Uploaded by Parth Hedaoo

Knorr case

Knorr: Unlocking The Market Potential
Jaydeep Mukherjee
Professor - Marketing
Management Development Institute
The Indian packaged soup market was a consolidated one, where the top three players
currently accounted for more than 90% of the market by value and volume. Hindustan Unilever
Limited (HUL) with its Knorr brand dominated the category with over half the market share.
However, over the last 3 years soup sales were slowing down, category penetration had stabilized at
5%. The average consumption was stagnant; unit price increases were driven value growth. Also,
almost half the sales volume came from less than a fifth of consumers. A new CEO of the food
business had been bought in two years back, and there were many questions in her mind about the
company’s current approach being robust enough to unlock the full potential of the category in India.
Was there an opportunity in increasing consumption by providing more relevant consumption triggers
and a more differentiated product basket? Or did the opportunity lie in segmenting consumers by need
states, and targeting more niches even in such a low penetration category?
As part of extending the product usage and addressing an additional need state for
consumption, Knorr instant soup called ‘Cup-a-soup’ was launched in Jan 2012. Instant soups were
expected to get some additional consumers and lead to some additional consumption also. But with
distribution limited to Modern trade outlets and practically nil marketing support, the company had
signalled that it was not really expecting instant soups to be a significant growth driver. However, the
category witnessed a steep growth when Capital Foods Ltd., an Indian company extended its “Ching’s
Secret” (henceforth referred to as Ching’s) brand of soups and noodles by introducing instant soups in
January 2013. Their launch was accompanied by an impactful promotional burst -mostly using the
outdoor medium –which stole a march over Knorr. Within just one year of launch, Ching’s enjoyed a
70% share of the instant soups market, and the sub category of instant soups had grown to over 10%
of the entire soup category in this period.
Knorr’s strategy thus far had been along classic market development lines -starting with a
base product portfolio to drive penetration, and adding the more evolved and differentiated products
once the market was seeded for the basic product. The success of Ching’s instant soups showed that
there was an opportunity to expand the category and quickly gain market share by doing things
At the beginning of 2014, the key questions going through the CEO’s mind were: Which
approach would yield faster growth – a classic market seeding approach, which created enablers along
the 4 P’1s to stimulate demand. Or a more radical approach, which made dramatic changes, especially
on the product front to make consumers sit up and take notice of the category.
In the next 5 years, the category was expected to grow at a CAGR of 15 %. A slight reduction
in the prices was expected due to an increase in the intensity of the competition and extending
4 P’s stands for Product, Price, Promotion and Place elements of marketing mix
consumption beyond the current core segment. HUL wanted a significant piece of this growth because
Unilever – HUL’s parent organisation - was relying on Knorr, and specifically Knorr soups to be the
engine of growth for the food business in India. Going forward, the decision on the strategy for Knorr
soups had to be taken quickly, as the stakes in the India food business were very high at Unilever, and
could determine the course of other parts of the food business.
Company and brand background
In 1931, Unilever set up its first Indian subsidiary, Hindustan Vanaspati Manufacturing
Company, followed by Lever Brothers India Limited (1933) and United Traders Limited (1935). In
November 1956, these three companies merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited. In June 2007, the
company was renamed Hindustan Unilever Limited. The vision of the company included the
following four pillars:
We work to create a better future every day.
We help people feel good, look good and get more out of life with brands and
services that are good for them and good for others.
We will inspire people to take small everyday actions that can add up to a big
difference in the world.
We will develop new ways of doing business that will allow us to double the size of
our company while reducing our environmental impact.
HUL was one of the well diversified and consistently growing consumer products businesses
in India. Its financial performance in 2013-14 was indicative of its overall stable growth trend for
many decades. Compared to the previous financial year, the domestic consumer, business grew by 9%
(with 4% underlying volume growth, which was better than the market). Profit before interest and
taxes grew by 12%, and cash generated from operations was over Rs2 50 Billion for the year, an
increase of around 10% over the previous year.
Overall Foods and particularly savoury were a disproportionately small Unilever business in
India. It was also small relative to nearest competitor Nestle, whose culinary business was around Rs
29.52 Billion in India. The per capita consumption of the company’s savoury products in India (soups,
noodles, meal makers) was not even at 20% of the level in Pakistan, and way behind countries like
Indonesia and Brazil. HUL’s Indian Foods business was around Rs. 12.32 Billion, of which ‘savoury’
(Soups, Meal makers and Noodles) contributed around 15%. The portfolio in India was noticeably
different as compared to the global ‘savoury’ portfolio, which was lead by Cooking Products with
45% share of the business. Unilever believed that the food business in India was a huge potential
growth opportunity which could be unlocked with the right strategy.
