Working Title: “Assessment of Factors Affecting the Dismissed Drug Cases on
Illegal Drugs in Zamboanga del Sur”
CHAPTER I
1.1
Rationale of the Study
Dangerous drugs, as stated in RA 9165, include those which are listed in the
Schedules annexed to the 1961 and 1971 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances respectively, in which Shabu (Methamphetamine HCl) is the
most used illegal drug in the country, followed by Cannabis or Marijuana. Cocaine,
Ephedrine, and Ecstasy also constituted the rest of PDEA confiscations (Ranada,
2016).
The possession, manufacture, unnecessary and unlawful prescription, unlawful
importation, sale or trading, dispensation, and administration of the aforementioned
dangerous drugs face a monetary fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) depending on the possessed
quantity and regardless of the degree of purity; and a penalty of twelve-year to life
imprisonment to death (RA 9165).
As of 2016, Filipinos with an average age of 10 up to 69 use dangerous drugs
according to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. Inhalants, which are
commonly in the form of toluene-based glue, are used by minors specifically among
street children since these substances are relatively low in cost and are easy to obtain
(Njord L, Merill, Njord R, Lindsay, Pachano, 2010). With this record of prevalent illegal
use, the Philippines aggressively started the War on Drugs campaign upon President
Duterte’s assumption to office on June 30, 2016 with a bulk record of 1,298 drug cases
in just three months (July to September 2016) totaling a figure of 1,411 cases from
January to October in the same year (Elemia, 2016).
From July 2016 to September 2017, a total of 96,943 complaints are handled by
the Department of Justice of which 95,242 cases are resolved while the remaining
1,701 are still pending as of 2018 at 98.25% disposal rate. Conversely, 21,908 illegal
drug cases are referred to prosecution and 42, 182 are filed in court (Department of
Justice, 2018). In homicide cases as of January 17, 2018 with a total number of 2,235
drug-related incidents, only 413 cases are solved while 1, 822 are still under
investigation (Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management, 2018; CRAS Philippine National Police, 2018).
According to the National Prosecution Service (2016, 2017), of the 68,895 cases
filed by the prosecution in court, 2,617 are dismissed in 2016 by the courts. Of these,
one hundred-thirteen (113) are filed in court in 2016 in the province of Zamboanga del
Sur; twenty-two (22) are convicted while twenty-six (26) of these are closed or
dismissed/dismissed upon filing. (Zamboanga del Sur Police Station, 2019).
In 2017, the courts dismissed 5,270 cases out of 70,706 cases filed, equivalent
to about 7.5%. Despite the low percentage, Justice Secretary Menardo Guevarra is still
worried about the government for losing cases because of flawed handling. He said that
oftentimes, the main reason for dismissal is technical which includes failure to observe
procedural requirements particularly on the chain of custody of the drugs seized (Buan,
2018).
Rappler journalist Lian Buan suggested that it is the courts that cannot keep up
with the bulk cases filed by the prosecutors. Regional trial courts of 204,795 were
assigned with 289,295 drug cases alone on top of everything else, in which each case
has to be finished no later than 60 days from its filing as provided by the Dangerous
Drugs Act (Buan, 2018).
Meanwhile, then Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno said that lack of
government lawyers to handle the cases and the non-appearance of witnesses also
influence such delays and dismissals. As she learned from Justice Secretary Vitaliano
Aguirre II that there were vacancies for 500 prosecutors in DOJ, she suggested that
there should be two prosecutors and two public attorneys for every judge to fast-track
the proceedings (Torres-Tupas, 2016).
On the other hand, Police Regional Director Noli Taliño said on their behalf, there
might be an involvement of a syndicate because of the recorded delays of filing of
charges. According to him, tactics like talking to the complainant beforehand to settle
the case can also lead to case dismissal once fixed. Although statistics show the low
percentage of cases dismissed, Taliño stated that the objective here is to have
successful cases so that they won’t get dismissed (Sunstar Cebu, 2017).
Valenzuela RTC Br. 284 also dismissed the P6.4B shabu case of the nine
accused on the ground of “forum shopping” in which a case involving the same facts is
filed in two separate courts, hoping that one of them will rule favorably (Torres-Tupas,
2018).
Due to the numerous grounds aforementioned herein, the researchers narrowed
down the possible factors affecting the end result of illegal drug-related cases into four
(4) levels, namely: Intelligence stage, Investigatory stage, Operations, and the Court
Trial stage.
This study is considered as an action research aiming to further the betterment of
the disposition of drug-related cases specifically in Zamboanga del Sur, to identify the
constraints of the dismissed cases by assessing the effect of the abovementioned
factors, evaluating the deemed deficiencies in handling these cases, and by addressing
the cited dismissal factors through formulated recommendations.
1.2
Research Problem
This study addresses the following research problems:
1. Under what conditions does the intelligence stage work? How do these influence
the result on this stage?
2. What is the flow of the investigatory stage and what are plausible factors which
could greatly affect this stage?
