vox, and The Guardian and has provided commentary on NPR, CBC, CNN, ABC, MSNBC, Fox News, al-Jazeera, and C-Span. She
has published opeds in various outlets, including TIME, Reuters, CNN, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and Defense One. Kelsey is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the National Committee on
North Korea. She was selected to the CSIS Mid-Career Cadre in 2018 and serves on the Board of Directors for the Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellowship. Prior to joining the Arms Control Association, Kelsey worked a think tank in
Jerusalem researching Middle East security issues. She holds a masters degree in peace studies from the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame and a bachelor of arts summa cum laude in
international studies and political science from Butler University.]
[Reif Full Quals: Kingston A. Reif is the Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association, where his work focuses on nuclear disarmament, deterrence, and arms control, preventing nuclear
terrorism, missile defense, and the defense budget. Reif is an expert on the legislative process and closely monitors Congressional action on these issues. Prior to joining the Arms Control Association, Reif was the Director of
Nuclear-Nonproliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation and Council for a Livable World. Reif originally came to the Center in 2008 as a Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow. From September 2008 until May
2009 he served as Dr. Morton Halperinâ's research assistant on the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission. Reif returned to the Center in May 2009 as the Deputy Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Reif holds a B.A. in
International Relations from Brown University. He spent two years in the U.K. as a British Marshall Scholar where he received a MSc. in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a
M.Litt. in International Security Studies from the University of St. Andrews. He is a 2014 Truman National Security Project Fellow and a 2018 Shawn Brimley Next Generation National Security Leaders Fellow. Reif has published
articles and op-eds in various outlets, including the Washington Post, Foreign Policy, DefenseOne, Time, Defense News, and the Hill. He has been quoted in such publications as The Economist, The New York Times, Time, Defense
News, National Journal, FoxNews.com, and US News and World Report. He has also been interviewed on TV and radio outlets, including C-SPAN's Washington Journal program, CNN's The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer, and AlJazeera.
The bipolar world order independently guarantees reliable internal balancing and
rapid and accurate responses to global threats --- that’s key to preventing miscalc
Waltz 81, Waltz, Kenneth. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”. Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Strategies). 1981.
http://home.sogang.ac.kr/sites/jaechun/courses/Lists/b6/Attachments/39/5.%20The%20spread%20of%20nuclear%20weapons.pdf // Sage AA
[Summary of Quals: Leading IR theorist of last half century, Wrote Theory of International Politics that defined IR for the next decade, B.A. from
Oberlin College and Ph.D. from Columbia University, Ford Professor of Political Science at Berkeley, Member of Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of
War and Peace Studies at Columbia, President of American Political Science Association, Honorary Doctorate from 6 colleges]
[Full Quals: Waltz was a towering figure in the field of international politics, arguably the leading international relations theorist of the last half century. He established himself as a prominent scholar early in his career with
the publication of his first book in 1959. Man, the State, and War is still in print–indeed a digital version is now available–and it continues to be a mainstay of undergraduate courses. Waltz’s lasting contribution was to provide a
typology for the causes of war which helped to organize the then nascent discipline. First-image explanations locate the causes of war within man. Hans Morgenthau, for example, attributed war to man’s desire for power. Secondimage accounts explain war in terms of the structure of states, e.g., democracies versus authoritarian states, capitalist versus socialist. Henry Kissinger makes this kind of argument when he links international instability to
revolutionary states. So do those who argue that democracies do not go to war against each other. Going back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s stag hunt, third-image explanations find the causes of war to lie in the international system
itself and, more specifically, in international anarchy. Even if every individual and every state were good, conflicts of interest would still arise. After all, conflicts or, more politely, differences in taste or circumstance make gains from
trade possible. But in the anarchy of international politics, there is nothing to prevent a state from trying to resolve these differences through the use of force. Theory of International Politics, published in 1979, further defined the
field for the next decade. Whether agreeing or disagreeing with Waltz, virtually every other international relations scholar began by locating his or her work in terms of Waltz. Long before game-theoretic models made the
approach common place, Waltz conceived of the international system in terms of the basic motivations of states and the strategic environment in which states interact in pursuit of their goals. He thought in terms of incentives and
constraints. The most important factor defining the states’ environment and affecting the stability of the international system for Waltz was the distribution of power. The broad patterns of relations among states are largely
determined by their position in the hierarchy of power. Many were amazed that France and Germany found peace after the Second World War given their long history of violent conflict. Waltz was not. Both had fallen from the
ranks of the great powers, and the primary axis of conflict had shifted to the two poles of the bi-polar world. That made the European Community and later the European Union possible. Waltz argued famously and controversially that nuclear proliferation or,
as he preferred to say, the spread of nuclear weapons makes major war less likely. Nuclear-armed states – be they the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, India and Pakistan during the 1999 Kargil War, or a nuclear-armed Iran and its rivals in a future conflict – are less likely to fight a major war against each other than they would be if they did not have nuclear
weapons. The obvious reading for Waltz of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the Kargil conflict was that “the presence of nuclear weapons prevented escalation from major skirmish to full-scale war.” A strong belief that both sides had a second-strike capability was enough to deter. More weapons and more nuclear options did not make things safer or more dangerous; they only
wasted money. An active scholar until the end of his life, Waltz reasoned in “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb” in Foreign Affairs a few months before he died that a nuclear-armed Iran, rather than being the worst possible outcome of the conflict, would probably be the outcome “most likely to restore stability to the Middle East.” By reducing imbalances of power, new nuclear states
Born and raised in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Waltz received his B.A. from Oberlin College and his Ph.D. from Columbia
University in 1954, after serving in the United States Army during the Second World War and the Korean conflict. He taught at Columbia until 1957 when he left for Swarthmore College and then Brandeis University. He joined the
Berkeley faculty in 1971 as the Ford Professor of Political Science. A scholar in great demand, he also lectured and taught at the London School of Economics, the Australian National University, Peking University, Fudan University,
the United States Air Force Academy, and the University of Bologna. He returned to New York and joined the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia after retiring from Berkeley in 1994. A dedicated
teacher, he continued to offer a graduate seminar until 2010 while dividing his time between homes in Manhattan and Harborside, Maine. Waltz was President of the American Political Science Association (1987-1988) and
received honorary doctorates from Copenhagen University, Oberlin College, Nankai University, Aberystwyth University, and most recently from the University of Macedonia in Saloniki, Greece, which he accepted in person in
the spring of 2011. Married for 59 years, Waltz’s beloved wife, Helen “Huddie” Waltz, died in 2008. He was predeceased by a son, Michael, and is survived by two sons, Daniel and Kenneth Jr., and four grandchildren, Sarah Grace,
typically bring more rather than less regional and international stability. In the fall of 2002, Waltz joined a group of other international relations scholars in opposing the coming war with Iraq.
Constantine, Thomas and Thomas Leonidas.]
-
Warsaw Pact: Treaty establishing mutual-defense organization between Soviet Union and Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania
Bipolarity has produced two outstandingly good effects. They are seen by contrasting multipolar and bipolar worlds. First,
in a
multipolar world there are too many powers to permit any of them to draw clear and fixed lines
between allies and adversaries and too few to keep the effects of defection low. With three or more
powers, flexibility of alliances keeps relations of friendship and enmity fluid and makes everyone's
estimate of the present and future relation of forces uncertain. So long as the system is one of fairly
small numbers, the actions of any of them may threaten the security of others. There are too many to
enable anyone to see for sure what is happening, and too few to make what is happening a matter of
indifference.
In a bipolar world, the two great powers depend militarily mainly on themselves. This is almost
entirely true at the strategic nuclear level, largely true at the tactical nuclear level, and partly true at the conventional level. In
1978, for example, the Soviet Union's military expenditures were over 90% of the total for the Warsaw
Treaty Organization, and those of the United States were about 60% of the total for NATO. With a
GNP 30% as large as ours, West Germany's expenditures were 11.5% of the NATO total, and that is the
second largest national contribution. Not only do we carry the main military burden within the alliance because
of our disproportionate resources but also because we contribute disproportionately from those
resources. In fact if not in form, NATO consists of guarantees given by the United States to her European
allies and to Canada. The United States, with a preponderence of nuclear weapons and as many men
in uniform as the West European states combined, may be able to protect them; they cannot protect
her.
Because of the vast differences in the capabilities of member states, the roughly equal sharing of
burdens found in earlier alliance systems is no longer possible. The United States and the Soviet Union
balance each other by ‘internal’ instead of ‘external’ means, relying on their own capabilities more
than on the capabilities of allies. Internal balancing is more reliable and precise than external
balancing. States are less likely to misjudge their relative strengths than they are to misjudge the
strength and reliability of opposing coalitions. Rather than making states properly cautious and
forwarding the chances of peace, uncertainty and miscalculation cause wars. In a bipolar world,
uncertainty lessens and calculations are easier to make. The military might of both great powers
makes quick and easy conquest impossible for either, and this is clearly seen. To respond rapidly to
fine changes in the military balance is at once less important and more easily done.
Second, in the great-power politics of a multipolar world, who is a danger to whom. and who can be
expected to deal with threats and problems, are matters of uncertainty. Dangers are diffused,
responsibilities blurred, and definitions of vital interest easily obscured. Because who is a danger to
whom is often unclear, the incentive to regard all disequilibrating changes with concern and respond
to them with whatever effort may be required is weakened. To respond rapidly to fine changes is at
once more difficult, because of blurred responsibilities, and more important, because states live on
narrow margins. Interdependence of parties, diffusion of dangers, confusion of responses: These are the
characteristics of great-power politics in a multi polar world.
In the great-power politics of a bipolar world, who is a danger to whom is never in doubt. Moreover, with
only two powers capable of acting on a world scale, anything that happens anywhere is potentially of
concern to both of them. Changes may affect each of the two powers differently, and this means all
the more that few changes in the world at large or within each other's national realm are likely to be
thought irrelevant. Self-dependence of parties, clarity of dangers, certainty about who has to face
them: These are characteristics of great-power politics in a bipolar world. Because responsibility is clearly fixed, and
because relative power is easier to estimate. a bipolar world tends to be more peaceful than a
multipolar world.
***2NR***
Impact Topline
2NR – ! – OV
The crux of the debate is what world order is more preferable to prevent war: the aff’s
multi-polar model or the neg’s bipolar model.
On the UQ debate --- we are living in a bipolar order with regards to military power --the US and Russia are centuries ahead of other nations in the nuclear race with 10x
more nuclear weapons.
On the link debate --- The plan collapses the bipolar world order by eliminating
nuclear arsenals and bringing all countries down to the same playing field – that has 2
effects: (a) it eliminates the fear of disrupting the other great power that used to keep
both powers in check, just like how the Cold War was avoided through a mutual
recognition of unacceptable loss between 2 nations, and (b) multipolarity makes it
impossible to recognize what is going on and draw the line between allies and
adversaries in the midst of a multitude of alliances.
On the impact debate --- the DA turns the case --- 2 reasons
1. Squo solves case – 2 independent reasons.
(a) The bipolar world order disincentivizes the first strike anyway – but eliminating
nukes is destabilizing and volatile, which is uniquely bad and links to the link turns
(b) Bipolarity checks regional nuclear tensions – if regional tensions like Indo-Pak
escalated, that would guarantee a response from the US or Russia, which smaller
states aren’t able to deal with.
2. Link turns case – 2 independent reasons
(a) Bipolarity prevents miscalc – the existence of only two great powers makes it
infinitely easier for states to perform accurate risk-calculus compared to a world with
several opposing coalitions, and those 2 powers can respond faster to global threats
with clear definitions of vital interest in mind
(b) Even if we don’t win the link to bipolarity, nukes independently prevent miscalc --every nation knows that risking nuclear war entails unacceptable losses, but leaders
have empirically concluded conventional wars are net beneficial.
You should prefer empirics over analytics on the deterrence debate --- 3 reasons
1. Analytics are predictive and there are multiple reasons for/against disarmament –
empirics are preferable because they resolve the link differentials and show the net
advantage
2. Their analytical arguments are empirical claims without empirical warrants – even if
the aff has some advantage, my historical analysis proves the disad outweighs
3. I check back for circumstantial differences between the past and status quo by
looking at the heights of tensions in past wars
UQ
AT: Multi-Polar Now
1] The multipolarity the 1AR refers to is completely different from the multipolarity
the 1NC refers to. The 1NC refers to military bipolarity in which 2 great powers have
relatively equal nuclear forces, but the 1AR refers to multipolarity in general with
economic or diplomatic power. The aff creates a military-based multipolar world order
exists because all nations have very similar sizes and capabilities of conventional
weapons that put them on the same playing field --- the neg world preserves
bipolarity by ensuring that the US and Russia have an overwhelming number of
nuclear weapons --- together, they have 10x more than all other nuclear nations
combined! That allows them to adequately gauge their relative strengths and respond
quickly to global threats – that’s the Waltz evidence.
2] Even if there are regional nuclear tensions between nations, bipolarity can still be
true --- the US and Russia’s domination over nuclear weapons disincentivizes smaller
nations from escalating conflicts because that escalation would incur the wrath of a
nuclear superpower. The fact that there are regional nuclear conflicts doesn’t disprove
the existence of an overarching bipolar relationship that keeps those tensions in
check.
AT: Hegemony Now
1] The hegemony the 1AR refers to is completely different from the hegemony the
1NC refers to. The 1NC refers to military bipolarity in which 2 great powers have
relatively equal nuclear forces, but the 1AR refers to hegemony in general with
economic or diplomatic power. The aff creates a military-based multipolar world order
exists because all nations have very similar sizes and capabilities of conventional
weapons that put them on the same playing field --- the neg world preserves
bipolarity by ensuring that the US and Russia have an overwhelming number of
nuclear weapons --- together, they have 10x more than all other nuclear nations
combined! That allows them to adequately gauge their relative strengths and respond
quickly to global threats – that’s the Waltz evidence.
2] We are NOT in a military hegemony – nukes are the key to military primacy, and the
US and Russia are neck to neck in the nuclear race --- you should definitely err
negative because it’s been empirically proven that the US and Russia have
counterbalanced each other before AND Russia is obviously trying to develop new
tech that can circumvent US tech.
Link
2NR – AT: Deterrence Case C/A
The aff groups 2 arguments the DA makes into one, which is not true. The Waltz
evidence says (a) nukes are key to bipolarity, which prevents war, and (b) nukes
independently prevent war. Even if we lose nukes independently preventing
conventional war, Waltz indicates that bipolarity makes it infinitely easier for states to
assess their relative strengths and respond faster to global threats. The aff can win
that nukes don’t prevent conventional war or deter miscalc, but the neg can still win if
we prove that nukes create a bipolar world order that sets a precedent for new
nuclear states, allows states to perform accurate risk-calclulus by identifying relative
strengths easily, and lets nations respond faster to global threats. We will still win
nukes prevent war on their own, but the neg doesn’t need to win that in order to win
the DA.
2NR – AT: Combine Forces
Their model of alliances is outdated --- separate national systems don’t add up and
states fear giving control of forces to other nations
Waltz 81, Waltz, Kenneth. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”. Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Strategies). 1981.
http://home.sogang.ac.kr/sites/jaechun/courses/Lists/b6/Attachments/39/5.%20The%20spread%20of%20nuclear%20weapons.pdf // Sage AA
[Summary of Quals: Leading IR theorist of last half century, Wrote Theory of International Politics that defined IR for the next decade, B.A. from
Oberlin College and Ph.D. from Columbia University, Ford Professor of Political Science at Berkeley, Member of Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of
War and Peace Studies at Columbia, President of American Political Science Association, Honorary Doctorate from 6 colleges]
[Full Quals: Waltz was a towering figure in the field of international politics, arguably the leading international relations theorist of the last half century. He established himself as a prominent scholar early in his career with
the publication of his first book in 1959. Man, the State, and War is still in print–indeed a digital version is now available–and it continues to be a mainstay of undergraduate courses. Waltz’s lasting contribution was to provide a
typology for the causes of war which helped to organize the then nascent discipline. First-image explanations locate the causes of war within man. Hans Morgenthau, for example, attributed war to man’s desire for power. Secondimage accounts explain war in terms of the structure of states, e.g., democracies versus authoritarian states, capitalist versus socialist. Henry Kissinger makes this kind of argument when he links international instability to
revolutionary states. So do those who argue that democracies do not go to war against each other. Going back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s stag hunt, third-image explanations find the causes of war to lie in the international system
itself and, more specifically, in international anarchy. Even if every individual and every state were good, conflicts of interest would still arise. After all, conflicts or, more politely, differences in taste or circumstance make gains from
trade possible. But in the anarchy of international politics, there is nothing to prevent a state from trying to resolve these differences through the use of force. Theory of International Politics, published in 1979, further defined the
field for the next decade. Whether agreeing or disagreeing with Waltz, virtually every other international relations scholar began by locating his or her work in terms of Waltz. Long before game-theoretic models made the
approach common place, Waltz conceived of the international system in terms of the basic motivations of states and the strategic environment in which states interact in pursuit of their goals. He thought in terms of incentives and
constraints. The most important factor defining the states’ environment and affecting the stability of the international system for Waltz was the distribution of power. The broad patterns of relations among states are largely
determined by their position in the hierarchy of power. Many were amazed that France and Germany found peace after the Second World War given their long history of violent conflict. Waltz was not. Both had fallen from the
ranks of the great powers, and the primary axis of conflict had shifted to the two poles of the bi-polar world. That made the European Community and later the European Union possible. Waltz argued famously and controversially that nuclear proliferation or,
as he preferred to say, the spread of nuclear weapons makes major war less likely. Nuclear-armed states – be they the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, India and Pakistan during the 1999 Kargil War, or a nuclear-armed Iran and its rivals in a future conflict – are less likely to fight a major war against each other than they would be if they did not have nuclear
weapons. The obvious reading for Waltz of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the Kargil conflict was that “the presence of nuclear weapons prevented escalation from major skirmish to full-scale war.” A strong belief that both sides had a second-strike capability was enough to deter. More weapons and more nuclear options did not make things safer or more dangerous; they only
wasted money. An active scholar until the end of his life, Waltz reasoned in “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb” in Foreign Affairs a few months before he died that a nuclear-armed Iran, rather than being the worst possible outcome of the conflict, would probably be the outcome “most likely to restore stability to the Middle East.” By reducing imbalances of power, new nuclear states
Born and raised in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Waltz received his B.A. from Oberlin College and his Ph.D. from Columbia
University in 1954, after serving in the United States Army during the Second World War and the Korean conflict. He taught at Columbia until 1957 when he left for Swarthmore College and then Brandeis University. He joined the
Berkeley faculty in 1971 as the Ford Professor of Political Science. A scholar in great demand, he also lectured and taught at the London School of Economics, the Australian National University, Peking University, Fudan University,
the United States Air Force Academy, and the University of Bologna. He returned to New York and joined the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia after retiring from Berkeley in 1994. A dedicated
teacher, he continued to offer a graduate seminar until 2010 while dividing his time between homes in Manhattan and Harborside, Maine. Waltz was President of the American Political Science Association (1987-1988) and
received honorary doctorates from Copenhagen University, Oberlin College, Nankai University, Aberystwyth University, and most recently from the University of Macedonia in Saloniki, Greece, which he accepted in person in
the spring of 2011. Married for 59 years, Waltz’s beloved wife, Helen “Huddie” Waltz, died in 2008. He was predeceased by a son, Michael, and is survived by two sons, Daniel and Kenneth Jr., and four grandchildren, Sarah Grace,
typically bring more rather than less regional and international stability. In the fall of 2002, Waltz joined a group of other international relations scholars in opposing the coming war with Iraq.
Constantine, Thomas and Thomas Leonidas.]
In the old days weaker
powers could improve their positions through alliance by adding the strength of
foreign armies to their own. Cannot some of the middle states do together what they are unable to do
alone? For two decisive reasons, the answer is ‘no’. First, nuclear forces do not add up. The technology of
warheads, of delivery vehicles, of detection and surveillance devices, of command and control
systems, count more than the size of forces. Combining separate national forces is not much help.
Second, to reach top technological levels would require lull collaboration by, say, several European
states. To achieve this has proved politically impossible. As de Gaulle often said, nuclear weapons make
alliances obsolete. At the strategic level he was right.
States fear dividing their strategic labours fully—from research and development through production,
planning, and deployment. This is less because one of them might in the future be at war with another, and more because
anyone's decision to use the weapons against third parties might be fatal to all of them. Decisions to
use nuclear weapons may be decisions to commit suicide.
Only a national authority can be entrusted with the decision, again as de Gaulle always claimed. Only by merging and
losing their political identities can middle states become great powers. The non-additivity of nuclear forces means that in
our bipolar world efforts of lesser states cannot tilt the strategic balance.
Great powers are strong not simply because they have nuclear weapons but also because their
immense resources enable them to generate and maintain power of all types. military and other, at
strategic and tactical levels. Entering the great-power club was easier when great powers were larger in number and smaller in size.
With fewer and bigger ones, barriers to entry have risen. The club will long remain the world's most exclusive one. We
need not fear that the spread of nuclear weapons will turn the world into a multipolar one.
2NR – AT: Miscalc/Deterrence
Nukes are comparatively better than conventional forces at preventing miscalc and
deterring first strikes --- we have the best author and best analysis – please refer to
the card after round!!
Waltz 81, Waltz, Kenneth. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”. Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Strategies). 1981.
http://home.sogang.ac.kr/sites/jaechun/courses/Lists/b6/Attachments/39/5.%20The%20spread%20of%20nuclear%20weapons.pdf // Sage AA
[Summary of Quals: Leading IR theorist of last half century, Wrote Theory of International Politics that defined IR for the next decade, B.A. from
Oberlin College and Ph.D. from Columbia University, Ford Professor of Political Science at Berkeley, Member of Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of
War and Peace Studies at Columbia, President of American Political Science Association, Honorary Doctorate from 6 colleges]
[Full Quals: Waltz was a towering figure in the field of international politics, arguably the leading international relations theorist of the last half century. He established himself as a prominent scholar early in his career with
the publication of his first book in 1959. Man, the State, and War is still in print–indeed a digital version is now available–and it continues to be a mainstay of undergraduate courses. Waltz’s lasting contribution was to provide a
typology for the causes of war which helped to organize the then nascent discipline. First-image explanations locate the causes of war within man. Hans Morgenthau, for example, attributed war to man’s desire for power. Secondimage accounts explain war in terms of the structure of states, e.g., democracies versus authoritarian states, capitalist versus socialist. Henry Kissinger makes this kind of argument when he links international instability to
revolutionary states. So do those who argue that democracies do not go to war against each other. Going back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s stag hunt, third-image explanations find the causes of war to lie in the international system
itself and, more specifically, in international anarchy. Even if every individual and every state were good, conflicts of interest would still arise. After all, conflicts or, more politely, differences in taste or circumstance make gains from
trade possible. But in the anarchy of international politics, there is nothing to prevent a state from trying to resolve these differences through the use of force. Theory of International Politics, published in 1979, further defined the
field for the next decade. Whether agreeing or disagreeing with Waltz, virtually every other international relations scholar began by locating his or her work in terms of Waltz. Long before game-theoretic models made the
approach common place, Waltz conceived of the international system in terms of the basic motivations of states and the strategic environment in which states interact in pursuit of their goals. He thought in terms of incentives and
constraints. The most important factor defining the states’ environment and affecting the stability of the international system for Waltz was the distribution of power. The broad patterns of relations among states are largely
determined by their position in the hierarchy of power. Many were amazed that France and Germany found peace after the Second World War given their long history of violent conflict. Waltz was not. Both had fallen from the
ranks of the great powers, and the primary axis of conflict had shifted to the two poles of the bi-polar world. That made the European Community and later the European Union possible. Waltz argued famously and controversially that nuclear proliferation or,
as he preferred to say, the spread of nuclear weapons makes major war less likely. Nuclear-armed states – be they the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, India and Pakistan during the 1999 Kargil War, or a nuclear-armed Iran and its rivals in a future conflict – are less likely to fight a major war against each other than they would be if they did not have nuclear
weapons. The obvious reading for Waltz of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the Kargil conflict was that “the presence of nuclear weapons prevented escalation from major skirmish to full-scale war.” A strong belief that both sides had a second-strike capability was enough to deter. More weapons and more nuclear options did not make things safer or more dangerous; they only
wasted money. An active scholar until the end of his life, Waltz reasoned in “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb” in Foreign Affairs a few months before he died that a nuclear-armed Iran, rather than being the worst possible outcome of the conflict, would probably be the outcome “most likely to restore stability to the Middle East.” By reducing imbalances of power, new nuclear states
Born and raised in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Waltz received his B.A. from Oberlin College and his Ph.D. from Columbia
University in 1954, after serving in the United States Army during the Second World War and the Korean conflict. He taught at Columbia until 1957 when he left for Swarthmore College and then Brandeis University. He joined the
Berkeley faculty in 1971 as the Ford Professor of Political Science. A scholar in great demand, he also lectured and taught at the London School of Economics, the Australian National University, Peking University, Fudan University,
the United States Air Force Academy, and the University of Bologna. He returned to New York and joined the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia after retiring from Berkeley in 1994. A dedicated
teacher, he continued to offer a graduate seminar until 2010 while dividing his time between homes in Manhattan and Harborside, Maine. Waltz was President of the American Political Science Association (1987-1988) and
received honorary doctorates from Copenhagen University, Oberlin College, Nankai University, Aberystwyth University, and most recently from the University of Macedonia in Saloniki, Greece, which he accepted in person in
the spring of 2011. Married for 59 years, Waltz’s beloved wife, Helen “Huddie” Waltz, died in 2008. He was predeceased by a son, Michael, and is survived by two sons, Daniel and Kenneth Jr., and four grandchildren, Sarah Grace,
typically bring more rather than less regional and international stability. In the fall of 2002, Waltz joined a group of other international relations scholars in opposing the coming war with Iraq.
Constantine, Thomas and Thomas Leonidas.]
Weapons and strategies change the situation of states in ways that make them more or less secure, as
Robert Jervis has brilliantly shown. If weapons are not well suited for conquest, neighbours have more peace of mind. According to the
defensive-deterrent ideal, we should expect war to become less likely when weaponry is such as to
make conquest more difficult, to discourage pre-emptive and preventive war, and to make coercive
threats less credible. Do nuclear weapons have those effects? Some answers can be found by considering how nuclear deterrence and
how nuclear defence may improve the prospects for peace.
First, wars can be fought in the face of deterrent threats, but the higher the stakes and the closer a
country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own
destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. Wars between nuclear states may
escalate as the loser uses larger and larger warheads. Fearing that, states will want to draw back. Not
escalation but de-escalation becomes likely. War remains possible. but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for. If states can score
only small gains because large ones risk retaliation, they have little incentive to fight.
Second, states act with less care if the expected costs of war are low and with more care if they are
high. In 1853 and 1854, Britain and France expected to win an easy victory if they went to war against
Russia. Prestige abroad and political popularity at home would be gained. if not much else. The vagueness of their
plans was matched by the carelessness of their acts. In blundering into the Crimean War they acted hastily on scant information, pandered to
their people's frenzy for war, showed more concern for an ally's whim than for the adversary's situation, failed to specify the changes in
behaviour that threats were supposed to bring. and inclined towards testing strength first and bargaining second. In
sharp contrast,
the presence of nuclear weapons makes States exceedingly cautious. Think of Kennedy and Khruschev
in the Cuban missile crisis. Why fight if you can't win much and might lose everything?
Third, the question demands a negative answer all the more insistently when the deterrent
deployment of nuclear weapons contributes more to a country's security than does conquest of
territory. A country with a deterrent strategy does not need the extent of territory required by a
country relying on a conventional defence in depth. A deterrent strategy makes it unnecessary for a
country to fight for the sake of increasing its security, and this removes a major cause of war.
Fourth, deterrent effect depends both on one's capabilities and on the will one has to use them. The
will of the attacked, striving to preserve its own territory, can ordinarily be presumed stronger than
the will of the attacker striving to annex someone else's territory. Knowing this, the would-be attacker
is further inhibited.
Certainty about the relative strength of adversaries also improves the prospects for peace. From the late nineteenth century onwards the speed
of technological innovation increased the difficulty of estimating relative strengths and predicting the course of campaigns. Since World War II,
technology has advanced even faster, but short of an antiballistic missile (ABM) breakthrough, this does not matter very much. It does not
disturb the American-Russian equilibrium because one side's missiles are not made obsolete by improvements in the other side's missiles. In
1906 the British Dreadnought, with the greater range and fire power of its guns, made older battleships obsolete. This does not happen to
missiles. As Bernard Brodie put it: 'Weapons that do not have to fight their like do not become useless because of the advent of newer and
superior types”. They do have to survive their like, but that is a much simpler problem to solve (see discussion below).
Many wars might have been avoided had their outcomes been foreseen. 'To be sure,' Georg Simmel once said, ‘the most effective
presupposition for preventing struggle, the exact knowledge of the comparative strength of the two parties, is very often only to be obtained by
the actual fighting out of the conflict'. Miscalculation
causes wars. One side expects victory at an affordable
price, while the other side hopes to avoid defeat. Here the differences between conventionalmultipolar and nuclear-bipolar worlds are fundamental. In the former, states are too often tempted to
act on advantages that are wishfully discerned and narrowly calculated. In 1914, neither Germany nor
France tried very hard to avoid a general war. Both hoped for victory even though they believed their
forces to be quite evenly matched. In 1941, Japan, in attacking the United States, could hope for
victory only if a series of events that were possible but not highly probable took place. Japan would
grab resources sufficient for continuing the conquest of China and then dig in to defend a limited
perimeter. Meanwhile, the United States and Britain would have to deal with Germany, which, having defeated the Soviet Union, would be
supreme in Europe. Japan could then hope to fight a defensive war for a year or two until America, her purpose weakened, became willing to
make a compromise peace in Asia.
Countries more readily run the risks of war when defeat, if it comes, is distant and is expected to bring
only limited damage. Given such expectations, leaders do not have to be insane to sound the trumpet and urge their people to be bold
and courageous in the pursuit of victory. The outcome of battles and the course of campaigns are hard to foresee
because so many things affect them, including the shifting allegiance and determination of alliance
members. Predicting the result of conventional wars has proved difficult.
Uncertainty about outcomes does not work decisively against the fighting of wars in conventional
worlds. Countries armed with conventional weapons go to war knowing that even in defeat their
suffering will be limited. Calculations about nuclear war are differently made. Nuclear worlds call for
and encourage a different kind of reasoning. If countries armed with nuclear weapons go to war, they
do so knowing that their suffering may be unlimited. Of course, it also may not be. But that is not the kind of uncertainty
that encourages anyone to use force. In a conventional world, one is uncertain about winning or losing. In a
nuclear world, one is uncertain about surviving or being annihilated. If force is used and not kept within limits,
catastrophe will result. That prediction is easy to make because it does not require close estimates of
opposing forces. The number of one's cities that can be severely damaged is at least equal to the
number of strategic warheads an adversary can deliver. Variations of number mean little within wide ranges. The
expected effect of the deterrent achieves an easy clarity because wide margins of error in estimates of
probable damage do not matter. Do we expect to lose one city or two, two cities or ten? When these
are the pertinent questions, we stop thinking about running risks and start worrying about how to
avoid them. In a conventional world, deterrent threats are ineffective because the damage
threatened is distant, limited, and problematic. Nuclear weapons make military miscalculations
difficult and politically pertinent prediction easy.
2NR – AT: Other States Proliferate
1] Other states cannot achieve the same degree of nuclear arms that the US and
Russia have anytime soon --- France, which is third in line, needs 5,000+ nukes to catch
up with the US!! The bipolarity is preserved by the overwhelming number of nukes
that the US and Russia have.
2] The incentive to proliferate is tempered by the fear of provoking both twin
superpowers --- empirically proven by NoKo, which has said for a decade that it will
proliferate but doesn’t want to anger a nuclear US.
