Kapur Surya Foundation
East Asian IdentityAuthor(s): K SYAMALAMMA and P KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY
Source: World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues , Vol. 14, No. 4 (WINTER
2010 (OCT—DEC)), pp. 20-35
Published by: Kapur Surya Foundation
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K SYAMALAMMA AND P KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY
EAST ASIAN IDENTITY
Identity may be based on various factors like class or caste, language, state,
religion, nation and even continent. In the process a person acquires multiple
identities and depending on a particular situation, one of the identities may
dominate. In the twenty-first century, identities may also be based on regions
and regional organisations promote a pan-regional identity among their people.
This article examines whether it is possible for a region like East Asia to form
an identity and whether cultural identities take shape and develop because of
regional organisations, since the success or failure of such endeavours influence
the evolution of integration. Accordingly, natural geographical and cultural
boundaries as well as “identity” in the East Asian context, as shaped by cultural,
economic, historical, political, religious and security factors, are analysed.
K SYAMALAMMA AND P KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY
I
dentity may be formed among people based on social class, caste, language,
state, religion and nation. In this process, a person acquires multiple identities
and as such may be a Brahmin, Telugu, Andhra, Hindu and Indian
simultaneously. Based on a particular situation, one of these identities may dominate.
For example, when such a person settles in a Western country, the “Indian identity”
normally predominates. Identity may also be based on continent—African,
American, Asian or European. Canadians for instance, identify themselves as both
Canadians and North Americans. In the twenty-first century, identities may also
be formed based on regions—East European, North African or South Asian. These
identities also have a civilisational, cultural and historical basis as indicated by the
Chinese, Egyptian, Greek, Indus, Mesopotamian and Roman civilisations. In
addition, regional organisations like the European Union (EU) promote a panregional identity among their people.
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EAST ASIAN IDENTITY
The question examined here is whether it is possible for a region—like East
Asia (China, Japan, North and South Korea)—to form an identity and if cultural
identities form and develop because of regional organisations like the Asia–Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), the EU or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). To this end it analyses natural geographical and cultural boundaries. For
example, South Asia has a natural geographical boundary; in fact it is a single land
mass. It also has a natural cultural
boundary in the sense that most ancient East Asians (Chinese, Japanese
civilisational traits have been inherited and Koreans) differ ethnically
and are practised by a majority of the from Southeast Asians as do their
people from dress and ornaments to languages and scripts. The
food habits, languages, religions, et al. practice of religions are also
The South Asian region formed a specific. Even in their art forms
regional organisation—the South Asian East Asians have maintained a
Association for Regional Cooperation, specific identity at least from the
which contributes to “regional identity”. sixteenth century onwards.
Similarly, the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) may be cited as an example for the Southeast Asian region.
On the other hand, if an organisation has an artificial boundary, grouping or
bonding, it is difficult for it to contribute to regional identity—APEC, BRIC
(Brazil, Russia, India and China), NATO, etc are some examples. Therefore, natural
geographical and cultural boundaries are fundamental to the identity of a regional
organisation. This identity may be formed by academicians, diplomats, economists,
planners, politicians or any group initiating a regional organisation. The more
popular such an association becomes among the people, the more identity it forms.
Although East Asia displays certain differences in language, its dress and
ornaments, family systems and values, food habits, marriage systems and
ceremonies, music and dance, race and ethnicity, religious beliefs, etc are similar
and form a natural bond. East Asians (Chinese, Japanese and Koreans) differ ethnically
from Southeast Asians as do their languages and scripts. The practice of religions
such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Shinto, Taoism, Zen or Shamanism, which
were absorbed into Korean Buddhism are also specific to East Asia and different
from Southeast Asia. Even in their art forms—landscapes, porcelain art, portraits
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K SYAMALAMMA AND P KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY
and pottery—East Asians have maintained a specific identity at least from the
sixteenth century onwards. There is a general understanding among academicians,
leaders and policymakers as to what constitutes East Asia as distinct from Southeast
Asia. The brochure of the 2009 conference India and East Asia: Prospects of
Cooperation and Problems of Integration organised by the Centre for Southeast Asian
and Pacific Studies, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati, Andhra Pradesh, India,
defines East Asia as consisting of China, Japan, North Korea and South Korea.
