International Phenomenological Society
Descriptive Phenomenology and Constructivism
Author(s): Hans Seigfried
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Dec., 1976), pp. 248-261
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107196
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DISCUSSION
DESCRIPTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTIVISM
Phenomenologists, committing themselves to the description of
the life-world, frequently criticize scientific knowledge for being
abstract and constructivistic. Discussing the relationship between
ontology and science in a Heideggerian context, I dismiss such criticism by arguing that the pheomena which phenomenology describes
are by their very nature constructions and that phenomenology itself
is nothing but a method modeled on that of the sciences and designed
to finally turn philosophy into a strict science after centuries of random speculation. Phenomenology, consequently, cannot function as
a basis for diatribes against science and technology.
Heidegger's main concern in his phenomenological period was,
as for EHusserl, the justification and foundation of scientific knowl-
edge (Grundlegung der Wissenschaften). The very idea of fundamental ontology is proof of it because it is the explicit task of funda-
mental ontology to lay the foundations for regional ontologies which
in turn provide the foundations for the various positive sciences. A
most decisive step in the clarification of the idea of a fundamental
ontology is the differentiation between ontology and science, between
the procedures of ontological and of positive scientific research.
The task of fundamental ontology is to exhibit the ontological
fundaments of scientific knowledge by securing access to the structure of the being of entities themselves through the "disclosure of the
internal possibility of the comprehension of being" (K, 242).1 However, Heidegger's characterization of such access seems to be so
vague, ambiguous, and even contradictory, that it becomes nearly
impossible to distinguish ontological from scientific research procedures.
On the one hand, Heidegger insists that such access and disclosure is possible "only through the understanding insofar as this
has the character of projection (Entwurf)," and that "the explicit
achievement of projection . . . is necessarily construction (Konstruk-
1 M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. by J. S. Churchi
(2nd ed.; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 242. Abbreviated in the t
as K, followed by the page reference. Occasionally I changed the translation where
felt it to be misleading or unnecessarily obscure. This also holds for my quotation
from Being and Time.
248
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DESCRIPTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTIVISM 249
tion)" (K, 240f). From this one could conclude that the difference
between the procedures of ontology and science cannot be the difference between description and construction but only between two
forms of construction, granted, of course, that scientific procedures
are constructive.
On the other hand, Heidegger claims that ontology, which exhibits the ontological fundaments of scientific explanations by disclosing their a priori, is not "a-prioristic construction," but that it
is empirical, descriptive, and phenomenological (BT, 490nx, 60, 62).2
In other words, "only as phenomenology, is ontology possible" (BT,
60), for "the term 'phenomenology' expresses a maxim which can be
formulated as 'To the things themselves!' It is opposed to all freefloating constructions and accidental findings; it is opposed to taking
over any conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated;
it is opposed to those pseudo-questions which parade themselves as
'problems,' often for generations at a time" (BT, 50). Scientific research, in contrast, Heidegger claims, takes over its "basic concepts"
(Grundbegriffe), which it uses as "proximal clues for disclosing" a
particular area of research "concretely and for the first time," naively
and without demonstration from "our pre-scientific ways of exper-
iencing and interpreting" that area (BT, 29). Occasional and more or
less radical revisions of such concepts, if not transparent to the
scientists, lead to research crises. The special and monumental task
of ontological research is to prevent and overcome such crises
through the clarification and justification (verification: K, 241) of
such 'basic concepts' (BT, 29-31). And from this one could conclude
that the difference between the procedures of ontology and scienc
must be the difference between phenomenological description an
free-floating, abstract construction.
However, I think that textual and conceptual analyses can dissolve this seeming contradiction in the differentiation between the
procedures of ontology and science and by so doing shed light on
some high-flown claims by some phenomenologists as to the justifi-
cation and verification of scientific knowledge.
There are many ways of defining the task and program of pheno-'
2 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (New York:
Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 490 (note x), 60, 62. Abbreviated in the text as BT, followed
by the page reference.
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250 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
menology.3 The most common one today is still that it is the descriptive grasping and disclosing of the a priori of scientific knowledge.
