1NC
1nc Invade North Korea
The United States federal government should
-
-
Invade North Korea
Cooperate with China in creation of Buffer Zone
Offer demilitarization/neutralization of Korean peninsula in exchange for China helping rebuild
North Korea
Cooperate with South Korea to make North Korea a protectorate with gradual integration into
the South Korean economic and political structure through a multi-decade reunification
roadmap
Maxwell planks
Invading North Korea would be successful – it won’t result in Korean Nuclear war, Chinese
intervention, or a large-scale quagmire
Gobry 1/7/15 – Pascal-Emmanuel, senior research analyst for Business Insider Intelligence, MSc in
management from HEC Paris, “The case for invading North Korea”
http://theweek.com/articles/441214/case-invading-north-korea
If someone disputes that there is a moral imperative toward regime change in North Korea — I do not want
to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind. The only question remains: is it feasible? I would like to argue that it is. 1. The
military aspect This is obviously the trickiest part. North Korea has nukes, as well as countless artillery positions trained on Seoul and
South Korea. Any attempt at regime change in North Korea must destroy their offensive capabilities in one
strike. U.S. forces should be able to destroy all of North Korea's artillery in one strike.
one thing that the
After all, if there's
U.S. military is very good at, it's launching enormous amounts of rockets and bombs with
great precision . With satellite, any significant artillery positions are known . Given the U.S.'s
overwhelming technological advantage and total dominance of the sky, and the effect of surprise, it
should not be impossible to pull off. The key question, then, is North Korea's nuclear weapons, and this
is a question that no one without access to classified information can answer. But the North Korean
regime does not possess many warheads . They cannot be stored in many locations. And it stands to reason
that the
U.S. intelligence community has been hard at work figuring out where they are, and figuring
out a plan on how to get to them . If that could be pulled off, it's possible North Korea could fall quickly,
with little harm to anyone outside the country.
(By the way, when the regime falls on its own, as it inevitably must, what
will happen to its warheads, and how hard will it be to get them into good hands then?) Those are big "if"s, but military
history is full
of stunning successes that were once deemed impossible, like the German push through the Ardennes, D-Day, and the
Israeli Air Force's total destruction of the Egyptian Air Force in one strike in the Six Day War.
2. The geopolitical aspect This
would make everyone unhappy. South Korea is not exactly fond of the status quo, but neither is it fond of a
unification that would drag down its economy. And China would be particularly unhappy, since it views North
Korea as a useful pawn. But that makes it an accomplice with the North Korean regime. And although China
would be very unhappy , it would ultimately come to live with it. First, China is not going to nuke
the U.S. over North Korea . Second, we should remember that the Chinese leadership is fundamentally
obsessed with keeping growth and employment up so that their people don't revolt against them.
And given
that serious economic or political retaliation against the U.S. would hurt that goal more than
it would hurt the U.S., they will abstain from much more than gesticulation. The U.S. should be
overwhelmingly generous in logistical, humanitarian, and financial support for the North Koreans that
will surely try to immigrate to China. It should even assist China in creating a buffer zone within North
Korea so that it's not overwhelmed with refugees , which is China's main fear relating to a North Korean regime collapse.
China might even welcome the new situation : The North Korean regime has recently gone "rogue" in
its relationship with China and is today as much a headache for China as it is for everyone else. If the
U.S. offers the demilitarization and neutralization of the Korean Peninsula to China in exchange for
helping rebuild North Korea, China would actually come out ahead by removing U.S. troops from the
Peninsula. 3. Nation-building I opposed the war in Iraq. I thought what would happen was...exactly what happened. Iraq
never was a nation, it is a bundle of fractious ethnicities and loyalties only held together by an
authoritarian regime. So I get the skepticism towards nation building. But there's only one thing more stupid than
thinking that with some magic pixie dust Iraq could turn into Switzerland: thinking that because nation-building failed in Iraq, it can never
succeed. In 2003, the conventional thinking was that nation-building was a cake-walk; today, it is that nation-building is impossible — dare I
suggest
the true answer is somewhere in between ?
Here's a radical idea: East
Asia and the Middle East are
actually
different places . North Korea has a unified country, language, culture, and ethnicity . After the
regime falls, no one will fight for the Juche idea or the North Korean regime , which everyone in
North Korea hates . (If you think that just because people see regime propaganda all day every day they
believe it, you have a poor grasp of history and an even poorer view of human nature.) You know
what would really help nation-building in North Korea? What if there was a huge reservoir of people
of the same ethnicity, language, and culture? What if those people were all already from an advanced
economy with the rule of law and democracy and modern institutions and could really help the
country adapt to the 21st century? What if they were all conveniently located right next to North
Korea, and what if their government had a massive interest in stabilizing the region? Maybe on the southern border. We could call that place
"South North Korea", or "South Korea" for short
. If such a place existed, that would make facile parallels to Iraq
look really dumb, wouldn't it? Immediate unification would lead to massive chaos. Instead, the
South should run the North as a kind of protectorate
— people
who have been living under
totalitarianism for decades can't be switched over to democracy overnight, that lesson of Iraq is valid — a kind
of giant Hong Kong or charter city, with civil liberties and the rule of law and all those good things .