3. Who and what is involved in the operations during the case proceedings? What
are the technical procedures observed?
4. How do the courtroom actors affect the litigations? What are the steps necessary
to adhere to prosper case proceedings?
1.3
Objectives of the Study
The researchers aim to assess the different factors affecting the dismissed cases
in Pagadian City. Specifically, it aims to:
1. Gather data of the nature of dismissed drug-related cases in the year 2016 to
2018 from Zamboanga del Sur Municipal and Regional Trial Courts;
2. Identify the factors of each dismissed case as specified by the written case
reports;
3. Assess or evaluate each factor in accordance to the standard PDEA Operations
Procedure, PNP Anti-Illegal Drugs Operations Procedure Manual, Dangerous
Drugs Board Procedure, and RA 10640 on chain of custody procedure;
4. Tally the gathered data for analysis; and
5. Formulate recommendations based on the result of analyzed data for further
study or improvement on procedure implementation, or both.
1.4
Significance of the Study
This study provides an understanding of plausible reasons as to the disturbing
low level of percentage on the disposition of cases filed in court by assessing the factors
affecting each case proceeding in the aforementioned stages, specifically addressing
the dismissed cases related to drugs in Zamboanga del Sur.
This study also provides corrective measures from the assessment of factors
affecting the dismissed cases to further the betterment of the disposition of cases in the
province of Zamboanga del Sur through formulated recommendations.
1.5
Scope and Limitation of the Study
This research focuses only on the abovementioned major stages (i.e. intelligence
stage, investigatory stage, operations, court trial stage) wherein each filed cases
undergo which could have numerous effects on the disposition of said cases. Analysis
of data provided in this study is confined only within the illegal drugs cases filed in the
province of Zamboanga del Sur, Region IX, from 2016 to 2018.
CHAPTER II
2.1
Review of Related Literature
Production, sale, and trade of dangerous drugs is a threat to the well-being of the
global community which undermines legitimate institutions, and erodes social values;
this problem has long been considered primarily as an issue of law enforcement and
criminality and for years the fight against illegal drugs and their abuse has been the
subject of numerous discussions at the national and international level (Olario, 1999).
To mitigate this long-been outstanding concern, the government has already
enacted countermeasures including the Special Dangerous Drug Court in 1996 which
shall try heinous drug cases and speed up disposition of drug cases filed. Now, the
government has aggressively mobilized the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the
local government units nationwide through anti-drug campaigns.
However, despite the spurt of drug-related cases filed and has resulted in mass
arrests (Narag, 2018), there are still a hundred couple of cases which are mishandled,
pending, and/or dismissed due to a number of factors related to technical areas where
these case proceedings undergo. The exercise of hierarchical organization, for one. The
Philippine government allows administrative agencies to exercise adjudicatory powers
in definite issues solely in aid of their administrative functions and objectives but a policy
of strict observance of such hierarchical structure is enforced by the Supreme Court.
Meaning, it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the desired reparation could not be
obtained in the appropriate level of courts or unless it can be justified to call for its
primary jurisdiction (Article VIII, Section 1, 1987 constitution).
This problem of recurring clogged court dockets has become a primary focus of
judicial reforms by the Supreme Court (Disini, Aguiling-Pangalangan, Daroy-Morales,
Gatmaytan, Lim-Jardeleza, 2002). The court also identified laziness, inept, and
sometimes corrupt judges, as causes of this dilemma. Also cited is the tendency of
lawyers themselves to misuse and abuse the Rules of Court by resorting to all kinds of
delaying tactics against their opponents (Disini, et. al, 2002).
According to Michalski (2018), procedural values (i.e. speed, cost, accuracy)
form the flow of procedural rules. However, these prescriptions rely on frameworks that
conflate process and outcome thus fail to address underlying issues which impedes
access to justice. Therefore when these values conflict with one another, courts have to
prioritize one over the other. For example, the growing number of filed illegal drug cases
in court may increase in speed and reduce its cost but might come inaccurate. Thus,
some might weep over the cost of litigation while others lament over the quality of the
case proceedings. This suggests that such success is due to the inequities in resources
that are exacerbated by the innate biases of the judicial system (Haynie, 1994;
Michalski, 2018; Franco, 2008).
Michalski (2018) contended that whenever one procedural value is favored over
another, some litigants are also given favor over others. This implies that conflict among
procedural values is a conflict over which litigants to support or which ones to hinder.
Research have also exposed that litigation was focused on finding liable parties liable,
and blameless parties blameless. Yet this focus has shifted over time. Some courts
have pointed out that accurate judgements are expensive, time-consuming, and often
rely on discovery which mostly invades litigants’ privacy. They argue that the ideal of
such judgement should be forgone in favor of saving litigants’ money and time. This
shows that shifting a procedural value over another radically alters the nature and
process of legal action.