Indeed the vast majority of papers dealt with these countries. There seems however,
to be some confusion, even among academicians, regarding the identity and
membership of the East Asia Summit (EAS). Some scholars, especially historians
clearly confine East Asia to the above mentioned four nations, while others include
ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand while discussing the EAS.
According to Mark Selden (“East Asian Regionalism and its Enemies in Three
Epochs: Political Economy and Geopolitics, 16th to 21st Centuries”, Asia–Pacific
Journal: Japan Focus, Vol 9-4-09, 25 February 2009, available at, http://
japanfocus.org), “World attention has focused on China’s rapid and sustained
economic growth in the wake of earlier
Contemporary East Asian surges by Japan and Korea. Yet
development is best understood contemporary East Asian development
not as a series of discrete national is best understood not as a series of
phenomena but in terms of discrete national phenomena but in
regional and global dynamics. terms of regional and global dynamics
Thus to gauge the character and that include economic development but
assess the prospects requires equally require attention to geopolitics
assessment of the geopolitics and and cultural interchange. … (Thus) to
political economy of the last four gauge the character and assess the
decades in the region and prospects of East Asian regional
development … requires assessment of
globally.
the geopolitics and political economy of
the last four decades in the region and globally. … (Furthermore), the first summit
of the three East Asian nations, held in Fukuoka, Japan on 13 December 2008 in
an effort to frame a common policy in response to the world recession is illustrative
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of the possibilities for East Asian regional responses to the contemporary financial
and economic crisis”. Selden clearly defines the East Asian region as consisting of
China, Japan and Korea and differentiates between East Asia, Southeast Asia, Asia–
Pacific and the Pacific in his analysis.
Selden further argues that “East Asia confronts multiple problems at a time
when the meltdown of the world economy has discredited the core principles of
neoliberal economics on which Washington banked its claims to world leadership
over the preceding three decades. To be sure, the weaknesses of other emerging
regional formations including ASEAN+3 and the Shanghai Group (China, Russia
and four Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,
with India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan as observers), are palpable. New regional
bonds, moreover, will face more demanding tests as the world economy enters its
most difficult period since the depression/World War of the 1930s–40s, a period
in which Asia’s high-flying exportoriented economies too confront The genius of the Chinese mind
economic and financial reverses after transformed the world-denying
several decades of sustained expansion. message of Indian Buddhism
The prospects for the Asia–Pacific surely into an essentially worldinclude a substantial American role in affirming doctrine. This Sinified
both geopolitical and economic Buddhism that penetrated Korea
perspective. Yet the ability of the US to and Japan engendered a very
dominate the geopolitics and political distinctive form of secularity,
economy of East Asia and the Pacific has blending in with with-worldly
been fundamentally and perhaps attitudes and patterns of thought
irrevocably weakened. It is too soon to already indigenous to the
tell whether East Asian nations will cultures of Eastern Asia.
devise regional solutions to deal
effectively with the most serious economic recession of the post-war era whose
consequences are already so clearly visible in the sharp downturn of exports and
GDP (gross domestic product) in early 2009, still less whether the US, casting
aside neoliberal premises in favour of a new Keynesian gospel, will succeed in
overcoming the challenges of the recession” (ibid).
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K SYAMALAMMA AND P KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY
Peter L Berger (“Secularity: West and East”, available at, http://
www2.kokugakuin.ac.jp) analyses East Asian identity based on common religions
and cultures. According to him, “the question is not whether everything that happens
in Eastern Asia can be explained in terms of East Asian culture. Rather, the question
is, more moderately, to what extent cultural factors should be taken into account
in the assessment of East Asian development. More narrowly here, it is to what
extent a specifically East Asian secularity
Between 1997 and 1998, there is such a factor. “What phenomena are
was a wave of currency and relevant to an exploration of this
financial crises and most problem? I will suggest six: the distinctive
Southeast Asian countries religious pluralism of Eastern Asia; the
pinned their hopes on Japan, distinctive character of East Asian
which promised five billion Buddhism; the ‘naturalism’ (of) Shinto
dollars as a new special loan and and Japanese religious consciousness in
through
ASEAN,
swap general; the role of the Confucian ethic;
arrangement repurchase facility the pragmatism of East Asia(n) folk
of $500 million was given to the religion and finally, at least in some of
the countries of the region, the role of
ten members.
Christianity. … Put simply it can be
argued that it was the genius of the Chinese mind that transformed the worlddenying message of Indian Buddhism into an essentially world-affirming doctrine
and that it did so by developing a number of themes already implicit in Indian
Mahayana. It was, of course this Sinified Buddhism that penetrated Korea and
Japan. East Asian Mahayana can then be seen as having engendered a very distinctive
form of secularity, blending in with with-worldly attitudes and patterns of thought
already indigenous to the cultures of Eastern Asia”.
Jeffrey Robertson (“South Korea and the East Asia Summit: Collective Identity,
Balance of Power or Domestic Politics?”, Defence and Trade Section, Foreign Affairs,
4 December 2006, available at, http://www.aph.gov.au) opines “it is tempting to
argue that ethnic or cultural similarities explain the collective identity that has formed
in East Asia. However, the states of Southeast Asia are just as different from South
Korea in terms of ethnicity and culture as Australia, New Zealand and India”. It
appears that ASEAN always aimed at maintaining its identity. For example, instead
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of admitting the East Asian countries Japan, China and South Korea into its fold,
it created the ASEAN+3. On the other hand however, in the formulation of the
EAS, it did not design an EAS+ASEAN, suggesting that when it concerns East Asia
per se, ASEAN would like to be involved in it; it is hesitant to leave East Asia or
Northeast Asia alone. In most countries, in the curricula of history and geography,
regions have natural boundaries like South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, West
Asia, etc and regional identities are based on them. However, ASEAN has created
an identity for East Asia in the form of the EAS. Strictly speaking, Southeast Asia
is not a part of East Asia. However, ASEAN simply expanded to include East Asia
for its own interests—economical, political and even strategic. Many scholars,
however, do not consider this aspect.
Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto first mooted the idea of
strengthening policy dialogues between the leaders of Japan and ASEAN countries
in January 1997 and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad on a visit
to Japan in March 1997 suggested the idea of ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South
Korea). Between 1997 and 1998, there
was a wave of currency and financial As a part of East Asian
crises and most Southeast Asian cooperation, China, Japan and
countries’ growth rates plummeted. South Korea agreed to hold
ASEAN pinned its hopes on Japan, annual tripartite meetings,
which promised 600 billion yen (five chaired in rotation, during the
billion dollars) as a new special loan to ASEAN+3 summits. Although
these countries and through ASEAN, the major thrust is in the
swap arrangement repurchase facility of economic field, the ultimate aim
$500 million was given to the ten is to achieve a framework of
members. In addition, Japan concluded “Cooperation for Prosperity in
bilateral arrangements with many Northeast Asia”.
ASEAN countries as well as China for a
total of $36.5 billion. In March 2002, the Bank of Japan and the People’s Bank of
China made a swap arrangement for three billion dollars worth of yen, which was
politically significant for the promotion of regional cooperation. In June 2002,
China concluded a swap arrangement with South Korea for lending up to two
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K SYAMALAMMA AND P KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY
billion dollars and the financial cooperation among the three countries—China,
Japan and South Korea was strengthened (Masayuki Masuda, “Japan’s Leading
Role in East Asian Regionalism: Toward Building an East Asian Community”,
Chapter 2, East Asian Strategic Review, Tokyo: National Institute of Defence
Studies, 2005, pp36–9).
As part of East Asian cooperation, cooperation among China, Japan and South
Korea has made headway. At the ASEAN+3 Summit 1999, leaders of these countries
agreed to hold annual tripartite meetings, chaired in rotation, during the ASEAN+3
summits. At the second meeting in 2000, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi proposed a tripartite foreign
The idea of the EAC, is ministers’ meeting to expand and deepen
promoted by ASEAN mainly the process of consultation and
because of the financial help it cooperation among the three nations.
has received from China, Japan The leaders also agreed, in principle, to
and South Korea since 1997, hold economic and finance ministers’
even though these three meetings. Although the major thrust of
countries have a “Northeast or this tripartite cooperation is in the
East Asian” identity as distinct economic field, the ultimate aim is to
from a “Southeast Asian or achieve a framework of “Cooperation
for Prosperity in Northeast Asia”. At the
ASEAN identity”.
tripartite meeting held at Bali in October
2003, the leaders issued a joint declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite
Cooperation among the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of
Korea, the first such declaration by these three countries (ibid, pp43–4). “While
characterising the tripartite cooperation focused on economic cooperation as an
essential part of East Asian cooperation, the declaration clearly states that the three
countries will strengthen security dialogue and facilitate exchange and cooperation
among their defence or military personnel” (ibid, p44).
At a tripartite meeting prior to the Sixth ASEAN+3 Summit in 2002, Chinese
Premier Zhu Rongji said that creating a free trade area covering China, Japan and
South Korea was significant and proposed the creation of a Northeast Asian Free
Trade Zone as a preliminary step towards an East Asian Free Trade Area (ibid, p42).
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At the ASEAN+3 Ministerial Meeting in July 2004, Chinese Foreign Minister Li
Zhaoxing proposed to step up discussions about the future course of action with a
view to strengthening East Asian cooperation, such as the formation of the East
Asian Community (EAC); accelerating the integration of the economies of Northeast
and Southeast Asian countries and holding an East Asian summit on comprehensive
East Asian cooperation (ibid, p46). ASEAN countries, especially Singapore pleaded
with Japan to fulfil a leadership role in
building an EAC and actively engage The nature of regionalism
with ASEAN countries not only in reinforces the role that politics
economic but also in political and plays in the domestic scene.
security fields. Association members also Regionalism is overwhelmingly
appreciated China’s role in the an elitist phenomenon. It is
formulation of the EAC (ibid, pp48– pursued doggedly by a small
50). According to Masayuki Masuda collection of academics, industry
“factors holding the key to the creation leaders and government officials.
of an EAC are the development of However, the wider population
cooperation between Japan and is largely indifferent to the
ASEAN, actions that will be taken by pursuit.
major regional powers (Japan and
China) and the relations between these two regional powers” (ibid, p50). The
Chairman of South Korea’s Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian
Cooperation Initiative, Moon Chungin, called on China, Japan and South Korea
to conclude a Northeast Asian Free Trade Agreement (FTA) at an early date as a
preliminary process to creating an East Asian FTA (ibid). The idea of the EAC, is
promoted by ASEAN mainly because of the financial help it has received from
China, Japan and South Korea since 1997, even though these three countries have
a “Northeast or East Asian” identity as distinct from a “Southeast Asian or ASEAN
identity”.
Furthermore, during the 2009 North Korean nuclear test crisis, ASEAN’s
response was minimal, showing that the association does not have an “identity” in
East Asia when it comes to war and security. On 22 July 2009, the EAS Foreign
Ministers Informal Consultations chaired by the Thai Foreign Minister issued a
statement from Phuket, Thailand that “expressed their grave concern over the recent
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K SYAMALAMMA AND P KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY
underground nuclear test and missile launches undertaken by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK), which constituted a violation of the relevant UNSC
(United Nations Security Council) resolutions. They urged the DPRK to fully
comply with its obligations and the relevant UNSC resolutions. They expressed
their full support for the early resumption of the Six-Party talks. They also
emphasised the importance of addressing outstanding issues, including humanitarian
concerns. The foreign ministers also reaffirmed their support for possible
contribution of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as the premier regional security
forum that includes all participants of the Six-Party talks, towards an enduring
peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula” (available at, http://www.mofa.go.jp).
The statement does not speak of the East Asian Region, the EAS or China, Japan
and South Korea in reference to the nuclear crisis. However, these three countries
asserted their East Asian identity as far
East Asian cooperation has lasted as the North Korean nuclear crisis was
for several years and its identity concerned and no Southeast Asian
is coming. There are common country is part of the Six-Party talks.
values in the developing process ASEAN contributes to “regional
among East Asian nations— security” only through ARF, as the
comfort, consensus, consultation, premier regional security forum. The
Forty-First ASEAN Ministerial
cooperation and openness.
Meeting-Post Ministerial Conference–
Fifteenth ARF (17–24 July 2008, Shangri La, Singapore) website’s motto reads
“One ASEAN at the Heart of Dynamic Asia” (available at, http://www.41amm.sg).
This symbolises both the identity question almost of a possessive nature of ASEAN
and the desire to lead Asia.
