CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I Under JOSE EDMUND E. GUILLEN, LL.B., LL.M. (UMLS) LIST OF CASES A. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 1. De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602 (1987) 153 SCRA 602 FACTS: Alfredo De Leon was elected Barangay Captain in the elections on May 17, 1982. On February 9, 1987, petitioner received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986, but signed by OIC Governor Esguerra on February 8, 1987, designating Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores Taytay, Rizal. Petitioners pray that the memorandum is null and void in accordance with Section 3 of Barangay Election Act of 1982. Petitioner further that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC governor no longer has authority to designate successors and replace them. ISSUE: Is the dismissal order of De Leon et. Al. by respondent OIC Governor valid? HELD: The constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, the Provisional Constitution has been superseded. As such, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2 Article III of said Constitution. The Memoranda was declared to be of no legal force and the writ of prohibition enjoining respondents from proceeding with the take-over was granted. 2. Angara v. Electoral Commission 63 Phil.139 (1936) DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case. ISSUES: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, RULING: In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost against the petitioner. B. THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE 1. Bacani v. Nacoco 100 PHIL 468 (1956) FACTS: Bacani and Matoto are court stenographers both assigned in the CFI of Manila. During the pendency of another civil case (Civil Case No. 2293 entitled 'Francisco Sycip vs. NACOCO'), Alikpala, counsel for NACOCO(Nat’l Coconut Corporation) , requested the said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees. The NACOCO paid the amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. Subsequently, the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by virtue of a DOJ circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. Petitioners countered that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court while the defendants set up as a defense that the NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 hence, exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity. No, it is not. GOCCs do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry. It was given a corporate power separate and distinct from the government, as it was made subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government. There are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people. President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows: The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery. (2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children. (3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime. (4) The determination of contract rights between individuals. (5) The definition and punishment of crime. (6) The administration of justice in civil cases. (7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens. (8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.’ The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The principles deter mining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals. 2. PVTA v. CIR 65 SCRA 416 (1975) Facts: More specifically, it deals with the question of whether petitioner, the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, discharges governmental and not proprietary functions. The facts are undisputed. On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private respondents, filed with respondent Court a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure... to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. There was an answer filed by petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denying the allegations and raising the special defenses of lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.[... espondent Court issued an order sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime services from December 23, 1963 up to the date the... decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid.[9] There was a motion for reconsideration, but respondent Court en banc denied the same.[10] Hence this petition... for certiorari. Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, as had been noted, would predicate its plea for the reversal of the order complained of on the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as... it is exercising governmental functions and that it... is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444. Issues: More specifically, it deals with the question of whether petitioner, the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, discharges governmental and not proprietary functions. Ruling: The amendatory statute, Republic Act No. 4155,[14] renders even more evident its nature as a governmental agency. Its first section on the declaration of policy reads: "It is declared to be the national policy, with respect to the local Virginia Tobacco industry, to encourage the... production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and economic basis, and to create a climate conducive to local cigarette manufacture of the qualities... desired by the consuming public, blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes."[15] The objectives are set forth thus: "To attain this national policy the following objectives are hereby... adopted: 1. Financing; 2. Marketing; 3. The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) at the best obtainable prices and conditions in order that a reinvigorated Virginia... tobacco industry may be established on a sound basis; and 4. Improving the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes through blending of imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco; such importation with corresponding exportation at a ratio of one kilo of imported to four... kilos of exported Virginia tobacco, purchased by the importer-exporter from the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration."[1 "The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government... quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private... individual or group of individuals,' continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere... else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social... justice." It did cite Section 2 of the Act, but its very language leaves no doubt that "it shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private . xxx"[42] Nor are... private respondents included among the employees who are thereby barred from enjoying the statutory benefits it cited Marcelo vs. Philippine National Red Cross[43] and Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Araos. respondent Court must be sustained. denying a motion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed. 3. Govt. of the Phil. Islands v. Monte de Piedad 35 PHIL. 728 FACTS: About $400,000 were paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions for the relief of those damaged by the earthquake on June 3, 1863, in the Philippines. Upon the petition of the governing body of the respondent, the Philippine government directed its treasurer to turn over to the respondent the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each. Petitioner now brings suit to recover said amount with interest against respondents in behalf of the various petitions of the persons and heirs to whom the relief was intended. Defendant contends that the amount was given as a donation and that the court erred in stating that the Philippine Islands has subrogated the Spanish government in its rights. ISSUE: Does the government of the Philippines have authority to file a suit against the respondent? HELD: The legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature. The court further asserted that said amount was not a donation and that respondent is liable for the debt regardless of the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States. It is said that there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region, however, the circumstances present in the case are not political in nature. The great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continue in force until they are abrogated or changed by the new ruler. As such, the government has the authority to file a suit on behalf of its people by virtue of the principle of parens patriae. 4. Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh 75 PHIL 113 (1945) FACTS: The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to continue the proceedings in petitioner’s case on the ground that the proclamation, issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court during the Japanese occupation. Respondent contends that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue pending judicial proceedings and that the government established during the Japanese occupation was no de facto government. ISSUES:1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the Japanese occupation remain good and valid? 2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidate all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of said court? 3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said courts? HELD: It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government established by military forces and thus a de facto government of the second kind. Legislative, as well as judicial, acts of de facto governments, which are not of political complexion, remain valid after reoccupation. It is presumed that the proclamation of General MacArthur did not specifically refer to judicial processes thus it has not invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese regime. The existence of the courts depends upon the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction. Such laws, not political in nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty and continue in force until repealed by legislative acts. It is thus obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue proceedings in cases, not of political complexion. 5. People v. Gozo 53 SCRA 476 (1973) FACTS: Appellant Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City, which she then demolished to build another one in its place. These she did without securing the building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, as provided for in Municipal Order No. 14 Series of 1964. She was convicted by the trial court of violation of the said ordinance, which she contested by invoking due process as taught in People vs. Fajardo. Appellant Gozo maintained that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. She argued the validity of Municipal Order No. 14 or at the very least its applicability to her in view of the location of her dwelling within the naval base. ISSUE: Whether or not Municipal Order No. 14 Series of 1964 is valid and may be enforced within the naval base. HELD: Yes. First, the Court held that using the precedent in People vs. Fajardo is fruitless because this case contemplates upon defendant Fajardo who tried securing a permit from the Mayor and, when unable to, built his home nonetheless for needing it badly. The case at bar, on the other hand, shows that the appellant never bothered to comply with the ordinance. The Court reiterated that, under the terms of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States, The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. The United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. Jurisdiction of the Philippines over the military bases may be diminished but it does not disappear. These bases are under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed insofar as it found the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and modified insofar as she is required to demolish the house that is the subject matter of the case, she being given a period of thirty days from the finality of this decision within which to obtain the required permit. Only upon her failure to do so will that portion of the appealed decision requiring demolition be enforced. Costs against the accused 6. Laurel v. Misa 77 PHIL 856 (1947) Facts: In G. R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended. Issue: Whether or not the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines was then suspended Held: No.The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state). 7. Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff 75 PHIL 857 (1946) FACTS: Ramon Ruffy was the provincial commander stationed in Mindoro at the outbreak of war on December 8, 1941. When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro on February 27, 1942, Mayor Ruffy retreated to the mountains and organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as the Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area. The case at bar is a petition for prohibition praying that respondents be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of the petitioners on the ground that petitioners were not subject to military law at the time of the offense. ISSUE: 1. Are the petitioners subject to military law at the time of war and Japanese occupation? 2. Is 93d Article of War constitutional? HELD: Petitioners were subject to military jurisdiction as provided for in Article of War (2d). The Bolo Area was a contingent of the 6th military district which had been recognized by the United States Army. The petitioners assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of War on the ground that it violates Article VIII Section 2 par. 4 of the Constitution which provides that “National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment”. The petitioners are in error for courts-martial are agencies of executive character and are not a portion of the judiciary. The petition thus has no merits and is dismissed with costs. People 8. Moya Lim Yao v. Comm. On Immigration 41 SCRA 292 Facts: On 13 March 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung, a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, was permitted to come into the Philippines for a period of one month until 13 April 1961 through a non-immigrant visa. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. The Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it every time she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962. 9. Po Xo Bi v. Rep., G.R. 32398, January 27, 1992 Territory 10. R.A. No. 3046, June 17, 1961 11. R. A. No. 5446, September 8, 1968 12. P.D. No. 1599, June 11, 1978 13. R.A. No. 9522 – New Phils. Baseline Law 14. Merlin M. Magalona et. al., vs. Eduardo Ermita, August 16, 2011 Government 15. Go Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh FACTS: The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to continue the proceedings in petitioner’s case on the ground that the proclamation, issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court during the Japanese occupation. Respondent contends that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue pending judicial proceedings and that the government established during the Japanese occupation was no de facto government. ISSUES:1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the Japanese occupation remain good and valid? 2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidate all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of said court? 3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said courts? HELD: It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government established by military forces and thus a de facto government of the second kind. Legislative, as well as judicial, acts of de facto governments, which are not of political complexion, remain valid after reoccupation. It is presumed that the proclamation of General MacArthur did not specifically refer to judicial processes thus it has not invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese regime. The existence of the courts depends upon the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction. Such laws, not political in nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty and continue in force until repealed by legislative acts. It is thus obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue proceedings in cases, not of political complexion. 