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Navarro v. CSC 226 SCRA 522

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Under
JOSE EDMUND E. GUILLEN, LL.B., LL.M. (UMLS)
LIST OF CASES
A. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
1. De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602 (1987)
153 SCRA 602
FACTS:
Alfredo De Leon was elected Barangay Captain in the elections on May 17, 1982. On
February 9, 1987, petitioner received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986, but
signed by OIC Governor Esguerra on February 8, 1987, designating Florentino Magno as
Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores Taytay, Rizal. Petitioners pray that the
memorandum is null and void in accordance with Section 3 of Barangay Election Act of
1982. Petitioner further that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent
OIC governor no longer has authority to designate successors and replace them.
ISSUE:
Is the dismissal order of De Leon et. Al. by respondent OIC Governor valid?
HELD:
The constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, the
Provisional Constitution has been superseded. As such, respondent OIC Governor could
no longer rely on Section 2 Article III of said Constitution. The Memoranda was declared
to be of no legal force and the writ of prohibition enjoining respondents from proceeding
with the take-over was granted.
2. Angara v. Electoral Commission 63 Phil.139 (1936)
DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION
FACTS:
In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members
of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.
On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect
of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed
the last date to file election protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest"
against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected
Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified.
On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last
day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers
exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the
affirmative,
RULING:
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a
conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand,
and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not
be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not
follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people
and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a
separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of
authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the
government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate
cases.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of
the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."
The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members,
to an independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in
the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as
an express prohibition in the Constitution.
Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper
exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and
approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests.
When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming
the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not
yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of
the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election
contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot
be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing
of said election protests.
The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the
resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time
for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the
Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied,
with cost against the petitioner.
B. THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
1. Bacani v. Nacoco 100 PHIL 468 (1956)
FACTS:
Bacani and Matoto are court stenographers both assigned in the CFI of Manila. During
the pendency of another civil case (Civil Case No. 2293 entitled 'Francisco Sycip vs.
NACOCO'), Alikpala, counsel for NACOCO(Nat’l Coconut Corporation) , requested the said
stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during
the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the
needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the
payment of their fees. The NACOCO paid the amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to
Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page.
Subsequently, the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by
virtue of a DOJ circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government entity, was
exempt from the payment of the fees in question.
Petitioners countered that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of
section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court while the defendants set up as a defense that
the NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 hence, exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity.
No, it is not.
GOCCs do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the
classification of municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the
purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences
in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products
and the proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which our government has
chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry. It was given a corporate power
separate and distinct from the government, as it was made subject to the provisions of
the Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may
exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and
be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an
entity different from our government.
There are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its
objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute
of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress
and prosperity of the people.
President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows:
The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from
violence and robbery.
(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and
children.
(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the
determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.
(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external
danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.’
The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public
charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The
principles deter mining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these
optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those
things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government
should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the
public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals.
2. PVTA v. CIR 65 SCRA 416 (1975)
Facts:
More specifically, it deals with the question of whether petitioner, the Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration, discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.
The facts are undisputed. On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private respondents, filed
with respondent Court a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the
overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the
failure... to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No.
444.
There was an answer filed by petitioner Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration denying the allegations and raising the special defenses of
lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.[... espondent Court issued an order
sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime services from December 23, 1963
up to the date the... decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing petitioner to
pay the same, minus what it had already paid.[9] There was a motion for reconsideration,
but respondent Court en banc denied the same.[10] Hence this petition... for certiorari.
Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, as had been noted, would predicate its
plea for the reversal of the order complained of on the basic proposition that it is beyond the
jurisdiction of respondent Court as... it is exercising governmental functions and that it... is
exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Issues:
More specifically, it deals with the question of whether petitioner, the Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration, discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.
Ruling:
The amendatory statute, Republic Act No.
4155,[14] renders even more evident its nature as a governmental agency. Its first section
on the declaration of policy reads: "It is declared to be the national policy, with respect to
the local Virginia Tobacco industry, to encourage the... production of local Virginia tobacco
of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign markets,
to establish this industry on an efficient and economic basis, and to create a climate
conducive to local cigarette manufacture of the qualities... desired by the consuming public,
blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally
manufactured cigarettes."[15] The objectives are set forth thus: "To attain this national
policy the following objectives are hereby... adopted: 1. Financing; 2. Marketing; 3. The
disposal of stocks of the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration (PVTA) at the best obtainable prices and conditions in order that a
reinvigorated Virginia... tobacco industry may be established on a sound basis; and
4. Improving the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes through blending of imported
and native Virginia leaf tobacco; such importation with corresponding exportation at a ratio
of one kilo of imported to four... kilos of exported Virginia tobacco, purchased by the
importer-exporter from the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration."[1
"The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government... quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The
areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government
was called upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better equipped to administer
for the public welfare than is any private... individual or group of individuals,' continue to
lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government
must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of
the times. Here as almost everywhere... else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater
socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed
adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle
concerning the promotion of social... justice."
It did cite Section 2 of the Act, but its very language leaves no doubt that "it shall apply to
all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private . xxx"[42] Nor
are... private respondents included among the employees who are thereby barred from
enjoying the statutory benefits it cited Marcelo vs. Philippine National Red Cross[43] and Boy
Scouts of the Philippines vs. Araos.
respondent Court must be sustained.
denying a motion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed.
3. Govt. of the Phil. Islands v. Monte de Piedad 35 PHIL. 728
FACTS:
About $400,000 were paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of
the Spanish Dominions for the relief of those damaged by the earthquake on June 3,
1863, in the Philippines. Upon the petition of the governing body of the respondent, the
Philippine government directed its treasurer to turn over to the respondent the sum of
$80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each. Petitioner now brings suit to
recover said amount with interest against respondents in behalf of the various petitions
of the persons and heirs to whom the relief was intended. Defendant contends that the
amount was given as a donation and that the court erred in stating that the Philippine
Islands has subrogated the Spanish government in its rights.
ISSUE:
Does the government of the Philippines have authority to file a suit against the
respondent?
HELD:
The legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all
charities of public nature. The court further asserted that said amount was not a donation
and that respondent is liable for the debt regardless of the cession of the Philippine
Islands to the United States. It is said that there is a total abrogation of the former
political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region, however, the circumstances
present in the case are not political in nature. The great body of municipal law which
regulates private and domestic rights continue in force until they are abrogated or
changed by the new ruler. As such, the government has the authority to file a suit on
behalf of its people by virtue of the principle of parens patriae.
4. Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh 75 PHIL 113 (1945)
FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to continue the
proceedings in petitioner’s case on the ground that the proclamation, issued on October
23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the court during the Japanese occupation. Respondent
contends that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue pending judicial
proceedings and that the government established during the Japanese occupation was no
de facto government.
ISSUES:1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the Japanese
occupation remain good and valid?
2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidate all judgments and judicial acts and
proceedings of said court?
3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said courts?
HELD:
It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government established
by military forces and thus a de facto government of the second kind. Legislative, as well
as judicial, acts of de facto governments, which are not of political complexion, remain
valid after reoccupation. It is presumed that the proclamation of General MacArthur did
not specifically refer to judicial processes thus it has not invalidated all the judgments and
proceedings of the courts during the Japanese regime. The existence of the courts
depends upon the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction. Such laws,
not political in nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty and continue in
force until repealed by legislative acts. It is thus obvious that the present courts have
jurisdiction to continue proceedings in cases, not of political complexion.
5. People v. Gozo 53 SCRA 476 (1973)
FACTS: Appellant Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the United States
Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City, which she then
demolished to build another one in its place. These she did without securing the building
permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, as provided for in Municipal Order No. 14
Series of 1964. She was convicted by the trial court of violation of the said ordinance,
which she contested by invoking due process as taught in People vs. Fajardo. Appellant
Gozo maintained that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the
American armed forces. She argued the validity of Municipal Order No. 14 or at the very
least its applicability to her in view of the location of her dwelling within the naval base.
ISSUE: Whether or not Municipal Order No. 14 Series of 1964 is valid and may be
enforced within the naval base.
HELD: Yes. First, the Court held that using the precedent in People vs. Fajardo is
fruitless because this case contemplates upon defendant Fajardo who tried securing a
permit from the Mayor and, when unable to, built his home nonetheless for needing it
badly. The case at bar, on the other hand, shows that the appellant never bothered to
comply with the ordinance. The Court reiterated that, under the terms of the Agreement
between the Philippines and the United States, The Philippine Government has not
abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested
itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. The United States
Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses.
Jurisdiction of the Philippines over the military bases may be diminished but it does not
disappear. These bases are under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the
military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed insofar as it
found the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and modified insofar as she is
required to demolish the house that is the subject matter of the case, she being given a
period of thirty days from the finality of this decision within which to obtain the required
permit. Only upon her failure to do so will that portion of the appealed decision requiring
demolition be enforced. Costs against the accused
6. Laurel v. Misa 77 PHIL 856 (1947)
Facts:
In G. R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the
petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on the theory that a
Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the
Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and
penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the sovereignty of
the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance
of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended.
Issue:
Whether or not the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines
was then suspended
Held:
No.The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or
severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to
the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the
sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs
a body politic or society which constitute the state).
7. Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff 75 PHIL 857 (1946)
FACTS:
Ramon Ruffy was the provincial commander stationed in Mindoro at the outbreak of war
on December 8, 1941. When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro on February 27,
1942, Mayor Ruffy retreated to the mountains and organized and led a guerrilla outfit
known as the Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area. The case at bar is a petition for prohibition
praying that respondents be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of
the petitioners on the ground that petitioners were not subject to military law at the time
of the offense.
ISSUE:
1. Are the petitioners subject to military law at the time of war and Japanese
occupation?
2. Is 93d Article of War constitutional?
HELD:
Petitioners were subject to military jurisdiction as provided for in Article of War (2d). The
Bolo Area was a contingent of the 6th military district which had been recognized by the
United States Army. The petitioners assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of War on
the ground that it violates Article VIII Section 2 par. 4 of the Constitution which provides
that “National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction
over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment”. The
petitioners are in error for courts-martial are agencies of executive character and are not
a portion of the judiciary. The petition thus has no merits and is dismissed with costs.
People
8. Moya Lim Yao v. Comm. On Immigration 41 SCRA 292
Facts:
On 13 March 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung, a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, was
permitted to come into the Philippines for a period of one month until 13 April 1961
through a non-immigrant visa. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in
the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period
of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated
extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February
1962.
On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for
injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half
years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write
either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or
Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one,
Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. The Court of
First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and
Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
Issue:
Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a
Filipino citizen.
Held:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native
born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a
citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,
provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15
is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization
as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should
follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature
intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and
procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization
proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her
own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to
prove it every time she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or
exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not
vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case
may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Every
time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to
such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed
out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have
become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
9. Po Xo Bi v. Rep., G.R. 32398, January 27, 1992
Territory
10. R.A. No. 3046, June 17, 1961
11. R. A. No. 5446, September 8, 1968
12. P.D. No. 1599, June 11, 1978
13. R.A. No. 9522 – New Phils. Baseline Law
14. Merlin M. Magalona et. al., vs. Eduardo Ermita, August 16, 2011
Government
15. Go Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh
FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to continue the
proceedings in petitioner’s case on the ground that the proclamation, issued on October
23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the court during the Japanese occupation. Respondent
contends that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue pending judicial
proceedings and that the government established during the Japanese occupation was no
de facto government.
ISSUES:1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the Japanese
occupation remain good and valid?
2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidate all judgments and judicial acts and
proceedings of said court?
3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said courts?
HELD:
It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government established
by military forces and thus a de facto government of the second kind. Legislative, as well
as judicial, acts of de facto governments, which are not of political complexion, remain
valid after reoccupation. It is presumed that the proclamation of General MacArthur did
not specifically refer to judicial processes thus it has not invalidated all the judgments and
proceedings of the courts during the Japanese regime. The existence of the courts
depends upon the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction. Such laws,
not political in nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty and continue in
force until repealed by legislative acts. It is thus obvious that the present courts have
jurisdiction to continue proceedings in cases, not of political complexion.
16. Lawyers League for a Better Phils. V. Aquino, May 22, 1986
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing
that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation
No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by
stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of
the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that the
people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire
country. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new
government.
17. Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 PHIL 778
In 1918, the mayor of Manila had 170 "women of ill repute" forcibly rounded up, put on a
ship, and sent to Davao as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against him. The
Supreme Court said that the women were not chattels but Filipino citizens who had the
fundamental right not to be forced to change their place of residence. This case justifies
one of the basic rights of citizen, the right of domain.
Issue:
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the
respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao.
Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in
deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of
Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters
consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao
where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of
prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the
case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should
be filed in the city of Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open:
(1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of
the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity
those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have
presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right
to be present.
Held:
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos
each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further
that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally
take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then,
when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that
the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this
other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of
the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the
wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom
the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the
application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the
chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city
of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return
them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be
permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile
and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be
easily evaded.
Sovereignty
18. Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 75 PHIL 285
Facts:
Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged
with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of
goods and other necessaries... was prosecuted for the crime of robbery
He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he commenced... to
serve on August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction
The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and
Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was a political instrumentality
of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of... which
are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America, and therefore, null and
void... that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve...
the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and "that the
penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the
Revised Penal Code."... he City Fisc
The City Fiscal of Manila... submits that the petition for habeas corpus be
denied on the following grounds: That the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction and the Acts, Ordinances and Executive Orders, creating it are not of a
political complexion, for said Court was created, and the crimes and offenses placed
under its jurisdiction were penalized heavily, in response to an urgent... necessity,
according to the preamble of Ordinance No. 7; that the right to appeal in a criminal case
is not a constitutional right; and that the summary procedure established in said
Ordinance No. 7 is not violative of the provision of Article III, section 1 (18) of the
Constitution of the Commonwealth, to the effect that no person shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself, nor of the provision of section 1 (1) of the same Article that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without... due process of law.
Issues:
The questions which we have to resolve in the present case in the light of the law of
nations are,
first, the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the ... summary procedure adopted for that court;
secondly, the validity of the sentence which imposes upon the petitioner the penalty of
life imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation; and
thirdly, if they were then valid, the effect on... said punitive sentence of the
reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth
Government.
Ruling:
"The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a
sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in
truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the
Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive
Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same the
Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his
proclamation... of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, 'under
enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the "Republic of
the Philippines" was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free
expression of the... peoples' will nor the sanction of the Government of the United
States.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer
the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino
people,... before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into
an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means
recognized in the law of nations."
(1) As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the only factor to be considered is the authority of the
legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is... well established
in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the
occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered
state, it is drawn entirely from the law martial as denned in the... usages of nations. The
authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose authority
and procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state, or through the
ordinary courts and authorities of the... occupied district."
A belligerent "occupant may where necessary, set up military courts instead of the
ordinary courts; and in case, and in so far as, he admits the administration of justice by
the ordinary courts, he may nevertheless,... so far as is necessary for military purposes,
or for the maintenance of public order and safety, temporarily alter the laws, especially
the Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is administered as well as the laws
regarding... procedure." (Oppenheim'si International Law, Vol. II, sixth edition, 1944, p.
349.)
It is, therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner, imposing upon him the penalty of
life imprisonment, was good and valid, since it was within the admitted power or...
competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime of
which petitioner was convicted.
In view of all the foregoing, the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby granted and
it is ordered that the petitioner be released forthwith, without pronouncement as to
costs. So ordered.
19. Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, supra
Nature of the Action: Petition for prohibition, praying that respondents be commanded to
desist from further proceedings in the trial of petitioners before the military court
Facts: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at
designated camps or military bases all over the country. When the Japanese forces
reached Mindoro, Ruffy and his band were forced to retreat to the mountains. A guerilla
outfit was then organized, called as the “Bolo Area”. However, a certain Capt. Esteban
Beloncio relieved petitioners of their positions and duties in the “Bolo Area”, after Lieut.
Col. Enrique Jurado effected a change of command. The latter, however, was slain
allegedly by petitioners, and it was this murder which gave rise to petitioners’ trial, the
legality of which is now being contested.
Issue: Were the petitioners subject to the military law at the time of war and Japanese
occupation?
Ruling: Our conclusion, therefore, is that the petition has no merit and that it should be
dismissed with costs.
Ratio Decidendi: Yes, the petitioners were subject to military law. By their acceptance of
appointments as officers in the Bolo Area, they became members of the Philippine
Army—the Bolo Area being a contingent of the 6th military district which is recognized by
the United States army. Thus, petitioners are covered by the National Defense Act,
Articles of War, and other pertinent laws during an occupation.
20. Reagan v. CIR 30 SCRA 968
Facts:
The petitioner is a citizen of the United State and an employee of Bendix
Radio, Divison of Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provided technical assistance to the
United States Air Force was assigned at the Clark Air Base Pampanga, honor about July 7,
19. Nine months, before his tour duty expires, petitioner imported a tax free 1960
Cadillac car which valued at $6443.83. More than two months after the car was imported,
petitioner requested the Clark Air Base Commander for a permit to sell the car. The
request was granted with the condition that he would sell it to a member of the United
States Armed Forces or an employee of the U.S. Military Bases.
On July 11, 1960, petitioner sold the car to Willie Johnson for $6600, a private
in US Marine Corps, Sangby Point, Cavite as shown by a bill of sale executed at Clark Air
Base. On the same date William Johnson Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000 as
evidence by a deed of sale executed in Manila.
The respondent after deducting the landed cost of the car and the personal
exemption which the petitioner was entitled, fixed as his net income arising from such
transaction the amount of P17912.34 rendering him liable for income tax of P2979.00.
After paying the sum, he sought refund from the respondent claiming that he is
exempted. He filed a case within the Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the sum
P2979.00 plus legal rate of interest.
Issue:
Whether or not the said income tax of P2979.00 was legally collected by respondent from
petitioner.
Ruling:
The Philippine is an independent and sovereign country or state. Its authority
may be exercised over its entire domain. Its laws govern therein and everyone to whom
it applies must submit to its term. It does not prelude from allowing another power to
participate in the exercise of jurisdictional rights over certain portions of its territory. Such
areas sustain their status as native soil and still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction
may be diminished but it does not disappear.
The Clark Air Base is one of he bases under lease to the American armed
forces by virtue of the Military Bases Agreement which states that a “national of the US
serving or employed in the Philippines in connection with the construction, maintenance,
operation, or defense of the bases and residing in the Philippines only by reason such
unemployment is not to be taxed on his income unless derived in the bases which one
clearly derived the Phil.
Therefore the Supreme Court sustained the decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals rendering the petitioner liable of the income tax arising from the sale of his
automobile that have taken place in Clark Air Field which is within our territory to tax.
21. Province of North Cotabato v. The Govt. of the R. P., Oct. 14, 2008: Associated State
Doctrine
Province of North Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga Del Norte, City of Iligan, City of
Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and
Municipality of Linnamon, Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano and Sec. Mar Roxas
-vsErmita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator National
Mapping & Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr. and respondents in intervention
Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development and Muslim Legal Assistance
Foundation Inc.,
Facts:
Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
which is scheduled to be signed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
the MILF in August 05, 2008. Five cases bearing the same subject matter were consolidated
by this court namely:-



GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer to
declare unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to the public and be open
for public consultation.
GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and void said
MOA-AD and to exclude the city to the BJE.
GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the MOA-AD
and additionally impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.


GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare null and
void the MOA-AD and without operative effect and those respondents enjoined from
executing the MOA-AD.
GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment prohibiting
and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the
MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and
nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal and impleading Iqbal.
The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between the
government and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the Agreement on
General Cessation of Hostilities; and the following year, they signed the General Framework
of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the early of 2000, the
MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the
hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out warwhich tolled the peace negotiation. It was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when the
negotiation regarding peace in Mindanao continued. MILF was hesitant; however, this
negotiation proceeded when the government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace talks
resumed and MILF suspended all its military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to
the ceasefire between the parties. After the death of MILF Chairman Hashim and Iqbal took
over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD in its final form was born.

MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in the birth
of this MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international
laws such as ILO Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e
compact right entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and order). The body is divided into
concepts and principles, territory, resources, and governance.
Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all indigenous
peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people have the right to selfgovernance of their Bangsamoro homeland to which they have exclusive ownership by virtue
of their prior rights of occupation in the land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the
Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with defined territory and with a system of
government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations." It
then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants
the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the
Bangsamoro.
As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-SuluPalawan geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are those which
voted in the inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories,
“A” which will be subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the signing and “B” which
will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of another separate agreement.
Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms
from the coastline of the BJE territory; they shall also have "territorial waters," which shall
stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines
(RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial
waters, the BJE and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and
management over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in the
territorial waters; but no provision on the internal waters.
Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish
trade missions in those countries, as well as environmental cooperation agreements, but not
to include aggression in the GRP. The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and
obligation of the government. The BJE shall have participation in international meetings and
events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be
entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of
border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of
incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands
forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to explore its
resources and that the sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total
production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they shall
have the right to cancel or modify concessions and TLAs.
And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the GRP and
MILF is associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and responsibility. This structure of
governance shall be further discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which
was highly contested before the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to build, develop
and maintain its own institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the
comprehensive compact as well.
Issues:
1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the exercise of
judicial review
2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation
and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD; and
3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws
Ruling:
The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution.

On the Procedural Issue
1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a need for the
exercise of judicial review.
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the court will
decline on issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere academic questions.
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.
The contention of the SolGen is that there is no issue ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD
is only a proposal and does not automatically create legally demandable rights and
obligations. Such was denied.
The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their duty or in
grave abuse of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that acts made by authority
which exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of
the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists.
When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete acts made under the MOA-AD are not
necessary to render the present controversy ripe and that the law or act in question as not
yet effective does not negate ripeness.
With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the Province of
Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in
intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to
have locus standi since it is their LGUs which will be affected in whole or in part if include
within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as
taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal
and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can
be given legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as an intervenor. And
lastly, the Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and
Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in
Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government
organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand to be benefited or prejudiced in the
resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD.
On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD has
already been suspended and that the President has already disbanded the GRP, the SC
disagrees. The court reiterates that the moot and academic principle is a general rule only,
the exceptions, provided in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will decide cases, otherwise
moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the
situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review; and
that where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or
doer, it does not divest the court the power to hear and try the case especially when the
plaintiff is seeking for damages or injunctive relief.
Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the GRP did
not render the petitions moot and academic. The MOA-AD is subject to further legal
enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus
for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and,
in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.
At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. There is a
reasonable expectation that petitioners will again be subjected to the same problem in the
future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. But with
respect to the prayer of Mandamus to the signing of the MOA-AD, such has become moot
and academic considering that parties have already complied thereat.

On the Substantive Issue
2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the
public at large.
As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the right of the people
to demand information, and integrated therein is the recognition of the duty of the
officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure
establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open
democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State
to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the
freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the
people.
Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-executory with reasonable
safeguards —the effectivity of which need not await the passing of a statute. Hence, it is
essential to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free
political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be
responsive to the people's will.
The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is corollary to the twin rights
to information and disclosure. And feedback means not only the conduct of the plebiscite as
per the contention of the respondents. Clearly, what the law states is the right of the
petitioners to be consulted in the peace agenda as corollary to the constitutional right to
information and disclosure. As such, respondent Esperon committed grave abuse of
discretion for failing to carry out the furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereto. Moreover, he cannot invoke
of executive privilege because he already waived it when he complied with the Court’s order
to the unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD.
In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related to such peace
talks as enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,
which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great
number of inhabitants from their total environment.
With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully at all levels on
decisions that would clearly affect their lives, rights and destinies. The MOA-AD is an
instrument recognizing ancestral domain, hence it should have observed the free and prior
informed consent to the ICC/IPPs; but it failed to do so. More specially noted by the court is
the excess in authority exercised by the respondent—since they allowed delineation and
recognition of ancestral domain claim by mere agreement and compromise; such power
cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to the effect.
3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they
cannot be all accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them:

On matters of the Constitution.
Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties. The parties
manifested that in crafting the MOA-AD, the term association was adapted from the
international law. In international law, association happens when two states of equal power
voluntarily establish durable links i.e. the one state, the associate, delegates certain
responsibilities to the other, principal, while maintaining its international status as state; free
association is a middle ground between integration and independence. The MOA-AD
contains many provisions that are consistent with the international definition of association
which fairly would deduced that the agreement vest into the BJE a status of an associated
state, or at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The court vehemently objects
because the principle of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond
what the Constitution can grant to a local government; even the ARMM do not have
such recognition; and the fact is such concept implies recognition of the associated
entity as a state. There is nothing in the law that contemplate any state within the
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. The
court disagrees with the respondent that the MOA-AD merely expands the ARMM.
BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. As such the
MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Republic.

