13 April 2020 Virtual Lecture The 1991 Persian Gulf War (Desert Storm) The 1991 Gulf War’s “dangerous lessons” for the USA #1: The war left an impression that the US military was overwhelmingly powerful H/, this was exaggerated by the conflict’s circumstances: Iraq was armed with late-model Soviet equipment, but these were export versions that often did not have the most advanced software, radar, etc. used by the actual Soviet Army. Even more importantly, training for Iraqi forces (w/ the arguable exception of the Republican Guard) was poor. The “real” lesson of the war: Poorly trained land forces cannot effectively fight a welltrained and highly disciplined “first rate” enemy in a conventional war. Unsurprisingly, US enemies stopped trying to fight conventional wars! The 1991 Persian Gulf War (Desert Storm) The 1991 Gulf War’s “dangerous lessons” for the USA (cont.) #2: The UNSC was now an effective international institution (i.e., the centerpiece of the “New World Order”) A “desert mirage”: Actually, the UNSC was effective b/c of the specific circumstances: both the major powers and all of Iraq’s neighbors (except Jordan), absolutely opposed Iraqi control of a large % of the global oil supply Under current technological and political conditions, its difficult to imagine a similar effort Improved oil extraction technology has made previously inaccessible supplies affordable to pump in much of the world China, Russia, and others no longer willing to accept US leadership, and the US is reluctant to work with other major powers on a basis of “true equality” The global community surely would not formally accept Iraq’s conquest, but ineffective sanctions would be far more likely than a coordinated military effort The 1991 Persian Gulf War (Desert Storm) The 1991 Gulf War’s “dangerous lessons” for the USA (cont.) #3 (related to #2): International problems can be solved on an ad hoc basis by the USA as a hegemonic guarantor of world order Various conflicts showed that this was not following the break-up of Yugoslavia, and—much more sharply—the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq
