CASE 1 1 RAMIREZ V. CA
Ramirez and Garcia had a disagreement which Ramirez made a recording and a transcript of.
Upon filing a civil case against Garcia, she presented the transcript. Garcia, upon finding that a
recording has been made, filed a criminal case against Ramirez. Ramirez sought the quash the
information through a motion intially granted by the RTC but was annulled by the CA. Ramirez
filed the petition to question the decision of the CA. SC agreed with the CA and held that
recording the confrontation constituted a violation of RA 4200, despite Ramirez being party to
the conversation.
WON Ramirez’ recording violated RA 4200– YES
What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,intercepting or recordingprivate
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. Even a person privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the
latter qualifies as a violation of said RA.
CASE 2 2 GAANAN V. IAC
Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebonoffered to withdraw the complaint
for direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand
was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to
personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently
arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to
the telephone conversation without complainant''s consent, complainant charged Gaanan and
Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).
The lower courtfound both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 4200. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act,
such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
HELD:
No, An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,
dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof
cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone
extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use. in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension
telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be
construed as not including an extension telephone. The mere act of listening, in order to be
punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of
similar nature.
CASE 3 3 ZULUETA V CA
Cecilia Zulueta broke into her husband’s office and obtained his alleged private correspondence
with his paramours. What happened next will shock you! RTC, CA, and SC all rendered the
evidence as inadmissible.
WON the evidence is admissible. – NO.
The Law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making in
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent
of the otheras to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
CASE 4 Alejano v. Cabuay
FACTS:
Armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and took control of the
Oakwood Premier
Luxury Apartments ("Oakwood"), an upscale apartment complex, located in the business district
of Makati
City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in
its
immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the
administration and
called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.
The
soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with government
emissaries. Government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the RTC against
the soldiers
involved in the Oakwood incident. The appellate court declared that while the opening and
reading of
Trillanes’ letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not
justify the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Whether the opening, inspection and reading of the letter of the detainees violated the
detainees’ right to
privacy.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen’s privacy rights62 is
a
guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or
imprisoned.
The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the
limitations
inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial
detainees and
convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.
CASE 5 ROXAS V.DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.
ROXAS V. DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.
G.R. No. 152072. July 12, 2007
FACTS:
In a Resolution dated 26 September 2006, the Court En Banc ordered Atty. Romeo G. Roxas to explain in writing
why he should not be held in contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action when he, in a letter dated 13
September 2006 addressed to Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario with copies thereof furnished the Chief
Justice and all the other Associate Justices, intimated that Justice Nazario decided G.R. No. 152072 and No. 152104
on considerations other than the pure merits of the case, and called the Supreme Court a "dispenser of injustice."
In his letter of explanation, Atty. Roxas extended apologies to Justice Nazario, to the other members of the High
Court and to the High Court itself as a revered institution and ultimate dispenser of justice. He said he was merely
exercising his right to express a legitimate grievance or articulate a bona fide and fair criticism of the Honorable
Court's ruling. He explained that his criticism of the assailed ruling was done in good faith with no intention
whatsoever to offend any member, much less tarnish the image of the Court. Instead of resorting to public criticism
through media exposure, he chose to ventilate his criticism in a very discreet and private manner by writing a
personal letter confined to the hallowed halls of the Court and within bounds of decency and propriety.
To prevent liability from attaching on account of his letter, he invokes his rights to free speech and privacy of
communication. The invocation of these rights will not, however, free him from liability.
ISSUE:
Whether Constitutional right to free speech and privacy of communication can be invoked by the petitioner?
RULING:
NO. The letter directed against the Supreme Court is not an exercise of free speech but an abuse of such right where
it is contemptuous. —Atty. Roxas’ letter contained defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court isnot an exercise of
free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised
as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or
public respect therefor and confidence therein. Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy one’s
irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.
The Supreme Court does not curtail the right of any person to be critical of courts and judges as long as they are
made in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels.
The statements of Atty. Roxas against the Court was made in mala fides.—In the case at bar, we find the statements
made by Atty. Roxas to have been made mala fides and exceeded the boundaries of decency and propriety. By his
unfair and unfounded accusation against Justice Nazario, and his mocking of the Court for allegedly being part of a
wrongdoing and being a dispenser of injustice, he abused his liberty of speech.