Impact
2NR – EXT – Bipolarity Good
[THIS IS IN LONG VERSION] The bipolar world order guarantees reliable internal
balancing and rapid and accurate responses to global threats
Waltz 81, Waltz, Kenneth. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”. Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Strategies). 1981.
http://home.sogang.ac.kr/sites/jaechun/courses/Lists/b6/Attachments/39/5.%20The%20spread%20of%20nuclear%20weapons.pdf // Sage AA
[Summary of Quals: Leading IR theorist of last half century, Wrote Theory of International Politics that defined IR for the next decade, B.A. from
Oberlin College and Ph.D. from Columbia University, Ford Professor of Political Science at Berkeley, Member of Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of
War and Peace Studies at Columbia, President of American Political Science Association, Honorary Doctorate from 6 colleges]
[Full Quals: Waltz was a towering figure in the field of international politics, arguably the leading international relations theorist of the last half century. He established himself as a prominent scholar early in his career with
the publication of his first book in 1959. Man, the State, and War is still in print–indeed a digital version is now available–and it continues to be a mainstay of undergraduate courses. Waltz’s lasting contribution was to provide a
typology for the causes of war which helped to organize the then nascent discipline. First-image explanations locate the causes of war within man. Hans Morgenthau, for example, attributed war to man’s desire for power. Secondimage accounts explain war in terms of the structure of states, e.g., democracies versus authoritarian states, capitalist versus socialist. Henry Kissinger makes this kind of argument when he links international instability to
revolutionary states. So do those who argue that democracies do not go to war against each other. Going back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s stag hunt, third-image explanations find the causes of war to lie in the international system
itself and, more specifically, in international anarchy. Even if every individual and every state were good, conflicts of interest would still arise. After all, conflicts or, more politely, differences in taste or circumstance make gains from
trade possible. But in the anarchy of international politics, there is nothing to prevent a state from trying to resolve these differences through the use of force. Theory of International Politics, published in 1979, further defined the
field for the next decade. Whether agreeing or disagreeing with Waltz, virtually every other international relations scholar began by locating his or her work in terms of Waltz. Long before game-theoretic models made the
approach common place, Waltz conceived of the international system in terms of the basic motivations of states and the strategic environment in which states interact in pursuit of their goals. He thought in terms of incentives and
constraints. The most important factor defining the states’ environment and affecting the stability of the international system for Waltz was the distribution of power. The broad patterns of relations among states are largely
determined by their position in the hierarchy of power. Many were amazed that France and Germany found peace after the Second World War given their long history of violent conflict. Waltz was not. Both had fallen from the
ranks of the great powers, and the primary axis of conflict had shifted to the two poles of the bi-polar world. That made the European Community and later the European Union possible. Waltz argued famously and controversially that nuclear proliferation or,
as he preferred to say, the spread of nuclear weapons makes major war less likely. Nuclear-armed states – be they the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, India and Pakistan during the 1999 Kargil War, or a nuclear-armed Iran and its rivals in a future conflict – are less likely to fight a major war against each other than they would be if they did not have nuclear
weapons. The obvious reading for Waltz of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the Kargil conflict was that “the presence of nuclear weapons prevented escalation from major skirmish to full-scale war.” A strong belief that both sides had a second-strike capability was enough to deter. More weapons and more nuclear options did not make things safer or more dangerous; they only
wasted money. An active scholar until the end of his life, Waltz reasoned in “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb” in Foreign Affairs a few months before he died that a nuclear-armed Iran, rather than being the worst possible outcome of the conflict, would probably be the outcome “most likely to restore stability to the Middle East.” By reducing imbalances of power, new nuclear states
Born and raised in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Waltz received his B.A. from Oberlin College and his Ph.D. from Columbia
University in 1954, after serving in the United States Army during the Second World War and the Korean conflict. He taught at Columbia until 1957 when he left for Swarthmore College and then Brandeis University. He joined the
Berkeley faculty in 1971 as the Ford Professor of Political Science. A scholar in great demand, he also lectured and taught at the London School of Economics, the Australian National University, Peking University, Fudan University,
the United States Air Force Academy, and the University of Bologna. He returned to New York and joined the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia after retiring from Berkeley in 1994. A dedicated
teacher, he continued to offer a graduate seminar until 2010 while dividing his time between homes in Manhattan and Harborside, Maine. Waltz was President of the American Political Science Association (1987-1988) and
received honorary doctorates from Copenhagen University, Oberlin College, Nankai University, Aberystwyth University, and most recently from the University of Macedonia in Saloniki, Greece, which he accepted in person in
the spring of 2011. Married for 59 years, Waltz’s beloved wife, Helen “Huddie” Waltz, died in 2008. He was predeceased by a son, Michael, and is survived by two sons, Daniel and Kenneth Jr., and four grandchildren, Sarah Grace,
typically bring more rather than less regional and international stability. In the fall of 2002, Waltz joined a group of other international relations scholars in opposing the coming war with Iraq.
Constantine, Thomas and Thomas Leonidas.]
-
Warsaw Pact: Treaty establishing mutual-defense organization between Soviet Union and Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania
Bipolarity has produced two outstandingly good effects. They are seen by contrasting multipolar and bipolar worlds. First,
in a
multipolar world there are too many powers to permit any of them to draw clear and fixed lines
between allies and adversaries and too few to keep the effects of defection low. With three or more
powers, flexibility of alliances keeps relations of friendship and enmity fluid and makes everyone's
estimate of the present and future relation of forces uncertain. So long as the system is one of fairly
small numbers, the actions of any of them may threaten the security of others. There are too many to
enable anyone to see for sure what is happening, and too few to make what is happening a matter of
indifference.
In a bipolar world, the two great powers depend militarily mainly on themselves. This is almost
entirely true at the strategic nuclear level, largely true at the tactical nuclear level, and partly true at the conventional level. In
1978, for example, the Soviet Union's military expenditures were over 90% of the total for the Warsaw
Treaty Organization, and those of the United States were about 60% of the total for NATO. With a
GNP 30% as large as ours, West Germany's expenditures were 11.5% of the NATO total, and that is the
second largest national contribution. Not only do we carry the main military burden within the alliance because
of our disproportionate resources but also because we contribute disproportionately from those
resources. In fact if not in form, NATO consists of guarantees given by the United States to her European
allies and to Canada. The United States, with a preponderence of nuclear weapons and as many men
in uniform as the West European states combined, may be able to protect them; they cannot protect
her.
Because of the vast differences in the capabilities of member states, the roughly equal sharing of
burdens found in earlier alliance systems is no longer possible. The United States and the Soviet Union
balance each other by ‘internal’ instead of ‘external’ means, relying on their own capabilities more
than on the capabilities of allies. Internal balancing is more reliable and precise than external
balancing. States are less likely to misjudge their relative strengths than they are to misjudge the
strength and reliability of opposing coalitions. Rather than making states properly cautious and
forwarding the chances of peace, uncertainty and miscalculation cause wars. In a bipolar world,
uncertainty lessens and calculations are easier to make. The military might of both great powers
makes quick and easy conquest impossible for either, and this is clearly seen. To respond rapidly to
fine changes in the military balance is at once less important and more easily done.
Second, in the great-power politics of a multipolar world, who is a danger to whom. and who can be
expected to deal with threats and problems, are matters of uncertainty. Dangers are diffused,
responsibilities blurred, and definitions of vital interest easily obscured. Because who is a danger to
whom is often unclear, the incentive to regard all disequilibrating changes with concern and respond
to them with whatever effort may be required is weakened. To respond rapidly to fine changes is at
once more difficult, because of blurred responsibilities, and more important, because states live on
narrow margins. Interdependence of parties, diffusion of dangers, confusion of responses: These are the
characteristics of great-power politics in a multi polar world.
In the great-power politics of a bipolar world, who is a danger to whom is never in doubt. Moreover, with
only two powers capable of acting on a world scale, anything that happens anywhere is potentially of
concern to both of them. Changes may affect each of the two powers differently, and this means all
the more that few changes in the world at large or within each other's national realm are likely to be
thought irrelevant. Self-dependence of parties, clarity of dangers, certainty about who has to face
them: These are characteristics of great-power politics in a bipolar world. Because responsibility is clearly fixed, and
because relative power is easier to estimate. a bipolar world tends to be more peaceful than a
multipolar world.
2NR – AT: Multipolarity Good
1] History proves that multipolarity will inevitably fail and cause the next Great War --it caused 2 World Wars in under 50 years!
Varisco 13, Varsico, Andrea Edordo. [THIS CONTENT WAS WRITTEN BY A STUDENT AND ASSESSED AS PART OF A UNIVERSITY DEGREE.]
“Towards a Multi-Polar International System: Which Prospects for Global Peace?” E-International Relations Students, 3 June 2013.
https://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/03/towards-a-multi-polar-international-system-which-prospects-for-global-peace/ // Sage AA
Multi-Polarity in History History
has indeed already shown how multi-polarity is more unstable and warprone than bipolarity or unipolarity. The modern history of Europe for example has been characterized by
many multi-polar moments.
At the beginning of the 17th century, the multi-polar European order was swept away by the Thirty
Years War, a conflict that lasted from 1618 to 1648 and was triggered by religious, territorial and
dynastic disputes over the internal politics and balance of power among various Christian groups and
principalities. The conflict involved the Holy Roman Empire of the Hapsburgs, German Protestant
princes, the foreign powers of France, Sweden, Denmark, England and the United Provinces and was
ended by the Peace of Westphalia, which introduced the concept of state sovereignty and gave rise to the modern international system of
states. This system of states was challenged by the expansion of the Napoleonic Empire at the beginning of the 19th century. After the defeat of
the Emperor, in 1815 the great powers held the Congress of Vienna to re-establish the previous state order and formulated the Concert of
Europe as a mechanism to enforce their decisions.
The Concert of Europe was composed by the Quadruple Alliance of Russia, Prussia, Austria and Great
Britain and was aimed to achieve a balance of power in Europe, preserving the territorial status quo, protecting
legitimate governments and containing France after decades of war. The Concert of Europe was one of the few historical examples of stable
multi-polarity: the regular meetings of the great powers assured decades of peace and stability in the continent. The Concert of Europe
suppressed uprisings for constitutional governments in Italy and Spain, secured the independence of Greece and Belgium but did
not
prevent the Crimean War in 1853 and a return to great power rivalry.
During the 20th century multi-polar international systems resulted in instability and led to two world
wars in less than 50 years. The balance of power and the system of alliances of the early 20th century
was swept away by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand of Austria in 1914. That event triggered
World War I, a global conflict that caused the death of more than 15 million people in less than five
years. After few decades, the multi-polar world emerged by World War I with a new system of
alliances and the multilateral body of the League of Nations was not able to tame the totalitarian
aspirations of Hitler. The German invasion of Poland in 1939 triggered World War II, the deadliest
conflict of the history which resulted in millions of deaths and in the holocaust. Since the end of the
World War II the world has never been multi-polar again, nevertheless these historical accounts seem
to indicate how multi-polarity often created an unstable and unpredictable world, characterized by
shifting alliances and by the aspiration of the rising powers to change the balance of power and create
a new order.
2] Cross-apply the disad overview here --- we’ve given you explicit warrants on why
multipolarity is insufficient to check back conventional warfare and only bipolarity can
create incentive structures that optimize risk calculus and prevent miscalculation. That
means that even if they win that multipolarity is good for economic growth,
diplomacy, or other non-military impacts, we are winning that bipolarity is good
specifically in the context of preventing war. AND you should prefer the 2NR analysis –
the 1AR just read a card saying multipolarity good that isn’t contextualized
whatsoever to the DA – you shouldn’t let the 2AR re-extrapolate the card since I don’t
have a chance to respond.
2NR – AT: Liberalism K
Liberalism is both inevitable and good – its self-correcting mechanisms maintain global
stability, facilitate international cooperation to resolve intractable problems, and raise
global standards of living while constantly correcting for failure. Any other system
risks global catastrophe and can’t be effectuated anyway given liberalism’s
entrenched nature.
Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry ’18, *Deudney: Associate Professor of political science,
international relations and political theory at Johns Hopkins University, received the Alumni
Distinguished Teaching Award at Johns Hopkins University, former senior research fellow at the
TransAtlantic Academy at the German Marshall Fund, **Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of
Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Co-Director of Princeton’s Center for
International Security Studies, served as a member of the Policy Planning Staff in 1991-92, as a member
of an advisory group at the State Department in 2003-04, and as a member of the Council on Foreign
Relations Task Force on U.S.-European relations, “Liberal World: The Resilient Order,” Foreign Affairs
2018, Issue 4, pgs. 18-22
In many respects, today's liberal democratic malaise is a byproduct of the liberal world order's success.
After the Cold War, that order became a global system, expanding beyond its birthplace in the West. But
as free markets spread, problems began to crop up: economic inequality grew, old political bargains
between capital and labor broke down, and social supports eroded. The benefits of globalization and
economic expansion were distributed disproportionately to elites. Oligarchic power bloomed. A
modulated form of capitalism morphed into winnertake- all casino capitalism. Many new democracies
turned out to lack the traditions and habits necessary to sustain democratic institutions. And large flows
of immigrants triggered a xenophobic backlash. Together, these developments have called into question
the legitimacy of liberal democratic life and created openings for opportunistic demagogues.
Just as the causes of this malaise are clear, so is its solution: a return to the fundamentals of liberal
democracy. Rather than deeply challenging the first principles of liberal democracy, the current
problems call for reforms to better realize them. To reduce inequality, political leaders will need to
return to the social democratic policies embodied in the New Deal, pass more progressive taxation, and
invest in education and infrastructure. To foster a sense of liberal democratic identity, they will need to
emphasize education as a catalyst for assimilation and promote national and public service. In other
words, the remedy for the problems of liberal democracy is more liberal democracy; liberalism contains
the seeds of its own salvation.
Indeed, liberal democracies have repeatedly recovered from crises resulting from their own excesses. In
the 1930s, overproduction and the integration of financial markets brought about an economic
depression, which triggered the rise of fascism. But it also triggered the New Deal and social democracy,
leading to a more stable form of capitalism. In the 1950s, the success of the Manhattan Project,
combined with the emerging U.S.-Soviet rivalry, created the novel threat of a worldwide nuclear
holocaust. That threat gave rise to arms control pacts and agreements concerning the governance of
global spaces, deals forged by the United States in collaboration with the Soviet Union. In the 1970s,
rising middle-class consumption led to oil shortages, economic stagnation, and environmental decay. In
response, the advanced industrial democracies established oil coordination agreements, invested in
clean energy, and struck numerous international environmental accords aimed at reducing pollutants.
The problems that liberal democracies face today, while great, are certainly not more challenging than
those that they have faced and overcome in these historically recent decades. Of course, there is no
guarantee that liberal democracies will successfully rise to the occasion, but to count them out would fly
in the face of repeated historical experiences.
Today's dire predictions ignore these past successes. They suffer from a blinding presentism. Taking
what is new and threatening as the master pattern is an understandable reflex in the face of change, but
it is almost never a very good guide to the future. Large-scale human arrangements such as liberal
democracy rarely change as rapidly or as radically as they seem to in the moment. If history is any guide,
today's illiberal populists and authoritarians will evoke resistance and countermovements.
THE RESILIENT ORDER
After World War II, liberal democracies joined together to create an international order that reflected
their shared interests. And as is the case with liberal democracy itself, the order that emerged to
accompany it cannot be easily undone. For one thing, it is deeply embedded. Hundreds of millions, if not
billions, of people have geared their activities and expectations to the order's institutions and incentives,
from farmers to microchip makers. However unappealing aspects of it may be, replacing the liberal
order with something significantly different would be extremely difficult. Despite the high expectations
they generate, revolutionary moments often fail to make enduring changes. It is unrealistic today to
think that a few years of nationalist demagoguery will dramatically undo liberalism.
Growing interdependence makes the order especially difficult to overturn. Ever since its inception in the
eighteenth century, liberalism has been deeply committed to the progressive improvement of the
human condition through scientific discovery and technological advancements. This Enlightenment
project began to bear practical fruits on a large scale in the nineteenth century, transforming virtually
every aspect of human life. New techniques for production, communication, transportation, and
destruction poured forth. The liberal system has been at the forefront not just of stoking those fires of
innovation but also of addressing the negative consequences. Adam Smith's case for free trade, for
example, was strengthened when it became easier to establish supply chains across global distances.
And the age-old case for peace was vastly strengthened when weapons evolved from being simple and
limited in their destruction to the city-busting missiles of the nuclear era. Liberal democratic capitalist
societies have thrived and expanded because they have been particularly adept at stimulating and
exploiting innovation and at coping with their spillover effects and negative externalities. In short, liberal
modernity excels at both harvesting the fruits of modern advance and guarding against its dangers.
This dynamic of constant change and ever-increasing interdependence is only accelerating. Human
progress has caused grave harm to the planet and its atmosphere, yet climate change will also require
unprecedented levels of international cooperation. With the rise of bioweapons and cyberwarfare, the
capabilities to wreak mass destruction are getting cheaper and ever more accessible, making the
international regulation of these technologies a vital national security imperative for all countries. At the
same time, global capitalism has drawn more people and countries into cross-border webs of exchange,
thus making virtually everyone dependent on the competent management of international finance and
trade. In the age of global interdependence, even a realist must be an internationalist.
The international order is also likely to persist because its survival does not depend on all of its members
being liberal democracies. The return of isolationism, the rise of illiberal regimes such as China and
Russia, and the general recession of liberal democracy in many parts of the world appear to bode ill for
the liberal international order. But contrary to the conventional wisdom, many of its institutions are not
uniquely liberal in character. Rather, they are Westphalian, in that they are designed merely to solve
problems of sovereign states, whether they be democratic or authoritarian. And many of the key
participants in these institutions are anything but liberal or democratic.
Consider the Soviet Union's cooperative efforts during the Cold War. Back then, the liberal world order
was primarily an arrangement among liberal democracies in Europe, North America, and East Asia. Even
so, the Soviet Union often worked with the democracies to help build international institutions.
Moscow's committed antiliberal stance did not stop it from partnering with Washington to create a raft
of arms control agreements. Nor did it stop it from cooperating with Washington through the World
Health Organization to spearhead a global campaign to eradicate smallpox, which succeeded in
completely eliminating the disease by 1979.
More recently, countries of all stripes have crafted global rules to guard against environmental
destruction. The signatories to the Paris climate agreement, for example, include such autocracies as
China, Iran, and Russia. Westphalian approaches have also thrived when it comes to governing the
commons, such as the ocean, the atmosphere, outer space, and Antarctica. To name just one example,
the 1987 Montreal Protocol, which has thwarted the destruction of the ozone layer, has been actively
supported by democracies and dictatorships alike. Such agreements are not challenges to the
sovereignty of the states that create them but collective measures to solve problems they cannot
address on their own.
Most institutions in the liberal order do not demand that their backers be liberal democracies; they only
require that they be status quo powers and capable of fulfilling their commitments. They do not
challenge the Westphalian system; they codify it. The UN, for example, enshrines the principle of state
sovereignty and, through the permanent members of the Security Council, the notion of great-power
decision-making. All of this makes the order more durable. Because much of international cooperation
has nothing at all to do with liberalism or democracy, when politicians who are hostile to all things
liberal are in power, they can still retain their international agendas and keep the order alive. The
persistence of Westphalian institutions provides a lasting foundation on which distinctively liberal and
democratic institutions can be erected in the future.
Another reason to believe that the liberal order will endure involves the return of ideological rivalry. The
last two and a half decades have been profoundly anomalous in that liberalism has had no credible
competitor. During the rest of its existence, it faced competition that made it stronger. Throughout the
nineteenth century, liberal democracies sought to outperform monarchical, hereditary, and aristocratic
regimes. During the first half of the twentieth century, autocratic and fascist competitors created strong
incentives for the liberal democracies to get their own houses in order and band together. And after
World War II, they built the liberal order in part to contain the threat of the Soviet Union and
international communism.
The Chinese Communist Party appears increasingly likely to seek to offer an alternative to the
components of the existing order that have to do with economic liberalism and human rights. If it ends
up competing with the liberal democracies, they will again face pressure to champion their values. As
during the Cold War, they will have incentives to undertake domestic reforms and strengthen their
international alliances. The collapse of the Soviet Union, although a great milestone in the annals of the
advance of liberal democracy, had the ironic effect of eliminating one of its main drivers of solidarity.
The bad news of renewed ideological rivalry could be good news for the liberal international order.
The liberal order is better than alternatives, and can be revised to remedy illiberal
elements, but the total absence of it greenlights Trumpian excesses
Simpson 18
Emile Simpson, Research fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows, formerly a British Army officer,
“There’s Nothing Wrong With the Liberal Order That Can’t Be Fixed by What’s Right With It.” Foreign
Policy. August 7, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/07/theres-nothing-wrong-with-the-liberalorder-that-cant-be-fixed-by-whats-right-with-it/
Is the liberal international order under attack by the Trump administration worth defending? That’s the
question raised by a series of recent articles by prominent realist commentators—including Patrick
Porter, Paul Staniland, Graham Allison, and Stephen M. Walt. Their answer, in short, is no. They make
some good points, but there are fundamental problems with their critique.
The realists offer two arguments: that the liberal international order is a myth that never was, so the
idea of defending it is an illusion anyway, or that this order overreached in the post-Cold War era as the
United States tried to make the world in its own image, causing failures that should not be repeated,
whether endless wars or mass outsourcing of blue-collar jobs abroad.
Taken together, these two views are contradictory: You can’t criticize the failures of liberal international
order if it never existed; President Donald Trump is either attacking it, or he is not. There is a further
incoherence in the fact that the realists complain about U.S. imperial overreach but display the same
zeal as the neoconservatives in dismissing as irrelevant the rules of liberal international order that might
restrain the very excesses of U.S. foreign policy they criticize.
I do agree with the realist critique of liberal international order on a fundamental point: that globalization has overshot since the end of the Cold War (as
I arguedbefore Trump was elected). To my mind, the most serious problem is that, while free markets have expanded rapidly to cover most of the globe, democratic
governance has not advanced in tandem. As I have also written about in the context of China, the paradigm case, it is now virtually undeniable that there is no
necessary connection between capitalism and democracy.
During the Cold War, authoritarian capitalist regimes existed, too, and did so within the “free world,” but the West could argue that supporting them was the lesser
evil: Indonesia under Suharto was hardly North Korea. Now that argument can no longer be made, because virtually all states plug in to the same free-market
system, even if they play it differently—take China’s state-owned enterprise model, for example. Thus, a key reason for China’s rise is that much of its overseas
activity has been perfectly legal, at least on the surface: buying ports, mines, agriculture, and other states’ sovereign debt; building massive infrastructure projects;
and so on.
In short, global markets and the legal rules that support them are the most entrenched aspect of the liberal international order. But it’s entirely legitimate—and I’d
argue, accurate—to criticize the labeling of market liberalization as “liberal” whenever free markets are not accompanied by free people. There is nothing
hypocritical in distinguishing between the international order as a whole and those parts of it that are, to varying degrees, liberal.
The integration of global markets illustrates only one area regulated by the global legal system, a prominent aspect of the international order. (The international
order is also regulated by its political and social conventions, although their content is more subjective.) If you want proof of the legal dimension of international
order, look at what happens when a state wants to move from one set of rules to another, as with Brexit, where the majority of the debate concerns legal rules.
Of course, all legal rules express deeper power structures, be they military, economic, or cultural. So, to
refer to international order as being rules-based does not entail commitment to a utopia of rules
unmoored from the realities of power: Strong states clearly influence the rules more. And certain bodies
of rules within this order are plainly violated more frequently than others—for example, those
concerning the use of force. But those are still exceptions: Most states don’t invade one another most of
the time, and when the United States has respected international legal rules in this area, such as in the
Persian Gulf War, the results have been better than in cases where it did not, such as in the invasion of
Iraq in 2003.
Rather than explain these points away as anomalies, I would recognize them as evidence of the fragility
and limitations of the liberal dimensions of the international order. But that recognition does not imply
that the liberal order has no value: All states, after all, have interests that they cannot achieve on their
own and so need to develop rules for working together.
This is a point that even the realist skeptics of liberal international order are prepared to concede when
it comes to issues like climate change. Both Allison and Walt, for example, express regret that the United
States pulled out of the Paris climate change agreement—a classic instrument of international law. Yet
their view that the United States should not have pulled out of the Paris agreement contradicts the
claim that international rules are pointless. The same can be said for their regret that that Washington
pulled out the Iran nuclear agreement.
Rather than emphasize the contradiction, I would emphasize the realists’ common ground with liberal
internationalism, which could be extended to other global problems: money laundering, offshore tax
evasion, human trafficking, and so on. In short, if the realists didn’t express such hostility to the theory
of consensual international cooperation, they would likely support many of its specific expressions.
Finally, while I accept the realist view that the West should not try to make the world in its own image
by involuntarily pressing its values on others through the barrel of a gun, that doesn’t mean that liberal
powers shouldn’t push for global rules that instantiate liberal values. Accommodating others does not
mean giving up your own values; it just means recognizing their proper limits, on a case by case basis.
Indeed, this is what the realists get the most wrong in their tendency to fetishize power over all else.
Politics and political order are downstream from culture, and the power of the United States ultimately
rests on its values. The Cold War was not merely about bare power, but two ideas of what constitutes a
just society. The problem since the end of the Cold War has been that the United States has no clear
standard to define its values against, not least because it has not pushed back against the disjuncture of
capitalism and democracy now evident whenever autocrats get the benefits of access to the West and
Western investment without signing up to its values.
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that, since the early 1990s, the West has traded material gain
for damage to its own values. Now we are seeing the backlash. Don’t believe me? Just look at all the
corrupt offshore money in London property, making prices unaffordable for ordinary, hardworking
young people, and wonder why many of them have lost faith in capitalism. Values matter in
international order, and we can only see that if we reject the realists’ amoral blinkers.
Ultimately, peace requires a combination of stability and justice. With the Roman Empire collapsing
around him in the fifth century A.D., and contemplating a new order, Augustine writes in The City of
God: “Anyone, then, who is rational enough to prefer right to wrong and order to disorder can see that
the kind of peace that is based on injustice, as compared with that which is based on justice, does not
deserve the name of peace.” In other words, there’s nothing wrong with the international order, and its
liberal dimensions, that can’t be fixed by what’s right with it.
Us heg
1nc
The liberal world order and US hegemony rests on the back of nuclear power. The
nuclear umbrella provided by the US is key to maintaining heg and containing
dangerous nations.
Peter Hayes, 6-16-2018, "Trump and the Interregnum of American Nuclear Hegemony," Taylor &
Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1532525 MP
During the Cold War, American nuclear leadership was based not only on its uniquely capable nuclear
forces, but on a shared vision a liberal international order supported by strategic nuclear deterrence
aimed at containing illiberal states, most importantly the former Soviet Union. This system evolved
ultimately into the grotesque Cold War balance of terror based at its peak on 70,000 nuclear weapons in
the American and Soviet arsenals. A theory of nuclear hegemony extends Cox’s theory of global political
economic hegemony and applies it to the realm of global nuclear security.4 Nuclear hegemony is
arguably the necessary complement to economic hegemony for a global superpower.
At the peak of this nuclear hegemonic framework, the United States and its allies negotiated their
divergent interests in how to offset nuclear threats by creating combined capacities and multilateral and
bilateral alliances whereby the hegemonic state secured the consent of its allies to its leadership role.
Hegemony combines securing consent in the form of a shared nuclear ideology with the
institutionalization of nuclear extended deterrence in the form of nuclear alliances. This
institutionalization resulted in the integration in command structures and force elements all the way
down to low level units. To sustain the whole enterprise, the United States committed its peerless
strategic nuclear forces to protect not only itself, but its allies, but always only at its own prerogative.
Nuclear hegemony enabled the United States to legitimate its leadership and to exercise authority over
vast bulk of the nuclear weapons aimed at the former Soviet Union which, in contrast, rans its sphere of
influence – including its nuclear weapons – in an outright imperial manner.
American nuclear hegemony was never complete. Some states defected or never signed up. For
example, the British and the French insisted on making their own nuclear weapons and retaining the
right to use nuclear weapons independent of the United States and/or NATO. Israel’s relentless
acquisition of nuclear weapons required the United States to turn a blind eye to its “invisible” nuclear
arsenal. In some cases, domestic civil society revolted against nuclear hegemony. For example, Japanese
civil society’s “nuclear allergy” displaced American weapons from mainland Japan in 1960 to US bases in
Okinawa where in turn they were driven out by reversion in 1972.
In spite of these exceptions, at its peak in the mid-1980s, American nuclear hegemony encompassed
North America, Western Europe and the Asia-Pacific allies in a coordinated alliance system, and
provided the multi-national power basis for first containing the Soviet Union and later China, and then
constructing global nuclear arms control treaties aimed at restraining horizontal proliferation, and later,
limiting vertical proliferation by the then two superpowers, encapsulated in the 1968 Nuclear Non
Proliferation Treaty followed by the strategic arms limitation treaties. This system integrated ideology,
institutions, and force structures in a way that created dependency on the United States, but also
interdependency between these essential elements that made it hegemonic, and more than merely the
sum of its parts.
Foreign powers are closing the gap between the US in terms of conventional arsenals
now – the days of conventional US military superiority are numbered
Frank A. Rose, 10-23-2018, "As Russia and China improve their conventional military capabilities,
should the US rethink its assumptions on extended nuclear deterrence?," Brookings,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/23/as-russia-and-china-improve-theirconventional-military-capabilities-should-the-us-rethink-its-assumptions-on-extended-nucleardeterrence/ MP
The Bush and Obama administrations’ NPRs were based on the assumption that the United States was
unlikely to be involved in a major conflict with Russia or China, but that perception of the Russian and
Chinese threat has changed. As Thomas Wright notes in his recent book, “All Measures Short of War:
The Contest for the 21st Century and the Future of American Power,” “The United States is in
competition with Russia and China for the future of the international order.” The Trump
administration’s National Security Strategy concurs with Wright’s assessment stating that “after being
dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned.”
As part of this competition, over the past decade Russia and China have dramatically improved their
conventional and asymmetric military capabilities. Though the United States currently possesses
unmatched global military power projection capabilities, and spends substantially more on defense than
Russia and China, there is little doubt that Russia and China have achieved conventional military parity
or local superiority with the United States in certain regional contingencies in Eastern Europe and the
Western Pacific.
A recent RAND Corporation report notes that Russian military investments over the past decade have
significantly reduced the “once-gaping qualitative and technological gaps between Russia and NATO.”
The report also asserts that Russia currently enjoys a favorable balance-of-forces, in short warning
regional conflicts on its borders. The same can be said for Chinese conventional military capabilities in
the Western Pacific. For example, during testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in
March 2018, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Robert Ashley highlighted
that China is continuing “to develop capabilities to dissuade, deter, or defeat potential third-party
intervention during a large-scale theater campaign, such as a Taiwan contingency.” And an increasing
number of independent defense analysts, including retired U.S. Admiral and former NATO Supreme
Commander James Stavridis, argue that China has essentially achieved military parity with the United
States in East Asia.
Russia and China are also devoting significant resources to develop disruptive technologies like offensive
cyber and anti-satellite weapons, which are designed to exploit perceived gaps and vulnerabilities in U.S.
defenses. As Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats testified before the Senate Select Committee
in February 2018:
“Both Russia and China continue to pursue anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons as a means to reduce U.S. and
allied military effectiveness…Military reforms in both countries in the past few years indicate an
increased focus on establishing operational forces designed to integrate attacks against space systems
and services.”
Coats also noted that both nations were continuing to develop offensive cyber capabilities designed to
disrupt, degrade, and destroy U.S. and allied critical infrastructures.
Most importantly, the United States’ long-term technological advantage is eroding. From the 1950s
through the mid-1980s the United States retained an overwhelming technological advantage in the
development of key technologies such nuclear weapons, computer chips, and precision-guided
munitions. This began to change in the late 1980s. As a recent New York Times article notes:
“In the late 1980s, the emergence of inexpensive and universally available microchips upended the
Pentagon’s ability to control technological progress. Now, rather than trickling down from military and
advanced corporate laboratories, today’s new technologies increasingly come from consumer electronic
firms.”
And Russia and China are investing heavily in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, cyber, and
hypersonics. Indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin has said that whoever becomes the world leader
in the artificial intelligence sphere will “become ruler of the world.”
Russian and Chinese objectives are clear: Create a more favorable military balance in Eastern Europe
and the Western Pacific. Indeed, the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) concedes that in the
face of improving Russian and Chinese military capabilities, the U.S. “competitive military advantage has
been eroding.” The NDS recommends a number of specific steps the United States could take to
improve its conventional capabilities, such as: building a more lethal force; modernizing key systems like
space, cyber, and missile defense; developing innovative operational concepts; and cultivating
workforce talent. While implementing the proposals in the NDS would certainly improve U.S.
conventional forces, they are unlikely to restore the overwhelming conventional military superiority that
the United States once enjoyed.
Waning US military hegemony in the face of China Russia aggression is causing
declining confidence in the US umbrella – only a recommitment to nuclear deterrence
solves
Frank A. Rose, 10-23-2018, "As Russia and China improve their conventional military capabilities,
should the US rethink its assumptions on extended nuclear deterrence?," Brookings,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/23/as-russia-and-china-improve-theirconventional-military-capabilities-should-the-us-rethink-its-assumptions-on-extended-nucleardeterrence/ MP
Russia and China’s improving military capabilities—coupled with their aggressive actions in Ukraine, the
South China Sea, and the East China Sea—have created serious concerns among U.S. allies. These
concerns are compounded by President Trump’s hyperbolic rhetoric and unpredictable behavior, which
was on display at this summer’s G-7 and NATO summits. As a result, allies are beginning to seriously
question the United States’ ability and willingness to meet its extended deterrence commitments.
Recently, numerous allied leaders like German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French
President Emmanuel Macron have spoken of the need for European nations to “take our fate into our
own hands” when it comes to security.
Additionally, serious allied strategists and defense thinkers like Paul Dibb, a professor emeritus at
Australian National University, have begun raising concerns about China’s growing military capabilities
and the Trump administration’s continued commitment to extended deterrence. In a recent article, Dibb
writes that “prudent defense planning needs to accept that Beijing is developing to threaten us
seriously,” and “because of the uncertainties surrounding America’s commitment to its allies, we may
need to revisit the reassurance about extended nuclear deterrence that we have enjoyed since the
creation of ANZUS in 1951.”
How will the United States be able to maintain an effective extended deterrence posture given the
above-mentioned challenges? From my perspective, the United States should take the following steps in
response.
Modernize and strengthen U.S. and allied theater nuclear forces and consultative mechanisms. The
United States should modernize its theater-level nuclear forces to ensure effective deterrence against
Russia and China. In particular, it should acquire the B-21 strategic bomber, the B-61-12 nuclear gravity
bomb, and the Long-Range Stand-Off nuclear cruise missile. NATO allies should also continue their
procurement of dual-capable aircraft as well as enhance the alliance nuclear training and exercise
program. Finally, the United States should strengthen its consultations on extended deterrence with key
allies through forums such as the Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) with Japan and the Deterrence
Strategy Committee (DSC) with the Republic of Korea.
The overwhelming conventional military superiority that the United States enjoyed since the end of the
Cold War is coming to an end. Though it will likely maintain conventional superiority at the global level
for some time to come, Russia and China have achieved military parity or superiority in a number of
regional contingencies in Eastern Europe and the Western Pacific. Consequently, the United States must
fundamentally reassess many of the assumptions that have underpinned its defense strategy since the
end of the Cold War, especially the belief that the its overwhelming conventional military superiority
could allow it to reduce the role of nuclear weapons its defense strategy.
America first means heg low now – foreign leadership is poised to take over eliminating the nuclear umbrella pushes us over the edge and obliterates any trust US
allies have
Stewart Patrick, 1-23-2018, "How U.S. Allies Are Adapting to "America First"," Foreign Affairs,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-01-23/how-us-allies-are-adapting-americafirstSome extinction impact MP
One year after Trump’s inauguration, the liberal order has not collapsed. But it is in distress as the
president turns his back on the world the United States made to embrace a nationalist and isolationist
foreign policy. Although they still hope that Trump’s abdication of global leadership is a temporary
aberration rather than a lasting inflection point, U.S. allies and partners are making contingency plans.
The tendency toward hedging is most marked in transatlantic relations, the bedrock of the post-1945
liberal order. At NATO’s Brussels summit in May, Trump rattled Europeans by suggesting that his
country’s commitment to the alliance was contingent on their reimbursing American taxpayers for U.S.
military expenditures while declining to endorse Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which covers
collective defense. Although he belatedly affirmed the United States’ commitments two months later,
Europeans got the message. “The times in which we can fully count on others are somewhat over, as I
have experienced in the past few days,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel said after the Brussels
summit.
Europeans have hardly abandoned the Western alliance, but Trump’s unpredictability is spurring them
to take greater responsibility for their own defense. In June, EU member states launched a new
European Defense Fund, promising to increase their own defense spending by 4.3 percent. Beyond
bolstering the continent’s capacity to stand up to Russia, these new capabilities are designed to increase
the EU’s “strategic autonomy” vis-à-vis the United States. In addition, 25 of the EU’s 28 member states
have agreed to endorse an EU defense pact, known as Permanent Structured Cooperation, that “could
cover projects ranging from new battle tanks to the deployment of multinational forces.”
America’s most important European allies, such as France and Germany, have also been alienated by
Trump’s coziness with Russian president Vladimir Putin, his affinity for authoritarian leaders generally,
his unquestioning embrace of Israel in its dispute with the Palestinians, and his clumsy hectoring of UN
member states regarding the U.S. decision to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. They have
resisted his efforts to scupper the Iran nuclear deal, too, insisting that it will persist regardless of U.S.
withdrawal.
Trump’s “America first” lurch has sent shock waves through the Asia-Pacific as well. Traditional U.S.
allies are suddenly wondering whether the United States remains a credible partner capable of (or
interested in) preserving the regional balance of power, or even meeting its treaty obligations. Australia,
for instance, is debating whether it can rely on the United States to balance China’s rise. Canberra’s
foreign policy white paper, released in November, recommends what Michael Fullilove of the Lowy
Institute calls a challenging “gymnastic move,” namely: “hedging against the dual risks of a reckless
China and a feckless United States.”
Other historic U.S. allies and partners are also embracing self-help. Japan’s defense spending is set
to reach record levels as Tokyo responds to North Korean provocations and Chinese maritime
assertiveness. South Korea is accelerating its own arms buildup to counter the threat from North Korea,
and President Moon Jae-in has declared his intention to assume wartime operational controlof the
ROK’s military from the United States, which would otherwise command South Korea’s 650,000member military in the event of war. At the same time, Trump’s bellicose threats against Kim Jong Un’s
regime, which many in the South consider provocative, risk driving a wedge between the United States
and its longtime ally.
Singapore, meanwhile, is hedging in another direction, as I anticipated a year ago. Although the United
States remains its most important security partner, the city-state has boosted military ties with China,
conducting more bilateral exercises with the Chinese navy and army. In sum, nations that have long
encouraged the United States to counterbalance China are now placing side wagers in the event that
their American patron falters.
Hedging is also occurring in the global economy, as the Trump administration abandons U.S. leadership
on trade liberalization. Immediately after his inauguration, the president withdrew from the TransPacific Partnership (TPP). This was a devastating blow to U.S. diplomatic credibility, with geopolitical as
well as economic implications. Trump has also moved to renegotiate the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA)—though his demands on Canada and Mexico are so extreme that negotiations have
slowed to a crawl. More generally, the White House has signaled its disdain for the World Trade
Organization (WTO), threatening to ignore any unwanted rulings by its dispute resolution mechanism.
The president’s attacks on the rules-based system of international commerce has generated
a backlash from members as diverse as the EU, China, and Argentina, who fear that Trump could spark a
downward spiral into tit-for-tat protectionism.
As the United States steps back, other trading nations are stepping up. Global trade in goods and
services actually grew 4.2 percent in 2017. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in
November, the remaining eleven members of the TPP revived the agreement, now rechristened the
Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). This sent a clear message that
they prefer a multilateral scheme to bilaterally negotiated deals with a protectionist United States.
The EU, meanwhile, is overtaking the United States when it comes to setting trade rules. In December
it concluded a major free trade agreement with Japan, which along with the EU accounts for over 30
percent of the world’s GDP. The Japan deal comes on the heels of previous EU agreements with Canada
and Vietnam, and Brussels now has its eyes on another potential blockbuster deal, this time with
Mercosur.
China is also filling the void—and attracting new partners. Last year began incongruously, with President
Xi Jinping delivering a speech in Davos, in which the leader of the Chinese Communist Party depicted his
nation as globalization’s savior. By the end of 2017, any irony had worn off. China has moved to cement
its leadership in the Asia-Pacific economy through its Belt and Road Initiative, which will invest a
staggering one trillion dollars in infrastructure to link Europe and Asia; its Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP), a China-focused free trade area; and its Asia Infrastructure Investment
Bank, which now boasts eighty members. French President Emmanuel Macron and other European
leaders have made pilgrimages to Beijing to close economic deals. Closer to the United States, the
Chinese are also making inroads among Latin American nations frustrated by Trump’s hard-line trade
stance.
Impact Module
Alliances Key
US hegemony and alliances are key to global stability – a perceived lack of alliances
sparks international aggression
Ted R. Bromund et. al 17--(Ted R. Bromund, Studies Anglo-American relations, U.S. relations with
Europe and the EU, and the U.S.’s leadership role in the world, Reclaiming American Realism, American
Affairs Journal, accessed 6-28-2019, https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/05/reclaiming-americanrealism/)//ND
We are fortunate to have Canada and Mexico as neighbors; our allies, unfortunately, are next door to
China, Russia, autocrats, and Islamists. Given our good fortune, and our strength, it is inevitable that we
are the ones who are forward deployed, because we are the ones who have the geopolitical freedom to
help. But we should remember that our deployments defend our place in the world—and the ability of
Americans to be free in it—just as much as they defend our allies. Without our close alliances and the
forward yet benign deployment of our forces, we would look out onto an unwelcoming Middle East and
an increasingly troubled Asia, where Americans would be seen simply as outsiders, not as welcome
partners by some. Moreover, the allies we have, such as the United Kingdom, Israel, Japan, and South
Korea, are part of a global network of liberal societies and economies that dynamically interact and add
immeasurably to global wealth, not least back in the United States. We cannot avoid becoming involved
merely by retreating from our allies. American indifference or perceived weakness can engender
instability that is not in our interests, and which forces us to consider more risky forms of involvement.
For example, China’s buildup of forces in the South China Sea, and its efforts to dominate strategic
waterways and raise doubts about future freedom of navigation, occurred in part due to its perception
that America’s lack of active military alliances in Southeast Asia would make the United States unable to
counter its expansion. To China, America is an interloper in areas it has traditionally dominated and
considered part of its sphere of influence; thus, it believed that U.S. naval and air forces (which currently
can only be transiently present in Southeast Asia), were a paper tiger and could be intimidated into
eventual withdrawal. Washington, indeed, has struggled with trying to prove its credibility in keeping
open vital sea lanes in the South China Sea, without having bases from which it can project a regular
presence. That is why offshore balancing is an attractive concept in theory; in the real world, it would be
all offshore and no balancing, as our allies and others would doubt our commitment to play a
meaningful role during a crisis, and as the costs of “fighting our way back in” would be politically
unacceptable at home. Our alliances also help us in another way. Without us, our smaller yet strategic
allies would be unable to defend themselves, and our larger ones—Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and
South Korea, to name four—would have to fend for themselves. The cheapest way to do that would be
to acquire nuclear weapons, which could lead to a cascade of nuclear proliferation. The resulting
regional environments would be tense and unstable, and future crises could well become violent. We
therefore need to reassure our friends as we deter our enemies—for the sake of greater stability that
reduces the chances of a major conflagration in strategic areas drawing in American forces. Happily, our
alliances, backed by our strength, are a means for us to do both at once. Part of the answer to the
problems we face with our allies is for the free world to stop doing the things that alienate its publics
and make it vulnerable to autocratic blandishments. Above all, we must stop centralizing power in the
hands of unaccountable experts, an approach that, as the EU is belatedly discovering, only makes
rejecting democracy more appealing. Another part of the answer is for the United States to make clear
what side it is on. Starry-eyed “resets” or “open hands” towards aggressive, repressive regimes only
confuse those who wish to rally beneath a flag of freedom and liberalism. Trying to win over the whole
world risks losing those already on our side. Finally, our first choice should always be to deter trouble
where it matters most, not to fight it: the example of Western Europe after 1945 is proof of the value of
resolutely holding the line. Thus, the danger in this competitive world is not that we will be too strong. It
is our weakness, not our strength, that is provocative, because American weakness makes our allies
fearful and encourages our competitors to take chances. Providing strong defenses is both necessary for
peace and a charge laid upon Congress by the Constitution. This charge must be fulfilled.
A strong alliance network is an impact filter — solves great-power war, growth, and
democracy.
Brands & Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at
the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and
Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of
Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 7: Rediscovering Tragedy; Published by Yale University Press;
//GrRv)
What’s true for America is equally true for its broader coalition of like-minded states. In geopolitics as in
many things, there is great strength in numbers. Yet that strength will hold only if the supporters of the
international order lock arms and commit fully to its defense. Preventing great-power war and
international aggression, promoting an open global economy that averts depression and privation,
upholding democracy and human rights in the face of authoritarian resurgence, and defending liberal
norms that are being assaulted are goals that can be achieved only through strong partnerships and
collective effort. If the democracies are divided, the autocracies will exploit those divisions; if America
and its allies struggle to achieve unity of action, they will be outmaneuvered or overawed by revisionist
powers. The trend in today’s environment is, in many ways, toward greater fragmentation within what
was once called the “free world.” But a tragic mindset requires understanding that greater coordination
and solidarity is required if that free world is to prosper.
For defenders of the international order, then, the question is not whether such coordination and
solidarity is desirable, but how it can best be achieved. Here there is no escaping the centrality of
American leadership. It is fair enough to point out that America pays a disproportionate share of the
costs of sustaining an order that benefits so many. It is entirely reasonable, at a time when threats are
rising and challenges multiplying, to demand that collective sacrifices be distributed more evenly, if only
because Americans themselves will tire of supporting that order if they feel that they are doing it alone.
To put the matter baldly, Americans will not be forever willing to send their sons and daughters to die
for NATO if some of the richest countries in that alliance refuse to field minimally capable militaries of
their own.
What Americans must remember, though, is that the strong collective measures required to preserve
the international order are far more likely to emerge when America itself is fully committed. Allies and
partners will be more willing to run risks and confront revisionist powers if they are assured of U.S.
support than if they doubt it. An Asia-Pacific without American leadership would not be a region better
positioned to resist Chinese expansionism; it would be a weaker and more divided region, increasingly at
Beijing’s mercy. Likewise, supporters of free markets and democracy are more likely to stand up for
those arrangements if the world’s preeminent free-market democracy is in the vanguard; collective
action to meet the greatest global challenges will materialize more successfully if the United States acts
as the convener. America was “the one nation that has the necessary political, military, and economic
instruments at our disposal to catalyze a successful collective response,” James Baker said during the
Persian Gulf crisis in 1990; no other nation can play this role, even today.13 Finally, Americans must
keep in mind that if Washington pursues protectionist economic policies that impoverish its partners, if
it forsakes the liberal principles that have formed the ideological core of its alliances, if it extorts tribute
from its allies like some mafia protection racket, then it will lose the attractive power that allowed it to
lead such formidable coalitions in the first place. America endures its share of inequities and burdens in
the service of global order. Yet as a tragic sensibility reminds us, some burdens are tolerable because
they help prevent something far, far worse.
China Aggression – still need to cut
China is revisionist challenge to the military and economic order—hegemony and
alliances are key to prevent Chinese aggression and global wars
Ji Young Choi 18 – (Ji Young Choi, Associate Professor of Politics and Government, Director of East
Asia Studies, Affiliate Professor of International Studies, “Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the
Rise of China: Long Cycles, Power Transitions, and China's Ascent,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 42, Issue 1,
January-March 2018, pages 61-84)//ND
I have explored in light of historical and theoretical perspectives whether China is a candidate to
become a global hegemonic power. The next question I will address is whether the ascent of China will
lead to a hegemonic war or not. As mentioned previously, historical and theoretical lessons reveal that a
rising great power tends to challenge a system leader when the former's economic and other major
capabilities come too close to those of the latter and the former is dissatisfied with the latter's
leadership and the international rules it created. This means that the rise of China could produce intense
hegemonic competition and even a global hegemonic war. The preventive motivation by an old
declining power can cause a major war with a newly emerging power when it is combined with other
variables (Levy 1987). While a preventive war by a system leader is historically rare, a newly emerging
yet even relatively weak rising power at times challenges a much more powerful system leader, as in the
case of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 (Schweller 1999). A historical lesson is that "incomplete
catch-ups are inherently conflict-prone" (Thompson 2006, 19). This implies that even though it falls
short of surpassing the system leader, the rise of a new great power can produce significant instability in
the interstate system when it develops into a revisionist power. Moreover, the United States and China
are deeply involved in major security issues in East Asia (including the North Korean nuclear crisis, the
Taiwan issue, and the South China Sea disputes), and we cannot rule out the possibility that one of these
regional conflicts will develop into a much bigger global war in which the two superpowers are
entangled. According to Allison (2017), who studied sixteen historical cases in which a rising power
confronted an existing power, a war between the United States and China is not unavoidable, but
escaping it will require enormous efforts by both sides. Some Chinese scholars (Jia 2009; Wang and Zhu
2015), who emphasize the transformation of China's domestic politics and the pragmatism of Beijing's
diplomacy, have a more or less optimistic view of the future of US-China relations. Yet my reading of the
situation is that since 2009 there has been an increasing gap between this optimistic view and what has
really happened. It is premature to conclude that China is a revisionist state, but in what follows I will
suggest some important signs that show China has revisionist aims at least in the Asia Pacific and could
develop into a revisionist power in the future. Beijing has concentrated on economic modernization
since the start of pro-market reforms in the late 1970s and made efforts to keep a low profile in
international security issues for several decades. It followed Deng Xiaoping's doctrine: "hide one's
capabilities, bide one's time, and seek the right opportunity." Since 2003, China's motto has been
"Peaceful Rise" or "Peaceful Development," and Chinese leadership has emphasized that the rise of
China would not threaten any other countries. Recently, however, Beijing has adopted increasingly
assertive or even aggressive foreign policies in international security affairs. In particular, China has been
adamant about territorial issues in the East and South China Seas and is increasingly considered as a
severe threat by other nations in the Asia Pacific region. Since 2009, for example, Beijing has increased
naval activities on a large scale in the area of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. In 2010,
Beijing announced that just like Tibet and Taiwan, the South China Sea is considered a core national
interest. We can identify drastic rhetorical changes as well. In 2010, China's foreign minister publicly
stated, "China is a big country . . . and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact"
(Economist 2012). In October 2013, Chinese leader Xi Jinping also used the words "struggle and achieve
results," emphasizing the importance of China's territorial integrity (Waldron 2014, 166-167).
Furthermore, China has constructed man-made islands in the South China Sea to seek "de facto control
over the resource-rich waters and islets" claimed as well by its neighboring countries (Los Angeles Times
2015). As of now, China's strategy is to delay a direct military conflict with the United States as long as
possible and use its economic and political prowess to pressure smaller neighbors to give up their
territorial claims (Doran 2012). These new developments and rhetorical signals reflect significant
changes in China's foreign policies and signify that China's peaceful rise seems to be over. A rising great
power's consistent and determined policies to increase military buildups can be read as one of the
significant signs of the rising power's dissatisfaction with the existing order and its willingness to do
battle if it is really necessary. In the words of Rapkin and Thompson (2003, 318), "arms buildups and
arms races . . . reflect substantial dissatisfaction on the part of the challenger and an attempt to
accelerate the pace of military catchup and the development of a relative power advantage." Werner
and Kugler (1996) also posit that if an emerging challenger's military expenditures are increasing faster
than those of a system leader, parity can be very dangerous to the international political order. China's
GDP is currently around 60 percent of that of the United States, so parity has not been reached yet.
China's military budget, however, has grown enormously for the past two decades (double-digit growth
nearly every year), which is creating concerns among neighboring nations and a system leader, the
United States. In addition to its air force, China's strengthening navy or sea power has been one of the
main goals in its military modernization program. Beijing has invested large financial resources in
constructing new naval vessels, submarines, and aircraft carriers (Economist 2012). Furthermore, in its
new defense white paper in 2015, Beijing made clear a vision to expand the global role for its military,
particularly its naval force, to protect its overseas economic and strategic interests (Tiezzi 2015). Sea
power has special importance for an emerging great power. As Mahan (1987 [1890]) explained cogently
in one of his classic books on naval strategy, Great Britain was able to emerge as a new hegemonic
power because of the superiority of its naval capacity and technology and its effective control of main
international sealanes. Naval power has a special significance for China, a newly emerging power, as well
as for both economic and strategic reasons. First, its economy's rapid growth requires external
expansion to ensure raw materials and the foreign markets to sell its products. Therefore, naval power
becomes crucial in protecting its overseas business interests and activities. Second, securing major sealanes becomes increasingly important as they will be crucial lifelines for the supply of energy, raw
materials, and other essential goods should China become involved in a hegemonic war or any other
major military conflict (Friedberg 2011). In light of this, it is understandable why China is so stubborn
over territorial issues in the South China and East China Seas. In fact, history tells us that many rising
powers invested in sea power to expand their global influence, and indeed all the global hegemons
including Great Britain and the United States were predominant naval powers. Another important
aspect is that Beijing is beginning to voice its dissatisfaction with the existing international economic
order and take actions that could potentially change this order. The Chinese economy has overall
benefited from the post-World War II international liberal order, but the Bretton Woods institutions like
the IMF and the World Bank have been dominated by the United States and its allies and China does not
have much power or voice in these institutions. Both institutions are based in Washington, DC, and the
United States has enjoyed the largest voting shares with its veto power. Along with other emerging
economies, China has called for significant reforms, especially in the governing system of the IMF, but
reform plans to give more power to China and other emerging economies have been delayed by the
opposition of the US Congress (Choi 2013). In response to this, Beijing recently took the initiative to
create new international financial institutions including the AIIB. At this moment, it is premature to say
that these new institutions would be able to replace the Bretton Woods institutions. Nonetheless, this
new development can be read as a starting point for significant changes in global economic and financial
governance that has been dominated by the United States since the end of World War II (Subacchi
2015). China's historical legacies reinforce the view that China has a willingness to become a global
hegemon. From the Ming dynasty in the late fourteenth century to the start of the first Opium War in
1839, China enjoyed its undisputed hegemonic position in East Asia. "Sino-centrism" that is related to
this historical reality has long governed the mentality of Chinese people. According to this hierarchical
world view, China, as the most advanced civilization, is at the center of East Asia and the world, and all
China's neighbors are vassal states (Kang 2010). This mentality was openly revealed by the Chinese
foreign minister's recent public statement that I quoted previously: "China is a big country . . . and other
countries are small countries and that is just a fact" (Economist 2012). This view is related to Chinese
people's ancient superiority complex that developed from the long history and rich cultural heritage of
Chinese civilization (Jacques 2012). In a sense, China has always been a superpower regardless of its
economic standing at least in most Chinese people's mind-set. The strong national or civilizational pride
of Chinese people, however, was severely damaged by "the Century of Humiliation," a period between
the first Opium War (1839) and the end of the Chinese Civil War (1949). During this period, China was
encroached on by the West and invaded by Japan, experienced prolonged civil conflicts, and finally
became a semicolony of Great Britain while its northern territory was occupied by Japan. China's
economic modernization is viewed as a national project to lay an economic foundation to overcome this
bitter experience of subjugation and shame and recover its traditional position and old glory (Choi
2015). Viewed from this perspective, economic modernization or the accumulation of wealth is not an
ultimate objective of China. Rather, its final goal is to return to its traditional status by expanding its
global political and military as well as economic influence. What it ultimately desires is recognition
(Anerkennung), respect (Respekt), and status (Stellung). These are important concepts for
constructivists who see ideational motives as the main driving forces behind interstate conflicts (Lebow
2008). This reveals that constructivist elements can be combined with long cycle and power transition
theories in explaining the rise and fall of great powers, although further systematic studies on it are
needed. Considering all this, China has always been a territorial power rather than a trading state. China
does not seem to be satisfied only with the global expansion of international trade and the conquest of
foreign markets. It also wants to broaden its (particularly maritime) territories and spheres of influence
to recover its traditional political status as the Middle Kingdom. As emphasized previously, the type or
nature and goals or ideologies of a rising power matter. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan (territorial
powers) experienced rapid economic expansion and sought to expand their territories and influence in
the first half of the twentieth century. For example, during this period Japan's goal was to create the
Japanese empire in East Asia under the motto of the East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. On the other
hand, democratized Germany and Japan (trading powers) that enjoyed a second economic expansion
did not pursue the expansion of their territories and spheres of influence in the post-World War II era.
Twentiethcentury history suggests that political regimes predicated upon nondemocratic or nonliberal
values and cultures (for instance, Nazism in Germany and militarism in Japan before the mid-twentieth
century, and communism in the Soviet Union during the Cold War) can pose significant challenges to
democratic and liberal regimes. The empirical studies of Lemke and Reed (1996) show that the
democratic peace thesis can be used as a subset of power transition theory. According to their studies,
states organized similarly to the dominant powers politically and economically (liberal democracy) are
generally satisfied with the existing international rules and order and they tend to be status quo states.
Another historical lesson is that economic interdependence alone cannot prevent a war for hegemony.
Germany was one of the main trade partners of Great Britain before World War I (Friedberg 2011), and
Japan was the number three importer of American products before its attack on Pearl Harbor (Keylor
2011). A relatively peaceful relationship or transition is possible when economic interdependence is
supported by a solid democratic alliance between a rising great power and an existing or declining one.
Some scholars such as Ikenberry (2008) emphasize nuclear deterrence and the high costs of a nuclear
war. Power transition theorists agree that the high costs of a nuclear war can constrain a war among
great powers but do not view them as "a perfect deterrent" to war (Kugler and Zagare 1990; Tammen et
al. 2000). The idea of nuclear deterrence is based upon the assumption of the rationality of actors
(states): as long as the costs of a (nuclear) war are higher than its benefits, an actor (state) will not
initiate the war. However, even some rationalists admit that certain actors (such as exceedingly
ambitious risk-taking states) do not behave rationally and engage in unexpected military actions or
pursue military overexpansion beyond its capacity (Glaser 2010). The state's behaviors are driven by its
values, perceptions, and political ambitions as well as its rational calculations of costs and benefits.
Especially, national pride, historical memories, and territorial disputes can make states behave
emotionally. The possibility of a war between a democratic nation and a nondemocratic regime
increases because they do not share the same values and beliefs and, therefore, the level of mistrust
between them tends to be very high. China and the United States have enhanced their cooperation to
address various global issues like global warming, international terrorism, energy issues, and global
economic stability. But these issues are not strong enough to bring them together to overcome their
mistrust that stems from their different values, beliefs, and perceptions (Friedberg 2011). What is more
important is whether they can set mutually agreeable international rules on traditional security issues
including territorial disputes.
Heg Generic – Recycled Card
Military primacy solves economic growth, prolif, and great-power war.
Brands & Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at
the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and
Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of
Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 5: The Contemporary Amnesia; Published by Yale University
Press; //GrRv)
As William Wohlforth has noted, American primacy and activism acted as a powerful deterrent to greatpower conflict by creating enormous disincentives for Russia, China, or other actors to incur the
“focused enmity” of the United States.11 The persistence and even extension of the U.S. security
blanket smothered potential instability in unsettled regions such as Eastern Europe, while removing any
possibility of German or Japanese revanchism—a prospect much feared in the early 1990s—by keeping
those countries tightly lashed to Washington. American intervention helped extinguish bloody conflicts
in the Balkans before they could spread to neighboring countries; U.S. diplomatic and military pressure
kept aggressive tyrannies such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea bottled up and helped slow the spread of
nuclear weapons. U.S. support helped democratic forces triumph in countries from Haiti to Poland, as
the number of democracies rose from 76 in 1990 to 120 in 2000; America crucially assisted the advance
of globalization and the broad prosperity that came with it by promoting pro-market policies and
providing the necessary climate of reassurance and stability.12
Possible UQ text
CP: The United States should:
1) Substantially increase its nuclear arsenal
2) Invest in new forms of nuclear technology
3) Reinstate nuclear deterrence and nuclear umbrella policies as a strategic tool in foreign policy
*****Frontlines*****
Extensions
Overview
US hegemony is grounded in military superiority, specifically the US’s ability to ensure
the existence of a nuclear umbrella over it’s allies. The US is losing the conventional
arms race – that’s Rose 18, and allies are losing trust in America due to America first
policies. The reinvigoration of the nuclear umbrella is key to build up the trust of
allies, and by eliminating the US nuclear arsenal, we snap the already strained
relationship between the US and its allies. This kills US hegemony, which [insert
impact].
A2 US Nuclear Heg = proliferation
Leah et al. 17Leah, Christine, Former Chauncey Postdoctoral Fellow in Grand Strategy, Yale University,
and Adam B. Lowther, Director, School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies. “Conventional Arms
and Nuclear Peace.” Strategic Studies Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 1, 2017, pp. 14–24. JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/26271588.
The relationship between the size of a state’s arsenal and the resultant proliferation consequences is
complex and, at best, only one part of the proliferation puzzle. For the past quarter-century, the US
military’s mastery of precision warfare has provided it with a significant advantage over its prospective
rivals. Both China and Russia are working to offset this advantage, in part by developing their own
competing capabilities. However, according to recent research by national security analyst Matthew
Kroenig, there is no clear relationship between US nuclear force posture and proliferation decisions by
other states.1 Indeed, the connection may even be an odd proposition to make in the first place. That
national leaders (aside from a Russian president) would stop to assess US nuclear policy or the size of
the US nuclear arsenal before making decisions about nuclear proliferation is a tenuous assertion.
Kroenig’s research addresses an important question, but it does not analyze the role that the
geographical deployment of US military forces has on a country’s threat perceptions. In fact, states are
more likely to confront, and therefore fear, America’s conventional capabilities.
Nuke power 1NC
1NC - Shell - Short
Nuclear renaissance coming now - solves climate change and space travel
Muralidharan 18
Rathna K. Muralidharan (Program director at the non-profit Lexington Institute, a public-policy
research organization located in Arlington, Virginia, where she manages events, conducts
research, and supports staff analyses. Before joining the staff of the Lexington Institute, Rathna
worked at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, and
the Institute for the Study of War’s Iraq Project. Most recently, she worked at the Hudson
Institute where she assisted in researching U.S. security concerns in South Asia. She has
conducted extensive research on U.S. counterterrorism policies and objectives), "The Nuclear
Reactor Renaissance: Space Exploration and National Security," Real Clear Energy, 7-13-2018,
https://www.realclearenergy.org/articles/2018/07/13/the_nuclear_reactor_renaissance_space
_exploration_and_national_security_110313.html WJ
The nuclear power sector is seeing a resurgence in innovation, supported by new policies and emerging technologies.
The general public and various governments are starting to grasp the value of nuclear power as an
alternative, sustainable energy source. Unlike renewables, such as wind and solar power, nuclear energy is not
dependent on weather conditions for power generation, having a capacity factor of over 90 percent. Nuclear power
is also more eco-friendly than natural gas and coal and its “carbon-free” attributes are seen as critical in the fight
against climate change.
For decades, advancements
in the nuclear power sector have been incremental and focused largely on
making systems “walk away safe.” Today, the industry is pushing the boundaries and exploring
applications for nuclear power in ways that have never before been considered.
BWXT is at the forefront of this nuclear renaissance. This 6,000-employee company operates on the model of letting capital
drive strategy. BWXT is constantly evaluating new ways to ensure workers, funding, and policies are utilized in the most
effective way possible. The company also analyzes the needs of numerous other industries to determine how nuclear power
could provide innovative solutions.
This type of outward
thinking is what has created new technologies, such as medical isotopes and common
missile compartment tubes for Columbia-class nuclear submarines. Now, BWXT is paving a path forward in two of the
U.S. government’s top priorities: space exploration and national security. These advancements will revolutionize
both the technology and defense sectors by offering creative solutions to ongoing issues.
One of BWXT’s primary focuses is space exploration. The company is currently building a compact
nuclear reactor for space shuttles to put an astronaut on Mars and possibly even explore Jupiter’s moons by 2024.
This reactor will be operable with few to no people.
In August 2017, BWXT was awarded the contract for the Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) project by NASA to build a nuclear reactor to power
manned missions to Mars. According to NASA’s fact sheet on the program, “NTP
offers virtually unlimited energy density and
a specific impulse roughly double that of the high-est performing traditional chemical systems.”
The NTP reactor will be powered by low-enriched uranium (LEU) rather than the traditional highly
enriched uranium. This change in fuel source is advantageous because it reduces the level of security
regulations and could potentially be more affordable. NASA recognizes that nuclear power is the only
fuel source capable of powering missions farther out into our Solar System, making
such travel safer for astronauts by reducing the time humans are exposed to the physically altering
conditions of space, such as zero-gravity and cosmic radiation.
Space exploration can go faster and farther than ever before with nuclear reactors. The UN’s Office for Outer
Space Affairs has stated that “for some missions in outer space, nuclear power sources are particularly suited or even
essential owing to their compactness, long life, and other attributes.” By using nuclear power, NASA can
significantly reduce the time it takes to travel within and outside our Solar System. Mars can be reached in four
months rather than six. Jupiter can be reached in two to three years, and we can go beyond the Solar System in 12–14 years.
