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Intruders and Firewalls

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CP2414
Network Security
Intruders and Firewalls
Warm-up
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ahg6qcgoay4
It is easy to miss things if you don’t
know what you are looking for!
Credit: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0nzgQ7dd6wI
Intruders
• Three classes of intruders:
Masquerader
• An individual who is not authorised to use the
computer and who penetrates a system’s access
controls to exploit a legitimate user’s account
Misfeasor
• A legitimate user who accesses data, programs, or
resources for which such access is not authorised,
or who is authorised for such access but misuses
his or her privileges
Clandestine
user
• An individual who seizes supervisory control of the
system and uses this control to evade auditing and
access controls or to suppress audit collection
Examples of Intrusion
• Performing a remote root compromise of an e-mail server
• Defacing a Web server
• Guessing and cracking passwords
• Copying a database containing credit card numbers
• Viewing sensitive data, including payroll records and medical information,
without authorisation
• Running a packet sniffer on a workstation to capture usernames and
passwords
• Using a permission error on an anonymous FTP server to distribute pirated
software and music files
• Dialing into an unsecured modem and gaining internal network access
• Posing as an executive, calling the help desk, resetting the executive’s e-mail
password, and learning the new password
• Using an unattended, logged-in workstation without permission
Hackers
• Traditionally, those who hack into computers do so for the thrill of it
or for status
• Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and intrusion prevention systems
(IPSs) are designed to counter hacker threats
◦ In addition to using such systems, organisations can consider restricting remote
logons to specific IP addresses and/or use virtual private network technology
• CERTs
◦ Computer emergency response teams
◦ These cooperative ventures collect information about system vulnerabilities
and disseminate it to systems managers
◦ Hackers also routinely read CERT reports
◦ It is important for system administrators to quickly insert all software patches
to discovered vulnerabilities
Criminal hackers
• Organised groups of hackers
• Usually have specific targets, or at least classes of targets
in mind
• Once a site is penetrated, the attacker acts quickly,
scooping up as much valuable information as possible and
exiting
• IDSs and IPSs can be used for these types of attackers, but
may be less effective because of the quick in-and-out
nature of the attack
Insider Attacks
• Among the most difficult to detect and prevent
• Can be motivated by revenge or simply a feeling of
entitlement
• Countermeasures:
◦ Enforce least privilege, only allowing access to the resources
employees need to do their job
◦ Set logs to see what users access and what commands they are
entering
◦ Protect sensitive resources with strong authentication
◦ Upon termination, delete employee’s computer and network access
◦ Upon termination, make a mirror image of employee’s hard drive
before reissuing it (used as evidence if your company information
turns up at a competitor
Intrusion Techniques
• Objective of the intruder is to gain access to a system
or to increase the range of privileges accessible on a
system
• Most initial attacks use system or software
vulnerabilities that allow a user to execute code that
opens a backdoor into the system
• Ways to protect a password file:
One-way functioning
• The system stores only
the value of a function
based on the user’s
password
Access control
• Access to the password
file is limited to one or a
very few accounts
Quick Quiz-Intrusion Detection
•What are these terminologies mean?
◦True positive
◦True negative
◦False positive
◦True positive
•Regarding intruder detection, which of these
is/are the worst?
Intrusion Techniques
• 1. Try default passwords used with standard accounts that are shipped with
the system. Many administrators do not bother to change these defaults.
• 2. Exhaustively try all short passwords (those of one to three characters).
• 3. Try words in the system’s online dictionary or a list of likely passwords.
◦ Examples of the latter are readily available on hacker bulletin boards.
• 4. Collect information about users, such as their full names, the names of
their spouse and children, pictures in their office, and books in their office
that are related to hobbies.
• 5. Try users’ phone numbers, Social Security numbers, and room numbers.
• 6. Try all legitimate license plate numbers for this state.
• 7. Use a Trojan horse to bypass restrictions on access.
• 8. Tap the line between a remote user and the host system.
Intrusion Detection
• A system’s second line of defense
• Is based on the assumption that the behaviour of the
intruder differs from that of a legitimate user in ways
that can be quantified
• Considerations:
◦ If an intrusion is detected quickly enough, the intruder can be
identified and ejected from the system before any damage is done
or any data are compromised
◦ An effective intrusion detection system can serve as a deterrent, so
acting to prevent intrusions
◦ Intrusion detection enables the collection of information about
intrusion techniques that can be used to strengthen the intrusion
prevention facility
Profiles of behaviour of Intruders and Authorised Users
Approaches to Intrusion Detection
• Statistical anomaly detection
◦ Involves the collection of data relating to the behaviour of
legitimate users over a period of time
◦ Then statistical tests are applied to observed behaviour to
determine whether that behaviour is not legitimate user behaviour
◦ Threshold detection
◦ This approach involves defining thresholds, independent of user, for the frequency of
occurrence of various events
◦ Profile based
◦ A profile of the activity of each user is developed and used to detect changes in the
behaviour of individual accounts
• Rule-based detection
◦ Involves an attempt to define a set of rules or attack patterns that
can be used to decide that a given behaviour is that of an intruder
◦ Often referred to as signature detection
Audit Records
• Fundamental tool for intrusion detection
Native audit
records
Detection-specific
audit records
Virtually all multiuser operating systems
include accounting software that collects
information on user activity
A collection facility can be implemented
that generates audit records containing
only that information required by the
intrusion detection system
The advantage of using this information is
that no additional collection software is
needed
One advantage of such an approach is
that it could be made vendor
independent and ported to a variety of
systems
The disadvantage is that the native audit
records may not contain the needed
information or may not contain it in a
convenient form
The disadvantage is the extra overhead
involved in having two accounting
packages running on a machine
Statistical Anomaly Detection
• Threshold detection
◦ Involves counting the number
of occurrences of a specific
event type over an interval of
time
◦ If the count surpasses what is
considered a reasonable
number that one might expect
to occur, then intrusion is
assumed
◦ By itself is a crude and
ineffective detector of even
moderately sophisticated
attacks
• Profile-based
◦ Focuses on characterizing the
past behaviour of individual
users or related groups of
users and then detecting
significant deviations
◦ A profile may consist of a set
of parameters, so that
deviation on just a single
parameter may not be
sufficient in itself to signal an
alert
Measures That May Be Used For Intrusion Detection
Measure
Model
Type of Intrusion Detected
Login and Session Activity
Login frequency by day Mean and standard deviation Intruders may be likely to log in during off-hours
and time
Frequency of login at
Mean and standard deviation Intruders may log in from a location that a
different locations
particular user rarely or never uses.
Time since last login
Operational
Break-in on a “dead” account
Elapsed time per session Mean and standard deviation Significant deviations might indicate
masquerader.
Quantity of output to
Mean and standard deviation Excessive amount of data transmitted to remote
location
locations could signify leakage of sensitive data.
Session resource
utilization
Password failures at
login
Failures to login from
specified terminals
Execution frequency
Mean and standard deviation Unusual processor or I/O levels could signal an
intruder
Operational
Attempted break-in by password guessing.
Operational
Attempted break-in
Command or Program Execution Activity
Mean and standard deviation May detect intruders, who are likely to use
different commands, or a successful penetration
by a legitimate user, who has gained access to
privileged commands.
Program resource
utilization
Mean and standard deviation An abnormal value might suggest injection of a
virus or Trojan horse, which performs side-effects
that increase I/O or processor utilization.
Execution denials
Operational model
Read, write, create,
delete frequency
Records read, written
Failure count for read,
write, create, delete
May detect penetration attempt by individual user
who seeks higher privileges.
File access activity
Mean and standard deviation Abnormalities for read and write access for
individual users may signify masquerading or
browsing.
Mean and standard deviation Abnormality could signify an attempt to obtain
sensitive data by inference and aggregation.