16. Lawyers League for a Better Phils. V. Aquino, May 22, 1986 FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines." ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate. HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government. 17. Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 PHIL 778 In 1918, the mayor of Manila had 170 "women of ill repute" forcibly rounded up, put on a ship, and sent to Davao as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against him. The Supreme Court said that the women were not chattels but Filipino citizens who had the fundamental right not to be forced to change their place of residence. This case justifies one of the basic rights of citizen, the right of domain. Issue: The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor. Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc. That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead. The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions; For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. Held: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. Sovereignty 18. Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 75 PHIL 285 Facts: Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries... was prosecuted for the crime of robbery He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he commenced... to serve on August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of... which are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America, and therefore, null and void... that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve... the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code."... he City Fisc The City Fiscal of Manila... submits that the petition for habeas corpus be denied on the following grounds: That the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and the Acts, Ordinances and Executive Orders, creating it are not of a political complexion, for said Court was created, and the crimes and offenses placed under its jurisdiction were penalized heavily, in response to an urgent... necessity, according to the preamble of Ordinance No. 7; that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a constitutional right; and that the summary procedure established in said Ordinance No. 7 is not violative of the provision of Article III, section 1 (18) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, to the effect that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, nor of the provision of section 1 (1) of the same Article that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without... due process of law. Issues: The questions which we have to resolve in the present case in the light of the law of nations are, first, the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the ... summary procedure adopted for that court; secondly, the validity of the sentence which imposes upon the petitioner the penalty of life imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation; and thirdly, if they were then valid, the effect on... said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government. Ruling: "The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation... of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, 'under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines" was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the... peoples' will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people,... before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations." (1) As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the only factor to be considered is the authority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is... well established in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered state, it is drawn entirely from the law martial as denned in the... usages of nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the... occupied district." A belligerent "occupant may where necessary, set up military courts instead of the ordinary courts; and in case, and in so far as, he admits the administration of justice by the ordinary courts, he may nevertheless,... so far as is necessary for military purposes, or for the maintenance of public order and safety, temporarily alter the laws, especially the Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is administered as well as the laws regarding... procedure." (Oppenheim'si International Law, Vol. II, sixth edition, 1944, p. 349.) It is, therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner, imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, was good and valid, since it was within the admitted power or... competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime of which petitioner was convicted. In view of all the foregoing, the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby granted and it is ordered that the petitioner be released forthwith, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered. 19. Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, supra Nature of the Action: Petition for prohibition, praying that respondents be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of petitioners before the military court Facts: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated camps or military bases all over the country. When the Japanese forces reached Mindoro, Ruffy and his band were forced to retreat to the mountains. A guerilla outfit was then organized, called as the “Bolo Area”. However, a certain Capt. Esteban Beloncio relieved petitioners of their positions and duties in the “Bolo Area”, after Lieut. Col. Enrique Jurado effected a change of command. The latter, however, was slain allegedly by petitioners, and it was this murder which gave rise to petitioners’ trial, the legality of which is now being contested. Issue: Were the petitioners subject to the military law at the time of war and Japanese occupation? Ruling: Our conclusion, therefore, is that the petition has no merit and that it should be dismissed with costs. Ratio Decidendi: Yes, the petitioners were subject to military law. By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area, they became members of the Philippine Army—the Bolo Area being a contingent of the 6th military district which is recognized by the United States army. Thus, petitioners are covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War, and other pertinent laws during an occupation. 20. Reagan v. CIR 30 SCRA 968 Facts: The petitioner is a citizen of the United State and an employee of Bendix Radio, Divison of Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provided technical assistance to the United States Air Force was assigned at the Clark Air Base Pampanga, honor about July 7, 19. Nine months, before his tour duty expires, petitioner imported a tax free 1960 Cadillac car which valued at $6443.83. More than two months after the car was imported, petitioner requested the Clark Air Base Commander for a permit to sell the car. The request was granted with the condition that he would sell it to a member of the United States Armed Forces or an employee of the U.S. Military Bases. On July 11, 1960, petitioner sold the car to Willie Johnson for $6600, a private in US Marine Corps, Sangby Point, Cavite as shown by a bill of sale executed at Clark Air Base. On the same date William Johnson Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000 as evidence by a deed of sale executed in Manila. The respondent after deducting the landed cost of the car and the personal exemption which the petitioner was entitled, fixed as his net income arising from such transaction the amount of P17912.34 rendering him liable for income tax of P2979.00. After paying the sum, he sought refund from the respondent claiming that he is exempted. He filed a case within the Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the sum P2979.00 plus legal rate of interest. Issue: Whether or not the said income tax of P2979.00 was legally collected by respondent from petitioner. Ruling: The Philippine is an independent and sovereign country or state. Its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. Its laws govern therein and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its term. It does not prelude from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional rights over certain portions of its territory. Such areas sustain their status as native soil and still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished but it does not disappear. The Clark Air Base is one of he bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the Military Bases Agreement which states that a “national of the US serving or employed in the Philippines in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation, or defense of the bases and residing in the Philippines only by reason such unemployment is not to be taxed on his income unless derived in the bases which one clearly derived the Phil. Therefore the Supreme Court sustained the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals rendering the petitioner liable of the income tax arising from the sale of his automobile that have taken place in Clark Air Field which is within our territory to tax. 21. Province of North Cotabato v. The Govt. of the R. P., Oct. 14, 2008: Associated State Doctrine Province of North Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga Del Norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon, Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano and Sec. Mar Roxas -vsErmita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator National Mapping & Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr. and respondents in intervention Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., Facts: Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which is scheduled to be signed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF in August 05, 2008. Five cases bearing the same subject matter were consolidated by this court namely:- ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer to declare unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to the public and be open for public consultation. GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and void said MOA-AD and to exclude the city to the BJE. GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the MOA-AD and additionally impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita. ï‚· ï‚· GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare null and void the MOA-AD and without operative effect and those respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-AD. GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal and impleading Iqbal. The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between the government and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities; and the following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out warwhich tolled the peace negotiation. It was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when the negotiation regarding peace in Mindanao continued. MILF was hesitant; however, this negotiation proceeded when the government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace talks resumed and MILF suspended all its military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to the ceasefire between the parties. After the death of MILF Chairman Hashim and Iqbal took over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD in its final form was born. ï‚· MOA-AD Overview This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in the birth of this MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws such as ILO Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e compact right entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and order). The body is divided into concepts and principles, territory, resources, and governance. Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people have the right to selfgovernance of their Bangsamoro homeland to which they have exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of occupation in the land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro. As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-SuluPalawan geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories, “A” which will be subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the signing and “B” which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE territory; they shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in the territorial waters; but no provision on the internal waters. Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those countries, as well as environmental cooperation agreements, but not to include aggression in the GRP. The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the government. The BJE shall have participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to explore its resources and that the sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions and TLAs. And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the GRP and MILF is associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and responsibility. This structure of governance shall be further discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly contested before the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to build, develop and maintain its own institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as well. Issues: 1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the exercise of judicial review 2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD; and 3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws Ruling: The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution. ï‚· On the Procedural Issue 1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a need for the exercise of judicial review. The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the court will decline on issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere academic questions. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. The contention of the SolGen is that there is no issue ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and does not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations. Such was denied. The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their duty or in grave abuse of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that acts made by authority which exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete acts made under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe and that the law or act in question as not yet effective does not negate ripeness. With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the Province of Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have locus standi since it is their LGUs which will be affected in whole or in part if include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as an intervenor. And lastly, the Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand to be benefited or prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD. On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD has already been suspended and that the President has already disbanded the GRP, the SC disagrees. The court reiterates that the moot and academic principle is a general rule only, the exceptions, provided in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review; and that where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer, it does not divest the court the power to hear and try the case especially when the plaintiff is seeking for damages or injunctive relief. Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the GRP did not render the petitions moot and academic. The MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity. At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. But with respect to the prayer of Mandamus to the signing of the MOA-AD, such has become moot and academic considering that parties have already complied thereat. ï‚· On the Substantive Issue 2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, and integrated therein is the recognition of the duty of the officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people. Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-executory with reasonable safeguards —the effectivity of which need not await the passing of a statute. Hence, it is essential to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure. And feedback means not only the conduct of the plebiscite as per the contention of the respondents. Clearly, what the law states is the right of the petitioners to be consulted in the peace agenda as corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. As such, respondent Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to carry out the furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereto. Moreover, he cannot invoke of executive privilege because he already waived it when he complied with the Court’s order to the unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related to such peace talks as enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment. With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully at all levels on decisions that would clearly affect their lives, rights and destinies. The MOA-AD is an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, hence it should have observed the free and prior informed consent to the ICC/IPPs; but it failed to do so. More specially noted by the court is the excess in authority exercised by the respondent—since they allowed delineation and recognition of ancestral domain claim by mere agreement and compromise; such power cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to the effect. 3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot be all accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them: ï‚· On matters of the Constitution. Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties. The parties manifested that in crafting the MOA-AD, the term association was adapted from the international law. In international law, association happens when two states of equal power voluntarily establish durable links i.e. the one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, principal, while maintaining its international status as state; free association is a middle ground between integration and independence. The MOA-AD contains many provisions that are consistent with the international definition of association which fairly would deduced that the agreement vest into the BJE a status of an associated state, or at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The court vehemently objects because the principle of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. ï‚· On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond what the Constitution can grant to a local government; even the ARMM do not have such recognition; and the fact is such concept implies recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is nothing in the law that contemplate any state within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. The court disagrees with the respondent that the MOA-AD merely expands the ARMM. BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. As such the MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. ï‚· On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE includes those areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the respondents in the MOA-AD that these areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in contrary to the express provision of the Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of the ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of the law since those included in its territory are areas which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and not to the BJE. ï‚· On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend that the powers vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20, art. 10 of the constitution and that a mere passage of a law is necessary in order to vest in the BJE powers included in the agreement. The Court was not persuaded. SC ruled that such conferment calls for amendment of the Constitution; otherwise new legislation will not concur with the Constitution. Take for instance the treaty making power vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear that only the President has the sole organ and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nation. Should the BJE be granted with the authority to negotiate with other states, the former provision must be amended consequently. Section 22 must also be amended—the provision of the law that promotes national unity and development. Because clearly, associative arrangement of the MOA-AD does not epitomize national unity but rather, of semblance of unity. The associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity. ï‚· On matters of domestic statutes. o Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption of the definition of Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD. Said law specifically distinguishes between the Bangsamoro people and the Tribal peoples that is contrary with the definition of the MOA-AD which includes all indigenous people of Mindanao. o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and recognition of the ancestral domain is a clear departure from the procedure embodied in the IPRA law which ironically is the term of reference of the MOA-AD. ï‚· On matters of international law. The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the law of the land. In international law, the right to self-determination has long been recognized which states that people can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. There are the internal and external self-determination—internal, meaning the self-pursuit of man and the external which takes the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral secession. This principle of selfdetermination is viewed with respect accorded to the territorial integrity of existing states. External self-determination is only afforded in exceptional cases when there is an actual block in the meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-determination. International law, as a general rule, subject only to limited and exceptional cases, recognizes that the right of disposing national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every state. On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a general right to independence or secession from those states under international law, but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to internal self-determination; have the right to autonomy or selfgovernment in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions; have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the indigenous people their own police and security force; but rather, it shall be the State, through police officers, that will provide for the protection of the people. With regards to the autonomy of the indigenous people, the law does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of a state; since it would impair the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states. ï‚· On the basis of the suspensive clause. o It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion cannot be had, since the provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall not take effect until the necessary changes to the legal framework are effected. The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to Memorandum of Instructions from the President stating that negotiations shall be conducted in accordance to the territorial integrity of the country—such was negated by the provision on association incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart from this, the suspensive clause was also held invalid because of the delegated power to the GRP Peace panel to advance peace talks even if it will require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. The legality of the suspensive clause hence hinges on the query whether the President can exercise such power as delegated by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace Panel. Well settled is the rule that the President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. The power of the President to conduct peace negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but is rather implied from her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence. As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. At all event, the president may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable; but she may not be prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers. Clearly, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty. The President’s power is limited only to the preservation and defense of the Constitution but not changing the same but simply recommending proposed amendments or revisions. o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition but is a term because it is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will take effect; but, when. Hence, the stipulation is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework –which changes would include constitutional amendments. Simply put, the suspensive clause is inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional. ï‚· On the concept underlying the MOA-AD. While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process. C. STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT Basis: Constitutional and Jurisprudence 1. Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 83 On July 3, 1971, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings in favor of respondents PJ Kiener Co. Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corp., and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P 1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. On June 24, 1969, respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to execute the decision. The corresponding Alia Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of the aforementioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment with several banks specially on the monies due to the AFP in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ. The deposits of the banks are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP. ISSUE: Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent. RULING: It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. A continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suablitity is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may cause private parties, the loss of government efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater is such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. The State may not be sued without its consent. Public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by the law. Money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that money’s sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it. The Supreme Court granted the writs of certiorari and prohibition, while nullifying and setting aside both the order declaring the decision s executor as well as the alia writ of execution issued. It was ruled that public funds cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and even if the State liability had been adjudged. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. 2. Lasco v. UNRENRE 241 SCRA 681 FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages after being dismissed from their employment with the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE) which was involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island. The UNRFNRE filed a Motion to Dismiss and alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since the UNRFNRE enjoyed diplomatic immunity pursuant to the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The respondent attached a letter from the Department of Foreign Affairs acknowledging its immunity from suit, prompting the Labor Arbiter to issue an order dismissing the complaints. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. ISSUE: Did the private respondent waive its diplomatic immunity when it engaged in exploration work and entered into a contract of employment with the petitioners? HELD: No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, stating that the presence of the private respondent in the Philippines was not because of a commercial venture but because of a joint project entered into by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. The mission of the UNRFNRE was not to exploit our natural resources and gain monetarily but to help improve the quality of life of the people which included that of the petitioners. 3. SEAFDEC v. NLRC, 241 SCRA 580 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the decision of the NLRC sustaining the labor arbiter, in holding herein petitioners liable to pay private respondent the amount of P126,458.89 plus interest thereon computed from May 16, 1986 until full payment thereof is made, as separation pay and other post-employment benefits. On April 20, 1975, private respondent Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate an a probationary basis by the SEAFDEC-AQD and was appointed Senior External Affairs Officer on January 5, 1983 with a monthly basic salary of P8,000.00 and a monthly allowance of P4,000.00. Thereafter, he was appointed to the position of Professional III and designated as Head of External Affairs Office with the same pay and benefits. SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through an agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand on December 28, 1967 by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country On May 8, 1986, petitioner Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of termination to private respondent informing him that due to the financial constraints being experienced by the department, his services shall be terminated at the close of office hours on May 15, 1986 and that he is entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one (1) month of his basic salary for every year of service plus other benefits. Upon petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD’s failure to pay private respondent his separation pay, the latter filed on March 18, 1987 a complaint against petitioners for non-payment of separation benefits plus moral damages and attorney’s fees with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC Petitioners in their answer with counterclaim alleged that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization and that private respondent must first secure clearances from the proper departments for property or money accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid, and which clearances had not yet been obtained by the private respondent. LABOR ARBITER: ordered petitioner to pay the benefits claimed NLRC: affirmed the LA. PETITIONER CONTENDS that: SEAFDEC-AQD is immune from suit owing to its international character and the complaint is in effect a suit against the State which cannot be maintained without its consent. ISSUE: WON the petitioner is within the scope of application of Philippine labor laws (WON SEAFDEC is immuned from suit) HELD: Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As such, according to one leading authority “they must be deemed to possess a species of international personality of their own.” (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 83 [1956 ed.]) One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e.,that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in there operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states. WHEREFORE, finding SEAFDEC-AQD to be an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or local agency of the Philippine government, the questioned decision and resolution of the NLRC dated July 26, 1988 and January 9, 1989, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been rendered without jurisdiction. 