Nuclear reactors will also enable us to better study and utilize the resources in our Solar System by reducing travel time and reaching higher
velocities. In comparison to the main engine of the Space Shuttle, nuclear
reactors have double the propulsion efficiency
and can therefore support the delivery of “large, automated payloads to distant worlds.” Powering spacecraft
using nuclear energy will enable shuttles to transport larger and heavier payloads between the Moon
and Earth.
Nuclear power can also play a role in defending assets in outer space. In June, President Trump announced his plan to
create a sixth wing of the military to protect our interests beyond Earth’s surface, called the “Space Force.” It is clear that the U.S.
government is very serious about the need to secure our resources in space as key adversaries aim to do
the same. Revolutions in nuclear reactors come at the optimal time as the great power competition
evolves into space.
On July 2, China announced its intentions to build a super heavy rocket that would surpass NASA’s Space Launch System. Since China’s space
program is run by the military, it’s feasible that this technology can be used for defense purposes such as ballistic missiles and military satellites.
In March, Russia announced the successful testing of a hypersonic missile of the Kinzhal missile system. This weapon is capable of being
“launched into space, navigating on its own into Earth's atmosphere and avoiding radar and antimissile defenses.”
By using nuclear technology to support existing infrastructure, the U.S. can protect its assets in space
from threats. Nuclear-powered space tugs are one such capability. A space tug is stationed in space and used to move cargo to different
levels of orbit, such as from low Earth orbit to geospace. Payloads are at the greatest risk of attack when they are being
launched into orbit since they can be struck by ballistic missiles before or during launch.
Since space tugs remain in orbit, they
are capable of running multiple payloads in space rather than requiring a
new tug be launched along with every delivery, thereby reducing costs and space debris while also
eliminating the threat of attack during launch. Nuclear-powered space tugs would be more energy efficient than any other fuel
source, giving space tugs a longer life span.
Innovations in nuclear reactor technology are not just limited to space. The same type of reactor that is
being developed to power shuttles headed to Jupiter can also be used here on Earth to power military
bases. Currently, U.S. military installations are 99 percent dependent on local utilities for power, making them more vulnerable to outages
and sabotage.
By installing a compact nuclear reactor on site, military bases would be energy independent and
critically able to continue operating in the event of an emergency. These reactors would function as a battery powered
by LEU, which is non-proliferable, and would require minimal maintenance to operate.
The renewed interest around the nation and the world in sustainable energy sources is spurring a
nuclear renaissance. As more companies and countries seek resilient, long-term, and environmentally friendly solutions, nuclear
power is becoming an increasingly obvious choice. The World Nuclear Association reported in June that “50 power reactors
are currently being constructed in 13 countries.” With companies like BWXT committed to using nuclear energy in a variety of fields to solve
current and future problems, the
future is looking brighter and more resiliently powered.
Nuclear zero stops it -- strong anti-proliferation norms block access to nuclear material
and reactor development
Kumar 17
Vinod Kumar (Associate Fellow Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India),
2017, The Expectant Global Nuclear Energy Renaissance: Movers, Shakers and Spoilers.
Resurgence of Nuclear Power, 39–70. doi:10.1007/978-981-10-5029-9_3
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-5029-9_3 WJ
What are the trends that indicate the prospects of a renaissance happening, especially since earlier signs, like in the
USA, did not end in fruitful outcomes? A handful of global indicators could be highlighted to support the assumption
that a renaissance might be in the offing in the global nuclear industry, though with inherent challenges.
First, the hopes of revival in many established nuclear bases such as USA and Russia even as some European nations
such as UK, France and the Scandinavians have reposed faith in nuclear power, which also indicates a revisiting of phase-out
policies in the industrial world. Second, the massive confidence that the developing world has placed on nuclear
energy as evident from the numerous expansion plans of those nations with the existing nuclear energy
infrastructure, as also the decision of many small and emerging economies to make their plunge into nuclear energy. Third is a host of
systematic factors that has the potential to drive the renaissance, including the galloping pace of reactor
technology development, best practices emerging in civil nuclear liability laws, increasing access of insurance and risk management
tools, and above all the imperative of nations to promote clean fuel to meet climate change mitigation
targets.
3.3.1 Industrial World Still Relies on Nuclear Energy
While the US revival efforts have been ongoing since the beginning of the mil- lennium despite numerous constraints, Russia
is on a
faster pace in expanding its nuclear energy infrastructure with notable advances made in launching its Generation-III fast
neutron reactors as well as in ensuring its technological footprint in emerging markets through exports of its VVER light water reactors
(NewEurope 2016). Besides its existing tally of 36 operating reactors with a total capacity of 27,000 MW, Russia plans to add one large reactor
per year till 2028, with around 22 planned units running up to around 21,000 MW capacity, alongside an equal number earmarked for exports
(WNA 2016f).
As for
Europe, where feasibility of nuclear power continues to remain in popular debate, countries that
have preferred to retain nuclear power are announcing new projects or seeking to replace ageing ones with new
units. The UK, with plans to retire half of 15 operational reactors by middle of next decade, has opted for a foreign-funded consortium model to
kick off its Hinkley Point nuclear project, with Chinese and French state-run energy firms as collaborators (BBC 2016; Riley and Mullen 2016).
This is beside an intended plan to allow the China General Nuclear Corporation to build a nuclear plant at Bradwell, as agreed during the
Chinese President’s visit in October 2015. France, which is heavily nuclear energy-dependent, is
seemingly weighing on Areva’s
Generation-III European Pressurised Reactors (EPR) not just to display its continuing reliance on nuclear energy but also to
establish its international standing as a nuclear supplier and technology incubator.
Despite reported timeline delays and cost outruns (Guardian 2016), the EPRs at Flamanville plant in France, Olkiluoto-3 in
Finland as well as the proposed project at UK’s Hinkley symbolise a renewed thrust across Europe for nuclear power, as also the
role played by other new-generation reactors in this renewal. On the other hand, the actual relevance of the nuclear industry in
Europe is in the comparatively nascent economies in Scandinavia, especially Finland and Sweden, which have preferred to
retain nuclear as a power source and probably delay or avoid a total transition to renewable means. Along with unit 5, which is
currently under con- struction, Finland is planning further expansion for units 6 and 7 in Olkiluoto (WNA 2016d). Another
project, run by Fennovoima, is under construction to set up a VVER-1200 reactor and has a unique model of co-ownership by
Rusatom Overseas (Milne 2016b).
Sweden, on the other hand, produces 40% of its electricity from nine existing reactors and plans to replace the ageing ones with
an ambitious plan of 10 new reactors (Milne 2016a). However, Sweden’s contribution to the nuclear revival is more significant.
The nation not just revised its earlier plan, finalised in 1980s, to close nuclear and forego life extension of reactors, but removed
a tax from 2017 that discriminates against nuclear power while subsides wind and biomass to progress towards the goal to total
renewable energy by 2040. A certain fillip to nuclear energy, this reversal also means that stringent anti-nuclear sentiments
that prevailed in Scandinavia following the Fukushima incident, and phase-out models like Germany’s Energiewende, has given
way to more realistic approaches towards nuclear energy. In Europe, these revival signs could be signs of an impending
renaissance as it ignites fresh life into the industry.
3.3.2 Developing World as the Catalyst
At the other end of the spectrum, an
expectant renaissance in nuclear energy is all about ‘a great leap forward’
for many countries in the developing world for whom access to sustainable means of
energy is closely linked to the economic progress and upliftment of their societies.
Nuclear energy has traditionally been an elitist preserve with the developed and the
industrial world always controlling the technology and restricting access through nonproliferation structures including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and supplier
cartels like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Even those countries in underdeveloped regions with major uranium
deposits, like in some African countries, could not harness the economic potential of their
natural resources owing to the domination and control of advanced nations over the
affairs of the atom, and its normative structures.
Consequently, very few countries in the third world have been successful in establishing a nuclear industry that could be on par with their peers
in the developed world. Even
those who managed to set up a comparatively active base—such as India, China or
Brazil—had perennial struggles with the development of reactor and reprocessing technologies, access to
fissile materials or in dealing with denial regimes over attempts to develop indigenous capabilities or
gaining strategic autonomy that mismatched with the global norms perpetuated by the Westernoriented liberal security community. The renaissance, therefore, for the developing world is about the
establishment of robust nuclear industries, uninterrupted access to nuclear fuel cycles and fissile
materials, and meeting major developmental, economic and climate change targets by placing nuclear at the
centre of their energy security missions. In practice, this could also mean that the epicentre of the global nuclear industry
could be shifting to the developing world, especially the bases in Asia, who could shape the future
norms, best practices and structures for this domain. According to estimates of the World Nuclear Association, around 45 countries are at
various stages or plans for nuclear energy programmes, with 32 of them being in Asian region (WNA 2016e). This includes Albania, Italy, Serbia,
Croatia, Portugal, Poland, Belarus, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Turkey and Ireland (in Europe); Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania
and Namibia (in Africa); and Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay (in Americas). The gravity of the Asian shift is marked
by the fact that nuclear projects in some subregions in Asia such as the Middle East and East Asia will be almost the same number or more than
those planned in the above two regions. For example, 14 states in the Middle East (UAE and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Yemen, Israel, Syria,
Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, and Sudan) have plans for setting up nuclear plants.
Rapid spread of nuclear power technology is vital to rapid decarbonization -- licensing
and export restrictions prevent solutions to climate change
Goldstein et al 19
Joshua S. Goldstein (professor emeritus of international relations at American University), Staffan A.
Qvist (Swedish energy engineer, author of “A Bright Future: How Some Countries Have Solved Climate
Change and the Rest Can Follow”), and Steven Pinker (professor of psychology at Harvard University), "
Nuclear Power Can Save the World" NYT, 4-6-2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/06/opinion/sunday/climate-change-nuclear-power.html WJ
As young people rightly demand real solutions to climate change, the question is not what to do —
eliminate fossil fuels by 2050 — but how. Beyond decarbonizing today’s electric grid, we must use clean electricity to
replace fossil fuels in transportation, industry and heating. We must provide for the fast-growing energy needs of poorer
countries and extend the grid to a billion people who now lack electricity. And still more electricity will be needed to remove excess carbon
dioxide from the atmosphere by midcentury.
Where will this gargantuan amount of carbon-free energy come from? The popular answer is renewables
alone, but this is a fantasy. Wind and solar power are becoming cheaper, but they are not available
around the clock, rain or shine, and batteries that could power entire cities for days or weeks show no
sign of materializing any time soon. Today, renewables work only with fossil-fuel backup.
Germany, which went all-in for renewables, has seen little reduction in carbon emissions, and, according to our
calculations, at Germany’s rate of adding clean energy relative to gross domestic product, it would take
the world more than a century to decarbonize, even if the country wasn’t also retiring nuclear plants early. A few lucky
countries with abundant hydroelectricity, like Norway and New Zealand, have decarbonized their electric grids, but their success cannot be
scaled up elsewhere: The
world’s best hydro sites are already dammed.
Small wonder that a growing response to these intimidating facts is, “We’re cooked.”
But we
actually have proven models for rapid decarbonization with economic and energy growth: France
and Sweden. They decarbonized their grids decades ago and now emit less than a tenth of the world
average of carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour. They remain among the world’s most pleasant places to live and enjoy much
cheaper electricity than Germany to boot.
They did this with nuclear power. And they did it fast, taking advantage of nuclear power’s intense
concentration of energy per pound of fuel. France replaced almost all of its fossil-fueled electricity with nuclear power
nationwide in just 15 years; Sweden, in about 20 years. In fact, most of the fastest additions of clean electricity
historically are countries rolling out nuclear power.
This is a realistic solution to humanity’s greatest problem. Plants
built 30 years ago in America, as in France, produce
cheap, clean electricity, and nuclear power is the cheapest source in South Korea. The 98 U.S. reactors
today provide nearly 20 percent of the nation’s electricity generation. So why don’t the United States and other
countries expand their nuclear capacity? The reasons are economics and fear.
New nuclear power plants are hugely expensive to build in the United States today. This is why so few are being built. But they don’t need to be
so costly. The
key to recovering our lost ability to build affordable nuclear plants is standardization and
repetition. The first product off any assembly line is expensive — it cost more than $150 million to develop the first
iPhone — but costs plunge as they are built in quantity and production kinks are worked out.
Yet as a former chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission put it, while France has two types of reactors and hundreds of types of cheese,
in the United States it’s the other way around. In recent decades, the United States and some European countries have created ever more
complicated reactors, with ever more safety features in response to public fears. New,
one-of-a-kind designs, shifting
regulations, supply-chain and construction snafus and a lost generation of experts (during the decades
when new construction stopped) have driven costs to absurd heights.
These economic problems are solvable. China and South Korea can build reactors at one-sixth the current cost in the United
States. With the political will, China could replace coal without sacrificing economic growth, reducing world carbon emissions by more than 10
dozens of American start-ups are developing “fourth generation” reactors that can
be mass-produced, potentially generating electricity at lower cost than fossil fuels. If American activists,
politicians and regulators allow it, these reactors could be exported to the world in the 2030s and ’40s, slaking
poorer countries’ growing thirst for energy while creating well-paying American jobs. Currently, fourthpercent. In the longer term,
generation nuclear power receives rare bipartisan agreement in Congress, making it a particularly appealing American policy to address climate
change. Congress recently passed the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act by big margins. Both parties love innovation,
entrepreneurship, exports and jobs.
This approach will need a sensible regulatory framework. Currently, as M.I.T.’s Richard Lester, a nuclear engineer, has written, a
company
proposing a new reactor design faces “the prospect of having to spend a billion dollars or more on an
open-​ended, all‑or‑nothing licensing process without any certainty of outcomes.” We need government
on the side of this clean-energy transformation, with supportive regulation, streamlined approval, investment in research and
incentives that tilt producers and consumers away from carbon.
All this, however, depends on overcoming an irrational dread among the public and many activists. The reality
is that nuclear power is the safest form of energy humanity has ever used. Mining accidents, hydroelectric
dam failures, natural gas explosions and oil train crashes all kill people, sometimes in large numbers, and
smoke from coal-burning kills them in enormous numbers, more than half a million per year.
By contrast, in 60 years of nuclear power, only three accidents have raised public alarm: Three Mile Island in 1979, which killed
no one; Fukushima in 2011, which killed no one (many deaths resulted from the tsunami and some from a panicked evacuation
near the plant); and Chernobyl in 1986, the result of extraordinary Soviet bungling, which killed 31 in the accident and perhaps
several thousand from cancer, around the same number killed by coal emissions every day. (Even if we accepted recent claims
that Soviet and international authorities covered up tens of thousands of Chernobyl deaths, the death toll from 60 years of
nuclear power would still equal about one month of coal-related deaths.)
Nuclear power plants cannot explode like nuclear bombs, and they have not contributed to weapons proliferation, thanks
to robust international controls: 24 countries have nuclear power but not weapons, while Israel and North Korea have nuclear weapons but not
power.
Nuclear waste is compact — America’s total from 60 years would fit in a Walmart — and is safely stored in concrete casks and pools, becoming
less radioactive over time. After we have solved the more pressing challenge of climate change, we can either burn the waste as fuel in new
types of reactors or bury it deep underground. It’s
a far easier environmental challenge than the world’s enormous
coal waste, routinely dumped near poor communities and often laden with toxic arsenic, mercury and
lead that can last forever.
Despite its demonstrable safety, nuclear power presses several psychological buttons. First, people estimate risk according to
how readily anecdotes like well-publicized nuclear accidents pop into mind. Second, the thought of radiation activates the
mind-set of disgust, in which any trace of contaminant fouls whatever it contacts, despite the reality that we all live in a soup of
natural radiation. Third, people feel better about eliminating a single tiny risk entirely than minimizing risk from all hazards
combined. For all these reasons, nuclear power is dreaded while fossil fuels are tolerated, just as flying is scary even though
driving is more dangerous.
Opinions are also driven by our cultural and political tribes. Since the late 1970s, when No Nukes became a signature cause of
the Green movement, sympathy to nuclear power became, among many environmentalists, a sign of disloyalty if not treason.
Despite these challenges, psychology and politics can change quickly. As
the enormity of the climate crisis sinks in and the
hoped-for carbon savings from renewables don’t add up, nuclear can become the new green. Protecting the
environment and lifting the developing world out of poverty are progressive causes. And the millennials and Gen Z’s might rethink the sacred
values their boomer parents have left unexamined since the Doobie Brothers sang at the 1979 No Nukes concert.
If the American public and politicians can face real threats and overcome unfounded fears, we can solve
humanity’s most pressing challenge and leave our grandchildren a bright future of climate stability and abundant energy. We
can dispatch, once and for all, the self-fulfilling prophesy that we’re cooked.
Warming causes extinction
Xu and Ramanathan 17
Yangyang Xu, Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at Texas A&M University; and Veerabhadran
Ramanathan, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of
Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, 9/26/17, “Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding
dangerous to catastrophic climate changes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
of America, Vol. 114, No. 39, p. 10315-10323
We are proposing the following extension to the DAI risk categorization: warming greater than 1.5 °C as
“dangerous”; warming greater than 3 °C as “catastrophic?”; and warming in excess of 5 °C as
“unknown??,” with the understanding that changes of this magnitude, not experienced in the last 20+ million
years, pose existential threats to a majority of the population. The question mark denotes the subjective nature of our
deduction and the fact that catastrophe can strike at even lower warming levels. The justifications for the proposed extension to risk
categorization are given below.
From the IPCC burning embers diagram and from the language of the Paris Agreement, we infer that the DAI begins at warming greater than
1.5 °C. Our
criteria for extending the risk category beyond DAI include the potential risks of climate change to
the physical climate system, the ecosystem, human health, and species extinction. Let us first consider the
category of catastrophic (3 to 5 °C warming). The first major concern is the issue of tipping points. Several studies (48, 49) have
concluded that 3 to 5 °C global warming is likely to be the threshold for tipping points such as the collapse of
the western Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of deep water circulation in the North Atlantic, dieback of Amazon
rainforests as well as boreal forests, and collapse of the West African monsoon, among others. While natural scientists
refer to these as abrupt and irreversible climate changes, economists refer to them as catastrophic events (49).
Warming of such magnitudes also has catastrophic human health effects. Many recent studies (50, 51) have focused
on the direct influence of extreme events such as heat waves on public health by evaluating exposure to heat stress and hyperthermia. It has
been estimated that the likelihood of extreme events (defined as 3-sigma events), including heat waves, has increased 10-fold in the recent
decades (52). Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat stress. For example, the 2013 European heat wave led to about 70,000 premature
mortalities (53). The major finding of a recent study (51) is that, currently, about 13.6% of land area with a population of 30.6% is exposed to
deadly heat. The authors of that study defined deadly heat as exceeding a threshold of temperature as well as humidity. The thresholds were
determined from numerous heat wave events and data for mortalities attributed to heat waves. According to this study, a 2
°C warming
would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100
would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose
existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as
providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates.
Climate risks can vary markedly depending on the socioeconomic status and culture of the population, and so we must
take up the question of “dangerous to whom?” (54). Our discussion in this study is focused more on people and not on the ecosystem, and
even with this limited scope, there are multitudes of categories of people. We will focus on the poorest 3 billion people living mostly
in tropical rural areas, who are still relying on 18th-century technologies for meeting basic needs such as cooking and heating. Their
contribution to CO2 pollution is roughly 5% compared with the 50% contribution by the wealthiest 1 billion (55). This bottom 3 billion
population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a oneto five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal
areas, a 1- to 2-m rise
in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses existential threat if they do not
relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming
in excess of 4 °C (54). However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C.
Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes
(>5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ∼1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of
species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in
ocean acidity due to increased CO2) can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90% of species to
the dangers of extinction (57).
The bodily harms combined with climate
change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to
water and food security, as summarized recently (58), motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as
unknown??, implying the possibility of existential threats. Fig. 2 displays these three risk categorizations (vertical dashed lines).
1NC - Shell - Long
Nuclear renaissance coming now - solves climate change and space travel
Muralidharan 18
Rathna K. Muralidharan (Program director at the non-profit Lexington Institute, a public-policy
research organization located in Arlington, Virginia, where she manages events, conducts
research, and supports staff analyses. Before joining the staff of the Lexington Institute, Rathna
worked at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, and
the Institute for the Study of War’s Iraq Project. Most recently, she worked at the Hudson
Institute where she assisted in researching U.S. security concerns in South Asia. She has
conducted extensive research on U.S. counterterrorism policies and objectives), "The Nuclear
Reactor Renaissance: Space Exploration and National Security," Real Clear Energy, 7-13-2018,
https://www.realclearenergy.org/articles/2018/07/13/the_nuclear_reactor_renaissance_space
_exploration_and_national_security_110313.html WJ
The nuclear power sector is seeing a resurgence in innovation, supported by new policies and emerging technologies.
The general public and various governments are starting to grasp the value of nuclear power as an
alternative, sustainable energy source. Unlike renewables, such as wind and solar power, nuclear energy is not
dependent on weather conditions for power generation, having a capacity factor of over 90 percent. Nuclear power
is also more eco-friendly than natural gas and coal and its “carbon-free” attributes are seen as critical in the fight
against climate change.
For decades, advancements
in the nuclear power sector have been incremental and focused largely on
making systems “walk away safe.” Today, the industry is pushing the boundaries and exploring
applications for nuclear power in ways that have never before been considered.
BWXT is at the forefront of this nuclear renaissance. This 6,000-employee company operates on the model of letting capital
drive strategy. BWXT is constantly evaluating new ways to ensure workers, funding, and policies are utilized in the most
effective way possible. The company also analyzes the needs of numerous other industries to determine how nuclear power
could provide innovative solutions.
This type of outward
thinking is what has created new technologies, such as medical isotopes and common
missile compartment tubes for Columbia-class nuclear submarines. Now, BWXT is paving a path forward in two of the
U.S. government’s top priorities: space exploration and national security. These advancements will revolutionize
both the technology and defense sectors by offering creative solutions to ongoing issues.
One of BWXT’s primary focuses is space exploration. The company is currently building a compact
nuclear reactor for space shuttles to put an astronaut on Mars and possibly even explore Jupiter’s moons by 2024.
This reactor will be operable with few to no people.
In August 2017, BWXT was awarded the contract for the Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) project by NASA to build a nuclear reactor to power
manned missions to Mars. According to NASA’s fact sheet on the program, “NTP
offers virtually unlimited energy density and
a specific impulse roughly double that of the high-est performing traditional chemical systems.”
The NTP reactor will be powered by low-enriched uranium (LEU) rather than the traditional highly
enriched uranium. This change in fuel source is advantageous because it reduces the level of security
regulations and could potentially be more affordable. NASA recognizes that nuclear power is the only
fuel source capable of powering missions farther out into our Solar System, making
such travel safer for astronauts by reducing the time humans are exposed to the physically altering
conditions of space, such as zero-gravity and cosmic radiation.
Space exploration can go faster and farther than ever before with nuclear reactors. The UN’s Office for Outer
Space Affairs has stated that “for some missions in outer space, nuclear power sources are particularly suited or even
essential owing to their compactness, long life, and other attributes.” By using nuclear power, NASA can
significantly reduce the time it takes to travel within and outside our Solar System. Mars can be reached in four
months rather than six. Jupiter can be reached in two to three years, and we can go beyond the Solar System in 12–14 years.
Nuclear reactors will also enable us to better study and utilize the resources in our Solar System by reducing travel time and reaching higher
velocities. In comparison to the main engine of the Space Shuttle, nuclear
reactors have double the propulsion efficiency
and can therefore support the delivery of “large, automated payloads to distant worlds.” Powering spacecraft
using nuclear energy will enable shuttles to transport larger and heavier payloads between the Moon
and Earth.
Nuclear power can also play a role in defending assets in outer space. In June, President Trump announced his plan to
create a sixth wing of the military to protect our interests beyond Earth’s surface, called the “Space Force.” It is clear that the U.S.
government is very serious about the need to secure our resources in space as key adversaries aim to do
the same. Revolutions in nuclear reactors come at the optimal time as the great power competition
evolves into space.
On July 2, China announced its intentions to build a super heavy rocket that would surpass NASA’s Space Launch System. Since China’s space
program is run by the military, it’s feasible that this technology can be used for defense purposes such as ballistic missiles and military satellites.
In March, Russia announced the successful testing of a hypersonic missile of the Kinzhal missile system. This weapon is capable of being
“launched into space, navigating on its own into Earth's atmosphere and avoiding radar and antimissile defenses.”
By using nuclear technology to support existing infrastructure, the U.S. can protect its assets in space
from threats. Nuclear-powered space tugs are one such capability. A space tug is stationed in space and used to move cargo to different
levels of orbit, such as from low Earth orbit to geospace. Payloads are at the greatest risk of attack when they are being
launched into orbit since they can be struck by ballistic missiles before or during launch.
Since space tugs remain in orbit, they
are capable of running multiple payloads in space rather than requiring a
new tug be launched along with every delivery, thereby reducing costs and space debris while also
eliminating the threat of attack during launch. Nuclear-powered space tugs would be more energy efficient than any other fuel
source, giving space tugs a longer life span.
Innovations in nuclear reactor technology are not just limited to space. The same type of reactor that is
being developed to power shuttles headed to Jupiter can also be used here on Earth to power military
bases. Currently, U.S. military installations are 99 percent dependent on local utilities for power, making them more vulnerable to outages
and sabotage.
By installing a compact nuclear reactor on site, military bases would be energy independent and
critically able to continue operating in the event of an emergency. These reactors would function as a battery powered
by LEU, which is non-proliferable, and would require minimal maintenance to operate.
The renewed interest around the nation and the world in sustainable energy sources is spurring a
nuclear renaissance. As more companies and countries seek resilient, long-term, and environmentally friendly solutions, nuclear
power is becoming an increasingly obvious choice. The World Nuclear Association reported in June that “50 power reactors
are currently being constructed in 13 countries.” With companies like BWXT committed to using nuclear energy in a variety of fields to solve
current and future problems, the
future is looking brighter and more resiliently powered.
Nuclear zero stops it -- strong anti-proliferation norms block access to nuclear material
and reactor development
Kumar 17
Vinod Kumar (Associate Fellow Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India),
2017, The Expectant Global Nuclear Energy Renaissance: Movers, Shakers and Spoilers.
Resurgence of Nuclear Power, 39–70. doi:10.1007/978-981-10-5029-9_3
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-5029-9_3 WJ
What are the trends that indicate the prospects of a renaissance happening, especially since earlier signs, like in the
USA, did not end in fruitful outcomes? A handful of global indicators could be highlighted to support the assumption
that a renaissance might be in the offing in the global nuclear industry, though with inherent challenges.
First, the hopes of revival in many established nuclear bases such as USA and Russia even as some European nations
such as UK, France and the Scandinavians have reposed faith in nuclear power, which also indicates a revisiting of phase-out
policies in the industrial world. Second, the massive confidence that the developing world has placed on nuclear
energy as evident from the numerous expansion plans of those nations with the existing nuclear energy
infrastructure, as also the decision of many small and emerging economies to make their plunge into nuclear energy. Third is a host of
systematic factors that has the potential to drive the renaissance, including the galloping pace of reactor
technology development, best practices emerging in civil nuclear liability laws, increasing access of insurance and risk management
tools, and above all the imperative of nations to promote clean fuel to meet climate change mitigation
targets.
3.3.1 Industrial World Still Relies on Nuclear Energy
While the US revival efforts have been ongoing since the beginning of the mil- lennium despite numerous constraints, Russia
is on a
faster pace in expanding its nuclear energy infrastructure with notable advances made in launching its Generation-III fast
neutron reactors as well as in ensuring its technological footprint in emerging markets through exports of its VVER light water reactors
(NewEurope 2016). Besides its existing tally of 36 operating reactors with a total capacity of 27,000 MW, Russia plans to add one large reactor
per year till 2028, with around 22 planned units running up to around 21,000 MW capacity, alongside an equal number earmarked for exports
(WNA 2016f).
As for
Europe, where feasibility of nuclear power continues to remain in popular debate, countries that
have preferred to retain nuclear power are announcing new projects or seeking to replace ageing ones with new
units. The UK, with plans to retire half of 15 operational reactors by middle of next decade, has opted for a foreign-funded consortium model to
kick off its Hinkley Point nuclear project, with Chinese and French state-run energy firms as collaborators (BBC 2016; Riley and Mullen 2016).
This is beside an intended plan to allow the China General Nuclear Corporation to build a nuclear plant at Bradwell, as agreed during the
Chinese President’s visit in October 2015. France, which is heavily nuclear energy-dependent, is
seemingly weighing on Areva’s
Generation-III European Pressurised Reactors (EPR) not just to display its continuing reliance on nuclear energy but also to
establish its international standing as a nuclear supplier and technology incubator.
Despite reported timeline delays and cost outruns (Guardian 2016), the EPRs at Flamanville plant in France, Olkiluoto-3 in
Finland as well as the proposed project at UK’s Hinkley symbolise a renewed thrust across Europe for nuclear power, as also the
role played by other new-generation reactors in this renewal. On the other hand, the actual relevance of the nuclear industry in
Europe is in the comparatively nascent economies in Scandinavia, especially Finland and Sweden, which have preferred to
retain nuclear as a power source and probably delay or avoid a total transition to renewable means. Along with unit 5, which is
currently under con- struction, Finland is planning further expansion for units 6 and 7 in Olkiluoto (WNA 2016d). Another
project, run by Fennovoima, is under construction to set up a VVER-1200 reactor and has a unique model of co-ownership by
Rusatom Overseas (Milne 2016b).
Sweden, on the other hand, produces 40% of its electricity from nine existing reactors and plans to replace the ageing ones with
an ambitious plan of 10 new reactors (Milne 2016a). However, Sweden’s contribution to the nuclear revival is more significant.
The nation not just revised its earlier plan, finalised in 1980s, to close nuclear and forego life extension of reactors, but removed
a tax from 2017 that discriminates against nuclear power while subsides wind and biomass to progress towards the goal to total
renewable energy by 2040. A certain fillip to nuclear energy, this reversal also means that stringent anti-nuclear sentiments
that prevailed in Scandinavia following the Fukushima incident, and phase-out models like Germany’s Energiewende, has given
way to more realistic approaches towards nuclear energy. In Europe, these revival signs could be signs of an impending
renaissance as it ignites fresh life into the industry.
3.3.2 Developing World as the Catalyst
At the other end of the spectrum, an
expectant renaissance in nuclear energy is all about ‘a great leap forward’
for many countries in the developing world for whom access to sustainable means of
energy is closely linked to the economic progress and upliftment of their societies.
Nuclear energy has traditionally been an elitist preserve with the developed and the
industrial world always controlling the technology and restricting access through nonproliferation structures including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and supplier
cartels like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Even those countries in underdeveloped regions with major uranium
deposits, like in some African countries, could not harness the economic potential of their
natural resources owing to the domination and control of advanced nations over the
affairs of the atom, and its normative structures.
Consequently, very few countries in the third world have been successful in establishing a nuclear industry that could be on par with their peers
in the developed world. Even
those who managed to set up a comparatively active base—such as India, China or
perennial struggles with the development of reactor and reprocessing technologies, access to
fissile materials or in dealing with denial regimes over attempts to develop indigenous capabilities or
gaining strategic autonomy that mismatched with the global norms perpetuated by the Westernoriented liberal security community. The renaissance, therefore, for the developing world is about the
establishment of robust nuclear industries, uninterrupted access to nuclear fuel cycles and fissile
materials, and meeting major developmental, economic and climate change targets by placing nuclear at the
centre of their energy security missions. In practice, this could also mean that the epicentre of the global nuclear industry
could be shifting to the developing world, especially the bases in Asia, who could shape the future
norms, best practices and structures for this domain. According to estimates of the World Nuclear Association, around 45 countries are at
Brazil—had
various stages or plans for nuclear energy programmes, with 32 of them being in Asian region (WNA 2016e). This includes Albania, Italy, Serbia,
Croatia, Portugal, Poland, Belarus, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Turkey and Ireland (in Europe); Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania
and Namibia (in Africa); and Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay (in Americas). The gravity of the Asian shift is marked
by the fact that nuclear projects in some subregions in Asia such as the Middle East and East Asia will be almost the same number or more than
those planned in the above two regions. For example, 14 states in the Middle East (UAE and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Yemen, Israel, Syria,
Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, and Sudan) have plans for setting up nuclear plants.