Operational
May detect users who persistently attempt to
access
Rule-Based Intrusion Detection
• Techniques detect intrusion by observing events in the system
and applying a set of rules that lead to a decision regarding
whether a given pattern of activity is or is not suspicious
• Rule-based anomaly detection
◦ Is similar in terms of its approach and strengths to statistical anomaly
detection
◦ Historical audit records are analyzed to identify usage patterns and to
automatically generate rules that describe those patterns
◦ Current behaviour is then observed, and each transaction is matched
against the set of rules to determine if it conforms to any historically
observed pattern of behaviour
◦ In order for this approach to be effective, a rather large database of
rules will be needed
Rule-Based Intrusion Detection
• Rule-based penetration identification
◦ Typically, the rules used in these systems are specific to the
machine and operating system
◦ The most fruitful approach to developing such rules is to analyze
attack tools and scripts collected on the Internet
◦ These rules can be supplemented with rules generated by
knowledgeable security personnel
• USTAT (UNIX State Transition Analysis Tool)
◦ A model independent of specific audit records
◦ Deals in general actions rather than the detailed specific actions
recorded by the UNIX auditing mechanism
◦ Implemented on a SunOS system that provides audit records on 239
events
USTAT Actions versus SunOS Event Types
USTAT Action
SunOS Event Type
Read
open_r, open_rc, open_rtc, open_rws,
open_rwtc, open_rt, open_rw, open_rwt
Write
truncate, ftruncate, creat, open_rtc,
open_rwc, open_rwtc, open_rt, open_rw,
open_rwt, open_w, open_wt, open_wc,
open_wct
Create
mkdir, creat, open_rc, open_rtc, open_rwc,
open_rwtc, open_wc, open_wtc, mknod
Delete
rmdir, unlink
Execute
exec, execve
Exit
exit
Modify_Owner
chown, fchown
Modify_Perm
chmod, fchmod
Rename
rename
Hardlink
link
Base-Rate Fallacy
• To be of practical use, an intrusion detection system should detect a
substantial percentage of intrusions while keeping the false alarm
rate at an acceptable level
◦ If only a modest percentage of actual intrusions are detected, the
system provides a false sense of security
◦ If the system frequently triggers an alert when there is no intrusion,
then either system managers will begin to ignore the alarms or
much time will be wasted analyzing the false alarms
• Because of the nature of the probabilities involved, it is very difficult
to meet the standard of high rate of detections with a low rate of
false alarms
◦ If the actual numbers of intrusions is low compared to the number
of legitimate uses of a system, then the false alarm rate will be high
unless the test is extremely discriminating
Distributed Intrusion Detection
• Traditional systems focused on single-system stand-alone
facilities
◦ The typical organisation, however, needs to defend a distributed
collection of hosts supported by a LAN or internetwork
◦ A more effective defense can be achieved by coordination and
cooperation among intrusion detection systems across the network
• Major design issues:
A distributed
intrusion
detection system
may need to deal
with different
audit record
formats
One or more
nodes in the
network will serve
as collection and
analysis points for
the data from the
systems on the
network
Either a
centralized or
decentralized
architecture can
be used
Architecture for Distributed Intrusion Detection
Agent Architecture
Honeypots
• Decoy systems that are designed to lure a potential attacker away from critical
systems
• Because any attack against the honeypot is made to seem successful,
administrators have time to mobilize and log and track the attacker without
ever exposing productive systems
• Recent research has focused on building entire honeypot networks that
emulate an enterprise, possible with actual or simulated traffic and data
Has no
production value
Designed to:
• These systems are filled with fabricated information designed to
appear valuable but that a legitimate user of the system wouldn’t
access
• Thus, any attempt to communicate with the system is most likely a
probe, scan, or attack
• Divert an attacker from accessing critical systems
• Collect information about the attacker’s activity
• Encourage the attacker to stay on the system long enough for
administrators to respond
Example of Honeypot Deployment
Intrusion detection exchange format
• To facilitate the development of distributed intrusion
detection systems that can function across a wide range
of platforms and environments, standards are needed
to support interoperability
• Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Intrusion
Detection Working Group
◦ Purpose of the group is to define data formats and exchange
procedures for sharing information of interest to intrusion
detection with response systems and to management systems
that may need to interact with them
◦ Have issued the following Request for Comments (RFC)s:
◦ Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Requirements (RFC 4766)
◦ The Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (RFC 4765)
◦ The Intrusion Detection Exchange Protocol (RFC 4767)
Model For Intrusion Detection Message Exchange
Password Management
•Front line of defense against intruders