Historically, the HUL food business in India has had forays into some other savoury
categories, many of which had not been successful. Knorr was launched in India through soups in
1999. This is the one product platform that was consistently supported, but required the creation of a
new habit in the market. Over the years, several products had been added in the Knorr brand portfolio,
they included ‘Soupy Snax’; ‘Gravy Base’; Mealmakers; Seasonings and Noodles.
The philosophy of Knorr brand was centred on high quality, and it prided itself on a genuine
understanding of local flavours. Knorr soups, though not the pioneer; could be credited with
establishing the category of “ready to cook” soups in India. With a wide number of variants, it had a
Rs = Indian Rupee, where 1US $ = 60 Rs.
flavour to literally suit every taste palate; and it was backed by HUL’s very powerful marketing and
distribution capability. The product range included the ‘Classic’ range of soups with flavours like
‘Thick Tomato’, ‘Mixed Vegetable’ and ‘Chicken Delite’. The Chinese range had flavours like
‘Sweet Corn Vegetable’, ‘Sweet Corn Chicken’, ‘Hot and Sour’ and the ‘Instant Soups’ range had
‘Tomato’, ‘Mast Masala’ and ‘Mixed Vegetable’. Knorr’s portfolio in India was expanded with the
launch of the Knorr Soupy Noodles range: a unique product which brought together the fun of
noodles - immensely popular in India - with the health and goodness of soups. It was available in four
variants: ‘Mast Masala’, ‘Tomato Chatpata’, ‘Chinese Chow’ and ‘Yummy Chicken’. Knorr, in India
was focused on empowering homemakers and enabling them to make healthy, wholesome and
delicious food options. Knorr’s value proposition was that, Knorr Ready to Cook helped the consumer
make her family's favourite dishes at home and helped her get restaurant like taste at home itself.
Soups in the context of food in India
Indian food habits were as diverse as the country itself; and like Indian culture, Indian food
too had been influenced by various civilizations. So, across the country, hundreds of distinct palates
existed, sometimes changing with every few kilometres. One of the drivers of food habits had also
been the diversity of weather conditions, which, along with local availability, impacted the choice of
foods. However, at a broad level, the core of the traditional Indian meal structure had remained
largely the same - with three main eating occasions - breakfast, lunch and dinner – punctuated by
numerous snacking occasions.
The typical Indian main meal was a balanced one, a healthy mix of cereals like rice or wheat,
vegetables and pulses, meat/poultry/fish. Most families across India relied on this for nourishment and
sustenance through the day. Since the bulk of nourishment expectations was loaded onto main meals,
the area of snacking had over time become a journey of discovery and experimentation, of oral
gratification and enjoyment, of feel good and fun. The considerable time between meals, especially
the large gap between lunch and dinner, was thus addressed by a variety of snacks ranging from light
biscuits/chips to noodles to heavy fried items like “pakoras/samosas3”. In recent times, the snacking
space witnessed the entry of a large number of national and regional packaged snacks brands. This
had increased the options available to consumers (both for at home and out of home consumption),
accelerated the move from unbranded to branded products, and further increased snacking occasions.
In many ways, soups were not a natural fit with the Indian main meal structure. To begin
with, unlike the western meal format, where every meal was served course by course, the ‘thali’
concept was at the core of Indian meals. In a ‘thali’, all items were served together and were eaten
together; and the soup doesn’t find a place in the traditional Indian ‘thali’. Further, Indian cooking
had no concept of stock, the process which was intrinsic to soup making as the western world knew it.
And finally, soups are quite contrarian to the typical snacking codes of crispy, crunchy, tasty delights
with a high degree of play value.
In terms of consumption, traditionally soups in India had out of home, special occasion
associations, like wedding dinners and restaurants, or visits to the cooler climes of hill stations. Soups
were strongly perceived as a ‘winter’ product; not suited for the tropical hot climate prevalent in most
parts of the country, for most part of the year. The only home consumption where soups were
acceptable across the country was as a patient’s diet, as it was considered healthy, nutritious and
bland, hence easy to digest. An exception to these general ‘principles’ around soup was the popularity
of ‘Rasam” in south India, a liquid like preparation of lentils with black pepper and tamarind or
Traditional Indian snacks, with taste and belly fill attributes
tomato, usually eaten with rice or prior to a meal. But beyond Rasam, there were not too many
examples of a “liquid” preparation being consumed for sustenance or snacking. In fact, it was
debatable whether a “liquid” was at all considered “food” by most Indians. This perhaps was driven
by the “belly full” food culture of India, where solid food had a definite pre-eminence, and liquids
were associated more with drinks and beverages supporting the main meal.