Rapid spread of nuclear power technology is vital to rapid decarbonization -- licensing
and export restrictions prevent solutions to climate change
Goldstein et al 19
Joshua S. Goldstein (professor emeritus of international relations at American University), Staffan A.
Qvist (Swedish energy engineer, author of “A Bright Future: How Some Countries Have Solved Climate
Change and the Rest Can Follow”), and Steven Pinker (professor of psychology at Harvard University), "
Nuclear Power Can Save the World" NYT, 4-6-2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/06/opinion/sunday/climate-change-nuclear-power.html WJ
As young people rightly demand real solutions to climate change, the question is not what to do —
eliminate fossil fuels by 2050 — but how. Beyond decarbonizing today’s electric grid, we must use clean electricity to
replace fossil fuels in transportation, industry and heating. We must provide for the fast-growing energy needs of poorer
countries and extend the grid to a billion people who now lack electricity. And still more electricity will be needed to remove excess carbon
dioxide from the atmosphere by midcentury.
Where will this gargantuan amount of carbon-free energy come from? The popular answer is renewables
alone, but this is a fantasy. Wind and solar power are becoming cheaper, but they are not available
around the clock, rain or shine, and batteries that could power entire cities for days or weeks show no
sign of materializing any time soon. Today, renewables work only with fossil-fuel backup.
Germany, which went all-in for renewables, has seen little reduction in carbon emissions, and, according to our
calculations, at Germany’s rate of adding clean energy relative to gross domestic product, it would take
the world more than a century to decarbonize, even if the country wasn’t also retiring nuclear plants early. A few lucky
countries with abundant hydroelectricity, like Norway and New Zealand, have decarbonized their electric grids, but their success cannot be
scaled up elsewhere: The
world’s best hydro sites are already dammed.
Small wonder that a growing response to these intimidating facts is, “We’re cooked.”
But we
actually have proven models for rapid decarbonization with economic and energy growth: France
and Sweden. They decarbonized their grids decades ago and now emit less than a tenth of the world
average of carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour. They remain among the world’s most pleasant places to live and enjoy much
cheaper electricity than Germany to boot.
They did this with nuclear power. And they did it fast, taking advantage of nuclear power’s intense
concentration of energy per pound of fuel. France replaced almost all of its fossil-fueled electricity with nuclear power
nationwide in just 15 years; Sweden, in about 20 years. In fact, most of the fastest additions of clean electricity
historically are countries rolling out nuclear power.
This is a realistic solution to humanity’s greatest problem. Plants
built 30 years ago in America, as in France, produce
cheap, clean electricity, and nuclear power is the cheapest source in South Korea. The 98 U.S. reactors
today provide nearly 20 percent of the nation’s electricity generation. So why don’t the United States and other
countries expand their nuclear capacity? The reasons are economics and fear.
New nuclear power plants are hugely expensive to build in the United States today. This is why so few are being built. But they don’t need to be
so costly. The
key to recovering our lost ability to build affordable nuclear plants is standardization and
repetition. The first product off any assembly line is expensive — it cost more than $150 million to develop the first
iPhone — but costs plunge as they are built in quantity and production kinks are worked out.
Yet as a former chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission put it, while France has two types of reactors and hundreds of types of cheese,
in the United States it’s the other way around. In recent decades, the United States and some European countries have created ever more
complicated reactors, with ever more safety features in response to public fears. New,
one-of-a-kind designs, shifting
regulations, supply-chain and construction snafus and a lost generation of experts (during the decades
when new construction stopped) have driven costs to absurd heights.
These economic problems are solvable. China and South Korea can build reactors at one-sixth the current cost in the United
States. With the political will, China could replace coal without sacrificing economic growth, reducing world carbon emissions by more than 10
percent. In the longer term,
dozens of American start-ups are developing “fourth generation” reactors that can
be mass-produced, potentially generating electricity at lower cost than fossil fuels. If American activists,
politicians and regulators allow it, these reactors could be exported to the world in the 2030s and ’40s, slaking
poorer countries’ growing thirst for energy while creating well-paying American jobs. Currently, fourthgeneration nuclear power receives rare bipartisan agreement in Congress, making it a particularly appealing American policy to address climate
change. Congress recently passed the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act by big margins. Both parties love innovation,
entrepreneurship, exports and jobs.
This approach will need a sensible regulatory framework. Currently, as M.I.T.’s Richard Lester, a nuclear engineer, has written, a
company
proposing a new reactor design faces “the prospect of having to spend a billion dollars or more on an
open-​ended, all‑or‑nothing licensing process without any certainty of outcomes.” We need government
on the side of this clean-energy transformation, with supportive regulation, streamlined approval, investment in research and
incentives that tilt producers and consumers away from carbon.
All this, however, depends on overcoming an irrational dread among the public and many activists. The reality
is that nuclear power is the safest form of energy humanity has ever used. Mining accidents, hydroelectric
dam failures, natural gas explosions and oil train crashes all kill people, sometimes in large numbers, and
smoke from coal-burning kills them in enormous numbers, more than half a million per year.
By contrast, in 60 years of nuclear power, only three accidents have raised public alarm: Three Mile Island in 1979, which killed
no one; Fukushima in 2011, which killed no one (many deaths resulted from the tsunami and some from a panicked evacuation
near the plant); and Chernobyl in 1986, the result of extraordinary Soviet bungling, which killed 31 in the accident and perhaps
several thousand from cancer, around the same number killed by coal emissions every day. (Even if we accepted recent claims
that Soviet and international authorities covered up tens of thousands of Chernobyl deaths, the death toll from 60 years of
nuclear power would still equal about one month of coal-related deaths.)
Nuclear power plants cannot explode like nuclear bombs, and they have not contributed to weapons proliferation, thanks
to robust international controls: 24 countries have nuclear power but not weapons, while Israel and North Korea have nuclear weapons but not
power.
Nuclear waste is compact — America’s total from 60 years would fit in a Walmart — and is safely stored in concrete casks and pools, becoming
less radioactive over time. After we have solved the more pressing challenge of climate change, we can either burn the waste as fuel in new
types of reactors or bury it deep underground. It’s
a far easier environmental challenge than the world’s enormous
coal waste, routinely dumped near poor communities and often laden with toxic arsenic, mercury and
lead that can last forever.
Despite its demonstrable safety, nuclear power presses several psychological buttons. First, people estimate risk according to
how readily anecdotes like well-publicized nuclear accidents pop into mind. Second, the thought of radiation activates the
mind-set of disgust, in which any trace of contaminant fouls whatever it contacts, despite the reality that we all live in a soup of
natural radiation. Third, people feel better about eliminating a single tiny risk entirely than minimizing risk from all hazards
combined. For all these reasons, nuclear power is dreaded while fossil fuels are tolerated, just as flying is scary even though
driving is more dangerous.
Opinions are also driven by our cultural and political tribes. Since the late 1970s, when No Nukes became a signature cause of
the Green movement, sympathy to nuclear power became, among many environmentalists, a sign of disloyalty if not treason.
Despite these challenges, psychology and politics can change quickly. As
the enormity of the climate crisis sinks in and the
hoped-for carbon savings from renewables don’t add up, nuclear can become the new green. Protecting the
environment and lifting the developing world out of poverty are progressive causes. And the millennials and Gen Z’s might rethink the sacred
values their boomer parents have left unexamined since the Doobie Brothers sang at the 1979 No Nukes concert.
If the American public and politicians can face real threats and overcome unfounded fears, we can solve
humanity’s most pressing challenge and leave our grandchildren a bright future of climate stability and abundant energy. We
can dispatch, once and for all, the self-fulfilling prophesy that we’re cooked.
Warming causes extinction
Xu and Ramanathan 17
Yangyang Xu, Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at Texas A&M University; and Veerabhadran
Ramanathan, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of
Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, 9/26/17, “Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding
dangerous to catastrophic climate changes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
of America, Vol. 114, No. 39, p. 10315-10323
We are proposing the following extension to the DAI risk categorization: warming greater than 1.5 °C as
“dangerous”; warming greater than 3 °C as “catastrophic?”; and warming in excess of 5 °C as
“unknown??,” with the understanding that changes of this magnitude, not experienced in the last 20+ million
years, pose existential threats to a majority of the population. The question mark denotes the subjective nature of our
deduction and the fact that catastrophe can strike at even lower warming levels. The justifications for the proposed extension to risk
categorization are given below.
From the IPCC burning embers diagram and from the language of the Paris Agreement, we infer that the DAI begins at warming greater than
1.5 °C. Our
criteria for extending the risk category beyond DAI include the potential risks of climate change to
the physical climate system, the ecosystem, human health, and species extinction. Let us first consider the
category of catastrophic (3 to 5 °C warming). The first major concern is the issue of tipping points. Several studies (48, 49) have
concluded that 3 to 5 °C global warming is likely to be the threshold for tipping points such as the collapse of
the western Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of deep water circulation in the North Atlantic, dieback of Amazon
rainforests as well as boreal forests, and collapse of the West African monsoon, among others. While natural scientists
refer to these as abrupt and irreversible climate changes, economists refer to them as catastrophic events (49).
Warming of such magnitudes also has catastrophic human health effects. Many recent studies (50, 51) have focused
on the direct influence of extreme events such as heat waves on public health by evaluating exposure to heat stress and hyperthermia. It has
been estimated that the likelihood of extreme events (defined as 3-sigma events), including heat waves, has increased 10-fold in the recent
decades (52). Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat stress. For example, the 2013 European heat wave led to about 70,000 premature
mortalities (53). The major finding of a recent study (51) is that, currently, about 13.6% of land area with a population of 30.6% is exposed to
deadly heat. The authors of that study defined deadly heat as exceeding a threshold of temperature as well as humidity. The thresholds were
determined from numerous heat wave events and data for mortalities attributed to heat waves. According to this study, a 2
°C warming
would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100
would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose
existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as
providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates.
Climate risks can vary markedly depending on the socioeconomic status and culture of the population, and so we must
take up the question of “dangerous to whom?” (54). Our discussion in this study is focused more on people and not on the ecosystem, and
even with this limited scope, there are multitudes of categories of people. We will focus on the poorest 3 billion people living mostly
in tropical rural areas, who are still relying on 18th-century technologies for meeting basic needs such as cooking and heating. Their
contribution to CO2 pollution is roughly 5% compared with the 50% contribution by the wealthiest 1 billion (55). This bottom 3 billion
population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a oneto five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal
areas, a 1- to 2-m rise
in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses existential threat if they do not
relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming
in excess of 4 °C (54). However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C.
Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes
(>5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ∼1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of
species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in
ocean acidity due to increased CO2) can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90% of species to
the dangers of extinction (57).
The bodily harms combined with climate
change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to
water and food security, as summarized recently (58), motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as
unknown??, implying the possibility of existential threats. Fig. 2 displays these three risk categorizations (vertical dashed lines).
Space colonization solves every existential threat -- failure makes human extinction
inevitable
Kaku 18
Dr. Michio Kaku (Professor of theoretical physics in the City College of New York and CUNY Graduate
Center, Co-Inventor of String Field Theory, PhD from UC Berkeley). The Future of Humanity:
Terraforming Mars, Interstellar Travel, Immortality, and Our Destiny Beyond. Doubleday Publishing.
2018. pp 25-33. WJ
It is as inescapable as the laws of physics that humanity will one day confront some type of extinctionlevel event. But will we, like our ancestors, have the drive and determination to survive and even flourish?
If we scan all the life-forms that have ever existed on the Earth, from microscopic bacteria to towering
forests, lumbering dinosaurs, and enterprising humans, we find that more than 99.9 percent of them
eventually became extinct. This means that extinction is the norm, that the odds are already stacked heavily
against us. When we dig beneath our feet into the soil to unearth the fossil record, we see evidence of many ancient lifeforms. Yet only the smallest handful survive today. Millions of species have appeared before us; they had their day in
the sun, and then they withered and died. That is the story of life.
No matter how much we may treasure the sight of dramatic, romantic sunsets, the smell of fresh ocean breezes, and the warmth of a summer’s
day, one
day it will all end, and the planet will become inhospitable to human life. Nature will eventually
turn on us, as it did to all those extinct life-forms.
The grand history of life on Earth shows that, faced with a hostile environment, organisms inevitably
meet one of three fates. They can leave that environment, they can adapt to it, or they will die. But if we look
far enough into the future, we will eventually face a disaster so great that adaptation will be virtually
impossible. Either we must leave the Earth or we will perish. There is no other way.
These disasters
have happened repeatedly in the past, and they will inevitably happen in the future. The
Earth has already sustained five major extinction cycles, in which up to 90 percent of all life-forms vanished from the Earth.
As sure as day follows night, there will be more to come.
On a scale of decades, we
face threats that are not natural but are largely self-inflicted, due to our own folly
and shortsightedness. We face the danger of global warming, when the atmosphere of the Earth itself turns against us. We face
the danger of modern warfare, as nuclear weapons proliferate in some of the most unstable regions of the globe. We face the danger of
weaponized microbes, such as airborne AIDS or Ebola, which can be transmitted by a simple cough or
sneeze. This could wipe out upward of 98 percent of the human race. Furthermore, we face an expanding
population that consumes resources at a furious rate. We may exceed the carrying capacity of Earth at
some point and find ourselves in an ecological Armageddon, vying for the planet’s last remaining supplies.
In addition to calamities that we create ourselves, there are also natural disasters over which we have
little control. On a scale of thousands of years, we face the onset of another ice age. For the past one hundred
thousand years, much of Earth’s surface was blanketed by up to a half mile of solid ice. The bleak frozen landscape drove many
animals to extinction. Then, ten thousand years ago, there was a thaw in the weather. This brief warming spell led
to the sudden rise of modern civilization, and humans have taken advantage of it to spread and thrive. But this flowering has occurred during
an interglacial period, meaning we will likely meet another ice age within the next ten thousand years. When it comes, our
cities will
disappear under mountains of snow and civilization will be crushed under the ice.
We also face the possibility that the supervolcano under Yellowstone National Park may awaken from its
long slumber, tearing the United States apart and engulfing the Earth in a choking, poisonous cloud of
soot and debris. Previous eruptions took place 630,000, 1.3 million, and 2.1 million years ago. Each event was separated by roughly
700,000 years; therefore, we may be due for another colossal eruption in the next 100,000 years.
On a scale of millions of years, we
face the threat of another meteor or cometary impact, similar to the one that
helped to destroy the dinosaurs 65 million years ago. Back then, a rock about six miles across plunged into the Yucatán
peninsula of Mexico, sending into the sky fiery debris that rained back on Earth. As with the explosion at Toba, only much larger, the ash
clouds eventually darkened the sun and led temperatures to plunge globally. With the withering of vegetation,
the food chain collapsed. Plant-eating dinosaurs starved to death, followed soon by their carnivorous
cousins. In the end, 90 percent of all life-forms on Earth perished in the wake of this catastrophic event.
For millennia, we have been blissfully ignorant of the reality that the
Earth is floating in a swarm of potentially deadly
rocks. Only within the last decade have scientists begun to quantify the real risk of a major impact. We now know that
there are several thousand NEOs (near-Earth objects) that cross the orbit of the Earth and pose a danger to
life on our planet. As of June 2017, 16,294 of these objects have been catalogued. But these are just the ones we’ve found.
Astronomers estimate that there are perhaps several million uncharted objects in the solar system that
pass by the Earth.
I once interviewed the late astronomer Carl Sagan about this threat. He stressed to me that “we live in a cosmic shooting gallery,” surrounded
by potential hazards. It is only a matter of time, he told me, before a large asteroid hits the
somehow illuminate these asteroids, we would see the night sky filled with thousands of menacing points of light.
Even assuming we avoid all these dangers, there is another that dwarfs all the others. Five
Earth. If we could
billion years from now, the sun will
expand into a giant red star that fills the entire sky. The sun will be so gigantic that the orbit of the Earth will be inside its
blazing atmosphere, and the blistering heat will make life impossible within this inferno.
Unlike all other life-forms on this planet, which must passively await their fate, we
humans are masters of our own destiny.
Fortunately, we are now creating the tools that will defy the odds given to us by nature, so that we don’t
become one of the 99.9 percent of life-forms destined for extinction. In this book, we will encounter the pioneers who
have the energy, the vision, and the resources to change the fate of humanity. We will meet the dreamers who believe that humanity can live
and thrive in outer space. We will analyze the revolutionary advances in technology that will make it possible to leave the Earth and to settle
elsewhere in the solar system, and even beyond.
But if there is one lesson we can learn from our history, it is that humanity, when faced with life-threatening crises, has risen to the challenge
and has reached for even higher goals. In some sense, the
spirit of exploration is in our genes and hardwired into our
soul.
But now we
face perhaps the greatest challenge of all: to leave the confines of the Earth and soar into
outer space. The laws of physics are clear; sooner or later we will face global crises that threaten our very existence.
Life is too precious to be placed on a single planet, to be at the mercy of these planetary threats.
We need an insurance policy, Sagan told me. He concluded that we should become a “two planet species.” In other words, we need
a backup plan.
In this book, we will explore the history, the challenges, and the possible solutions that lie before us. The
path will not be easy, and
there will be setbacks, but we have no choice.
Nuclear power undermines disarmament -- either they link, or they don’t solve
Rublee 10
Maria Rost Rublee (Associate Professor of International Relations at Monash University, with expertise
in constructivism, nuclear politics, maritime security, and diversity in security studies), 2010,The Nuclear
Threshold States, The Nonproliferation Review, 17:1, 49-70, DOI: 10.1080/10736700903484660 WJ
One commonality between the countries, however, is perhaps the
most serious challenge to disarmament from any
threshold state: insistence on fissile material production and the right to the complete fuel cycle. The NPT
guarantees the right of all members to civilian nuclear technology. However, this right has the potential effect
of undermining nonproliferation and disarmament. ‘‘The most sensitive issue in the short term is the development of
indigenous abilities to produce nuclear fuel, which even when legal in NPT terms, would potentially allow a state to
master the technically most difficult part of a nuclear weapons program.’’ 101 This is especially the case
considering the increased interest in nuclear power, as Perkovich notes:
If the number of nuclear power reactors and states that host them grows dramatically, so too will
the number of facilities for enriching uranium and, perhaps, for separating plutonium from spent reactor fuel.
The same technologies and people that produce fissile material for civilian purposes can be
employed to produce weapons. More broadly, as nuclear know-how, equipment, and material spread around the world,
so too does the wherewithal to develop nuclear weapons. The difficulty of detecting weapons proliferation rises
as the overall density of nuclear commerce, training and cooperation increases.102
Do national enrichment and reprocessing facilities represent a threat to global nuclear disarmament? Certainly more immediate challenges to
nuclear elimination exist, from entry into force of the CTBT, willingness of states outside the NPT to join, and deep reductions in U.S. and
Russian nuclear arsenals. But in terms of challenges posed by threshold states, the
ability to create fissile material may be the
gravest danger to achieving zero. Not only does enrichment and reprocessing give the countries the
capability to take the nuclear option, but they also announce to the world that nationally owned
enrichment and reprocessing are acceptable and perhaps necessary for a largescale civilian nuclear
program. If these types of facilities spread, it will undermine confidence in nonproliferation (as fear over breakout
capabilities increases) and disarmament (as NWS hesitate to permanently renounce nuclear arms when numerous other states can
create them easily).
2NR
Turns Case
Nuclear power undermines disarmament -- either they link, or they don’t solve
Rublee 10
Maria Rost Rublee (Associate Professor of International Relations at Monash University, with expertise
in constructivism, nuclear politics, maritime security, and diversity in security studies), 2010,The Nuclear
Threshold States, The Nonproliferation Review, 17:1, 49-70, DOI: 10.1080/10736700903484660 WJ
One commonality between the countries, however, is perhaps the
most serious challenge to disarmament from any
threshold state: insistence on fissile material production and the right to the complete fuel cycle. The NPT
guarantees the right of all members to civilian nuclear technology. However, this right has the potential effect
of undermining nonproliferation and disarmament. ‘‘The most sensitive issue in the short term is the development of
indigenous abilities to produce nuclear fuel, which even when legal in NPT terms, would potentially allow a state to
master the technically most difficult part of a nuclear weapons program.’’ 101 This is especially the case
considering the increased interest in nuclear power, as Perkovich notes:
If the number of nuclear power reactors and states that host them grows dramatically, so too will
the number of facilities for enriching uranium and, perhaps, for separating plutonium from spent reactor fuel.
The same technologies and people that produce fissile material for civilian purposes can be
employed to produce weapons. More broadly, as nuclear know-how, equipment, and material spread around the world,
so too does the wherewithal to develop nuclear weapons. The difficulty of detecting weapons proliferation rises
as the overall density of nuclear commerce, training and cooperation increases.102
Do national enrichment and reprocessing facilities represent a threat to global nuclear disarmament? Certainly more immediate challenges to
nuclear elimination exist, from entry into force of the CTBT, willingness of states outside the NPT to join, and deep reductions in U.S. and
Russian nuclear arsenals. But in terms of challenges posed by threshold states, the
ability to create fissile material may be the
gravest danger to achieving zero. Not only does enrichment and reprocessing give the countries the
capability to take the nuclear option, but they also announce to the world that nationally owned
enrichment and reprocessing are acceptable and perhaps necessary for a largescale civilian nuclear
program. If these types of facilities spread, it will undermine confidence in nonproliferation (as fear over breakout
capabilities increases) and disarmament (as NWS hesitate to permanently renounce nuclear arms when numerous other states can
create them easily).
XT -- Link
Nuclear latency incentivizes energy development
Shellenberger 18
Michael Shellenberger (leading energy, security, and environmental expert. He advises policymakers around the world, including in the U.S.,
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Belgium. He is co-founder of Breakthrough
Institute, where he was president from 2003 - 2015, and served as an advisor to MIT's "Future of Nuclear Energy" task force), "For Nations
Seeking Nuclear Energy, The Option To Build A Weapon Remains A Feature Not A Bug," Forbes, 8/29/18,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2018/08/29/for-nations-seeking-nuclear-energy-the-option-to-build-a-weapon-remainsa-feature-not-a-bug/#3d15f9c52747 WJ
“If
you want a meeting with the president of the U.S., and insurance against an invasion,” explained Narang,
“then get a nuclear weapon. Do it secretly. Make it ambiguous. Build a reactor, pull out of [the Non-Proliferation Treaty], kick out the
inspectors. ”
Since its birth in the 1950s, the nuclear industry and scientific community have stressed the separateness of energy production and weapons.
But recent statements by Middle Eastern leaders have thrust the connections — technical, workforce, and
motivational — into the limelight.
Of the 26 nations around the world that are building or are committed to build nuclear power plants, 23
have a weapon, had a weapon, or have shown interest in acquiring a weapon, according to a new Environmental
Progress analysis.
The 13 nations that had a weapons program, or have shown interest in acquiring a weapon, are Argentina, Armenia,
Bangladesh, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, Japan, Romania, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.).
Consider:
U.A.E., which has finished construction of its first nuclear plant, and has shown high-level interest in
acquiring a nuclear weapon — something acknowledged by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton;
Turkey has begun construction of a nuclear plant and, may be secretly developing a weapon or “laying the
groundwork to replace the nuclear umbrella the US provides;”
Egypt will start construction of a nuclear plant in 2020 and is viewed by experts as a possible nuclear
weapons state if Iran decides to acquire a weapon;
Bangladesh has shown interest in developing weapons latency in the past and currently has a nuclear
plant under construction.
Brazil is seeking to a multipurpose reactor, has in the past sought a weapon, and “will leave the door
open to developing nuclear weapons“ according to a new Stratfor analysis.
This trend fits the historic pattern. In the 60 years of civilian nuclear power, at
least 20 nations* sought nuclear power at
least in part to give themselves the option of creating a nuclear weapon.
Of the other nations building nuclear plants, seven have weapons (France, U.S., Britain, China, Russia, India and Pakistan), two had weapons as
part of the Soviet Union (Ukraine and Belarus), and one (Slovakia) was part of a nation (Czechoslovakia) that sought a weapon.
Poland, Hungary, and Finland are the only three nations (of the 26) for which we could find no evidence of “weapons latency” as a motivation.
While those 23 nations clearly have motives other than national security for pursuing nuclear energy, gaining
weapons latency appears to be the difference-maker.
The flip side also appears true: nations
that lack a need for weapons latency often decide not to build nuclear
power plants, which can be more difficult and expensive than fossil fueled ones.
Recently, Vietnam
and South Africa, neither of which face a significant security threat, decided against
building nuclear plants and opted instead for burning more coal, despite suffering from air pollution and
professing concern for climate change.
Why Nuclear
Energy Prevents War
In 2015, two scholars at Texas A&M university, Matthew Fuhrmann and Benjamin Tkach, set out to answer two questions: how many nations
have the ability to build a weapon? And what impact does nuclear weapons “latency” have on war?
A growing body of research had found that latency deters against military attacks, Fuhrmann and Tkach noted. But with Israel
and U.S. threatening pre-emptive action against Iran, could latency also be a threat to peace?
Fuhrmann and Tkach found that 31
nations had the capacity to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium, and that
71 percent of them created that capacity to give themselves weapons latency.
What was the relationship between nuclear latency and military conflict? It was negative. “Nuclear
latency appears to provide
states with deterrence-related benefits,” they concluded, “that are distinct from actively pursuing nuclear bombs.”
Why might this be? Arriving at an ultimate cause is difficult if not impossible, the authors note. But one obvious possibility is that the “latent
nuclear powers may be able to deter conflict by (implicitly) threatening to ‘go nuclear’ following an attack.”
Non-proliferation prohibitively raises the effective cost of nuclear power - global
warming
Mueller 16
John Mueller (Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center
for International Security Studies), “‘AT ALL COSTS’”: THE DESTRUCTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF ANTIPROLIFERATION POLICY” from Should We let The Bomb Spread? Edited by Henry D. Sokolski (Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College), 2016. 67-110. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12076.7. WJ
Hampering Economic Development.
Leonard Weiss notes “restrictions
on nuclear trade and development are important elements of a
nonproliferation regime.”67 Anti-proliferation efforts can thus hamper worldwide economic development
by increasing the effective costs of developing nuclear energy. As countries grow, they require ever-increasing amounts
of power. Any measure that limits their ability to acquire this vital commodity—or increases its price—effectively
slows economic growth at least to some degree and thereby reduces the gains in life expectancy
inevitably afforded by economic development.
In the various proclamations about controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons, this cost goes almost entirely unconsidered. For example,
one of the common proposals by anti-proliferators is that no country anywhere (except those already doing it) should be able to construct any
facilities that could produce enriched uranium or plutonium—substances that can be used either in advanced reactors or in bombs. The
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) does specifically guarantee to signing non-nuclear countries “the
fullest possible exchange of technology” for the develop ment of peaceful nuclear power. However, as Richard Betts points out,
this guarantee has been undermined by the development of a “nuclear suppliers cartel” that has worked
to “cut off trade in technology for reprocessing plutonium or enriching uranium,” thereby reducing the NPT to “a
simple demand to the nuclear weapons have-nots to remain so.” Under some proposals, the cartel would be extended to fuel as well.68
Anti-proliferator Allison is among those advocating the cartelization of nuclear fuel. He further suggests that nuclear states
guarantee to sell the non-nuclear ones all the nuclear fuel they need (presumably in perpetuity) at less than half price, but does
not attempt to calculate the price tag for this.69 The 2008 Graham Commission, of which Allison was a member, repeats this
demand, though it suggests that nuclear fuel be made available at market prices “to the extent possible.” It, too, eschews cost
considerations.70 There is, however, a glimmer of evidence that the economic cost of hampering the nuclear industry has been
considered, at least in passing, by some dedicated anti-proliferators. In a 2007 plea that the world be made free of nuclear
weapons, four former top policy officials insisted that the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) be phased out from civil
commerce and be removed from all the research facilities in the entire world—a costly demand that was not repeated in their
2008 version.71
The anti-proliferation obsession has also resulted in the summary dismissal of potentially promising
ideas for producing energy. Thomas Schelling points out that there was a proposal in the 1970s (the decade that experienced two
major shocks in the price of oil) to safely explode tiny thermonuclear bombs in underground caverns to generate steam that could produce
energy in an ecologically clean manner. According to Schelling, both arms control and energy policy analysts universally rejected the proposal at
the time “without argument, as if the objections were too obvious to require articulation.”72 On closer exploration, of course, this scheme
might have proved unfeasible for technical or economic reasons. However, to dismiss it without any sort of analysis was to blithely sacrifice
energy needs—and therefore human welfare—to an anti-proliferation knee-jerk.
Something similar may now be in the cards. Though currently in the research phase, it
may become possible in the future to
radically reduce the cost of producing nuclear energy by using lasers for isotope separation to produce the
fuel required by reactors.73 This, of course, might also make it easier, or at any rate less costly, for unpleasant
states to develop nuclear weapons. Accordingly, a balanced assessment of costs and benefits would have to be made if the
technique ever proves to be feasible. However, there is an excellent chance no one will ever make it: like the technology
Schelling discusses, it will be dismissed out of hand. Relatedly, the anti-proliferation obsession has sometimes hampered
the potentially valuable expansion of nuclear power to ships, particularly to icebreakers.
Enhancing Dependence on Foreign Oil.
There is also something of a security aspect to this process. Ever since the oil shocks of the 1970s, it has become common
in American politics to espy a danger to the country’s security in allowing it to be so dependent on a product that is so disproportionately
supplied to the world by regimes in the Middle East that are sometimes contemptible, hostile, and or unstable. One obvious solution would be
to rely much more on nuclear energy. There are a number of reasons why this has failed to happen, but the
association of nuclear
power with nuclear weapons and worries about nuclear proliferation have had the result of making it
much more difficult and expensive—often prohibitively so—to build nuclear reactors.74
Undercutting Efforts to Prevent Global Warming. In addition, because
nuclear power does not emit greenhouse gases, it
is an obvious potential candidate for helping with the problem of global warming, an issue many people hold to
be of the highest concern for the future of the planet. Since many of the policies arising from the nonproliferation
fixation increase the costs of nuclear power, they, to that degree, exacerbate the problem.
Weapon controls threaten civilian nuclear technology
Mathis 13
Kyle Mathis (Litigation attorney with Thomas J. Henry Law, JD University of Alabama School of Law).
"The Nuclear Supplier Group: Problems and Solutions." Ala. CR & CLL Rev. 4 (2013): 169.
https://www.law.ua.edu/acrcl/files/2017/04/Nuclear_Supplier_Group.pdf WJ
There is no reason to wonder why the world would want to control the spread of nuclear weapons. The
detonation of nuclear weapons in Japan in 1945 showed the world a weapon that left all of its predecessors in the dust as to pure destructive
capability. Since then, the world has seen the advent of a multitude of strategies to try to control this spread or "proliferation" of nuclear
weapons. One
of the byproducts of controlling this proliferation is closely controlling the spread of the
beneficial civilian nuclear energy technologies that closely resemble nuclear weapons programs. However,
the current and potential usefulness of nuclear energy is difficult to forget. Since the revelation that obtaining energy from nuclear reactions is
possible, scientists
and lay people alike have heralded it as the future for world energy. From a humanitarian
nuclear
energy has the potential to drastically help the development of underdeveloped
prospective,
nations while helping to curb the environmental problems created by the modem consumption of fossil
fuels.
From a scientific perspective, the
process to make fuel grade and weapons grade uranium is nearly identical,
creating a multitude of dilemmas. Seemingly, the world would like to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons;' but how can
or should this be done? The first thing to be looked into is how, since the advent of the nuclear bomb, the world has been attempting to control
the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons development strengthens nuclear power
CND 18
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, June 2018, “Nuclear power and nuclear weapons”,
https://cnduk.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Nuclear-power-and-nuclear-weapons-1.pdf WJ
The connections between nuclear power and nuclear weapons have
kept secret. Most governments take great pains to keep their connections well hidden.
always been very close and are largely
The civil nuclear power industry grew out of the atomic bomb programme in the 1940s and the 1950s. In Britain,
the civil nuclear power programme was deliberately used as a cover for military activities.
Military nuclear activities have always been kept secret, so the nuclear power industry’s habit of hiding things from the public
was established right at its beginning, due to its close connections with military weapons. For example, the atomic weapons
facilities at Aldermaston and Burghfield in Berkshire, where British nuclear weapons are built and serviced, are still deleted
from Ordnance Survey maps, leaving blank spaces.
It was under the misleading slogan of ‘Atoms for Peace’, that the Queen ceremonially opened what was officially described as Britain’s
first
nuclear power station, at Calder Hall in Cumbria, in 1956. The newsreel commentary described how it
would produce cheap and clean nuclear energy for everyone.
