G.R. No. 166401
October 30, 2006
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 158660-67]
she slept in the said house, yet again she was sexually
abused by appellant. She was then nine (9) years old.7
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO BON, appellant.
AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was
raped by appellant for the third time, again at the house of
her grandmother.8 The following year, when she was twelve
(12), she was abused for the fourth time by appellant. This
time, she was raped in an outdoor clearing9 after having
been invited there by appellant to get some vegetables.
While at the clearing, appellant forced her to lie down on a
grassy spot and tried to insert his penis in her vagina. As
she cried in pain, appellant allegedly stopped.10
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Two critical issues emerge in this case. The first relates to
whether the Court should affirm the conviction of appellant
Alfredo Bon (appellant) for six counts of rape and two
counts of attempted rape, the victims being his then-minor
nieces. On that score, we affirm. As a consequence
though, we are ultimately impelled to confront a
question much broader in both scope and
import. While the Court had previously declined to
acknowledge the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty through the 1987 Constitution,1 we now find it
necessary to determine whether the enactment of Republic
Act No. 9346 resulted in the statutory interdiction of the
death penalty.
The second issue arises as we are compelled to review the
maximum term of reclusion temporal in the sentence
imposed on appellant by the Court of Appeals for the two
counts of attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed by
the appellate court prior to the enactment of Republic Act
No. 9346 which ended the imposition of the death penalty
in the Philippines. The proximate concern as to appellant is
whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape, which
under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that
of consummated qualified rape, should be computed from
death or reclusion perpetua.
First, the antecedent facts.
I.
Eight (8) Informations2 were filed within the period from 21
August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against
appellant, charging him with the rape of AAA3 and
BBB,4 the daughters of his older brother. Appellant was
accused of raping AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6899-G,
6902-G, 6906-G, and 6908-G; while he was accused of
raping BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689-G, 6903-G, 6905G, and 6907-G.5All these cases were consolidated for trial.
The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several
instances over a span of six (6) years.
Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle,
and both identified him as the man who had raped them.
During trial, their respective birth certificates and the
medical certificates executed by the doctor who physically
examined them were entered as documentary evidence.
AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she
was first molested in 1994 in the house appellant had
shared with her grandmother.6 She recounted that the
incident took place when she and appellant were alone in
the house. Appellant touched her thighs and vagina,
removed her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina.
Appellant threatened that she and her parents would be
killed should she disclose the incident to anyone. She
thereafter stopped sleeping in the house of her
grandmother. It was only three (3) years after, in 1997, that
It was only on 12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to
her mother, CCC,11 the brutish acts appellant had done to
her.12 Her mother thus filed a complaint against her uncle.
AAA identified appellant in open court and presented as
documentary evidence her birth certificate to prove that she
was born on 3 September 1988.13
BBB, on the other hand, testified that she was first raped by
appellant in 1997 when she was ten (10) years old, also at
the house appellant shared with her grandmother. While
alone in the house, appellant poked a knife at her, removed
her clothes and inserted his penis in her vagina. Despite the
pain she felt, she could not resist appellant as he was
holding a knife. She did not report the rape to her parents
out of fear of appellant's threat that he would kill her.14 BBB
further testified that in 1998 and 1999, she was raped again
by appellant on several occasions, the rapes occurring
under threat of a bladed weapon, and regardless of the time
of day.15
BBB stated that she was last raped by appellant on 15
January 2000.16 On that night, she was sleeping beside her
sister AAA in the house of her grandmother when she felt
appellant touching her body. She pushed him away but
appellant pulled her three (3) meters away from AAA
towards the door. As appellant was holding a knife, BBB
could not make any noise to alert her sister. Appellant
ordered her to remove her clothes and forced her to lie
down. After he took off his clothes, appellant placed himself
on top of BBB and stayed there for three (3) minutes
"moving up and down." Thereafter, she put on her clothes
and returned to where her sister was. She added that
although it was dark, she knew it was appellant who had
molested her as she was familiar with his smell. Since then,
she never slept in her grandmother's house again.17
It was on 14 June 2000 that BBB disclosed her harrowing
experience to her mother. Prior to that, however, she had
already revealed the sexual abuses she had underwent to
her sister AAA. Upon learning of the same, her mother
brought her to the police station and her statement was
taken. Thereafter, she was brought to the hospital to be
examined. Furthermore, BBB explained that she only
reported the abuses done to her on 14 June 2000 or five (5)
months after the last rape because she was afraid of
appellant's threat of killing her and her family.18
The third witness for the prosecution was the mother, CCC.
She testified that she only knew of the abuses done on her
daughters on 15 June 2000. Five months earlier, CCC
became concerned after observing that BBB, on the pretext
of preparing clothes for a game, was packing more than
enough clothes. She asked her other daughter, DDD, to dig
into the matter and the latter told her that BBB was planning
to leave their house. Upon learning this, she sent somebody
to retrieve BBB. However, it was only five months after that
incident that BBB confided to her mother that she was
raped by appellant. CCC lost no time in reporting the matter
to the authorities and had BBB and AAA examined in the
hospital. After examination, it was confirmed that BBB was
indeed sexually molested.19
CCC initially did not tell her husband about what had
happened to their daughters because she was afraid that
her husband might kill appellant. It was only after appellant
was arrested that she disclosed such fact to her husband.
After the arrest of appellant, his relatives became angry at
CCC, and her mother-in-law avoided talking to her since
then.20
The physician who examined BBB and AAA also testified
for the prosecution. Dr. Purita T. Tullas (Dr. Tullas), medical
officer of Gumaca District Hospital, testified that she was
the one who examined BBB and AAA, and thereafter,
issued medical certificates for each child. These medical
certificates were presented in court.21
The medical certificate of BBB revealed that at the time of
examination, there were no external sign of physical injury
found on her body. However, Dr. Tullas found that the labia
majora and minora of BBB was slightly gaping, her vaginal
orifice was admitting two fingers without resistance and
there were hymenal lacerations at "three (3) o'clock" and
"eight (8) o'clock" which might have happened a long time
before her examination. Dr. Tullas concluded that there
might have been sexual penetration caused by a male sex
organ for several times.22
AAA's medical certificate stated that at the time of
examination, there were no external physical injuries
apparent on her body. AAA's labia majora and minora were
well coaptated and the hymen was still intact. On direct
examination, Dr. Tullas said that it could happen that the
hymen would still be intact despite sexual penetration with
a person having an elastic hymen. On the other hand, when
asked on cross-examination, she stated that there was also
the possibility that no foreign body touched the labia of the
pudendum of AAA.23
Only appellant testified for his defense, offering denial and
alibi as his defense. He averred in court that from 1994 to
2000, he lived in the house of his parents which was about
"thirty (30) arm stretches" away from the house of BBB and
AAA. He denied having raped BBB on 15 January 2000
because on said date he was at the house of his sister, two
(2) kilometers away from the house of his parents where
the rape occurred, from 11:30 in the morning and stayed
there until early morning of the following day.24
He offered a general denial of the other charges against him
by BBB and AAA. He claimed that he seldom saw the two
minors. He further asserted that prior to the institution of the
criminal case against him he had a smooth relationship with
his nieces and the only reason the case was filed against
him was that CCC, his sister-in-law and the mother of his
nieces, harbored ill-feelings towards his deceased father,
who would call CCC "lazy" within earshot of other family
members.25
The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of
rape.26 The RTC pronounced appellant's defense of denial
and alibi as unconvincing, citing jurisprudence declaring
denial and alibi as intrinsically weak defenses. The RTC
concluded that appellant failed to controvert the clear,
candid and straightforward testimonies of his nieces. It
further considered the qualifying circumstances of minority
of the victims and the relationship of the victims and
appellant, the latter being the former's relative by
consanguinity within the third degree.
As the penalty imposed consisted of eight (8) death
sentences, the records of the case were automatically
elevated to this Court for review. However, in the aftermath
of the pronouncement of the Court in People v. Mateo27 the
present case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action and disposition.
On 29 December 2004, the Court of Appeals agreed with
the rulings of the RTC in regard to six (6) of the eight (8)
death sentences imposed on appellant.28 The appellate
court ratiocinated, thus:
We have painstakingly gone over the record of
these cases and find no cogent reason to deviate
from the findings of the trial court except in at
least two (2) cases. The prosecution's case
which was anchored mainly on the testimonies of
private complainants [BBB] and [AAA], deserve
full faith and credit for being clear, precise and
straightforward. Like the trial court, We find no
reason to disbelieve the private complainants. It
was established with certitude that the accused
on several occasions sexually assaulted his
nieces. The perpetration of the crimes and its
authorship were proved by the victims' candid
and unwavering testimonies both of whom had
the misfortune of sharing the same fate in the
hands of their own uncle. The sincerity of [AAA]
was made more evident when she cried on the
witness stand in obvious distress over what their
uncle had done to her and her sister.29
The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in
Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and 6908 to attempted rape. In
these two (2) cases, it was alleged that appellant had raped
AAA in 1999 and on 11 June 2000, respectively. According
to the appellate court, it could not find evidence beyond
reasonable doubt in those two (2) cases that appellant had
accomplished the slightest penetration of AAA's vagina to
make him liable for consummated rape. It stressed that
there was not even moral certainty that appellant's penis
ever touched the labia of the pudendum, quoting portions
of the transcript of the stenographic notes where AAA was
asked if appellant was then successful in inserting his penis
into her vagina and she answered in the
negative.30 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reduced the
penalties attached to the two (2) counts of rape from death
for consummated qualified rape to an indeterminate penalty
of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, for attempted rape.
Appellant, in his Supplemental Brief31 before this Court,
assails the findings of the Court of Appeals. He cites
inconsistencies in the testimony of BBB as to what really
transpired on 15 January 2000. Particularly, appellant
observes that BBB testified on 6 June 2001 as to her rape
on 15 January 2000. BBB, her sister and appellant had
been sleeping side by side. However, when BBB again
testified on 3 July 2002, this time she stated that on that
night, as she and her sister AAA were sleeping in their room
at their parents' house (and not at her grandmother's), the
accused passed through a window, entered their room and
raped her again.32 Appellant also latches on the
inconsistencies in BBB's testimony as to the length of the
duration of her rape on that day. In BBB's testimony on 6
June 2001, she said that appellant was atop her for three
(3) minutes while in the 3 July 2002 hearing, BBB stated
that the rape lasted for only half a minute.
It must be observed though that BBB was at a tender age
when she was raped in 2001. Moreover, these
inconsistencies, which the RTC and the Court of Appeals
did not consider material, were elicited while BBB was
testifying in open court. Our observations in People v.
Perez33 on the appreciation of alleged inconsistencies in
the testimony of rape victims who happen to be minors are
instructive, thus:
We note that these alleged inconsistencies refer,
at best, only to trivial, minor, and insignificant
details. They bear no materiality to the
commission of the crime of rape of which
accused-appellant
was
convicted.[34] As
pointed out by the Solicitor General in the
Appellee's Brief, the seeming inconsistencies
were brought about by confusion and merely
represent minor lapses during the rape victim's
direct examination and cannot possibly affect her
credibility. Minor lapses are to be expected when
a person is recounting details of a traumatic
experience too painful to recall. The rape victim
was testifying in open court, in the presence of
strangers, on an extremely intimate matter,
which, more often than not, is talked about in
hushed tones. Under such circumstances, it is
not surprising that her narration was less than
letter-perfect.[35] "Moreover, the inconsistency
may be attributed to the well-known fact that a
courtroom atmosphere can affect the accuracy of
testimony and the manner in which a witness
answers questions."[36]37
Further, the public prosecutor offered a convincing
explanation on why BBB was confused on some points of
her two testimonies. Particularly in the Memorandum for the
People38 filed with the RTC, the public prosecutor creditably
explained the inconsistencies, thus:
[BBB]'s testimony on July 3, 2002 might be
contradictory to her first testimony on June 6,
2001, with respect to the last rape on January 15,
2000, as regards the place of commission—
house of her parents or house of accused; and
the length of time he stayed on her top – 3
minutes or half-minute. But she remained
consistent in her declaration that on January 15,
2000, her uncle inserted his penis into her
vagina, and he was moving while on her top then
she felt something came out from him. He was
able to rape her because he threatened her with
a knife or bladed weapon. Further, the first she
took the witness stand on June 6, 2001, she was
made to recall the last rape, the first rape and
many acts of sexual abuses [sic] against her. She
was even confused about her age when she was
first raped by her uncle. After she testified on
November 14, 2001, for the separate charges of
rapes in 1997, 1998 and 1999, she was able to
recall more clearly the last rape on January 15,
2000, which happened in her own house. These
noted discrepancies as to the exact place of
commission – accused's house or victim's house
– is not an essential element of the crime of rape
and both houses are situated in Brgy. Villa Padua
Ilaya, Gumaca, Quezon, which is within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. x x
x 39
In addition, we share the lower court's disbelief of
appellant's proffered defenses of denial and alibi. These
two defenses are inherently the weakest as they are
negative defenses. Mere denials of involvement in a crime
cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the
offended party. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the
defendant to prove that he was somewhere else when the
crime was committed; he must likewise demonstrate that it
is physically impossible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time.40
In the case at bar, appellant's alibi that he was at his sister's
house barely two (2) kilometers away when the rape took
place on 15 January 2000 cannot be given credence by this
Court. If we are to thread this line of reasoning, appellant
could have easily left his sister's house in the middle of the
night, raped BBB, and then returned to his sister's house
without much difficulty and without anybody noticing his
absence.
Well-settled is the rule that a categorical and positive
identification of an accused, without any showing of illmotive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial.41 The defenses of
denial and alibi deserve scant consideration when the
prosecution has strong, clear and convincing evidence
identifying appellant as the perpetrator.42 In this case, both
BBB and AAA, minors and relatives of appellant, positively
identified him as their rapist in open court. The lower courts
found no issue detracting from the credibility of such
identification.
It is worthy to note that the alibi presented by appellant is
limited to the 15 January 2000 rape of BBB. He offers
nothing to counteract the accusations against him involving
the seven (7) other specific acts of rape other than the
averment that he did not know anything about the
allegations propounded on him, an infinitesimal defense
considering the evidence against him.
Appellant does claim that the present case was merely
instituted because of the grudge of CCC towards his
deceased father. It is outrageous to even suggest that a
mother will subject her daughters to the humiliating
experience of coming before the court and narrating their
harrowing experience just because she was tagged by her
father-in-law as lazy. In addition, CCC's father-in-law had
died several years before the criminal charges against
appellant were ever instituted. If CCC truly wanted to
retaliate and damage the reputation of her father-in-law,
she could have done so when the latter was still alive. No
member of a rape victim's family would dare encourage the
victim to publicly expose the dishonor of the family, more
specifically if such accusation is against a member of the
family, unless the crime was in fact committed.43
Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct
a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private
parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has
not in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek
justice for the wrong done to her. Testimonies of childvictims are normally given full weight and credit, since when
a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape has been committed. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity.44 The weight of
such testimonies may be countered by physical evidence to
the contrary, or indubitable proof that the accused could not
have committed the rape, but in the absence of such
countervailing proof, these testimonies shall be accorded
utmost value.
The twin aggravating circumstances of minority and
relationship were properly appreciated in this case. The
minority of the victims and their relationship with appellant
were aptly established
in the lower court proceedings. Not only did the prosecution
allege in the Informations the ages of the victims when they
were raped but the prosecution also presented the birth
certificates of BBB and AAA in court as documentary
evidence to prove that they were both minors when
appellant raped them. Appellant, in open court, also
admitted that that he was the uncle of both victims being
the brother of the victims' father, and thus, a relative of the
victims within the third degree of consanguinity.
Furthermore, the delay in reporting the repulsive acts of
appellant to BBB and AAA is understandably justified,
considering that appellant repeatedly threatened to kill
them and their family should they disclose the incidents to
anyone. It has been held time and again that delay in
revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a
fabricated charge.45 Such intimidation must be viewed in
light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of
the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast
rule. It is enough that the intimidation produces a fear that
if the victim does not yield to the perverse impulses of the
accused, something would happen to her at the moment, or
even thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she
would report the incident.46
AAA also testified in the same vein in Criminal Case No.
6908-G.
Q – I am now through with Criminal Case No.
6906-G. In Criminal Case No. 6908-G, also for
Rape. When was the last time that this sexual
abuse was committed by your Uncle?
A – June 11, Mam. [sic]
Q – What year?
A – June 11, 2000, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q – What did your Uncle do to you on June 11,
2000?
A – He also removed my clothes, Mam. [sic]
At the same time, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
the two counts of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 6906-G and
6908-G were not proven beyond reasonable doubt, but only
the two separate incidents of attempted rape.
It is to be noted that there is an attempt to commit rape
when the offender commences its commission directly by
overt acts but does not perform all acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.47 In
Criminal Case No. 6906-G, the records show that there was
no penetration or any indication that the penis of appellant
touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA. This was
evident in AAA's testimony at the hearing on 17 October
2001, to wit:
Q – And after removing your clothes, what did he
do to you?
A – He was trying to insert his penis into my
vagina, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q – And what did you feel when he was trying to
insert his penis in your vagina?
A – Painful, Mam. [sic]
Q – Do you remember of any unusual incident
that happened to you when you were eleven
years old?
Q – And what did you do when you feel painful?
A – Yes, Mam. [sic]
Q – When you cried, what did your Uncle do, if
any?
A – I cried, Mam. [sic]
Q – What was that?
A – He also touched my vagina and my other
private parts and he inserted also his penis (into)
my vagina. [sic]
A – He did not pursue what he was doing, Mam.
[sic]
xxxx
Q – Was he able to insert his penis into your
vagina?
Q – And your Uncle was not able to penetrate his
penis to your vagina?
A – No, Mam. [sic]
A – No, Mam.49 [sic]
Q – Why?
In downgrading the offense committed and consequently
decreasing the penalty, the CA declared:
A – It was painful, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q – How many times did he try to insert his penis
into your vagina?
A – Many times, Mam.48 [sic]
It is carnal knowledge, not pain, that is the
element to consummate rape. Indeed pain may
be deduced from the sexual act but accused
cannot be convicted of rape by presuming carnal
knowledge out of pain. It is well-settled that
complete penetration of the penis into the vagina
is not necessary to convict for consummated
rape since the slightest penetration of one into
the other will suffice. However, in People v.
Campuhan, the term "slightest penetration" was
clarified to mean that there must be sufficient and
convincing proof of the penis indeed touching at
the very least the labias of the female organ.
Mere epidermal contact between the penis and
the external layer of the victim's vagina (the
stroking and the grazing of the male organ upon
the female organ or the mons pubis) categorizes
the crime as attempted rape or acts of
lasciviousness. There must be positive proof of
even the slightest penetration, more accurately,
the touching of the labias by the penis, before
rape could be deemed consummated. We,
therefore, take exception to the finding of the trial
court that when the accused was trying to insert
his penis into the child's vagina, the act proved
painful to [AAA,] which made the accused stop
from further executing the act. From the
testimony of private complainant, [AAA] in the
afore-numbered cases, the prosecution failed to
demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt that
accused-appellant's penis reached the labia of
the pudendum of AAA's vagina. There is no basis
then to apply the rule that the introduction of the
penis into the aperture of the female organ
(thereby touching the labia of the pudendum)
already consummates the case of rape. x x x 50
It should be added that under Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code, there is an attempt when the offender commences
the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does
not perform all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance. In the crime of rape,
penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the
felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused
must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual
organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the
penetration, however slight, is not completed.51
The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of
Appeals that it has been established beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of six (6)
counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape.
However, in light of Rep. Act No. 9346, the appropriate
penalties for both crimes should be amended.
II.
We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty
imposable on appellant for the six (6) counts of rape. The
sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view
of Rep. Act No. 9346, titled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." Section
2 of the law mandates that in lieu of the death penalty,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.
Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the death
sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if the guilt of
the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when
appropriate. Since the passage of Rep. Act No. 9346, the
Court has had occasion to effectuate such reduction in
recent
cases
such
as People
v.
Tubongbanua52 and People v. Cabalquinto.53
III.
The question of what should be the appropriate penalty for
the two (2) counts of attempted rape proves to be the more
challenging but interesting question facing the Court.
The Court of Appeals had sentenced appellant, for the
attempted rape of AAA, to "an indeterminate penalty of ten
(10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum," for each count of attempted rape. There is no
doubt as to the validity of this sentence at the time it was
meted prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346. Article
51 of the Revised Penal Code establishes the penalty to be
imposed upon the principals of an attempted felony:
ART. 51. xxx — A penalty lower by two degrees
than that prescribed by law for the consummated
felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an
attempt to commit a felony.54
What is the penalty "lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law" for attempted rape? Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, which incorporates the amendments
introduced by Rep. Act No. 8353, prescribes:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years
of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law spouse of the parent of the victim. x
x x55
The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a
victim duly proven to have been under eighteen years of
age and to have been raped by her uncle, is death under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The
determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the
death penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71
of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties.—For the
purpose of graduating the penalties which,
according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57,
inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon
persons guilty as principals of any frustrated or
attempted felony, or as accomplices or
accessories, the following rules shall be
observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is
single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in
degree shall be that immediately following that
indivisible penalty in the respective graduated
scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code.56
xxxx
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) warrants
special attention, crucial as it is to our disposition of this
question. The provision reads:
Art. 71. Graduated scales. — In the case in which
the law prescribes a penalty lower or higher by
one or more degrees than another given penalty,
the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be
observed in graduating such penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from
the graduated scale in which is comprised the
given penalty:
The courts, in applying such lower or higher
penalty, shall observe the following graduated
scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death
2. Reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
4. Prision mayor
5. Prision correctional
6. Arresto mayor
7. Destierro
8. Arresto menor
9. Public censure
10. Fine57
xxxx
Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty
two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal,
which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court
of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape. Reclusion
temporal is a penalty comprised of three divisible
periods, a minimum, a medium and a maximum.
At the same time, the Indeterminate Sentence Law
prescribes that "the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense."
The purpose of the prescription of minimum and maximum
periods under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to effect
the privilege granted under the same law, for prisoners who
have served the minimum penalty to be eligible for parole
per the discretion of the Board of Indiscriminate
Sentence.58 Thus, convicts sentenced to suffer death
penalty or life-imprisonment are ineligible under that law, as
are persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua, an indivisible
penalty without minimum or maximum periods.59
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to
suffer the penalty for attempted rape, with a maximum
penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a
minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next
lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not
been enacted, the Court would have affirmed such
sentence without complication. However, the enactment of
the law has given rise to the problem concerning the
imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum
term within reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two
degrees lower than death. With the elimination of death as
a penalty, does it follow that appellant should now be
sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua, the highest remaining penalty with the enactment
of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so followed, appellant would be
sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.
IV.
Obviously, our ruling on the appropriate penalty on
appellant for attempted rape will affect not only appellant,
but several classes of convicts as well. Before we proceed
with the discussion, the Court finds it necessary to make
the following qualification.
Prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346, the death
penalty was imposable under two different frames of
reference. This was especially made clear with the 1993
amendments to the Revised Penal Code through Rep. Act
No. 7659, or the Death Penalty Law. Under the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty was provided
for in two ways, namely: as the maximum penalty for
"reclusion perpetua to death," and death itself as an
automatic and exclusive penalty. Death as the automatic
penalty was mandated for the crimes of qualified bribery "if
it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or
present;"60 kidnapping or detention "for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person;"61 destructive arson wherein "death results;"62 and
rape qualified by any of the several circumstances
enumerated under the law.
On the other hand, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to
death" was imposable on several crimes, including
murder,63 qualified piracy,64 and treason.65 The imposition
of the death penalty for crimes punishable by "reclusion
perpetua to death" depended on the appreciation of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances generally
outlined in Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
Reference to those two provisions was unnecessary if the
penalty imposed was death, as opposed to "reclusion
perpetua to death."
There is no need for now to discuss the effects of Rep. Act
No. 9346 on the penalties for frustrated and attempted
felonies which were punishable by "reclusion perpetua to
death" if consummated, or on accomplices and accessories
to such felonies. Such situations do not relate to the case
of appellant, who was convicted of two (2) counts of
attempted rape, which, if consummated, of course would
have carried prior to the enactment of Rep. Act 9346 the
penalty of death, and not "reclusion perpetua to death."
The Court also recognizes that the graduation of penalties
reckoned from "reclusion perpetua to death" differs from
that based on the exclusive penalty of death. For example,
it has been held that the penalty two degrees lower than
"reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor.66 In
contrast, the Court has likewise held that for qualified rape
in the attempted stage, "the penalty x x x two (2) degrees
lower than the imposable penalty of death for the offense
charged x x x is reclusion temporal."67 In People v.
Tolentino,68 we ruled that the accused, who had been
sentenced to die for the rape of his nine (9)-year old
stepdaughter, was guilty only of attempted rape. In
explaining that "reclusion temporal" was the proper penalty,
the Court, through then Chief Justice Davide, explained:
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty for an attempted felony is the
"penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated
felony." In this case, the penalty for the rape if it
had been consummated would have been death,
pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, since
[RT69] was eight years old and TOLENTINO was
the common-law spouse of [RT's] mother. The
last paragraph thereof provides:
The death penalty shall also be
imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen
(18) years of age and the offender is a
parent,
ascendant,
step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim.
xxxx
The penalty in this case should have been
reclusion temporal, which is the penalty
lower by two degrees than death. However,
with the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, TOLENTINO may be
sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment
penalty whose minimum shall be within the
range of prision mayor and whose maximum
shall be within the range of reclusion
temporal in its medium period pursuant to
Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.70
This dichotomy results from the application of Article 61 of
the Revised Penal Code. Both reclusion perpetua and
death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for
the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties …
the penalty next lower in degree shall be that
immediately following the lesser of the penalties
prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence,
in passing sentence on those convicted of attempted
felonies which warranted the penalty of "reclusion
perpetua to death" if consummated, the Court has
consistently held that penalty two degrees lower than
"reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor. In
contrast, if the penalty for the consummated crime is
the single indivisible penalty of death, as was
prescribed for several crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659,
Article 61(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that
"the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and
indivisible, the penalty next lower in degree shall be
that immediately following that indivisible penalty in
the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article
71". Thus, the proper penalty two degrees lower than
death is reclusion temporal.
It is also for this reason that the controversy we are now
addressing did not similarly arise after the enactment of the
1987 Constitution, which prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty subject to its subsequent readoption at the
choice of Congress. Generally, the highest penalty imposed
under the Revised Penal Code was "reclusion perpetuato
death," a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. As
a result, the Court had no occasion, after the passage of
the 1987 Constitution, to consider the effect of the charter
on penalties downgraded from a single indivisible penalty.
It was under Rep. Act No. 7659, passed in 1993, that some
commonly occurring crimes, such as qualified rape and
kidnapping for ransom, were penalized with the single
indivisible penalty of death.
The discussion for purposes of this decision will only center
on crimes, such as qualified rape as defined in the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, for which the imposable penalty
was death alone. Thus, our ruling will bear no direct effect
on the sentencing of accomplices and accessories or
persons guilty of the attempted or frustrated stage of
felonies for which the imposable penalty was "reclusion
perpetua to death."
Hence, it should be understood that any reference
forthwith to the penalty of death does not refer to the
penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death."
V.
If there was a clear intent in Rep. Act No. 9346 to
downgrade the penalties for convicts whose sentences had
been graduated beginning from death pursuant to Article
71, the Court would not hesitate to enforce such
downgrading based on clear statutory intent. However,
nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly refers to those
penalties imposed on frustrated or attempted felonies, or on
accessories and accomplices.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 bears examination:
Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of
death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly,
Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One
Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177),
otherwise known as the Act Designating
Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed.
Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise
known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other
laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar
as they impose the death penalty are hereby
repealed or amended accordingly.
If the penalties for attempted rape of a minor,71 among
others, were deemed to have been amended by virtue of
Rep. Act No. 9346, such amendment can be justified under
the ambit of the repealing clause, which reads, "all other
laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose
the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly." While this clause may, given its breadth,
initially impress as the nature of a general repealing clause,
it is in actuality an express repealing clause. Section 1
specifically repeals all laws, executive orders and
decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty, and
not merely such enactments which are inconsistent
with Rep. Act No. 9346.
Section 1 arguably presents more problems in that regard
with its utilization of the particular phrase "insofar as they
impose the death penalty." We can entertain two schools of
thought in construing this provision, both of them rooted in
literalist interpretations. First, it can be claimed that the
present application of the penalties for attempted rape of a
minor (among many examples) does not "impose the death
penalty," since none of the convicts concerned would face
execution through the application of the penalty for
attempted rape. Hence, the statutory provisions enforced in
determining the penalty for attempted rape, or other crimes
not punishable by death, are not amended by Rep. Act No.
9346.
On the other hand, the operation of the provisions imposing
the penalty for attempted rape of a minor necessarily calls
for the application, if not its literal imposition, of death as a
penalty, in the context of applying the graduated scale of
penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. If we
were to construe "impose" as to mean "apply," then it could
be argued that Article 71 was indeed amended by Rep. Act
No. 9346. After all, the application of Article 71 to crimes
such as attempted rape of a minor call for the actual
operation of the death penalty not only in theory, but as a
means of determining the proper graduated penalty.
On face value, the attractive worth of the firstly offered line
of thinking is enhanced by its innate conservatism, limiting
as it would the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346. It also can be
understood if confronted with the option of employing either
a liberal or a conservative construction, there is a natural
tendency to employ the conservative mode. Further, the
reasoning is seemingly consistent with that employed by
the Court in People v. Muñoz,72 a decision which will be
thoroughly analyzed in the course of this discussion.
If the true intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the extent
of the "imposition" of the death penalty to actual executions,
this could have been accomplished with more clarity. For
example, had Section 1 read instead "insofar as they
sentence an accused to death," there would have been no
room for doubt that only those statutory provisions calling
for actual executions would have been repealed or
amended. The inability of Congress to shape the repealing
clause in so specific a fashion does leave open the question
whether Congress did actually intend to limit the operation
of Rep. Act No. 9346 to actual executions only.
But let us for now test that premise by assuming for the
nonce that the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was
to limit the prohibition of the law to the physical imposition
of the death penalty, without extending any effect to the
graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of the Revised
Penal Code.
enough to have explicitly stated such intent in the law itself.
Of course, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346, either in the
caption or in the provisions, explicates the intention to
equalize the penalties for principals and accomplices in any
crime at all.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that it would, at bare
minimum, seem strange that the penalties for principals and
accomplices are equalized in some crimes, and not in
others. Let us return to our previous example of X and Y,
but this time, assume that they were charged for simple
kidnapping, with no qualifying circumstance that would
have resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. Since
the crime is not punishable by death, Rep. Act No. 9346
would have no effect in the imposition of the penalty for
simple kidnapping. Accordingly, X would have been
sentenced to reclusion perpetua as the principal, while Y
would have been sentenced to reclusion temporal as an
accomplice.
Since simple kidnapping is a comparatively lighter crime
than kidnapping for ransom, the lesser penalties are
justified. Since Y was merely an accomplice to the crime of
simple kidnapping, the imposition on him of a lighter penalty
than X is in accord with the Revised Penal Code and
established juridical and legal thought. Less justifiable
would be the notion that in kidnapping for ransom, the
principal and the accomplice would receive the same
penalty, while in simple kidnapping, the principal suffers a
higher penalty than the accomplice. Frankly, there is no
rational explanation for such a disparity, and no legal
justification other than the recognition that Congress has
the power to will it so.
VI.
There are troubling results if we were to uphold, based on
legislative intent, the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346
that limits its effects only to matters relating to the physical
imposition of the death penalty.
Illustrations are necessary. The easy demonstration of
iniquitous results is in the case of accomplices. Under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
kidnapping for ransom was punishable by death. Let us say
X and Y were tried for the crime. X was charged as a
principal for having directly participated in the kidnapping.
Y was charged as an accomplice for having allowed X to
use his house to detain the victim, even though Y was
abroad at the time of the crime and otherwise had no other
participation therein. Both X and Y were convicted by final
judgment. Since X could no longer be meted the death
penalty, he is sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua.
Ordinarily, Y as an accomplice should receive the penalty
next lower in degree, or reclusion temporal. Yet following
the "conservative" interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346,
the graduation of penalties remains unaffected with the
enactment of the new law. Thus, under Article 71, which
would still take into account the death penalty within
the graduated scale, Y, as an accomplice, would be
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the same penalty as
the principal.
It might be countered that part of the legislative intent
of Rep. Act No. 9346, by retaining the graduated scale
of penalties under Article 71, was to equalize the
penalties of principals and accomplices for crimes
previously punishable by death. We do not doubt that the
legislature has the theoretical capability to amend the penal
law in such fashion. Yet given the drastic effects of
equalizing the penalties for principals and accomplices, a
step that runs contrary to entrenched thought in criminal
law, one could reasonably assume that a legislature truly
oriented to enact such change would have been candid
Admittedly, the impact of Rep. Act No. 9346 is less
dramatic in relation to frustrated and attempted
felonies which were punishable by death if
consummated. The consummated felony previously
punishable by death would now be punishable
by reclusion perpetua. At the same time, the same
felony in its frustrated stage would, under the
foregoing premise in this section, be penalized one
degree lower from death, or also reclusion perpetua. It
does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty
of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the
consummated and frustrated felony. However, the
anomaly would be mainly in theory, as we recognize
that those felonies previously punishable by death are
improbable of commission in their frustrated stage,
unlike several felonies punishable by "reclusion
perpetua to death,"73 such as murder, which may be
frustrated.
Still, it cannot be denied that these felonies previously
punishable by death are capable of commission in their
attempted stages and that the Revised Penal Code
provides that the penalty for attempted felonies is "a
penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by
law for the consummated felony." The Court has thus
consistently imposed reclusion temporal, the penalty
two degrees lower than death, as the maximum term for
attempted felonies which, if consummated, would have
warranted the death penalty.74 If it were to be insisted
that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not affect at all the penalties
for attempted felonies, then those found guilty of the
subject attempted felonies would still be sentenced
to reclusion temporal, even though the "penalty lower
by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony" would now be prision mayor.
It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Rep. Act
No. 9346 that would sanction a penalty for some attempted
felonies that is only one degree lower than the
consummated crime would, again, be disharmonious and
inconsistent with the Revised Penal Code and established
thought in criminal law. Conceding again that the legislature
has the discretion to designate the criminal penalties it sees
fit, a regime that foists a differential theoretical basis for the
punishment of different attempted felonies resulting in
discriminatory penalties is not only irrational but also, to say
the least, highly suspect. Considering that physical liberties
are at stake, it would be a most cruel joke if such
discriminatory effects ensued not from deliberate legislative
will, but from oversight.
VII.
The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that
leaves extant the penalties for accomplices, accessories,
frustrated and attempted felonies, clearly results in illogical,
iniquitous and inconsistent effects. In contrast, no similar
flaws ensue should we construe Rep. Act No. 9346 instead
as not having barred the application of the death penalty
even as a means of depreciating penalties other than death.
In particular, the operative amendment that would assure
the integrity of penalties for accomplices, accessories,
frustrated and attempted felonies lies in Article 71, which
ranks "death" at the top of the scale for graduated penalties.
Simply put, the negation of the word "death" as previously
inscribed in Article 71 will have the effect of appropriately
downgrading the proper penalties attaching to accomplices,
accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies to the level
consistent with the rest of our penal laws. Returning to our
previous examples, Y, the convicted accomplice in
kidnapping for ransom, would now bear the penalty
of reclusion temporal, the penalty one degree lower than
that the principal X would bear (reclusion perpetua). Such
sentence would be consistent with Article 52 of the Revised
Penal Code, as well as Article 71, as amended, to remove
the reference to "death." Moreover, the prospect of the
accomplice receiving the same sentence as the principal,
an anomalous notion within our penal laws, would be
eliminated. Thus, the same standard would prevail in
sentencing principals and accomplices to the crime of
kidnapping in ransom, as that prescribed to the crime of
simple kidnapping.
The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346
were construed as having eliminated the reference to
"death" in Article 71 would run across the board in our penal
laws. Consistent with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code,
those convicted of attempted qualified rape would receive
the penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed by law,
now Rep. Act No. 9346, for qualified rape.
There are principles in statutory construction that will
sanction, even mandate, this "expansive" interpretation of
Rep. Act No. 9346. The maxim interpretare et concordare
legibus est optimus interpretandi embodies the principle
that a statute should be so construed not only to be
consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws
on the same subject matter, as to form a complete,
coherent and intelligible system—a uniform system of
jurisprudence.75"Interpreting and harmonizing laws with
laws is the best method of interpretation. x x x x This
manner of construction would provide a complete,
consistent and intelligible system to secure the rights of all
persons affected by different legislative and quasilegislative acts."76 There can be no harmony between Rep.
Act No. 9346 and the Revised Penal Code unless the later
statute is construed as having downgraded those penalties
attached to death by reason of the graduated scale under
Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear and consistent
rule emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated
and attempted
accomplices.
felonies,
and
for
accessories
and
It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal
or criminal laws are strictly construed against the state and
liberally in favor of the accused.77 If the language of the law
were ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor
of the defendant than it would if the statute were remedial,
as a means of effecting substantial justice.78 The law is
tender in favor of the rights of an individual. 79 It is this
philosophy of caution before the State may deprive a
person of life or liberty that animates one of the most
fundamental principles in our Bill of Rights, that every
person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Resort to the aforementioned principles in statutory
construction would not have been necessary had Rep. Act
No. 9346 ineluctably stated that the repeal of all laws
imposing the death penalty did not engender the
corresponding modification of penalties other than death,
dependent as these are on "death" as a measure under the
graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. Admittedly, if
this were indeed the intent of Congress, and such intent
were unequivocally expressed in Rep. Act No. 9346, the
resulting inequities and inconsistencies we had earlier
pointed out would have remained. If that were to be the
case, we would have acknowledged, perhaps tacitly, that
such inequities and inconsistencies fell part of the
legislative intent. It does not speak well of a Congress to be
deliberately inconsistent with, or ignorant of its own prior
enactments. Yet ultimately, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346
is not expressive of such rash or injudicious notions, as it is
susceptible to a reading that would harmonize its effects
with the precepts and practices that pervade our general
penal laws, and in a manner that does not defy the clear will
of Congress.
VIII.
One who would like to advocate that Rep. Act No. 9346 did
not correspondingly amend any of the penalties other than
death in our penal laws would most certainly invoke our
ruling in People v. Muñoz,80 decided in 1989. Therein, a
divided Court ruled in that the constitutional bar on the
imposition of the death penalty did not enact "a
corresponding modification in the other periods [in
penalties]", there being no expression of "such a
requirement… in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution
or indicat[ion] therein by at leastclear and unmistakable
implication."81 In so concluding, the Court made the oftcited pronouncement that there was nothing in the 1987
Constitution "which expressly declares the abolition of the
death penalty."82
It is time to re-examine Muñoz and its continued viability in
light of Rep. Act No. 9346. More precisely, would Muñozas
precedent deter the Court from ruling that Rep. Act No.
9346 consequently downgraded penalties other than
death?
It can be recalled that the accused in Muñoz were found
guilty of murder, which under the Revised Penal Code,
carried the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. The subject murders therein were not
attended by any modifying circumstance, and thus
penalized in the penalty's medium term. Jurisprudence
previous to Muñoz held that the proper penalty in such
instances should be "the higher half of reclusion
temporal maximum," with reclusion temporal maximum,
divided into two halves for that purpose. Muñoz rejected
this formulation, holding instead that the penalty should
be reclusion perpetua. Towards this conclusion, the Court
made the above-cited conclusions relating to the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty, and the
charter's effects on the other periods. Six justices dissented
from that ruling, and as recently as 1997, a member of the
Court felt strongly enough to publish a view urging the
reexamination of Muñoz.83
It would be disingenuous to consider Muñoz as directly
settling the question now befacing us, as the legal premises
behind Muñoz are different from those in this case. Most
pertinently, Muñoz inquired into the effects of the
Constitution on the proper penalty for murder; while herein,
we are ascertaining the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the
proper penalty for attempted qualified rape. Muñoz may
have pronounced that the Constitution did not abolish
the death penalty, but that issue no longer falls into
consideration herein, the correct query now being
whether Congress has banned the death penalty
through
Rep.
Act
No.
9346.
Otherwise
framed, Muñoz does not preclude the Court from
concluding that with the express prohibition of the
imposition of the death penalty Congress has
unequivocally banned the same.
Muñoz made hay over the peculiar formulation of Section
19(1), Article III, which provided that "[n]either shall death
penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
for it." Muñoz and its progenies, have interpreted that
provision as prohibiting the actual imposition of the death
penalty, as opposed to enacting an amendatory law that
eliminates all references and applications of the death
penalty in our statutes. It can also be understood and
appreciated that at the time Muñoz was decided, it would
have been polemical to foster an unequivocal
pronouncement that Section 19(1), Article III abolished the
death penalty, since the very provision itself acknowledged
that Congress may nonetheless subsequently provide for
the penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes," as Congress very well did just four (4) years
after Muñoz. No such language exists in Rep. Act No. 9346.
Of course, the legislature has the inherent and
constitutional power to enact laws prescribing penalties for
crimes, and the Constitution will not prohibit Congress from
reenacting the death penalty "for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes." Yet it was that express
stipulation in the Constitution that dissuaded the Court from
recognizing the constitutional abolition of the death penalty;
and there is no similar statutory expression in Rep. Act No.
9346, which could be construed as evocative of intent
similar to that of the Constitution.
The doctrine in Muñoz that the constitutional prohibition on
the imposition of the death penalty did not enact a
corresponding modification of other penalties is similarly
irrelevant to this case, which calls for an examination as to
whether such corresponding modifications of other
penalties arose as a consequence of Rep. Act No. 9346,
and not the Constitution.
For purposes of legal hermeneutics, the critical question is
whether Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to delete the word
"death" as expressly provided for in the graduated scale of
penalties under Article 71. Muñoz did not engage in an
analogous inquiry in relation to Article 71 and the
Constitution, for what was relevant therein was not the
general graduated scale of penalties, but the range of the
penalties for murder. Herein, at bare minimum, no provision
in Rep. Act No. 9346 provides a context within which the
concept of "death penalty" bears retentive legal effect,
especially in relation to Article 71. Unlike the
Constitution, Rep. Act No. 9346 does expressly stipulate
the amendment of all extant laws insofar as they called for
the imposition of the penalty of death.
The impression left by Muñoz was that the use of the word
"imposition" in the Constitution evinced the framer's intent
to retain the operation of penalties under the Revised Penal
Code. In the same vein, one might try to construe the use
of "imposition" in Rep. Act No. 9346 as a means employed
by Congress to ensure that the "death penalty", as applied
in Article 71, remain extant. If the use of "imposition" was
implemented as a means of retaining "death" under Article
71, it would have been a most curious, roundabout means
indeed. The Court can tolerate to a certain degree the
deliberate vagueness sometimes employed in legislation,
yet constitutional due process demands a higher degree of
clarity when infringements on life or liberty are intended. We
have ruled, on due process grounds, as arbitrary and
oppressive a tax assessed on a standard characterized as
"nothing but blather in search of meaning."84 In the matter
of statutes that deprive a person of physical liberty, the
demand for a clear standard in sentencing is even more
exacting.
Yet in truth, there is no material difference between
"imposition" and "application," for both terms embody the
operation in law of the death penalty. Since Article 71
denominates "death" as an element in the graduated scale
of penalties, there is no question that the operation of Article
71 involves the actual application of the death penalty as
a means of determining the extent which a person's liberty
is to be deprived. Since Rep. Act No. 9346 unequivocally
bars the application of the death penalty, as well as
expressly repeals all such statutory provisions requiring the
application of the death penalty, such effect necessarily
extends to its relevance to the graduated scale of penalties
under Article 71.
We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346
intended to retain the operative effects of the death penalty
in the graduation of the other penalties in our penal
laws. Munoz cannot enjoin us to adopt such conclusion.
Rep. Act No. 9346 is not swaddled in the same restraints
appreciated by Muñoz on Section 19(1), Article III. The very
Congress empowered by the Constitution to reinstate the
imposition of the death penalty once thought it best to do
so, through Rep. Act No. 7650. Within the same realm of
constitutional discretion, Congress has reversed itself. It
must be asserted that today, the legal status of the
suppression of the death penalty in the Philippines has
never been more secure than at any time in our political
history as a nation.
Following Muñoz, the sovereign people, through the 1987
Constitution, might not have willed the abolition of the death
penalty and instead placed it under a suspensive condition.
As such, we affirmed the characterization of the death
penalty during the interregnum between the 1987
Constitution and its reimposition through law as being "in a
state of hibernation."85 No longer. It reawakened — then it
died; because the sovereign people, through Rep. Act No.
9346, banned the death penalty. Only by an Act of
Congress can it be reborn. Before that day, the
consideration of death as a penalty is bereft of legal effect,
whether as a means of depriving life, or as a means of
depriving liberty.
Despite our present pronouncement on the ban against of
the death penalty, we do not acknowledge
that Muñozlacked legal justification when it was decided;
that its application as precedent prior to Rep. Act No. 9346
was erroneous; or that previous sentences imposed on
convicts
on
the
basis
of Muñoz were
wrong. Muñoz properly stood as the governing precedent in
the matter of sentences that passed finality prior to Rep. Act
No. 9346; and the consistent reliance by the courts on its
doctrines entrenched its footing in criminal law
jurisprudence.
IX.
Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death
penalty in the Philippines, also effectively classified the
crimes listed therein as "heinous," within constitutional
contemplation. Such reclassification under Rep. Act No.
7659 was accompanied by certain legal effects other than
the imposition of the death penalty, such as the increase in
imposable fines attached to certain heinous crimes.86 The
categorization of certain crimes as "heinous", constituting
as it does official recognition that some crimes are more
odious than others, has also influenced this Court in
adjudging the proper pecuniary indemnities awarded to the
victims of these crimes. Hence, a general inclination
persists in levying a greater amount of damages on
accused found guilty of heinous crimes.
It should be understood that the debarring of the death
penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly
declassify those crimes previously catalogued as
"heinous". The amendatory effects of Rep. Act No. 9346
extend only to the application of the death penalty but not
to the definition or classification of crimes. True, the
penalties for heinous crimes have been downgraded under
the aegis of the new law. Still, what remains extant is the
recognition by law that such crimes, by their abhorrent
nature, constitute a special category by themselves.
Accordingly, Rep. Act No. 9346 does not serve as basis for
the reduction of civil indemnity and other damages that
adhere to heinous crimes.
degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision
mayor.
Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should
be extended to this new ruling, favorable as it is to persons
previously convicted of crimes which, if consummated or
participated in as a principal, would have warranted the
solitary penalty of death. We see no choice but to extend
the retroactive benefit. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
states that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal[87] x x x x although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same." Given
that we have ruled that Rep. Act No. 9346 downgraded the
penalties for such crimes, the benefit of Article 22 has to
apply, except as to those persons defined as "habitual
criminal[s]." Indeed, Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly
recognized that its enactment would have retroactive
beneficial effects, referring as it did to "persons x x x whose
sentences were reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of
this Act."88
It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No.
9346 and Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, there may
be convicts presently serving their original sentences
whose actual served terms exceed their reduced
sentences. It should be understood that this decision
does not make operative the release of such convicts,
especially as there may be other reasons that exist for
their continued detention. There are remedies under law
that could be employed to obtain the release of such
prisoners, if warranted. Offices such as the Public
Attorney's Office and non-governmental organizations that
frequently assist detainees possess the capacity and
acumen to help implement the release of such prisoners
who are so entitled by reason of this ruling.
X.
XI.
Having pronounced the statutory disallowance of the death
penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346 and the corresponding
modification of penalties other than death through that
statute, we now proceed to discuss the effects of these
rulings.
As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with
finality, the application is immediate. Henceforth, "death,"
as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no
longer form part of the equation in the graduation of
penalties. For example, in the case of appellant, the
determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be
reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two
degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the
maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion
temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but
instead, prision mayor.
There should be little complication if the crime committed
was punishable by the free-standing penalty of "death," as
utilized in Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged
penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death," as often used in
the Revised Penal Code and other penal laws. The facts of
the present case do not concern the latter penalty, hence
our reluctance to avail of an extended discussion thereof.
However, we did earlier observe that both "reclusion
perpetua" and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article
61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty
prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible
penalties x x x x the penalty next lower in degree shall be
that immediately following the lesser of the penalties
prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence, as
we earlier noted, our previous rulings that the penalty two
We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo
Bon. By reason of Rep. Act No. 9346, he is spared the
death sentence, and entitled to the corresponding reduction
of his penalty as a consequence of the downgrading of his
offense from two (2) counts consummated rape to two (2)
counts of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of rape, we
downgrade the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with
no eligibility for parole, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For
each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape, we
downgrade by one degree lower the penalty imposed by the
Court of Appeals. We hold that there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor
should be imposed in it medium period. Consequently, we
impose the new penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum.
Lastly, as to damages, the Court awards AAA P30,000.00
as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages
and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of
attempted rape, it being the prevailing rate of indemnity as
pronounced in the recent case of People v. Miranda.89
Separately, the Court applies prevailing jurisprudence90 in
awarding to BBB and AAA P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages, for each count of consummated
rape.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The Court sentences appellant Alfredo J.
Bon to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no possibility
of parole for each of the six (6) counts of consummated
rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6699,
6902, and against BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689, 6903,
6905, and 6907. Appellant is further ORDERED to
indemnify AAA and BBB for the crime of consummated
rape, in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages for each of them.
For the two (2) counts of attempted rape of AAA in Criminal
Cases No. 6906 and 6908, appellant is hereby
SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccionalas
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) of prision mayor as
maximum for each count of attempted rape. In addition,
appellant is ORDERED to indemnify AAA for each of the
two (2) counts of attempted rape in the amounts
of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral
damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Puno, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna,
Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
CASE DIGEST
Facts:
Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period
from 21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca,
Quezon against Alfredo Bon, charging him with
the rape of his two nieces, the daughters of his
older brother.
Appellant was convicted by the trial court of eight
counts of rape. The trial court considered the
qualifying circumstances of minority of the
victims and appellant’s relationship with them,
being the former's relative by consanguinity
within the third degree (uncle), and imposed
upon Bon eight death sentences.
As the penalty imposed consisted of eight death
sentences, the records of the case were
automatically elevated to the Supreme Court for
review. However, in the aftermath of the
pronouncement of the Court in People v.
Mateo the present case was transferred to the
Court of Appeals for appropriate action and
disposition.
Upon automatic review, the Court of Appeals
downgraded the convictions in two of the cases
to attempted rape. It held that the prosecution
failed to demonstrate beyond any shadow of
doubt that Bon’s penis reached the labia of the
pudendum of the victim’s vagina. Accordingly, it
reduced the penalties attached to the two counts
of rape from death for consummated qualified
rape to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, for attempted rape.
Subsequently, Republic Act No. 9346, titled “An
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines,” was enacted.
Section 2 of the said law mandates that, in lieu of
the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the
Court can no longer uphold the death sentences
imposed by lower courts, but must, if the guilt of
the accused is affirmed, impose instead the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when appropriate.
Issue:
Whether or not Bon’s penalty for attempted
qualified rape (note that Bon committed 6
counts of consummated rape, and 2 counts of
attempted rape which is the issue here), which
under the penal law should be two degrees lower
than that of consummated qualified rape, should
be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.
Held:
RECLUSION PERPETUA. "Death," as utilized in
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no
longer form part of the equation in the graduation
of penalties. In the case of appellant, the
determination of his penalty for attempted rape
shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower
than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his
penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as
ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision
mayor.
The maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est
optimus interpretandi embodies the principle that
a statute should be so construed not only to be
consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with
other laws on the same subject matter, as to form
a complete, coherent and intelligible system—a
uniform system of jurisprudence. "Interpreting
and harmonizing laws with laws is the best
method of interpretation. x x x x This manner of
construction would provide a complete,
consistent and intelligible system to secure the
rights of all persons affected by different
legislative and quasi-legislative acts." There can
be no harmony between Rep. Act No. 9346 and
the Revised Penal Code unless the later statute
is construed as having downgraded those
penalties attached to death by reason of the
graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that
manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge
as to the application of penalties for frustrated
and attempted felonies, and for accessories and
accomplices.
By reason of Rep. Act No. 9346, he is spared
the death sentence, and entitled to the
corresponding reduction of his penalty as a
consequence of the downgrading of his offense
from two (2) counts consummated rape to two (2)
counts of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts
of rape, we downgrade the penalty of death
to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole,
pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the
two (2) counts of attempted rape, we downgrade
by one degree lower the penalty imposed by the
Court of Appeals. We hold that there being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the
penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it
medium period. Consequently, we impose the
new penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum,
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum.
To understand it better:
SCALE NO. 1
1.
Death- ABOLISHED ALREADY
(so consummated felonies are now
down to reclusion perpertua)
2.
Reclusion perpetua- CONSUMMATED
(in the case of people v. bon, bon
committed 6 counts of rape)
3. Reclusion temporal - the law does not
consider “frustrated” rape
4. Prision mayor - ATTEMPTED (being two
degrees lower of that of the consummated
one)
5. Prision correctional
6. Arresto mayor
7. Destierro
8. Arresto menor
9. Public censure
10. Fine57
G.R. No. 135919
May 9, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
DANNY DELOS SANTOS Y FERNANDEZ, appellant.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision1 dated October 2,
1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3551798, finding appellant
Danny delos Santos guilty of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
In the Information2 dated February 23, 1998, appellant was
charged with murder, thus:
"That on or about the 6th day of November 1997,
in the Municipality of San Jose, Del Monte,
Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with a kitchen knife, with
intent to kill one Rod Flores y Juanitas,
with evident premeditation, treachery and
taking advantage of superior strength, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with the said kitchen
knife said Rod Flores y Juanitas, hitting him on
the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting
upon him mortal wounds which directly caused
his death."
Upon
arraignment,
appellant
pleaded
"not
guilty."3 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The
prosecution presented Marcelino de Leon, Marvin Tablate,
Dr. Benito Caballero and Romeo Flores as its witnesses.
Appellant and Sonny Bautista took the witness stand for the
defense.
Marcelino De Leon testified that at around 8:00 p.m. of
November 6, 1997, he saw Rod Flores drinking "gin" with
Narciso Salvador, Marvin Tablate and Jayvee Rainier at the
latter's house in Sarmiento Homes, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan.4 As he was about to fetch water from a nearby
faucet, he approached them and borrowed Flores'
cart.5 While waiting for the cart, he stood across Flores who
was then seated and conversing with the group.6Suddenly,
appellant emerged from the back of Flores and stabbed him
with a knife,7 making an upward and downward
thrust.8 Flores ran after he was stabbed twice.9 Appellant
pursued him and stabbed him many times.10As a result,
Flores' intestines bulged out of his stomach. 11 Appellant
ceased stabbing Flores only after he saw him dead.
Thereafter, he turned his ire against Jayvee Rainier and
chased him. Fearful for his life, witness De Leon hid himself
and later on reported the incident to the police.12
Marvin Tablate corroborated De Leon's testimony. On
cross-examination, Tablate testified that he tried to help
Flores by separating him from the appellant who ran
away.13 He also testified that the latter joined his group at
about 11:00 a.m. and kept on "coming back and forth."
Dr. Caballero declared on the witness stand that Flores
suffered twenty-one (21) stab wounds in the frontal,
posterior and lateral side of his body, eleven (11) of which
were fatal. Dr. Caballero said it was possible that appellant
was behind Flores considering the stab wounds inflicted at
his back.14 According to the doctor, Flores died because of
"massive external/internal hemorrhages due to multiple
stab wounds in the thorax and abdomen penetrating both
lungs, heart, stomach, liver, spleen and intestines."15
Romeo Flores testified that his son Rod Flores was then
working at Vitarich, Marilao, Bulacan, earning P600.00
every 15th day of the month;16 that he spent P100,000.00
for his son's burial and wake; that he has receipts in the
amount of P19,110.00 spent for the funeral services and
the cost of the cemetery lot17 and a list of other expenses in
the amount of P35,960.00;18 and that his family has been
grieving for the loss of a loved one.
Appellant had a different version of the events. He denied
the accusation and declared that on November 6, 1997 at
8:00 p.m., he was in his auntie's house in Muson, San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan,19 forty (40) meters away from the
scene of the crime. He was then fetching water.20 Earlier, at
about 5:30 p.m., he and Flores met but they did not greet
each other. There was no altercation between them.
Hence, he could not understand why De Leon and Tablate
testified against him.
Sonny Bautista testified that on that particular date and
time, he and appellant were in their auntie's house in San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan.21 They watched television up to
8:30 p.m. and then went home. At about 10:00 p.m.,
appellant was arrested. Bautista did not inform the
policemen that they were watching television in their
auntie's house at the time the crime took place. Neither did
he accompany appellant to the police station.22
On October 2, 1998, the trial court rendered a Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"All premises considered, this Court resolves and
so holds that the prosecution has been able to
establish the criminal culpability of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Danny
delos Santos is hereby found guilty of the crime
of Murder with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.
"In the imposition of the penalty, the Court hereby
takes into account the brutality in the manner by
which the life of the victim was taken, and if only
to serve as deterrent to others who might be
similarly obsessed, it is believed that the higher
of the two penalties provided should be meted to
the accused herein. Absent any circumstance
that would mitigate the severity of his criminal act
and pursuant to Articles 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 6, Republic Act
no. 7659, the accused Danny delos Santos y
Fernandez is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Death by lethal injection.
"Further, the accused is condemned to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased the amount of
P50,000.00 for the victim's death. Moreover,
accused delos Santos is ordered to pay the said
heirs of the deceased Rod Flores the following
sums of money:
1. P264,000.00 for loss of earning
capacity;
2. P55,070.00 for actual
compensatory damages;
3. P50,000.00 for moral damages;
and
4. P50,000.00 for exemplary damages.
"With costs against the accused.
Tablate declared that he was drinking "gin" with them at
about 11:00 a.m. De Leon testified that no one assisted
Flores when he was being attacked by appellant. However,
Tablate stated that he attempted to separate Flores from
appellant after the former had sustained two stab wounds.
"SO ORDERED."
In his Appellant's brief, appellant ascribes to the trial court
the following errors:
"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY
OF
THE
ALLEGED
EYEWITNESSES, AND IN NOT ACQUITTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON GROUND OF
REASONABLE DOUBT.
"II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO INDEMNIFY THE
HEIRS OF VICTIM THE AMOUNT OF
P50,000.00
FOR
VICTIM'S
DEATH;
P264,000.00 FOR LOSS OF EARNING
CAPACITY; P55,070.00 FOR ACTUAL AND
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES; P50,000.00
FOR MORAL DAMAGES; AND P50,000.00
FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES."23
Appellant contends that there are some inconsistencies
between the testimonies of De Leon and Tablate, the
prosecution witnesses. Also, there is no evidence that he
has a motive to kill Flores. In fact, there was no previous
heated argument or altercation between them. That the
prosecution witnesses executed their sworn statements
only after two months from the commission of the crime
raises doubt as to their credibility. Finally, the evidence for
the prosecution failed to meet the exacting test of moral
certainty, hence, the trial court should not have ordered him
to indemnify the heirs of Flores.
The Solicitor General, in the Appellee's brief, counters that:
(a) the inconsistencies pointed out by appellant are minor
and do not vitiate the fact that he was the one who killed
Flores; (b) appellant's defenses of alibi and denial are
worthless since he was positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses; (c) he failed to proffer any
explanation why the prosecution witnesses implicated him;
(d) the crime was aggravated by cruelty because he
"butchered" Flores until his intestines bulged out of his
stomach; and (e) the heirs of Flores are entitled to
indemnification as it has been shown beyond reasonable
doubt that appellant killed him.
The first assigned error involves a determination of the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Settled is the rule
that when it comes to credibility of witnesses, appellate
courts generally do not overturn the findings of trial courts.
The latter are in a best position to ascertain and measure
the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their
actual observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying,
demeanor and behavior in court.24
We see no reason to deviate from this rule.
Appellant maintains that there are inconsistencies in the
testimonies of De Leon and Tablate. While De Leon
testified that appellant did not join Flores' group, however,
The first alleged inconsistency is understandable. Unlike
Tablate who was with the group in a drinking spree, De
Leon approached Flores only when he borrowed the cart
from the latter at about 8:00 p.m. He stayed with Flores'
group only for about thirty minutes,25 or up to 8:30 p.m.
Thus, he could not have observed that appellant joined the
group earlier, or at about 11: 00 a.m.
The second alleged inconsistency is a minor one that does
not enfeeble the prosecution's theory that appellant killed
Flores. Evident from De Leon's testimony is the fact that he
was so shocked in witnessing the gruesome killing of his
companion. With such a state of mind, it would be too much
to demand from him a full recollection of the details
surrounding the event. Many times we have ruled that
inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when
referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not
affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or
the weight of their testimony.26 They only serve to
strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses
for they erase the suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony.27 What we find important in the case at bar is
that the two prosecution witnesses were one in saying that
it was appellant who stabbed Flores with a knife. We quote
the clear and straightforward account of the incident by De
Leon and Tablate. During cross-examination, De Leon
testified as follows:
"Atty. De la Cruz:
Q
You did not see the accused because
it was dark in that place, is it not?
A
No, sir, he suddenly appeared from the
back of Rod Flores and started stabbing Rod
that is why we were surprised.
Court:
Q
How did the accused thrust the weapon
to the victim?
A
(Witness demonstrating by making
upward, downward thrust at the back of the
victim)
Atty. De la Cruz:
Q
Where was Rod Flores hit, if you know?
A
At the back, sir.
Q
How many times?
A
At first, twice, sir.
Court:
Q
That was the time when Rod Flores ran
away after having been stabbed twice.
A
A
Yes, Your Honor.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Yes, sir.
Q
How many times did the accused stab
Rod Flores?
Court:
Q
How did the accused thrust for the second
time the weapon at the back of the victim.
A
Both at the back, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
A
I saw him stabbed the victim twice, sir.
(Witness demonstrated in downward position
as if he was holding something).
Q
What was he holding?
A
A knife, sir.
Atty. De la Cruz:
Q
Was Rod Flores able to ran away?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Where were you when Rod Flores was
running away?
A
We were left behind, sir. I was not able to
move anymore.
Q
Flores?
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Court:
Q
Are you sure that when Rod Flores fell
to the ground, he was not able to rise nor was
he able to run away?
A
He was able to run but then he was
drunk and the accused was able to catch and
stab him again, sir.
And was the accused able to reach
xxx
xxx
xxx
A
Yes, sir.
Q
What did the accused do?
Q
Are you positive to the identity of
Danny delos Santos that he was the one who
stabbed Rod Flores?
A
sir.
Again, he started stabbing at the back,
A
Q
So the stabbing was inflicted at the
back of the victim?
A
Not all, sir, because he turned him face
up and stabbed him again, sir."28
Tablate's direct testimony reads:
"Fiscal Vicente:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q
How did Danny delos Santos stab Rod
Flores?
A
"Patalikod," sir.
Q
What do you mean?
A
Danny delos Santos stabbed Rod
Flores at the back, sir.
Q
When you said Danny delos Santos
stabbed Rod Flores at the back, are you
saying that Danny delos Santos was at the
back of Rod Flores at the time?
Yes, sir." 29
Appellant argues that since the prosecution witnesses
testified that there was no altercation between him and
Flores, it follows that no motive to kill can be attributed to
him. This is an inconsequential argument. Proof of motive
is not indispensable for a conviction, particularly
where the accused is positively identified by an
eyewitness and his participation is adequately
established.30 In People vs. Galano,31 we ruled that in the
crime of murder, motive is not an element of the offense, it
becomes material only when the evidence is circumstantial
or inconclusive and there is some doubt on whether the
accused had committed it. In the case before us, no such
doubt exits as De Leon and Tablate positively identified
appellant.
In a last-ditch attempt to cast doubt on the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, appellant questions why their
statements were taken only on January 29, 1998 when the
incident happened on November 6, 1997. The two-month
delay is hardly an indicium of a concocted story. It is but
natural for witnesses to avoid being involved in a criminal
proceeding particularly when the crime committed is of such
gravity as to show the cruelty of the perpetrator. Born of
human experience, the fear of retaliation can have a
paralyzing effect to the witnesses.32 Thus, in People vs.
Dacibar,33 we held that the initial reluctance of witnesses to
volunteer information about a criminal case is of common
knowledge and has been judicially declared as insufficient
to affect credibility, especially when a valid reason exists for
such hesitance.
Anent the second error, appellant contends that the trial
court erred in indemnifying the heirs of Flores since his guilt
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Suffice it to state
at this point that the evidence for the prosecution produces
moral certainty that appellant is guilty of the crime charged,
hence, should be answerable for all its consequences.
As earlier mentioned, appellant's defenses are mere alibi
and denial. He testified that at the time the crime took place,
he was in his auntie's house in Muson; San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. When probed by the trial court, he categorically
stated that the house is only 40 meters away from the scene
of the crime and may be traveled in about three or five
minutes.34 For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be
convincing enough to preclude any doubt on the physical
impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus
criminis at the time of the incident.35 Certainly, the required
impossibility does not exist here.
Weighing the evidence of the prosecution vis-à-vis that of
the defense, the scale of justice must tilt in favor of the
former. Time and again, we ruled that positive identification,
where categorical and consistent and without any showing
of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative
and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in
law.36 With marked relevance is the fact that appellant did
not present any evidence to show that the prosecution
witnesses, in testifying against him, have improper motive.
The prosecution was able to establish that appellant's
attack on Flores was from behind without any slightest
provocation on his part37 and that it was sudden and
unexpected. This is a clear case of treachery. Where the
victim was totally unprepared for the unexpected attack
from behind with no weapon to resist it, the stabbing could
only be described as treacherous.38 There being treachery,
appellant's conviction for murder is in order.
However, in the imposition of penalty, we cannot appreciate
the aggravating circumstance of cruelty considered by the
trial court. Pursuant to the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, every Information must state not only the
qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances.39 This
rule may be given retroactive effect in the light of the wellestablished rule that statutes regulating the procedure of
the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage.40 The aggravating circumstance of cruelty, not
having been alleged in the Information, may not be
appreciated to enhance the liability of appellant.
41
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
for the consummated crime of murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. In this case, the lesser of the two
indivisible penalties shall be imposed, there being neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending the
crime.42
In keeping with the current jurisprudence, the heirs of Flores
are entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity ex delicto.43 As regards the actual damages, it
appears that out of the P55,070.00 awarded by the trial
court, only P19,170.0044 was actually supported by
receipts. The other amounts were based solely on a list
prepared by Romeo Flores. To be entitled to actual
damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss
with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the
injured party.45 In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to
present receipts for the other expenses incurred. Thus, in
light of the recent case of People vs. Abrazaldo,46 we grant
the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages inasmuch
as the proven actual damages is less than P25,000.00. The
moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00 is
affirmed, there being proofs that because of Flores' death,
his heirs suffered wounded feelings, mental anguish,
anxiety and similar injury.47 However, we reduce to
P25,000.00 only the trial court's award of P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages.48
The amount of indemnity for loss of earning capacity is
based on the income at the time of death and the probable
life expectancy of the victim. In the case at bar, the trial
court found that Flores' annual gross income is P14,400.00
computed at the rate of P1,200.00 a month for twelve (12)
months. From this amount is deducted the necessary and
incidental expenses, estimated at 50%, leaving a balance
of P7,200.00. His net income would then be multiplied by
his life expectancy, using the following formula: 2/3 x 80 25 (age of the victim at time of death). Considering that he
was 25 years old when he died, his life expectancy would
be 37. Multiplying the net balance of his annual income by
his life expectancy, the loss of his earning is P266,400.00,
thus:
"In computing the life expectancy and loss of
earning capacity of a person the following
formula is used:
Life expectancy 2/3 x (80 - the age of the victim at the time of
death)
2/3 x (80 - 25)
2/3 x 55
= 36.66 or 37
Loss of earning capacity net annual income x life expectancy
P7,200 x 37
= P266,400.00" 49
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 2, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Malolos, Bulacan, in
Criminal Case No. 3551798, finding appellant Danny delos
Santos y Fernandez guilty of the crime of murder is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay the heirs of the late Rod Flores y Juanitas the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,0000.00 as temperate
damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P266,400.00 for loss of earning
capacity.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
Facts: November 6, 1997 in San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan, Rod Flores was in drinking spree with
Narciso Salvador, Marvin Tablate and Jayvee
Rainier, when suddenly, appellant, Danny Delos
Santos emerged from the back of Flores and stabbed
him to death with knife. Fearful for their lives after
witnessing the gruesome killing, witnesses De Leon
and Tablate only testified two months after the
incident happened.
RTC found him guilty of murder with qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
Issue:
1.
2.
WON the testimonies of the witnesses
are credible even after two month
period
(WON proof of motive to kill is
indispensable for conviction)
HELD:
1.
2.
Yes. The court ruled that the two-month
delay is hardly an indicium of a concocted
story. It is but natural for witnesses to avoid
being involved in a criminal proceeding
particularly when the crime committed is
gruesome showing the cruelty of the
perpetrator. Born of human experience, the
fear of retaliation can have a paralyzing
effect to the witnesses. Thus, the initial
reluctance of witnesses to volunteer
information about a criminal case is of
common knowledge and has been judicially
declared as insufficient to affect credibility,
especially when a valid reason exists for
such hesitance.
Here, De Leon and Tablete feared that
appellant may turn his ire to them for
witnessing the crime. No. Proof of motive is
indispensable for a conviction, particularly
where the accused is positively identified by
an eyewitness and his participation is
adequately established. In the crime of
murder, motive is not an element of the
offense, it becomes material only when the
evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive
and there is some doubt on whether the
accused had committed it. Here, De Leon
and Tablate positively identified appellant.
G.R. NO. 166479, February 28, 2006
RODOLFO C. VELASCO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks
to set aside the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 23366 dated 30 July 2004 which affirmed the
decision[2] of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 98-02175-D dated 29
June 1999, finding accused-petitioner Rodolfo C. Velasco
guilty of Attempted Murder, and its Resolution[3] dated 21
December 2004 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
An Information[4] dated 20 April 1998 charged petitioner
with the crime of Attempted Murder committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of April, 1998, in the City of
Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, SN I
RODOLFO C. VELASCO, being then armed with a gun,
with treachery and with intent to kill one FREDERICK
MARAMBA, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon
the latter by shooting him, hitting him on the left upper arm,
the said accused having thus commenced a felony directly
by overt acts but did not perform all the acts of execution
which could have produced the crime of murder, by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, to the damage and prejudice of said
FREDERICK MARAMBA.
When arraigned, petitioner, with the assistance of
counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.[5]
On 29 September 1998, the Hon. Luis M. Fontanilla,
Executive Judge of RTC of Dagupan City, ordered the
release of petitioner after a surety bond was posted by the
Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation in the amount of
P120,000.00.[6]
The evidence is summarized by the trial court as follows:
The evidence of the prosecution tends to show that on April
19, 1998, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, private
complainant Frederick Maramba was cleaning and washing
his owner type jeep in front of his house at Lasip Grande,
Dagupan City when a motorized tricycle stopped near him.
Accused Rodolfo Velasco dashed out of the tricycle,
approached the complainant and fired at him several times
with a .45 caliber pistol. The accused missed with his first
shot but the second one hit the complainant at the upper
arm, causing him to stumble on the ground. The
complainant stood up and ran, while the accused continued
firing
at
him
but
missed.
The shooting incident was reported to the police sub-station
in Malued District by Barangay Captain Dacasin of Lasip
Grande, describing the suspect as wearing a vest or a
"chaleco." The police, composed of SPO4 Romulo Villamil,
PO3 Rolando Alvendo, and SPO1 Soliven respondent and
pursued the accused who proceeded on board a motorized
tricycle to the highway going to Barangay Banaoang in
Calasiao
town.
The police caught up with the tricycle and brought the
accused to the police sub-station. A firearm (Exhibit "A")
protruding from the waistline of the accused, three (3)
magazines (Exhibit "B", "B-1" & "B-2") and fourteen (14) live
ammunitions (Exhibits "C" to "C-13") were confiscated from
the possession of the accused. The police also recovered
seven (7) spent ammunitions (Exhibits "D" to "D-6") at the
crime scene. At the City Jail in Dagupan City where the
accused was subsequently brought, the private
complainant Frederick Maramba identified and pointed to
the accused as the one who fired at him, hitting him on the
upper left arm. Complainant identified the affidavit which he
executed naming the accused as his assailant (Exhibit "H")
and who shot him on the morning of April 19, 1998 in front
of
his
residence
at
Lasip
Grande.
Private complainant further testified that he was
hospitalized and treated at the Region 1 Medical Center,
Dagupan City by Dr. Arturo de Vera, Jr. who issued a
Medico-Legal Certificate stating that the victim sustained,
"Gunshot wound point of entry: 1.5 cm lateral aspect distal,
3rd arm left" and; "Gunshot wound point of exit: 4 cm lateral
aspect posterior, 3rd arm left" (Exhibit "I"). By reason of his
wounds, complainant incurred expenses for hospitalization
and medicines in the total amount of P2,696.06 (Exhibit "J"
to
"J-14").
Armando Maramba, the driver of the tricycle in which the
accused rode, testified that he picked up the accused who
was wearing a chaleco, at the intersection of Pogo-Lasip
Road. Upon reaching the parked jeep which was being
washed by the private complainant, the accused ordered
him to stop. The accused alighted and fired several shots
at the victim. Then the accused went back to the tricycle
and ordered him to proceed to Calasiao. The accused
alighted at the intersection of the De Venecia Highway and
Malued Road and took another tricycle. Witness executed
an affidavit before the Police Headquarters in Dagupan City
(Exhibit "G") and identified the accused as the one who shot
the private complainant.
The accused, on the other hand, interposed the defense of
alibi. He said that on April 18, 1998, he went to a friend's
house in Lingayen, Pangasinan and spent the night there.
The following morning, April 19, 1998, between 6:00 to 7:00
o'clock, he left Lingayen riding in the Volkswagen car of
Berting Soriano. He alighted at the corner of Banaoang
diversion road. From there he took a tricycle and told the
driver to bring him at the foot of the bridge going to
Bayambang. While on his way to Calasiao, he heard a jeep
behind him blowing its horn and when he looked back he
saw three men on board pointing their guns at him. He told
the tricycle driver to stop and thereupon the three men
approached him and introduced themselves as policemen.
They confiscated his gun and then brought him to the police
station for interrogation. Thereafter, the police lodged him
in
the
City
Jail
of
Dagupan.
Accused testified that he did not know personally the
complaining witness and denied having fired at him. He
further said that his .45 caliber pistol which was seized from
him by the police is licensed (Exhibit "2").[7]
In its decision dated 29 June 1999, the RTC of Dagupan
City, Branch 41, found petitioner guilty of the crime charged,
disposing of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Rodolfo C. Velasco guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted murder,
defined and penalized under Article 248, in relation to the
3rd par. of Arts. 6 and 51 of the Revised Penal Code, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
Four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum to Eight
(8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the complaining
witness the amount of P2,696.00, as actual damages.[8]
The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the
private complainant Frederick Maramba and Armando
Maramba when they identified petitioner as the assailant. It
rejected petitioner's defense of alibi saying it was not
impossible for him to be at the crime scene when the crime
was committed because the place where he allegedly
alighted from the car of a certain Berting Soriano was only
about ten minutes away. It concluded that his defense
cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the
prosecution
witnesses.
On 1 July 1999, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal signifying
his intention to appeal to the Court of Appeals.[9]
Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, petitioner, after
filing a Motion to Bail, was allowed to post bail in the amount
of P160,000.00.[10] To obviate the possibility of flight, the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) was directed
to include petitioner in its hold departure list.[11]
On 30 July 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The decretal portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the appeal is DISMISSED.
The assailed Decision dated June 29, 1999 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 41 of Dagupan City, in Criminal Case
No. 98-02175-D, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
accused-appellant.[12]
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the decision which
motion was denied per resolution[13] dated 21 December
2004.
Petitioner is now before us via petition for review
on certiorari, raising the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT.
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court has been
filed. It adds that even if the case is to be decided on the
merits,
the
petition
likewise
will
fail.
In his Reply,[18] petitioner submits that a review of the facts
of the case is justified on the ground that the Court of
Appeals sanctioned substantial and jurisprudential
departures committed by the trial court. He maintains that
(1) the trial court precipitately observed that alibi is a weak
defense; (2) the trial court did not consider that the
prosecution had no evidence proving his intention to kill; (3)
the trial court did not consider the fact that victim did not
know him and vice-versa; (4) it was impossible for him, a
navy man – a protector of the people – to have failed to
fatally hit the victim after firing seven shots; and (5) the
instant
case
is
a
frame
up.
On 17 October 2005, the Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.[19]
In his memorandum, petitioner further argues that the
findings of fact in this case should be reviewed because the
Court of Appeals erroneously restated the factual findings
of the trial court when it purposely omitted and added words
changing the tenor of the shooting incident as found by the
trial court. He adds that the findings of fact of the trial court
do not support a conviction of attempted murder but only
attempted homicide as there was no treachery since private
complainant was still able to focus his eyes on the gunman
until he was fired upon. Further, he points out that the Court
of Appeals made different findings as to where the seven
spent shells were recovered. He maintains there was
suppression of evidence when the prosecution failed to
present a ballistic report on the seven empty shells that
would show the identity of the assailant. In addition, he
claims that since there was suppression of evidence on the
part of the prosecution, the testimony of Armando Maramba
is not credible, he being a relative of the victim.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
DENIED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PER
THE RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 21, 2004.[14]
Petitioner invokes the defenses of denial and alibi. He
denies having shot the victim. He alleges that the
prosecution was not able to sufficiently establish the identity
of the assailant because the Barangay Chairman, who
reported the incident to the policemen, identified the
assailant as one wearing a "chaleco," was not presented to
corroborate the testimony of petitioner. He contends that
had the Barangay Chairman been presented, the latter's
testimony would have been adverse to the prosecution.
Instead, he points out that the prosecution presented police
officers who were not eyewitnesses. He adds that he had
no motive to harm, much less kill, the victim, the latter being
a total stranger. He explains that since the identity of the
assailant is in doubt, motive becomes important and his
alibi
gains
weight
and
value.[15]
In a resolution dated 6 April 2005, the Court, without giving
due course to the petition, required respondent to file a
Comment.[16]
In its Comment[17] dated 8 September 2005, respondent
People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), argues that the factual findings of the Court
of Appeals cannot be reviewed since the issue (i.e., positive
identification) petitioner is raising involves the credibility of
witnesses and the weighing of evidence. It asserts that
since the same deals with a question of fact and there being
no instance present to take the case out of the general rule
that factual findings of the Court of Appeals may be
reviewed, a review thereof cannot be made because only a
question of law can be re-examined if a petition for review
Petitioner primarily invokes the defenses of denial and alibi.
It is his claim that the prosecution failed to conclusively
establish the identity of the assailant and that he was
merely
framed-up.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the instant petition for
review on certiorari was filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court where a review is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion and will be granted only when
there are special and important reasons therefor. It is not
the function of this Court to re-examine the evidence
submitted by the parties unless the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are not supported by evidence on record
or the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.
This Court is limited to the review or revision of errors of law
and not to analyze or weigh the evidence all over again. [20]
We agree with the OSG that as ruled by this Court, no
questions of facts may be raised in this Court under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, unless, among other grounds,
there is clear and convincing proof that the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts or
when the Court of Appeals failed to notice and appreciate
certain relevant facts of substance which if properly
considered would justify a different conclusion, and when
there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
facts in the light of the evidence on record. Anything less
will not suffice to overturn the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming on appeal the decision of the trial court.
It bears stressing that the findings of facts of the trial court,
its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties and
the assessment of the credibility and probative weight of the
evidence of the parties and its conclusion anchored on its
findings are given high respect if not conclusive effect by
this Court, especially if affirmed by the Court of Appeals
because of the unique advantage of the trial court of
observing and monitoring the demeanor, conduct and
deportment of the witnesses as they regale the court with
their testimonies. The exception to this rule is when the trial
court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misappreciated
cogent facts and circumstances of substance which if
considered would alter the outcome of the case.[21] After
scrutinizing the records of the case and thoroughly
evaluating all the evidence proffered, we find no reason to
deviate from the findings of facts of the trial court as
affirmed
by
the
Court
of
Appeals.
In the case at bar, the testimonies of private complainant
Frederick Maramba and Armando Maramba were given
credence and full probative weight and credence by the trial
court in the identification of petitioner as the assailant.
Private complainant saw petitioner alight from the tricycle of
Armando Maramba before he successively shot at him at a
distance of about four meters while chasing him for 25 to
30 meters.[22] Armando Maramba witnessed the shooting
because he was the driver of the tricycle in which petitioner
rode in going to the house of private complainant and in
leaving the crime scene.[23] After the shooting incident,
private complainant went to the City Jail and identified
petitioner as the person who shot him.[24] At the Dagupan
City Police Station, Armando Maramba pointed to petitioner
as the assailant not because he saw a man wearing a
chaleco, but because it was he whom he saw shoot the
private
complainant.[25]
Petitioner asks that the findings of fact of the case should
be reviewed because the Court of Appeals erroneously
restated the factual findings of the trial court when it
purposely omitted and added words changing the tenor of
the shooting incident as found by the trial court. Petitioner
said the Court of Appeals purposely added the word
"suddenly" and replaced the phrase "near him" with "in front
of." He adds that the Court of Appeals added the phrase
"without any warning" and removed the phrase
"approached the complainant." He even claims that the
Court of Appeals changed the manner how private
complainant was shot, when he was hit, and how he
stumbled and how he was able to stand up and continue
running. He further states that the Court of Appeals made a
different finding as to where the seven spent shells were
recovered. He points out that the Court said the seven
spent shells were recovered from the accused while the trial
court found that the same were found in the crime scene.
As above discussed, the findings of the trial court on its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their
testimonies and the probative weight thereof, are accorded
by the appellate court high respect if not conclusive effect,
unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued or
misinterpreted facts and circumstances, which if
considered, would alter the outcome of the case.[26] In the
case at bar, the addition or omission of these words, and
the difference between the findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals as to where the seven spent shells were
found, are too minor and inconsequential to affect the
outcome of this case. These, even if considered, would not
overturn the established fact that petitioner was identified
as the assailant. Nothing in the record shows that there was
any inconsistency as regards the identity of the assailant.
Both private complainant and Armando Maramba were one
in
pointing
to
petitioner
as
the
culprit.
Petitioner interposes the defenses of denial and alibi. He
denies participation in the crime claiming that he was
aboard a tricycle on his way to Calasiao, Pangasinan, when
policemen arrested him and brought him to the Dagupan
Police Station. On the other hand, the victim himself
identified petitioner as his attacker which statement was
corroborated
by
Armando
Maramba.
To be believed, denial must be buttressed by strong
evidence of non-culpability. Otherwise, it is purely selfserving and without merit.[27] Settled is the rule that the
defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light
of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified
on affirmative matters.[28] Greater weight is given to the
categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation
in the commission of the crime.[29] There being no strong
and credible evidence adduced to overcome the
testimonies of private complainant and Armando Maramba
pointing to him as the culprit, no weight can be given
petitioner's
denial.
Petitioner's defense of alibi likewise fails. As against
positive identification by prosecution witnesses, the
accused's alibi is worthless.[30] Having been identified by
two credible witnesses, petitioner cannot escape liability.
Moreover, for alibi to prosper, it must be proven that during
the commission of the crime, the accused was in another
place and that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the locus criminis.[31] Courts view the defense of alibi with
suspicion and caution not only because it is inherently weak
and unreliable, but also it can be fabricated easily.[32] As
found by the trial court, it was not physically impossible for
petitioner to be at the crime scene when the crime was
committed since it only takes a ten-minute ride from the
place where he allegedly alighted from the car of one
Berting Soriano to the crime scene. We have held that:
Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene
of the crime at the time of the commission of the felony, is
a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no mistake
about it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a
good defense. But to be valid for purposes of exoneration
from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such
that it would have been physically impossible for the person
charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time
of its commission, the reason being that no person can be
in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so
airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is
the least possibility of accused's presence at the crime
scene, the alibi will not hold water.[33]
Petitioner contends there was suppression of evidence
when the prosecution did not place on the witness stand
Barangay Captain Dacasain of Lasip Grande and when it
failed to present a ballistic report on the seven empty shells
because both are vital evidence to prove the identity of the
assailant.
We
find
such
contention
untenable.
As to the non-presentation of Barangay Captain Dacasin,
the same does not constitute suppression of evidence.
Barangay Captain Dacasin was not an eyewitness to the
shooting incident contrary to the claim of petitioner.
Although he was the one who reported the incident to the
police station, he was merely informed by Armando
Maramba that the person who shot private complainant
wore a "chaleko" or vest.[34] Thus, not being an eyewitness,
his testimony, even if taken, would have nothing to do with
the identification of the assailant. If he really wanted to have
Barangay Captain Dacasin take the witness stand, he could
have asked the trial court for a subpoena ad testificandum.
This,
he
did
not
do.
As regards the failure of the police to present a ballistic
report on the seven spent shells recovered from the crime
scene, the same does not constitute suppression of
evidence. A ballistic report serves only as a guide for the
courts in considering the ultimate facts of the case.[35] It
would be indispensable if there are no credible
eyewitnesses to the crime inasmuch as it is corroborative
in nature.[36] The presentation of weapons or the slugs and
bullets used and ballistic examination are not prerequisites
for conviction. The corpus delicti and the positive
identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime are more than enough to sustain his
conviction.[37] Even without a ballistic report, the positive
identification by prosecution witnesses is more than
sufficient to prove accused's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. [38] In the instant case, since the identity of the
assailant has been sufficiently established, a ballistic report
on the slugs can be dispensed with in proving petitioner's
guilt
beyond
reasonable
doubt.
Petitioner's asseveration that it is unthinkable for him to
shoot private complainant because he has no motive to
harm, much less kill the latter, he being a total stranger,
deserves scant consideration. It must be stressed that
motive is a state of (one's) mind which others cannot
discern. It is not an element of the crime, and as such does
not have to be proved. In fact, lack of motive for committing
a crime does not preclude conviction. It is judicial
knowledge that persons have been killed or assaulted for
no reason at all.[39] Even in the absence of a known motive,
the time-honored rule is that motive is not essential to
convict when there is no doubt as to the identity of the
culprit.[40] Motive assumes significance only where there is
no showing of who the perpetrator of the crime was.[41] In
the case at bar, since petitioner has been positively
identified as the assailant, the lack of motive is no longer of
consequence.
Petitioner argues that the testimony of prosecution witness
Armando Maramba should not be given weight because the
same is biased and incredible on the ground that he is the
uncle
of
the
private
complainant.
This argument does not inspire belief. The blood
relationship of Armando Maramba and private complainant
would not render the former's testimony unworthy of belief.
On the contrary, relationship could strengthen the
witnesses' credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved
relative to falsely accuse someone other than the actual
culprit. Their natural interest in securing the conviction of
the guilty would deter them from implicating a person other
than the true offender.[42] It is settled that where there is no
evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal
witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper
motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated
and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and
credit.[43] The weight of the testimony of witnesses is not
impaired nor in anyway affected by their relationship to the
victim when there is no showing of improper motive on their
part.[44] Jurisprudence likewise holds that if an accused had
really nothing to do with a crime, it would be against the
natural order of events and of human nature, and against
the presumption of good faith, that a prosecution witness
would falsely testify against him.[45] In the case before us,
aside from petitioner's claim that he was framed-up, there
is nothing in the records that shows that Armando Maramba
had ulterior motives in testifying against him. Necessarily,
the testimony of Armando Maramba must be given full
credit.
Petitioner claims that as a navy man who is trained to kill
enemies of the state, a "protector of the people," he could
not have acted in the manner which the prosecution pointed
out. He said it is against human experience to attempt to kill
a person in the presence of a witness and in broad daylight,
and that it is preposterous that after firing seven shots at
close range, he failed to fatally hit the private complainant.
All these, he said, only point to a different assailant.
We are not convinced. The records show that the shooting
happened at around 7:30 a.m. The fact that the shooting
occurred in broad daylight does not render its commission
impossible.[46] This Court takes notice that it is not unusual
that killings are perpetrated in front of witnesses. In the
instant case, the attempted killing was witnessed by
Armando Maramba, the driver of the tricycle which
petitioner rode in going to, and in leaving, the crime scene.
Petitioner argues that he could not have been the assailant
because it was simply impossible for him, being a navy
man, not to fatally hit private complainant after firing seven
shots at close range. In effect, what he is saying is that the
bungled killing cannot be the handiwork of an experienced
soldier like him. Such an argument does not hold water. In
the case of People v. Mamarion,[47] we brushed aside the
very same argument raised by the accused therein who
was an experienced military man. We ruled that an accused
is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous,
or even present, good moral character and exemplary
conduct. The fact that petitioner was a navy man -- a
protector of the people -- does not mean that he is innocent
of the crime charged or that he is incapable of doing it. This
argument fails in light of the identification made by the
victim himself and by Armando Maramba that it was
petitioner
who
was
the
assailant.
Finally, petitioner submits that if ever he committed a crime,
he merely committed attempted homicide. He maintains
there was no sudden firing because the victim testified he
was observing the alleged gunman for a period of ten
seconds before the latter finally drew his .45 caliber pistol
and fired at him. After the first shot, the victim was able to
run
away.
The lower court was correct in appreciating treachery in the
commission of the crime. There is treachery when the
following essential elements are present, viz:(a) at the time
of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack
employed by him.[48] The essence of treachery is the swift
and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim.[49] It was
clearly established that private complainant, while washing
his jeep, was suddenly fired upon by petitioner for no
reason at all. The suddenness of the shooting and the fact
that he was unarmed left private complainant with no option
but to run for his life. It is likewise apparent that petitioner
consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack
making sure that private complainant will have no chance
to defend himself by reason of the surprise attack.
Petitioner's claim that the shooting was not sudden
because private complainant was observing him from the
time he alighted from the tricycle is belied by the fact that
private complainant was not able to run when he was first
fired upon. Though private complainant was looking at him,
the former was not forewarned by any outward sign that an
attack was forthcoming. It was only after the first shot that
he
felt
his
life
was
in
danger.
Having commenced the criminal act by overt acts but failing
to perform all acts of execution as to produce the felony by
reason of some cause other than his own desistance,
petitioner committed an attempted felony. Petitioner
already commenced his attack with a manifest intent to kill
by shooting private complainant seven times, but failed to
perform all the acts of execution by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is, poor aim and the swiftness
of the latter. Private complainant sustained a wound on the
left arm that is not sufficient to cause his death. The settled
rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not
sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted
murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of
execution that would have brought about death.[50]
The penalty imposed by the trial court is correct. Under
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower
than two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in
an attempted felony. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpertua to
death. The penalty two degrees lower is prision mayor.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being
no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the minimum
of the penalty to be imposed should be within the range
of prision correccional, and the maximum of the penalty to
be imposed should be within the range of prision mayor in
its
medium
period.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
DENIED.
Costs
against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
On April 19, 1998 at about 7:30 o’clock in the
morning, private complainant Frederick Maramba was
cleaning and washing his owner type jeep in front of his
house at Lasip Grande, Dagupan City when a motorized
tricycle stopped near him. Accused Rodolfo Velasco
dashed out of the tricycle, approached the complainant and
fired at him several times with a .45 pistol. The accused
missed with his first shot but the second one hit the
complainant at the upper arm, causing him to stumble on
the ground. The complainant stood up and ran, while the
accused continued firing at him but missed.
The incident was reported by the Brgy. Captain
Dacasin describing that the suspect was wearing “chaleco”.
The police caught up the suspect and recovered in him
were firearm and ammunitions. The police also recovered
7 spent ammunitions in the crime scene.
Private complainant identified the affidavit which
he executed naming the accused as his assailant and who
shot him on the morning of 19 April 1998. He further
testified that he was hospitalized, and his medico-legal
certificate stated the wound he sustained. Another witness,
Armando Maramba, the driver of the tricycle where the
accused rode, also testified the events of the crime.
The accused interposed the defense of alibi, that
on April 18, 1998, he went to a friend’s house in Pangasinan
and spent the night there.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Velasco was guilty of attempted homicide.
RULING:
The petition is DENIED affirming the decisions of RTC and
CA.
G.R. NO. 154502, April 27, 2007
EMMIE RESAYO Y CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] dated 25 July
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18313.
The Court of Appeals upheld the decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 70 (trial court) in Criminal
Case Nos. 76322-23 finding petitioner Emmie Resayo y
Cruz (Resayo) and Ricardo Reyes y Cruz @ Richie (Reyes)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and frustrated
homicide.
The Facts
On 13 February 1989, Resayo and Reyes were charged in
two separate Informations with the crimes of homicide and
frustrated
homicide.
The
Informations
read:
Criminal
Case
No.
76322
That on or about the 5th day of February, 1989, in the
Municipality of Tagig, [sic] Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with Larry C. Reyes who is still at large and
mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with a
bladed weapon, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
with the said bladed weapon one Roberto C. Aguinaldo on
the vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal and fatal stab wounds which caused his death.
Contrary to law.
[3]
Criminal
Case
No.
76323
That on or about the 5th day of February, 1989, in the
Municipality of Tagig, [sic] Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with Larry C. Reyes who is still at large and
mutually helping and aiding with one another, armed with a
bladed weapon, with intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
with the said bladed weapon one Alfredo A. Braga on the
vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab
wounds which ordinarily would have caused his death, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would have
produce[d] the crime of homicide but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
the accused, that is, due to the timely and able medical
attendance rendered to the said Alfredo A. Braga which
prevented
to
[sic]
his
death.
Contrary to law.[4]
Upon arraignment, the two accused pleaded not guilty.
Thereafter,
trial
ensued.
The trial court rendered a decision on 17 March 1995
finding the accused guilty as charged. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds both
accused Emmie Resayo and Richie Reyes guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of homicide and frustrated
homicide. However, Richie Reyes is entitled to the
mitigating
circumstance
of
voluntary
surrender.
Consequently, the Court sentences Emmie Resayo to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum for homicide
and the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum for
frustrated
homicide.
On the other hand, accused Richie Reyes is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum for homicide and the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as maximum for the crime of
frustrated
homicide.
Further, the Court hereby orders said accused to jointly and
severally pay the heirs of the deceased Robert[o] Aguinaldo
the sum of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil indemnity for
the death of the victim, P15,000.00 for funeral expenses
and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay Alfredo Braga
the amount of P5,000.00 for medical expenses and
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees but without subsidiary
imprisonment
in
case
of
insolvency.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
ruling. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals'
decision dated 25 July 2002 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is
hereby DISMISSED and the decision appealed from in
Criminal Case Nos. 76322-76323 is hereby AFFIRMED
and
UPHELD.
With
costs
against
the
accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals' decision, Resayo
filed the instant petition for review. Reyes did not appeal
from the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Trial
When trial started, it was Judge Armie Elma who presided
and heard the entire testimony of Dionisio Esteban
(Esteban) and the partial testimony of Walter John Victoria
(Victoria). Thereafter, Judge Harriet Demetriou (Judge
Demetriou) presided over the case and penned the
decision.
The prosecution presented nine witnesses, namely,
Esteban, Alfredo Braga (Braga), Victoria, Dr. Desiderio
Moraleda, Mrs. Lina Aguinaldo, Mrs. Editha Braga, Dr.
Bonifacio Lacsina, Mrs. Rosario Villanueva, and Dr. Manuel
Oliveros. The defense, on the other hand, presented seven
witnesses, namely, Resayo, Reyes, Dr. Emmanuel Dela
Fuente, Joselito Cipriano, Merlita Flores, Ernesto
Hermillos, and Elena Reyes Tamayo.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution established that at about 1:30 p.m. of 5
February 1989, the group consisting of Braga, Esteban,
Victoria, Roderick Bautista (Bautista), Edgardo Cruz,
Alexander Garcia, Henry Victoria, Eduardo Relon, Antonio
Esteban, and Roberto Aguinaldo (Aguinaldo) were in the
house of their friend Emy Roldan (Roldan) located at
Mastrilli Street, Bambang, Taguig, Metro Manila to
celebrate simultaneously Roldan�s birthday and the
fiesta of Taguig. They had a few rounds of beer and
exchanged jokes with Bogac Reyes (Bogac)[7] as their
subject. At about 4:00 to 4:30 p.m., Bogac�s brothers,
Larry, Cris, and Reyes, and their brother-in-law Rey arrived
at the party to confront the group that was teasing Bogac.
Roldan's mother, Aida Roldan, was able to patch up their
differences and the celebration resumed until 7:00 to 7:30
p.m. While Braga's group was heading home, Esteban
momentarily stopped to talk to his wife at the alley beside
Roldan's house so the others went ahead. Aguinaldo and
Braga were slightly in front of the others. Aguinaldo's hand
was on Braga's shoulders. While talking to his wife,
Esteban saw Larry heading toward Braga's group. Larry
suddenly pulled a knife and stabbed Aguinaldo who was
able to parry the blow, which instead hit Braga on the left
side
of
the
body
just
below
the
rib.
Thereafter, Victoria and Aguinaldo called their other friends
who were still in the alley, and they immediately responded
and pursued Larry who ran to Quezon Street. Esteban was
able to catch up with Larry who tried to stab him but caused
only a slight wound at his armpit. Victoria saw Aguinaldo
run after Larry. Victoria, in turn, chased Aguinaldo to pacify
him. However, upon reaching Quezon Street, Resayo
suddenly appeared and stabbed Aguinaldo in the chest.
Then, an unfamiliar group of six or seven armed persons
appeared at the corner of Mastrilli and Quezon Streets. An
unidentified man tried to stab Victoria prompting him to
retreat
and
run
towards
Roldan's
house.
Meanwhile, Esteban, who was stabbed by Larry, saw
Aguinaldo sprawled on the corner of Mastrilli and Quezon
Streets. Since he was also in pain, Esteban asked Bautista
to bring Aguinaldo to the hospital while a neighbor brought
Esteban home. Along the way, Esteban saw Reyes stab
Braga for the second time below the right nipple. Braga was
then already walking slowly and crouching while holding his
left
abdomen.
Dr. Desiderio Moraleda testified that Aguinaldo's stab
wound located at his left mammary region, measuring 1.4 x
0.7 cm., 4 cm. from the anterior midline, 8 cm. deep,
directed posteriorwards, slightly upwards and medialwards,
passing thru the 5th left intercostal space, lacerating the
pericardial sac and left and right ventricles of the heart was
fatal. This wound eventually caused Aguinaldo's death.
Aguinaldo's mother, Lina, testified that in addition to her
moral sufferings, she incurred funeral expenses of
P15,000.
Braga's mother, Editha, testified that she spent P5,000 for
the medical treatment of her son, and P600 per appearance
of
the
private
prosecutor.
Dr. Bonifacio Lacsina, a surgeon, and Dr. Manuel Oliveros,
chief resident physician of the Rizal Medical Center, had
similar findings that Braga's stab wound located at the left
subcostal area with stomach perforation on greater
curvature would have caused Braga's death were it not for
the immediate medical attention.
Version of the Defense
The defense rests on alibis. Resayo, who was a tricycle
driver, claims that he was pedaling his tricycle at the time of
the incident. He testified that at around 7:00 p.m. of 5
February 1989, he brought a passenger to Barrio Sagad,
Pasig. The passenger, a certain Patrolman David Rayos
Del Sol (Pat. Rayos), made Resayo wait for two hours,
before boarding the tricycle again, arriving at Taguig at
around 9:00 p.m. The police invited Resayo for questioning
in the morning of 7 February 1989 and executed a sworn
statement dated 8 February 1989. Resayo alleged that he
was accused of killing Aguinaldo based solely on the
description of the suspect as having a red mark on the face
caused by a fist blow. While Resayo had a red mark on his
face, this was due to an operation on 3 October 1988, and
not a fist blow. To support his claim, Resayo presented a
medical certificate issued by the hospital. Resayo alleged
that when he gave his statement, Pipiano Mamonong and
Pat. Rayos were present, and the latter appeared surprised
as he was on board Resayo's tricycle at the time in
question.
Dr. Emmanuel Dela Fuente, a medical specialist at the
Rizal Medical Center, corroborated Resayo's testimony that
he had an operation on 3 October 1988, where an excision
was done on a portion of Resayo's face, the mark below his
eye having been caused by an infection as a result of the
operation.
Joselito Cipriano, another tricycle driver plying the route of
Barangay Tuktukan in Taguig, testified that he saw Resayo
at Pateros driving his tricycle going to Taguig. At 9:45 p.m.,
he met and talked to Resayo whom he saw near Barangay
Ususan and Barangay Tuktukan. He only learned about the
stabbing incident when Resayo was jailed as a suspect. He
visited Resayo in jail, who told him that he was innocent,
and he believed Resayo since they were both pedaling their
tricycles
at
the
time
of
the
incident.
Merlita Flores, sister of Reyes and cousin of Resayo,
testified that Resayo's house is adjacent to hers. On the
date in question, she had visitors since it was the fiesta of
Taguig. At around 7:00 p.m., she heard people shouting
"May gulo, may gulo." She climbed up to Quezon Street
where she found that there was a fight between Braga's
group and others against the visitors of her other brother
Larry. She shielded her brother Larry who was being
mauled by Braga's group. Then she shouted, "Huwag!
Ayan, may nasagasaan na," as she allegedly saw
Aguinaldo being run over by a red car. However, when
cross-examined, she admitted that Aguinaldo's death was
due to a stab wound. Braga's group picked up Aguinaldo
while she accompanied her brother Larry home so the
blood on his forehead could be treated. She claimed she
did not see Resayo at the scene of the incident. She only
saw him park his tricycle at around 8:00 p.m. Neither did
she see her brother Reyes, who she claimed was then
inside the house of her cousin at No. 04 Quezon Street,
Bambang,
Taguig.
Hence, upon the continuation of Victoria's testimony, Judge
Demetriou still had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of Victoria, who pinned Resayo to the crime. As
to Esteban's testimony, Judge Demetriou relied upon the
transcribed stenographic notes for her decision. Moreover,
the full record was available to Judge Demetriou. There is
no sufficient showing that she did not thoroughly examine
and analyze the evidence before her, particularly the
testimonies
of
both
Esteban
and
Victoria.
Ernesto Hermillos, a third cousin of both accused, testified
that an unknown assailant, who was one of Lauro Reyes'
visitors,
stabbed
Aguinaldo.
We find untenable Resayo's argument that Victoria, being
a friend of both Aguinaldo and Braga, would naturally testify
in favor of the victims. On the contrary, being Aguinaldo's
best friend, Victoria instinctively seeks justice for the
senseless death of Aguinaldo. We also find no improper
motive for Victoria to falsely testify against Resayo. Absent
any showing of an improper motive on his part, his
testimony must be given full faith and credit.[10]
Reyes, Resayo's co-accused, denied the charges against
him. He testified that he was at the Bambang Bridge,
approximately 100 meters from the crime scene, during the
stabbing incident. He stated that there was an on-going
fight between Braga and Larry's groups, while he was about
to go to work. Thus, his wife brought him to their aunt's
house, which was only two meters from the Bambang
Bridge, to avoid being involved in the fight. He claimed that
he stayed there for about one hour, after which they
proceeded
to
their
place
of
work.
Elena Reyes Tamayo, another sister of Larry and Reyes,
testified that a fight ensued between Braga's and her
brother Larry's groups. She claimed that she saw a certain
Totoy suddenly draw a bladed weapon and was about to
stab her brother. Then, a certain Leo Bernales who was
holding a knife prevented him and stabbed Totoy. She
stated, on cross examination, that it was Leo Bernales who
stabbed Totoy and not her brother Ricardo (or Reyes).
The Issues
Resayo faults the Court of Appeals for (1) finding the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible, though
the judge who penned the decision did not hear their entire
testimonies; (2) ruling that there was conspiracy; (3) not
recognizing the alibis of the accused; and (4) disregarding
Resayo's gesture of accepting the police's invitation as a
sign of innocence.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
On the credibility of the prosecution witnesses
Resayo argues that since Judge Demetriou did not hear the
entire testimonies of Esteban and Victoria, the rule on noninterference with the determination of the credibility of
witnesses does not apply. Indeed, one of the recognized
exceptions to this rule is when the judge who penned the
decision is not the judge who received the evidence and
heard the witnesses.[8] However, the efficacy of a decision
is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente only
took over from a colleague who had earlier presided over
the trial. It does not follow that a judge who was not present
during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision.[9] In
the present case, what Judge Demetriou did not hear was
the entire testimony of Esteban and the direct examination
and partial cross-examination of Victoria, who was the
eyewitness that identified Resayo as Aguinaldo's killer.
On the alleged inconsistency in Braga's statements, that he
failed to state in his written statement but was later able to
testify that he and Aguinaldo were merely pacifying their
other group members, it is settled that contradictions
between the contents of an affiant's affidavit and his
testimony in the witness stand do not always militate
against the witness' credibility. This is so because affidavits,
which are usually taken ex parte, are often incomplete and
inaccurate.[11] Likewise settled is the rule that
inconsistencies on minor, trivial, and insignificant matters
do not affect the credibility of witnesses. There is hardly a
witness who can perfectly remember the details of a crime.
Human memory is not as unerring as a photograph. [12] We
can attribute Braga's lapses to the natural fickleness of a
man'�s
memory.
Resayo further harps on Braga's failure to identify
Aguinaldo's killer while Braga was in pain in the hospital
and on Braga and Esteban's testimonies that Resayo was
not among those who went to Roldan's house at 4:30 p.m.
It must be borne in mind that the time material to this case
is around 7:00 p.m. and not 4:30 p.m. Even if Resayo was
nowhere to be found at or near Roldan's house at 4:30 p.m.,
it does not follow that Resayo could not or was not present
at the crime scene at 7:00 p.m. As the Court of Appeals
held, whether or not Resayo actually had gone to Roldan's
house earlier in the afternoon together with his cousins
Larry and Reyes to settle Bogac's quarrel with Braga's
group is immaterial for the purpose of establishing the
actual participation of Resayo in the killing of Aguinaldo and
wounding of Braga later in the evening of the same day.[13]
Likewise, the fact that Esteban's answers to Questions 1 to
4 of his sworn statement were supplied by his uncle who
was a policeman investigating the case did not necessarily
destroy
Esteban's
credibility
as
a
witness.
Resayo also contends that Exhibit "D," which was Braga's
sworn statement executed a few hours after the stabbing
incident, did not contain any information on the identity of
Aguinaldo's assailant. Resayo insists that since Braga did
not know who actually stabbed Aguinaldo, Braga did not
volunteer such information to the investigator. Even without
Braga's statement on Resayo's participation in the crimes,
Victoria's direct and categorical statement on the witness
stand that it was Resayo who stabbed Aguinaldo is
sufficient to sustain a conviction. Criminals are convicted
not on the number of witnesses against them but on the
quality of the testimony given under oath. Even one witness
will suffice provided he or she succeeds in convincing the
court of the guilt of the accused with moral certainty. The
testimony of a single witness is enough to convict, even of
a charge of murder, if it is positive and credible. [14]
attacked the victims while they were heading home. As the
trial court found, there is no evidence that Resayo and
Reyes were at the crime scene at the same time. Also as
testified to by Victoria, Resayo suddenly appeared from a
corner and stabbed Aguinaldo near his heart while
Aguinaldo was chasing his assailant, Larry. Thus:
Q:
Did you actually see the stabbing of Roberto
Aguinaldo?
A:
Yes, I did.
Q:
Who stabbed Roberto Aguinaldo?
A:
Emmie Resayo.
Q:
How did he stab Roberto Aguinaldo?
A:
Roberto Aguinaldo and I were running and suddenly
Emmie Resayo, the accused[,] came out from a
corner and treacherously stab Roberto Aguinaldo
near his heart.
On the finding of conspiracy
Q:
Resayo points out that he had no motive to harm Aguinaldo.
He maintains that it was a rumble where the participants
acted on their own, with no clear intention of conspiring to
hurt
or
kill
a
particular
person.
Why did you say that he treacherously stabbed
Roberto Aguinaldo when in fact Aguinaldo was hit
at the chest which presupposes that the two were
facing each other?
A:
Because he suddenly appeared from the corner.
Q:
Why were you running together with Roberto
Aguinaldo, Mr. Witness?
A:
I was running after the assailant of Alfredo Braga,
sir?
Resayo continues to wonder why Larry or Lauro Reyes,
who was often mentioned in the pleadings, was never
formally charged for hitting Braga. As the Court of Appeals
held, the determination of who should be criminally charged
in court is essentially an executive, not a judicial, function.
The public prosecutor, as the officer authorized to direct
and control the prosecution of all criminal actions, should
ascertain whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty of such offense.[15]
Motive is not essential to convict when there is no doubt as
to the identity of the culprit. Lack of motive does not
preclude conviction when the crime and the participation of
the accused in the crime are definitely shown, particularly
when we consider that it is a matter of judicial knowledge
that persons have killed or committed serious offenses for
no
reason
at
all.[16]
However, we disagree with the trial court and Court of
Appeals' finding of conspiracy. The trial court concluded
that there is conspiracy though there is no evidence that
both Resayo and Reyes were at the crime scene at the
same time. The trial court found that Reyes' act of stabbing
Braga after the latter was already stabbed by Reyes'
brother Larry is a manifestation that he intended to carry out
the unlawful purpose of finishing off Braga while Resayo
took care of Aguinaldo. The trial court ruled that Resayo
and Reyes were moved and motivated by one common
design and purpose, considering that they are first cousins.
Bogac, on whose behalf Resayo and Reyes were
retaliating, is closely related to both of them. The Court of
Appeals, in sustaining the trial court's finding of conspiracy,
similarly found that the manner by which the accused
attacked the victims shows that they were impelled by a
shared sentiment generated by the earlier quarrel involving
accused's
close
relative.
On the contrary, we find that the manner by which both
accused attacked the victims does not clearly and
convincingly show that Resayo and Reyes were motivated
by a common intent of killing Aguinaldo and Braga. There
is doubt on whether Resayo was among those who
confronted Braga's group about their teasing of Bogac, who
was admittedly a close relative of both accused. Victoria's
testimony that Resayo was among those who confronted
Braga's group[17] contradicts Esteban's testimony that
Resayo was not present when the initial confrontation
occurred
at
4:30
p.m.[18]
Further, Resayo was not even among the group who first
x x x x[19]
From the foregoing circumstances, it is not clear whether
Resayo, in stabbing Aguinaldo, and Reyes, in wounding
Braga, shared the same unlawful intent. There is no
evidence showing that Resayo was impelled by the same
motive of retaliating against Braga's group for teasing
Bogac. Nothing shows that Resayo knew that his cousin
Bogac was being teased by Braga's group. Resayo stabbed
Aguinaldo upon seeing Aguinaldo run after his cousin Larry.
We can infer, from this act alone, that Resayo reacted to
Aguinaldo's act of chasing Larry. Thus, another explanation
for Resayo's act would be to protect his cousin Larry and
prevent Aguinaldo from harming him, instead of retaliating
against Braga's group for teasing Bogac. Since we are
confronted with variant though equally plausible versions of
events, we prefer the version that is in accord with the
acquittal or the least liability of the accused.[20] Hence,
considering this possible scenario, a finding of conspiracy
cannot
arise.
Since there is no conspiracy in this case, the act of one is
not the act of all. Consequently, each of the accused should
be held liable for his individual criminal act. Resayo should
only be guilty of homicide for fatally stabbing Aguinaldo
while Reyes should only be convicted of frustrated
homicide for seriously wounding Braga.
On the alibi of Resayo
Resayo's defense rests on denial and alibi. He claims that
he was pedaling his tricycle in Pateros at the time of the
incident. We have consistently ruled that alibi is the weakest
defense not only because of its inherent weakness and
unreliability, but also because it is easy to fabricate. It is
generally rejected when the accused is positively identified
by a witness.[21] For the defense of alibi to prosper, Resayo
must establish by clear and convincing evidence not only
that he was not present at the crime scene but also that it
was physically impossible for him to have been present
there at the time of its commission.[22] This Resayo failed to
do.
We agree with the Court of Appeals' ruling that the accused
failed to prove that it was physically impossible for them to
be present at the crime scene, which was just along the
street near their respective residences. Reyes was only 100
meters away at Bambang Bridge from the crime scene and
there was no proof of the exact time he had left the place.
On the other hand, Resayo was pedaling his tricycle. We
agree with the Court of Appeals' observation that Resayo's
mobility, while pedaling his tricycle, during the time of the
incident "only heightened the possibility that he could have
momentarily lurked at the corner of Quezon and Mastrilli
Streets to await the approaching Aguinaldo and stab him
with a single fatal thrust at the heart, and then disappear
right away."[23] Further, where there is even the slightest
chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene,
the alibi will not hold.[24] In addition, Resayo's statement that
he went home at 9:30 p.m. conflicts with the statement of
another defense witness, Merlita Flores, who claimed that
she saw Resayo park his tricycle at 8:00 p.m.
On Resayo's accession to police's invitation
Resayo points out that his accession to the police's
invitation was an indication of his innocence. He was found
by the investigators ferrying passengers in Sta. Ana, Metro
Manila and willingly went with them upon their request. He
insists that this gesture is proof of his non-complicity in the
crime charged. This argument is without merit. Such
behavior does not sufficiently rebut the eyewitness'
testimony nor is it conclusive proof of his innocence. There
is nothing extraordinary with this conduct of acceding to the
police's invitation to go to the headquarters for
questioning.[25]
On the award of actual damages
The award of actual damages amounting to P15,000 to
the heirs of Roberto Aguinaldo cannot be sustained. This
amount was allegedly incurred in the interment of the
deceased. Except for the amount of P7,500 that was
supported by receipts,[26] the remaining sum of P7,500
was unsubstantiated by competent evidence. The award
of actual damages cannot rest on the bare allegation of
the heirs of the victim.[27]
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition. We find
petitioner Emmie Resayo guilty only of homicide and
sentence him to an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment ranging from eight years and one day of
prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years, eight months
and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. We also
order petitioner to pay the heirs of Roberto Aguinaldo
P50,000 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim,
P7,500 for funeral expenses, and P10,000 for attorney's
fees.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m. of 5 February 1989, the
group consisting of Braga, Esteban, Victoria, Roderick
Bautista (Bautista), Edgardo Cruz, Alexander Garcia,
Henry Victoria, Eduardo Relon, Antonio Esteban, and
Roberto Aguinaldo (Aguinaldo) were in the house of their
friend Emy Roldan (Roldan) located at Mastrilli Street,
Bambang, Taguig to celebrate both the birthday of Roldan
and Fiesta of Taguig. They had few drinks and had jokes
about certain Bogac. At 4:00 to 4:30 p.m., Bogac’s brothers,
Larry, Cris, and Reyes, and their brother-in-law Rey arrived
at the party to confront the group. The mother of Roldan
was able to patch the differences and the celebration
continued at around 7:00-7:30 p.m. While the group of
Braga was on their way home, Esteban saw Larry heading
toward them and suddenly pulled a knife and stabbed
Aguinaldo who was able to parry the blow, which instead hit
Braga on the left side of the body just below the rib.
Thereafter,
their other friends pursued
Larry who ran to Quezon Street. Victoria saw Aguinaldo run
after Larry and upon reaching Quezon Street, Resayo
suddenly appeared and stabbed Aguinaldo in the chest.
Esteban saw Aguinaldo sprawled on the corner of Mastrilli
and Quezon Streets. Esteban saw Reyes stab Braga for the
second time below the right nipple.
Dr. Desiderio Moraleda testified that Aguinaldo's
stab wound located at his left mammary region, measuring
1.4 x 0.7 cm., 4 cm. from the anterior midline, 8 cm. deep,
directed posteriorwards, slightly upwards and medialwards,
passing thru the 5th left intercostal space, lacerating the
pericardial sac and left and right ventricles of the heart was
fatal. This wound eventually caused Aguinaldo's death.
Dr. Bonifacio Lacsina and Dr. Manuel Oliveros,
had similar findings that Braga's stab wound located at the
left subcostal area with stomach perforation on greater
curvature would have caused Braga's death were it not for
the immediate medical attention.
Meanwhile, the defense had rests on alibis and
denial. Resayo was at the time of the incident pedaling his
tricycle. He testified that at around 7:00 p.m. of 5 February
1989, he brought a passenger to Barrio Sagad, Pasig.
Resayo alleged that he was accused of killing Aguinaldo
based solely on the description of the suspect as having a
red mark on the face caused by a fist blow. Resayo had a
red mark on his face, this was due to an operation on 3
October 1988. Resayo presented a medical certificate
issued by the hospital. Dr. Emmanuel Dela Fuente
corroborated Resayo's testimony that he had an operation
on 3 October 1988.