As a result of all these factors, overall, there was no fixed perception about soup, what it was,
when it was to be consumed, etc. Hence, “soups”, as was understood by the western world had no
fixed role to play in the Indian menu in its current liquid format – either as a part of main meals or as
a snacking option.
Soups as a category in India
The Indian packaged soup market was essentially the ready to cook soup, where the soup was
packed in a powder form. Canned or preserved soups were more popular than ready to cook soups
internationally; however, they had an insignificant presence in India and were unlikely to do well in
the near future.
Hotels and restaurants were a large segment for soup preparation and consumption, but their
reliance on branded soup powders was practically nil. They prepared soups from scratch and partly as
a by-product of their cooking process. This added value from the perspective of authentic tastes, and
also helped them to substantially reduce costs. Thus, the ready to cook soups market was essential for
home consumption and marketing activities and spends in the category were specifically targeted at
home consumers.
The ready to cook soup category itself had two product types – cook up and instant. The
cook ups required the soup powder to be dissolved in water and boiled for around 5-7 minutes, while
the instant variance only required adding boiling water and stirring. The first launch in the packaged
soup category was an instant soup by a company called Nissin Foods, in the 1970s. It was way ahead
of its time and when the marketing initiatives could not build up a strong enough sales, it was
withdrawn. Cook up soups was introduced subsequently in late 1980’s and were able to sustain the
category after they were marketed aggressively. However, in their second innings, instant soups had
shot up to nearly 10% of the total category in just about a couple of years of their launch in early
Pack formats and prices were standard across the category. Cook ups were available in packs
that served four, and their maximum retail price (MRP) ranged from Rs 40 -45. Instant soups were
available in 1/2/4 serve packs at Rs10/20/45 respectively. The Knorr instant soup was available as a
single serve pack only.
Apart from HUL, the key players in the category were Nestle India and Capital foods.
Nestle’s soups were launched under its mega brand ‘Maggi’, which was the biggest instant noodle
brand in India. Capital Foods Ltd. a Mumbai based Indian company with its Ching’s range of soups
and noodles, was a major national player with strong presence in modern trade retail as well as
traditional retail outlets. The other competitors were MTR, Bambino and Sil, who had a limited
product range in the soup category, but were well known for other product categories, with good
distribution reach across some geographic regions in India. MTR was associated with pre-cooked and
instant mixes, Bambino had a variety of packaged food items like vermicelli, pasta etc. and Sil was
best remembered for its jams and custards. See Exhibit1 for the market size estimates. The soup
category was available in essentially the modern trade (which included the hypermarkets and
supermarkets) as well as the independent retailers (also called general trade). See Exhibit 2 for share
of sales from the different channels.
There were many different varieties of soups in the market, from ‘Mushroom’ to ‘Chinese
Manchurian’, from ‘Chicken Delight’ to ‘Mast Masala4’. However, only a few flavours were
consistently successful and the top four variants constituted 70% of the market (for both instant and
cook-up). The popularity was highest for Tomato, followed by Mixed Vegetable, Sweet Corn, and
Hot and Sour and this had remained constant across the period 2008-13. Knorr’s recent launch of the
instant tomato soup with croutons5 had also had an initial good response.
Soup consumption was primarily an urban market phenomenon and the demand was not
uniform across the regions. The ratio of sales in the cities of Mumbai (Western region), Delhi
(Northern region), Chennai (Southern region) and Kolkata (Eastern Region) was in the ratio 3:3:2:1.
There were differences in the shares of the different brands in the top four markets of India. October
to February contributed almost 75% of soups sales; hence, ensuring the commercial viability of
distribution set up during lean months was difficult. The problem was more acute for brands with
lesser market share.
Consumer behaviour
Soups seemed to be an “out of sight, out of mind” category, with low felt need to begin with.
Relatively speaking, the more affluent were found to adopt the product faster. The exposure/ trial to
soups in restaurants had some anecdotal linkage with soup adoption for home consumption. But
consumption by household type was in line with the overall demographics in India - families,
followed by two member homes, and then single person homes.