What is called the a priori of scientific knowledge consists of the
so-called 'guidelines' legitimately used in scientifc research in the
disclosure of the various domains of things. Most phenomenologists
claim that only "the truly original structures of the objects"4 can
legitimately be used as guidelines, the structures of the things themselves as they are "immediately given in primordial experience,"5 in
an experience "prior to any contribution of thought."6 They call the
things themselves as given in immediate experience (intuition) phenomena and the description of the phenomena in this sense phenomenology. The task of phenomenology is, thus, the description of the
structures of the things themselves as they are immediately given in
primordial experience, prior to any contribution of thought, i.e., the
description of the things as they are given in 'lived' experience or, as
they say, of the things of the life-world.7 Phenomenology, consequently, "describes its objects instead of constructing explanations"8 as in
fact the sciences do with the help of dogmatically accepted concepts
and inherited "prejudices"' which they use to frame the objects of
their investigations, thus creating a split between the world scientifically explained and technologically managed and the natural world we
live in. In this way the sciences squander their value for life (Lebens-
bedeutung),10 resulting in an ever increasing estrangement from life
(Lebensentfremdung),"1 which can only be overcome by the reduction
3 Husserl's development of the idea of phenomenology is, of course, better known
than any other, although it is only one development of that idea among many (e.g.,
Heidegger's, Sartre's, Merleau-Ponty's, et al.). However, phenomenology, as developed
by Husserl students, has recently led to assessments of science and technology which I
take to be highly questionable. The purpose of this paper is to show that the idea of
phenomenology can and was, in fact, developed differently from the way it was developed by Husserl himself and by his students. It seems to me that phenomenology as
developed and practiced by Heidegger is philosophically more promising with regard
to the assessment of science and technology.
4 J. J. Kockelmans, "What Is Phenomenology," in Phenomenology. The Philosophy
of Edmund Husseri and Its Interpretation, ed. by J. J. Kockelmans (Garden City:
Doubleday & Co., 1967), p. 33 t.
5 Ibid., p. 34.
6 J. M. Edie, "Transcendental Phenomenology and Existentialism," in J. J. Kockel-
mans, op. cit., p. 244.
7Cf. J. J. Kockelmans, ibid., p. 34, and J. M. Edie, ibid., p. 248 f.
8 R. Schmitt, "Husserl's Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction," in J.
Kockelmans, op. cit., p. 58.
9 J. J. Kockelmans, ibid., p. 34.
10 G. Brand, Die Lebenswelt. Eine Philosophie des konkreten Apriori (Berlin: Walter
de Gruyter & Co., 1971), p. 7.
11 G. Brand, ibid., p. 15.
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DESCRIPTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTIVISM 251
of the scientific explanations to or their derivation from the life-
world.12 And since it is presupposed that the life-world is always
already clearly and 'naturally' understood and accepted with 'lived'
and unshakable certainty,13 it is claimed, naturally, that the reduction
of scientific explanations to the world we live in promises finally to
draw the limits and to provide that long searched for fundamentum
certum et inconcussum for the abstract, artificial, and constructivistic explanations of the sciences.
Well, the outline of the nature and task of phenomenology in
Heidegger's Being and Time seems to be slightly but decisively different, mainly because Heidegger 'deformalizes' the ordinary concept
of phenomenon and defines the phenomenological concept of phenomenon more precisely and in a way which is philosophically more
promising (BT, 59). Heidegger does not question the contention that
the task of phenomenology is the genuine disclosure of the a priori,
i.e., of the ontological foundations of positive research (BT, 490nx)
through a "grasping and explicating of the phenomena in a way which
is 'original' and 'intuitive,'" but he insists that this 'original' and
'intuitive' grasping and disclosing is "directly opposed to the naivete
of a haphazard, 'immediate,' and thoughtless 'beholding'" (BT, 61).
Phenomenology is the 'science of phenomena,' and it is a descriptive science, so much so that 'descriptive phenomenology' becomes
a tautological expression for Heidegger (BT, 59). However, what
phenomenology 'describes' are not simply the phenomena in the
ordinary sense, namely 'that which shows itself in itself,' the things
which are accessible through 'original' and 'immediate' intuition, but
what phenomenology thematically 'describes' are the phenomena in
the phenomenological sense only: that which shows itself necessarily
but 'unthematically' in the ordinary phenomena (BT, 4f). Heidegger
illustrates this thesis in reference to Kant's philosophy by pointing
out that what phenomenology 'describes' are not the things which
are accessible through empirical intuition but rather what Kant calls
the 'forms of intuition' (BT, 55).