4. Callado v. IRRI 244 SCRA 210 FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Callado was employed as a driver at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). On February 11, 1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident. After evaluating petitioner's answer, explanations and other evidence by IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager, the latter issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner on December 7, 1990. Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Private respondent likewise informed the Labor Arbiter, through counsel, that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same. However, the Labor Arbiter finds private respondent IRRI to have waived its immunity considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case. ISSUE: Whether or not IRRI waived its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-employee relationship. HELD: The Court ruled in the negative and vote to dismiss the petition. There’s no merit in petitioner's arguments, thus IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed. Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides: Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives. The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity. On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its position clear. Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically informing him that the Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity. Tests to Determine if Suit is Against the State 5. Begoso v. PVA 32 SCRA 466 Facts: • Plaintiff sought the aid of the judiciary to obtain the benefits to which he believed he was entitled under the Veterans’ Bill of Rights. • He filed his claim for disability pension on March 4, 1955 but was erroneously disapproved on June 21, 1955 due to his dishonorable discharge from the army. • The Board of Administrators of PVA finally approved his claim on September 2, 1964, entitling him with a pension of P30 a month, to take effect on October 5 of that year. • Believing that his pension should have taken effect back in 1955 when his claim was disapproved, and that he is entitled to a higher pension of P50 (RA No. 1362 amending Section 9 of RA No. 65) as a permanently incapacitated person, which was increased to P100 a month when RP 1362 was amended by RA No. 1920 on June 22, 1957, Begosa filed a case against PVA in the Court of First Instance. • CFI ruled in favor plaintiff. • Defendants claim that the plaintiff has not exhausted all administrative remedies before resorting to court action and that the plaintiff’s claim is in reality a suit against the Government which cannot be entertained by this Court for lack of jurisdiction because the Government has not given its consent. Issue: WON the SC can entertain the suit against PVA. Held: Yes. Ratio: • Where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suitability may appropriately be invoked. • However, it has no application where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statue appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff. • Also, where there is a stipulation of facts, the question before the lower court being solely one of law and on the face of the decision, the actuation of appellants being patently illegal, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies certainly does not come into play. 6. Del Mar v. PVA 52 SCRA 340 Facts: Quirico del Mar served as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command during World War II as a major. He obtained an honorable discharge from the service on October 20, 1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical disability. The Philippine Veterans Board (PVA’s predecessor) granted him a monthly life pension of Php50 effective January 28, 1947. In March 1950, however, the said Board discontinued payment of his pension. This was because del Mar is receiving a similar pension from the United States Government through the US Veterans Administration because he served in the US Army in the Far East during WWII. The discontinuation of the pension was based on Section 9 of RA 65, which states “The persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof who are permanently incapacitated from work owing to sickness, disease, or injuries sustained in line of duty, shall be given a life pension of one hundred pesos a month, and ten pesos a month for each of his unmarried children below 18 years of age, unless they are actually receiving a similar pension from other Government funds, and shall receive, in addition, the necessary hospitalization and medical care.” This provision was reflected in the PVA’s Rules and Regulations on Veterans’ Benefits, specifically on Section 6 of Regulation No. 2, to wit, “SEC. 6. Effect of receipt of USVA pension benefit — termination, reduction. — An award of a similar disability compensation from the US Veterans Administration shall be a ground for the cancellation of a disability pension granted under this Regulation: Provided, however, That if and while the disability compensation awarded by the US Veterans Administration is less than the pension granted hereunder, the difference in amount shall be assumed and paid by the PVA: Provided, further, That upon proper application, the disability award previously cancelled may be restored upon the termination of the US Veterans Administration award if the cause of such termination is due to negative military service report of the pensioner certified by the US Department of the Army and not for any other valid cause: Provided, finally, That the veteran is medically determined to be still suffering from the disability for which he was previously awarded a pension. Payment of pension thus restored shall take effect or shall commence only from the date of approval of restoration and when funds become available.” PVA construes “from other Government funds” to include funds of the United States. Issue: May the PVA be sued? Ruling: Yes. The Court made a lengthy disquisition on the history, development, and organization of the PVA to show that it is an entity or agency of the Republic of the Philippines. However, even if it is a government entity, the PVA could not validly invoke the State immunity from suit since in this case, the claimant institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply with his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the public funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant. 7. Veterans Manpower v. CA 214 SCRA 286 Facts: On March 28, 1988, VMPSI filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court at Makati... praying the court to... issue a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo, enjoining the defendants, or any one acting in their place or stead, to refrain from committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSI's license... issue a writ of preliminary injunction to the same effect Render decision and judgment declaring null and void the amendment of Section 4 of R.A. No. 5487, by PD No. 11 exempting organizations like PADPAO from the prohibition that no person shall organize or have an interest in more than one... agency PADPAO as an illegal organization existing in violation of said prohibition... declaring null and void the February 1, 1982 directive of Col. Sabas V. Edadas, in the name of the then PC Chief, requiring all private security agencies/security forces such as VMPSI to join PADPAO... as a pre-requisite to secure/renew their licenses... ordering the defendants to refrain from further... harassing VMPSI and from threatening VMPSI with cancellations or non-renewal of license, without legal and justifiable cause... ordering the defendants to pay to VMPSI the sum of P1,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages, P1,000,000.00... as exemplary damages, and P200,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency. On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila (Annex B,... Petition). Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower than... the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency (Annex D, Petition). The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSI's license (Annex E, Petition) As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when it requested one. VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10, 1988, requesting him to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSI's application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO (Annex F, Petition). As the PC Chief did not reply, and VMPSI's license was expiring on March 31, 1988, VMPSI filed Civil Case No. 88-471 in the RTC-Makati, Branch 135, on March 28, 1988 against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA. the court issued a restraining order enjoining the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA "from committing acts that would result in the cancellation or nonrenewal of VMPSI's license" The PC chief and PC-SUSIA filed a "Motion to Dismiss, Opposition to the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and Motion to Quash the Temporary Restraining Order," on the grounds that the case is against the State which had not given consent thereto and that VMPSI's... license already expired on March 31, 1988, hence, the restraining order or preliminary injunction would not serve any purpose because there was no more license to be cancelled (Annex H, Petition). Respondent VMPSI opposed the motion. n June 10, 1988, the RTC-Makati issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond of P100,000.00, restraining the defendants, or any one acting in their behalf, from cancelling or denying renewal of VMPSI's license, until further orders from the court. The PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above order, but it was denied by the court in its Order of August 10, 1988 (Annex R, Petition). On November 3, 1988, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA sought relief by a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. Issues: whether or not VMPSI's complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent. Ruling: The answer is yes Principles: the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA... being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the... organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PCSUSIA) may not be sued without the Government's consent... especially VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorney's fees from said public respondents Even if its action prospers, the payment of its... monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose. since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being... called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities. he Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO was intended to professionalize... the industry and to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of security services, clearly, a... governmental function. The execution of the said agreement is incidental to the purpose of R.A. 5487, as amended, which is... to regulate the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen or security guard agencies. (Underscoring Ours.) The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority,... hence, from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the public respondents. "It is obvious that public service would be hindered, and public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suits at... the instance of every citizen, and, consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the government" Suit Against Govt. Agencies PNB v. CIR 81 SCRA 314 FACTS: The BIR issued a final decision on disputed assessment amounting to more than 41 million pesos against PNB for deficiency payments of documentary stamp taxes (DST), withholding taxes on compensation, and expanded withholding taxes for taxable year 1997. PNB immediately paid except for the DST, arguing that its interbank call loans (ICLs) transacted in 1997 are not subject to DST. The BIR's position is that, although not considered as deposit subsitute debt instruments (DSDIs), ICLs having maturity of more than 5 days are within the concept of loan agreements. Hence, they are subject to DST. ISSUES: [1] Considering that PNB's ICLs have a maturity of more than 5 days, are they governed by the amended tax law? [2] Are ICLs within the concept of loan agreements? [3] Are ICLs considered DSDI by the Tax Code? [4] Are ICLs subject to DST? HELD: [1] No, they are not. Although under the amended Tax Code, ICLs with more than 5 days of maturity are considered DSDIs (hence, subject to DST), this amendment came to effect in 1998. Tax laws are generally prospective and cannot be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of PNB. [2] No, ICLs are not considered loan agreements. An ICL refers to the cost of borrowings from other resident banks and non-bank financial institutions with quasi-banking authority that is payable on call or demand. It is transacted primarily to correct a bank's reserve requirements. 8. SSS v. CA 120 SCRA 707 FACTS: Spouses David and Socorro Cruz, applied and granted a real estate loan by the SSS with residential lot located at Pateros, Rizal as collateral. The spouses Cruz complied with their monthly payments. When delayed were incurred in their monthly payments SSS filed a petition for foreclosure of their real estate mortgage executed by the spouses Cruz on the ground that the spouses Cruz defaulted in payment, Pursuant for these application for foreclosure notices were published on the second notice the counsel for spouses Cruz sent a letter to SSS informing the latter that his clients are up to date in their payment of the monthly amortization and the SSS should discontinued the publication of the notices of foreclosure. This request remain unheaded, this spouses Cruz filed an action for damages against SSS before RTC in Rizal. SSS invoking its immunity from suit being an agency of the government performing government function. The trial court and court of appeal nevertheless awarded damages in favor of spouses Cruz which was affirmed by court of appeal, Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not SSS is immune from suit. HELD: Negative.. The SSS has a distinct legal personality and it can be sued for damages. The SSS does not enjoy immunity from suit by express statutory consent. It has corporated power separate and distinct from the government. SSS own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in court. These words “sue and be sued” embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental function, by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability that statutory law has given to the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the court; subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. 9. Rayo v. CFI of Bulacan 110 SCRA 460 FACTS: On October 26, 1978, typhoon “Kading” struck Bulacan. Due to this, the National Power Corporation (NPC), through its plant superintendent Benjamin Chavez, simultaneously opened 3 floodgates of Angat Dam. The opening of the floodgates caused several towns to be inundated (the town of Norzagaray was the most affected one). It resulted to a hundred deaths and damage to properties that were worth over a million pesos. Petitioners (victims) filed a complaint for damages against NPC, including plant superintendent Benjamin Chavez. Respondent filed counterclaims and put up a special and affirmative defense that “in the operation of the Angat Dam,” it is “performing a purely governmental function”, hence it “cannot be sued without the express consent of the State.” Petitioners oppose the defense, contending that the NPC is not performing governmental but merely proprietary functions and that under its own organic act, Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 6395, it can sue and be sued in any court. CFI dropped the NPC from the complaint and left Chavez as the sole party-defendant. CFI RULING: Upon a motion for reconsideration, the CFI ruled that petitioners’ reliance on Sec. 3 of RA 6395 is not tenable since the same refer to such matters that are only within the scope of the other corporate powers of said defendant and not matters of tort as in the instant cases. Being an agency performing a purely governmental function in the operation of the Angat Dam, said defendant was not given any right to commit wrongs upon individuals. To sue said defendant for tort may require the express consent of the State. PETITION DISMISSED. ISSUES: Whether respondent National Power Corporation performs a governmental function with respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam; and Whether the power of respondent National Power Corporation to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort. HELD: SC reversed the CFI decision and GRANTED petitioners to reinstate their complaint against the NPC. It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A. No. 6395). As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can “sue and be sued in any court” is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners. 10. Malong v. PNR 185 SCRA 63 Facts · The Petitioners, Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977 their son, Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was between Tarlac City and Capas. The said train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the proximity of All Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay them damages totalling P136,370. · The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that it had no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State. · The petitioners appealed to SC pursuant to RA No. 5440. Issue · W/N the PNR is immune from suit? NO. o Although the PNR is a government instrumentality under Republic Act No. 4156, as amended by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, it was held that the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers. o However, as held in precedents, the correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the” objectives “for which the entity was organized.” o The Manila Hotel case also relied on the following rulings: “By engaging in a particular business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations.” Held The order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, costs against the Philippine National Railways. It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees could not sue the PNR for damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons engaged in that private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function. Jesus P. Disini v. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et. al., June 22, 2010 FACTS: On 16 February 1989, the Republic of the Philippines and Disini entered into an Immunity Agreement under which Disini undertook to testify for the Republic and provide its lawyers with the information, affidavits, and documents they needed in its case against Westinghouse Electric Corporation before the United States District Court of New Jersey and in the arbitration case that Westinghouse International Projects Company and others filed against the Republic before the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration. Disini worked for his second cousin, Herminio, as an executive in the latter's companies from 1971 to 1984. The Republic believed that the Westinghouse contract for the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, brokered by one of Herminios companies, had been attended by anomalies. In the Immunity Agreement, the Republic guaranteed that, apart from the two Westinghouse cases, it would not compel Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign proceeding brought by the Republic against Herminio. Disini complied with his undertaking but 18 years later, upon the Republic's application, the Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena against Disini, commanding him to testify and produce documents before that court in an action that the Republic filed against Herminio. Disini moved to quash the subpoena, invoking the Immunity Agreement. The Sandiganbayan ignored the motion and issued a new subpoena directing him to testify before it. Subsequently, the PCGG revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement insofar as it prohibited the Republic from requiring Disini to testify against Herminio. Later on, the Sandiganbayan denied Disinis motion to quash the subpoena. Disini, thus, brought the matter to the Supreme Court. The Republic maintained that the PCGGs power to grant immunity under Section 5 of Executive Order 14 covered only immunity from civil or criminal prosecution and did not cover immunity from providing evidence in court. The Republic argued that Disini's immunity from testifying against Herminio contravened the state's policy to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired under the regime of former President Marcos. The Republic further argued that under the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement which reads: Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. Disini's obligation to provide truthful information or testimony, Disini, despite the immunity given him against being compelled to testify in other cases, was to provide truthful information or testimony in such other cases. For his part, Disini argued that the Republic, through the PCGG, was estopped from revoking the questioned immunity as it had made him believe that it had the authority to provide such guarantee. The Republic countered by invoking Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that (t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees from them or from their nominees, or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel. ISSUE: Did the PCGG act within its authority when it revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement? HELD: No. PCGG needs to fulfill its obligations honorably as Disini did. More than anyone, the government should be fair. The language of Section 5, Executive Order 14 affords latitude to the PCGG in determining the extent of the criminal immunity it may grant. It has discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending on the situation of the witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in this case, to conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation. Trusting in the Government's honesty and fidelity, Disini agreed and fulfilled his part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the essence of due process, should hold the Republic on to its promise. 11. Dept. of Agriculture v. NLRC 227 SCRA 693 Facts: The case is regarding money claims filed by employees of a secuity agency against the Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed and requested by National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Department of Agriculture (Petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims (aggregating 266,483.91PHP) of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Forthwith, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA. A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the NLRC, alleging that the writ issued was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void and all actions pursuant thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The petitioner also pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good. The petitioner alleges that the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency. Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State is applicable on this case. Rulings: No. The rule of non-suability of the State is not absolute and it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government “consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.” Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract.  In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. In this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims. Discussion: ACT NO. 3083 - AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED Section 1. Complaint against Government. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, expressed or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties. xxx Sec. 5. When the Government of the Philippine Island is plaintiff in an action instituted in any court of original jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right to assert therein, by way of set-off or counterclaim in a similar action between private parties. Sec. 7. Execution. No execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any court against the Government of the Philippine Islands under the provisions of this Act; but a copy thereof duly certified by the clerk of the Court in which judgment is rendered shall be transmitted by such clerk to the Governor-General (President of the PH), within five days after the same becomes final. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be “sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. However, the money claim should first be brought to the Commission on Audit. Act 3083 stands as the general law waiving the State’s immunity from suit, subject to its general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that ‘no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims against the Government must be strictly observed. Effect of Consent When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability. “WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the public respondents are hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and implementing any and all writs of execution issued pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner.” Suit Against Public Officers 12. VMPSI v. CA, 214 SCRA 286 Facts: The constitutionality of the following provisions of R.A. 5487(otherwise known as the “Private Security Agency Law”), as amended, is questioned by VMPSI in its complaint: SEC. 4. Who may Organize a Security or Watchman Agency. - Any Filipino citizen or a corporation, partnership, or association, with a minimum capital of five thousand pesos, one hundred per cent of which is owned and controlled by Filipino citizens may organize a security or watchman agency: Provided, That no person shall organize or have aninterest in, more than one such agency except those which are alreadyexisting at the promulgation of this Decree: x x x.” (As amended by P.D. Nos. 11 and 100.) SEC. 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine Constabulary. -The Chief the Philippine Constabulary, in consultation with thePhilippine Association Detective and Protective Agency Operators,Inc. and subject to the provision existing laws, is hereby authorized to issue the rules and regulations necessary carry out the purpose of this Act.” of of of to VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency. Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that “all private security agencies/company security forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are located...”. As such membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade. On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila. On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency (Annex D, Petition). The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSI’s license. As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when it requested one. VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10, 1988, requesting him to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO Issue: Whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent Held: Yes. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the Government’s consent, especially in this case because VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees from said public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose. While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC¬-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities. The correct test for the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the State but the legal nature of the act. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into a business contract. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO was intended. to professionalize the industry and to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of security services, clearly, a governmental function. The execution of the said agreement is incidental to the purpose of R.A.5487, as amended, which is to regulate the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen or security guard agencies 13. Larkins v. NLRC 241 SCRA 598 Facts: Private respondents filed a complaint with the regional arbitration of the NLRC against Lt Col. Frankhauser for illegal dismissal and under payment of wages. Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non suability applies? Held: Yes. Private respondents were dismissed by Lt Col. Frankhauser acting for and in behalf of the US Government. 14. Shauf v. CA 191 SCRA 713 Facts: Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified. By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality and sex. Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if she’s available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateo’s appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation. Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc. RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages + 20% of such amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages. Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit. Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit against the US government which would require consent. Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of international law. Hence this petition for review on certiorari. Issue: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces Held: No they are not immune. WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. Ratio: They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any arbitrary, irregular or abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial judge in ruling that private respondents committed acts of discrimination for which they should be held personally liable. There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf was refused appointment as Guidance Counselor by the defendants on account of her sex, color and origin. She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Santo Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34 semester hours in psychology?guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral science. She has also completed all course work in human behavior and counselling psychology for a doctoral degree. She is a civil service eligible. More important, she had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976. In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant Persi did not even consider the application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but referred the vacancy to CORRO which appointed Edward B. Isakson who was not eligible to the position. Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from Article II, Section 9, of the 1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed.. There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing the acts complained of have, in effect, violated the basic constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a living which is very much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this, they should be held accountable Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself of her remedy under the United States federal legislation on equality of opportunity for civilian employees, which is allegedly exclusive of any other remedy under American law, let alone remedies before a foreign court and under a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines. SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is entitled as a matter of plain and simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise proscribed, which will best advance and protect her interests. There is, thus, nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in Philippine courts which should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and inconclusive representations of private respondents on that score. 