On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE
includes those areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of the
ARMM. The stipulation of the respondents in the MOA-AD that these areas need not
participate in the plebiscite is in contrary to the express provision of the Constitution.
The law states that that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region."
Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of the ARMM, it would still run
afoul the wordings of the law since those included in its territory are areas which
voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and not to the BJE.

On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend that the
powers vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20,
art. 10 of the constitution and that a mere passage of a law is necessary in order to
vest in the BJE powers included in the agreement. The Court was not persuaded. SC
ruled that such conferment calls for amendment of the Constitution; otherwise new
legislation will not concur with the Constitution. Take for instance the treaty making
power vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear that only the
President has the sole organ and is the country’s sole representative with foreign
nation. Should the BJE be granted with the authority to negotiate with other states,
the former provision must be amended consequently. Section 22 must also be
amended—the provision of the law that promotes national unity and development.
Because clearly, associative arrangement of the MOA-AD does not epitomize national
unity but rather, of semblance of unity. The associative ties between the BJE and the
national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status
which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence,
is certainly not conducive to national unity.

On matters of domestic statutes.
o Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption of the
definition of Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD. Said law specifically distinguishes
between the Bangsamoro people and the Tribal peoples that is contrary with the definition
of the MOA-AD which includes all indigenous people of Mindanao.
o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and recognition of the ancestral
domain is a clear departure from the procedure embodied in the IPRA law which ironically is
the term of reference of the MOA-AD.

On matters of international law.
The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the
law of the land. In international law, the right to self-determination has long been
recognized which states that people can freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. There are the internal and external
self-determination—internal, meaning the self-pursuit of man and the external which takes
the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral secession. This principle of selfdetermination is viewed with respect accorded to the territorial integrity of existing states.
External self-determination is only afforded in exceptional cases when there is an actual
block in the meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-determination. International
law, as a general rule, subject only to limited and exceptional cases, recognizes that the
right of disposing national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every
state.
On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that indigenous peoples
situated within states do not have a general right to independence or secession from those
states under international law, but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed
above as the right to internal self-determination; have the right to autonomy or selfgovernment in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means
for financing their autonomous functions; have the right to the lands, territories and
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the indigenous
people their own police and security force; but rather, it shall be the State, through police
officers, that will provide for the protection of the people. With regards to the autonomy of
the indigenous people, the law does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the
near-independent status of a state; since it would impair the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent states.

On the basis of the suspensive clause.
o It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion cannot be had, since
the provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall not take effect until the necessary changes
to the legal framework are effected.
The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to Memorandum of
Instructions from the President stating that negotiations shall be conducted in accordance to
the territorial integrity of the country—such was negated by the provision on association
incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart from this, the suspensive clause was also held invalid
because of the delegated power to the GRP Peace panel to advance peace talks even if it
will require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. The legality of the
suspensive clause hence hinges on the query whether the President can exercise such
power as delegated by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace Panel. Well settled is the rule that the
President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. The power of the
President to conduct peace negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but is
rather implied from her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief
Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as
Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and
lawless violence.
As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations,
solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. At all event,
the president may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers
viable; but she may not be prevented from submitting them as recommendations to
Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures
for constitutional amendment and revision.
While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be
exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and
referendum - she may submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner
that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers. Clearly, the principle may be
inferred that the President - in the course of conducting peace negotiations - may validly
consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she
may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way
as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty. The President’s power is limited
only to the preservation and defense of the Constitution but not changing the same but
simply recommending proposed amendments or revisions.
o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition but is a term
because it is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will
take effect; but, when. Hence, the stipulation is mandatory for the GRP to effect the
changes to the legal framework –which changes would include constitutional amendments.
Simply put, the suspensive clause is inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority
to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the
"consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.