It is impossible to see the need for a special and distinctive
'science of phenomena' unless one 'deformalizes' the formal and
ordinary concept of phenomenon. For if the concept of phenomenon
is taken formally and in the ordinary sense, then "any exhibiting of
an entity as it shows itself in itself, may be called 'phenomenology'
with formal justification" (BT, 59) as, for example, the descriptive
12.. Janssen, Geschichte und Lebenswelt. Ein Beitrag zur Diskussion von Husserts
Spitwerk (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), p. 150.
13G. Brand, ibid., p 16 f.
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252 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
part of any science may be called 'phenomenology.' Thus, if the task
of phenomenology would be to simply describe whatever shows itself
in itself, it could never have become a special and distinctive 'science'
alongside, above, or below the positive sciences, as many phenomenologists claim it to be.
However, if there is something else besides what shows itself in
itself which does not show itself, but which necessarily has to be
'described' thematically whenever we explicitly exhibit something
which shows itself in itself, i.e., whenever we try to elaborate an
understanding of what shows itself in itself which is critical and
transparent to itself and which is not merely a naive, 'immediate,'
and thoughtless 'beholding,' then there would be a need for a special
and distinctive 'science of phenomena' (BT, 60). This would be in
addition to the ordinary 'phenomenologies,' i.e., in addition to the
positive sciences or, more accurately, to the phenomenological parts
in the positive sciences which have already taken it up as their task
to exactly describe whatever shows itself in itself, the things themselves. This presupposes, of course, not only (1) that there is a need
for such transparency but also (2) that even what shows itself in
itself cannot be grasped without some-'unthematic'-familiarity
with that 'something else.' The description of what shows itself in
itself, thus, remains provisional, naive, and dogmatic without the
explicit and thematic exhibition of that 'something else.' "Thus, that
which demands that it become a phenomenon, and which demands
this in a distinctive sense and in terms of its ownmost content as a
thing, is what phenomenology has taken into its grasp thematically as
its object" (BT, 59). And since the thematic 'description' of that
'something else' could obviously not be the task of the ordinary
'phenomenologies,' it would have to become the task of a special and
distinctive 'science of phenomena.'
What the special and distinctive 'science of phenomena' thematically 'describes' is manifestly "something that proximally and for
the most part does not show itself: it is something that lies hidden, in
contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show
itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus
shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its
meaning and its ground" (BT, 59). In short, what the special and
distinctive 'science of phenomena,' phenomenology in the narrow
sense of the term, thematically exhibits and 'describes' is not what
proximally and for the most part shows itself but the hidden 'meaning' and 'ground' of it.
Of course, the point of departure of phenomenology in this sense
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DESCRIPTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTIVISM 253
must be, like that of any science whatsoever, that which shows itself
in itself, the things themselves, the phenomena in the formal and
ordinary sense. To secure such a point of departure phenomenology
has to grasp them "in such a way that everything about them which
is up for discussion must be treated by exhibiting it directly and
demonstrating it directly" (BT, 59). In other words, it has to start out
as 'descriptive phenomenology,' with a concise description of what
shows itself in itself, whereby the term 'description' simply has the
sense of a prohibition-the avoidance of characterizing anything without direct demonstration (BT, 59, 50).
But how does phenomenology gain and secure access from what
shows itself in itself to that which proximally and for the most part
does not show itself but which necessarily belongs to what thus
shows itself as its 'meaning' and its 'ground,' i.e., how does phenomenology gain and secure access to the phenomena in the phenomenological sense, exhibit them and make them show themselves?
It is the declared business of phenomenology to describe these phenomena. But in what sense can that which does not show itself be described? Certainly not in the ordinary sense of the term. But if 'pheno
menological description' "does not signify such a procedure as we
find, let us say, in botanical morphology" (BT, 59), then what kind
of procedure does it signify, then what is, positively, the meaning of
'phenomeneological description'?
Heidegger claims that Being and Time, the investigation itself,
shows "that the meaning of phenomenological description lies in
interpretation" (BT, 61), i.e., that the business of phenomenology is
the business of interpreting. And he calls phenomenology, for this
reason, "a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word"
(BT, 62).
But Heidegger's investigation shows as perspicuously that, for
this very reason, 'phenomenological description' is by its very nature
dependent upon (mediated by) 'prejudices' because "whenever something is interpreted as something, the interpretation will be founded
essentially upon fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. An
interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us" (BT, 191f). Consequently, phenomenology does
not and cannot give an un-'prejudiced' description of objects of 'immediate' experience, as many phenomenologists emphatically claim,14
simply because there is no such experience, as Being and Time
demonstrates.