Instead of millions of famished North Korean refugees dragging down the South's economy, North Korea
will find comparative advantage providing cheap labor for South Korean, Chinese, and Japanese
companies as the first step on the economic development ladder . Democratization would proceed in
a slow process , starting with local governance and moving on from there, within the context of a
multi-decade roadmap to reunification.
1nc a2: quagmire/insurgency DA planks
-
Influence campaign on the general North Korean public to hedge against government-sponsored
propaganda
Influence campaign on second-tier North Korean officials and the North Korean military to
maintain governmental, WMD caretaking, and stability roles
Establish a “north Korean- hands” program to prepare for the collapse
Engage in contingency planning with China to increase transparency and coordination over the
invasion.
Maxwell 10 – David S., US Army Special Forces officer with extensive experience in Asia to include Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. He is
a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, and the National War College, National
Defense University. He is currently a member of the faculty at the National War College. The opinions expressed in this paper are the author’s
and do not represent National Defense University, Department of Defense or U.S. Government positions, “Irregular Warfare on the Korean
Peninsula Thoughts on Irregular Threats for north Korea Post-Conflict and Post-Collapse: Understanding Them to Counter Them”
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/irregular-warfare-on-the-korean-peninsula
Dealing with the Worse Case: The Kim Family Regime’s Legacy of Irregular Threats If in taking a native den one thinks chiefly of the market that
he will establish there on the morrow, one does not take it in the ordinary way. --Lyautey: The Colonial Role of the Army, Revue Des Deux
Mondes, 15 February 19009 While planning has taken place at various times over the years to allow the alliance to react to such threats as
terrorism, use of WMD, humanitarian disaster and internally displaced persons/refugee flow and internal civil war two questions should be
asked: 1) Has the alliance prepared for the worse case and the worse case being an insurgency that opposes reunification following collapse of
the Kim Family regime? 2) What can and should be done prior to collapse to assist in mitigating the threats and shaping the outcome on the
Peninsula? Although
the “to do list” is long, there are five immediate actions that the alliance should
take to plan and prepare for the worse case . There are five key fundamental tasks that the ROK –US
alliance and the international community must do to prepare for the collapse of the Kim Family Regime.
These are by no means all of them; however, focusing on these five tasks
the effects of
will provide the foundation needed to mitigate
irregular threats and improve the conditions for successful alliance and international efforts to deal with
the effects of regime collapse.
First , a decision must be made as to the end state envision for the Korean
Peninsula. As stated the ROK-US alliance requires an end state that could be along these lines: A stable, secure, peaceful,
economically vibrant, non-nuclear peninsula, reunified under a liberal constitutional form of
government determined by the Korean people.10 It is imperative that an end state be decided upon not
only to provide focus
campaign
that is
of the end state, a
for planners and policy makers but also to
provide the foundation for an influence
critical to shaping the environment after
the
collapse
of the regime. Along with the establishment
decision must be made regarding Alliance transformation and leadership of operations
in north Korea. It is imperative that South Korea leads the effort in reunification
and operations in the north
because this
will help to undermine the 60 plus years of propaganda in which the South has been portrayed as a
puppet of the US. However, as evidenced by the so-called “OPCON transfer” that was originally scheduled for 2012 and was recently
pushed back until 2015, the ROK military is not yet fully resourced to conduct independent operations. In addition, the reality of the OPCON
transfer issue is not about solely about command and control of ROK military forces. This action is actually the dissolution of the ROK/US
Combined Forces Command (CFC) which has been one of the most effective combined commands in the world since 1978. It is commanded by
a US four star general with a ROK four star deputy. Rather
than dissolve CFC perhaps CFC should remain in tact and
the command should shift to a ROK four star general in command with a US four star deputy. In this way
the ROK would be in charge of operations in the north and would still be able to exploit the expertise
and full capabilities of the combined command .11 The second most important action is to exec ute
an influence campaign focusing on the second tier leaders to maintain control of their organizations
in order
to prevent attack and a future insurgency . The second tier leaders are those corps, maneuver, and special
operations commanders who control not only forces but also WMD capabilities. These
leaders are key to maintaining control
of the nKPA. In addition, an active influence campaign is necessary to prepare the north Korean population for
a post regime end state that results in a reunified Peninsula. This is the most difficult, complex and time
consuming effort but one that is critical to beginning to undo the sixty plus years of political and
social indoctrination
that has used the Juche ideology as a de facto religion as means of social control. Additionally, this
indoctrination has developed the highest levels of distrust and fear of outsiders which will make any stability operations
extremely difficult and makes the population ripe to support an insurgency especially, if that insurgency continues to perpetuate the Kim
Family regime myths of the legitimacy of north Korea being based on anti-Japanese partisan warfare. Following regime collapse antiJapanese
will be substituted with anti-foreigner. Furthermore,
a decision must be made to avoid the mistakes of the Iraq War .