•Virtually all multiuser systems require that a user
provide not only a name or identifier (ID) but also
a password
◦ Password serves to authenticate the ID of the individual
logging on to the system
◦ The ID provides security by:
◦ Determining whether the user is authorised to gain access to a system
◦ Determining the privileges accorded to the user
◦ Used in discretionary access control
Attack strategies and countermeasures
Workstation hijacking
Exploiting user mistakes
• The attacker waits until a logged-in workstation is
unattended
• The standard countermeasure is automatically logging
the workstation out after a period of inactivity
• Attackers are frequently successful in obtaining
passwords by using social engineering tactics that trick
the user or an account manager into revealing a
password; a user may intentionally share a password
to enable a colleague to share files; users tend to
write passwords down because it is difficult to
remember them
• Countermeasures include user training, intrusion
detection, and simpler passwords combined with
another authentication mechanism
Offline dictionary attack
Specific account attack
• Determined hackers can frequently bypass access
controls and gain access to the system’s password file
• Countermeasures include controls to prevent
unauthorised access to the password file, intrusion
detection measures to identify a compromise, and
rapid reissuance of passwords should the password
file be compromised
• The attacker targets a specific account and submits
password guesses until the correct password is
discovered
• The standard countermeasure is an account lockout
mechanism, which locks out access to the account
after a number of failed login attempts
Attack strategies and countermeasures
Electronic monitoring
• If a password is communicated across a
network to log on to a remote system, it is
vulnerable to eavesdropping
• Simple encryption will not fix this problem,
because the encrypted password is, in effect,
the password and can be observed and
reused by an adversary
Password guessing against single
user
• The attacker attempts to gain knowledge
about the account holder and system
password policies and uses that knowledge to
guess the password
• Countermeasures include training in and
enforcement of password policies that make
passwords difficult to guess
Exploiting multiple password use
Popular password attack
• Attacks can become much more effective or
damaging if different network devices share
the same or a similar password for a given
user
• Countermeasures include a policy that forbids
the same or similar password on particular
network devices
• Attack is to use a popular password and try it
against a wide range of user IDs
• Countermeasures include policies to inhibit
the selection by users of common passwords
and scanning the IP addresses of
authentication requests and client cookies for
submission patterns
UNIX Password Scheme
Unix implementations
• Crypt(3)
◦ Was designed to discourage guessing attacks
◦ This particular implementation is now considered inadequate
◦ Despite its known weaknesses, this UNIX scheme is still often required for compatibility
with existing account management software or in multivendor environments
• MD5 secure hash algorithm
◦ The recommended hash function for many UNIX systems, including Linux, Solaris, and
FreeBSD
◦ Far slower than crypt(3)
• Bcrypt
◦ Developed for OpenBSD
◦ Probably the most secure version of the UNIX hash/salt scheme
◦ Uses a hash function based on the Blowfish symmetric block cipher
◦ Slow to execute
◦ Includes a cost variable
Passwords Cracked from a Sample Set of 13,797 Accounts
* Computed as the number of matches divided by the search size. The more words that needed to be tested for a match, the lower the cost/benefit ratio.
© 2017 Pearson Education, Inc., Hoboken, NJ.
Password selection strategies
• The goal is to
eliminate guessable
passwords while
allowing the user to
select a password
that is memorable
• Four basic
techniques are in
use:
User education
• Users can be told the
importance of using hardto-guess passwords and
can be provided with
guidelines for selecting
strong passwords
Computer-generated
passwords
• Computer-generated
password schemes have a
history of poor
acceptance by users
• Users have difficulty
remembering them
Reactive password
checking
Proactive password
checking
• A strategy in which the
system periodically runs
its own password cracker
to find guessable
passwords
• A user is allowed to select
his or her own password,
however, at the time of
selection, the system
checks to see if the
password is allowable
and, if not, rejects it
Performance of Bloom Filter
Summary
• Intruders
◦ behaviour patterns
◦ Intrusion techniques
• Intrusion detection
◦ Audit records
◦ Statistical anomaly
detection
◦ Rule-based intrusion
detection
◦ The base-rate fallacy
◦ Distributed intrusion
detection
◦ Honeypots
◦ Intrusion detection
exchange format
• Password management
◦ The vulnerability of
passwords
◦ The use of hashed
passwords
◦ User password choices
◦ Password selection
strategies
◦ Bloom filter
Quick Quiz
• What are the three classes of intruders?
Explain.
• What is the difference between statistical
anomaly detection and rule-based intrusion
detection?
• What are honeypots? Where are the
locations which they can be deployed?