14 See note 7, above.
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254 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
The problem which has to be taken up in conjunction with this
result of the Heideggerian investigation (which, in persuance of the
main objective of this paper, I merely present here without extensive
argumentation) and which Heidegger has taken up thematically in
Being and Time and in part, in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics
is how to conceive the character of this 'fore' of experience and
description. Obviously, it is not enough to say simply that it is something a priori which, in fact, prestructures experience and description
in such and such a way. The problem is much more to explain why
experience and description have this character and how access can be
gained and secured to the phenomena in view of it. Heidegger claims
that there has been no attempt so far to pose explicitly and thematically the problem of why understanding not only has in fact but
why it must have these forestructures. Being and Time claims to be
the first attempt at an explicit elaboration of this problem.
The analysis starts out with a descriptive account of the phenomenal findings about questioning and understanding, research and
explanation, then 'points out' the constitutional structures. found, and
finally 'supplies,' i.e., constructs, the 'ground' for the structures found,
the 'ground' being temporality (BT, 486).
This thesis is not regarded as an unchallengeable dogma, still less
as a final solution of the problem, but rather as a first and elaborate
formulation of the problem which, even at this point, still remains
obscure enough. Thus, Being and Time is understood as a laborious
attempt to secure a horizon for the problem itself and for possible
solutions to it. The question is: how is the understanding of being
and entities at all possible? Being and Time suggests that this question can be answered by 'going back' to the primordial constitutionof-being of man who understands being and entities, and it argues
extensively and in much detail that the existential-ontological constitution of the totality of man's being is 'grounded' in temporarily.
Consequently, the elaborate state of the problem at the end of Being
and Time is how to interpret temporarily, i.e., how to construct temporalily in such a way that the possibility and necessity of all modes
of understanding, non-conceptual as well as conceptual, become intrinsically comprehensible.
Being and Time argues that the elaboration of the problem must
and can avoid free-floating speculations by critically securing the
point of departure of the whole phenomenological and hermeneutical
analysis and by insisting on direct demonstration of the necessity of
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DESCRIPTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTIVISM 255
the various steps taken in the construction of the 'ground' upon which
all forms of understanding become intrinsically comprehensible and
transparent.
The arguments which are supposed to critically secure the point
of departure are designed to show that it is particularly important
to realize that it is a mistake in principle to start out with the
account of some specific and definite way of understanding, with the
way of understanding as we find it, e.g., in today's astronomy-or,
more properly, astrophysics. For what we are left with in all such
cases is the familiar persausive assurance that the chosen form of
understanding is the 'original' one, the 'all-decisive' one, etc., against
which we are urged to measure all other forms of understanding.
Ordinarily, a closer look easily discovers that the alleged 'original'
form is in many ways 'derivative from' or 'based on' more 'primitive'
and more 'simple' forms of understanding.
Instead, the analysis starts out with a descriptive account of the
phenomenal findings about the undifferentiated character of understanding which it has 'proximally and for the most part,' i.e., of the
'average everyday' kind of understanding. The reasons given to justify this starting point are twofold. It is claimed (1) that as a matter
of principle the start should be made with what is 'ontically closest
to us and well known,' in other words, with the most familiar 'average everyday' kind of understanding, and (2) that all other forms of
understanding originate in and lead back again to the average
everyday kind of understanding. This latter claim remains empty at
first, but the progressing analysis itself can and in fact does substantiate it by demonstrating that in fact and how precisely all other
kinds of understanding emerge from and lead back again to the
average everyday kind of understanding (BT, 69).
Of course, the phenomenal findings about the average everyday
kind of understanding have to be clearly and laboriously circumscribed and the adequacy of the description directly demonstrated.
But it would be a fatal mistake to think that this kind of description,
the descriptive account of the phenomenal findings about the average
everyday kind of understanding, is what phenomenological description intends to give in the end; it merely provides the point of departure for the phenomenological description, and not its point of
destination. The phenomenological description of 'x' is certainly not
the same as the descriptive account of the phenomenal findings about
x'; the latter is a description of 'x' in the ordinary sense of the term,
the former is the construction of the necessary a priori of 'x' as circumscribed in and only in the given descriptive account of the phenomenal findings about 'x.' To put it in reference to the task of Being
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256 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
and Time: The phenomenological description, e.g., of Dasein's 'average
everydayness,' does not describe how we manage a knife and fork,
but it constructs its necessary a priori by showing how all handling
of a knife and fork 'presupposes' the transcendence of Dasein, its
being-in-the-world (K, 243).