Soups were a low interest category, and there was not much of active advocacy by current
users. Even the role of the distribution channel was restricted to just stocking and running promotions
so that the consumers in turn stocked up. But anecdotal evidence suggested that many a times, the
trigger for consumption happened via trial at a friend’s/relatives home. Goodness was an important
reason to enter the category, as soups were considered intrinsically healthy. Characteristics of light
filler, mood enhancement (soothing, warmth) were other reasons for adoption. There was also a clear
correlation of sales with marketing initiatives like advertisements, trials, consumer promotion, etc.
Thus a significant part of the increase in sales was possibly coming from repeat purchasers. However,
the category suffered from low adoption rate post trial. After the initial excitement, the trial was not
found to translate into regular consumption. Category consumption remained low at 2 packs per
annum, with heavy users being those who consumed a pack every 2 months!
Commonly stated reasons for the less than enthusiastic adoption was high cost, presence of
added preservatives in the formulation, and a bland taste. So interestingly, the taste was both a reason
for consuming soups, and also one of the reasons for not consuming soups.
Despite significant and sustained marketing attempts to peg soups as a snack, the
substitutability with snacks in actual practice remained low. Twice the number of consumers
substituted soup consumption with another beverage, as opposed to substituting it with a snack. The
liquid nature of soups was probably at play here, and a soupy noodle was perhaps not on top of
consumer’s mind to impact this aspect.
Indian word for spices/spicy
Pieces of fried bread
The low relevance of soups was underscored by consumer scepticism about its suitability for
various demographics. Many perceived it to be relevant for kids and elders, though the reality was
that most kids did not like the taste of soups. One of the most common responses to soups across
different consumers was that “it’s not for me”. Thus, there was possibly a need to provide a strong
trigger for consumption, to build a strong soup consumption habit at a faster rate to accelerate growth.
Though, the convenience driven instant soups had certainly emerged as a segment, overall the
market size and penetration were too small to really look at market segmentation from the product
variant point of view. The HUL team had considered potential segments at the top end of the market,
with flavours driven by popular international cuisines like Spanish and Mexican. But they had
concluded that it was not a path to pursue, as it would be akin to creating a "niche within a niche".
Northern and Western India with the biggest two metropolitan cities of Delhi and Mumbai,
accounted for 65% of soup consumption in India. The inherent experimental nature of the northern
consumer was possible one driver. The other reason was the weather, since sales showed a spike in
December and January, the winter months in the North, and monsoon (rainy) months in the West
which lasted from June to September.
HUL’s Knorr strategy
The Indian food culture has always been a hub of fusion and seemingly contradictory trends.
While the traditional main meal was sacrosanct, in parallel, there was a growing trend to try
adventurous new foreign foods and regional cuisines. Similarly, cooking the traditional way went
hand in hand with a greater dependence on convenience solutions, especially in the urban India.
Soups were seen as being a part of the modern food basket, but costly on a per serving basis,
compared to many other products. The category being in the introduction stage of its life cycle was
expected to attract the experimental, affluent, urban Indians as potential early adopters.
One of the challenges facing every Indian homemaker was to provide a variety of food
options, especially for food outside the traditional main meals. This clamour for variety was
especially driven by children, who always hankered for something new, something different. The
toddlers ate what the mother provided; the grownups used their pocket money in having snacks of
their choice and were beyond the mothers focus area. Hence the tussle was between the children and
mothers, where mothers controlled the options available, but they possibly could not force her
children beyond a point of resistance.
Mothers, however were the gatekeepers, in charge of the food that was procured and served in
most Indian households. Thus, HUL had targeted mothers with kids between 7 -12 years, as the core
audience to build its Soup category in India. See Exhibit 3 for a sketch of the Knorr soup’s target
consumer. The brand promoted the concept of enhancing the soup with the addition of some chopped
vegetables, which potentially pressed many right buttons. Firstly, it made the home maker feel in
control of the food she provided. Secondly, it helped her deliver variety, and also helped her address
the personal tastes and preferences of different family members.
Apart from whom to target, a key challenge was where and how to position the product. The
urban, metropolitan food habit included breakfast, lunch and late dinner. There was a considerable
gap between lunch and dinner, a space where a heavy as well as light snack could fit in depending on
the specific need state of the consumer. However, for a soup, the problem of this space was that it
would end up competing with a variety of products. From the evening tumbler of milk to other
traditional fried snacks, to packaged baked or fried snacks. Milk was considered healthy by mothers,
but was resisted by most children as not tasty and boring (even after the addition of some flavour and
taste enhancing additives). Other snacks which were acceptable to children were either considered
less healthy by the mother, or were inconvenient to prepare. Many snacks were perceived to be too
heavy on the stomach, which could adversely impact the dinner intake, something which the home
maker didn’t want to compromise on.