A joint press statement of the EAS on 3 June 2009 from Bangkok, Thailand
says, “In order to promote sub-regional development, they encouraged the Economic
Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) and the ASEAN Secretariat to work together to prepare as soon as possible
a coherent master plan, which would contribute to coordinating, expediting,
upgrading and expanding sub-regional initiatives and promoting private sector
participation. In addition, they called upon ERIA to provide policy
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recommendations to stimulate economic growth in the region, deepen regional
integration and strengthen partnership in East Asia. … They agreed that ASEANled consultations with other organisations and fora in Asia and the Asia–Pacific
would contribute to safeguarding the region from future regional and global
economic and financial crises” (available at, http://www.mofa.go.jp). These
statements elucidate that ASEAN is well aware of the distinct identity of East Asia
as well as its own Southeast Asian identity. It also has a clear understanding of and
makes a distinction between Asia and the Asia–Pacific.
“The nature of regionalism also reinforces the role that politics plays in the
domestic scene. Regionalism is overwhelmingly an elitist phenomenon. It is pursued
doggedly by a small collection of academics, industry leaders and government
officials. However, the wider population is largely indifferent to the pursuit, except
in the intermittent media frenzies that accompany major conferences. This allows
regionalism to become an exploitable
wedge issue in domestic politics. Firstly, An East Asia security community
the extension of membership in East would serve as an effective way
Asian regionalism has to date held for states in the region to
negative connotations when covered in cooperatively address common
the South Korean media. … Secondly, security threats such as terrorism
many South Koreans simply believe and the proliferation of nuclear
Australia is not an ‘East Asian’ country. weapons, leaving not only the
This was cited as the primary reason by region but also the rest of the
a majority of respondents as to why world more secure in the
Australia should not be in an East Asian process.
regional community. Commonly held
perceptions of ‘East Asia’ in South Korea include only China, South Korea and
Japan and occasionally also include the ASEAN states” (Robertson, ibid). The
Japanese also have a public perception of an “East Asian identity”. According to a
public opinion poll on foreign affairs conducted by Japan’s Cabinet Office in
October 2004 for the period 1978–2004, the percentage of Japanese that felt an
affinity towards China was between 80 and 38 and during 1980–94 was between
80 and 50 (Masuda, ibid, Figure 2.2, p53).
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Wu Jianmin, Vice President of the Committee for Foreign Affairs under the
National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
criticises the argument that there is no common identity for East Asia as in the case
of the EU. According to him, East Asian cooperation has lasted for several years
and its identity is coming. There are common values in the developing process
among East Asian nations, which he summarises as the four Cs and one O—
comfort, consensus, consultation, cooperation and openness. Others later suggested
adding another C for closeness (People’s Daily, Overseas Edition, 15 November
2005, available at, http://
In an international survey in english.peopledaily.com.cn). Jianmin
2000 regarding identity in Japan further says that “Some scholars believe
two-thirds of the population said that the integration of the East Asian
they were Japanese by economy is only a process, so it is not
nationality, only 26 per cent said necessary to talk about ‘identity’. Those
they were Asian. Koreans on the who have such a viewpoint likely do not
other hand had an overwhelming understand what identity is. The soresponse—88 per cent said they called identity is the common features
were Korean as well as Asian. shared by the countries in this area and
Although the Chinese are also the game rules that are gradually
nationalistic by about 80 per formed in the process of building the
cent, only 30 per cent said they East Asian Community. The rules are a
collective presentation of regional
were Asian.
features. Comparing the East Asian
games rules with that of other regions, there are similarities and differences. Does it
not show that the East Asian identity is coming into being? If there are no such
identity and games rules, it is inconceivable to build the community and to make
achievements in the process of developing the East Asian economic integration”
(ibid).
Another scholar Hitoshi Tanaka (“East Asia Community Building: Toward an
East Asia Security Forum”, East Asia Insights, Vol 2, No 2, April 2007) has similar
opinions but in the context of East Asian security. “The obstacles to achieving a
genuine community of states in a region as diverse as East Asia are considerable,
both in number and degree. The community-building process is going to take
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time. In light of this fact, it is clear that recognition of shared interests, rather than
divisive issues, should be the point of focus for the foreseeable future. In addition
to addressing the specific problem in question, such a process would strengthen
regional identity and facilitate the creation of a more stable and secure environment
for the region as a whole. The spread of a regional ‘East Asia’ identity could be a
means for individuals to develop an identity beyond the nation-state and help
absorb and dissipate destabilising nationalistic sentiment that the region has seen
rise sharply in recent years. An East Asia security community would serve as an
effective way for states in the region to cooperatively address common security
threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, leaving not only
the region but also the rest of the world more secure in the process”.