On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration
binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing
amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally
defective. The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under
international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing
amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of
discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the
Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to
guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to
their solution. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people
themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure
the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with
that process.
C. STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
Basis: Constitutional and Jurisprudence
1. Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 83
On July 3, 1971, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings in favor of respondents
PJ Kiener Co. Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corp., and against
the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P 1,712,396.40,
subject of Special Proceedings.
On June 24, 1969, respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor issued an Order declaring the
aforestated decision final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon
City as well as Manila to execute the decision. The corresponding Alia Writ of Execution
was issued. On the strength of the aforementioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial
Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment with several banks specially on the monies
due to the AFP in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the
said Writ.
The deposits of the banks are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the
payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel
and for maintenance and operations of the AFP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.
RULING:
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of
sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives
its consent.
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. A continued adherence to
the doctrine of non-suablitity is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that
may cause private parties, the loss of government efficiency and the obstacle to the
performance of its multifarious functions are far greater is such a fundamental principle
were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted.
The State may not be sued without its consent. Public funds cannot be the object of a
garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and
the state liability adjudged. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to
be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action
only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public
funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by the law.
Money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government employees, is
not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason
is, the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by
express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment
would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that money’s
sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of
the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be
entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the
foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it.
The Supreme Court granted the writs of certiorari and prohibition, while nullifying and
setting aside both the order declaring the decision s executor as well as the alia writ of
execution issued.
It was ruled that public funds cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if
the consent to be sued had been previously granted and even if the State liability had
been adjudged. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action only up to
the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of
the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties
may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is
based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by
law.
2. Lasco v. UNRENRE 241 SCRA 681
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages after being dismissed from
their employment with the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration
(UNRFNRE) which was involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the
United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island. The UNRFNRE filed a Motion to
Dismiss and alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality
since the UNRFNRE enjoyed diplomatic immunity pursuant to the 1946 Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The respondent attached a letter from the
Department of Foreign Affairs acknowledging its immunity from suit, prompting the Labor
Arbiter to issue an order dismissing the complaints. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied.
ISSUE:
Did the private respondent waive its diplomatic immunity when it engaged in exploration
work and entered into a contract of employment with the petitioners?
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, stating that the presence of the private
respondent in the Philippines was not because of a commercial venture but because of a
joint project entered into by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral
exploration in Dinagat Island. The mission of the UNRFNRE was not to exploit our natural
resources and gain monetarily but to help improve the quality of life of the people which
included that of the petitioners.
3. SEAFDEC v. NLRC, 241 SCRA 580
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the decision of the NLRC
sustaining the labor arbiter, in holding herein petitioners liable to pay private respondent the
amount of P126,458.89 plus interest thereon computed from May 16, 1986 until full
payment thereof is made, as separation pay and other post-employment benefits.
On April 20, 1975, private respondent Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research
Associate an a probationary basis by the SEAFDEC-AQD and was appointed Senior External
Affairs Officer on January 5, 1983 with a monthly basic salary of P8,000.00 and a monthly
allowance of P4,000.00. Thereafter, he was appointed to the position of Professional III and
designated as Head of External Affairs Office with the same pay and benefits.
SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian
Fisheries Development Center, organized through an agreement entered into in Bangkok,
Thailand on December 28, 1967 by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,
Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country
On May 8, 1986, petitioner Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice
of termination to private respondent informing him that due to the financial
constraints being experienced by the department, his services shall be terminated at the
close of office hours on May 15, 1986 and that he is entitled to separation benefits
equivalent to one (1) month of his basic salary for every year of service plus other benefits.
Upon petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD’s failure to pay private respondent his separation pay, the
latter filed on March 18, 1987 a complaint against petitioners for non-payment of separation
benefits plus moral damages and attorney’s fees with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC
Petitioners in their answer with counterclaim alleged that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over
the case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization and that private
respondent must first secure clearances from the proper departments for property or money
accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid, and which clearances had
not yet been obtained by the private respondent.
LABOR ARBITER: ordered petitioner to pay the benefits claimed
NLRC: affirmed the LA.
PETITIONER CONTENDS that: SEAFDEC-AQD is immune from suit owing to its international
character and the complaint is in effect a suit against the State which cannot be maintained
without its consent.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner is within the scope of application of Philippine labor laws (WON
SEAFDEC is immuned from suit)
HELD: Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department
(SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent
NLRC.
Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys
functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is
located.
In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a
distinct juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are
situated. As such, according to one leading authority “they must be deemed to possess a
species of international personality of their own.” (Salonga and Yap, Public International
Law, 83 [1956 ed.])
One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local
jurisdiction, i.e.,that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals
of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such
an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru
which the host government may interfere in there operations or even influence or control its
policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would
impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its
member-states.
WHEREFORE, finding SEAFDEC-AQD to be an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of
the courts or local agency of the Philippine government, the questioned decision and
resolution of the NLRC dated July 26, 1988 and January 9, 1989, respectively, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
4.
Callado v. IRRI 244 SCRA 210
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Callado was employed as a driver at the International Rice Research
Institute (IRRI).
On February 11, 1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.
After evaluating petitioner's answer, explanations and other evidence by IRRI's Human
Resource Development Department Manager, the latter issued a Notice of Termination to
petitioner on December 7, 1990.
Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Private respondent likewise informed the Labor Arbiter, through counsel, that the Institute
enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620,
and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization
in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same.
However, the Labor Arbiter finds private respondent IRRI to have waived its immunity
considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not IRRI waived its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an
employer-employee relationship.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative and vote to dismiss the petition.
There’s no merit in petitioner's arguments, thus IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed.
Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides: Immunity from Legal Process. The
Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except
insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute
or his authorized representatives.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its
Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its position clear.
Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically informing him that the
Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity.
Tests to Determine if Suit is Against the State
5. Begoso v. PVA 32 SCRA 466
Facts: • Plaintiff sought the aid of the judiciary to obtain the benefits to which he believed
he was entitled under the Veterans’ Bill of Rights. • He filed his claim for disability pension
on March 4, 1955 but was erroneously disapproved on June 21, 1955 due to his
dishonorable discharge from the army. • The Board of Administrators of PVA finally
approved his claim on September 2, 1964, entitling him with a pension of P30 a month, to
take effect on October 5 of that year. • Believing that his pension should have taken effect
back in 1955 when his claim was disapproved, and that he is entitled to a higher pension of
P50 (RA No. 1362 amending Section 9 of RA No. 65) as a permanently incapacitated person,
which was increased to P100 a month when RP 1362 was amended by RA No. 1920 on June
22, 1957, Begosa filed a case against PVA in the Court of First Instance. • CFI ruled in favor
plaintiff. • Defendants claim that the plaintiff has not exhausted all administrative remedies
before resorting to court action and that the plaintiff’s claim is in reality a suit against the
Government which cannot be entertained by this Court for lack of jurisdiction because the
Government has not given its consent.
Issue: WON the SC can entertain the suit against PVA.
Held: Yes.
Ratio: • Where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether
in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded against not
being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suitability may appropriately
be invoked. • However, it has no application where the suit against such a functionary had
to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statue
appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff. • Also, where there is a stipulation of
facts, the question before the lower court being solely one of law and on the face of the
decision, the actuation of appellants being patently illegal, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies certainly does not come into play.
6.
Del Mar v. PVA 52 SCRA 340
Facts:
Quirico del Mar served as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command during World
War II as a major. He obtained an honorable discharge from the service on October 20,
1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical disability. The Philippine Veterans Board
(PVA’s predecessor) granted him a monthly life pension of Php50 effective January 28,
1947. In March 1950, however, the said Board discontinued payment of his pension. This
was because del Mar is receiving a similar pension from the United States Government
through the US Veterans Administration because he served in the US Army in the Far East
during WWII. The discontinuation of the pension was based on Section 9 of RA 65, which
states
“The persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof who are permanently incapacitated
from work owing to sickness, disease, or injuries sustained in line of duty, shall be given a
life pension of one hundred pesos a month, and ten pesos a month for each of his
unmarried children below 18 years of age, unless they are actually receiving a similar
pension from other Government funds, and shall receive, in addition, the necessary
hospitalization and medical care.”
This provision was reflected in the PVA’s Rules and Regulations on Veterans’ Benefits,
specifically on Section 6 of Regulation No. 2, to wit,
“SEC. 6. Effect of receipt of USVA pension benefit — termination, reduction. — An award of
a similar disability compensation from the US Veterans Administration shall be a ground for
the cancellation of a disability pension granted under this Regulation: Provided,
however, That if and while the disability compensation awarded by the US Veterans
Administration is less than the pension granted hereunder, the difference in amount shall be
assumed and paid by the PVA: Provided, further, That upon proper application, the disability
award previously cancelled may be restored upon the termination of the US Veterans
Administration award if the cause of such termination is due to negative military service
report of the pensioner certified by the US Department of the Army and not for any other
valid cause: Provided, finally, That the veteran is medically determined to be still suffering
from the disability for which he was previously awarded a pension. Payment of pension thus
restored shall take effect or shall commence only from the date of approval of restoration
and when funds become available.”
PVA construes “from other Government funds” to include funds of the United States.
Issue:
May the PVA be sued?
Ruling:
Yes. The Court made a lengthy disquisition on the history, development, and organization of
the PVA to show that it is an entity or agency of the Republic of the Philippines. However,
even if it is a government entity, the PVA could not validly invoke the State immunity from
suit since in this case, the claimant institutes an action against a functionary who fails to
comply with his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the public funds already
appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant.
7. Veterans Manpower v. CA 214 SCRA 286
Facts:
On March 28, 1988, VMPSI filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court at Makati... praying
the court to... issue a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo, enjoining the
defendants, or any one acting in their place or stead, to refrain from committing acts that
would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSI's license... issue a writ of
preliminary injunction to the same effect
Render decision and judgment declaring null and void the amendment of Section 4 of R.A.
No. 5487, by PD No. 11 exempting organizations like PADPAO from the prohibition that no
person shall organize or have an interest in more than one... agency
PADPAO as an illegal organization existing in violation of said prohibition... declaring null and
void the February 1, 1982 directive of Col. Sabas V. Edadas, in the name of the then PC
Chief, requiring all private security agencies/security forces such as VMPSI to join PADPAO...
as a pre-requisite to secure/renew their licenses... ordering the defendants to refrain from
further... harassing VMPSI and from threatening VMPSI with cancellations or non-renewal of
license, without legal and justifiable cause... ordering the defendants to pay to VMPSI the
sum of P1,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages, P1,000,000.00... as exemplary
damages, and P200,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of the 1987
Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade,
and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and
Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest
in more than one security agency.
On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC
Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of
security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro
Manila (Annex B,... Petition).
Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat
competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower
than... the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May
12, 1986.
PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on
Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its
license to operate a security agency (Annex D, Petition).
The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSI's
license (Annex E, Petition)
As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when
it requested one.
VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10, 1988, requesting him to set aside or disregard the
findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSI's application for renewal of its license, even without
a certificate of membership from PADPAO (Annex F, Petition).
As the PC Chief did not reply, and VMPSI's license was expiring on March 31, 1988, VMPSI
filed Civil Case No. 88-471 in the RTC-Makati, Branch 135, on March 28, 1988 against the PC
Chief and PC-SUSIA.
the court issued a restraining order enjoining the PC
Chief and PC-SUSIA "from committing acts that would result in the cancellation or nonrenewal of VMPSI's license"
The PC chief and PC-SUSIA filed a "Motion to Dismiss, Opposition to the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and Motion to Quash the Temporary Restraining Order," on the
grounds that the case is against the State which had not given consent thereto and that
VMPSI's... license already expired on March 31, 1988, hence, the restraining order or
preliminary injunction would not serve any purpose because there was no more license to
be cancelled (Annex H, Petition). Respondent VMPSI opposed the motion.
n June 10, 1988, the RTC-Makati issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond of
P100,000.00, restraining the defendants, or any one acting in their behalf, from cancelling
or denying renewal of VMPSI's license, until further orders from the court.
The PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above order, but it was
denied by the court in its Order of August 10, 1988 (Annex R, Petition).
On November 3, 1988, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA sought relief by a petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
whether or not VMPSI's complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the
State without its consent.
Ruling:
The answer is yes
Principles:
the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA... being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a
primarily governmental function of regulating the... organization and operation of private
detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PCSUSIA) may not be sued without the Government's consent... especially
VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary
damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorney's fees from said public
respondents
Even if its action prospers, the payment of its... monetary claims may not be enforced
because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose.
since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being... called to account in this
case, were performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross
negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities.
he Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO was intended to
professionalize... the industry and to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as
the current rates of security services, clearly, a... governmental function. The execution of
the said agreement is incidental to the purpose of R.A. 5487, as amended, which is... to
regulate the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen or security guard
agencies. (Underscoring Ours.)
The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority,... hence, from
a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the public respondents.
"It is obvious that public service would be hindered, and public safety endangered, if the
supreme authority could be subjected to suits at... the instance of every citizen, and,
consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the proper
administration of the government"
Suit Against Govt. Agencies
PNB v. CIR 81 SCRA 314
FACTS:
The BIR issued a final decision on disputed assessment amounting to more than 41 million
pesos against PNB for deficiency payments of documentary stamp taxes (DST), withholding
taxes on compensation, and expanded withholding taxes for taxable year 1997. PNB
immediately paid except for the DST, arguing that its interbank call loans (ICLs) transacted
in 1997 are not subject to DST.
The BIR's position is that, although not considered as deposit subsitute debt instruments
(DSDIs), ICLs having maturity of more than 5 days are within the concept of loan
agreements. Hence, they are subject to DST.
ISSUES:
[1] Considering that PNB's ICLs have a maturity of more than 5 days, are they governed by
the amended tax law?
[2] Are ICLs within the concept of loan agreements?
[3] Are ICLs considered DSDI by the Tax Code?
[4] Are ICLs subject to DST?
HELD:
[1] No, they are not. Although under the amended Tax Code, ICLs with more than 5 days of
maturity are considered DSDIs (hence, subject to DST), this amendment came to effect in
1998. Tax laws are generally prospective and cannot be given retroactive effect to the
prejudice of PNB.
[2] No, ICLs are not considered loan agreements. An ICL refers to the cost of borrowings
from other resident banks and non-bank financial institutions with quasi-banking authority
that is payable on call or demand. It is transacted primarily to correct a bank's reserve
requirements.
8. SSS v. CA 120 SCRA 707
FACTS:
Spouses David and Socorro Cruz, applied and granted a real estate loan by the SSS
with residential lot located at Pateros, Rizal as collateral. The spouses Cruz complied with
their monthly payments. When delayed were incurred in their monthly payments SSS filed a
petition for foreclosure of their real estate mortgage executed by the spouses Cruz on the
ground that the spouses Cruz defaulted in payment, Pursuant for these application for
foreclosure notices were published on the second notice the counsel for spouses Cruz sent
a letter to SSS informing the latter that his clients are up to date in their payment of the
monthly amortization and the SSS should discontinued the publication of the notices of
foreclosure. This request remain unheaded, this spouses Cruz filed an action for damages
against SSS before RTC in Rizal. SSS invoking its immunity from suit being an agency of the
government performing government function. The trial court and court of appeal
nevertheless awarded damages in favor of spouses Cruz which was affirmed by court of
appeal, Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not SSS is immune from suit.
HELD:
Negative.. The SSS has a distinct legal personality and it can be sued for damages.
The SSS does not enjoy immunity from suit by express statutory consent.
It has corporated power separate and distinct from the government. SSS own
organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in court. These words “sue and
be sued” embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that even assuming that the
SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental function,
by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the government must be
deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby
concede its liability that statutory law has given to the private citizen a remedy for the
enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit to
the jurisdiction of the court; subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
9. Rayo v. CFI of Bulacan 110 SCRA 460
FACTS: On October 26, 1978, typhoon “Kading” struck Bulacan. Due to this, the National
Power Corporation (NPC), through its plant superintendent Benjamin Chavez, simultaneously
opened 3 floodgates of Angat Dam.
The opening of the floodgates caused several towns to be inundated (the town of
Norzagaray was the most affected one). It resulted to a hundred deaths and damage to
properties that were worth over a million pesos.
Petitioners (victims) filed a complaint for damages against NPC, including plant
superintendent Benjamin Chavez.
Respondent filed counterclaims and put up a special and affirmative defense that “in the
operation of the Angat Dam,” it is “performing a purely governmental function”, hence it
“cannot be sued without the express consent of the State.”
Petitioners oppose the defense, contending that the NPC is not performing governmental
but merely proprietary functions and that under its own organic act, Section 3 (d) of
Republic Act No. 6395, it can sue and be sued in any court.
CFI dropped the NPC from the complaint and left Chavez as the sole party-defendant.
CFI RULING: Upon a motion for reconsideration, the CFI ruled that petitioners’ reliance on
Sec. 3 of RA 6395 is not tenable since the same refer to such matters that are only within
the scope of the other corporate powers of said defendant and not matters of tort as in the
instant cases.
Being an agency performing a purely governmental function in the operation of the Angat
Dam, said defendant was not given any right to commit wrongs upon individuals. To sue
said defendant for tort may require the express consent of the State. PETITION DISMISSED.
ISSUES:
Whether respondent National Power Corporation performs a governmental function with
respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam; and
Whether the power of respondent National Power Corporation to sue and be sued under its
organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort.
HELD: SC reversed the CFI decision and GRANTED petitioners to reinstate their complaint
against the NPC.
It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money in
it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A. No. 6395). As a
government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and
separate from that of the Government. Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can
“sue and be sued in any court” is without qualification on the cause of action and
accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners.
10. Malong v. PNR 185 SCRA 63
Facts
·
The Petitioners, Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977
their son, Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while
it was between Tarlac City and Capas. The said train was overloaded with passengers and
baggage in view of the proximity of All Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR
be ordered to pay them damages totalling P136,370.
·
The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that it had no jurisdiction because the
PNR, being a government instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State.
·
The petitioners appealed to SC pursuant to RA No. 5440.
Issue
·
W/N the PNR is immune from suit? NO.
o Although the PNR is a government instrumentality under Republic Act No. 4156, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, it was held that the
State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different
from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from
suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on
common carriers.
o However, as held in precedents, the correct rule is that "not all government entities,
whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is
determined by the character of the” objectives “for which the entity was organized.”
o The Manila Hotel case also relied on the following rulings: “By engaging in a particular
business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac
vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law
governing private corporations.”
Held
The order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings, costs against the Philippine National Railways.
It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees
could not sue the PNR for damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to
the obligations of persons engaged in that private enterprise. It is not performing any
governmental function.
Jesus P. Disini v. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et. al., June 22, 2010
FACTS: On 16 February 1989, the Republic of the Philippines and Disini entered into an
Immunity Agreement under which Disini undertook to testify for the Republic and provide its
lawyers with the information, affidavits, and documents they needed in its case against
Westinghouse Electric Corporation before the United States District Court of New Jersey and
in the arbitration case that Westinghouse International Projects Company and others filed
against the Republic before the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration.
Disini worked for his second cousin, Herminio, as an executive in the latter's companies from
1971 to 1984.
The Republic believed that the Westinghouse contract for the construction of the Bataan
Nuclear Power Plant, brokered by one of Herminios companies, had been attended by
anomalies. In the Immunity Agreement, the Republic guaranteed that, apart from the two
Westinghouse cases, it would not compel Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign
proceeding brought by the Republic against Herminio. Disini complied with his undertaking
but 18 years later, upon the Republic's application, the Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena
against Disini, commanding him to testify and produce documents before that court in an
action that the Republic filed against Herminio.
Disini moved to quash the subpoena, invoking the Immunity Agreement.
The Sandiganbayan ignored the motion and issued a new subpoena directing him to testify
before it. Subsequently, the PCGG revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement insofar as
it prohibited the Republic from requiring Disini to testify against Herminio. Later on, the
Sandiganbayan denied Disinis motion to quash the subpoena. Disini, thus, brought the
matter to the Supreme Court. The Republic maintained that the PCGGs power to grant
immunity under Section 5 of Executive Order 14 covered only immunity from civil or criminal
prosecution and did not cover immunity from providing evidence in court.
The Republic argued that Disini's immunity from testifying against Herminio contravened the
state's policy to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired under the regime of former President
Marcos. The Republic further argued that under the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the
Immunity Agreement which reads: Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. Disini's obligation to
provide truthful information or testimony, Disini, despite the immunity given him against
being compelled to testify in other cases, was to provide truthful information or testimony in
such other cases.
For his part, Disini argued that the Republic, through the PCGG, was estopped from revoking
the questioned immunity as it had made him believe that it had the authority to provide
such guarantee. The Republic countered by invoking Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution which provides that (t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully
acquired by public officials or employees from them or from their nominees, or transferees,
shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.
ISSUE: Did the PCGG act within its authority when it revoked and nullified the Immunity
Agreement?