Atty. Roxas likewise cannot hide under the mantle of the right to privacy. It must be disclosed that prior to his letter
addressed to Justice Nazario, Atty. Roxas first wrote then Chief Justice Panganiban asking for an investigation as to
how the assailed decision was rendered and to sanction the perpetrators. The accusations contained therein are
similar to those in his letter to Justice Nazario. The fact that his letters were merely addressed to the Justices of this
Court and were not disseminated to the media is of no moment. Letters addressed to individual Justices, in
connection with the performance of their judicial functions, become part of the judicial record and are a matter of
concern for the entire court. As can be gathered from the records, the letter to then Chief Justice Panganiban was
merely noted and no show-cause order was issued in the hope that Atty. Roxas would stop his assault on the Court.
However, since Atty. Roxas persisted in attacking the Court via his second letter, it be-hooved the Court to order
him to explain why he should not be held in contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action.
CASE 6
F:
Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed an action in the RTC of Makati to enjoin the
petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution," a documentary of the EDSA
Revolution in 1986 on the ground that it violated his right to privacy. Petitioners contended that
the movie would not involve his private life not that of his family. But the trial court issued a writ
of preliminary injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from making the movie making
reference whatsoever to Ponce Enrile. This, this action for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.
HELD: Yes. Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom to produce motion pictures
and to exhibit them. What is involved is a prior restraint by the Judge upon the exercise of
speech and of expression by petitioners. Because of the preferred character of speech and of
expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint. The Judge
should have stayed his hand considering that the movie was yet uncompleted and therefore
there was no "clear and present danger." The subject matter of the movie does not relate to the
private life of Ponce Enrile. The intrusion is no more than necessary to keep the film a truthful
historical account. He is, after all, a public figure. The line of equilibrium in the specific context
of the instant case between freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy may
be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful
and historical in its presentation of facts. There must be no showing of a reckless disregard of
truth.Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie on the 4-day revolution. Enrile, who had
previously been asked for the use of his character in the movie and had refused the offer, sued
to enjoin the filming because he did not want any mention of his and his family's name. The SC
lifted the injunction issued by the lower court on the ground that it amounted to prior restraint,
which is no better if imposed by the courts than if imposed by administrative bodies or by
ecclesiatical officials.In Ayer, the reference to Enrile is unavoidable because his name is part of
history and this cannot be changed or altered; thus his name can be used so long as only his
public life is dwelled only. But in Lagunzad, although Moises Padilla was also a public figure,
the movie dealth with both the public and private lives of Moises Padilla.
Case 7
SANIDAD vs. COMELEC
181 SCRA 529
Facts:
On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January 1990. The Comelec, by
virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA
6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of
the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V.
Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of “Overview” for the “Baguio Midland Courier” assailed the
constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers) of the
said resolution, which provides “During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and
on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use
his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.”
Issue:
Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should be under Comelec
regulation, during plebiscite periods.
Held:
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to
supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for
the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to
the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable,
equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are
ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (“a
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is
required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period”) can be
construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate
the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite
periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are
neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has no statutory basis.
Case 8
ADIONG V. COMELEC G.R. 103956
FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its
powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and
7166 and other election laws.
Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be
posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21
hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. - It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in
any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common
posted areas and/or billboards.
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections
assails the COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in
“mobile” places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is
violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No.
6646.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution is constitutional.
RULING:
The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. There
is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case.
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places does not endanger any substantial
government or public interest.
Under the clear and present danger rule, not only must the danger be patently clear and
pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided, must be so substantive as to justify a
clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the prohibition is not so much that of
the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to
express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A
sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his
private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of
anybody else.
Moreover, the restriction is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private
property, which in this case is a privately owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition,
another cardinal right guaranteed under the Constitution is violated which is that no person shall
be deprived of his property without due process of law.
Case 9
COMELEC prohibited the conduct of exit polls by ABS-CBN on the ground of clear and present
danger it poses to the integrity of elections. However the court said that it erred in such measure
because it violates freedom of speech and freedom of press by making an overbroad resolution
as it prohibits the long-tern use of such data on research.
issue
WON COMELEC in the exercise of its powers can ban exit polls? NO. The measure is
overbroad and unnecessarily restricts fundamental rights of speech and of press.