To ignore this difference and to confuse phenomenological de-
scription with the descriptive account of the phenomenal findings is
to confuse the 'apriorism,' i.e., the a priori research (the disclosure
and construction of the a priori) of phenomenology with the mere
preparation of its phenomenal basis (BT, 490nx). We find this preparation not only at the beginning of phenomenology but at the beginning of many sciences, e.g., zoology, though not at the beginning of all
sciences, e.g., Newtonian physics (the Philosophiae naturalis principia
mathematics start out, as is well known, with definitiones, axiomata,
etc., instead). Such misunderstanding and misrepresentation of the
program of phenomenology has too often turned phenomenology, the
a priori research, into a 'knite-and-tork-phenomenology,' whose relevance and importance for scientific research, as claimed by phenomenologists, must be considered terribly overstated.
The point of departure, consequently, does not necessarily distinguish phenomenological from scientific research, although in some
cases it obviously does-to a degree. However, the critical securing
of the point of departure by the method of accurate description of the
phenomenal findings alone cannot avoid free-floating speculations
and guarantee the access to the phenomena of phenomenology, i.e.,
to the 'ground' and necessary a priori of what is given in the descriptive account of the phenomenal findings. Because the 'meaning,'
'ground,' and necessary a priori or whatever one prefers to call that
which allows us to understand and comprehend and without which
we simply cannot understand the given-is not 'accessible,' does not
'show itself,' and cannot be 'found' in what is given in the descriptive
account of the phenomenal findings; it has to be 'provided,' 'added,'
and 'supplied.' And phenomenology claims to 'supply' it in a way
which methodically avoids mistaking free-floating speculations for
the necessary a priori by insisting on direct demonstration of the
necessity of the provided construction for the understanding and for
the transparency of what is given in the critically secured descriptive
account of the phenomenal findings. The conceptual construction has
to be provided directly and exclusively for the understanding of the
phenomenal findings. Unfortunately, many phenomenologists give
the impression that the demand for direct demonstration is satisfied
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DESCRIPTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTIVISM 257
by the sheer claim that something is 'essential' to something. The
construction cannot be freely and arbitrarily invented-as the working hypotheses of scientists often incorrectly appear to be to many
phenomenologists. It has to be demonstrated in each case that it is
necessarily linked up with the phenomenal findings in such a way
that without it we could not understand the phenomenal findings as
we in fact do and that theses-findings could not appear to be transparent otherwise. Its sole purpose is, to use an old phrase, the saving
of the phenomena; however, phenomena taken not in the deformalized sense of phenomenology but simply in the sense of the phenomenal findings. The only possible verification and justification of such
construction is, of course, the understanding which it 'provides'-an
understanding which is clear and transparent to itself (K, 241).
From what has been said it follows, of course, that neither the
point of departure nor the point of destination nor the procedure
from the one to the other distinguishes phenomenological from scientific research. The title 'phenomenology' is simply the name for any
genuine scientific and philosophical empiricism, i.e., for the method
of every science and of every scientific, i.e., respectable philosophy
(BT, 490nx). To claim a radical difference between phenomenological
and scientific research, as many phenomenologists emphatically do,
is to mistake the task and the procedure of phenomenology and of
science as well. For from what has been said it follows that the term
'phenomenology' does not and cannot characterize any discipline or
form of research with regard to its object or subject matter. It characterizes, instead, all responsible research, philosophical as well as
scientific, solely with regard to its procedure or method (Behandlungsart, BT, 62), i.e., the title 'phenomenology' merely and solely
"informs us of the 'how' with which what is to be treated . . . gets
exhibited and handled" (BT, 59); in short, it signifies a "methodological conception" (BT, 50).
In other words, the phenomenological procedure, as outlined,
truly and radically distinguishes all philosophical and scientific research; however, not from each other, but it distinguishes and separates toto caelo both together from all free-floating speculations,
arbitrary constructions, accidental findings, and all "those pseudoquestions which parade themselves as 'problems,' often for generations at a time" (BT, 50). The maxim of phenomenology, 'To the
things themselves!,' is, as Heidegger not only admits but emphasizes,
"abundantly self-evident, and it expresses . . . the underlying principle of any scientific knowledge whatsoever" -(BT, 50). It is the expression of a prohibition-in philosophy as well as in science: 'Avoid
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258 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
characterizing anything without demonstration!' (BT, 59). Ignoring
this principle and prohibition leads necessarily to arbitrary speculations, stupefying dogmatism, and blundering obscurity-in science as
well as in philosophy.
However, Heidegger's exposition of the idea of phenomenology,
of something "'so self-evident" (BT, 50), in the course of the clarifi-
fication of the only possible and justifiable method of his fundamental-ontological research, and this research itself, frequently misled
many to confuse phenomenology with philosophy, with fundamental
ontology, and with the analysis of the average everydayness in particular, especially in view of the still ongoing analysis and discussion
of the life-world and its relationship to science and technology, a discussion and analysis to which so many phenomenologists have committed themselves exclusively. The high-flown and often infamous
attacks, indicated at the beginning of this paper, of so many lifeworld phenomenologists against scientific research and technology,
and the overselling of the phenomenology of the life-world as a panacea for their shortcomings, are merely consequences of such a confusion.
But only a hazy understanding of the idea of phenomenology and
a hasty reading of Being and Time in particular can lead to such
consequences. For phenomenology itself can never be legitimately
contrasted with science, nor can it be identified with a particular,
'special' kind of science, or for that matter with philosophy, and even
less with any of its many identified 'disciplines,' such as ontology,
fundamental ontology, or the philosophical analysis of the life-world.
None of the many kinds of philosophical research can be distinguished
from scientific research merely on the ground that it is phenomenological. For all kinds of philosophical and scientific research are and
have to be phenomenological, if they are not to degenerate into freefloating speculation and arbitrary constructivism.
What distinguishes philosophical research from scientific research is, consequently, not the alleged fact that the one is phenomenological and the other one not, nor for that matter that the one is
descriptive and the other one constructive. However, there are decisive differences between philosophical and scientific research,
and I would like to point out only one-one which helps to further
clarify the idea of phenomenology. Heidegger argues in Being and
Time that what distinguishes philosophical research from scientific
research is the fact that the one is ontological, or even fundamentalontological, whereas the other one is purely ontical. Ontological research tries (1) to 'disclose' the a priori 'presupposed' and already
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DESCRIPTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTIVISM 259
operative in a particular area of scientific research, or even in average everyday life, in other words, it tries to 'supply' the a priori
necessary to understand and to make fully transparent the de facto
understanding of the things in a particular area of scientific research
or in ordinary life, and most importantly, in carrying out its critical
and philosophical task, it tries (2) to establish the limitations of that
a priori and to justify it within the established limitations. Ontical
research, on the other hand, describes and explains the things observable in a particular area of research, always 'presupposing' and
'taking for granted' (1) some particular (regional) a priori together
with (2) some fundamental (universal) a priori. In other words, it
always works within some rich and firmly compacted particular
system of categories and principles and it is always 'guided' by some
'basic' and 'common' concepts in its study of the things observable
in a particular area of scientific research, whose critical analysis and
justification it leaves to other 'disciplines'-to the various regional
ontologies and to fundamental ontology. In short, ontological research, since Plato and Aristotle, is thematically concerned with the
explanation and understanding of the understanding of things,
whereas ontical research is merely concerned with the explanation
and understanding of things.
Being and Time, a treatise in fundamental ontology, is understood
as an attempt to 'disclose' the a priori which is still hidden but nevertheless already operative in our average everyday understanding of
things and which remotely 'guides' all scientific research; in other
words, it tries to 'supply' the a priori which is necessary to make the
average everyday understanding of things transparent to itself-and,
more importantly, it tries to point out its limitations and to establish
its legitimacy. At the beginning of such an enterprise the problem of
the proper procedure has to be discussed because it is still, despite
Kant's 'Copernician Revolution,' the main obstacle to lasting success
in philosophical and ontological research. The analogous problem in
scientific research was solved long ago, and this explains, in Kant's
words, why "the study of nature has entered on the secure path of a
science, after having for so many centuries been nothing but a process
of merely random groping.""5 However, although it was understood
since Kant that only a "method modelled on that of the student of
nature"1 can promise real success in philosophical research, it was
Husserl, according to Heidegger, who made philosophical progress
Is I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by N. K. Smith (Toronto: Macmillan
1965), p. 20 f.