HELD: No. PCGG needs to fulfill its obligations honorably as Disini did. More than anyone,
the government should be fair. The language of Section 5, Executive Order 14 affords
latitude to the PCGG in determining the extent of the criminal immunity it may grant. It has
discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending on the situation of the
witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even
agree, as in this case, to conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to induce
cooperation. Trusting in the Government's honesty and fidelity, Disini agreed and fulfilled his
part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the essence of due process,
should hold the Republic on to its promise.
11. Dept. of Agriculture v. NLRC 227 SCRA 693
Facts: The case is regarding money claims filed by employees of a secuity agency against
the Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed and requested by National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
Department of Agriculture (Petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract
for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to
their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various
premises of the DA.
Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of
13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime
pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the
security agency for the payment of money claims (aggregating 266,483.91PHP) of the
complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision.
Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution
to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security
agency. Forthwith, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.
A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of
injunction was filed by the petitioner with the NLRC, alleging that the writ issued was
effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and
that, therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void and all actions pursuant
thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The petitioner also pointed
out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's
governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good.
The petitioner alleges that the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the
writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money
claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded
the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived
its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State is applicable on this case.
Rulings: No. The rule of non-suability of the State is not absolute and it does not say that
the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The
general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the
Philippine government “consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action
between private parties.”
Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law.
Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation,
thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract.
 In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the
other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.
This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without
qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its
non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise
of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.
In this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a
governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But, be that as it may, the claims of the
complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims.
Discussion:
ACT NO. 3083 - AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED
Section 1. Complaint against Government. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the
Government of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, expressed or implied, which could
serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.
xxx
Sec. 5. When the Government of the Philippine Island is plaintiff in an action instituted in
any court of original jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right to assert therein, by way
of set-off or counterclaim in a similar action between private parties.
Sec. 7. Execution. No execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any court
against the Government of the Philippine Islands under the provisions of this Act; but a copy
thereof duly certified by the clerk of the Court in which judgment is rendered shall be
transmitted by such clerk to the Governor-General (President of the PH), within five days
after the same becomes final.
Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be “sued upon any moneyed claim involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied. However, the money claim should first be
brought to the Commission on Audit. Act 3083 stands as the general law waiving the State’s
immunity from suit, subject to its general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that ‘no
execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of
the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing
money claims against the Government must be strictly observed.
Effect of Consent
When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to
unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it
does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has
a liability.
“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The writ of execution directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture
is nullified, and the public respondents are hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing
and implementing any and all writs of execution issued pursuant to the decision rendered by
the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner.”
Suit Against Public Officers
12. VMPSI v. CA, 214 SCRA 286
Facts:
The constitutionality of the following provisions of R.A. 5487(otherwise
known as the “Private Security Agency Law”), as amended, is questioned by VMPSI in its
complaint:
SEC. 4. Who may Organize a Security or Watchman Agency. - Any Filipino citizen
or a corporation, partnership, or association, with a minimum capital of five
thousand pesos, one hundred per cent of which is owned and controlled by
Filipino citizens may organize a security or watchman agency: Provided, That no
person shall organize or have aninterest in, more than one such agency except
those which are alreadyexisting at the promulgation of this Decree: x x x.” (As
amended by P.D. Nos. 11 and 100.)
SEC. 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine Constabulary. -The Chief
the Philippine Constabulary, in consultation with thePhilippine Association
Detective and Protective Agency Operators,Inc. and subject to the provision
existing laws, is hereby authorized to issue the rules and regulations necessary
carry out the purpose of this Act.”
of
of
of
to
VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of the
1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint
of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and
Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an
interest in more than one security agency.
Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of
the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security
Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC
Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that “all private
security agencies/company security forces must register as members of any PADPAO
Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are located...”. As such
membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal
and constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in
restraint of trade.
On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC
Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of
security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of
Metro Manila.
On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing
VMPSI of cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services
rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said
customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of
Agreement dated May 12, 1986.
PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee
on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of
its license to operate a security agency (Annex D, Petition).
The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of
VMPSI’s license.
As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI
when it requested one.
VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10, 1988, requesting him to set aside or disregard
the findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of its license, even
without a certificate of membership from PADPAO
Issue:
Whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a
suit against the State without its consent
Held:
Yes. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of
the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that,
being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental
function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or
security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be
sued without the Government’s consent, especially in this case because VMPSI’s
complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but
worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum of
P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorney’s
fees from said public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its
monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not consent to appropriate
the necessary funds for that purpose.
While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state
for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if
the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state
itself although it has not been formally impleaded.
A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he
acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the
acts for which the PC Chief and PC¬-SUSIA are being called to account in this case,
were performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence,
or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities.
The correct test for the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract
by the State but the legal nature of the act.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level
of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
when it enters into a business contract. It does not apply where the contract relates to
the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and
PADPAO was intended. to professionalize the industry and to standardize the salaries of
security guards as well as the current rates of security services, clearly, a governmental
function. The execution of the said agreement is incidental to the purpose of R.A.5487,
as amended, which is to regulate the organization and operation of private detective,
watchmen or security guard agencies
13. Larkins v. NLRC 241 SCRA 598
Facts: Private respondents filed a complaint with the regional arbitration of the NLRC against
Lt Col. Frankhauser for illegal dismissal and under payment of wages.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non suability applies?
Held: Yes. Private respondents were dismissed by Lt Col. Frankhauser acting for and in
behalf of the US Government.
14. Shauf v. CA 191 SCRA 713
Facts:
Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air
Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at
Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified.
By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment
opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer)
and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her
nationality and sex.
Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a
180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected
to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be
selected to fill a future vacancy if she’s available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time,
Mrs. Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateo’s appointment was
extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateo’s
stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint
that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of
the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation.
Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service
Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc.
RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages +
20% of such amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages.
Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be
collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that
they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their
official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They
claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the
exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to
exhaust all administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC
decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.
Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a
suit against the US government which would require consent.
Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing
suits against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only
in the Philippines & is not part of international law.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed
Forces
Held:
No they are not immune.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby
ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.
Ratio:
They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary
citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is
removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises
where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.
It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad
faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen Inasmuch as the State authorizes
only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not
acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have
been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against
the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been
said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State
department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades
the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent."The rationale for
this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any arbitrary, irregular or
abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial judge in ruling that private respondents
committed acts of discrimination for which they should be held personally liable.
There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf was
refused appointment as Guidance Counselor by the defendants on account of her sex, color
and origin.
She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Santo Tomas, Manila, in 1971
and has completed 34 semester hours in psychology?guidance and 25 quarter hours in
human behavioral science. She has also completed all course work in human behavior and
counselling psychology for a doctoral degree. She is a civil service eligible. More important,
she had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9 level for
approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976.
In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant Persi did not even consider
the application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but referred the vacancy to CORRO which
appointed Edward B. Isakson who was not eligible to the position.
Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall afford full
protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from
Article II, Section 9, of the 1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless
of sex, race, or creed..
There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing the acts
complained of have, in effect, violated the basic constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q.
Shauf to earn a living which is very much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this,
they should be held accountable
Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself of her remedy
under the United States federal legislation on equality of opportunity for civilian employees,
which is allegedly exclusive of any other remedy under American law, let alone remedies
before a foreign court and under a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines.
SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is entitled as a matter of
plain and simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise proscribed, which will best
advance and protect her interests. There is, thus, nothing to enjoin her from seeking
redress in Philippine courts which should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and
inconclusive representations of private respondents on that score.
15. Republic v. Hon. Edilberto Sandoval 220 SCRA 124
Facts: Farmer-rallyists(KMP), led by its national president, Jaime Tadeo, presented their
problems and demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free to farmers; (b)
zero
retention of lands by landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of land payments;
There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists
and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the
Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most
significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and
wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such
recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action
for damages against the Republic and the military/police officers involved in the
incident.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages
Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the
petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State.
AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and, therefore,
whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves asthe basis for a cause of
action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of
the Commission does not in any way bind the State.
The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were
responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope
of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong.
The military and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held
personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence,the acts cannot
be considered official.
Consent to be Sued
Express Consent
22. CA 327 as amended by PD 1445
23. Act No. 3083
24. Article IX, 1987 Constitution
25. Article 2180, Civil Code of the Philippines
26. Department of Agriculture v. NLRC 227 SCRA 693
Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a
contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity.
Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the
various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment
of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay,
holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security
agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the
security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The
DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and
executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment
against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on
execution the motor vehicles of the DA.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case
Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that “the State may not be sued
without its consent” reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the
State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the
jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt
from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any
circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The State’s consent may be given expressly
or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. Implied
consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the
government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to
have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.
But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign
function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a
governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
fact, performed any act proprietary in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute
money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed
claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to
Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to
the Commission on Audit.
27. Meritt v. Govt. of the Phil. Islands 34 PHIL 311
FACTS:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a
motorcycle, when an ambulance of the General Hospital struck the plaintiff in an
intersection. By reason of the resulting collusion, the plaintiff was so severely injured
that, according to Dr. Saleeby, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal
region, a wound in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued
from his nose and he was entirely unconscious. The marks revealed that he had one or
more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain had suffered material
injury.
Upon recovery the doctor noticed that the plaintiff’s leg showed a contraction of an inch
and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the
fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of
the brain and nerves. The damages that the plaintiff got from the collision disabled him
to do this work as a contractor and forced him to give up contracts he recently had.
As the negligence which cause the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee
of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable
for the damages resulting therefrom. The Philippine Legislature made an Act (Act No.
2457) that authorizes the plaintiff to bring suit against the GPI and authorizing the
Attorney- General to appear in said suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government is legally-liable for the damages incurred by the
plaintiff.
RULING:
No, the Government is not legally-liable for the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
It being quiet clear that Act. No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government’s
liability to any cause not previously recognized.
That according to paragraph 5 of Article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid
down in a decision, among others, of the May 18, 1904, in a damage case, the
responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent,
duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with
some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on
acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or
technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by
the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in
sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the
second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of
Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (GPI) is only liable, according to the above
quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and
employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of Article
1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not
such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs
in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the
amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the
negligent acts of one of its employees, be legislative enactment and by appropriating
sufficient funds therefore, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely
with the Legislature and not with the courts.
28. Republic v. Purisima 78 SCRA 470
FACTS: The jurisdictional issues raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding arose from the
failure of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila to
apply the well-known and of-reiterated doctrine of the non-suability of a State, including its
offices and agencies, from suit without its consent. It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss
filed by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of
respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of
contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.
ISSUE: Can an agreement between the Rice and Corn Administration and Yellow Ball Freight
Lines, Inc. operate as a waiver of the national government from suit?
HELD: NO.
The consent to be sued, to be effective must come from the State thru a statute, not
through any agreement made by counsel for the Rice and Corn Administration.Apparently
respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract between the private respondent,
plaintiff in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn Administration which, according to him,
anticipated the case of a breach of contract within the parties and the suits that may
thereafter arise. The consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting
through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever
counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the
government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority.
Implied Consent
29. U.S. v. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487
Facts:
At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic,
Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States.
US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages.
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with
the requests based on the letters received from the US.
In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the
company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous
unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings
of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.
The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I.
Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The
complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the
projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the
defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third
parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the
jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of
defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual
defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has
not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the
complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the
motion.
The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to
reconsider but to no avail.
Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case
No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
Issue/s:
WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be
able to invoke state immunity
Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set
aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
Ratio:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law
are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of
states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign
& governmental acts)
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out
of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it
enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise
of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base
which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a
function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a
State but the legal nature of the act
30. Malong v. PNR 138 SCRA 63
Facts
·
The Petitioners, Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977
their son, Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while
it was between Tarlac City and Capas. The said train was overloaded with passengers and
baggage in view of the proximity of All Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR
be ordered to pay them damages totalling P136,370.
·
The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that it had no jurisdiction because the
PNR, being a government instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State.
·
The petitioners appealed to SC pursuant to RA No. 5440.
Issue
·
W/N the PNR is immune from suit?
NO.
o Although the PNR is a government instrumentality under Republic Act No. 4156, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, it was held that the
State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different
from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from
suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on
common carriers.
o However, as held in precedents, the correct rule is that "not all government entities,
whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is
determined by the character of the” objectives “for which the entity was organized.”
o The Manila Hotel case also relied on the following rulings: “By engaging in a particular
business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac
vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law
governing private corporations.”
Held
The order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings, costs against the Philippine National Railways.
It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees
could not sue the PNR for damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to
the obligations of persons engaged in that private enterprise. It is not performing any
governmental function.
Notes
·
Abad Santos, J., concurring:
o The claim that Philippine National Railways is immune from suit because it is an
instrumentality of the government is so outlandish that it deserves slight consideration.
o He mentioned the Central Bank of the Philippines as an example of government
instrumentality that is not immune from suit for it also performs proprietary functions.
o He also contended the use of the immunity from suit on the part of the government
corporations to deny justice that is due to the people they are to serve.
31. Department of Health vs. Phils. Pharmawealth Inc., Feb. 20, 2013
Facts: Defense of state immunity does not apply where the public official is charged in his
official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of
others neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official
capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been
committed while he occupied a public position. Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr.
issued an Administrative Order providing for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug
suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner
Department of Health (DOH). Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (Pharmawealth)
submitted to DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug
products, including the antibiotic ―Penicillin G Benzathine. Petitioner DOH issued an
Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine.
Despite the lack of response from DOH regarding Pharmawealth‘s request for inclusion
of additional items in its list of accredited products, the latter submitted its bid for the
Penicillin G Benzathine contract and gave the lowest bid thereof. . In view, however, of the
non- accreditation of respondent‘s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was
awarded to Cathay/YSS Laboratories‘ (YSS). Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for
injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial praying,
inter alia, that the trial court ―nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to
YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct petitioners DOH et al. to declare Pharmawealth as the
lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that they
accordingly award the same to plaintiff company‖ and ―adjudge defendants Romualdez,
Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to plaintiff. Petitioners DOH et al. subsequently
filed a motion to dismiss praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of
state immunity. The trial court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals
(CA) denied DOH‘s petition for review which affirmed the order issued Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City denying petitioners‘ motion to dismiss the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the charge against the public officers acting in their official capacity will
prosper.
HELD:
The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting
within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of
official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In its
complaint, DOH sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their
official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse
of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the
official concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in
an appropriate suit. As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not
avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of
action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule
58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a court,
agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in
causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State.
Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for
acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it
apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his
personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he
occupied a public position. In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal
capacities for damages in connection with their alleged act of ―illegally abusing their official
positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine
contract [which act was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth
of their powers given by law is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For
an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of
sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally
32. JUSMAG Phil. V. NLRC 239 SCRA 224
FACTS:

Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) assails the January 29, 1993
Resolution of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (public respondent),
in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-03-02092-92, reversing the July 30, 1991 Order of the
Labor Arbiter, and ordering the latter to assume jurisdiction over the complaint for
illegal dismissal filed by FLORENCIO SACRAMENTO (private respondent) against
petitioner.

Private respondent was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance support
personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAG-Philippines. He had been with JUSMAG from
December 18, 1969, until his dismissal on April 27, 1992. When dismissed, he held
the position of Illustrator 2 and was the incumbent President of JUSMAG
PHILIPPINES-FILIPINO CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (JPFCEA), a labor
organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. His
services were terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position. He was also
advised that he was under administrative leave until April 27, 1992, although the
same was not charged against his leave.

On March 31, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint with the Department of
Labor and Employment on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed
from service by JUSMAG. He asked for his reinstatement. JUSMAG then filed a
Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of the United States.
It further alleged lack of employer-employee relationship and that it has no juridical
personality to sue and be sued.
ISSUE:
Whether JUSMAG was immune from suit as an agency of the United States.
RATIO:



YES, from the foregoing, it is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of
private respondent, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the
United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947.
Hence, we agree with petitioner that the suit is, in effect, one against the United
States Government, albeit it was not impleaded in the complaint. Considering that
the United States has not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against
JUSMAG cannot prosper.
In this jurisdiction, we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. Immunity of State from suit is one of
these universally recognized principles. In international law, “immunity” is commonly
understood as the exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction
of another state. This is anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states
under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the
maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal)
The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone further metamorphosis. The
view evolved that the existence of a contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign
states may, at all times, be sued in local courts. The complexity of relationships
between sovereign states, brought about by their increasing commercial activities,
mothered a more restrictive application of the doctrine. Thus, in United States of
America vs. Ruiz, we clarified that our pronouncement in Harry Lyons, supra, with
respect to the waiver of State immunity, was obiter and “has no value as an
imperative authority.” As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity
from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii).
The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
33. Santiago v. Republic 87 SCRA 284
Facts: On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his counsel filed an action for
revocation of a Deed of Donation executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971,
with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the Donee, in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga City. Mr. Santiago alleged that the Bureau, contrary to the terms of
donation, failed to install lighting facilities and water system on the property and to build
an office building and parking lot thereon which should have been constructed and ready
for occupancy on before December7, 1974. That because of the circumstances, Mr.
Santiago concluded that he was exempt from compliance with an explicit constitutional
command, as invoked in the Santos v Santos case, a 1952 decision which is similar.
The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in favor of the respondent on the
ground that the state cannot be sued without its consent, and Santos v Santos case is
discernible. The Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza affirmed the dismissal on ground
of constitutional mandate. Ildefonso Santiago filed a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.
Held: The Supreme Court rules, that the constitutional provision shows a waiver. Where
there is consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not to be express. It can be implied.
In this case it must be emphasized, goes no further than a rule that a donor, with the
Republic or any of its agency being a Donee, is entitle to go to court in case of an
alleged breach of the conditions of such donation.
The writ of Certiorari prayed is granted and the order of dismissal of October 20, 1977
is nullified, set aside and declare to be without force and effect. The Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II, is hereby directed to proceed with this case,
observing the procedure set forth in the rules of court. No cost.
34. Froilan v. Oriental Pan Shipping, September 30, 1950
FACTS
After Fernando Froilan’s, plaintiff, failure of payment for the remaining balance, interest
incurred and insurance premiums of the said vessel (MV/FS 197), the contract made was
rescinded by the Shipping Administration (SA). Upon repossession of the said vessel,
Shipping Administration approved a charter contract to Pan Oriental Shipping (POS),
defendant. Upon receiving the vessel, Pan Oriental Shipping had it repaired and had paid
the stipulated initial payment. On the contract, Shipping Administration gave Pan
Oriental option to purchase the boat.
Upon the reconsideration submitted by Froilan, the Cabinet resolved to restore Froilan to
his rights under the original sale with conditions that he shall pay a sum of money upon
delivery of the vessel to him, that he shall continue paying the remaining installments
due, and that he shall assume the expenses incurred for the repair and by docking of the
vessel.
This decision was then protested by Pan Shipping Oriental saying that the said vessel
was delivered to it by the Shipping Administration thus Shipping Administration must be
the one to dispose of said authority to the property and that Froilan has already given up
his rights to the said vessel upon failure to comply. When Froilan paid and Pan Oriental
refused to surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an action for in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful
owner of said property.
ISSUE
Whether Pan Oriental or Froilan had the right to the vessel.
Whether or not the government’s motion to dismissPan Oriental counterclaims may prosper.
HELD:
In the circumstances of this case, neither Froilan nor the Pan Oriental holds a valid contract
over the vessel. However, since the Shipping Administration, representing the government
ratified its proposed contract with Froilan by receiving the full consideration of the sale to
the latter and since Pan Oriental has no capacity to question the Shipping Administration of
the actuation made, the decision of the lower court adjudicating the vessel to FroiIan and its
successor Compañia Maritima, must be sustained.
As considered in the case, Pan Oriental cannot be considered a possessor in bad faith until
after the institution of the instant case. However, since it is not disputed that said appellant
made useful and necessary expenses on the vessel, appellant is entitled to the refund of
such expenses with the right to retain the vessel until he has been reimbursed therefore. As
it is by the concerted acts of defendants and intervenor Republic of the Philippines that
appellant was deprived of the possession of the vessel over which appellant had a lien for
his expenses, appellees Froilan, Compañia Maritima, and the Republic of the Philippines3are
declared liable for the reimbursement to appellant of its legitimate expenses, as allowed by
law, with legal interest from the time of disbursement.
Scope of Consent
35. Rizal Commercial Bank v. De Castro, 168 SCRA 49
Facts: Badoc Planters, Inc. filed an action for recovery of unpaid tobacco deliveries against
PVTA. Hon. Lourdes P. San Diego, then Presiding Judge, ordering the defendants therein to
pay jointly and severally, the plaintiff Badoc Planters, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
“BADOC”) within 48 hours the aggregate amount of P206,916.76, with legal interests
thereon. Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court on the very same day, issued a Writ of
Execution addressed to Special Sheriff Faustino Rigor, who then issued a Notice of
Garnishment addressed to the General Manager and/or Cashier of Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as RCBC). However, PVTA filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. The Judge set aside the Orders of Execution and of Payment and the Writ
of Execution and ordering petitioner and BADOC “to restore, jointly and severally, the
account of PVTA with the said bank in the same condition and state it was before.
Issues:
1) Whether or not PVTA funds are public funds not subject to garnishment;
2) Whether or not the respondent Judge correctly ordered the herein petitioner to reimburse
the amount paid to the Special Sheriff by virtue of the execution issued pursuant to the
Order/Partial Judgment dated January 15, 1970.
1) Whether or not PVTA funds are public funds not subject to garnishment;
Republic Act No. 2265 created the PVTA as an ordinary corporation with all the attributes of
a corporate entity subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law. Hence, it possesses the
power “to sue and be sued” and “to acquire and hold such assets and incur such liabilities
resulting directly from operations authorized by the provisions of this Act or as essential to
the proper conduct of such operations.” Among the specific powers vested in the PVTA are:
1) to buy Virginia tobacco grown in the Philippines for resale to local bona fide tobacco
manufacturers and leaf tobacco dealers [Section 4(b), R.A. No. 2265]; 2) to contracts of any
kind as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of its purpose with any person,
firm or corporation, with the Government of the Philippines or with any foreign government,
subject to existing laws [Section 4(h), R.A. No. 22651; and 3) generally, to exercise all the
powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act [Section 4(k), R.A. No. 2265.]
From the foregoing, it is clear that PVTA has been endowed with a personality distinct and
separate from the government which owns and controls it. Accordingly, this Court has
heretofore declared that the funds of the PVTA can be garnished since “funds of public
corporation which can sue and be sued were not exempt from garnishment. Inasmuch as
the Tobacco Fund, a special fund, was by law, earmarked specifically to answer obligations
incurred by PVTA in connection with its proprietary and commercial operations authorized
under the law, it follows that said funds may be proceeded against by ordinary judicial
processes such as execution and garnishment. Garnishment is considered as a specie of
attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a
stranger to the litigation. Under the above-cited rule, the garnishee [the third person] is
obliged to deliver the credits, etc. to the proper officer issuing the writ and “the law exempts
from liability the person having in his possession or under his control any credits or other
personal property belonging to the defendant, …, if such property be delivered or
transferred, …, to the clerk, sheriff, or other officer of the court in which the action is
pending.
2) Whether or not the respondent Judge correctly ordered the herein petitioner to reimburse
the amount paid to the Special Sheriff
No. The bank was in no position to question the legality of the garnishment since it was not
even a party to the case. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, it had neither the
personality nor the interest to assail or controvert the orders of respondent Judge. It had no
choice but to obey the same inasmuch as it had no standing at all to impugn the validity of
the partial judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff or of the processes issued in execution
of such judgment. RCBC cannot therefore be compelled to make restitution solidarily with
the plaintiff BADOC. Plaintiff BADOC alone was responsible for the issuance of the Writ of
Execution and Order of Payment and so, the plaintiff alone should bear the consequences of
a subsequent annulment of such court orders; hence, only the plaintiff can be ordered to
restore the account of the PVTA.
36. Mun. of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez 130 SCRA 556
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D. Vda. De Imperio, et al. v. Municipal
Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, et al." dated April 28, 1978, under presiding Judge
Oscar C. Fernandez, rendered judgement in favour of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant Municipal Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, represented by Mayor Mar Marcelo
G. Aure and its Municipal Treasurer. The court ordered the defendant municipality to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of Php64,440.00 corresponding to the rentals collected from the tenants
from 1970 up to and including 1975 plus interest thereon at the legal rate from January
1970 until fully paid. In addition to this, the defendant municipality must pay the plaintiffs
the sum of Php3,000.00 for attorney's fees and to pay the cost of suit. Thereafter, the
private respondents moved for issuance of the writ of execution for the satisfaction of the
said judgement, however, petitioner, on July 30, 1982, filed a Motion to Quash the writ of
execution on the ground that the municipality's property or funds are all public funds
exempt from execution. The said Motion was then denied by the respondent judge in an