CP2414
Network Security
Firewalls
The Need for firewalls
• Internet connectivity is no longer optional for organisations
◦ Individual users within the organisation want and need Internet access
• While Internet access provides benefits to the organisation, it
enables the outside world to reach and interact with local
network assets
◦ This creates a threat to the organisation
◦ While it is possible to equip each workstation and server on the
premises network with strong security features, this may not be
sufficient and in some cases is not cost-effective
The Need for firewalls
• Firewall
◦ An alternative, or at least complement, to host-based
security services
◦ Is inserted between the premises network and the
Internet to establish a controlled link and to erect an
outer security wall or perimeter
◦ The aim of this perimeter is to protect the premises
network from Internet-based attacks and to provide a
single choke point where security and auditing can be
imposed
◦ May be a single computer system or a set of two or
more systems that cooperate to perform the firewall
function
Firewall characteristics
• Design goals for a firewall:
◦ All traffic from inside to outside, and vice versa, must pass through the firewall
◦ Only authorised traffic, as defined by the local security policy, will be allowed to pass
◦ The firewall itself is immune to penetration
• Characteristics that a firewall access policy could use to filter traffic:
IP Address and Protocol Values
• Controls access based on the source or destination addresses and port numbers, direction of flow
being inbound or outbound, and other network and transport layer characteristics
Application Protocol
• Controls access on the basis of authorised application protocol data
User Identity
• Controls access based on the user’s identity, typically for inside users who identify themselves using
some form of secure authentication technology, such as IPSec
Network Activity
• Controls access based on considerations such as the time or request
Firewall expectations
Defines a single choke point that keeps
unauthorised users out of the protected
network, prohibits potentially vulnerable
services from entering or leaving the network,
and provides protection from various kinds of
IP spoofing and routing attacks
Provides a location for monitoring
security-related events
A firewall
Is a convenient platform for several Internet
functions that are not security related
Can serve as the platform for IPsec
Firewall limitations
Cannot protect against
attacks that bypass the
firewall
A laptop, PDA, or portable
storage device may be used
and infected outside the
corporate network, and
then attached and used
internally
A Firewall
Cannot guard against
wireless communications
between local systems on
different sides of the
internal firewall
May not protect fully against
internal threats, such as a
disgruntled employee or an
employee who unwittingly
cooperates with an external
attacker
Types of Firewalls
Packet-Filtering Example
Rule
Direction
Src
address
Dest
address
Protocol
Dest
port
Action
A
In
External
Internal
TCP
25
Permit
B
Out
Internal
External
TCP
>1023
Permit
C
Out
Internal
External
TCP
25
Permit
D
In
External
Internal
TCP
>1023
Permit
E
Either
Any
Any
Any
Any
Deny
Packet Filtering firewalls
Weaknesses
• Because packet filter firewalls do not examine upper-layer data, they
cannot prevent attacks that employ application-specific vulnerabilities or
functions
• Because of the limited information available to the firewall, the logging
functionality present in packet filter firewalls is limited
• Most packet filter firewalls do not support advanced user authentication
schemes
• Packet filter firewalls are generally vulnerable to attacks and exploits that
take advantage of problems within the TCP/IP specification and protocol
stack - spoofing
• Due to the small number of variables used in access control decisions,
packet filter firewalls are susceptible to security breaches caused by
improper configurations
Strengths
• Its simplicity
• Transparent to users and are very fast
Attacks and countermeasures
IP address
spoofing
Source routing
attacks
Tiny fragment
attacks
The intruder transmits packets
from the outside with a source
IP address field containing an
address of an internal host
The source station specifies the
route that a packet should take
as it crosses the internet, in the
hopes that this will bypass
security measures that do not
analyze the source routing
information
The intruder uses the IP
fragmentation option to create
extremely small fragments and
force the TCP header
information into a separate
packet fragment
Countermeasure is to discard all
packets that use this option
Countermeasure is to enforce a
rule that the first fragment of a
packet must contain a
predefined minimum amount of
the transport header
Countermeasure is to discard
packets with an inside source
address if the packet arrives on
an external interface
Stateful Firewall Connection State Table
Source Address
Source Port
Destination
Address
Destination Port
Connection
State
192.168.1.100
1030
210.22.88.29
80
Established
192.168.1.102
1031
216.32.42.123
80
Established
192.168.1.101
1033
173.66.32.122
25
Established
192.168.1.106
1035
177.231.32.12
79
Established
223.43.21.231
1990
192.168.1.6
80
Established
212.22.123.32
2112
192.168.1.6
80
Established