Held : two theoretical test in determining the validity of restrictions to such freedoms, as follows:
These are the "clear and present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. means that
the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded
against is the "substantive evil" sought to be prevented. . . . The "dangerous tendency" rule, on
the other hand, . . if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right
to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate
acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated
in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite
persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of
such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous
tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the
time element; the danger must not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable.33 The evil
sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a
restraint of a writing instrument By the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants
are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or
reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second, the survey
result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of
the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for,
based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the
credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and
independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot
undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome
of one can only be indicative of the other. With the foregoing premises, The SC conclude that
the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of
disrupting elections, exit polls — properly conducted and publicized — can be vital tools for the
holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections; and for the elimination of electionfixing, fraud and other electoral ills.
Case 10
Facts : Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the
parties to the conversation discussed "rigging" the results of the 2004 elections to favor
President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye (Bunye) held a
press conference in Malacañang Palace, where he played before the presidential press corps
two compact disc recordings of conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified
the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second
compact disc had been "spliced" to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to
Garcillano. On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television
stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a "cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations" issued to them.5 On 14 June 2005, NTC officers
met with officers of the broadcasters group, Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters saPilipinas (KBP),
to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement expressing
commitment to press freedom
Issue : WON the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an
impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression
Held : When expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four
categories of expression, namely: pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of
imminent lawless action, and danger to national security. All other expression is not subject to
prior restrain Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value
expression. Any content-based prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without
exception. A protected expression means what it says – it is absolutely protected from
censorship Prior restraint on expression is content-based if the restraint is aimed at the
message or idea of the expression. Courts will subject to strict scrutiny content-based restraint.
If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral
even if it burdens expression The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a
content-based prior restraint because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The
NTC’s claim that the Garci Tapes might contain "false information and/or willful
misrepresentation," and thus should not be publicly aired, is an admission that the restraint is
content-based The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does
not fall under any of the four existing categories of unprotected expression recognized in this
jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a political expression because it
exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly improper conversations with a COMELEC
Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last presidential elections. The content of the
Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on the sanctity of the
ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. Public
discussion on the credibility of the electoral process is one of the highest political expressions of
any electorate, and thus deserves the utmost protection. If ever there is a hierarchy of protected
expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank. The rule, which recognizes no
exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. On this
ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts determine that
the subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the public
airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint.
However, there is no claim here by respondents that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes
involves national security and publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of the State.
The alleged violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a prior
restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly prohibits the
enactment of any law, and that includes anti-wiretapping laws, curtailing freedom of expression.
The only exceptions to this rule are the four recognized categories of unprotected expression.
However, the content of the Garci Tapes does not fall under any of these categories of
unprotected expression.
Case 11
On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired "Prosti-tuition," an
episode of the television (TV) program "The Inside Story" produced and hosted by respondent
Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their
tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes, pimps, customers, and some
faculty members were interviewed. The Philippine Women’s University (PWU) was named as
the school of some of the students involved and the facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue,
Manila conspicuously served as the background of the episode. The showing of "The Inside
Story" caused uproar in the PWU community. Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee
of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and Teachers Association filed letter-complaints3 with
petitioner MTRCB. Acting on the letter-complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal
complaint with the MTRCB Investigating Committee, alleging among others, that respondents
(1) did not submit "The Inside Story" to petitioner for its review and (2) exhibited the same
without its permission, thus, violating Section 74 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 19865 and
Section 3,6 Chapter III and Section 7,7 Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations
respondents explained that the "The Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news
documentary and socio-political editorial," the airing of which is protected by the constitutional
provision on freedom of expression and of the press. Accordingly, petitioner has no power,
authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents.
Issue : WON the “inside story” is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of
expression and of the press.
Held :
No. Respondents claim that the showing of "The Inside Story" is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However, there has been
no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of
the press has a preferred status. If this Court, in Iglesiani Cristo, did not exempt religious
programs from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason,
there is no justification to exempt therefrom "The Inside Story" which, according to
respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of
the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status. The only exceptions from the
MTRCB’s power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986,
such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government
and/or its departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels.
Case 12
CASE DIGEST : SWS vs Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the
period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish
them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present
danger to justify such restraint.
Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the
dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?
Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to
be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public
convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient
to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic
institutions.”