On one hand, Hagan (1989) introduced the notion of loose coupling versus tight
coupling to expound the variations in decision-making in criminal justice systems as
discussed in Narag’s (2017) study. It is described as loosely coupled when the different
subcomponents (i.e. police, prosecution, courts, pretrial services, corrections) works
independently and are autonomous from each other. Consequently, Hagan (1989)
described it as tightly coupled when the components are linked and coordinated; if
prosecutors’ goals and intentions are evident with the police department as to what
crimes they should prioritize, police officers will be guided in their arrest decisions. This
will reduce arrest incongruences and it will be reasonable to expect for the tightly
coupled systems to have speedier disposition of cases (Narag, 2017 as cited in Hall,
1987).
Einstein, Flemming, and Nardulli (1988) also investigated the courtroom
dynamics and alluded that judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and other court actors develop
informal or clandestine agreements to facilitate the disposition of cases. This is
supported by Church (1982) and his fellow researchers (Church, Carlson, Lee, & Tan,
1978) who disclosed the influence of local legal culture on the shared expectations on
the pace of case litigation.
In addition, Speedy Trial Law (RA 8943) of 1998 was introduced specifying time
constraints for different stages of resolution in the hope of disposing cases at a speedy
pace. But such law also provides several exclusions in the computation of the length of
time to authorize which such courtroom actors can liberally draw from, hence easily
substantiating delay in adjudicating cases (Olario, 1999).
On the other hand, Narag’s (2017) findings showed that detained individuals
spend more time inside the jail before a decision is made on their cases which
eventually end up either getting acquitted or dismissed. One inmate charged with drug
law violation grieves,
If you are charged with drugs, then you have no bail. That is almost automatic.
Then they will make you rot longer. But then, you are acquitted. Most cases are
eventually acquitted or dismissed. They will let you suffer first, then, let you out. (Juan,
male, 4 years in jail)
Narag (2017) accounts that based on this perspective, the essence of prolonged
trial detention is the thought that such process has become the punishment. This kind of
narrative can also indicate the lack of coordination among court actors since most
judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers in the “challenged” courts are not aware of
their clients’ length of stay in jail. This is compounded by the justifications touted by the
court actors in the delay of filed cases.
American Bar Association (2006) describes mediation and negotiation as
presenting parties a greater participation over the outcome and in reaching a resolution.
According to Shestowsky (2015) as cited in Smith & Martinez (2009), scholars often
conceive legal procedures on a scale. On one end, negotiation will offer participants
control over both the process and the end result and does not involve a biased third
party. While on the other end, intercession and trial will empower third parties to define
the outcome of a dispute and will propose formality on the processes involved.
Mediation, existing in the middle of the spectrum, utilizes an unbiased third party
but allows parties themselves to shape the process and control the outcome.
2.1
Theoretical Framework
2.1.1 Procedural Justice Paradigm. This doctrine dated back to the early 1970s
which is an empirical study of Thibaut and Walker together with their colleagues which
revealed that the public care about their direct and indirect control over the legal
decisions which directly affects them. Their research suggests that when laypeople
evaluate procedures, they generally assess how such processes distribute control
between the parties themselves and third parties (e.g. mediators, judges, prosecutors)
(Shestowsky, 2015). This also proposes that disputants prefer procedures that allow
them to control the process. Their early work highlights the role of that opportunity to
share and listen to another’s dispute story plays in how disputants take options, which
also underscores the effect of subjective perception in the functioning of the legal
system.
2.1.2 Instrumental or Social Exchange Theory. This theory suggests that
people would normally desire process control because of the belief that it can provide
them an indirect way to control their disputes’ outcome. A prominent factor would that
be of informal engagements among third parties mentioned above which may or may
not be informative to the other party in suit.
2.1.3. Group Value Model. This theory supports a defendant’s care about the
process. The quality of the process they experience helps them assess the status of the
dispute to which they are involved with. When the fairness of an outcome is abstruse,
people would often associate their evaluations based on what they have experienced as
a mental shortcut for weighing the outcome (Shestowsky, 2015).
2.1.4 Social Dominance Theory. This theory assumes that complex social
systems are inherently group-based, caste-like hierarchies consisting of at least two
social groups: a dominant group and one or several subordinate groups. This theory
also highlights the existence of two kinds of social institutions, hierarchy-enhancing
institution and hierarchy-attenuating institution. Hierarchy-enhancing institutions tend to
favor the socially strong against the socially weak. Examples include the police
departments, internal security forces, and large, private economic concerns (Sidanius,
Shaw, & Pratto, 1994). Consequently, people within hierarchy-attenuating institutions
would have low levels of social dominance orientation.
Within the social dominance paradigm, hierarchy-enhancing institutions will tend
to allocate unreasonably greater positive social values to those of high-status groups
and unduly greater negative values to those in low-status groups.
2.1.5. Resource Inequality Theory. Resource inequality theory assumes that
large and high-status institutions as well as the government have greater resources,
both in money and litigation experience, than individuals, and thus are more likely to
win. However, this theory has ignored the relationship between adjudication and social
structure. This results to a growing dissatisfaction among the citizens together with the
growing number of controversies submitted for judicial resolution (Disini, et. al, 2002).