The north Korean military must be kept intact , as it is one of the very few functioning institutions and can be a
critical component for maintaining internal stability as well as executing support and stabilization operations. Most
importantly
an intact military is one of the best methods to prevent a future insurgency . However, keeping
the military intact requires a successful influence campaign to lay the foundation for influencing those
commanders who can and should maintain control of their forces and work with the ROK military and
civilian leadership. Eight years after Operation Enduring Freedom began in Afghanistan, the “Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands” program was
developed. This was in recognition of the importance of having planners, both military and civilian, with sufficient cultural expertise to
understand the problems in the region and allow for effective plans and policies to be developed that are informed by cultural awareness and
understanding. The same mistake should not be made in terms of north Korea. Existing
ROK and US military and civilian
north Korean experts should be brought together and dedicated to planning for north Korean
collapse. An investment should be made in developing younger “north Korea-hands” to be ready to
deal with the aftermath of the Kim Family Regime. A competent staff and organization of experts cannot be created rapidly
after the crisis occurs. A ROK-US “north Korean- hands” program should be established immediately to
develop the expertise that will be required among ROK and US military and civilian security practitioners before the crisis
occurs. These north Korean Hands need to be from across the professional spectrum and assist in the
development of policy and strategy as well as the development of the campaign plan to deal with collapse. They will also
be able to assist in the training and readiness of the military forces and civilian agencies that will
execute the operations to achieve the end state of a reunified Korea. Lastly , an international coalition
must be established to support reunification of the Peninsula . Most importantly, the ROK and the US must
engage with China. Chinese actions will play a critical role in the outcome of crisis on the Peninsula in either
post-conflict or post-collapse. The ROK-US alliance and China must find common ground in interests and
through engagement and transparency develop plans and methods for minimizing the potential for
conflict between the alliance and China. Efforts to build an international coalition and engage with China must be undertaken
prior to the crisis of regime collapse . Reunification, while the responsibility of the ROK, will require enormous
resources not only in terms of manpower and material but also in terms of funding. There are numerous studies attesting to the huge costs
of reunification, costs that are likely to make German reunification pale in comparison because of the vast differences in infrastructure and
standards of living between north and South. However, failure
to support reunification efforts and quell an
insurgency in the north will, as already stated, likely bring instability
in terms of security to Northeast Asia but also have
global economic impact. It is in the interest of the regional powers as well as the global economic powers to support reunification. But
effort to build this coalition must occur now even if it is done behind closed doors
the
in order to prevent
political conflict prior to the collapse of the Kim Family Regime. In conclusion, the irregular threats that will be present on the Korean Peninsula
when the Kim Family Regime collapses will be extremely complex and dangerous. While the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been difficult,
the worse case scenarios on the peninsula will be far more difficult. The threats must be understood and planners and policy makers must take
an objective and realistic look at the problems that will have to be faced. While everyone may hope for a “soft landing” and peaceful
reunification, the alliance
and international community needs to prepare for the most likely and most
dangerous outcomes. This requires active preparatory actions
by the ROK-US alliance across the instruments of
national power. Planning is good, but preparation is better. While the Kim Family Regime has demonstrated enormous resiliency muddling
through severe internal crises since the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, a course of action cannot be to hope that it will continue to survive. The
pressures on north Korea are likely to someday cause attack or collapse, either of which will be catastrophic for the ROK, the region and
international community.
Solvency
2nc a2: no intel to strike
Our intelligence is precise on North Korean missile locations and capability – there is no risk
of missed coverage
Suri 13 – Jeremi, professor of history and public affairs at the University of Texas, Austin, “Bomb North
Korea, Before It’s Too Late” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/opinion/bomb-north-korea-beforeits-too-late.html
Thanks to precise satellite reconnaissance , striking the North Korean missile on the ground would
be much easier than after it was launched . Since the U nited S tates cannot possibly know the missile’s
trajectory before a launch, and Mr. Kim has said he is targeting America and its allies, we have reason to
believe that civilians face serious danger. Since a missile on the ground is an obvious and largely
undefended target, we can be reasonably sure that a strike would destroy it and preserve regional
stability and the safety of our allies . An American pre-emptive strike would also re-establish necessary red lines for North Korea
and other countries in similar circumstances.
2nc a2: north korean war DA
No risk of a North Korean war – China will rein in North Korea and Kim will understand
further attacks would be an act of suicide after imposition of a credible threat
Suri 13 – Jeremi, professor of history and public affairs at the University of Texas, Austin, “Bomb North
Korea, Before It’s Too Late” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/opinion/bomb-north-korea-beforeits-too-late.html
The North
Korean government would certainly view the American strike as a provocation, but it is unlikely that
Mr. Kim would retaliate by attacking South Korea, as many fear. First , the Chinese government would do
everything
it could to
prevent such a reaction. Even if they oppose an American strike, China’s leaders
understand that a full-scale war would be far worse . Second , Mr. Kim would see in the American strike
a renewed commitment to the defense of South Korea . Any attack on Seoul would be an act of
suicide
for him, and
he knows that. A war on the Korean Peninsula is unlikely after an American strike ,
but it is not inconceivable. The North
save face. Under
Koreans might continue to escalate, and Mr. Kim might feel obligated to start a war to
these unfortunate circumstances, the U nited S tates and its allies would still be better off
fighting a war with North Korea today, when the conflict could still be confined largely to the Korean
Peninsula. As North Korea’s actions over the last two months have shown, Mr. Kim’s government is willing to escalate its
threats much more rapidly than his father’s regime did. An unending crisis would merely postpone
war to a later date, when the damage caused by North Korea would be even greater.