Case 13
Policarpio vs. Manila Times
GR no. L-16027, May 30, 1962
Conception, J.:
FACTS: Plaintiff Lumen Policarpio seeks to recover damages from Manila Times by reason of
the publication in the Saturday Mirror and the Daily Mirror of two articles which are claimed to be
per se defamatory, libelous and false and jeopardize her integrity and good name. These
articles were about the charges against her which caused her to be separated from her service
as a executive secretary of the local UNESCO National Commission. Plaintiff maintains that the
effect of these false statements was to give the general impression that she was guilty or at
least probably guilty of the crimes of malversation of public funds and estafa. Likewise, she
asserted that there are other inaccuracies in the news item.
ISSUE: W/N Manila Times had acted maliciously in publishing the aforementioned articles.
RULING: Affirmative. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following
cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers
in the exercise of other functions.
In the case at bar, aside from containing information derogatory to the plaintiff, the article
presented her in a worse predicament than that in which she, in fact, was. In other words, said
article was not a fair and true report of the proceedings there in alluded to. What is more, its
sub-title — "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUD" — is a comment or remark, besides
being false. Accordingly, the defamatory imputations contained in said article are "presumed to
be malicious".
Case 14
A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court against Borjal and Soliven
for writing and publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory and offensive against Francisco
Wenceslao, attacking among others the solicitation letters he send to support a conference to
be launch concerning resolving matters on transportation crisis that is tainted with anomalous
activities. Wenceslao however was never named in any of the articles nor was the conference
he was organizing. The lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the private respondent for
damages which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A petition for review was filed before the
SC contending that private respondent was not sufficiently identified to be the subject of the
published articles.
W/N the subject article constitutes qualifiedly privileged communication
Yes. The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the declared objective of the
conference, the composition of its members and participants, and the manner by which it was
intended to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with public
interest.
Case 15
Facts : Sometime in April 1992, a complaint for libel was filed by Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr. against
Dr. Rhodora M. Ledesma, petitioner herein, before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office,
docketed as I.S. No. 92-5433A. Petitioner filed her counter-affidavit to the complaint. Finding
"sufficient legal and factual basis," the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filed on July 6, 1992 an
Information for libel against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104.
A petition for review of the resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Vestil was filed by petitioner
before the Department of Justice pursuant to P.D. No. 77 as amended by P.D. No. 911. The
Department of Justice gave due course to the petition and directed the Quezon City prosecutor
to move for deferment of further proceedings and to elevate the entire records of the case. 5
Accordingly, a "Motion to Defer, Arraignment" dated September 7, 1992 was filed by Prosecutor
Tirso M. Gavero before the court a quo. 6 On September 9, 1992, the trial court granted the
motion and deferred petitioner's arraignment until the final termination of the petition for review.
7 Without the consent or approval of the trial prosecutor, private complainant, through counsel,
filed a Motion to Lift the Order dated September 9, 1992 and to Set the Case for
Arraignment/Trial
Issue : WON the letter is libelous
Held : In every case for libel, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b)
it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable
Petitioner's letter was written to seek redress of proper grievance against the inaccurate
distribution and payment of professional fees and against unfair treatment in the Nuclear
Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart Center Petitioner's letter was written to seek
redress of proper grievance against the inaccurate distribution and payment of professional fees
and against unfair treatment in the Nuclear Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart Center.