This was untrue. Calder Hall was not a civil power station. It
was built primarily to produce plutonium for nuclear
weapons. The electricity it produced was a by-product to power the rest of the site.
Fire at Windscale piles
In 1957, a major fire occurred at Windscale nuclear site (what is now known as Sellafield). The effects of the Windscale fire were hushed up at
the time but it is now recognised as one of the world’s worst nuclear accidents. An official statement in 1957 said: ‘There was not a large
amount of radiation released. The amount was not hazardous and in fact it was carried out to sea by the wind.’ The truth, kept hidden for over
thirty years, was that a large quantity of hazardous radioactivity was blown east and south east, across most of England.
After years of accidents and leaks, several of them serious, and regular cover-up attempts by both the management and government, it was
decided to change the plant’s name in 1981 to Sellafield, presumably in the hope that the public would forget about Windscale and the
accident.
When, in 1983, Greenpeace divers discovered highly radioactive waste being discharged into the sea through a pipeline at Sellafield and tried to
block it, British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL), who then operated the site, repeatedly took Greenpeace to the High Court to try to stop them and to
sequestrate its assets. The
first generation of British Magnox nuclear power stations were all secretly designed
with the dual purpose of plutonium and electricity production in mind.
Some people think that because plutonium is no longer needed by the UK to make weapons as it already has huge stocks of weapons grade
plutonium, there no longer is any connection between nuclear
inextricably linked. For example:
weapons and nuclear energy. This is incorrect: they remain
All the processes at the front of the nuclear fuel cycle, i.e. uranium ore mining, uranium ore milling,
uranium ore refining, and U-235 enrichment are still used for both power and military purposes.
The UK factory at Capenhurst that makes nuclear fuel for reactors also makes nuclear fuel for nuclear
(Trident and hunter-killer) submarines.
Nuclear reactors are used to create tritium (the radioactive isotope of hydrogen) necessary for nuclear weapons.
Subsidising the arms industry
The development of both the nuclear weapons and nuclear power industries is mutually beneficial.
Scientists from Sussex University confirmed this once again in 2017, stating that the government is using the Hinkley Point C nuclear power
station to subsidise Trident, Britain’s nuclear weapons system.
XT -- UQ
Systemic factors makes new nuclear development likely to take off
Kumar 17
Vinod Kumar (Associate Fellow Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India),
2017, The Expectant Global Nuclear Energy Renaissance: Movers, Shakers and Spoilers.
Resurgence of Nuclear Power, 39–70. doi:10.1007/978-981-10-5029-9_3
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-5029-9_3
optimism about a nuclear revival is also propped up by a handful of systemic
stimulants. These include the advent of new generation of reactor technologies, improved access to and
affordability of uranium as well as legal and risk management structures that intend to make the
industry robust and accountable. Adding to this momentum is also a general corporate trend favouring
consolidation within the global nuclear industry over the past decade. 3.3.3.1 Reactor Technologies During the initial phase in the
3.3.3 Systemic Factors as Stimulant The
1950s and 1960s, gas-/water-cooled and graphite-moderated designs formed the first generation of nuclear reactors (EuropeanCommission 2015). It was, however, the second generation of
pressurised water (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) that has dominated power generation since the 1970s and accounts for the bulk of reactors in operation worldwide. These include
the PWR designs by Westinghouse, BWRs by General Electric, PHWRs by AECL (running on natural uranium), the Chinese CPR-1000 based on Framatome (Areva) design, the CNP PWRs of 600
and 1000 MW, the Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant’s (KSNP) OPR-1000s, (Goldberg and Rosner 2011), as well as the early variants of the Russian Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky Reactors
A significant driver of the
nuclear renewal is the advent of third generation (Gen-III) reactors, which comes with designs for
extended lifetimes—up to 50– 60 years—and enhanced safety and performance features. Available
literature on Gen-III reactors describe them as having improved and standardised designs so as to
expedite licensing, reduce cost and construction time, along with the advantage of their higher burn-up
enabling efficient use of fuel and waste reduction (WNA 2016g). More importantly, they are designed to withstand conceivable safety challenges or
(VVER). Gen-II reactors were designed for a lifetime of 20–30 years with traditional safety features and passive engineering systems (Fig. 3.2).
any damage to the reactor that could result in core meltdown or radiological release. Advanced PWRs have capacities ranging from 600 to 1600 MW and the BWRs in the 1250–1550 range
(FISA 2009). The prominent systems of this generation include Westinghouse’s AP-600, General Electric (GE) ABWR, CANDU 6 and VVER-1000, among others (Goldberg and Rosner 2011).
the factor that drives optimism in the
industry is the rapid pace of technological upgrades as evident by the quick progress to Gen-III+ systems.
Unlike the over 30-year gap between Generations II and III, the galloping to the next technological level
is visible in the Gen-III+ reactors which have integrated new benchmarks based on the basic Gen-III
design. The significance for the expectant nuclear renewal is that the many ongoing and upcoming
projects will be adopting Gen-III and III+ reactors, thus signifying a new era of nuclear plant operation.
Gen-III+, in fact, comes with improvements in safety over Gen-III through passive safety features that do
not require active controls or operator intervention (Marques 2011) to mitigate the impact of abnormal events.
While Gen-III designs have been in vogue since the mid-1990s, though only beginning to make notable market inroads,
The systems on offer include the VVER-1200 (Rosatom), AP-1000/1400 (Westinghouse), Hualong 1 (CNNC) and Areva’s EPR, considered the most advanced of this lot (Cognet 2010). However,
it is vital to note that the prospects of a renaissance taking shape in this sector are heavily dependent on the success and wider acceptance of these systems and the technologies they claim to
herald. Even the perceivably most advanced of these systems are yet to attain operational years or maturity amid aspersions being cast on various aspects of their designs, notably of EPR
(Samuel 2015; Clercq and Mallet 2016) and AP-1000 (Sasi 2016b). Nonetheless, despite the level of acceptability or success that these designs gain, the technological innovation will be an
enduring process, going by the current pursuit of Generation-IV reactor technologies. Gen-IV hinges on six reactor technology concepts, namely gas-cooled and lead-cooled fast reactors,
molten salt reactor, supercritical water-cooled reactor, sodium-cooled fast reactor and very high-temperature reactor (GIF 2014). According to WNA, the 13-nation strong Gen-IV International
Forum intends to deploy some of these technologies, mainly fast neutron reactors, by 2020–2030, marking a new era of fast reactors and operating at higher temperatures (WNA 2016h).
Besides this consortium, countries such as Russia (Patel 2016) and China (WNN 2014) are also working on waste-free fast neutron reactors, while those like India have long-running
programmes on fast breeder reactors with the aim of harnessing plutonium and thorium resources. While assuming that Gen-III and III+ systems will drive nuclear revival and growth in the
coming years, the future of the industry and its ability to remain as a sustainable source for the long term will invariably depend on the success attained by the Gen-IV development process.
And public support for nuclear power is on the rise – leads to more uptake
Ertelt 18
Sarah Ertelt, 3-7-2018, The Prindle Post Contributor, "Embracing Nuclear Power as a Solution to Climate Change", Prindle Post,
https://www.prindlepost.org/2018/03/nuclear-power-solution-climate-change/
Public opinion on nuclear power has historically been mixed and is largely dependent on how politicians frame the issue. In the article, “Framing trade-offs: The
politics of nuclear power and wind energy in the age of global climate change,” Sarah Pralle and Jessica Boscarino argue that before the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
disaster in 2011, a “Nuclear Renaissance” was on the horizon. Immediately following the incident, American support for nuclear energy was even lower than after
the Three Mile Island incident in 1979, at 43 percent in 2011. Since
the Fukushima disaster has almost seven years of distance
from public memory, a “Nuclear Renaissance” may be on the horizon again. Although nuclear power is arguably no safer
today than it was in 1960, the perceived threat of global climate change is much higher, allowing for a trade-off.
Yes, nuclear power has its risks, but the risks of climate change are worse. If politicians were to frame nuclear power as a
trade-off in this way, public support may increase in the coming years, since polling data shows that support for
nuclear energy increases if presented as a solution to climate change.
Defense industrial base
1NC DIB DA
DIB recovering from downturn now -- policy stability and sustained funding are crucial
to long turn investment
Green 19
Jeffery A. Green (President of J.A. Green & Company, a government relations firm based in
Washington, D.C. He previously served with the House Armed Services Committee and the
Defense Department.), "Industrial Base Gears Up for Great Power Conflict" National Defense
Magazine, 1-24-2019,
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2019/1/24/viewpoint-industrial-basegears-up-for-great-power-conflict WJ
For decades, free-trade ideology has dominated discussions about manufacturing and economic
development in the United States, even with respect to the defense industrial base. Though policies
stemming from this ideology have succeeded in generating great wealth for the U.S. economy, they have also led to a number of
unintended consequences, including the erosion of the manufacturing segment of the defense industrial
base.
With new authorities included in this year’s defense authorization bill, however, the Pentagon is wellequipped to reverse the decline in U.S. defense manufacturing and to provide secure supply of crucial
military components for the future.
The Defense Department is, of course, unlike any private sector business. It is responsible for responding to unforeseen events worldwide and
is also subject to threats and challenges that no private sector actor confronts.
A mistaken emphasis on free-trade ideology and a selective aversion to “picking winners and losers,” however, has led to
the false conclusion that the department, which has a budget larger than many midsize European countries, cannot and
should not attempt to shape the commercial sector that supplies it. This mindset has produced weak
points in the supply chain that potential adversaries have recognized and exploited.
A recent op-ed by retired Air Force Gen. Hawk Carlisle, former commander of Air Combat Command, and current president and CEO of the
National Defense Industrial Association, argues that today’s industrial base is vastly different than the one that propelled the United States to
military greatness in World War II and throughout the Cold War. Even as defense spending increased following 9/11, the defense industrial
base has continued to shrink and consolidate.
This process was greatly accelerated by budgetary uncertainty during the Obama administration. A study on
the impacts of budget sequestration by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Aerospace Industries Association, “Measuring
the Impact of Sequestration and the Defense Drawdown on the Industrial Base, 2011-2015,” notes that over
17,000 companies left
the defense industrial base during those years. This greatly reduced the scope of competition within the
industry and left the defense supply chain with a large number of single points of failure.
Looking at U.S. industry more broadly, it is clear that while certain segments of manufacturing output are doing well, industries that supply
defense manufacturing have sustained deep declines in recent years. The mining of non-fuel resources, for example, peaked in early 2006 and
has declined ever since. The decline in textile production has been even more dramatic. At a time when the economy is increasingly dominated
by service businesses, both
the executive branch and Congress must take a hard look at the ideological
underpinnings driving our industrial policy.
Thankfully,
the 2017 National Security Strategy acknowledged the deeply troubling decline of the defense
industrial base. The document notes: “A healthy defense industrial base is a critical element of U.S. power and the national security
innovation base. The ability of the military to surge in response to an emergency depends on our nation’s
ability to produce needed parts and systems, healthy and secure supply chains, and a skilled U.S. workforce. The erosion of
American manufacturing over the last two decades, however, has had a negative impact on these capabilities and threatens to undermine the
ability of U.S. manufacturers to meet national security requirements.”
One of the best-known single points of failure in today’s defense industrial base is the near sole-source dependence on China for rare earth
elements. Due to their unique properties, this select group of minerals is essential for the construction of much of the U.S. military’s high-tech
hardware, including everything from radars to night vision goggles. The lack of viable domestic sources for the elements creates a significant
strategic vulnerability.
An incident in 2010 shows just how dangerous this dependence can be. In the midst of an international dispute over control of fishing waters,
China abruptly cut off rare earth element exports to Japan, only resuming them a month later after Japan declined to prosecute the Chinese
ship captain involved in the incident. Had the export restrictions continued, the impact on the Japanese high-tech industry could have been
catastrophic.
Concerningly, there are indications that China may try to use the export of critical raw materials to gain geopolitical leverage over the United
States. At a public forum in Beijing in September, China’s former finance minister Lou Jiwei reportedly told an audience that China could restrict
exports of core items for the U.S. manufacturing supply chain. This speech was after the Communist Party’s People’s Daily printed a story
stating: “We are looking forward to a more beautiful counterattack and will keep increasing the pain felt by the U.S.” This statement is an
important reminder that our strategic materials vulnerabilities are real, and our senior government officials must heed this call to action to
build on the advances made this year.
Thankfully, government
policy is rapidly changing to create a more secure industrial base, highlighted by
efforts to create a more favorable business climate to sustain potentially low-volume, high priority
production of key materials. This process started with a number of executive orders issued by the administration.
For instance, Executive Order 13806, “Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency
of the United States,” mandated a comprehensive study of the defense industrial base. Likewise, Executive Order
13817, “Presidential Executive Order on a Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals,” initiated an intragovernmental strategy to end U.S. reliance on foreign suppliers of 35 critical mineral commodities.
The push to secure the defense industrial base was advanced greatly by the recently-passed National Defense Authorization Act. For example,
section 871 of the NDAA prohibits the Defense Department and its contractors from acquiring certain sensitive materials, including rare earth
magnets, from non-allied foreign nations including China, Russia and Iran. Once fully implemented in regulations, this language will help
catalyze a resurgence in U.S. domestic production of critical minerals and components.
As production scales up under the stimulus of steady demand, downstream consumers of these
products are likely to find that U.S. producers can outcompete foreign suppliers on both price and
quality. As it reviews the results of the administration’s industrial base study, Congress should consider adding more materials to the list in
future years.
This year’s NDAA, coupled with sustained attention from the executive branch, is the best thing to happen to the defense
industrial base in years. However, Congress and the executive branch must do more to get this vital sector
on solid footing for the era of renewed great power competition. As Congress gears up for the next authorization act, it
should use the recently-released executive branch assessment of defense industrial base vulnerabilities as a template for action. The report
highlights numerous single points of failure in the defense supply chain. Though some can be fixed through executive branch action alone,
others will require legislative support.
First, Congress must increase funding for the programs that directly support the industrial
Defense Production Act purchases, Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment and Manufacturing Technology.
The plan shocks the defense base.
Acheson 18
base, including
Director of Reaching Critical Will, the disarmament program of the Women’s International League for
Peace and Freedom, and one of the world’s oldest feminist peace organization. She has been involved
with intergovernmental disarmament processes since 2005 Ray Acheson, “Impacts of the nuclear ban:
how outlawing nuclear weapons is changing the world,” Global Change, Peace, & Security. 2018 WJ
Facilitating economic divestment
Another product of the stigmatization process is economic divestment. One of the key
aspirations for the nuclear ban was that it could prohibit the financial investment in nuclear
weapon production and maintenance. While this does not appear as a specific prohibition in
the TPNW, it is included in the prohibition on assisting, encouraging or inducing anyone to
engage in any activity prohibited by the Treaty.
In practical terms, this means that states parties to the TPNW would need to withdraw any
government money (such as pension funds) from companies that produce nuclear weapons. It
also means that banks, pension funds and other financial institutions will face pressure to
withdraw their money from such companies. In this way, the nuclear ban is likely to have a
significant impact on nuclear weapon modernization programmes and financial investments in
nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and related infrastructure.
Companies get and stay involved in the nuclear weapons business because it brings them
significant income with low financial risk or investment. The work and relationships with
governments involved in nuclear weapons facilitate other profitable activities, e.g. in the
development and marketing of nuclear power stations, in physical security, or in surveillance,
intelligence, and counter-proliferation. The prohibition on ‘assistance’ with prohibited acts has
a material impact on the corporations involved in the production of nuclear weapons. It helps
to undermine these companies’ rationale for being involved with the nuclear weapons
business. For nuclear warheads per se, only a fairly small number of companies are involved,
but many of these companies greatly value their wider international business.
The divestment campaign accompanying the treaty banning cluster munitions has been
successful in affecting the financial interests of corporations producing these weapon systems
and related components. Even within countries that have not joined the Convention on Cluster
Munitions, companies have ceased production on these illegal weapons. For example, the last
company producing cluster munitions in the United States, Textron, announced in August 2016
that it would no longer produce these weapons. The US government has not allotted funds for
cluster munition production since 2007, even though it did not join the Convention adopted in 2006.5
A strong domestic defense manufacturing capacity undergirds US hegemony and
foreign policy influence – rising challengers present new threats to heg in key hotspots
Caverley 12
Jonathan Caverley, an Assistant Professor at Northwestern University, Ethan B. Kapstein, a Professor at
the University of Texas at Austin, a Visiting Professor at Georgetown University, and a Senior Fellow at
the Center for a New American Security, “Arms Away: How Washington Squandered Its Monopoly on
Weapons Sales,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5 (SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2012), pp. 125-132
If the United States' sliding market share were just an economic matter, one might simply dismiss the issue by arguing that the country's
defense industry, which must report to its shareholders, will soon be forced to face the consequences of its business strategy and retrench. But
unlike other sectors, arms dealing has a geopolitical dimension, especially in Asia's booming export
market, as well as an economic one.
When Washington inks a weapons deal, the partner country is unlikely to deploy those arms in a manner
at odds with the United States' interests, which would threaten its access to those very weapons. So the more weapons
Washington sells, the more control it has over security decisions made abroad. More specifically, Washington
can exploit its market power to advance important foreign policy objectives. In 2005, for example,
Washington suspended Israel's access to the F-35 program to force Jerusalem to stop selling unmanned aerial vehicle parts to China. The United
States has used similar tactics to prevent Brazil and Spain from selling aircraft to Venezuela.
With Washington's interests turning toward Asia, arms
sales make it possible for the United States to arm its Pacific
allies and, at the same time, keep China isolated. This can be done in a direct manner, such as when the United States uses access to
its domestic arms market to encourage European Union states to maintain the weapons embargo on China that dates back to the 1989
Tiananmen Square killings. But there is an indirect route, as well. By
using its competitive advantage to shrink Russia's
export market, the United States could make China's principal arms supplier less appealing.
In recent years, Russia has done a particularly good job servicing weapons needs across Asia. A firm such as Sukhoi, a major Russian aircraft
manufacturer, knows it cannot rely on domestic orders alone for its survival. Over the last decade, it has succeeded in selling fairly inexpensive
fighter jets to countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. European producers, too, have ramped up production. Since 1990, firms across the
continent have developed at least two new fighter jets in addition to France's Rafale. Sweden has sold its Gripen single-engine fighter to
countries such as Hungary and Thailand; the Eurofighter, despite being inefficiently built on four separate assembly lines across the continent,
has been sold to Austria and Saudi Arabia.
Meanwhile, signs
of U.S. decline in the arms sphere in Asia abound. Pakistan's largest arms supplier is now
China, Singapore is acquiring French naval vessels, and for the first time in its history, the Philippines is looking to
non- American aircraft sources. These countries are less interested in the newest high-tech weaponry and more interested in
medium-sized arms they can afford. Washington does not sell weapons to China or Russia, of course, and India purchases only a limited
quantity. South Korea, a long-standing U.S. ally, has developed a growing domestic arms industry, producing, for example, diesel submarines
that it exports to such countries as Indonesia. If Washington
wants its "pivot" to Asia to stick, it needs to regain the
ground in the arms market that it has lost.
All these shifts could prove destabilizing. As the United States risks losing its position as a principal arms
supplier in the region, producers will proliferate, because small states entering the arms business have no choice
but to be export-oriented to survive and grow. In essence, they need to produce as much as possible. U.S. firms, in
contrast, can be more selective in their approach to exports, thanks to the large size of the United States' domestic market.
Washington can withhold supplies, reducing the amount of advanced weaponry in the world. From a security and
stability perspective, that is an advantage.
Hegemony collapse leads to transition wars
Keck 14
Zachary Keck is Managing Editor of The Diplomat, The Diplomat, January 24, 2014, “America’s Relative
Decline: Should We Panic?”, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-wepanic/
Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good
reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with,
hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history. This is not
only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have
benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the
road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the
international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states.
We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific
(and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has
unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of
other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally,
these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the
situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or
should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out
elsewhere in the years and decades ahead.
All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has
asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and
thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time,
America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major
regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par
with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the
possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will
also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to
protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals.
But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed
successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today’s
“globalized” world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be
solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change, health pandemics,
organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, among many others.
A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these
transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to
some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens
the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of
complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global
governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.
AT: Thumpers
Defense industrial base fine for the foreseeable future in the squo – several structural
advantages
Caverley 12
Jonathan Caverley, an Assistant Professor at Northwestern University, Ethan B. Kapstein, a Professor at
the University of Texas at Austin, a Visiting Professor at Georgetown University, and a Senior Fellow at
the Center for a New American Security, “Arms Away: How Washington Squandered Its Monopoly on
Weapons Sales,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5 (SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2012), pp. 125-132
is good news as well: many of the U.S. defense industry's competitive advantages - massive
economies of scale, a research budget that still dwarfs the rest of the world's, and the proven quality of its
products - will remain robust for the foreseeable future. Washington can and should leverage these
Yet there
advantages to dominate a global network of military products that keeps
exports out, and Chinese defense capabilities down.
European and other mid-tier states in, Russian
**Defenses of Heg
2NR AT: Impact D
Only variable that explains anything
Owen ‘11
John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard associate professor in the University of Virginia's Department of
Politics. He is the author of Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security (Cornell University Press, 1997) and of The
Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change 1510-2010 (Princeton University Press, 2010). "DON’T
DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/, AM
Andrew Mack
and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study
with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite
unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at
least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy
makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps
they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a
setup, but it is not. I
shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around
the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent
conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1
actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack
et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers
of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning
international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states
have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured
destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But
the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed
states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first
strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states
are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the
United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains
strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred
from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more
quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we
have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding
the downward trend in
international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace”
(democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or
“commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has
increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their
forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth
(where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies
among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries).
These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be
working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these
days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time,
when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms
reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example,
have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international
cooperation, including to end civil wars. We
would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got
started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear
peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars
call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is
called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the
global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one
powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global
public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion
(threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or
both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure
absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one
country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been
so predominant. There
is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of
international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN
or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep
cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is
the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the
Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a
candid look at U.S. foreign policy
reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is
that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider
economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence
irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since
the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic
openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish
reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic
interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven
growth. Second,
the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths
to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism
the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to
make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil
violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United
States as the global hegemon. The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of
democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being
the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become
much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most
anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend
to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But
general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.
American power solves nuclear war and dampens all conflict
Barnett ‘11
Thomas, American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at
Crossroads,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads,
AM
Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the
U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the
world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass
murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human
civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding
down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-
perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and
played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of
democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life
expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction
in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next
time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With selfdeprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up
as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most
vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before
that establishment reared its ugly head. The
last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th
century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2
million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers
report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though
admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to
war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both
encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to
keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.
--AT: Fettweis
Fettweis is wrong---U.S. heg is the cause of declining conflict
Francis P. Sempa 11, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, an adjunct
professor of political science at Wilkes University, and a contributing editor to American Diplomacy,
October 2011, Review of Dangerous Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace By
Christopher J. Fettweis, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 63, p. 150
Forget Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Machiavelli. Put aside Mackinder, Mahan, and Spykman. Close the military academies and war colleges. Shut
our overseas bases. Bring
our troops home. Make dramatic cuts in the defense budget. The end of major war,
and perhaps the end of war itself, is near, according to Tulane assistant professor Christopher Fettweis in his recent book, Dangerous
Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace.
Fettweis is not the first intellectual, nor will he be the last, to proclaim the onset of perpetual peace. He is squarely in the tradition of Immanuel
Kant, Herbert Spencer, and Norman Angell, to name just three. Indeed, in the book’s introduction, Fettweis attempts to rehabilitate Angell’s
reputation for prophecy, which suffered a devastating blow when the Great War falsified his claim in The Great Illusion that economic
interdependence had rendered great power war obsolete. Angell, Fettweis writes, was the first “prominent constructivist thinker of the
twentieth century,” and was not wrong—just ahead of his time (p. 5).
Fettweis bases his theory or vision of the obsolescence of major war on the supposed linear progress of human nature, a major tenet of 20thcentury liberalism that is rooted in the rationalist theories of the Enlightenment. “History,” according to Fettweis, “seems to be unfolding as a
line extending into the future—a halting, incomplete, inconsistent line perhaps, one with frequent temporary reversals, but a line nonetheless.”
The world is growing “more liberal and more reliant upon reason, logic, and science” (p. 217).
We have heard this all before. Human nature can be perfected. Statesmen and leaders will be guided by reason and
science. Such thinking influenced the visionaries of the French Revolution and produced 25 years of war among the great powers of Europe.
Similar ideas influenced President Woodrow Wilson and his intellectual supporters who endeavored at Versailles to transform the horrors of
World War I into a peace that would make that conflict “the war to end all wars.” What followed were disarmament conferences, an
international agreement to outlaw war, the rise of expansionist powers, appeasement by the democracies, and the most destructive war in
human history. Ideas,
which Fettweis claims will bring about the proliferation of peace, transformed Russia,
Germany, and Japan into expansionist, totalitarian powers. Those same ideas led to the Gulag, the Holocaust, and the
Rape of Nanking. So much for human progress.
Fettweis knows all of this, but claims that since the end of the Cold War, the leaders and peoples of the major powers,
except the United States, have accepted the idea that major war is unthinkable. His proof is that there has
been no major war among the great powers for 20 years—a historical period that coincides with the
American “unipolar” moment. This is very thin empirical evidence upon which to base a predictive
theory of international relations.
Fettweis criticizes the realist and neorealist schools of thought, claiming that their adherents focus too narrowly on the past behavior of states
in the international system. In his view, realists place too great an emphasis on power. Ideas and norms instead of power, he claims, provide
structure to the international system. Classical geopolitical theorists such as Halford Mackinder, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Nicholas Spykman, and
Colin Gray are dismissed by Fettweis in less than two pages, despite the fact that their analyses of great power politics and conflict have long
been considered sound and frequently prescient.
Realists and classical geopoliticians have more than 2,000 years of empirical evidence to support their
theories of how states and empires behave and how the international system works. Ideas are
important, but power is the governing force in international politics, and geography is the most permanent factor in
the analysis of power.
Fettweis makes much of the fact that the countries of Western and Central Europe, which waged war against each other
repeatedly for nearly 400 years, are at peace, and claims that there is little likelihood that they will ever again wage war against each other.
Even if the latter assertion turns out to be true, that does not mean that the end of major war is in sight. Throughout
history, some peoples and empires that previously waged war for one reason or another became pacific without producing worldwide
perpetual peace: the Mongols, Saracens, Ottomans, Dutch, Venetians, and the Spanish Empire come immediately to mind. A Europe at peace
does not translate to an Asia, Africa, and Middle East at peace.
In a world in which major wars are obsolete, Fettweis
believes the United States needs to adjust its grand strategy from
vigorous internationalism to strategic restraint. His specific recommendations include the removal of all U.S. military forces
from Europe; an end to our bilateral security guarantees to Japan and South Korea; an end to our alliance with Israel; an indifference to the
balance of power on the Eurasian landmass; a law enforcement approach to terrorism; a drastic cut in military spending; a much smaller Navy;
and the abolition of regional combatant commands.
What Fettweis
is proposing is effectively an end to what Walter Russell Mead calls “the maritime world order” that was
is a world order that has
defeated repeated challenges by potential hegemonic powers and resulted in an unprecedented spread
of prosperity and freedom. But all of that, we are assured, is in the past. China poses no threat. The United
States can safely withdraw from Eurasia. The power vacuum will remain unfilled.
established by Great Britain and maintained first by the British Empire and then by the United States. It
Fettweis needs a dose of humility. Sir Halford Mackinder, the greatest of all geopoliticians, was referring to visionaries and liberal
idealists like Fettweis when he cautioned, “He would be a sanguine man . . . who would trust the future peace of the world to a change in the
mentality of any nation.” Most profoundly, General Douglas MacArthur, who knew a little bit more about war and international conflict than
Fettweis, reminded the cadets at West Point in 1962 that “only the dead have seen the end of war.”
2NR AT: Heg Bad - Inev
They can't win offense - Even a collapsing U.S. will pursue hegemony
Calleo 10, Director – European Studies Program and Professor @ SAIS, (David P, “American Decline
Revisited,” Survival, 52:4, 215 – 227)
The history of the
past two decades suggests that adjusting to a plural world is not easy for the United States.
As its economic strength is increasingly challenged by relative decline, it clings all the more to its peerless
military prowess. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, that overwhelming military power, evolved over the
Cold War, is less and less effective. In many respects, America's geopolitical imagination seems frozen in the posture of
the Cold War. The lingering pretension to be the dominant power everywhere has encouraged the United States to
hazard two unpromising land wars, plus a diffuse and interminable struggle against 'terrorism'. Paying for these wars and
the pretensions behind them confirms the United States in a new version of Cold War finance. Once more, unmanageable fiscal problems
poison the currency, an old pathology that firmly reinstates the nation on its path to decline. It was the hegemonic Cold War role, after all, that
put the United States so out of balance with the rest of the world economy. In
its hegemonic Cold War position, the United
States found it necessary to run very large deficits and was able to finance them simply by creating and
exporting more and more dollars. The consequence is today's restless mass of accumulated global money. Hence, whereas the value of all
global financial assets in 1980 was just over 100% of global output, by 2008, even after the worst of the financial implosion, that figure had
exploded to just under 300%.25 Much of this is no doubt tied up in the massive but relatively inert holdings of the Chinese and Japanese. But
thanks to today's instantaneous electronic transfers, huge sums can be marshalled and deployed on very
short notice. It is this excess of volatile money that arguably fuels the world's great recurring bubbles. It can create the
semblance of vast real wealth for a time, but can also (with little notice) sow chaos in markets, wipe out savings and dry up credit for
real investment. What constitutes a morbid overstretch in the American political economy thus ends up as a threat to the world economy in
general. To lead itself and the world into a more secure future the United States must put aside its old, unmeasured geopolitical ambitions paid
for by unlimited cheap credit. Instead, the United States needs a more balanced view of its role in history. But America's post-Soviet
pundits have, unfortunately, proved more skilful at perpetuating outmoded dreams of past glory than at
promoting the more modest visions appropriate to a plural future. One can always hope that newer generations of Americans will find
it easier to adjust to pluralist reality. The last administration, however, was not very encouraging in this regard. III What about Barack Obama?
So far, his economic policy has shown itself probably more intelligent and certainly more articulate than his predecessor's. His thinking is less
hobbled by simple-minded doctrines. It accepts government's inescapable role in regulating markets and providing a durable framework for
orderly governance and societal fellowship. To be sure, the Obama administration, following in the path of the Bush administration, has carried
short-term counter-cyclical stimulation to a previously unimagined level. Perhaps so radical an expansion of credit is unavoidable under present
circumstances. The administration is caught between the need to rebalance by scaling back and the fear that restraint applied now will trigger a
severe depression. Obama's chief aide, Rahm Emanuel, is famous for observing: 'Rule one: Never allow a crisis to go to waste. They are
opportunities to do big things.'26 So far, Obama's administration has made use of its crisis to promote an unprecedented expansion of welfare
spending.27 Much of the spending is doubtless good in itself and certainly serves the administration's strong counter-cyclical purposes. But at
some point the need to pass from expansion to stabilisation will presumably be inescapable. Budget cuts will have to be found somewhere, and
demographic trends suggest that drastic reductions in civilian welfare spending are unlikely. Elementary prudence
might suggest that
today's financial crisis is an ideal occasion for America's long-overdue retreat from geopolitical overstretch, a time for
bringing America's geopolitical pretensions into harmony with its diminishing foreign possibilities and expanding domestic needs. The
opportunities for geopolitical saving appear significant. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), current military plans will require
an average military budget of $652bn (in 2010 dollars) each year through 2028. The estimate optimistically assumes only 30,000 troops will be
engaged abroad after 2013. As the CBO observes, these projections exceed the peak budgets of the Reagan administration's military build-up of
the mid-1980s (about $500bn annually in 2010 dollars). This presumes a military budget consuming 3.5% of GDP through 2020.28 Comparable
figures for other nations are troubling: 2.28% for the United Kingdom, 2.35% for France, 2.41% for Russia and 1.36% for China.29 Thus, while
the financial crisis has certainly made Americans fear for their economic future, it does not yet seem to
have resulted in a more modest view of the country's place in the world, or a more prudent approach to
military spending. Instead, an addiction to hegemonic status continues to blight the prospects for sound fiscal
policy. Financing the inevitable deficits inexorably turns the dollar into an imperial instrument that threatens the world with inflation.