2nc a2: china relations/china intervention
China won’t intervene if the US engages in direct and close consultations with China to not
occupy North Korea post-conflict
Suri 13 – Jeremi, professor of history and public affairs at the University of Texas, Austin, “Bomb North
Korea, Before It’s Too Late” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/opinion/bomb-north-korea-beforeits-too-late.html
China’s role in a potential war on the Korean Peninsula is hard to predict. Beijing will continue to worry about
the U nited S tates extending its influence up to the Chinese border. If armed hostilities erupt, President
Obama should be prepared for direct and close consultations with Chinese leaders to negotiate a
postwar settlement , in a larger multinational framework , that respects Beijing’s legitimate security
interests in North Korea . The U nited S tates has no interest in occupying North Korea. The Chinese are
unlikely to pursue an occupation of their own.
2nc invasion unpopular – public
Invasion is opposed by 70% of the American public
Lerner 13 – Mitchell, associate professor of history and director of the Institute for Korean Studies at
The Ohio State University, “Patience, Not Preemption, on the Korean Peninsula”
http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/patience-not-preemption-on-the-korean-peninsula/
Public opinion seems generally critical of the idea,
but there
is a growing minority that is clearly warming to
the proposition. An Ohio newspaper recently asked its online readers if they believed the U.S. should
“launch a preemptive strike” against the DPRK; 31% of the over 1,300 respondents replied in the
affirmative.
We’d Win – 2NC
We win the war – and it won’t go nuclear now
Dyer ‘10 – Ph.D. University of London, Journalist based in London (Gwynne, June 1, “ What would a war
with North Korea look like?”, Lexis)
Start with the worst-case scenario. What if there really were a war in the Korean peninsula? Even by local standards, the rhetoric has been
heated since the South Korean warship Cheonan was sunk by an explosion last March, killing 46 sailors, and it has been white-hot since
"independent investigators" reported on May 20 that a North Korean torpedo had struck the vessel. Everybody is on hair-trigger alert, and the
only communication between the two sides is by invective: North Korea has shut the "hot line" down. So suppose there is a local clash
somewhere along the DMZ, the demilitarized zone between the two countries that follows the 1953 ceasefire line, or at sea along the disputed
maritime frontier. Suppose it escalates: such things sometimes do. What
would a full-scale war between North and South
Korea look like? We are always told that North Korea has the fourth-largest army in the world, that it has heavy artillery within range of
the South Korean capital, Seoul (which it promises to turn into a "sea of fire" in case of war), and that it probably has nuclear weapons. So
would an inter-Korean war be a calamity? Yes, but mainly for the North. North Korea's weapons are a
long way from being state-of-the-art. Its air force is a flying scrapyard: around 400 Russian MiG-17, MiG-19 and Mig21 fighters or their Chinese equivalents (all designs that first flew in the 1950s or 1960s), and only three dozen relatively modern
Mig-29s that are reserved for the air defence of Pyongyang. It also has around 200 ground attack
aircraft, most of them equally antiquated. Imagine that Kim Jong-il gives the order, and the North Korean guns open up on
Seoul. The million-man army (half of which is kept within a few hours' drive of the DMZ) heads south, and
the bulk of the obsolete air force takes off to support them. Meanwhile, a shower of short-range ballistic
missiles, similar to the old Soviet-made Scuds, lands on air bases and command centres throughout South Korea.
What happens next depends on whether or not North Korea is using only conventional weapons. If it is,
then the attack fails quite fast. The North Korean air force is easily shot out of the sky, counter-battery
fire and air strikes destroy the artillery that is firing at Seoul, most of the Scud clones miss their targets,
and the North Korean divisions heading south across the DMZ are shredded by air power. No modern
army can survive without air cover: the ability of aircraft to kill ground targets with high accuracy and in large numbers had grown
a hundredfold since the Second World War. The South Korean and U.S. Air Forces have around 600 modern military
aircraft available in South Korea, and the U.S. can reinforce that number almost without limit in very
short order. A few hundred thousand North Koreans and a few tens of thousands of South Koreans would die in the
fighting, but nothing else of great moment would happen. It's not even likely that there would be a major counter-attack
into North Korea. Nobody would want to upset the Chinese by invading North Korea: better to leave the Pyongyang regime to fall of its own
weight after being humiliated by defeat. But that's what would happen if the North Koreans used only conventional weapons. Whether
or
not they have working nuclear weapons, they undoubtedly have chemical and biological weapons in
profusion. Wouldn't they use them? They almost certainly would. That would make the bombardment
of Seoul a much uglier affair, since civilians would have little protection against nerve gas or lethal bacteria, but it wouldn't
have much effect on the military outcome. The soldiers on both sides would have adequate protection,
and their operations would be equally hampered by the presence of such agents. Nuclear weapons are a
different matter, but it's far from certain that North Korea has any operational ones - that is, ones that
would work reliably, cause an explosion at least in the kiloton range, and are small enough to fit inside a
bomber or on top of a missile. More to the point, for North Korea to use such a weapon would be suicidal. The
nuclear retaliation of the United States would be rapid and overwhelming, and would effectively
exterminate the entire regime (together, unfortunately, with a lot of other people). But since the North
Koreans must know that, they would never act in a way that would bring that fate upon themselves.
Nuclear deterrence works.
Contingency Planning Key – 2NC
Contingency planning is key and solves crisis escalation.
Kydd, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, 8/3/2015 Andrew,
“Pulling the Plug: Can There Be a Deal with China on Korean Unification?” http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/pulling-plug-can-there-be-deal-chinakorean-unification
A suitable transition could be arranged with a referendum on unification and Korea-wide elections for a new parliament, which would highlight the role of all
Koreans in the process. If North Korean leaders prove unmoved by this vision, Chinese economic sanctions would confront them with a downward slope into
complete economic collapse. North Korea is dependent on China for energy and food.27 Hitherto, however dissatisfied China was with North Korean behavior,
there were strict limits on how much coercive leverage China could apply because it did not want the regime to collapse. With a negotiated deal in place, this
preference would disappear, and the self-imposed limits on China’s coercive leverage would disappear along with it. The
North could of course
threaten war, so the end-game would require delicate handling. which specifies what would
happen upon a DPRK collapse without taking active steps to hasten it . This would still be very
valuable because it would outline an agreement on how unification should unfold, fix
expectations about who does what, and greatly reduce the chance of confrontations and crisis
escalation
in the interior of the DPRK after
a collapse. With such a framework in place, we could then face
future provocations from the DPRK with greater equanimity and higher confidence that South
Korea, China, and the United States will find a common approach.
Contingency planning is key – prevents miscalc
Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, 12/23/2014 Richard, “Time to End the North Korean
Threat There are signs that Beijing is viewing the regime in Pyongyang as more strategic liability than asset.”
http://www.wsj.com/articles/richard-haass-time-to-end-the-north-korean-threat-for-good-1419376266
A debate is under way about how best to respond to North Korea’s cyberattack on Sony, an attack designed to punish the
firm for making a movie that humiliated Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un. Ideas range from a cyberattack to weaken North Korean political and military assets to
relisting the country as a state sponsor of terrorism, presumably accompanied by new
sanctions. These ideas are fine as far as they go, but they don’t
go far enough. The serious threat posed by North Korea far transcends cyberspace. Only one
approach is commensurate with the challenge: ending North Korea’s existence
as an independent entity and reunifying
the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang possesses between four and 10 nuclear devices as well as hundreds of short- and
intermediate-range missiles. The regime has active uranium enrichment and plutonium programs. It is only a
matter of time before North Korea can place a nuclear warhead on one or more of its missiles and produce missiles
capable of reaching the U.S. The regime is already a known proliferation threat —a decade ago it was helping to
build a nuclear reactor in Syria—and it
remains a potential source of missiles and nuclear materials to rogue states
and terrorists. North Korea also poses a serious conventional military threat. With a population of only 25 million, it
maintains the
fourth-largest standing armed forces in the world. North Korea’s active military forces are twice those of South Korea,
even though its population is only half that of its far wealthier southern neighbor. All this has a significant effect on U.S. defense planning.
There are
28,500 American troops stationed in South Korea; aggression by the North would instantly bring the
U.S. into a major , costly, dangerous war.
North Korea also is a threat to its own people. A United Nations Commission of Inquiry reported
earlier this year that it had committed crimes against humanity ranging from extermination and murder to enslavement and knowingly causing prolonged
starvation. The regime holds 100,000 political prisoners captive in gruesome conditions. The recent cyberattacks against Sony are hardly unique; North Korea has a
history of mounting such attacks against South Korean banks. There
is no evidence that negotiations, sanctions or anything
else have had or is having any effect on halting any of these activities. What has changed, though, are the attitudes of
North Korea’s neighbors, most important South Korea and China. For years governments in Seoul were at best lukewarm
toward the prospect of a unified peninsula, fearing the economic burden this would entail. But South Korean President Park Geunhye now speaks openly and frequently about the desirability of reunification, portraying it as a potential economic
bonanza. For decades Beijing has supported its North Korean ally out of a mixture of ideological commitment, strategic concerns (to keep
the peninsula from being united in the U.S. security orbit) and a desire to avoid refugee inflows. This support has been military, diplomatic and above all economic.
Almost all of North Korea’s foreign trade, as much as 90% by some estimates, is with China. Beijing provides what is in effect a massive subsidy as North Korea
imports far more from China, possibly as much as $1 billion annually, than it exports to China. Increasingly, though, one
encounters public and
private signs that Chinese officials are viewing North Korea as more strategic liability than asset. Beijing is
frustrated that Pyongyang ignores its requests to freeze or even dismantle its nuclear program lest these efforts lead South Korea and Japan to develop their own
nuclear weapons. More broadly, China has tired of an expensive relationship in which its interests are greater than its influence. Making matters worse was Kim
Jong Un’s decision to execute his uncle, Jang Song Thaek, widely viewed as China’s man in Pyongyang. China needs years and more likely decades of relative stability
in the region so that it can continue to address its many domestic challenges. North Korea is a threat to such stability. Meanwhile China’s ties with South Korea have
flourished. China is the South’s leading economic partner; Chinese leader Xi Jinping has traveled to Seoul but not to Pyongyang. So what needs doing?
The
priority must be to persuade China that the demise of North Korea need not be something to fear .
Washington and Beijing should convene talks about how they could manage scenarios, including North Korean
collapse and aggression. Nuclear
weapons and materials would need to be secured . Governments need to
make plans to ensure U.S., South Korean and Chinese forces do not come into conflict.
Talking necessary – key to make contingency plans effective.
Chun, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University,
2014 Chaesung, This paper is presented to the 2nd KRIS-Brookings Joint Conference on "Security and Diplomatic Cooperation between ROK
and US for the Unification of the Korean Peninsula”, “How Should the ROK and the US Stabilize a Peace Regime in the Korean Peninsula and
Build a Stable Security Environment in Northeast Asia in order to Promote and Shape the Satisfactory Unification of the Korean Peninsula?”