210.922.212.18
3321
192.168.1.6
80
Established
24.102.32.23
1025
192.168.1.6
80
Established
223.21.22.12
1046
192.168.1.6
80
Established
Application Level Gateway
• Also called an application proxy
• Acts as a relay of application-level traffic
• If the gateway does not implement the proxy code for a
specific application, the service is not supported and
cannot be forwarded across the firewall
• The gateway can be configured to support only specific
features of an application that the network administrator
considers acceptable while denying all other features
• Tend to be more secure than packet filters
• Disadvantage:
◦ The additional processing overhead on each connection
Circuit-Level Gateway
• Also called circuit-level proxy
• Can be a stand-alone system or it can be a specialized
function performed by an application-level gateway for
certain applications
• Does not permit an end-to-end TCP connection
• The security function consists of determining which
connections will be allowed
• Typical use is a situation in which the system
administrator trusts the internal users
• Can be configured to support application-level or proxy
service on inbound connections and circuit-level functions
for outbound connections
• Example of implementation is the SOCKS package
Bastion Host
• A system identified by the firewall administrator as a
critical strong point in the network’s security
• Typically serves as a platform for an application-level
or circuit-level gateway
Bastion Host
• Common characteristics:
◦ Executes a secure version of its operating system, making it a
hardened system
◦ Only the services that the network administrator considers
essential are installed
◦ May require additional authentication before a user is allowed
access to the proxy services
◦ Each proxy is configured to support only a subset of the
standard application’s command set
Bastion Host
• Common characteristics (Cont.’):
◦ Each proxy is configured to allow access only to specific host
systems
◦ Each proxy maintains detailed audit information by logging all
traffic, each connection, and the duration of each connection
◦ Each proxy module is a very small software package
specifically designed for network security
◦ Each proxy is independent of other proxies on the bastion host
◦ A proxy generally performs no disk access other than to read
its initial configuration file
◦ Each proxy runs as a nonprivileged user in a private and
secured directory on the bastion host
Host-Based Firewall
• A software module used to secure an individual
host
• Is available in many operating systems or can be
provided as an add-on package
• Filters and restricts the flow of packets
• Common location is a server
• Advantages:
◦ Filtering rules can be tailored to the host environment
◦ Protection is provided independent of topology
◦ Used in conjunction with stand-alone firewalls, provides
an additional layer of protection
Personal Firewall
• Controls the traffic between a personal computer or workstation on
one side and the Internet or enterprise network on the other side
• Can be used in the home environment and on corporate intranets
• Typically is a software module on the personal computer
• Can also be housed in a router that connects all of the home
computers to a DSL, cable modem, or other Internet interface
• Primary role is to deny unauthorised remote access to the
computer
• Can also monitor outgoing activity in an attempt to detect and block
worms and other malware
Example Firewall Configuration
A VPN Security Scenario
Example Distributed Firewall Configuration
Summary of Firewall Locations and Topologies
• Host-resident firewall
◦ This category includes personal firewall software
and firewall software on servers
◦ Can be used alone or as part of an in-depth firewall
deployment
• Screening router
◦ A single router between internal and external
networks with stateless or full packet filtering
◦ This arrangement is typical for small office/home
office (SOHO) applications
• Single bastion inline
◦ A single firewall device between an internal and
external router
◦ This is the typical firewall appliance configuration
for small-to-medium sized organisations
Summary of Firewall Locations and Topologies
• Single bastion T
◦ Similar to single bastion inline but
has a third network interface on
bastion to a DMZ where externally
visible servers are placed
• Double bastion inline
◦ DMZ is sandwiched between
bastion firewalls
• Double bastion T
◦ DMZ is on a separate network
interface on the bastion firewall
• Distributed firewall configuration
◦ Used by some large businesses and
government organisations
Summary
• The need for firewalls
• Firewall characteristics and
access policy
• Types of firewalls
◦
◦
◦
◦
Packet filtering firewall
Stateful inspection firewalls
Application level gateway
Circuit level gateway
• Firewall basing
◦ Bastion host
◦ Host based firewalls
◦ Personal firewall
• Firewall locations and
configurations
◦
◦
◦
◦
DMZ networks
Virtual private networks
Distributed firewalls
Firewall location and
topologies summary
Quick Quiz
•What are firewalls? Why are they
important?
•What are the disadvantages of packet filter
firewalls?
•What are distribute firewalls? What are the
advantages of using them?
•Where would you place a demilitarised zone
(DMZ) network? Why?
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