Takashi Inoguchi (“Does Identity Matter in Facilitating or Hindering Regional
Cooperation in East Asia?”, Paper presented at the Wilton Park Conference,
Gotenba, Shizuoka, 28 September–1 October 2003 and Global Communications
Platform, Japanese Institute of Global Communications, 27 October 2003, available
at, http://www.glocom.org) supplemented economic cooperation and regional
integration from the angle of economics with the angle of identity. By “identity”,
he denotes something with which one’s heart is at ease and something for which
one is ready to sacrifice. In determining one country’s foreign policy direction,
identity often matters. According to him, books such as Samuel P Huntington’s
Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity, (New York: Simon and
Schuster 2004) and Henry R Nau’s At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American
Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), clearly show that identity is
a main focus in the global discussion on foreign policy direction.
Inoguchi conducted an international survey in 2000 regarding the identity of
nations and continents in nine Asian and European countries. Among East Asian
nationals (Japanese, Korean and Chinese), in Japan two-thirds of the population
said they were Japanese by nationality, while one-third did not care or had never
thought about it. As far as the continental identity (Asian) was concerned only 26
per cent said they were Asian and the rest answered that they did not know. According
to Inoguchi, “Clearly, the Japanese national identity is not overwhelmingly strong.
Furthermore, the Japanese regional identity is weak at best” (ibid). Koreans on the
other hand had an overwhelming response—88 per cent said they were Korean as
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K SYAMALAMMA AND P KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY
well as Asian. They are clearly vehemently nationalistic and regionalistic at the
same time. Although the Chinese are nationalistic by about 80 per cent, unlike the
Koreans they are not Asianist as only 30 per cent said they were Asian. The survey
clearly indicates that identity does play an important role in a regional organisation.
However, had Inoguchi asked the people surveyed whether they identified
themselves as East Asians, around 80 per cent would have replied in the affirmative.
Significantly, while analysing East Asian economic cooperation and regional
integration, Inoguchi takes into consideration only the Chinese, Japanese and
Koreans when he states that trust among these three nations has been on a steady
rise (ibid). Therefore, East Asia or Northeast Asia denotes only these three nations.
Incidentally, the term “Northeast Asia” has been coined to distinguish the region
from “Southeast Asia”.
Pilwon Han, a Korean Professor of Architecture (“A New Tradition of East
Asian Cities: The Dualistic Urban Structure”, Asian Tradition in Architecture,
available at, http://ata.hannam.ac.kr) after studying Chinese, Japanese and Korean
cities believes that the “unique socio-cultural characters” of East Asian cities can be
understood by a critical review of their urbanism and architecture. According to
him, “Given that the identities of the
Today, people across East Asia East Asian cities are found in the urban
are beginning to think of planes within the urban lines, we need
themselves as members of a to look to the planes to critically
regional community. The understand East Asian cities. The planes
1997—8 Asian financial crisis are mainly composed of urban houses
catalysed nascent regionalism whose types contain the characteristics
into faster integration and of the urban structure. The urban house
development of an East Asian types in East Asia are common in that
they have private individual courtyards:
identity.
anmadang in Korea, yuanzi in China and
niwa in Japan. The urban house types represent the features of the cities in which
they are found. Compare the typical urban house types siheyuan in Beijing, lilong
House in Shanghai, hanok in Seoul and machiya in Tokyo and you can discover
differences of the cities, not to mention those of the house types themselves.
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Therefore, the urban house types are worth examining to clarify the individuality
of any East Asian as well as the common identity of East Asian cities”.
Interchanging the terms ASEAN and East Asia has created confusion among
scholars. In using the term East Asia (because of the EAS), one often wonders
whether it is the region East Asia (Northeast Asia) or the whole of Southeast Asia
and East Asia that is being discussed. For instance, according to Joshua Kurlantzick
(“Pax Asia–Pacifica: Asia’s Emerging Identity and Implications for US Policy”,
available at, http://www.pacificcouncil.org) “today, in subtle ways people across
East Asia are beginning to think of
themselves as members of a regional In creating a common cultural
community, as well as citizens of a identity, East Asia has not
particular country. … More than any become as Sino-centric as it has
other event, the 1997–8 Asian financial in building an economic identity.
crisis catalysed nascent regionalism into In many respects, it is the other
faster integration and development of Northeast Asian states that have
an East Asian identity. … In creating a dominated cultural integration.
common cultural identity, East Asia has
not become as Sino-centric as it has in building an economic identity. In many
respects, it is the other Northeast Asian states that have dominated cultural
integration”. However, even though he specifically refers to East Asia as a region, he
includes Southeast Asia as well in his analysis. This confusion arose as a result of the
formation of the EAS, which is neither East Asian nor Southeast Asian as a regional
organisation. This fact also explains its failure to help form an East Asian identity.