1/21/2014 http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/1/21-korean-peninsula-unification/chun-chaesung-paper.pdf
North Korean contingencies and transitional North Korea is an international issue, directly affecting
geopolitical interests of other countries,
such as the United States, China, Japan, and Russia. South
Korea is expected to
suggest more comprehensive framework of dialogue not just for the North Korean nuclear issues, but
also for the general North Korea strategy, unification, and even contingencies. Any changes in the
status quo on the Korean Peninsula will affect geostrategic interests of Northeast Asian countries,
especially in the times of power transition.
Russia
Strategic dialogue and policy coordination
among South Korea, the United States, Japan, and
will be crucial in preparing any possible contingencies . Once again, multilateral contingency plan
should be with the overall strategic consideration over the future of North Korea. Consequently, common
strategic views on the future of North Korea and Northeast Asian security relations will direct the
success or failure of coordinated response to North Korean contingencies.
Net Benefit
Allied Prolif/NK War NB – 1NC
The counterplan prevents a worse North Korean war by providing red lines and credibility to
allies to prevent future proliferation
Suri 13 – Jeremi, professor of history and public affairs at the University of Texas, Austin, “Bomb North
Korea, Before It’s Too Late” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/opinion/bomb-north-korea-beforeits-too-late.html
SINCE February, the
North Korean government has followed one threatening move with another. The spiral began
with an underground nuclear test. Then the North declared the armistice that ended the Korean War invalid. The
young dictator Kim Jong-un followed with a flurry of threats to attack civilian targets in South Korea, Japan and
the United States. Earlier this week, North Korea closed the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the only facility where citizens from North and South Korea work together.
And now the North is openly threatening (and visibly preparing) to fire a mobile-launcher-based Musudan missile with a range that could reach many of the places
Mr. Kim has menaced in his public statements. American intelligence agencies believe that North Korea is working to prepare even longer-range delivery systems to
carry the nuclear warheads already in its arsenal. Continue reading the main story RELATED COVERAGE Contrasting Views on North Korea Underscore Sensitivities
and Lack of EvidenceAPRIL 12, 2013 The
Korean crisis has now become a strategic threat to America’s core national
interests. The best option is to destroy the North Korean missile on the ground before it is launched .
The U nited S tates should use a precise airstrike to render the missile and its mobile launcher
inoperable. President Obama should state clearly and forthrightly that this is an act of self-defense in
response to explicit threats from North Korea and clear evidence of a prepared weapon . He should
give the leaders of South Korea, Japan, China and Taiwan advance notice before acting . And he should
explain that this is a limited defensive strike on a military target
to civilians
— and
— an
operation that poses no threat
that America does not intend to bring about regime change . The purpose is to
neutralize a clear and present danger . That is all. If North Korea is left to continue its threatening
behavior, it will jeopardize the fragile economies of the region and it will encourage South Korea and
Japan to develop their own nuclear weapons
— a policy already advocated by hawks in both countries. Most of all, North
Korean threats will encourage isolated states across the world to follow suit.
The Iranians
are
certainly watching . If North Korea can use its small nuclear arsenal to blackmail the region with impunity, why shouldn’t the mullahs in Tehran try to do
the same? The United States and its allies in East Asia have a legitimate right to self-defense and they have a deep interest in deterring future threats on this scale.
Thanks to precise satellite reconnaissance, striking the North Korean missile on the ground would be much easier than after it was launched. Since the United States
cannot possibly know the missile’s trajectory before a launch, and Mr. Kim has said he is targeting America and its allies, we have reason to believe that civilians face
serious danger. Since a missile on the ground is an obvious and largely undefended target, we can be reasonably sure that a strike would destroy it and preserve
regional stability and the safety of our allies. An American pre-emptive strike would also re-establish necessary red lines for North Korea and other countries in
similar circumstances. As President Xi Jinping of China stated earlier this month, “No one should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos
for selfish gains.” By eliminating the most recent North Korean missile threat, the United States will reduce the threat posed by the North’s arsenal. The United
States would also reassure everyone in the region, and those watching from other parts of the world, that although it is not seeking regime change, America and its
allies will not be blackmailed by threatened missile launches. The North Korean government would certainly view the American strike as a provocation, but it is
unlikely that Mr. Kim would retaliate by attacking South Korea, as many fear. First, the Chinese government would do everything it could to prevent such a reaction.