16 Ibid., p. 23, note a.
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260 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
really possible again. For "Edmund Husserl has not only enabled us
to understand once more the meaning of any genuine philosophical
empiricism; he has also given us the necessary tools" (BT, 490nx),
i.e., the elaborate "method modelled on that of the student of nature":
phenomenology. Husserl showed (1) how the method used in the
empirical sciences can be modified for its special purposes and used
successfully in philosophical and ontological research as well, and,
by doing so, he showed (2) how philosophy can become a 'strict
science' after centuries of free-floating speculation and construct-
ivism.
The purpose of the presentation and discussion of the idea of
phenomenology in the introduction to Heidegger's treatise in fundamental ontology is, consequently, to show first, that research in fun-
damental ontology in order to succeed has to proceed in exactly the
same way the sciences do: it has to be demonstrative, i.e., phenomenological (BT, 60, 62), in its construction of the necessary a priori,
and not speculative or, to use Heidegger's term, constructivistic (BT,
490nx). Secondly, the difference between scientific research and
philosophic research is not a difference in the method (constructivism-descriptivism) but rather a difference in the understanding and
explaining of things in terms of an accepted a priori, on the one side,
and an explicit grasping of the 'presuppositions' of such understanding and explaining, on the other side. And, thirdly, philosopical research does not halt at such explicit grasping but it aims ultimately
at a insight into the legitimacy and scope (Recht und Grenzen, K,
251) of such 'presuppositions,' i.e., it does not rest with an answer to
the quaestio facti, it seeks, beyond that, an answer to the quaestio
iuris.
Consequently, to halt at the mere construction of a necessary
a priori, of scientific research in a particular area as well as of
average everyday life, would vitiate the decisive difference indicated
between philosophical and scientific research. For the mere construction of any a priori whatsoever, even of the lifeworld a priori,
answers only the quaestio facti and leaves the quaestio iuris untouched. Merely to construct the a priori of average everyday life
and to interpret things in terms of that a priori is no less dogmatic
and no less in need of justification-even if accepted and presupposed
with 'lived' and unshakable certainty-than is scientific understanding which interprets things in terms of a less 'original' and less 'common' a priori. To demonstrate, therefore, the 'abstractness' of scientific knowledge and of its a priori, and to 'reduce' it to-or, for that
matter to 'deduce' it from-the 'original' and 'supportive' a priori of
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DESCRIPTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTIVISM 261
the life-world, does not prove anything whatsoever about the legitimacy of either one. Such 'reduction' by itself cannot overcome the
'prejudice'-free region of experience which can then become subject
to phenomenological description and which can be claimed to be the
only solid fundament of scientific knowledge. It merely exchanges
the 'prejudices' of the positive sciences for the 'prejudices' and the
'given' of ordinary, unexamined life; for if one appeals to what is
'given,' in any form whatever, then one will always find that what is
'given' "is nothing other than the obvious undiscussed assumption
(Vormeinung) of the person who does the interpreting" and describing (BT, 192).
Thus, if phenomenologists want to attain absolutely valid knowledge of things, as they claim, through a phenomenological foundation
of the 'abstract,' 'artificial,' and 'estranged' scientific knowledge, then
they have to raise and answer-with the-rigor and exactness of the
sciences ("nach den strengsten Regein einer schulgerechten Piinktlichkeit")"7-the quaestio iuris. To appeal, in response to such a demand for critical justification, to the forestructure, prejudgmental
structure, or circularity of all understanding, interpretation, and de-
scription, and to claim that
the life-world a priori into
ing appear meaningless, not
of a 'given' and unshakably
this structure not only forbids putting
question, but indeed makes such questiononly does not guarantee the identification
accepted a priori with a legitimate one,
as Habermas pointed out against Gadamer,18 but it turns phenome-
nology, the radical movement against free-floating speculation and
arbitrary constructivism in matters philosophical, into a reactionary
movement against philosophy and science through the construction
of an a priori and through the dogmatic claim that it is unchallengeable in principle and beyond improvement.
HANS SEIGERIED.
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.
171. Kant, Prolegomena, in Werke, Bd. 4 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co.,
p. 261.
18 J. Habermas, "Summation and Response," in Continuum 8 (1970), pp. 123ff.
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