There was thus a very clear need for healthy, tasty and reasonably light snack during the
evening. The 7 p.m. slot was identified as one that could give a peg to consumption (4-6 p.m. was a
heavy snacking slot). It was considered the time of the day when you need “a snack that fills the
hunger, but does not spoil appetite for dinner”. In 2009, Knorr was positioned to fulfil this need state
as a tasty 7 p.m. snack with 100% real vegetables. The campaign idea was “child’s tummy is happy
and mummy is also happy”. See Exhibit 4 for some of the advertising copy of Knorr.
This was an attempt to address two biggest barriers to soup consumption, lack of clarity on
why and when to have soups, and overcome the perception of soups as bland, boring, and unexciting.
A popular film star Kajol was the model in the campaign, to inspire habit change and add the
operational touch to the product.
In 2013 communication of Knorr, another barrier was sought to be addressed: the limited
consumption due to kids perceiving soups as not being tasty. In fact, research revealed that many
children had a preconceived notion that soups were not tasty and expressed surprise when they
actually tasted the soup. Thus the objective was to bring alive the exciting taste of Knorr soups by
advertising exciting “Chinese flavours” and by migrating the mother to chefman-ship. This was
captured as “Unbelievable Taste of packaged soup”. Campaign idea for 2013-15: Chef’s Challenge Everyone will love Knorr Soups (Hindi: Sab chatt kar jaaenge). HUL used its financial strength to
dominate the media. See Exhibit 5 for the media spends details in the category. Additionally, the
lower priced single serve Rs 10 pack was promoted as a penetration driver pack.
Competitive landscape
Nestle India
Nestle, HUL’s biggest competitor in soup category, was present across a variety of categories,
with some very powerful brands in India. Nestle launched soups under the umbrella of brand ‘Maggi’
during the late 1980’s. This was the time when Maggi had become one of the ‘top of mind’ brands
among urban Indians, thanks to its success in the instant noodles category as a ‘fast to cook, good to
eat’ convenient snack. Though instant noodles were perceived as not healthy by the homemaker,
children had a tremendous liking for its taste and the brand enjoyed one of the biggest franchises
among the children. During that time, though the upper end of the urban population was exposed to
soups through the proliferation of Chinese cuisine. Still, the ready to cook soup category did not find
acceptance in the market.
Nestle re-launched soups again in 1990’s in a ‘thick’ format highlighting a good belly-fill.
However, the response was lukewarm and they reasoned that the product failure was because the
product was not liked by their primary target market of the brand, the children aged 8 to 15 years.
Children were consuming soups not on their own will but under pressure from their mothers.
Research suggested that, adults and elders were the regular consumers of Maggi soups, hence Nestle
changed the composition of their soups in 2012 and re-positioned them as “Maggi Healthy Soups”.
These soups were made using Nestlé’s newly patented ‘granulation based technology’, designed to
retain the freshness of key ingredients and deliver a multi-sensorial experience. They contained fresh
vegetable purées and delivered the taste and aroma close to home-made soups. Maggi Healthy Soups
value proposition lived up to Maggi’s generic promise of Taste and Health, and also built on it by
providing the additional promise of low fat, low cholesterol, no added mono sodium glutamate (which
was considered harmful to health), no added preservatives or synthetic colours. These soups were
available in eight varieties. The Classic range of soups comprised Rich Tomato, Cream of Mushroom,
Mixed Vegetable, Creamy Chicken. The Chinese range was available in Hot and Sour, Sweet Corn,
Manchow and Chicken Sweet Corn.
Due to the financial clout and product development capability of the multinational parent
company, very strong brand franchise of Maggi, and a well-established distribution network in India,
Maggi soups were potentially the biggest competitor for Knorr. However, the activity level and
aggression in the market was low, possibly because Maggi soups contributed only 2% to the sales of
the Maggi brand, and the category itself had not grown significantly. See Exhibit 6 for some
promotions of Maggi Soups.
Capital Foods
Capital Foods owned the Ching’sbrand, was launched in 1996 as an Authentic Chinese Food
Ingredients Brand. The company established its authenticity by developing key ingredients in each of
Ching’sproducts from documented work of Chinese chefs. They tried to increase the market of the
brand by extending their soups portfolio of products like microwaveable pouched products, frozen
entrees, samosas, naan breads and paranthas. Chings considered themselves to be in the business of
elevating the experience of food consumption by integrating international foods for the global
populace for a variety of ethnic cuisines such as Chinese, Thai, Italian, Indian and European. The
company had three manufacturing facilities and apart from marketing their own brands in India and
exporting them, it was a leading ‘Private Label’ manufacturer in the processed food business globally.