Even if they oppose an American strike, China’s leaders understand that a full-scale war would be far worse. Second, Mr. Kim would see in the American strike a
renewed commitment to the defense of South Korea. Any attack on Seoul would be an act of suicide for him, and he knows that. A war on the Korean Peninsula is
unlikely after an American strike, but it is not inconceivable. The North Koreans might continue to escalate, and Mr. Kim might feel obligated to start a war to save
face. Under these unfortunate circumstances, the United States and its allies would still be better off fighting a war with North Korea today, when the conflict could
still be confined largely to the Korean Peninsula. As North Korea’s actions over the last two months have shown, Mr. Kim’s government is willing to escalate its
threats much more rapidly than his father’s regime did. An unending crisis would merely postpone war to a later date, when the damage caused by North Korea
would be even greater. China’s role in a potential war on the Korean Peninsula is hard to predict. Beijing will continue to worry about the United States extending its
influence up to the Chinese border. If armed hostilities erupt, President Obama should be prepared for direct and close consultations with Chinese leaders to
negotiate a postwar settlement, in a larger multinational framework, that respects Beijing’s legitimate security interests in North Korea. The United States has no
interest in occupying North Korea. The Chinese are unlikely to pursue an occupation of their own. Destroying
the North Korean missile
before it is launched is the best of bad options on the Korean Peninsula. A prolonged crisis would
undermine regional security and global efforts to stop nuclear proliferation . And a future war would be
much worse . The most prudent move is to eliminate the most imminent military threat in selfdefense, establish clear and reasonable limits on future belligerence, and maintain allied unity for
stability — not forced regime change
— in the region. This is the kind of pre-emptive
and maybe even preserve the uneasy peace on the Korean Peninsula.
action that would save lives
Allied Prolif/NK War NB – 2NC
Korean war is inevitable – better now than later – solves hotspot proliferation and Asian
economies
Suri ‘13 (Jeremi, Professor of History and Public Affairs – University of Texas, “Bomb North Korea,
Before It’s Too Late”, New York Times, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/opinion/bombnorth-korea-before-its-too-late.html)
Earlier this week, North Korea closed the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the only facility where citizens from North and South Korea work together. And now the
North is openly threatening (and visibly preparing) to fire a mobile-launcher-based Musudan missile with a range that could reach many of the places Mr. Kim has
intelligence agencies believe that North Korea is working to prepare
even longer-range delivery systems to carry the nuclear warheads already in its arsenal. The Korean
menaced in his public statements. American
crisis has now become a strategic threat to America’s core national interests. The best option is to destroy the North Korean missile on the ground before it is
launched. The United States should use a precise airstrike to render the missile and its mobile launcher inoperable. President Obama should state clearly and
forthrightly that this is an act of self-defense in response to explicit threats from North Korea and clear evidence of a prepared weapon. He should give the leaders
of South Korea, Japan, China and Taiwan advance notice before acting. And he should explain that this is a limited defensive strike on a military target — an
operation that poses no threat to civilians — and that America does not intend to bring about regime change. The purpose is to neutralize a clear and present
danger. That is all.
If North Korea is left to continue its threatening behavior, it will jeopardize
economies of the region
weapons
and it
the
fragile
will encourage South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear
— a policy already advocated by hawks in both countries. Most of all, North
Korean threats will encourage isolated
states across the world to follow suit . The Iranians are certainly watching. If North Korea can use its
small nuclear arsenal to blackmail the region with impunity, why shouldn’t the mullahs in Tehran try
to do the same? The United States and its allies in East Asia have a legitimate right to self-defense and they have a deep interest in
deterring future threats on this scale. Thanks to precise satellite reconnaissance, striking the North Korean missile on the ground would
be much easier than after it was launched. Since the United States cannot possibly know the missile’s trajectory before a launch, and Mr. Kim has said he is
targeting America and its allies, we have reason to believe that civilians face serious danger. Since a missile on the ground is an obvious and largely undefended
target, we can be reasonably sure that a strike would destroy it and preserve regional stability and the safety of our allies. An American pre-emptive strike would
also re-establish necessary red lines for North Korea and other countries in similar circumstances. As President Xi Jinping of China stated earlier this month, “No one
should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gains.” By eliminating the most recent North Korean missile threat, the United
States will reduce the threat posed by the North’s arsenal. The United States would also reassure everyone in the region, and those watching from other parts of
the world, that although it is not seeking regime change, America and its allies will not be blackmailed by threatened missile launches. The North Korean
government would certainly view the American strike as a provocation, but it is unlikely that Mr. Kim would retaliate by attacking South Korea, as many fear. First,
the Chinese government would do everything it could to prevent such a reaction. Even if they oppose an American strike, China’s leaders understand that a fullscale war would be far worse. Second, Mr. Kim would see in the American strike a renewed commitment to the defense of South Korea. Any attack on Seoul would
North
Koreans might continue to escalate, and Mr. Kim might feel obligated to start a war to save face. Under
be an act of suicide for him, and he knows that. A war on the Korean Peninsula is unlikely after an American strike, but it is not inconceivable. The
these unfortunate circumstances, the United States and its allies would still be
better off fighting a war with North Korea today,
when the conflict could still be confined largely to the Korean Peninsula. As North Korea’s actions over the last two months
have shown, Mr. Kim’s government is willing to escalate its threats much more rapidly than his father’s regime did.