It is a qualified privileged communication under Article 354(1) of the Revised Penal Code
Petitioner's letter was a private communication made in the performance of a moral duty on her
part. Her intention was not to inflict an unjustifiable harm on the private complainant, but to
present her grievance to her superior. The privileged nature of her letter overcomes the
presumption of malice. There is no malice when justifiable motive exists; and in the absence of
malice, there is no libel. We note that the information itself failed to allege the existence of
malice Further, we note that the information against petitioner was filed only on July 27, 1992 or
one year after June 27, 1991, the date the letter was sent. It is obviously nothing more than a
countercharge to give Complainant Torres a leverage against petitioner's administrative action
against him
Case 16
Facts : An information for libel was filed before the RTC, Branch 20, Naga City, against the
petitioner and Ramos who were then the managing editor and correspondent, respectively, of
the Bicol Forum, a local weekly newspaper circulated in the Bicol Region. The information reads
as follows: That on or about the 18th day up to the 24th day of August, 1986, in the Bicol Region
comprised by the Provinces of Albay, Catanduanes, Sorsogon, Masbate, Camarines Sur, and
Camarines Norte, and the Cities of Iriga and Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court under R.A. No. 4363, and B.P. Blg. 129, the above-named accused who are
the news correspondent and the managing editor, respectively, of the local weekly newspaper
Bicol Forum, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without justifiable motive
and with malicious intent of impeaching, discrediting and destroying the honor, integrity, good
name and reputation of the complainant as Minister of the Presidential Commission on
Government Reorganization and concurrently Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur, and
to expose him to public hatred, ridicule and contempt, write, edit, publish and circulate an issue
of the local weekly newspaper BICOL FORUM throughout the Bicol Region, with banner
headline and front page news item read by the public throughout the Bicol Region,
Issue : WON the questioned news item is libelous
Held : The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a
scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of
officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound
can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. Reckless conduct is not measured by
whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before
publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows
reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice the prosecution failed to
meet the criterion of "reckless disregard." As the records reveal, the issue of cash advances
against the coffers of the provincial government of Camarines Sur was a major political topic in
said locality at that time. Even the private respondent himself admitted during his direct
testimony that he went on radio in order to address the matter. It was clearly a legitimate topic to
be discussed not only by the members of the media but by the public as what was involved was
the dispensation of taxpayers’ money. Further, it bears emphasis that in this case, the petitioner
and Ramos had in their possession information relating to the cash advances and the private
respondent’s travels abroad. The information was provided by one who worked in the provincial
treasurer’s office and had access to the pertinent financial records of the provincial government.
Their informant was familiar with the procedure with regard to the approval of cash advances.
While substantiation of the facts supplied is an important reporting standard, still, a reporter may
rely on information given by a lone source although it reflects only one side of the story provided
the reporter does not entertain a "high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity." The
prosecution, in this case, utterly failed to prove that the petitioner and Ramos entertained such
awareness
Case 17
PEOPLE’S JOURNAL et. al. vs. FRANCIS THOENEN
G.R. No. 143372 December 13, 2005
Facts:
On 30 September 1990, a news item appeared in the People’s Journal claiming that a certain
Francis Thoenen, a Swiss national who allegedly shoots wayward neighbors’ pets that he finds
in his domain. It also claimed that BF Homes residents, in a letter through lawyer Atty. Efren
Angara, requested for the deportation of Thoenen to prevent the recurrence of such incident in
the future. Thoenen claimed that the article destroyed the respect and admiration he enjoyed in
the community. He is seeking for damages.
The petitioners admitted publication of the news item, ostensibly out of a “social and moral duty
to inform the public on matters of general interest, promote the public good and protect the
moral public (sic) of the people,” and that the story was published in good faith and without
malice.
Issue:
Whether or not the news report fall under privileged communication and therefore protected by
the constitutional provision on freedom of speech.
Held:
The right of free speech is not absolute. Libel is not protected speech. In the instant case, even
if we assume that the letter written by Atty. Angara is privileged communication, it lost its
character when the matter was published in the newspaper and circulated among the general
population, especially since the individual alleged to be defamed is neither a public official nor a
public figure.
Moreover, the news item contained falsehoods on two levels. First, the BF Homes residents did
not ask for the deportation of Thoenen, more so because the letter of the Atty. Anagara was a
mere request for verification of Thoenen’s status as a foreign resident. The article is also untrue
because the events she reported never happened. Worse, the main source of information, Atty.
Efren Angara, apparently either does not exist, or is not a lawyer.
There is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the
careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’
debate. Calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which “are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality…
The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the
truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection”
Case 18 fernando v. ca
Facts: Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, officers of the PNP
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in the National Capital Region conducted police
surveillance on the store Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair) in Quiapo. A Search
Warrant for violation of Article 201 of RPC against petitioner and a certain Warren Tingchuy and
the seizure of the following items:
a. Copies of New Rave Magazines with nude obscene pictures;
b. Copies of IOU Penthouse Magazine with nude obscene pictures;
c. Copies of Hustler International Magazine with nude obscene pictures; and
d. Copies of VHS tapes containing pornographic shows.