order dated August 23, 1982 and the writ of execution still stands in full force and effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the funds of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan, in the possession of
the provincial and municipal treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively, are public
funds which are exempt from execution for the satisfaction of the money judgement in Civil
Case No. 604-B.
HELD:
Yes, all the funds of the municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San
Miguel and of Bulacan, are public funds which are exempt from execution as stated under
Presidential Decree No. 477, "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration", Section 2,
paragraph (a): No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful
appropriation or other specific statutory authority. Furthermore, there must be an ordinance
duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan containing the corresponding appropriation for the
funds before any money of the municipality may be paid out.
Unlike the State which has the immunity of not being sued without its consent, A municipal
corporation is an example of an incorporated agency which has a charter of its own that
grants them the competence to sue and be sued. However, municipal government is
generally not liable for torts committed during the discharge of its governmental functions.
It can be held liable only if it has been proven that they were acting in a proprietary
function. Failing to do this, the claimant cannot recover.
37. Mun. of Makati v. CA 190 SCRA 206
Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondent
Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After hearing, the RTC fixed the appraised value
of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordered petitioner to pay this amount minus the
advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private respondent. It then
issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds
of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution,
for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper
appropriation required under the law. The RTC denied the motion. CA affirmed; hence,
petitioner filed a petition for review before the SC.
Issue:
1. Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt from garnishment and levy upon
execution?
2. If so, what then is the remedy of the private respondents?
Held:
1. Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy
and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the properties of
a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be
attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality.
Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended
primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and
functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the
municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an
amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision, no levy under execution
may
be
validly
effected
on
the
public
funds
of
petitioner.
2. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal
recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment
of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy
of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation
ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor.
For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject property
notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just
compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession of the property since the same
has been the site of Makati West High School since the school year 1986-1987. This Court
will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from
expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. The State's power of eminent domain
should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice. (Municipality of Makati vs.
CA, G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 1, 1990)
38. NIA v. CA 214 SCRA 35
Does the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) have jurisdiction over
construction contracts entered into between parties before the creation of said Commission
in 1985? When a construction contract contains an arbitration clause, is it still necessary for
the parties thereto to agree to submit disputes arising therefrom specifically to the CIAC for
the latter to acquire jurisdiction?
FACTS: In a competitive bidding held by Petitioner NIA, Hydro Resources Contractors
Corporation (HYDRO) was awarded Contract for the construction of the main civil works of
the Magat River Multi-Purpose Project. The contract provided that Respondent HYDRO
would be paid partly in Philippine pesos and partly in U.S. dollars. Respondent HYDRO
substantially completed the works under the contract in 1982 and final acceptance by
Petitioner NIA was made in 1984. Respondent HYDRO thereafter determined that it still had
an account receivable from Petitioner NIA representing the dollar rate differential of the
price escalation for the contract. After unsuccessfully pursuing its case with Petitioner NIA,
Respondent HYDRO filed with the CIAC a Request for Adjudication of the aforesaid claim.
Petitioner NIA filed its Answer wherein it questioned the jurisdiction of the CIAC alleging lack
of cause of action, laches and estoppel in view of Respondent HYDRO’s alleged failure to
avail of its right to submit the dispute to arbitration within the prescribed period as provided
in the contract. Later, Petitioner NIA filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction
over the disputes. The arbitral body constituted by both parties issued an order which
deferred the determination of the Motion to Dismiss and resolved to proceed with the
hearing of the case on the merits as the grounds cited by Petitioner NIA did not seem to be
“indubitable.” Petitioner NIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order. CIAC
in denying the Motion for Reconsideration ruled that it has jurisdiction over the Respondent
HYDRO’s claim over Petitioner NIA pursuant to E.O 1008 and that the hearing should
proceed as scheduled. CIAC then rendered a decision in the main case in favor of
Respondent HYDRO. Petitioner NIA filed with the CA an Original Action of Certiorari and
Prohibition with prayer for Restraining Order and/or Injunction which dismissed the same.
Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not CIAC has jurisdiction to hear and try the dispute between the
parties? ARGUMENTS: Petitioner NIA alleged that CIAC has no jurisdiction to hear and try
the dispute between the parties as EO No. 1008 had no retroactive effect. It contended that
there was no agreement with Respondent HYDRO to submit the dispute to CIAC for
arbitration considering that the construction contract was executed in 1978 and the project
completed in 1982, whereas the Construction Industry Arbitration Law creating CIAC was
signed only in 1985; and that while they have agreed to arbitration as a mode of settlement
of disputes, they could not have contemplated submission of their disputes to CIAC.
Petitioner NIA further argued that records show that it had not voluntarily submitted itself to
arbitration by CIAC. Petitioner NIA contended that the CIAC did not acquire jurisdiction over
the dispute since it was only Respondent HYDRO that requested for arbitration. It asserts
that to acquire jurisdiction over a case, as provided under E.O. 1008, the request for
arbitration filed with CIAC should be made by both parties, and hence the request by one
party is not enough. RULING: YES. Contrary to the claim of Petitioner NIA, the CIAC has
jurisdiction over the controversy. The instant Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATIO DECIDENDI: EO No. 1008, otherwise known as the “Construction Industry Arbitration
Law” which was promulgated on 4 February 1985, vests upon CIAC original and exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with contracts entered into by parties
involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the
completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. The disputes may
involve government or private contracts. For the Board to acquire jurisdiction, the parties to
a dispute must agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration. The complaint of
Respondent HYDRO against Petitioner NIA on the basis of the contract executed between
them was filed on 7 December 1994, during the effectivity of E.O. No. 1008. Hence, it is well
within the jurisdiction of CIAC. The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in force
at the time of the commencement of the action. Petitioner NIA’s argument that CIAC had no
jurisdiction to arbitrate on contract which preceded its existence is untenable. E.O. 1008 is
clear that the CIAC has jurisdiction over all disputes arising from or connected with
construction contract whether the dispute arises BEFORE or AFTER the completion of the
contract. Thus, the date the parties entered into a contract and the date of completion of
the same, even if these occurred before the constitution of the CIAC, did not automatically
divest the CIAC of jurisdiction as long as the dispute submitted for arbitration arose after the
constitution of the CIAC. Stated differently, the jurisdiction of CIAC is over the dispute, not
the contract; and the instant dispute having arisen when CIAC was already constituted, the
arbitral board was actually exercising current, not retroactive, jurisdiction. It is undisputed
that the contracts between Respondent HYDRO and Petitioner NIA contained anarbitration
clause wherein they agreed to submit to arbitration any dispute between them that may
arise before or after the termination of the agreement. Consequently, the claim of
Respondent HYDRO having arisen from the contract is arbitrable. Petitioner NIA’s reliance
with the ruling on the case of Tesco Services Incorporated v. Vera, is misplaced. The 1988
CIAC Rules of Procedure which were applied by this Court in the Tesco case had been duly
amended by CIAC Resolutions No. 2-91 and 3-93, Section 1 of Article III of which read as
follows: Submission to CIAC Jurisdiction — An arbitration clause in a construction contract or
a submission to arbitration of a construction contract or a submission to arbitration of a
construction dispute shall be deemed an agreement to submit an existing or future
controversy to CIAC jurisdiction, notwithstanding the reference to a different arbitration
institution or arbitral body in such contract or submission. When a contract contains a clause
for the submission of a future controversy to arbitration, it is not necessary for the parties to
enter into a submission agreement before the claimant may invoke the jurisdiction of CIAC.
Under the present Rules of Procedure, for a particular construction contract to fall within the
jurisdiction of CIAC, it is merely required that the parties agree to submit the same to
voluntary arbitration. Unlike in the original version of Section 1, as applied in the Tesco case,
the law as it now stands does not provide that the parties should agree to submit disputes
arising from their agreement specifically to the CIAC for the latter to acquire jurisdiction over
the same. Rather, it is plain and clear that as long as the parties agree to submit to
voluntary arbitration, regardless of what forum they may choose, their agreement will fall
within the jurisdiction of the CIAC, such that, even if they specifically choose another forum,
the parties will not be precluded from electing to submit their dispute before the CIAC
because this right has been vested upon each party by law, i.e., E.O. No. 1008. Moreover, it
is undeniable that Petitioner NIA agreed to submit the dispute for arbitration to the CIAC.
Petitioner NIA through its counsel actively participated in the arbitration proceedings by
filing an Answer with Counterclaim, as well as its compliance wherein it nominated
arbitrators to the proposed panel, participating in the deliberations on, and the formulation
of, the Terms of Reference of the arbitration proceeding, and examining the documents
submitted by Respondent HYDRO after Petitioner NIA asked for the originals of the said
documents.
D. PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Section 1
1. Villavicencio v. Lukban, supra
Section 2
2. Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 83 PHIL 171 (1949)
3. Agustin v. Edu 88 SCRA 195 (1997)
4. Ichong v. Hernandez 101 PHIL 115 (1957)
5. Gonzales v. Hechanova 9 SCRA 230 (1963)
6. In Re: Garcia 2 SCRA 984 (1961)
Section 4
7. People v. Lagman 66 PHIL 13 (1938)
Section 6
8. Aglipay v. Ruiz 64 PHIL 201 (1937)
Section 10 & 11 –relate to Article XIII
9. Calalang v. Williams 70 PHIL 726 (1940)
10. Almeda v. Court of Appeals 78 SCRA 194 (1977)
11. Ondoy v. Ignacio 97 SCRA 611 (1980)
12. Salonga v. Farrales 165 SCRA 359 (1981)
Sections 12- relate to Article XV & Sec. 13- relate to XIV, Sec. 19
13. Meyer v. Nebraska 262 US 390
14. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925)
15. People v. Ritter 194 SCRA 690
16. Dept. of Education v. San Diego 180 SCRA 533
17. Virtuoso v. Mun. Judge 82 SCRA 191
Section 16
18. Oposa v. Factoran 224 SCRA 792 (1993)
19. LLDA v.CA 231 SCRA 292 (1994)
Section 19
20. Garcia v. Board of Investments 191 SCRA 288 (1990)
Section 21
21. Ass. of Small Landowners in the Phils. V. Sec. of the DAR 175 SCRA 343 (1989)
Section 22
22. The City Govt. of Baguio City v. Atty. Brain Masweng et. Al. Feb. 4, 2009
Section 25
23. Basco v. Pagcor 197 SCRA 52 (1991)
24. Limbonas v. Mangelin 170 SCRA 786 (1989)
Section 28
25. Legaspi v. Civil Service Commision 150 SCRA 530 (1987)
26. Valmonte v. De Villa 170 SCRA 256 (1989)
27. Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato 203 SCRA 515(1991)
28. The Province of North Cotabato v. Govt. of the R.P. Peace Panel, Oct. 18, 2008.
E. SEAPRATION OF POWERS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
In Re: Manzano 166 SCRA 246 (1988)
Angara v. Electoral Commission 63 PHIL 139
Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA 166 SCRA 533
Casibang v. Aquino 92 SCRA 642
Tanada v. Cuenco 103 PHIL 1051
Sanidad v. Comelec 73 SCRA 333
Daza v. Singson 180 SCRA 496
Abakada Guro Party List v. Hon. Cesar V. Purisima, August 14, 2008
F. DELEGATION OF POWER
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Garcia v. Executive Secretary 211 SCRA 219
People v. Vera 65 PHIL 112-125
Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA supra
Ynot v. IAC 148 SCRA 659
Tablarin v. Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730
Pelaez v. Auditor General 15 SCRA 569