An unending crisis would
merely postpone war to a later date, when the damage caused by North Korea would be even
greater . China’s role in a potential war on the Korean Peninsula is hard to predict. Beijing will continue to worry about the United States extending its
influence up to the Chinese border. If armed hostilities erupt, President Obama should be prepared for direct and close consultations with Chinese leaders to
negotiate a postwar settlement, in a larger multinational framework, that respects Beijing’s legitimate security interests in North Korea. The United States has no
interest in occupying North Korea. The Chinese are unlikely to pursue an occupation of their own. Destroying the North Korean missile before it is launched is the
best of bad options on the Korean Peninsula. A
prolonged crisis would undermine
regional security and global
efforts to stop
nuclear proliferation. And a future war would be much worse . The most prudent move is to eliminate the most imminent
military threat in self-defense, establish clear and reasonable limits on future belligerence, and maintain allied unity for stability — not forced regime change — in
the region. This is the kind of pre-emptive action that would save lives and maybe even preserve the uneasy peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Asia economy collapses causes war
Auslin ‘9 (resident scholar at AEI (Michael “Averting Disaster”, The Daily Standard, 2/6,
http://www.aei.org/article/100044, 2/6/9)
As they deal with a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the globe must not forget that
when a
depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia , the most heavily armed region
on earth and riven with ancient hatreds and territorial rivalries. Collapsing trade flows can lead to
political tension, nationalist outbursts, growing distrust, and ultimately, military miscalculation . The result
would be disaster on top of an already dire situation. No
one should think that Asia is on the verge of conflict . But it
is also important to remember what has helped keep the peace in this region for so long. Phenomenal
growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and elsewhere since the 1960s have
naturally turned national attention inward, to development and stability. This has gradually led to increased political
confidence, diplomatic initiatives, and in many nations the move toward more democratic systems. America has directly benefited as well, and
not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also from the general conditions of peace in Asia. Yet policymakers need to
remember that even during these decades of growth, moments of economic shock , such as the 1973 Oil Crisis,
led to instability and bursts of terrorist activity in Japan, while the uneven pace of growth in China has
led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior of the country. Now imagine such
instability multiplied region-wide. The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China's potential slowdown, dwarfs any previous
economic troubles, including the 1998 Asian Currency Crisis. Newly urbanized workers rioting for jobs or living wages, conflict over natural
resources, further saber-rattling from North Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmare of governments in the region, and
particularly of democracies from newer ones like Thailand and Mongolia to established states like Japan and South Korea. How will
overburdened political leaders react to internal unrest? What happens if Chinese shopkeepers in Indonesia are attacked, or a Japanese naval
ship collides with a Korean fishing vessel? Quite simply, Asia's
political infrastructure may not be strong enough to
resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict . This would be a political and humanitarian disaster turning the clock
back decades in Asia.
It would almost certainly drag America in
at some point, as well. First of all, we
have alliance
responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any of them come under
armed attack. Failure on our part to live up to those responsibilities could mean the end of America's credibility in Asia. Secondly, peace in
Asia has been kept in good measure by the continued U.S. military presence since World War II. There have been terrible localized conflicts, of
course, but nothing approaching a systemic conflagration like the 1940s. Today, such a conflict would be far more bloody, and it
is unclear
if the American military, already stretched too thin by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, could contain the
crisis. Nor is it clear that the American people, worn out from war and economic distress, would be willing to shed even more blood and
treasure for lands across the ocean. The result could be a historic changing of the geopolitical map in the world's most populous region.
Perhaps China would emerge as the undisputed hegemon. Possibly democracies like Japan and South Korea would link up to oppose any
aggressor. India might decide it could move into the vacuum. All of this is guess-work, of course, but it has happened repeatedly throughout
history. There
is no reason to believe we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed
that have destroyed international systems in the past.
Ethical Obligation DA – 2NC
There’s an ethical obligation to topple the North Korean regime
Gobry 1/7/15 – Pascal-Emmanuel, senior research analyst for Business Insider Intelligence, MSc in
management from HEC Paris, “The case for invading North Korea”
http://theweek.com/articles/441214/case-invading-north-korea
North Korea is a joke, and shame on us for laughing . The "Hermit Kingdom" with its retro aesthetic and its goofy-looking
leader makes us laugh, from
But North
our well-heated homes. That's what The Interview and "Kim Jong-Il Looking at Things" are all about.
Korea isn't "weird," it's not "eccentric" — it is the vilest place on the face of the Earth. North
Korea's leaders keep their entire nation in a state of perpetual semi-starvation for the sole purpose of
maintaining power while they entertain themselves with prostitutes and fine foods from around the
world. The North Korean regime is well known for financing itself through drug trafficking and other forms of
international organized crime. Alcohol and hard drug use is positively pandemic, unsurprisingly considering life there. And forget
about any sort of culture or true education or access to knowledge, or anything we consider integral to human
flourishing. This is a country where everyone grows up in constant fear.
And it's really the
descriptions
of North Korea's concentration camps that should give anyone pause. (You owe it to yourself to read them.) If
regular citizens in North Korea starve, how do you think concentration camp inmates fare? North
Korea practices a system of collective punishment whereby if one person is found guilty (without trial, of
course) of an offense — such as being a Christian, or participating in the black market (which everyone must do to
survive) —
three generations of their family are sent off to the Gulag. There are children in these camps.
Many die of starvation. Those who do not have to work starting at the age of six. It is, truly, the rape and
defilement of an entire nation, a systematic and refined evil that only the human genius at its most
perverted can produce. We know about it. We witness it. We see it. What are we doing about it? We
are so smug towards our forefathers. What did you do about the Holocaust? What did you do about
segregation? "Oh, you don't understand, it was much more complicated than you make it out to be."
We have nothing but contempt for excuses like that, don't we? Do we really want to give the same
excuses to our grandchildren? And what excuses will we give ourselves? If someone disputes that
there is a moral imperative toward regime change in North Korea — I do not want to argue with him; he
shows (they show) a corrupt mind. The only question remains: is it feasible? I would like to argue that it is.