Pursuit of hegemony’s locked-in
Zach Dorfman 12, assistant editor of Ethics and International Affairs, the journal of the Carnegie
Council, and co-editor of the Montreal Review, “What We Talk About When We Talk About
Isolationism”, May 18, http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=605
The rise of China notwithstanding, the United States remains the world’s sole superpower. Its military (and, to a
considerable extent, political) hegemony extends not just over North America or even the Western hemisphere, but also Europe, large swaths
of Asia, and Africa. Its
interests are global; nothing is outside its potential sphere of influence. There are an
estimated 660 to 900 American military bases in roughly forty countries worldwide, although figures on the matter are
notoriously difficult to ascertain, largely because of subterfuge on the part of the military. According to official data there are
active-duty U.S. military personnel in 148 countries, or over 75 percent of the world’s states. The United States checks
Russian power in Europe and Chinese power in South Korea and Japan and Iranian power in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Turkey. In order to maintain a frigid peace between Israel and Egypt, the American government hands the former
$2.7 billion in military aid every year, and the latter $1.3 billion. It also gives Pakistan more than $400 million dollars in military aid annually (not
including counterinsurgency operations, which would drive the total far higher), Jordan roughly $200 million, and Colombia over $55 million.
U.S. long-term military commitments are also manifold. It is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the only institution
legally permitted to sanction the use of force to combat “threats to international peace and security.” In 1949 the United States helped found
NATO, the first peacetime military alliance extending beyond North and South America in U.S. history, which now has twenty-eight member
states. The United States also has a trilateral defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan,
Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. It is this sort of reach that led Madeleine Albright to call the United States the sole “indispensible
power” on the world stage. The
idea that global military dominance and political hegemony is in the U.S.
national interest—and the world’s interest—is generally taken for granted domestically. Opposition to it is
limited to the libertarian Right and anti-imperialist Left, both groups on the margins of mainstream political discourse.
Today, American supremacy is assumed rather than argued for: in an age of tremendous political division, it is a
bipartisan first principle of foreign policy, a presupposition. In this area at least, one wishes for a little less
agreement. In Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age, Christopher McKnight Nichols provides an erudite account of a period
before such a consensus existed, when ideas about America’s role on the world stage were fundamentally contested. As
this year’s
presidential election approaches, each side will portray the difference between the candidates’
positions on foreign policy as immense. Revisiting Promise and Peril shows us just how narrow the American
worldview has become, and how our public discourse has become narrower still. Nichols focuses on the years
between 1890 and 1940, during America’s initial ascent as a global power. He gives special attention to the formative debates surrounding the
Spanish-American War, U.S. entry into the First World War, and potential U.S. membership in the League of Nations—debates that were
constitutive of larger battles over the nature of American society and its fragile political institutions and freedoms. During this period, foreign
and domestic policy were often linked as part of a cohesive political vision for the country. Nichols illustrates this through intellectual profiles of
some of the period’s most influential figures, including senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah, socialist leader Eugene Debs,
philosopher and psychologist William James, journalist Randolph Bourne, and the peace activist Emily Balch. Each of them interpreted
isolationism and internationalism in distinct ways, sometimes deploying the concepts more for rhetorical purposes than as cornerstones of a
particular worldview. Today,
isolationism is often portrayed as intellectually bankrupt, a redoubt for idealists,
nationalists, xenophobes, and fools. Yet the term now used as a political epithet has deep roots in American political culture.
Isolationist principles can be traced back to George Washington’s farewell address, during which he urged his countrymen to steer clear of
“foreign entanglements” while actively seeking nonbinding commercial ties. (Whether economic commitments do in fact entail political
commitments is another matter.) Thomas Jefferson echoed this sentiment when he urged for “commerce with all nations, [and] alliance with
none.” Even the Monroe Doctrine, in which the United States declared itself the regional hegemon and demanded noninterference from
European states in the Western hemisphere, was often viewed as a means of isolating the United States from Europe and its messy alliance
system. In Nichols’s telling, however, modern isolationism was born from the debates surrounding the Spanish-American War and the U.S.
annexation of the Philippines. Here isolationism began to take on a much more explicitly anti-imperialist bent. Progressive isolationists such as
William James found U.S. policy in the Philippines—which it had “liberated” from Spanish rule just to fight a bloody counterinsurgency against
Philippine nationalists—anathema to American democratic traditions and ideas about national self-determination. As Promise and Peril shows,
however, “cosmopolitan isolationists” like James never called for “cultural, economic, or complete political separation from the rest of the
world.” Rather, they wanted the United States to engage with other nations peacefully and without pretensions of domination. They saw the
United States as a potential force for good in the world, but they also placed great value on neutrality and non-entanglement, and wanted
America to focus on creating a more just domestic order. James’s anti-imperialism was directly related to his fear of the effects of “bigness.” He
argued forcefully against all concentrations of power, especially those between business, political, and military interests. He knew that such
vested interests would grow larger and more difficult to control if America became an overseas empire. Others, such as “isolationist imperialist”
Henry Cabot Lodge, the powerful senator from Massachusetts, argued that fighting the Spanish-American War and annexing the Philippines
were isolationist actions to their core. First, banishing the Spanish from the Caribbean comported with the Monroe Doctrine; second, adding
colonies such as the Philippines would lead to greater economic growth without exposing the United States to the vicissitudes of outside trade.
Prior to the Spanish-American War, many feared that the American economy’s rapid growth would lead to a surplus of domestic goods and
cause an economic disaster. New markets needed to be opened, and the best way to do so was to dominate a given market—that is, a
country—politically. Lodge’s defense of this “large policy” was public and, by today’s standards, quite bald. Other proponents of this policy
included Teddy Roosevelt (who also believed that war was good for the national character) and a significant portion of the business class. For
Lodge and Roosevelt, “isolationism” meant what is commonly referred to today as “unilateralism”: the ability for the United States to do what
it wants, when it wants. Other “isolationists” espoused principles that we would today call internationalist. Randolph Bourne, a precocious
journalist working for the New Republic, passionately opposed American entry into the First World War, much to the detriment of his writing
career. He argued that hypernationalism would cause lasting damage to the American social fabric. He was especially repulsed by wartime
campaigns to Americanize immigrants. Bourne instead envisioned a “transnational America”: a place that, because of its distinct cultural and
political traditions and ethnic diversity, could become an example to the rest of the world. Its respect for plurality at home could influence
other countries by example, but also by allowing it to mediate international disputes without becoming a party to them. Bourne wanted an
America fully engaged with the world, but not embroiled in military conflicts or alliances. This was also the case for William Borah, the
progressive Republican senator from Idaho. Borah was an agrarian populist and something of a Jeffersonian: he believed axiomatically in local
democracy and rejected many forms of federal encroachment. He was opposed to extensive immigration, but not “anti-immigrant.” Borah
thought that America was strengthened by its complex ethnic makeup and that an imbalance tilted toward one group or another would have
deleterious effects. But it is his famously isolationist foreign policy views for which Borah is best known. As Nichols writes: He was consistent in
an anti-imperialist stance against U.S. domination abroad; yet he was ambivalent in cases involving what he saw as involving obvious national
interest….He also without fail argued that any open-ended military alliances were to be avoided at all costs, while arguing that to minimize war
abroad as well as conflict at home should always be a top priority for American politicians. Borah thus cautiously supported entry into the First
World War on national interest grounds, but also led a group of senators known as “the irreconcilables” in their successful effort to prevent U.S.
entry into the League of Nations. His paramount concern was the collective security agreement in the organization’s charter: he would not
assent to a treaty that stipulated that the United States would be obligated to intervene in wars between distant powers where the country had
no serious interest at stake. Borah possessed an alternative vision for a more just and pacific international order. Less than a decade after he
helped scuttle American accession to the League, he helped pass the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) in a nearly unanimous Senate vote. More than
sixty states eventually became party to the pact, which outlawed war between its signatories and required them to settle their disputes
through peaceful means. Today, realists sneer at the idealism of Kellogg-Briand, but the Senate was aware of the pact’s limitations
and carved out clear exceptions for cases of national defense. Some supporters believed that, if nothing else, the law would help strengthen an
emerging international norm against war. (Given what followed, this seems like a sad exercise in wish-fulfillment.) Unlike the League of Nations
charter, the treaty faced almost no opposition from the isolationist bloc in the Senate, since it did not require the United States to enter into a
collective security agreement or abrogate its sovereignty. This was a kind of internationalism Borah and his irreconcilables could proudly
support. The United States today looks very different from the country in which Borah, let alone William James, lived, both
domestically (where political and civil freedoms have been extended to women, African Americans, and gays and lesbians) and internationally
(with its leading role in many global institutions). But different strains of isolationism persist. Newt Gingrich has argued for a
policy of total “energy independence” (in other words, domestic drilling) while fulminating against President Obama for “bowing” to the Saudi
king. While recently driving through an agricultural region of rural Colorado, I saw a giant roadside billboard calling for American withdrawal
from the UN. Yet in
the last decade, the Republican Party, with the partial exception of its Ron Paul/libertarian faction, has
veered into such a belligerent unilateralism that its graybeards—one of whom, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, just
lost a primary to a far-right challenger partly because of his reasonableness on foreign affairs—were barely able to ensure Senate
ratification of a key nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Many of these same people desire a
unilateral war with Iran. And it isn’t just Republicans. Drone attacks have intensified in Yemen, Pakistan, and
elsewhere under the Obama administration. Massive troop deployments continue unabated. We spend
over $600 billion dollars a year on our military budget; the next largest is China’s, at “only” around $100
billion. Administrations come and go, but the national security state appears here to stay.
us specific - long
DIB recovering from downturn now due to laundry list of recent US policies, but
continued domestic base growth is key to long term stability
Pederson-Giles and Merrick 1/7 Jens Pederson-Giles and Kevin Merrick (NDIA junior fellows), 117-2020, "Signs Of Progress On Industrial Base Issues," National Defense Magazine,
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/1/17/signs-of-progress-on-industrial-baseissues ASa
For decades, defense policymakers have focused attention on the U.S. manufacturing sector as an area
of strategic concern for the United States. Issues such as production outsourcing, skilled personnel
deficits, insufficient investment in new technologies and equipment and worrisome supply chain
resiliency have plagued the manufacturing sector in recent years, encouraging doubts about its ability to
meet the military’s need for secure and reliable industrial supply
An interagency task force assessment of the state of the defense industrial base, initiated by President
Donald Trump’s Executive Order 13806, identified multiple systemic risks and recommended policy
initiatives to address them. Recent actions by the Trump administration have been promising, but
strengthening America’s industrial vulnerabilities will be a long process, requiring patience and
dedication by policymakers and the contracting community.
Released in September 2018, the interagency task force report titled, “Assessing and Strengthening the
Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States,”
established an important benchmark for understanding the risks to the defense industrial base’s
performance. The report identified macro focuses and risk archetypes shaping the industrial base —
including uncertainty of government spending, sole source manufacturing and diminishing STEM skills —
and specified roughly 300 impacts felt across 16 sectors in a classified appendix.
To address the risks and negative trends raised by the report, the agencies involved provided a lengthy
list of recommendations including expanding direct investment in the industrial base, growing workforce
development efforts and improving research efforts into next generation technologies.
The Trump administration has taken perhaps its most aggressive policy action to enhance domestic
sourcing of rare earth materials. Many advanced defense technologies rely on rare earth materials as
ingredients in critical high-performance components. In July 2019, Trump signed five presidential
determinations designating light rare earth elements, heavy rare earth elements, rare earth metals and
alloys — neodymium iron boron rare earth sintered material permanent magnets, and samarium cobalt
rare earth permanent magnets — as critical to national defense under Section 303 of the Defense
Production Act of 1950. This act gives the president broad economic policy authorities to create,
maintain, expand or restore domestic industrial base capabilities for the purpose of national defense.
Trump also signed similar orders this year regarding small unmanned aerial systems, naval sonobuoys
and critical chemicals for missiles and munitions. The Section 303 orders target some of the deficiencies
identified in E.O. 13806 report caused by sole source or foreign source production.
In another initiative to reduce reliance on foreign made goods, the Pentagon has begun a partnership
with domestic textile manufacturers to produce “smart fabrics” for use in military uniforms. Working
through the Advanced Functional Fabrics of America nonprofit, the Defense Department has funded a
collaborative research venture between the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Drexel University
and Apex Mills. Together this group has created a factory where they can rapidly design and create
prototype smart fabrics which can communicate health information from its wearers and test the
feasibility of producing durable outfits with these capabilities on a larger scale.
Financing partnerships to help build innovative and economically viable domestic sources for nextgeneration uniforms will mitigate the current risks presented by the military’s reliance on single source
and foreign source textile providers.
The administration also has used public-private partnerships to expand domestic sourcing of cold-rolled
aluminum. The E.O. 13806 report identified cold-rolled aluminum — which serves as an essential
ingredient in the armor for military ground vehicles, ships and aircraft — as an area of sourcing risk. The
Defense Department leveraged the Cornerstone Initiative, a public-private “consortium of consortiums,”
to invest $9.5 million into Constellium’s West Virginia plant to increase the production quality and
amount of cold-rolled aluminum.
The department’s industrial base analysis and sustainment program started the Cornerstone Initiative in
early 2018 using an other transaction authority agreement funding vehicle. While Cornerstone formed
before the 13806 report was published, it stands as a model to emulate in responding to other risk areas
mentioned in the report.
The administration has also acted to address risks to the availability of skilled workers. In June 2019, the
Department of Labor announced the creation of a new rule which would expand access to industryrecognized apprenticeship programs. This rule would allow educational institutions and industry groups
to be authorized as “standards recognition entities,” making them eligible to develop and approve the
apprenticeships. Additionally, Labor has pledged $183.8 million dollars in grant money to support
universities and industry groups working to build or expand their own apprenticeship programs.
Shortages in skilled domestic laborers is one of the macro-level problems identified by the report, and
industrial apprenticeships have a proven record of growing the size and quality of the manufacturing
workforce.
In a little over a year since the release of the report, the Trump administration has achieved some early
successes in addressing the vulnerabilities it identified. Despite the reasons for cautious optimism, there
remains significant work to be done to fully implement the recommendations. Restoring and advancing
U.S. manufacturing will require years of effort.
us specific - medium
The DIB is strong now. But it’s dependent on govt. policy.
Root, 19
Al Root, 19, 5-6-2019, [Defense Stocks Like Lockheed Martin Offer a Haven When the Dow Drops,
https://www.barrons.com/articles/defense-stocks-lockheed-martin-haven-dow-51557162289, Barron’s,
1-22-2020]MB
Companies deriving a majority of revenue from defense contracts were off 0.2% Monday afternoon.
Often times, the defense sector is uncorrelated with the broader stock market. Defense contractor sales
are dependent on conflict and government budgets. They are less dependent on the state of the global
economy. That can be a good thing for investors looking for a haven from global macroeconomic fears.
The back story: Defense stocks have been solid performers over recent history because of growing U.S.
defense budgets as well as continuing global conflict. Shares of defense primes—the so-called largest
U.S. defense contractors—have returned 17% a year on average over the past 5 years, better than the
13% return of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. What’s more, the defense primes trade for 16.3 times
estimated 2019 earning, in line with historical averages.
The defense primes are generally taken to be: Boeing (ticker: BA), Lockheed Martin (LMT), General
Dynamics (GD), Northrop Grumman (NOC), Raytheon (RTN) and L3 Technologies (LLL). Barron’s excludes
Boeing from defense-only calculations because it derives more of its sales from commercial aerospace.
all - short
The DIB is strong now.
Lemke, 19
Tim Lemke, 19, 6-25-2019, [Want to Invest in Defense Sectors? Here's What You Need to Know First,
https://www.thebalance.com/investor-s-guide-to-defense-stocks-in-2018-4172304, Balance, 1-222020]MB
Defense contractors including Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon have routinely been
some of the strongest performers in the stock market, with revenues in the billions and strong
returns for investors.
link updates
All Link
The plan wrecks the world economy. Nukes are a widespread reliable investment to
the DIB and economy. It’s more than 725 billion dollars not including investments in
companies not in the top 10 and non financial institutions like universities and
governments! We’ve inserted screenshots in the doc.
Snyder, 19
Sushi Snyder, 19 June, [Don't Bank on the Bomb, https://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/2018_whoinvests/, No Publication, 1-21-2020]MB
U.S. Link
Nukes are a widespread reliable investment to the DIB and economy. It’s more than
525 Billion dollars not including investments in companies not in the top 10 and non
financial institutions like universities and governments, In the U.S. alone! We’ve
inserted screenshots in the doc.
Snyder, 19
Sushi Snyder, 19 Juner, [Don't Bank on the Bomb, https://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/2018_whoinvests/, No Publication, 1-21-2020]MB
IndoPak Link
Nukes are a widespread reliable investment to the DIB and economy. It’s more than
13 Billion dollars not including investments in companies not in the top 10 and non
financial institutions like universities and governments, In India alone! We’ve inserted
a screenshot in the doc.
Snyder, 19
Susii Snyder, 19 June, [Don't Bank on the Bomb, https://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/2018_whoinvests/, No Publication, 1-21-2020]MB
internal link updates /potential 2nr cards
US DIB key to US power, especially in the face of rising challengers
Zur 19 Christian Zur(executive director for procurement policy at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and
serves as council executive to the chamber’s Procurement and Space Industry Council. Christian
specializes in federal agency regulatory and legislative acquisition initiatives.), 6-29-2019, "Amid budget
talks, remember that America’s defense-industrial base is indispensable," Defense News,
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/06/27/amid-budget-talks-remember-thatamericas-defense-industrial-base-is-indispensable/ ASa
As Congress takes up the annual defense budget, it is worth acknowledging the comfort and quality of
life to which we are accustomed owes its legacy in no small part to the collaborative force of the
greatest public-private partnership in American history: the defense-industrial base.
Those who would downplay this partnership may not fully grasp the extent to which the U.S. has
benefited immeasurably beyond its immediate national security needs. From safe and reliable
commercial aviation, to cancer research and treatment, to the internet itself, the innovation that has
supported our military over the decades have simultaneously enhanced the lives of all Americans.
The advantages accrued by the nation’s investment in technology have not always been readily
apparent, and the relationship has not always been easy or straightforward. The U.S. military often has
to create an industrial capability where once there was none.
Fortunately, the DNA of the commercial technology sector is directly intertwined into our robust and
diverse defense-industrial base. Influencing current innovation ranging from satellite telecommunication
to hybrid vehicles, Silicon Valley itself and countless university labs owe their founding to defense
investment grants and contracts.
Beyond the qualitative measures of these standout technologies, the defense-industrial base supports
one of the largest high-skill and high-wage workforces in the nation. Indeed, the U.S. defense and
aerospace industry employs 2.4 million workers with an average salary 44 percent above the national
average.
Despite antiquated procurement practices imposed by Congress and successive administrations, today’s
industrial base is flexible and resilient and able to meet every U.S. military requirement without fail. By
every measure, that is success.
But as the late Sen. John McCain cautioned at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in 2015, global research
and development is more than twice that of the United States, and Chinese R&D levels are projected to
surpass the United States by 2022.
As recently noted in the context of U.S. space dominance being under challenge by foreign competitors,
we must unharness American ingenuity and allow industry to develop and deploy innovation at
increasing speed and efficiency.
No different than other industrial sectors, defense companies reorganized and internally reformed over
the past few decades. Today, America’s top defense suppliers zealously manage their own compliance
and contract performance, rather than relying on government procurement officers to oversee product
development milestones and service delivery.
As legislative and executive branch policymakers resolve budget differences over the coming months, it
is worth recognizing the broad and diffused impact of such deliberations over the years. From the
convenience of weather data and digital photography to omnipresent mobile communications, the
innovation of our defense-industrial base has delivered for all Americans.
A strong domestic manufacturing base is key to American heg
Ettlinger and Gordon 11 Michael Ettlinger and Kate Gordon, Michael Ettlinger is the Vice President
for Economic Policy and Kate Gordon is the Vice President for Energy Policy at the Center for American
Progres, 4-7-2011, "The Importance And Promise Of American Manufacturing," Center for American
Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2011/04/07/9427/theimportance-and-promise-of-american-manufacturing/ ASa
-
kind of outdated
doesn’t seem super contextual (???)
Manufacturing is critically important to the American economy. For generations, the strength of our
country rested on the power of our factory floors—both the machines and the men and women who
worked them. We need manufacturing to continue to be a bedrock of strength for generations to come.
Manufacturing is woven into the structure of our economy: Its importance goes far beyond what
happens behind the factory gates. The strength or weakness of American manufacturing carries
implications for the entire economy, our national security, and the well-being of all Americans.
Manufacturing today accounts for 12 percent of the U.S. economy and about 11 percent of the privatesector workforce. But its significance is even greater than these numbers would suggest. The direct
impact of manufacturing is only a part of the picture.
First, jobs in the manufacturing sector are good middle-class jobs for millions of Americans. Those jobs
serve an important role, offering economic opportunity to hard-working, middle-skill workers. This
creates upward mobility and broadens and strengthens the middle class to the benefit of the entire
economy.
What’s more, U.S.-based manufacturing underpins a broad range of jobs that are quite different from
the usual image of manufacturing. These are higher-skill service jobs that include the accountants,
bankers, and lawyers that are associated with any industry, as well as a broad range of other jobs
including basic research and technology development, product and process engineering and design,
operations and maintenance, transportation, testing, and lab work.
Many of these jobs are critical to American technology and innovation leadership. The problem today is
this: Many multinational corporations may for a period keep these higher-skill jobs here at home while
they move basic manufacturing elsewhere in response to other countries’ subsidies, the search for
cheaper labor costs, and the desire for more direct access to overseas markets, but eventually many of
these service jobs will follow. When the basic manufacturing leaves, the feedback loop from the
manufacturing floor to the rest of a manufacturing operation—a critical element in the innovative
process—is eventually broken. To maintain that feedback loop, companies need to move higher-skill
jobs to where they do their manufacturing.
And with those jobs goes American leadership in technology and innovation. This is why having a critical
mass of both manufacturing and associated service jobs in the United States matters. The “industrial
commons” that comes from the crossfertilization and engagement of a community of experts in
industry, academia, and government is vital to our nation’s economic competitiveness.
Manufacturing also is important for the nation’s economic stability. The experience of the Great
Recession exemplifies this point. Although manufacturing plunged in 2008 and early 2009 along with the
rest of the economy, it is on the rebound today while other key economic sectors, such as construction,
still languish. Diversity in the economy is important—and manufacturing is a particularly important part
of the mix. Although manufacturing is certainly affected by broader economic events, the sector’s
internal diversity—supplying consumer goods as well as industrial goods, serving both domestic and
external markets— gives it great potential resiliency.
Finally, supplying our own needs through a strong domestic manufacturing sector protects us from
international economic and political disruptions. This is most obviously important in the realm of
national security, even narrowly defined as matters related to military strength, where the risk of a weak
manufacturing capability is obvious. But overreliance on imports and substantial manufacturing trade
deficits weaken us in many ways, making us vulnerable to everything from exchange rate fluctuations to
trade embargoes to natural disasters.
.
2nr stuff
additional link card (if it isn’t whole res)
-
maybe this would allow the dib disad to link to affs that weren’t the US
o ie if it was like russia / china / indopak / etc, it could be argued that that results in less people
investing in US nukes
o the link isn’t super explicit though
The plans results in strong international norms that disincentives investors worldwide
Berkleef 19 Terence Berkleef, Associate Director, Product Strategy and Development, 3-14-2018,
"Nuclear Weapons: The Next “No-Go” Area for Investors?," Sustainalytics,
https://www.sustainalytics.com/esg-blog/nuclear-weapons-divestment/ ASa
Additionally, several organizations with goals ranging from creating awareness and policy development
to campaigns on abolishing nuclear weapons and divestment campaigns are pushing the conversation
forward. Organizations such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and 2017 Noble Peace Prize winner
ICAN have a global reach and work with policymakers to achieve these goals. The PAX Don’t Bank on the
Bomb report covers investors’ stakes in nuclear weapon companies and assesses investment policies on
these weapons.
All these developments are expected to influence the (responsible) investment community. However,
while NGO campaigns help to further stigmatize nuclear weapons as an undesirable product, it is the
legal landscape that is expected to fundamentally change the financial industry. It is more than likely
that the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will enter into force in 2018. As seen with
other international treaties banning weapons such as landmines and cluster munitions, such a Treaty
sets a global standard on the legitimacy and political status of the weapon. For example, when the Oslo
Convention on cluster munitions came into force in 2008, after years of increased public and political
opposition to these weapons, the financial industry received even more scrutiny for its role as financier.
WHAT CAN INVESTORS DO?
Many investors already restrict investments in certain products, whether it’s a tobacco producer or a
cluster weapon company. When considering divestment, investors should create a clear policy
framework and process. Communication with internal and external stakeholders remains key. An
external stakeholder might question why there is still exposure to a certain company, while a portfolio
manager may want more background information before stocks are sold.
In the case of nuclear weapons, it is important to define what constitutes a company’s involvement.
Nuclear weapon programs are multi-year, multi-billion-dollar projects involving a wide range of
activities, which can include R&D, testing, production or life-extension programs. These programs also
cover a wide range of products: missiles, launching systems, but also nuclear material such as Tritium.
Our Controversial Weapons Radar research identified over 60 companies involved in nuclear weapon
programs.
impact extension
US heg is extremely important, a global hegemon ensures peace through checking
great power wars, which is essential for
1. international cooperation, wo a global power keeping states in check it is
impossible to solve extensional issues like superbugs, warming, and prolif which also
means that we zap their solvency, wo a dib we cant stop people from proliferating
anyways and
2. it is key to avoid periods of transition wars, which have historically been the most
violent, since states are incentivized to abandon old rules and norms, this leads to
extinction because new tech now means that a global power war would be extesential
our impact weighs theirs
1]turns case, glbl stability now, very few states prolif depsite the fact that a lot of
them can
2]ows on magnitude
transition wars go global but prolif stays local
link / il extension- us
the aff tanks this through shocking the defense industrial base, nuclear weapons
are especially key since they are low risk investments -- for the past 70 years
they have been a stable source of income, but the aff shows that
1. the US is willing to tank a majority of their income whenever – meaning that
this impact spills over to other sectors as companies lose trust in the US
government and
2. banks draw out since they are less likely to invest in higher risk technologies
and the plan necessitates ending contracts with the companies that maintain them
and provide associated products like delivery systems, surveillance technology, and
launch systems which crushes their ability to produce other arms
evaluate the link through certainty and policy reliability since that's the only thing that
matters -- investment into the dib is directly correlated to it's stability because nobody
will invest if it's high risk. thus without nukes the DIB collapses, since banks
withdrawal meaning the US loses heg - a strong dib is key to foreign policy influence
and checking rising powers.
link / il extension- all
the aff wrecks the world economy through shocking the dib, nukes are a reliale low
risk investments so tons of companies but large sums into them for the last 70 yrs .
1] It collapses the DIB via ending necessary contracts which fund the dib
2] MANYYYY companies lose tons of money since they put it into
at dib weak
1.
2.
it’s not a question of if the DIB is bad now, since policies being passed now with a focus on domestic base
are strengthening it
our ev ows on recency, (its from _ days ago) which is the most important thing because the DIB fluctuates
due to many factors like US policy and international relationships which change very frequently
at not that much of dib
1.
2.
3.
they misunderstand the link – it’s also a question of perception, since if the US randomly drops a
significant portion of their investment, investors will lose trust
x % is still significant considering that the US military is huge
it’s not about x% but rather what spill over will occur due to investors dropping out and other sectors
losing money such as survielence and counter terrorism
at other tech solves
1.
2.
nuclear weapons are unique in that they are low risk investments – that’s acheson 18, which mean that
even if other weapons development is good, nukes are a pre requisite
shifts to other weapons are really bad because developing new weapons are high risk and esp if it’s new
tech likely to end in failure which means high incentive not to invest
at u use don’t bank on the bomb
1] Even though Don’t Bank on the Bomb believes these investments are immoral it
doesn’t change the fact that they exist.
Econ DA
1NC -- Long
The US economy is on the brink of recession – several warrants.
Ian Salisbury 19 June 27, 2019, 6-27-2019, [Ian Salisbury is a senior editor for Money magazine, a personal
finance magazine and website published by Meredith Corporation. Its articles cover the gamut of personal finance
topics ranging from investing, saving, retirement and taxes to family finance issues like paying for college, credit,
career and home improvement.] "'Shockingly Weak': These Economic Indicators Are Flashing Red, According to
Experts," Money, https://money.com/slowing-economy-signals///CHS PK
A topsy-turvy bond market
Earlier this year the bond market started flashing one of its most reliable recession signals: Yields on
long-dated Treasurys slipped below those of shorter dated ones, suggesting fixed-income investors
foresee slow rates of growth and modest inflation in coming years. (Investors rush to buy longer-dated
bonds, locking in today’s comparatively high yields. But as those bonds’ prices rise, their yields fall). The
event, known as a yield curve inversion, made headlines when it first happened in March, but lasted
only a week. That, along with some recent tinkering in the bond market by the Federal Reserve, led
many to ignore the indicator, which has historically suggested a recession could take place in the next
year or two.
Starting in May, however the yield curve inverted again. This time around the inversion has lasted a
month and counting, making it much harder to write off. “Almost 60% of the US yield curve now
inverted, said Crescat Capital analyst Otavio Costa, in a recent tweet, referring to different bond
maturities along the curve. “We are at the pinnacle of a historic bubble. At any moment, the wheels will
come off.”
Struggling manufacturers
President Trump has put U.S. manufacturing jobs at the center of his economic vision. Earlier this
month, however, the closely watched ISM manufacturing index fell to 52.1 for May from 52.8 for April.
While any number over 50 suggests manufacturing businesses are still expanding, commentators were
quick to point out the May reading was the lowest level of the Trump presidency. Since then regional
manufacturing indicators have also shown weakness. On June 18, the New York Fed said the Empire
State Manufacturing Index posted its largest one-month drop on record, a “shockingly weak” result,
according to a note by Maria Fiorini Ramirez Inc. Chief Economist Joshua Shapiro.
One big culprit: Trump’s trade war with China. The Trump Administration hopes tariffs on Chinese goods
will aid U.S. manufacturers in the long run by making imports comparatively more expensive for U.S.
consumers. In the short run, however, it’s hurting, according to business executives quoted in the ISM
survey who blamed the tariffs for higher materials costs and snarled supply chains.
A looming earnings recession
The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act gave U.S. companies a big boost last year by slashing the corporate tax
rate, thereby increasing profits. The bad news: Companies can’t count on lower rates for another yearover-year bump. That has a many market watchers worried about what they call an earnings recession
— typically defined as two or more quarters in which corporate profits contract. After noticeably weak
profits in last quarter of 2018 — which prompted the Dow’s worst December since the 1930s —
earnings recovered somewhat during the first quarter.
Now, however, a relatively weak global economy, rising U.S. wages and trade tensions with China are
putting the pressure back on. Wall Street analysts expect corporate earnings to decline 2.6% for the
second quarter and 0.3% for the third before rebounding later this year, according to CNBC. Some
investors may still be too optimistic. “We saw companies that did poorly in the first quarter hold on to
strong fourth-quarter guidance and maintain optimism,” said Morgan Stanley Equity Strategist Michael
Wilson in a recent note. “We don’t buy this story,” he added.
Softening home prices
While it may not seem like it if you’re a millennial trying to buy a first home, the U.S. real estate market
has slowed considerably over the past several months. On Tuesday the widely watched S&P CoreLogic
Case-Shiller index showed U.S. home prices grew 3.5% year over year in April. While still positive, that
represents the slowest growth rate in seven years.
By at least one lesser-watched measure, housing website Zillow’s compilation of national home values,
prices actually declined between April and March. If the market does continue to weaken, that would be
bad news. A housing downturn has preceded every U.S. recession since the 1950s, according the Fed.
Wary consumers
Bullish U.S. consumers, encouraged by a humming job market, have been one of economy’s strongest
pillars. Even here, however, cracks are starting to show. Earlier this week the Conference Board said its
index of consumer sentiment fell to 121.5, its lowest level in nearly two years. The reading was below all
forecasts by analysts that Bloomberg polled. While unemployment remains low, there are also signs of
softening in the job market, with the U.S. adding just 75,000 jobs in May, compared to an average of
212,000 over the previous 12 months.
While consumers’ confidence remains historically high, the recent dip “highlights the risk of ‘talking
ourselves into a recession’,” according to Greg McBride, the chief financial analyst for Bankrate.com.