Pacific Stream Laundry Inc. v. Laguna Lake Devt. Authority, Dec. 18, 2009
G. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (Article VI)
Section 1
1. R.A. No. 6735 (System of Initiative and Referendum)
Section 5
2. R.A. No. 7941 (Party-List System)
3. Tobias v. Abalos 239 SCRA 106
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as
"An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Mandaluyong.” Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the
municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.
The petitioners contend on the following:
(1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one subject-one bill"
rule provided in the Constitution by involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1) the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the
congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
(2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts
under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of
the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the
Constitution.
(3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject
municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.
(4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that “within three
years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment
of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section
Issue:
WON the RA No. 7675 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one
representative" proviso in the Constitution stating that each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Contrary to petitioners' assertion,
the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is
a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision,
Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is
not absolute with the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law."
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of
Congress to reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted,
deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress
cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.
4.
Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec October 6, 2000
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec, June 26, 2001
BANAT V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009
Sen. Benigno Aquino v. Commission on Elections, April 7, 2010
Rai Sandra Sema v. Commission on Elections, July 16, 2008
COMELEC en banc v. AKB et. al. April 2, 2013
Section 6
10. Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec 248 SCRA 300
11. Aquino v. Comelec 248 SCRA 400
12. Co v. HRET 199 SCRA 692
Section 7
13. Dimaporo v. Mitra 202 SCRA 779
Section 11
14. Jimenez v. Cabangbang 17 SCRA 876
15. People v. Jalosjos 324 SCRA 689
16. Antero Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Aug. 25, 2009
Section 13
17. Bengzon v. Drilon 208 SCRA 133, 143-145
Section 14
18. Puyat v. De Guzman 113 SCRA 31
Section 16
19. Santiago v. Guingona 298 SCRA 756
20. Osmena v. Pendatun, supra
21. Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, January 28, 1997
22. U. S. v. Pons 34 PHIL 729
23. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez 7SCRA 347
24. Arroyo v. De Venecia 277 SCRA 268
Section 17
25. Lazatin v. HRET 168 SCRA 391
26. Bondoc v. Pineda 201 SCRA 792
27. Chavez v. Comelec 211 SCRA 315
28. Pimentel v. HRET 393 SCRA 227
29. Rep. Jovito Palparan, Jr. v. HRET, Feb. 11, 2010
30. Walden F. Bello v. COMELEC, Dec. 7, 2010
Section 18
31. Daza v. Singson 180 SCRA 496
32. Coseteng v. Mitra 187 SCRA 377
33. Guingona v. Gonzales 214 SCRA 789; MR 219 SCRA 326
Section 19
34. Wigberto Tanada vs. Comelec et. al., October 22, 2013
Section 21 and 22
35. Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee 203 SCRA 767
36. Camilo Sabio et al. v. Gordon et. al, October 17, 2006
37. Senate et. al. v. Ermita et al. April 20, 2006
38. Gudani et. al. v. Lt. Gen. Senga et. al. August 15, 2006
39. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability, G. R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
40. Reghis Romero v. Sen. Jinggoy Estrada et. al, April 2, 2009
Section 24
41. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 235 SCRA 630
42. Alvarez et. al. v. Guingona et. al. 252 SCRA 695
Section 25
43. Garcia v. Mata 65 SCRA 517
44. Demetria v. Alba 148 SCRA 208
45. Philconsa v. Enriquez 235 SCRA 506
Section 26
46. Philconsa v. Gimenez 15 SCRA 479
47. Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board 151 SCRA 208
48. Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra.
49. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra.
50. Tan v. Del Rosario 237 SCRA 324
Section 27
51. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra.
52. Gonzales v. Macaraig 191 SCRA 452
53. Bengzon v. Drilon, supra.
54. Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra.
Section 28
55. Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas v. Tan 163 SCRA 371
56. Province of Abra v. Judge Hernando 107 SCRA 104
57. Abra Valley College v. Aquino 162 SCRA 106
Section 29
58. Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works 110 PHIL. 331
59. Aglipay v. Ruiz 64 PHIL 201
60. Guingona v. Carague 196 SCRA 221
61. Osmena v. Orbos 220 SCRA 703
62. Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra.
Section 30
63. First Lepanto Ceramics Inc. v. CA 237 SCRA 519
64. Diaz v. CA 238 SCRA 785
Section 32
65. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Comelec 262 SCRA 292
H. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT (Article VII)
Section 1
1. Marcos v. Manglapus 177 SCRA 668; 178 SCRA 760
2. Soliven v. Makasiar 167 SCRA 393
3. Review Center Association of the Phils. V. Eduardo Ermita, April 2, 2009
4. Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel, supra
5. Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commission of 2010/Lagman et. al. v. Exec. Sec. Ochoa,
December 7, 2010
Section 13
6. Dennis funa vs. Agra, February 19, 2013
7. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 194 SCRA 317
8. Dennis Funa v. Executive Secretary, February 11, 2010
Section 15
9. Aytona v. Castillo 4 SCRA 1
10. IN Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. M.A. Valenzuela and Hon. P.B.
Villarta as RTC Judges 298 SCRA 408
11. Arturo de Castro v. JBC and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, March 7, 2010
Section 16
12. Sarmiento v. Mison 156 SCRA 549
13. Bautista v. Salonga 172 SCRA 160
14. Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments 177 SCRA 259
15. Calderon v. Carale 208 SCRA 254
16. Tarrosa v. Singson 232 SCRA 553
17. Flores v. Drilon 223 SCRA 568
18. Luego v. Civil Service Commission 143 SCRA 327
19. Pobre v. Mendieta 224 SCRA 738
20. Arturo de Castro v. JBC and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, March 7, 2010
Section 17
21. Drilon v. Lim 235 SCRA 135
22. Villena v. Secretary of Interior 67 PHIL 451
23. Lacson-Magallanes Co. Inc., v. Pano 21 SCRA 395
24. City of Iligan v. Director of Lands 158 SCRA 158
25. Gascon v. Arroyo 178 SCRA 582
26. Kilusang Bayan v. Dominguez 205 SCRA 92
Section 18
27. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, August 15, 2000
28. Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34 150 SCRA 144
29. Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary January 14, 2004
30. Gudani et. al. v. Lt. Gen. Senga et. al. August 15, 2006
31. David et. al. v. Arroyo et. al. May 3, 2006
32. Salviar M. Kulay an et. al v. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan, et. al., G. R. No. 187298
Section 19
33. Torres v. Gonzales 152 SCRA 272
34. Monsanto v. Factoran 170 SCRA 190
35. People v. Salle Jr. 250 SCRA 581
36. Garcia v. COA 226 SCRA 356
37. Llamas v. Orbos 202 SCRA 844
38. Eduardo Kapunan v. Court of Appeals, March 13, 2009
Section 21
39. Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading 3 SCRA 351
Presidential Immunity from Suit
40. Lourdes Rubrico et. al. v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo et. al., February 18, 2010
I. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT (Article VIII)
1.
2.
3.
4.
Hacienda Luisita Inc. vs. PARC et. al., November 22, 2011
Malaga v. Penachaos Jr. 213 SCRA 516
PACU v. Secretary of Education 97 PHIL 806
Mariano Jr. v. Comelec 242 SCRA 211
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
Macasiano v. NHA 224 SCRA 236
J. Joya v. PCGG 225 SCRA 586
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra
Bankers Association of the Phils. Vs. Comelec, Nov. 26, 2013
Kilosbayan v. Guingona Jr. 232 SCRA 110
Tatad v. Garcia Jr. 243 SCRA 436
Oposa v. Factoran, supra
Kilosbayan v. Morato 246 SCRA 540
Atty. Oliver Lozano v. Speaker Propero Nograles, June 16, 2009
League of Cities of the Phils. V. Commission on Elections, Dec. 21, 2009
Venancio Inonog v. Judge Francisco Ibay, July 28, 2009
Biraogo v. Phils. Truth Commission of 2010/Lagman et. al. v. Exec. Sec. Ochoa
Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal v. Pres. Electoral Tribunal, Nov. 23, 2010
Section 3
18. Bengzon v. Drilon, supra
Section 4
19.Limketkai Sons Milling Inc. v. CA et al. September 5, 1996
Section 5
19. Drilon v. Lim 235 SCRA 135
20. Larranaga v. CA 287 SCRA 581
21. First Lepanto Ceramics Inc. v. Court of Appeals 237 SCRA 519
22. Aruelo v. CA 227 SCRA 311
23. Javellana v. DILG 212 SCRA 2475
24. Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from payment of legal
fees, A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010
Section 6
25. Maceda v. Vasquez 221 SCRA 464
26. Raquiza v. Judge Castaneda Jr. 81 SCRA 235
Section 10
27. Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 152 SCRA 284
Section 11
28. De La Llana v. Alba 112 SCRA 294
29. People v. Judge Gacott Jr. 246 SCRA 52
Section 12
30. In Re: Manzano 166 SCRA 246
Section 14
31. Nicos Industrial Corp. v. CA 206 SCRA 127
32. Komatsu Industries (Phils.) Inc. v. CA 289 SCRA 604
33. Prudential Bank v. Castro 158 SCRA 646
34. Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals 293 SCRA 26
35. Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc v. Tan Tiong Bio AKA Henry Tan, October 6, 2010
Section 16
36. Valdez v. CA 194 SCRA 360
J. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
COMMON PROVISIONS
Section 6
1. Aruelo v. CA 227 SCRA 311
2. Mamerto T. Sevilla vs. Comelec, March 19, 2013
Section 7
3. Cua v. Comelec 156 SCRA 582
4. Acena v. Civil Service Commission 193 SCRA 623
5. Vital-Gozon v. Court of Appeals 212 SCRA 235
6. Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer 135 SCRA 25
7. Mateo v. CA 247 SCRA 284
8. Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONS
Section 2
9. TUPAS v. National Housing Corporation 173 SCRA 33
10. Salazar v. Mathay 73 SCRA 285
11. Corpus v. Cuaderno 13 SCRA 591
12. Luego v. Civil Service Commission 143 SCRA 327
13. PAGCOR v. Rilloraza June 25, 2001
14. SSS Employees Association v. Court of Appeals 175 SCRA 686
15. Lopez v. Civil Service Commission 194 SCRA 269
16. University of the Phils. And Alfredo de Torres v. CSC April 3, 2001
17. Navarro v. CSC 226 SCRA 522
18. Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy April 29, 1999
19. Santos v. Yatco 106 PHIL 745
20. CSC, Anicia De Lima v. Larry M. Alfonso, June 11. 2009
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Section 1
1. Cayetano v. Monsod 201 SCRA 210
2. Brillantes v. Yorac 192 SCRA 358
3. Lindo v. Comelec 194 SCRA 25
Section 2
4. Gallardo v. Judge Tabamo 218 SCRA 253
5. Relampagos v. Cumba 243 SCRA 690
6. Edding v. Comelec 246 SCRA 502
7. Regina Ongsiako Reyes vs. Comelec, October 22, 2013
8. Jose Miguel Arroyo vs. DOJ et. al., July 23, 2013
9. Salic Dumarpa vs. Comelec, April 2, 2013
10. Marc Douglas Cagas vs. Comelec, October 25, 2013
11. Comelec v. Judge Silva et. al. 286 SCRA 177
12. Torres v. Comelec 270 SCRA 583
Section 3
13. Sarmiento v. Comelec 212 SCRA 307
14. Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro 244 SCRA 41
Section 4
15. National Press Club v. Comelec 207 SCRA 1
16. Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils. V. GMA 289 SCRA 337
17. Adiong v. Comelec 207 SCRA 712
18. Sanidad v. Comelec 181 SCRA 529
19. Social Weather Stations v. Comelec May 5, 2001
20. Mitmug v. Comelec 230 SCRA 54
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Section 2
1. Guevarra v. Gimenez 6 SCRA 813
2. Orocio v. COA 213 SCRA 109
3. Osmena v. COA 238 SCRA 463
4. Sambeli v. Province of Isabela 210 SCRA 80
5. Bustamante v. COA 216 SCRA 134
6. Saliguniba v. COA 117 SCRA 669
7. Rebecca Barbo v. Commission on Audit, October 10, 2008
Section 3
8. PAL v. COA 245 SCRA 39
9. Bagatsing v. Committee on Privitization 246 SCRA 334
K. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
PD. 1606 amended by Republic Act No. 7975 and R. A. No. 10660
Nunez v. Sandiganbayan 111 SCRA 433
Republic Act No. 6770
Garcia v. Mojica 314 SCRA 207
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan 356 SCRA 636
Francisco v. House of Representatives et. al. Nov. 10, 2003
L. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
1. Republic v. Villanueva 114 SCRA 875
2. Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome 114 SCRA 799
3. Director of Lands v. IAC 146 SCRA 509
4. Godines v. Pak Luen 120 SCRA 223
5. Phils. Ports Authority v. Mendoza 138 SCRA 632
6. The Secretary of DENR v. Mayor Jose Yap et. al October 8, 2008
7. Republic of the Philippines v. CA August 6, 2008
8. Province of North Cotabato v. The Government
9. Nicasio Alcantara v. DENR, July 31, 2008
10. Oroport Cargohandling Services Inc. v. Phividec Industrial Authority, July 28, 2008
M. ESTACS
1.
2.
3.
4.
Miriam College Foundation v. CA 348 SCRA 265
U.P. v. Civil Service Commission April 3, 2001
Guingona v. Carague 196 SCRA 221
Republic Act No. 8371
5. Separate Opinion of Chief Justice Puno in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of the DENR et.
al. December 6, 2000
N. GENERAL PROVISIONS
1.
2.
3.
4.
Republic Act No. 6975
Carpio v. Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290
Manalo v. Sistoza 312 SCRA 239
Himagan v. People 237 SCRA 538
O. AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
.
De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602 (1987)
Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774 (1967)
Imbong v. Comelec 35 SCRA 28 (1970)
Occena v. Comelec, 104 SCRA 1 (1981)
Tolentino v. Comelec 41 SCRA 702 (1971)
Sanidad v. Comelec 73 SCRA 333 (1976)
Santiago v. Comelec (G.R. 127325, March 19, 1997)
R.A. No. 6735
Gonzales v. Comelec 21 SCRA 774
Defensor-Santiago v. Comelec March 19, 1997
Lambino et. al. v. Comelec October 25, 2006
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