Their clients included some of the most popular and well-known brands in the world.
The lead role for Ching’s soups was played by instant soup, and its positioning focused on the
‘simple and convenient’ way of making it by pouring the powder in a bowl of hot water. This opened
up avenues of individual consumption inside the home and became a potential vehicle to address the
varying needs of individual family members. See Exhibit 7 for promotional materials of Ching’s
Choices the CEO faced
Soups were thus far a low penetration category in India, positioned as a healthy snack and had
appealed in the urban metropolitan markets. With urbanization, increase in organized retail,
increasing incomes, and changing lifestyles there was likely to be a natural growth in the soups
market. This natural growth could be further enhanced by the addition of new flavours, the
introduction of single use packs, and reduction in prices.
But if Knorr soups had to be the engine of growth for the HUL food business in India, it
needed a strategy to accelerate growth at a much faster pace than had happened so far. Also, as the
category leader, it needed to lead the way in the market too, as it stood to lose the most through
intensified competition as the category grew. The major focus thus had to be to expand the market,
more dramatically.
The questions facing the CEO were many. While the base soup product was the dominant part
of the market, was that a result of actions by players in the market, or was that really driven by
consumer preferences? Was “lightness” as a selling proposition viable in the long run, given the
“belly full” Indian food culture? While the current portfolio of products provided a variety of
flavours, did it fall short of other key elements of Indian food semiotics, such as texture and bite?
The recent successes of Ching’s instant soups, and HUL’s own instant soup with croutons,
suggested that there was the opportunity for creating preference through differentiation even in this
low market penetration. Further, the consumer traction with the more substantial soups – tomato soup
with croutons and products like soupy noodles –reinforced the thought taking root at HUL that
perhaps a more un-soup approach was needed to create the desired impact on the market.
If being differentiated was key to developing the category, then should HUL stick to its tried
and tested approach to market development, or should it make some bold moves in terms of product
innovation for discontinuous growth.
There was a possibility that most new users may be attracted to the category with more
exciting products. At the same time, given that bulk of the sales was accounted for by heavy users,
there was a need to keep the excitement going for them too. So, new exciting products could actually
kill two birds with one stone.
With the current strategy, soups were slotted in the evening time, and faced stiff competition
from other traditional and non-traditional snacks (like biscuits, snack bars etc.). Would a move away
from “lightness” open up more consumption occasions? Would a “mealy” soup also open up not just
consumption occasions between meals, but also be a viable option for the main meals, where the
home maker was starting to add items from the modern food basket to add variety, especially for
Globally, HUL had in its portfolio soups with dumplings/ other add-ons, which would take
the product into a heavier snacking realm. But would this make more potential consumers sit up and
take notice of soups? The CEO was convinced that it was time to think through these various, related
issues. There was a significant investment required to completely revamp the product portfolio, and
the Knorr team needed to think through whether the gains from the revamp would not just offset the
costs, but a jump start Knorr soups into a different league in India. 2014 was the year to relook at the
Knorr strategy and embark on a growth trajectory.
Exhibit 1: Market Size of soups category from 2008-2013
Value in Rs.
Volume in Kilo
Source: Industry Estimates
Exhibit 2: The % share of sales across distribution channels from 2008-2013
Hyper markets
Super Markets
Independent retailers
Source: Industry Estimates
Exhibit 3: Target Consumer of Knorr
She was a homemaker and is proud of being one. She aspired to be a perfectionist in whatever she
did. Her life revolved around her family, and the food she cooked expresses her and which was why
she tried new ways of expressing it.
She took her role of the ‘food provider’ very seriously and was always striving to ensure that her
family and her kids to enjoy what they eat without compromising on their health.
During formal meal occasions she provided nutrition/healthy food to her kids, however the evening
snack time was where she allowed her kid to indulge.
Source: Company sources
Exhibit 4: Some select Knorr campaigns
Source: Internet images
Exhibit 5: Media spends in the soups category in Rs millions
2014 (Jan -Mar)
Source: Advertising agency database
Exhibit 6: Some select campaigns of Maggi Soups
Source: Internet images
Exhibit 7: Some select campaigns of Ching’s Secret
Source: Internet images