The police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five VHS tapes(among of which is
“Kahit sa Pangarap Lang” with Myra Manibog as actress who is naked) and ten different
magazines(Dalaga, Penthouse, Swank, Erotic, Rave, Playhouse, Gallery, QUI), which they
deemed pornographic. Petitioners were charged and convicted. CA affirmed the decision hence
this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the CA erred in affirming RTC’s decision.
Held: No. As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the
State in pursuing its mandate to protect the public from obscene, immoral and indecent
materials must justify the regulation or limitation. (Kottinger Rule Applied).
Case 19
Navarro vs. Villegas [GR L-31687, 26 February 1970] Resolution: 1 concur in separate opinion,
2 dissented Facts: Navarro requested for a permit to hold a meeting at Plaza Miranda in the
afternoon of 26 February 1970. The Mayor of Manila, Villegas, instead offered the Sunken
Gardens, as an alternative to Plaza Miranda, as the site of the demonstration. Mayor Villegas
has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought by Navarro. Navarro filedthe petition for
mandamus. The Court, after considering the pleadings and arguments of the parties, issued a
Resolution without prejudice to a more extended opinion.
Issue: Whether the Mayor possesses discretion to determine the public places to be used for
assembly, i.e. the Sunken Garden, instead of Plaza Miranda.
Held: As stated in Primicias v. Fugoso (80 Phil. 75), the Mayor possesses reasonable discretion
to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in order to
secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize
the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order. The Mayor has expressly stated his
willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal
activities of the community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza
Miranda as the site of the demonstration sought to be held in the afternoon of 26 February
1970. Experiences in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations do not warrant
the Court's disbelieving the Mayor's appraisal that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as compared
to one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of
public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of
such assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no means of preventing such
disorders. Consequently, every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is
placed in such a state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees
dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the
general detriment of the public. Civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an
ordered society. Navarro has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of Mayor to
grant their application for permit unconditionally
CASE 20
Jose B.L Reyes, in behalf of the ANTI-BASES COALITION (ABC) petitioner,
v.
Ramon Bagatsing, as Mayor of the City of Manila
Facts: Petitioner, retired Justice JB. L Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition
sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26,
1983 from 02:00 to 05:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the
gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open
space of public property, a short program would be held. There was likewise an
assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech
and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it “to ensure a peaceful march
and rally.” Petitioner filed suit for mandamus unaware that permit was denied, because it
was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusal of permit was due to police intelligence
reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit as this
time and at the place applied for.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of permit for the conduct peaceable assembly to the gates of U.S.
Embassy may be validly enforced.
HELD:
NO. Mandatory injunction prayed was granted.
RATIO:
[T]he Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and
peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: “No law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.”. There can be
no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on
the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Neither can there be any
valid objection to the use of the streets, to the gates of the US Embassy, hardly two block-away
at the Roxas Boulevard
There is merit to the observation that except as to the novel aspects of a litigation, the judgment
must be confined within the limits of previous decisions. The law declared on past occasions is,
on the whole, a safe guide, So it has been here. While the General rule is that a permit should
recognize the right of the applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice,
another place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be shown that there is a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were made.
By way of a summary The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the
licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it
were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official
concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its
grant but at another public place.
CASE 21
MALABANAN vs. RAMENTO (SHORT VERSION)
FACTS:
Petitioners, all officers of the Supreme Students Council of the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation, sought and were granted a permit to hold a meeting. At such gathering they
manifested their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the
Institute of Agriculture. They marched and demonstrated outside the place indicated in the
permit, disturbing the classes being held. They were later suspended for one academic year for
holding illegal assembly.
ISSUE:
WON there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free
speech in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed.
HELD:
Yes, petitioners are entitled to their rights to peaceful assembly and free speech. They enjoy like
the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to
those disposed to listen in gatherings. While the authority of educational institutions over the
conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional
safeguards
CASE 22
Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006
Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the
Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they
participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas
Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which
the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can
stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It
also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as
the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is
sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of
the government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing” suggest the
exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase “maximum
tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are
being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This
petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During
the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the
petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising
the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20,
October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880,
specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine
Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably assemble.
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional
protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without
which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor
injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such
and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the power to
prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety,
and general welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates
the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to
all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does
not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise
they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither the words “opinion,”
“protesting,” and “influencing” in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its
use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist
and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized
exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.