“Consumers that think the economy is weak will spend less and business owners that think the economy
is weak won’t hire more people.”
All that’s needed is a little push – the Fed is not ready for any sort of downturn.
Amy Ganz 18, 7-18-2018, [Student with graphic design experience and a demonstrated history of working in the
online media industry. Skilled in Catering, Food & Beverage, Photography, Microsoft Word, and Typography.
Strong professional with a Bachelor’s Degree focused in Digital Communication and Media/Multimedia from New
York University.] "Economy is fragile, recession could occur, Harvard professor warns," Fox Business,
https://www.foxbusiness.com/economy/economy-is-fragile-recession-could-occur-harvard-professor-warns//CHS
PK
Renowned Harvard professor and economist Martin Feldstein said the Federal Reserve would not be
prepared if a recession were to occur soon. Feldstein told FOX Business Opens a New Window. ’ Maria
Bartiromo during an interview on “Mornings with Maria Opens a New Window. ” on Wednesday that
the economy is in good shape because of low unemployment and inflation, but despite that, it is still
very fragile. While the former economic adviser for President Ronald Reagan said he can’t predict
exactly when a recession could happen, he said, “I think [the economy] is fragile because of the level of
asset prices. And if the economy turns down, the Fed has no tools to offset that.” As of June 14, the
Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) target federal funds rate was at 1.75%. Feldstein said that
“the danger now is it’s too low. If they have to cut it, they’ve got nothing to cut from.” In the 2008
recession, that rate was lowered to 0.25%, according to the FOMC. Feldstein said he’s worried that the
Fed has not been preparing during the past few years for a future recession. “The Fed made a mistake
by not starting several years ago to push up the short rate,” he said, “I think the loan rate is going to rise
not just because the Fed is tightening, but because everybody sees these large fiscal deficits coming
along.” As previously reported Opens a New Window. by FOX Business, more than 20 economists
predicted that a big economic downturn could occur between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the
second quarter of 2020, according to a report from the National Association for Business Economics.
The defense industry is key to a recovering manufacturing sector – the plan destroys a
major portion of the sector that collapses the economy.
O'Neil et al. 16, Brendan, et al.[ Managing Director, Consulting, IHS Economics and Country Risk, IHS is the
leading source of insight, analytics and expertise in critical areas that shape today’s business landscape], 4-202016, Aerospace and Defense Economic Impact Analysis. Aerospace Industries Association, 16AD, Aerospace and
Defense Economic Impact Analysis, www.aia-aerospace.org/report/aerospace-and-defense-an-economic-impactanalysis/.//CHS PK
The U.S. Aerospace & Defense industry is a global leader in innovation and significant component of the
nation’s advanced manufacturing base of industries. IHS was commissioned to quantify the economic
contributions of the U.S. Aerospace and Defense (A&D) industry to the U.S. economy and provide
enhanced understanding of the industry’s extensive supply chain, by economic sector at the national
and state level. The key findings of this study measure the economic contribution the A&D industry
makes in terms of employment, value added (contribution to GDP), sales (output), labor income and
taxes within the broader economy. In 2015, the U.S. economy posted $30.7 trillion in total sales activity;
of that total, IHS estimates that $786 billion was supported by the A&D industry’s economic activity. This
occurred through approximately $349 billion in direct sales activity, which initiated additional activity as
dollars flowed through the A&D supply chain. This “multiplier effect” drove an additional $256 billion in
indirect sales. Further, companies and their suppliers hired and paid employees, who, in turn, consumed
goods and services in the economy. These induced effects amounted to $181 billion in 2015. The graphic
below depicts this flow of economic impacts. The sales activity generated by the A&D industry triggers
additional economic benefits – workers must be hired and retained in order to deliver goods and
services; companies reap additional profits and make larger contributions to GDP; and both companies
and their employees must pay taxes. In this realm, IHS estimates that in 2015 the A&D industry fueled
the following contributions to the U.S. economy: • The U.S. A&D industry directly and indirectly
employed 1.7 million workers engaged in the design and production of end-user goods and services and
within the industry’s supply chain. About two-thirds of those workers were split about evenly between
the civilian aviation and the defense/national security sector. • More specifically, within the A&D
industry about 531,030 workers were employed in the design, manufacture and supply chain of civil and
general aviation aircraft, helicopters and space systems. Since 2013, employment in the sector has
decreased by a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of -0.38%, or by a net of 6,100 jobs. • Another
510,570 jobs were focused on the design, manufacture and supply chain of end-use military aircraft,
ground and sea systems, armaments and space systems. Since 2013, the segment’s employment base
experienced overall stability, decreasing by a CAGR of -0.03%, or a net loss of less than 1,000 jobs. • Jobs
supported by the A&D industry represent approximately two percent of the nation’s total employment
base. • Direct A&D industry jobs combined with those supported in the industry’s supply chain
represented 13 percent of the nation’s manufacturing employment base. • For every million dollars in
direct sales activity, eight employees are supported throughout the supply chain and across economic
sectors. • The A&D industry generated $300 billion in economic value, which represented 1.8 percent of
total nominal GDP in the U.S. • The output supported by the A&D industry directly and through the
supply chain represented about 10 percent of manufacturing output in the U.S. • Labor income
supported by the A&D industry represented about 2.3 percent of the nation’s total labor income. • The
average labor income per job within the A&D industry (both producers of end-use goods and services as
well as the supply chain) amounted to just over $93,000 – or approximately 44 percent above the
national average – reflecting the highly skilled nature of the workforce. • The contribution to tax
receipts from the A&D industry was $63 billion, or about 1.7 percent of the total tax revenues received
by the federal and state and local governments. The U.S. A&D industry is a broad complex of firms
performing a variety of functions including service delivery in support of operations and the
manufacturing of goods and of materials, components, systems and platforms for civil aviation, space,
and national security applications. For the purposes of this analysis, the A&D industry is defined by a set
of associated sectors categorized under the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) that
include firms that produce goods and services for end use by A&D industry customers, while other subsectors are predominately comprised of suppliers that support production. These two primary groupings
are described as having a ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ impact on the economy; firms that engage in producing
goods and services for end use are considered to have a ‘direct’ impact on the economy (for a list of
these sectors, see Table 1 in the Approach and Methodology section of this report), while firms in the
supply chain are considered to have an ‘indirect’ impact on the economy (for a list of these sectors, see
Table 2 in the Approach and Methodology section of this report). Further, firms supplying to ‘direct’
manufacturers are classified as ‘tier I’ and firms supplying to the ‘tier I’ suppliers are classified as ‘tier II’.
In addition to this tiered classification, there is a portion of the supplier base that does not fall within the
A&D industry. As a point of reference, firms that supply management consulting, transportation services
or office equipment to the tier I and II A&D-supplier community do not constitute the A&D supplier
base, but are included as part of the industry’s indirect and induced impact (for a list of these sectors,
see Table 3 in the Approach and Methodology section of this report).
The A&D industry is a vital component of the US economy, not solely for the role the industry plays in
national security, transportation and technological innovation, but also because its influence spans
many sectors and every state throughout the country. From commercial airliners to military vehicle
manufacturing, the A&D industry calls upon businesses across the nation to supply goods and services
for end-use production. From these transactions, the A&D industry supported an average of nearly 2.8
million jobs between 2013 and 2015, representing approximately two percent of total U.S. employment
and produced an average of $301 billion in total economic value, or 1.8 percent of nominal U.S. GDP. For
much of the previous five decades, the U.S. manufacturing base has experienced a continuous and
sometimes precipitous decline as global market forces drove firms to close, downsize, or relocate
abroad. The manufacturing segments associated with A&D have certainly not been immune to this
trend; however, over the past several years, strong growth in international markets has driven
resurgence in the sector, which has helped accelerate the country’s recent economic recovery. Over the
past five years, the U.S. manufacturing industry has enjoyed an average annual growth rate in payrolls of
1.5 percent. Meanwhile, the transportation manufacturing sector, which includes the manufacture of
ships, aircraft, and locomotives, posted an average annual growth rate in payrolls of 3.6 percent –
outpacing the 1.7 percent growth rate of total non-farm payrolls over that same period. The economic
impact of the A&D industry goes well beyond the companies directly involved in the production of
finished goods. The lengthy process of bringing these products to market supports a variety of services
that are critical to the success of the industry. The A&D value chain extends throughout the US – from
engineering and research and development efforts to the highly capital intensive sectors that provide
raw and intermediate materials and components. The result is an extended network of companies that
forge and fabricate metal, design and build complex systems, and assemble the finished goods that are
ultimately required by the industry. Furthermore, the economic activity associated with end use and
supply chain ripple out to a broader set of economic sectors as wages earned are spent across the
economy, benefitting sectors ranging from retail trade to the leisure and hospitality sector. The A&D
industry drives economic growth at the local level as well, as many states across the United States
depend heavily on the jobs and incomes created by the aerospace and defense industry. From the
aerospace manufacturers and suppliers in Washington and Southern California to the defense
contractors in Texas and Washington DC/Northern Virginia area, the A&D industry serves as an
economic keystone that not only creates jobs and boosts wages, but also provides a reliable stream of
tax revenue for state and local governments.
The plan shocks the entire nuclear supply chain.
Acheson, 18 – Director of Reaching Critical Will, the disarmament program of the Women’s International
League for Peace and Freedom, and one of the world’s oldest feminist peace organization. She has been involved
with intergovernmental disarmament processes since 2005
Ray Acheson, “Impacts of the nuclear ban: how outlawing nuclear weapons is changing the world,” Global Change,
Peace, & Security. 2018Facilitating economic divestment//CHS PK
Another product of the stigmatization process is economic divestment. One of the key aspirations for
the nuclear ban was that it could prohibit the financial investment in nuclear weapon production and
maintenance. While this does not appear as a specific prohibition in the TPNW, it is included in the
prohibition on assisting, encouraging or inducing anyone to engage in any activity prohibited by the
Treaty.
In practical terms, this means that states parties to the TPNW would need to withdraw any government
money (such as pension funds) from companies that produce nuclear weapons. It also means that
banks, pension funds and other financial institutions will face pressure to withdraw their money from
such companies. In this way, the nuclear ban is likely to have a significant impact on nuclear weapon
modernization programmes and financial investments in nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and related
infrastructure.
Companies get and stay involved in the nuclear weapons business because it brings them significant
income with low financial risk or investment. The work and relationships with governments involved in
nuclear weapons facilitate other profitable activities, e.g. in the development and marketing of nuclear
power stations, in physical security, or in surveillance, intelligence, and counter-proliferation. The
prohibition on ‘assistance’ with prohibited acts has a material impact on the corporations involved in the
production of nuclear weapons. It helps to undermine these companies’ rationale for being involved
with the nuclear weapons business. For nuclear warheads per se, only a fairly small number of
companies are involved, but many of these companies greatly value their wider international business.
The divestment campaign accompanying the treaty banning cluster munitions has been successful in
affecting the financial interests of corporations producing these weapon systems and related
components. Even within countries that have not joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions,
companies have ceased production on these illegal weapons. For example, the last company producing
cluster munitions in the United States, Textron, announced in August 2016 that it would no longer
produce these weapons. The US government has not allotted funds for cluster munition production
since 2007, even though it did not join the Convention adopted in 2006.5
US economic competitiveness is key to protect global commons, trade, and deter war
Colby and Lettow 14 [Elbridge Colby,Paul Lettow, (Elbridge Colby is the former Director of the
Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, where he led CNAS’ work on defense
issues. Previously, Colby served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force
Development. At the time of publication he was the Robert M. Gates fellow at the Center for a New
American Security. Paul Lettow was senior director for strategic planning on the U.S. National Security
Council staff), 07-03-14, “Have We Hit Peak America?,”, Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/03/have_we_hit_peak_america,]//AAA
Many foreign-policy experts seem to believe that retaining American primacy is largely a matter of
will—of how America chooses to exert its power abroad. Even President Obama, more often accused of being a prophet of decline than a
booster of America’s future, recently asserted that the United States “has rarely been stronger relative to the rest of the world.” The question,
he continued, is “not whether America will lead, but how we will lead.” But
will is unavailing without strength. If the United
States wants the international system to continue to reflect its interests and values—a system, for
example, in which the global commons are protected, trade is broad-based and extensive, and armed
conflicts among great nations are curtailed—it needs to sustain not just resolve, but relative power.
That, in turn, will require acknowledging the uncomfortable truth that global power and wealth are shifting
at an unprecedented pace, with profound implications. Moreover, many of the challenges America faces
are exacerbated by vulnerabilities that are largely self-created, chief among them fiscal policy. Much more
quickly and comprehensively than is understood, those vulnerabilities are reducing America’s freedom of action and
its ability to influence others. Preserving America’s international position will require it to restore its
economic vitality and make policy choices now that pay dividends for decades to come. America has to
prioritize and to act. Fortunately, the United States still enjoys greater freedom to determine its future than any other major power, in
part because many of its problems are within its ability to address. But this process of renewal must begin with analyzing
America’s competitive position and understanding the gravity of the situation Americans face.
Extinction.
Tønnesson 15 Stein Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace
program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International
Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311
Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current
understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and
economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions
can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and
drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or
unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars
among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14,
437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an
inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and
the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries
could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three
main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated
economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014;
Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act
on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by
foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic
development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic
begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external
dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or
credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or
prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the
instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear
deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan
(2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or
the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war
under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways
that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and
trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production
networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen
consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the
world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great
powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party
countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to
intervene.
1NC – Add Ons
Impact -- Disease
Economic decline hampers health programs and increase disease spread
Frank 18 – Robert A.University of Ottawa. [“Conflict and Disease: A Complex Relationship”, March
2018, [Lex AZ], 10.18192/riss-ijhs.v7i1.1895]
Impact of Economic Instability Financial crises hinder quality of life, while promoting redistribution of
funds away from areas that are most beneficial to citizens. A common feature of economic crises is a
rapid increase in unemployment, which often results in instability and mass protest (International
Labour Organization, 2013). The uncertainty associated with financial loss is also a significant stressor
that can negatively impact mental and physical health. Throughout the economic crisis in Greece,
mental illness and suicide rates have increased significantly, while HIV rates have also increased due to
intravenous drug utilization (Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014). Furthermore, many individuals are thrust
into poverty and subsequently face the barriers associated with low socioeconomic status. Despite the
significant impact of economic collapse on societal health, the quality of healthcare is often
paradoxically sacrificed due to reallocation of limited funds, as highlighted by the funding cuts to mental
health and drug abuse prevention programs in Greece during its economic struggles (Simou &
Koutsogeorgou, 2014). A society in economic crisis, therefore, faces a conflicting scenario with
increased demand for, but reduced supply of, health services.
Extinction—defense is wrong
Millett 17 Piers Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and
Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”,
Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028
Historically, disease
events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was
responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th
century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while
other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of
the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction
or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential
risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations,
overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s
favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type
pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely.
Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1
mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being
almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced
into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European
diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98%
loss of population). In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to
countermeasures, and global reach. But many
diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be
realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of
treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every
human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens,
such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory,
natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of
transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases
that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced
transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100%
case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies
have shown that other disease
traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2
Impact -- Diversionary War
Independently, collapse causes diversionary lashout – extinction
Foster 16 Dennis M. Distinguished Professor Head of the Department of International Studies and
Political Science, “Would President Trump go to war to divert attention from problems at home?”,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/19/yes-trump-might-well-go-towar-to-divert-attention-from-problems-at-home/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d755c6d748c6
These results are startling. Nearly 35 percent of Trump’s references to outside groups paint them as harmful to himself,
his allies and friends, and causes that are important to him — a percentage almost twice the previous high. The data suggest that Americans have elected a leader
who, if his campaign rhetoric is any indication, will be historically unparalleled among modern presidents in his active suspicion of those unlike himself and his inner
circle, and those who disagree with his goals. As a candidate, Trump also scored
second-lowest among presidents in conceptual
complexity. Compared to earlier presidents, he used more words and phrases that indicate less willingness to see multiple dimensions or ambiguities in the
decision-making environment. These include words and phrases like “absolutely,” “greatest” and “without a doubt.” A possible implication for military action I took
these data
on Trump and plugged them into the statistical model that we developed to predict major uses of force by the United States from 1953 to 2000.
For a president of average distrust and conceptual complexity, an economic downturn only weakly predicts an increase in the use of force. But the model
would predict that a president with Trump’s numbers would respond to even a minor economic
downturn with an increase in the use of force. For example, were the misery index (aggregate inflation and unemployment) equal to 12 —
about where it stood in October 2011 — the model predicts a president with Trump’s psychological traits would initiate
more than one major conflict per quarter.
Impact -- Political Instability
Economic decline causes political instability
A. Michael 16, 3-24-2016, [1966, BA (Hons), Princeton University; 1968, BA and MA, Oxford University; 1972,
PhD in Economics, Harvard University. Economist. 1973-75, Associate Professor of Economics, Stanford University;
1975-90, Professor, Economics and Business Administration, Harvard University; 1977-79, Member, Economics
Advisory Panel, National Science Foundation; 1984-90, Dean, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University;
1990-99, Phillip H Knight Professor and Dean, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University. Currently,
Chairman, Independent Commission on Growth and Development; Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution. Phillip H
Knight Professor Emeritus, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University. Member of Board: General Mills;
Siebel Systems; Nike; Exult. Member, American Economic Association. Fellow: American Academy of Arts and
Sciences; Econometric Society. Author of The Next Convergence. Recipient of awards, including: John Kenneth
Galbraith Prize (1978); Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (2001).] "Economic decline is leading to political
instability. What's the solution?," World Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/03/economicdecline-is-leading-to-political-instability-whats-the-solution//CHS PK
Over the last 35 years, Western democracies have seen a rapid rise in political instability, characterized
by frequent shifts in governing parties and their programs and philosophies, driven at least partly by
economic transformation and hardship. The question now is how to improve economic performance at
a time when political instability is impeding effective policymaking. In a recent article, one of us (David
Brady) shows the correlation between rising political instability and declining economic performance,
pointing out that countries with below-average economic performance have experienced the most
electoral volatility. More specifically, such instability corresponds with a decline in the share of industrial
or manufacturing employment in advanced countries. Though the extent of the decline varies somewhat
across countries – it has been less sharp in Germany than in the United States, for example – the pattern
is fairly ubiquitous. Over the last 15 years, in particular, increasingly powerful digital technologies
enabled the automation and disintermediation of “routine” white- and blue-collar jobs. With advances
in robotics, materials, 3D printing, and artificial intelligence, one can reasonably expect the scope of
“routine” jobs that can be automated to continue expanding. The rise of digital technologies also
boosted companies’ ability to manage complex multi-source global supply chains efficiently, and thus
take advantage of global economic integration. As services became increasingly tradable, manufacturing
declined steadily as a share of employment, from 40% in 1960 to about 20% today. But, in most
advanced countries, the tradable sector did not generate much employment, at least not enough to
offset declines in manufacturing. In the United States, for example, net employment generation in the
third of the economy that produces tradable goods and services was essentially zero over the last two
decades. Partly driven by these trends, the share of national income going to labor, which rose in the
early post-war period, began falling in the 1970s. While globalization and digital technologies have
produced broad-based benefits, in the form of lower costs for goods and an expanded array of services,
they have also fueled job and income polarization, with a declining share of middle-income jobs and a
rising share of lower- and higher-income jobs splitting the income distribution. The magnitude of this
polarization varies by country, owing to disparate social-security systems and policy responses. Until
2008, when economic crisis roiled much of the world, the concerns associated with rising inequality
were at least partly masked by higher leverage, with government expenditures and wealth effects from
rising asset prices supporting household consumption and propping up growth and employment. When
that growth pattern broke down, economic and political conditions deteriorated rapidly. Most obvious,
the drop in growth and employment has amplified the adverse effects of job and income polarization.
Beyond the obvious practical problems this has raised, it has impinged on many citizens’ sense of
identity. In the post-war industrial era, one could reasonably expect to earn a decent living, support a
family, and contribute in a visible way to the country’s overall prosperity. Being shunted into the nontradable service sector, with lower income and less job security, caused many to lose self-esteem, as
well as fostering resentment toward the system that brought about the shift. (It did not help matters
that the same system bailed out the main driver of the economic crisis, the financial sector – a move
that exposed a stark disparity between exigency and fairness.) While technology-driven economic
transformation is not new, it has never occurred as rapidly or on as large a scale as it has over the last 35
years, when it has been turbocharged by globalization. With their experiences and fortunes changing
fast, many citizens now believe that powerful forces are operating outside the control of existing
governance structures, insulated from policy intervention. And, to some extent, they are right. The
result is a widespread loss of confidence in government’s motivations, capabilities, and competence.
This sentiment does not appear to be mitigated much by a recognition of the complexity of the
challenge of maintaining incentives and dynamism while addressing rising inequality (which, at its most
extreme, undermines equality of opportunity and intergenerational mobility). As Brady points out,
during the more stable period immediately following World War II, growth patterns were largely benign
from a distributional perspective, and political parties were largely organized around the interests of
labor and capital, with an overlay of common interests created by the Cold War. As outcomes have
become increasingly unequal, there has been a fragmentation of interests across the electoral spectrum,
leading to instability in electoral outcomes, political paralysis, and frequent changes in policy
frameworks and direction. This has several economic consequences. One is policy-induced uncertainty,
which, by most accounts, amounts to a major impediment to investment. Another is the distinct lack of
consensus on an agenda to restore growth, reduce unemployment, reestablish a pattern of
inclusiveness, and retain the benefits of global interconnectedness. On one level, it is hard not to see
this as a self-reinforcing destructive cycle. Political instability reduces the likelihood of defining and
implementing a reasonably comprehensive, coherent, and sustained economic-policy agenda. The
resulting persistence of low growth, high unemployment, and rising inequality fuels continued political
instability and fragmentation, which further undermines officials’ capacity to implement effective
economic policies.
Impact -- Slow Growth
Slow growth alone is sufficient to cause great power war – extinction
Edelman & Brands 17 Eric Hal Hal Brands is senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments (CSBA) and Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Eric Edelman is counselor at CSBA and the
Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence at SAIS., 6-21-2017, "America and the Geopolitics of
Upheaval," Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/america-and-geopolitics-upheaval
"The essence of a
revolution is that it appears to contemporaries as a series of more or less unrelated upheavals,”
Henry Kissinger wrote in 1969. “But the crises which form the headlines of the day are symptoms of deep-seated
structural problems.” Kissinger wrote this passage as the postwar international system was coming under unprecedented strain, with profound shifts in
the global distribution of power driving incessant disruptions in U.S. foreign policy. His admonition applies just as well today, at the onset of a new era of upheaval.
During Donald Trump’s presidency and after, U.S.
foreign policy is likely to be wracked by crises. The instability and
violence along a resurgent Russia’s periphery, the growing frictions with an increasingly assertive China,
the provocations of a rapidly nuclearizing North Korea and the profound chaos at work throughout the
Middle East: these and other challenges have recently tested U.S. officials and are likely to do so for the
foreseeable future. The world now seems less stable and more dangerous than at any time since the
Cold War; the number and severity of global crises are increasing. Yet crises do not occur in a vacuum; they are
symptomatic of deeper changes in the international order. Accordingly, America’s responses will be ill-informed and astrategic
unless Washington first forms a deeper conception of the current moment. The geopolitical changes underway are often framed in
terms of “polarity”—the debate on whether America’s “unipolar moment” is over and a multipolar world has emerged. But this debate is
misleading. On the one hand, discussions of polarity frequently exaggerate American decline, obscuring the fact
that even though Washington’s international superiority has diminished, its global lead over any single
challenger remains quite impressive. On the other hand, the polarity debate actually obscures both the degree and breadth of the ongoing
changes in the international system, and of the challenges facing American officials. The fundamental fact of international politics today is that the post–Cold War
era has ended. The defining features of that period were uncontested U.S. and Western primacy, marked declines in ideological struggle and great-power conflict,
and remarkable global cooperation in addressing key international-security challenges. Now, however, the
world has returned to a more
normal—which is to say, more dangerous and unsettled—state. The core characteristics of the emerging
era are the gradual erosion of U.S. and Western primacy, revived great-power competition across all three
key regions of Eurasia, renewed global ideological struggle, and empowerment of the agents of
international strife and disorder. What makes the present period so tumultuous is that these forces
often compound one another’s destabilizing effects; moreover, their collective impact is magnified by a growing uncertainty about
whether America and other traditional defenders of the international system will continue playing that role in the future. American primacy is not
dead, in other words, and true multipolarity is still a long ways off. But U.S. primacy is far more contested than at any time in a quarter-century, and the
friendly contours of the post–Cold War system have given way to a darker and more challenging environment. The best way to understand the present era is to
compare it to the previous one. The post–Cold War era was defined by four phenomena that made it historically favorable to American interests. The first was
uncontested U.S. primacy. America emerged from the Cold War with clear economic dominance, possessing nearly 25 percent of
global GDP in 1994. It controlled nearly 40 percent of world defense outlays, along with utterly unrivaled advantages in global
power-projection capabilities. Crucially, these capabilities not only gave Washington an enormous lead over any
geopolitical competitor; they also provided the ability—as Saddam Hussein discovered in 1991—to marshal decisive
military might in virtually all the key strategic regions around the world. In the nineteenth century, the British ship of the line
symbolized London’s global primacy; in the late twentieth century, the American carrier strike group symbolized an even more imposing preeminence. Nor was
American dominance purely unilateral, because it was powerfully accentuated by the strengths of the broader Western coalition. In 1994, America’s treaty allies in
Europe and the Asia-Pacific accounted for 47 percent of global GDP and 35 percent of global military spending, giving Washington and its closest friends upward of
70 percent of global economic power and military spending. Throughout the post–Cold War era, allied involvement thus lent added force to U.S. diplomacy on key
issues of international order; from the Gulf War to the war in Afghanistan, allied contributions reinforced America’s ability to project military power overseas. This
was no balance of power; it was one of the most pronounced imbalances the world had ever seen. U.S. dominance was also evident in a second phenomenon—the
decline of international ideological competition. Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis has been much derided, but it captured three indisputable facts about
the post–Cold War era: that democracy and markets were spreading more widely than ever before; that there was no credible global competitor to the liberalcapitalist model; and that even former U.S. enemies, such as Russia, and authoritarian states, such as China, were making unprecedented efforts to integrate into
the liberal order either economically, politically or both. To be clear, Western concepts of human rights and political democracy were far from fully accepted in
these countries, and Russian and Chinese leaders—among others—sooner or later came to see liberal proselytism as a grave threat. But the intense ideological
struggles of the twentieth century were clearly over, and the liberal model seemed incontestably ascendant. These first two phenomena related to a third—the
remarkable great-power comity of the post–Cold War era. The end of the Cold War did not, as was widely expected, see a fragmenting of America’s alliances, or a
resurgence of Japanese and German revisionism. Rather, the major Western powers remained tied to America, largely because Washington continued to provide
crucial global public goods such as security and leadership of an open global economy. Moreover, the
sheer geopolitical dominance of the
Western coalition meant that it was dangerous if not impossible for countries like Russia and China to
mount serious great-power challenges of their own. Admittedly, there remained sometimes-serious disagreements between the
United States and these countries, over issues from NATO enlargement to Taiwan, and those disagreements would grow more pronounced with time. But the
danger of great-power war was nonetheless historically low during the 1990s, and great-power rivalries
were more muted than at any time since the Concert of Europe. All of these characteristics fed into a final post–Cold War
phenomenon: remarkable multilateral cooperation in addressing the relatively mild international disorder of the day. With great-power conflict
dormant, U.S. foreign policy and the international community focused largely on combating lesser
geopolitical “spoilers,” from ethnic cleansing to mass-casualty terrorism to the actions of aggressive
regional powers such as Iraq or North Korea. These efforts, in turn, were greatly aided by the relatively
tranquil state of international politics. The absence of great-power conflict made it far easier to organize
broad coalitions to confront malevolent actors, whether Saddam Hussein in 1990–91 or Al Qaeda after 9/11. In the same vein, great-power peace allowed
America and its allies to devote increasing attention to other forms of post–Cold War disorder. The fact that NATO could focus on “out of area” interventions for
roughly two decades after the Soviet collapse, for instance, was directly related to the paucity of more traditional geopolitical threats. It would be a mistake, of
course, to exaggerate how benign or pliable the post–Cold War environment really was. The “global disorder” of the period hardly seemed mild for the victims of
catastrophic terrorism or ethnic cleansing; U.S. primacy was not omnipotence, as Washington’s travails in places from Mogadishu to Srebrenica to Helmand amply
demonstrated. But by any meaningful historical comparison, the structure of international politics was uniquely conducive to the promotion of U.S. interests and
ideals—a fact that is now the source of some nostalgia as the global system changes in five significant ways. The first key structural shift underway is the erosion of
U.S. and Western primacy. It is incorrect to see this change as a transition from unipolarity to multipolarity, for true multipolarity will not arrive anytime soon. The
United States still possesses substantial economic advantages over its closest competitor, China, namely an $18 trillion GDP that (as of
2015) was more than $7 trillion larger than China’s, and a per-capita GDP roughly four times that of China. U.S. defense spending also remains around three times
that of China, and Washington maintains enormous advantages in the power-projection capabilities—aircraft carriers, advanced tactical aircraft, nuclear-powered
submarines and others—that allow it to command the global commons and exert disproportionate influence around the world. What
has happened
over the past fifteen years, however, is that the extent of U.S. and Western primacy has diminished. The
U.S. shares of global wealth and military spending have declined from 25 percent and 42 percent, respectively, in 2004, to around 22 and 34
percent in 2015. The drop-off among America’s allies has been more severe. U.S. allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific commanded 47 percent of global GDP and 35
percent of global military spending in 1994; those shares had fallen to 39 and 25 percent, respectively, by 2015. Moreover, many of America’s most powerful
allies—particularly in Europe—have undergone severe military decline. The British Royal Navy once ruled the waves, but now struggles to rule even the waters
around the home islands; the German army faces equipment shortfalls so severe that its troops have had to exercise with broomsticks in place of machine guns.
Western overmatch remains impressive by historical standards, but the global playing field is slanted
much less dramatically than before. Meanwhile, the relative positions of America’s principal competitors
have improved significantly. Russian economic power remains unimpressive, but an aggressive military
modernization program has roughly doubled defense spending over a decade while also developing the
capabilities needed to compete with the West—airborne assault units, special-operations forces, ballistic and other missile systems, and
anti-access/area-denial capabilities, among others. China, meanwhile, has expanded its share of global wealth more than
threefold, from 3.3 to 11.8 percent, between 1994 and 2015, and its share of world military spending more than fivefold, from 2.2 to 12.2
percent. As in Russia’s case, China’s military buildup has featured the tools—ballistic and cruise missiles,
diesel-electric and nuclear submarines, advanced air defenses, and fourth-generation fighters—needed
to offset longstanding U.S. advantages in the Asia-Pacific, as well as capabilities, such as aircraft carriers, needed to project Chinese power
even further afield. The uncontested U.S. primacy of the 1990s has become the highly contested primacy of
today. This is no academic distinction; the pernicious effects of this shift are already being seen. The
decline of allied military power has made it harder for those allies to defend themselves against growing security
threats, and to make more than token military contributions to addressing global challenges such as the
rise of the Islamic State. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates famously warned in 2011 that NATO faced a “dim if not dismal future” if European
capabilities continued to erode; American frustration has only become more pronounced since then. More fundamentally still, the
changing power
balance means that U.S. rivals and adversaries now have greater ability to shift the international order
to suit their own preferences, a factor driving a second key shift in global politics today. If great-power
comity was the post–Cold War norm, great-power competition is the standard today. Authoritarian rivals
that were never fully reconciled to the post–Cold War order, and accepted it only to the degree compelled by U.S. and Western primacy, are now using
their greater relative power to push back against that order in key geopolitical regions from East Asia to
the Middle East to eastern Europe. Because Washington’s principal adversaries can concentrate their
resources regionally, rather than having to distribute them globally, the power shifts that have occurred
in recent years are having outsized effects at the regional level. And because the regional orders now
being challenged have been the foundation of the broader post–Cold War system, these countries are
effectively subverting the system “from the bottom up.” Consider Chinese behavior in East Asia. Chinese leaders always saw
America’s post–Cold War dominance as a transitory condition to be suffered for a time, not something to be welcomed forever. And so as China’s geopolitical
potential has soared, Beijing has taken bolder steps to erect a Sino-centric regional order. It has asserted expansive maritime claims and
used techniques such as island building to shift facts on the ground without risking a premature military
clash with America. It has challenged longsta