Another scholar, Zeng Wang (“Idol Drama and Pan-East Asian Identity: A
Comparative Study on Narrative Structures of Idol Dramas in Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan and Mainland China”, Narrating the Nation Television Narratives and
National Identities, available at, http://www.urv.cat) has analysed television dramas
which for the last 15 years in China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have crisscrossed
borders and led to the formation of an “East Asian pop culture”. This culture has
not only attracted media attention but also academic analyses, enabling a discursive
construction of “pan-East Asian identity” as an object of study. After analysing 100
dramas from the four states Wang concludes that “a collective idea of ‘East Asian’
has emerged from narrations of these popular cultural products”. It is significant
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K SYAMALAMMA AND P KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY
that for analysing “East Asian” and “pan-East Asian identity” he has studied only
East Asia or Northeast Asia and excluded Southeast Asia, indicating that, in a true
sense, East Asia is a distinct entity both geographically and culturally,
notwithstanding general “Asian culture” or “Asian values”, which are visible all over
Asia, including South and West Asia.
An American–Asian Blog discussion (“The Pan-Asian Identity”, Reappropriate,
27 June 2006, available at, http://www.reappropriate.com) on Pan-Asian identity
in the US highlights how East Asians identify themselves as distinct from Southeast
Asians.
1. Anonymous – 27 June 2006, 12:27 am
“Pilipin@s are not and will never be ‘Asian’. … I see so much contempt from
East Asians on how they see the ‘darker’ Asians and Pilipin@s to be inferior to
them. I even see that elitism within activism and progressive movements within
the APA (Asia–Pacific) construct. *sigh* And I feel that same degree of elitism
when it comes to hapas never being ‘truly’ Asian–Pacific Islanders (APIA)”.
2. Jenn – 27 June 2006, 11:36 am
“That’s really very sad, Anonymous. I personally don’t think Filipinos are ‘less
Asian’ or ‘inferior’ to other APIAs … It sounds like you feel like the colourstruck issues of East Asian culture affects you here. Do you think it would be
better to dismantle the pan-Asian identity? Or do you merely wish that those
who are colour-struck would shut up and wise up? (Ditto with the hapa issue)”.
3. Gatamala – 27 June 2006, 3:13 pm
“Wow Anon. I have a friend of a certain background that made that ‘Filipinos
aren’t really Asian’ comment to me once. It should not have really impacted
me other than mere curiosity, but I did feel a bit of offense. I suppose I sympathise
because as an African–American, I am ‘mixed’ by nature (and not Black enough
for some Africans). She also informed me that her mother looked down on SE
Asians”.
CONCLUSION
J
ust like the “ASEAN way”, East Asians also have their own “way” or “identity”.
The ideas and plans like the “Cooperation for Prosperity in Northeast Asia”,
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“East Asian Free Trade Area”, “Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative,” “Northeast
Asian FTA”, “Northeast Asian Free Trade Zone”, etc by the East Asian countries of
China, Japan and South Korea clearly point to a specific East Asian identity and
consciousness even while working alongside ASEAN countries. Thus, East Asia is
a clearly defined region culturally, geographically and historically. Many traits from
art to houses, languages, movies and scripts appear to be common and alike to East
Asians and provide them with an “East Asian identity”. The people inhabiting East
Asia are conscious of this identity. ASEAN-led regional organisations however,
seem to be blurring East Asian identity, though not deliberately, by expanding into
East Asia or blending East Asia into Southeast Asia.
Acknowledgement: This article was presented at a conference on East Asia organised by the Centre for
Southeast Asian and Pacific Studies, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati, Andhra Pradesh, India. We
thank Y Yagama Reddy, Director of the Centre, for his encouragement.
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