15. Republic v. Hon. Edilberto Sandoval 220 SCRA 124 Facts: Farmer-rallyists(KMP), led by its national president, Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free to farmers; (b) zero retention of lands by landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of land payments; There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and the military/police officers involved in the incident. Issues: (1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity (2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves asthe basis for a cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the State. The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence,the acts cannot be considered official. Consent to be Sued Express Consent 22. CA 327 as amended by PD 1445 23. Act No. 3083 24. Article IX, 1987 Constitution 25. Article 2180, Civil Code of the Philippines 26. Department of Agriculture v. NLRC 227 SCRA 693 Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA. Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that “the State may not be sued without its consent” reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The State’s consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit. 27. Meritt v. Govt. of the Phil. Islands 34 PHIL 311 FACTS: It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, when an ambulance of the General Hospital struck the plaintiff in an intersection. By reason of the resulting collusion, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious. The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain had suffered material injury. Upon recovery the doctor noticed that the plaintiff’s leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The damages that the plaintiff got from the collision disabled him to do this work as a contractor and forced him to give up contracts he recently had. As the negligence which cause the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom. The Philippine Legislature made an Act (Act No. 2457) that authorizes the plaintiff to bring suit against the GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General to appear in said suit. ISSUE: Whether or not the Government is legally-liable for the damages incurred by the plaintiff. RULING: No, the Government is not legally-liable for the damages incurred by the plaintiff. It being quiet clear that Act. No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government’s liability to any cause not previously recognized. That according to paragraph 5 of Article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the May 18, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. It is, therefore, evidence that the State (GPI) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of Article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, be legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefore, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts. 28. Republic v. Purisima 78 SCRA 470 FACTS: The jurisdictional issues raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding arose from the failure of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila to apply the well-known and of-reiterated doctrine of the non-suability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit without its consent. It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. ISSUE: Can an agreement between the Rice and Corn Administration and Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. operate as a waiver of the national government from suit? HELD: NO. The consent to be sued, to be effective must come from the State thru a statute, not through any agreement made by counsel for the Rice and Corn Administration.Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract between the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn Administration which, according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract within the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise. The consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority. Implied Consent 29. U.S. v. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487 Facts: At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests based on the letters received from the US. In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects. The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.) Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. Issue/s: WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent. Ratio: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts) The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act 30. Malong v. PNR 138 SCRA 63 Facts · The Petitioners, Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977 their son, Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was between Tarlac City and Capas. The said train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the proximity of All Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay them damages totalling P136,370. · The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that it had no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State. · The petitioners appealed to SC pursuant to RA No. 5440. Issue · W/N the PNR is immune from suit? NO. o Although the PNR is a government instrumentality under Republic Act No. 4156, as amended by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, it was held that the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers. o However, as held in precedents, the correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the” objectives “for which the entity was organized.” o The Manila Hotel case also relied on the following rulings: “By engaging in a particular business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations.” Held The order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, costs against the Philippine National Railways. It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees could not sue the PNR for damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons engaged in that private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function. Notes · Abad Santos, J., concurring: o The claim that Philippine National Railways is immune from suit because it is an instrumentality of the government is so outlandish that it deserves slight consideration. o He mentioned the Central Bank of the Philippines as an example of government instrumentality that is not immune from suit for it also performs proprietary functions. o He also contended the use of the immunity from suit on the part of the government corporations to deny justice that is due to the people they are to serve. 31. Department of Health vs. Phils. Pharmawealth Inc., Feb. 20, 2013 Facts: Defense of state immunity does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued an Administrative Order providing for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner Department of Health (DOH). Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (Pharmawealth) submitted to DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic ―Penicillin G Benzathine. Petitioner DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from DOH regarding Pharmawealth‘s request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, the latter submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract and gave the lowest bid thereof. . In view, however, of the non- accreditation of respondent‘s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to Cathay/YSS Laboratories‘ (YSS). Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial praying, inter alia, that the trial court ―nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct petitioners DOH et al. to declare Pharmawealth as the lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that they accordingly award the same to plaintiff company‖ and ―adjudge defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to plaintiff. Petitioners DOH et al. subsequently filed a motion to dismiss praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. The trial court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied DOH‘s petition for review which affirmed the order issued Regional Trial Court of Pasig City denying petitioners‘ motion to dismiss the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the charge against the public officers acting in their official capacity will prosper. HELD: The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In its complaint, DOH sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit. As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State. Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in connection with their alleged act of ―illegally abusing their official positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally 32. JUSMAG Phil. V. NLRC 239 SCRA 224 FACTS: ï‚· Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) assails the January 29, 1993 Resolution of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (public respondent), in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-03-02092-92, reversing the July 30, 1991 Order of the Labor Arbiter, and ordering the latter to assume jurisdiction over the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by FLORENCIO SACRAMENTO (private respondent) against petitioner. ï‚· Private respondent was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAG-Philippines. He had been with JUSMAG from December 18, 1969, until his dismissal on April 27, 1992. When dismissed, he held the position of Illustrator 2 and was the incumbent President of JUSMAG PHILIPPINES-FILIPINO CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (JPFCEA), a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. His services were terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position. He was also advised that he was under administrative leave until April 27, 1992, although the same was not charged against his leave. ï‚· On March 31, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG. He asked for his reinstatement. JUSMAG then filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of the United States. It further alleged lack of employer-employee relationship and that it has no juridical personality to sue and be sued. ISSUE: Whether JUSMAG was immune from suit as an agency of the United States. RATIO: ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· YES, from the foregoing, it is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947. Hence, we agree with petitioner that the suit is, in effect, one against the United States Government, albeit it was not impleaded in the complaint. Considering that the United States has not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper. In this jurisdiction, we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. Immunity of State from suit is one of these universally recognized principles. In international law, “immunity” is commonly understood as the exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. This is anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal) The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone further metamorphosis. The view evolved that the existence of a contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local courts. The complexity of relationships between sovereign states, brought about by their increasing commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive application of the doctrine. Thus, in United States of America vs. Ruiz, we clarified that our pronouncement in Harry Lyons, supra, with respect to the waiver of State immunity, was obiter and “has no value as an imperative authority.” As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). 33. Santiago v. Republic 87 SCRA 284 Facts: On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his counsel filed an action for revocation of a Deed of Donation executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the Donee, in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. Mr. Santiago alleged that the Bureau, contrary to the terms of donation, failed to install lighting facilities and water system on the property and to build an office building and parking lot thereon which should have been constructed and ready for occupancy on before December7, 1974. That because of the circumstances, Mr. Santiago concluded that he was exempt from compliance with an explicit constitutional command, as invoked in the Santos v Santos case, a 1952 decision which is similar. The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in favor of the respondent on the ground that the state cannot be sued without its consent, and Santos v Santos case is discernible. The Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza affirmed the dismissal on ground of constitutional mandate. Ildefonso Santiago filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent. Held: The Supreme Court rules, that the constitutional provision shows a waiver. Where there is consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not to be express. It can be implied. In this case it must be emphasized, goes no further than a rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being a Donee, is entitle to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation. The writ of Certiorari prayed is granted and the order of dismissal of October 20, 1977 is nullified, set aside and declare to be without force and effect. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II, is hereby directed to proceed with this case, observing the procedure set forth in the rules of court. No cost. 34. Froilan v. Oriental Pan Shipping, September 30, 1950 FACTS After Fernando Froilan’s, plaintiff, failure of payment for the remaining balance, interest incurred and insurance premiums of the said vessel (MV/FS 197), the contract made was rescinded by the Shipping Administration (SA). Upon repossession of the said vessel, Shipping Administration approved a charter contract to Pan Oriental Shipping (POS), defendant. Upon receiving the vessel, Pan Oriental Shipping had it repaired and had paid the stipulated initial payment. On the contract, Shipping Administration gave Pan Oriental option to purchase the boat. Upon the reconsideration submitted by Froilan, the Cabinet resolved to restore Froilan to his rights under the original sale with conditions that he shall pay a sum of money upon delivery of the vessel to him, that he shall continue paying the remaining installments due, and that he shall assume the expenses incurred for the repair and by docking of the vessel. This decision was then protested by Pan Shipping Oriental saying that the said vessel was delivered to it by the Shipping Administration thus Shipping Administration must be the one to dispose of said authority to the property and that Froilan has already given up his rights to the said vessel upon failure to comply. When Froilan paid and Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an action for in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said property. ISSUE Whether Pan Oriental or Froilan had the right to the vessel. Whether or not the government’s motion to dismissPan Oriental counterclaims may prosper. HELD: In the circumstances of this case, neither Froilan nor the Pan Oriental holds a valid contract over the vessel. However, since the Shipping Administration, representing the government ratified its proposed contract with Froilan by receiving the full consideration of the sale to the latter and since Pan Oriental has no capacity to question the Shipping Administration of the actuation made, the decision of the lower court adjudicating the vessel to FroiIan and its successor Compañia Maritima, must be sustained. As considered in the case, Pan Oriental cannot be considered a possessor in bad faith until after the institution of the instant case. However, since it is not disputed that said appellant made useful and necessary expenses on the vessel, appellant is entitled to the refund of such expenses with the right to retain the vessel until he has been reimbursed therefore. As it is by the concerted acts of defendants and intervenor Republic of the Philippines that appellant was deprived of the possession of the vessel over which appellant had a lien for his expenses, appellees Froilan, Compañia Maritima, and the Republic of the Philippines3are declared liable for the reimbursement to appellant of its legitimate expenses, as allowed by law, with legal interest from the time of disbursement. Scope of Consent 35. Rizal Commercial Bank v. De Castro, 168 SCRA 49 Facts: Badoc Planters, Inc. filed an action for recovery of unpaid tobacco deliveries against PVTA. Hon. Lourdes P. San Diego, then Presiding Judge, ordering the defendants therein to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiff Badoc Planters, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “BADOC”) within 48 hours the aggregate amount of P206,916.76, with legal interests thereon. Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court on the very same day, issued a Writ of Execution addressed to Special Sheriff Faustino Rigor, who then issued a Notice of Garnishment addressed to the General Manager and/or Cashier of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as RCBC). However, PVTA filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Judge set aside the Orders of Execution and of Payment and the Writ of Execution and ordering petitioner and BADOC “to restore, jointly and severally, the account of PVTA with the said bank in the same condition and state it was before. Issues: 1) Whether or not PVTA funds are public funds not subject to garnishment; 2) Whether or not the respondent Judge correctly ordered the herein petitioner to reimburse the amount paid to the Special Sheriff by virtue of the execution issued pursuant to the Order/Partial Judgment dated January 15, 1970. 1) Whether or not PVTA funds are public funds not subject to garnishment; Republic Act No. 2265 created the PVTA as an ordinary corporation with all the attributes of a corporate entity subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law. Hence, it possesses the power “to sue and be sued” and “to acquire and hold such assets and incur such liabilities resulting directly from operations authorized by the provisions of this Act or as essential to the proper conduct of such operations.” Among the specific powers vested in the PVTA are: 1) to buy Virginia tobacco grown in the Philippines for resale to local bona fide tobacco manufacturers and leaf tobacco dealers [Section 4(b), R.A. No. 2265]; 2) to contracts of any kind as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of its purpose with any person, firm or corporation, with the Government of the Philippines or with any foreign government, subject to existing laws [Section 4(h), R.A. No. 22651; and 3) generally, to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act [Section 4(k), R.A. No. 2265.] From the foregoing, it is clear that PVTA has been endowed with a personality distinct and separate from the government which owns and controls it. Accordingly, this Court has heretofore declared that the funds of the PVTA can be garnished since “funds of public corporation which can sue and be sued were not exempt from garnishment. Inasmuch as the Tobacco Fund, a special fund, was by law, earmarked specifically to answer obligations incurred by PVTA in connection with its proprietary and commercial operations authorized under the law, it follows that said funds may be proceeded against by ordinary judicial processes such as execution and garnishment. Garnishment is considered as a specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation. Under the above-cited rule, the garnishee [the third person] is obliged to deliver the credits, etc. to the proper officer issuing the writ and “the law exempts from liability the person having in his possession or under his control any credits or other personal property belonging to the defendant, …, if such property be delivered or transferred, …, to the clerk, sheriff, or other officer of the court in which the action is pending. 2) Whether or not the respondent Judge correctly ordered the herein petitioner to reimburse the amount paid to the Special Sheriff No. The bank was in no position to question the legality of the garnishment since it was not even a party to the case. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, it had neither the personality nor the interest to assail or controvert the orders of respondent Judge. It had no choice but to obey the same inasmuch as it had no standing at all to impugn the validity of the partial judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff or of the processes issued in execution of such judgment. RCBC cannot therefore be compelled to make restitution solidarily with the plaintiff BADOC. Plaintiff BADOC alone was responsible for the issuance of the Writ of Execution and Order of Payment and so, the plaintiff alone should bear the consequences of a subsequent annulment of such court orders; hence, only the plaintiff can be ordered to restore the account of the PVTA. 36. Mun. of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez 130 SCRA 556 FACTS: In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D. Vda. De Imperio, et al. v. Municipal Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, et al." dated April 28, 1978, under presiding Judge Oscar C. Fernandez, rendered judgement in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Municipal Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, represented by Mayor Mar Marcelo G. Aure and its Municipal Treasurer. The court ordered the defendant municipality to pay the plaintiffs the sum of Php64,440.00 corresponding to the rentals collected from the tenants from 1970 up to and including 1975 plus interest thereon at the legal rate from January 1970 until fully paid. In addition to this, the defendant municipality must pay the plaintiffs the sum of Php3,000.00 for attorney's fees and to pay the cost of suit. Thereafter, the private respondents moved for issuance of the writ of execution for the satisfaction of the said judgement, however, petitioner, on July 30, 1982, filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the ground that the municipality's property or funds are all public funds exempt from execution. The said Motion was then denied by the respondent judge in an order dated August 23, 1982 and the writ of execution still stands in full force and effect. ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan, in the possession of the provincial and municipal treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively, are public funds which are exempt from execution for the satisfaction of the money judgement in Civil Case No. 604-B. HELD: Yes, all the funds of the municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel and of Bulacan, are public funds which are exempt from execution as stated under Presidential Decree No. 477, "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration", Section 2, paragraph (a): No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other specific statutory authority. Furthermore, there must be an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan containing the corresponding appropriation for the funds before any money of the municipality may be paid out. Unlike the State which has the immunity of not being sued without its consent, A municipal corporation is an example of an incorporated agency which has a charter of its own that grants them the competence to sue and be sued. However, municipal government is generally not liable for torts committed during the discharge of its governmental functions. It can be held liable only if it has been proven that they were acting in a proprietary function. Failing to do this, the claimant cannot recover. 37. Mun. of Makati v. CA 190 SCRA 206 Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After hearing, the RTC fixed the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordered petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private respondent. It then issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law. The RTC denied the motion. CA affirmed; hence, petitioner filed a petition for review before the SC. Issue: 1. Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution? 2. If so, what then is the remedy of the private respondents? Held: 1. Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner. 2. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor. For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject property notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession of the property since the same has been the site of Makati West High School since the school year 1986-1987. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice. (Municipality of Makati vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 1, 1990) 38. NIA v. CA 214 SCRA 35 Does the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) have jurisdiction over construction contracts entered into between parties before the creation of said Commission in 1985? When a construction contract contains an arbitration clause, is it still necessary for the parties thereto to agree to submit disputes arising therefrom specifically to the CIAC for the latter to acquire jurisdiction? FACTS: In a competitive bidding held by Petitioner NIA, Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation (HYDRO) was awarded Contract for the construction of the main civil works of the Magat River Multi-Purpose Project. The contract provided that Respondent HYDRO would be paid partly in Philippine pesos and partly in U.S. dollars. Respondent HYDRO substantially completed the works under the contract in 1982 and final acceptance by Petitioner NIA was made in 1984. Respondent HYDRO thereafter determined that it still had an account receivable from Petitioner NIA representing the dollar rate differential of the price escalation for the contract. After unsuccessfully pursuing its case with Petitioner NIA, Respondent HYDRO filed with the CIAC a Request for Adjudication of the aforesaid claim. Petitioner NIA filed its Answer wherein it questioned the jurisdiction of the CIAC alleging lack of cause of action, laches and estoppel in view of Respondent HYDRO’s alleged failure to avail of its right to submit the dispute to arbitration within the prescribed period as provided in the contract. Later, Petitioner NIA filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction over the disputes. The arbitral body constituted by both parties issued an order which deferred the determination of the Motion to Dismiss and resolved to proceed with the hearing of the case on the merits as the grounds cited by Petitioner NIA did not seem to be “indubitable.” Petitioner NIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order. CIAC in denying the Motion for Reconsideration ruled that it has jurisdiction over the Respondent HYDRO’s claim over Petitioner NIA pursuant to E.O 1008 and that the hearing should proceed as scheduled. CIAC then rendered a decision in the main case in favor of Respondent HYDRO. Petitioner NIA filed with the CA an Original Action of Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for Restraining Order and/or Injunction which dismissed the same. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. ISSUE: Whether or not CIAC has jurisdiction to hear and try the dispute between the parties? ARGUMENTS: Petitioner NIA alleged that CIAC has no jurisdiction to hear and try the dispute between the parties as EO No. 1008 had no retroactive effect. It contended that there was no agreement with Respondent HYDRO to submit the dispute to CIAC for arbitration considering that the construction contract was executed in 1978 and the project completed in 1982, whereas the Construction Industry Arbitration Law creating CIAC was signed only in 1985; and that while they have agreed to arbitration as a mode of settlement of disputes, they could not have contemplated submission of their disputes to CIAC. Petitioner NIA further argued that records show that it had not voluntarily submitted itself to arbitration by CIAC. Petitioner NIA contended that the CIAC did not acquire jurisdiction over the dispute since it was only Respondent HYDRO that requested for arbitration. It asserts that to acquire jurisdiction over a case, as provided under E.O. 1008, the request for arbitration filed with CIAC should be made by both parties, and hence the request by one party is not enough. RULING: YES. Contrary to the claim of Petitioner NIA, the CIAC has jurisdiction over the controversy. The instant Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. RATIO DECIDENDI: EO No. 1008, otherwise known as the “Construction Industry Arbitration Law” which was promulgated on 4 February 1985, vests upon CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. The disputes may involve government or private contracts. For the Board to acquire jurisdiction, the parties to a dispute must agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration. The complaint of Respondent HYDRO against Petitioner NIA on the basis of the contract executed between them was filed on 7 December 1994, during the effectivity of E.O. No. 1008. Hence, it is well within the jurisdiction of CIAC. The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Petitioner NIA’s argument that CIAC had no jurisdiction to arbitrate on contract which preceded its existence is untenable. E.O. 1008 is clear that the CIAC has jurisdiction over all disputes arising from or connected with construction contract whether the dispute arises BEFORE or AFTER the completion of the contract. Thus, the date the parties entered into a contract and the date of completion of the same, even if these occurred before the constitution of the CIAC, did not automatically divest the CIAC of jurisdiction as long as the dispute submitted for arbitration arose after the constitution of the CIAC. Stated differently, the jurisdiction of CIAC is over the dispute, not the contract; and the instant dispute having arisen when CIAC was already constituted, the arbitral board was actually exercising current, not retroactive, jurisdiction. It is undisputed that the contracts between Respondent HYDRO and Petitioner NIA contained anarbitration clause wherein they agreed to submit to arbitration any dispute between them that may arise before or after the termination of the agreement. Consequently, the claim of Respondent HYDRO having arisen from the contract is arbitrable. Petitioner NIA’s reliance with the ruling on the case of Tesco Services Incorporated v. Vera, is misplaced. The 1988 CIAC Rules of Procedure which were applied by this Court in the Tesco case had been duly amended by CIAC Resolutions No. 2-91 and 3-93, Section 1 of Article III of which read as follows: Submission to CIAC Jurisdiction — An arbitration clause in a construction contract or a submission to arbitration of a construction contract or a submission to arbitration of a construction dispute shall be deemed an agreement to submit an existing or future controversy to CIAC jurisdiction, notwithstanding the reference to a different arbitration institution or arbitral body in such contract or submission. When a contract contains a clause for the submission of a future controversy to arbitration, it is not necessary for the parties to enter into a submission agreement before the claimant may invoke the jurisdiction of CIAC. Under the present Rules of Procedure, for a particular construction contract to fall within the jurisdiction of CIAC, it is merely required that the parties agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration. Unlike in the original version of Section 1, as applied in the Tesco case, the law as it now stands does not provide that the parties should agree to submit disputes arising from their agreement specifically to the CIAC for the latter to acquire jurisdiction over the same. Rather, it is plain and clear that as long as the parties agree to submit to voluntary arbitration, regardless of what forum they may choose, their agreement will fall within the jurisdiction of the CIAC, such that, even if they specifically choose another forum, the parties will not be precluded from electing to submit their dispute before the CIAC because this right has been vested upon each party by law, i.e., E.O. No. 1008. Moreover, it is undeniable that Petitioner NIA agreed to submit the dispute for arbitration to the CIAC. Petitioner NIA through its counsel actively participated in the arbitration proceedings by filing an Answer with Counterclaim, as well as its compliance wherein it nominated arbitrators to the proposed panel, participating in the deliberations on, and the formulation of, the Terms of Reference of the arbitration proceeding, and examining the documents submitted by Respondent HYDRO after Petitioner NIA asked for the originals of the said documents. D. PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES Section 1 1. Villavicencio v. Lukban, supra Section 2 2. Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 83 PHIL 171 (1949) 3. Agustin v. Edu 88 SCRA 195 (1997) 4. Ichong v. Hernandez 101 PHIL 115 (1957) 5. Gonzales v. Hechanova 9 SCRA 230 (1963) 6. In Re: Garcia 2 SCRA 984 (1961) Section 4 7. People v. Lagman 66 PHIL 13 (1938) Section 6 8. Aglipay v. Ruiz 64 PHIL 201 (1937) Section 10 & 11 –relate to Article XIII 9. Calalang v. Williams 70 PHIL 726 (1940) 10. Almeda v. Court of Appeals 78 SCRA 194 (1977) 11. Ondoy v. Ignacio 97 SCRA 611 (1980) 12. Salonga v. Farrales 165 SCRA 359 (1981) Sections 12- relate to Article XV & Sec. 13- relate to XIV, Sec. 19 13. Meyer v. Nebraska 262 US 390 14. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925) 15. People v. Ritter 194 SCRA 690 16. Dept. of Education v. San Diego 180 SCRA 533 17. Virtuoso v. Mun. Judge 82 SCRA 191 Section 16 18. Oposa v. Factoran 224 SCRA 792 (1993) 19. LLDA v.CA 231 SCRA 292 (1994) Section 19 20. Garcia v. Board of Investments 191 SCRA 288 (1990) Section 21 21. Ass. of Small Landowners in the Phils. V. Sec. of the DAR 175 SCRA 343 (1989) Section 22 22. The City Govt. of Baguio City v. Atty. Brain Masweng et. Al. Feb. 4, 2009 Section 25 23. Basco v. Pagcor 197 SCRA 52 (1991) 24. Limbonas v. Mangelin 170 SCRA 786 (1989) Section 28 25. Legaspi v. Civil Service Commision 150 SCRA 530 (1987) 26. Valmonte v. De Villa 170 SCRA 256 (1989) 27. Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato 203 SCRA 515(1991) 28. The Province of North Cotabato v. Govt. of the R.P. Peace Panel, Oct. 18, 2008. E. SEAPRATION OF POWERS 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. In Re: Manzano 166 SCRA 246 (1988) Angara v. Electoral Commission 63 PHIL 139 Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA 166 SCRA 533 Casibang v. Aquino 92 SCRA 642 Tanada v. Cuenco 103 PHIL 1051 Sanidad v. Comelec 73 SCRA 333 Daza v. Singson 180 SCRA 496 Abakada Guro Party List v. Hon. Cesar V. Purisima, August 14, 2008 F. DELEGATION OF POWER 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Garcia v. Executive Secretary 211 SCRA 219 People v. Vera 65 PHIL 112-125 Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA supra Ynot v. IAC 148 SCRA 659 Tablarin v. Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730 Pelaez v. Auditor General 15 SCRA 569 Pacific Stream Laundry Inc. v. Laguna Lake Devt. Authority, Dec. 18, 2009 G. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (Article VI) Section 1 1. R.A. No. 6735 (System of Initiative and Referendum) Section 5 2. R.A. No. 7941 (Party-List System) 3. Tobias v. Abalos 239 SCRA 106 Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong.” Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. The petitioners contend on the following: (1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule provided in the Constitution by involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. (2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. (3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. (4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that “within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section Issue: WON the RA No. 7675 is unconstitutional. Ruling: The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution stating that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute with the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law." As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself. Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit. 4. Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec October 6, 2000 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec, June 26, 2001 BANAT V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009 Sen. Benigno Aquino v. Commission on Elections, April 7, 2010 Rai Sandra Sema v. Commission on Elections, July 16, 2008 COMELEC en banc v. AKB et. al. April 2, 2013 Section 6 10. Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec 248 SCRA 300 11. Aquino v. Comelec 248 SCRA 400 12. Co v. HRET 199 SCRA 692 Section 7 13. Dimaporo v. Mitra 202 SCRA 779 Section 11 14. Jimenez v. Cabangbang 17 SCRA 876 15. People v. Jalosjos 324 SCRA 689 16. Antero Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Aug. 25, 2009 Section 13 17. Bengzon v. Drilon 208 SCRA 133, 143-145 Section 14 18. Puyat v. De Guzman 113 SCRA 31 Section 16 19. Santiago v. Guingona 298 SCRA 756 20. Osmena v. Pendatun, supra 21. Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, January 28, 1997 22. U. S. v. Pons 34 PHIL 729 23. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez 7SCRA 347 24. Arroyo v. De Venecia 277 SCRA 268 Section 17 25. Lazatin v. HRET 168 SCRA 391 26. Bondoc v. Pineda 201 SCRA 792 27. Chavez v. Comelec 211 SCRA 315 28. Pimentel v. HRET 393 SCRA 227 29. Rep. Jovito Palparan, Jr. v. HRET, Feb. 11, 2010 30. Walden F. Bello v. COMELEC, Dec. 7, 2010 Section 18 31. Daza v. Singson 180 SCRA 496 32. Coseteng v. Mitra 187 SCRA 377 33. Guingona v. Gonzales 214 SCRA 789; MR 219 SCRA 326 Section 19 34. Wigberto Tanada vs. Comelec et. al., October 22, 2013 Section 21 and 22 35. Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee 203 SCRA 767 36. Camilo Sabio et al. v. Gordon et. al, October 17, 2006 37. Senate et. al. v. Ermita et al. April 20, 2006 38. Gudani et. al. v. Lt. Gen. Senga et. al. August 15, 2006 39. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability, G. R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 40. Reghis Romero v. Sen. Jinggoy Estrada et. al, April 2, 2009 Section 24 41. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 235 SCRA 630 42. Alvarez et. al. v. Guingona et. al. 252 SCRA 695 Section 25 43. Garcia v. Mata 65 SCRA 517 44. Demetria v. Alba 148 SCRA 208 45. Philconsa v. Enriquez 235 SCRA 506 Section 26 46. Philconsa v. Gimenez 15 SCRA 479 47. Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board 151 SCRA 208 48. Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra. 49. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra. 50. Tan v. Del Rosario 237 SCRA 324 Section 27 51. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra. 52. Gonzales v. Macaraig 191 SCRA 452 53. Bengzon v. Drilon, supra. 54. Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra. Section 28 55. Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas v. Tan 163 SCRA 371 56. Province of Abra v. Judge Hernando 107 SCRA 104 57. Abra Valley College v. Aquino 162 SCRA 106 Section 29 58. Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works 110 PHIL. 331 59. Aglipay v. Ruiz 64 PHIL 201 60. Guingona v. Carague 196 SCRA 221 61. Osmena v. Orbos 220 SCRA 703 62. Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra. Section 30 63. First Lepanto Ceramics Inc. v. CA 237 SCRA 519 64. Diaz v. CA 238 SCRA 785 Section 32 65. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Comelec 262 SCRA 292 H. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT (Article VII) Section 1 1. Marcos v. Manglapus 177 SCRA 668; 178 SCRA 760 2. Soliven v. Makasiar 167 SCRA 393 3. Review Center Association of the Phils. V. Eduardo Ermita, April 2, 2009 4. Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel, supra 5. Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commission of 2010/Lagman et. al. v. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, December 7, 2010 Section 13 6. Dennis funa vs. Agra, February 19, 2013 7. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 194 SCRA 317 8. Dennis Funa v. Executive Secretary, February 11, 2010 Section 15 9. Aytona v. Castillo 4 SCRA 1 10. IN Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. M.A. Valenzuela and Hon. P.B. Villarta as RTC Judges 298 SCRA 408 11. Arturo de Castro v. JBC and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, March 7, 2010 Section 16 12. Sarmiento v. Mison 156 SCRA 549 13. Bautista v. Salonga 172 SCRA 160 14. Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments 177 SCRA 259 15. Calderon v. Carale 208 SCRA 254 16. Tarrosa v. Singson 232 SCRA 553 17. Flores v. Drilon 223 SCRA 568 18. Luego v. Civil Service Commission 143 SCRA 327 19. Pobre v. Mendieta 224 SCRA 738 20. Arturo de Castro v. JBC and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, March 7, 2010 Section 17 21. Drilon v. Lim 235 SCRA 135 22. Villena v. Secretary of Interior 67 PHIL 451 23. Lacson-Magallanes Co. Inc., v. Pano 21 SCRA 395 24. City of Iligan v. Director of Lands 158 SCRA 158 25. Gascon v. Arroyo 178 SCRA 582 26. Kilusang Bayan v. Dominguez 205 SCRA 92 Section 18 27. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, August 15, 2000 28. Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34 150 SCRA 144 29. Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary January 14, 2004 30. Gudani et. al. v. Lt. Gen. Senga et. al. August 15, 2006 31. David et. al. v. Arroyo et. al. May 3, 2006 32. Salviar M. Kulay an et. al v. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan, et. al., G. R. No. 187298 Section 19 33. Torres v. Gonzales 152 SCRA 272 34. Monsanto v. Factoran 170 SCRA 190 35. People v. Salle Jr. 250 SCRA 581 36. Garcia v. COA 226 SCRA 356 37. Llamas v. Orbos 202 SCRA 844 38. Eduardo Kapunan v. Court of Appeals, March 13, 2009 Section 21 39. Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading 3 SCRA 351 Presidential Immunity from Suit 40. Lourdes Rubrico et. al. v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo et. al., February 18, 2010 I. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT (Article VIII) 1. 2. 3. 4. Hacienda Luisita Inc. vs. PARC et. al., November 22, 2011 Malaga v. Penachaos Jr. 213 SCRA 516 PACU v. Secretary of Education 97 PHIL 806 Mariano Jr. v. Comelec 242 SCRA 211 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. Macasiano v. NHA 224 SCRA 236 J. Joya v. PCGG 225 SCRA 586 Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra Bankers Association of the Phils. Vs. Comelec, Nov. 26, 2013 Kilosbayan v. Guingona Jr. 232 SCRA 110 Tatad v. Garcia Jr. 243 SCRA 436 Oposa v. Factoran, supra Kilosbayan v. Morato 246 SCRA 540 Atty. Oliver Lozano v. Speaker Propero Nograles, June 16, 2009 League of Cities of the Phils. V. Commission on Elections, Dec. 21, 2009 Venancio Inonog v. Judge Francisco Ibay, July 28, 2009 Biraogo v. Phils. Truth Commission of 2010/Lagman et. al. v. Exec. Sec. Ochoa Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal v. Pres. Electoral Tribunal, Nov. 23, 2010 Section 3 18. Bengzon v. Drilon, supra Section 4 19.Limketkai Sons Milling Inc. v. CA et al. September 5, 1996 Section 5 19. Drilon v. Lim 235 SCRA 135 20. Larranaga v. CA 287 SCRA 581 21. First Lepanto Ceramics Inc. v. Court of Appeals 237 SCRA 519 22. Aruelo v. CA 227 SCRA 311 23. Javellana v. DILG 212 SCRA 2475 24. Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from payment of legal fees, A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010 Section 6 25. Maceda v. Vasquez 221 SCRA 464 26. Raquiza v. Judge Castaneda Jr. 81 SCRA 235 Section 10 27. Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 152 SCRA 284 Section 11 28. De La Llana v. Alba 112 SCRA 294 29. People v. Judge Gacott Jr. 246 SCRA 52 Section 12 30. In Re: Manzano 166 SCRA 246 Section 14 31. Nicos Industrial Corp. v. CA 206 SCRA 127 32. Komatsu Industries (Phils.) Inc. v. CA 289 SCRA 604 33. Prudential Bank v. Castro 158 SCRA 646 34. Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals 293 SCRA 26 35. Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc v. Tan Tiong Bio AKA Henry Tan, October 6, 2010 Section 16 36. Valdez v. CA 194 SCRA 360 J. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS COMMON PROVISIONS Section 6 1. Aruelo v. CA 227 SCRA 311 2. Mamerto T. Sevilla vs. Comelec, March 19, 2013 Section 7 3. Cua v. Comelec 156 SCRA 582 4. Acena v. Civil Service Commission 193 SCRA 623 5. Vital-Gozon v. Court of Appeals 212 SCRA 235 6. Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer 135 SCRA 25 7. Mateo v. CA 247 SCRA 284 8. Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONS Section 2 9. TUPAS v. National Housing Corporation 173 SCRA 33 10. Salazar v. Mathay 73 SCRA 285 11. Corpus v. Cuaderno 13 SCRA 591 12. Luego v. Civil Service Commission 143 SCRA 327 13. PAGCOR v. Rilloraza June 25, 2001 14. SSS Employees Association v. Court of Appeals 175 SCRA 686 15. Lopez v. Civil Service Commission 194 SCRA 269 16. University of the Phils. And Alfredo de Torres v. CSC April 3, 2001 17. Navarro v. CSC 226 SCRA 522 18. Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy April 29, 1999 19. Santos v. Yatco 106 PHIL 745 20. CSC, Anicia De Lima v. Larry M. Alfonso, June 11. 2009 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Section 1 1. Cayetano v. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 2. Brillantes v. Yorac 192 SCRA 358 3. Lindo v. Comelec 194 SCRA 25 Section 2 4. Gallardo v. Judge Tabamo 218 SCRA 253 5. Relampagos v. Cumba 243 SCRA 690 6. Edding v. Comelec 246 SCRA 502 7. Regina Ongsiako Reyes vs. Comelec, October 22, 2013 8. Jose Miguel Arroyo vs. DOJ et. al., July 23, 2013 9. Salic Dumarpa vs. Comelec, April 2, 2013 10. Marc Douglas Cagas vs. Comelec, October 25, 2013 11. Comelec v. Judge Silva et. al. 286 SCRA 177 12. Torres v. Comelec 270 SCRA 583 Section 3 13. Sarmiento v. Comelec 212 SCRA 307 14. Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro 244 SCRA 41 Section 4 15. National Press Club v. Comelec 207 SCRA 1 16. Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils. V. GMA 289 SCRA 337 17. Adiong v. Comelec 207 SCRA 712 18. Sanidad v. Comelec 181 SCRA 529 19. Social Weather Stations v. Comelec May 5, 2001 20. Mitmug v. Comelec 230 SCRA 54 COMMISSION ON AUDIT Section 2 1. Guevarra v. Gimenez 6 SCRA 813 2. Orocio v. COA 213 SCRA 109 3. Osmena v. COA 238 SCRA 463 4. Sambeli v. Province of Isabela 210 SCRA 80 5. Bustamante v. COA 216 SCRA 134 6. Saliguniba v. COA 117 SCRA 669 7. Rebecca Barbo v. Commission on Audit, October 10, 2008 Section 3 8. PAL v. COA 245 SCRA 39 9. Bagatsing v. Committee on Privitization 246 SCRA 334 K. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. PD. 1606 amended by Republic Act No. 7975 and R. A. No. 10660 Nunez v. Sandiganbayan 111 SCRA 433 Republic Act No. 6770 Garcia v. Mojica 314 SCRA 207 Santiago v. Sandiganbayan 356 SCRA 636 Francisco v. House of Representatives et. al. Nov. 10, 2003 L. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY 1. Republic v. Villanueva 114 SCRA 875 2. Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome 114 SCRA 799 3. Director of Lands v. IAC 146 SCRA 509 4. Godines v. Pak Luen 120 SCRA 223 5. Phils. Ports Authority v. Mendoza 138 SCRA 632 6. The Secretary of DENR v. Mayor Jose Yap et. al October 8, 2008 7. Republic of the Philippines v. CA August 6, 2008 8. Province of North Cotabato v. The Government 9. Nicasio Alcantara v. DENR, July 31, 2008 10. Oroport Cargohandling Services Inc. v. Phividec Industrial Authority, July 28, 2008 M. ESTACS 1. 2. 3. 4. Miriam College Foundation v. CA 348 SCRA 265 U.P. v. Civil Service Commission April 3, 2001 Guingona v. Carague 196 SCRA 221 Republic Act No. 8371 5. Separate Opinion of Chief Justice Puno in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of the DENR et. al. December 6, 2000 N. GENERAL PROVISIONS 1. 2. 3. 4. Republic Act No. 6975 Carpio v. Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290 Manalo v. Sistoza 312 SCRA 239 Himagan v. People 237 SCRA 538 O. AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. . De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602 (1987) Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774 (1967) Imbong v. Comelec 35 SCRA 28 (1970) Occena v. Comelec, 104 SCRA 1 (1981) Tolentino v. Comelec 41 SCRA 702 (1971) Sanidad v. Comelec 73 SCRA 333 (1976) Santiago v. Comelec (G.R. 127325, March 19, 1997) R.A. No. 6735 Gonzales v. Comelec 21 SCRA 774 Defensor-Santiago v. Comelec March 19, 1997 Lambino et. al. v. Comelec October 25, 2006