Joselito Cipriano, testified that he saw Resayo at
Pateros driving his tricycle going to Taguig. At 9:45 p.m., he
met and talked to Resayo whom he saw near Barangay
Ususan and Barangay Tuktukan.
Merlita Flores testified that Resayo's house is
adjacent to hers. On the date in question, she had visitors
since it was the fiesta of Taguig. She claimed she did not
see Resayo at the scene of the incident. She only saw him
park his tricycle at around 8:00 p.m. Neither did she see her
brother Reyes, who she claimed was then inside the house
of her cousin at No. 04 Quezon Street, Bambang, Taguig
clearly and convincingly show that Resayo and
Reyes were motivated by a common intent of
killing Aguinaldo and Braga. There is doubt on
whether Resayo was among those who
confronted Braga's group about their teasing of
Bogac, who was admittedly a close relative of
both accused. Victoria's testimony that Resayo
was among those who confronted Braga's group
contradicts Esteban's testimony that Resayo was
not present when the initial confrontation
occurred at 4:30 p.m.
Since there is no conspiracy in this
case, the act of one is not the act of all.
Consequently, each of the accused should be
held liable for his individual criminal act. Resayo
should only be guilty of homicide for fatally
stabbing Aguinaldo while Reyes should only be
convicted of frustrated homicide for seriously
wounding Braga.
Reyes denied the charges against him. He
testified that he was at the Bambang Bridge, approximately
100 meters from the crime scene, during the stabbing
incident. His wife brought him to their aunt's house, which
was only two meters from the Bambang Bridge, to avoid
being involved in the fight. He claimed that he stayed there
for about one hour, after which they proceeded to their
place of work.
Elena Reyes Tamayo, sister of Larry and Reyes,
testified that a fight ensued between Braga's and her
brother Larry's groups. She claimed that she saw a certain
Totoy suddenly draw a bladed weapon and was about to
stab
her
brother.
a certain Leo Bernales who was holding a knife prevented
him and stabbed Totoy.
3)
On the Alibi of Resayo;
Alibi is the weakest defense not only
because of its inherent weakness and
unreliability, but also because it is easy to
fabricate. Resayo must establish by clear and
convincing evidence not only that he was not
present at the crime scene but also that it was
physically impossible for him to have been
present there at the time of its commission. This
Resayo failed to do.
Accused failed to prove that it was
physically impossible for them to be present at
the crime scene, which was just along the street
near their respective residences.
4)
On Resayo’s accession to police’s invitation;
Resayo points out that his accession to
the police's invitation was an indication of his
innocence. Such behavior does not sufficiently
rebut the eyewitness' testimony nor is it
conclusive proof of his innocence. There is
nothing extraordinary with this conduct of
acceding to the police's invitation to go to the
headquarters for questioning.
ISSUE:
1)
2)
3)
4)
Whether or not the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses credible, though the judge who
penned the decision did not hear their entire
testimonies;
Whether or not there was conspiracy;
Whether or not recognizing the alibis of the
accused;
Whether or not to disregard Resayo's gesture of
accepting the police's invitation as a sign of
innocence.
RULINGS:
1)
On the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses;
There is no sufficient showing that
Judge Demetriou did not thoroughly examine and
analyze the evidence before her, particularly the
testimonies of both Esteban and Victoria. Judge
Demetriou relied upon the transcribed
stenographic notes for her decision. Moreover,
the full record was available. We find untenable
Resayo's argument that Victoria, being a friend
of both Aguinaldo and Braga, would naturally
testify in favor of the victims. Instead, Victoria
instinctively seeks justice for the senseless death
of Aguinaldo. Her testimony must be given full
faith and credit.
2)
On the finding of Conspiracy;
The Court disagree with the trial court
and Court of Appeals' finding of conspiracy. The
trial court concluded that there is conspiracy
though there is no evidence that both Resayo
and Reyes were at the crime scene at the same
time. The Court find that the manner by which
both accused attacked the victims does not
G.R. No. 178541
March 27, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANGELO ZETA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision dated 30 June 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02054,1 affirming in
toto the Decision2 dated 29 November 2002 of the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 88, in Criminal
Case No. Q-95-63787, finding accused-appellant Angelo
Zeta and his wife, Petronilla Zeta (Petronilla), guilty of
murder.
The facts are as follows:
On 6 November 1995, an Information3 was filed before the
RTC charging appellant and Petronilla of Murder, thus:
That on or about the 28th day of October 1995, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, with
intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with evident premeditation, treachery, assault,
attack and employ personal violence upon the person of
RAMON GARCIA y LOPEZ by then and there shooting the
latter with the use of a .45 cal. pistol hitting him on the
different parts of his body, thereby causing the instant and
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of said RAMON GARCIA Y LOPEZ.
When arraigned on 20 December 1995, appellant and
Petronilla, assisted by their respective counsels de parte,
pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge of murder. 4 Trial on the
merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Aleine Mercado
(Aleine), Dr. Maria Cristina Freyra (Dr. Freyra), Police
Inspector Solomon Segundo (Inspector Segundo), Rey
Jude Naverra (Rey), Edwin Ronk (Edwin), Francisco Garcia
(Francisco), SPO1 Carlos Villarin (SPO1 Villarin), and
SPO2 Wakab Magundacan (SPO2 Magundacan). Their
testimonies, taken together, bear the following:
On 28 October 1995, at around 12:00 midnight, Edwin, Rey
and a certain Melvin Castillo (Melvin) had a drinking spree
outside the house of Rey located at No. 30-B Tacio Street,
La Loma, Quezon City. At about 2:00 in the morning of the
same date, a car stopped in front of the three. Appellant
was driving the car while Petronilla was seated beside him.
Petronilla opened the car’s window and asked Edwin if he
knows Ramon and the latter’s address at No. 25-C General
Tinio Street, La Loma, Quezon City. Edwin replied that he
did not know Ramon or his address. Thereafter, appellant
and Petronilla left on board the car and proceeded to
General Tinio Street, La Loma, Quezon City.5
At about 2:15 in the morning of the same date, the car
boarded by appellant and Petronilla stopped in front of
Ramon’s house at No. 25-C General Tinio Street, La Loma,
Quezon City. After parking nearby, appellant and Petronilla
alighted from the car and proceeded to Ramon’s house.
Petronilla repeatedly called Ramon. Aleine (niece of
Cristina Mercado, Ramon’s common-law wife) was
awakened by the repeated calls and opened the door.
Petronilla requested Aleine to call Ramon. Aleine told
Petronilla that she would wake up Ramon who was then
sleeping with Cristina at the second floor of the house.
Aleine invited appellant and Petronilla inside the house but
the two replied that they would just wait for Ramon outside.
Aleine proceeded to the second floor of the house and
knocked at the door of Ramon’s room. Ramon woke up.
Subsequently, Aleine went downstairs and proceeded to
the dining table. While Ramon was walking down the stairs,
appellant suddenly entered the house and shot Ramon
several times on different parts of the body with a caliber
.45 Llama pistol. Upon seeing appellant shooting Ramon,
Aleine hid inside the restroom. When the gunshots ceased,
Aleine went out of the restroom and saw Ramon sprawled
and bloodied on the ground floor.6
Edwin, Rey and Melvin were still drinking when they heard
the gunshots. They rushed to the direction of Ramon’s
house. When they were nearing Ramon’s house, Petronilla
suddenly stepped out of the main door of Ramon’s house
followed by appellant. Melvin uttered, "Mamamatay
tao."Petronilla merely looked at them and entered the car.
Appellant also proceeded inside the car and thereafter the
car sped away.7
Subsequently, Aleine went out of the house and called for
help. Edwin, Rey and Melvin approached her. They carried
Ramon and placed him inside a vehicle owned by a
neighbor. While they were on their way to the Chinese
General Hospital, Ramon told Aleine that the one who shot
him was"asawa ni Nellie na kapitbahay namin sa Las
Piñas." Ramon died due to gunshot wounds while being
operated on at the Chinese General Hospital. Thereafter,
the police arrived at the crime scene and recovered several
empty bullet shells and slugs.8
At about 10:55 the following morning, SPO2 Magundacan
received a report that a carnapped vehicle was parked
along Lakandula Street, P. Tuazon Blvd., Quezon City.
SPO2 Magundacan proceeded thereat and saw appellant
about to board a car armed with a gun visibly tucked in his
waist. SPO2 Magundacan approached appellant and asked
him for a license and/or registration papers of the gun but
appellant did not show any. SP02 Magundacan also
inquired from Petronilla, who was inside the car also armed
with a gun tucked in her waist, if she had a license but
Petronilla likewise failed to show any. Thus, SPO2
Magundacan brought appellant and Petronilla to Police
Precinct 8, Project 4, Quezon City, for investigation.
Subsequently, appellant and Petronilla, upon the request of
the La Loma police, were turned over to the police station
for investigation as regards the killing of Ramon. Appellant
and Petronilla were thereafter charged with murder.9
The prosecution also adduced documentary and object
evidence to buttress the testimonies of its witnesses, to wit:
(1) death certificate of Ramon;10 (2) sworn statement of
Aleine;11 (3) request for autopsy examination of Ramon’s
body;12(4) medico-legal report issued and signed by Dr.
Freyra stating that Ramon died due to gunshot
wounds;13 (5) anatomical sketch of a human body signed
by Dr. Freyra indicating the location of the gunshot wounds
on Ramon’s body;14 (6) physical science report stating that
a paraffin test was conducted on both hands of Ramon and
they were found negative for gunpowder nitrates;15 (7)
handwritten sketch made by Edwin depicting the streets of
Tacio and General Tinio;16 (8) request for ballistic
examination of the object evidence recovered from the
crime scene;17 (9) ballistic report issued and signed by
Inspector Segundo stating that the bullet extracted from
Ramon’s body and other bullets recovered from the crime
scene were similar to the bullets of the caliber .45 Llama
pistol seized from appellant;18 (10) certification from the
Personnel Division of the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT) affirming that Ramon was its
regular employee from 14 February 1981 up to 27 October
1995 and that he was receiving a monthly salary of
₱13,687.00 plus other benefits;19 (11) summary of
expenses and receipts for the wake of Ramon; 20 (12) joint
affidavit of SPO2 Magundacan and a certain PO2 Ronald
Zamora;21 (13) photographs showing the spot where
appellant and Petronilla stood while waiting for Ramon, the
stairs where Ramon walked down shortly before he was
shot several times by appellant, the area inside Ramon’s
house where appellant positioned himself while shooting at
Ramon, and the location where Ramon fell down after he
was shot several times by appellant;22 (14) nine empty
shells and seven deformed slugs fired from a caliber .45
pistol which were recovered by SPO1 Villarin from the crime
scene;23 (15) a deformed slug fired from a caliber .45 pistol
which was extracted from Ramon’s body; (16) test bullets
fired from the caliber .45 Llama pistol seized from
appellant;24 (17) the caliber .45 Llama pistol with Serial
Number C-27854 seized from appellant;25and (18) a calling
card recovered from Ramon with the print label "Cristine
Rent A Car," "Angelo D. Zeta" and with telephone numbers
and addresses.26
For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of
appellant, Petronilla, and Annabelle Vergara (Annabelle) to
refute the foregoing allegations. Their version of the
incident is as follows:
On 27 October 1995, at about 10:00 in the evening,
appellant, Petronilla and Annabelle (housemaid of the
couple) were in the couple’s house at Cainta, Rizal.27 Later,
appellant took Petronilla’s caliber .38 pistol and went to his
brother’s (Jose Zeta, Jr.) house in Marikina arriving therein
at around 12:00 midnight. Jose was out of the house so
appellant waited for him. At about 2:30 in the morning of 28
October 1995, Jose arrived. Thereafter, appellant
demanded from Jose the return of his three firearms, one
of which is a caliber .45 pistol. Jose, however, handed only
the caliber .45 pistol to appellant. Appellant berated Jose
for refusing to return the two other firearms. Irked, Jose
drew a gun. Appellant also drew the caliber .45 pistol and
shot Jose four times. Jose fell down on the ground.
Afterwards, appellant left the house, took Jose’s car which
was parked near the house, and proceeded to Police
Precinct 8, Project 4, Quezon City, where he waited for a
certain Tony Tolentino whom he claims to be a policeman
assigned at the Southern Police District. At about 9:00 in
the morning of 28 October 1995, the policeman on duty at
Precinct 8 informed appellant that the latter’s car parked
inside the precinct was a carnapped vehicle. The policemen
searched the car and found several guns including the
caliber .45 and the caliber .38. Appellant was thereupon
detained and charged with illegal possession of firearms
and carnapping.28
At about 10:00 in the morning of 28 October 1995,
Petronilla received a telephone call informing her that
appellant was at Police Precinct 8, Project 4, Quezon City.
She immediately proceeded thereat and presented
documents relative to her ownership and license of the
caliber .38 seized from appellant. Thereafter, she went
home at about 11:00 in the evening.29
On 2 November 1995, Petronilla visited appellant at
Precinct 8. During the visit, Aleine arrived at Precinct 8 and
pointed to appellant and Petronilla. Subsequently, appellant
and Petronilla were informed by the police that they were
suspects in the killing of Ramon. Thereafter, they were
charged with murder.30
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 29 November
2002 convicting appellant and Petronilla of murder. It held
that appellant and Petronilla conspired in killing Ramon. It
also ruled that Ramon’s killing was attended by the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
nocturnity. In conclusion, it imposed the death penalty on
appellant while Petronilla was merely sentenced
toreclusion perpetua "owing to her being a mother and her
lesser degree of participation in the killing of Ramon."
Thefallo of the decision reads:
Accordingly, based on the evidence presented by the
prosecution and the defense and finding both accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER
attended by the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and nocturnity without being offset by any
mitigating circumstances, the accused Angelo Zeta is
hereby sentenced to death by lethal injection. The wife and
co-accused Petronilla Zeta, although a co-conspirator in the
commission of the offense charged, is hereby sentenced to
RECLUSION PERPETUA owing to her being a mother and
her lesser degree of participation in the act of murder.
The accused Angelo Zeta and Petronilla Zeta are also
sentenced to indemnify in SOLIDUM the heirs of the victim
in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for the death of Ramon Garcia;
₱146,000.00 for the hospital and burial expenses; and
₱1,642,440.00 for the lost income of the deceased
reckoned at 10 years of productive life, plus costs.
The .45 caliber Llama pistol with Serial Number C-27854 is
confiscated in favor of the Government to be kept by the
Philippine National Police as mandated by law.31
On 9 December 2002, the RTC issued an Order forwarding
the records of the instant case to Us for automatic review
because of the death penalty imposed on appellant.32
On 24 December 2002, Petronilla filed a Notice of Appeal
with the RTC stating that she would appeal her conviction
to this Court.33
On 28 April 2004, Petronilla, through counsel, filed a Motion
to Withdraw Appeal before us34 stating that:
After a thorough review of the available stenographic notes
obtained by the close relatives of the accused-appellant
from the Regional Trial Court, the undersigned counsel
found out that there are no testimonial and/or documentary
evidence presented before the lower Trial Court that could
sufficiently serve as justifiable basis to warrant the reversal
of the appealed decision rendered insofar as PETRONILLA
ZETA is concerned.
Moreover, the undersigned counsel sustained serious
physical injuries that render difficult to further handle the
appeal that will require lengthy preparation of appellant’s
brief and other legal pleadings as may be required under
the Rules of Court.
Consequently, after discussion with accused-appellant
PETRONILLA ZETA, the undersigned counsel informed
her that he is now constrained to withdraw his appearance
in the above-entitled appealed case.
Upon being informed of the health predicament of the
undersigned counsel and after being enlightened about the
weakness of the appeal, accused-appellant PETRONILLA
ZETA willfully and voluntarily decided to WITHDRAW the
appeal and do hereby signify to the Honorable Court that
she is no longer interested in the further prosecution of her
appeal. She, likewise, has no objection to the withdrawal of
the appearance of Atty. Alfredo E. Anasco, as her counsel
in the above-entitled case.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the aboveentitled appeal be ordered withdrawn and the MOTION TO
WITHDRAW APPEAL be GRANTED, and the withdrawal of
appearance of counsel be given due course.
On 28 September 2004, we issued a Resolution granting
Petronilla’s motion to withdraw appeal.35
On 22 November 2005, we issued a Resolution remanding
the instant case to the Court of Appeals for proper
disposition pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.36On
30 June 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
Decision affirming in totothe Decision of the RTC. Thus:
Thus, after finding that the trial court’s conclusions are
supported by the evidence presented and in full accord with
existing law and jurisprudence, We find no reason to set it
aside.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the
appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The November 29, 2002
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
88 in Criminal Case No. Q-95-63787 is AFFIRMED.37
Appellant elevated the present case before us on the
following grounds:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE
THE
FACT
THAT
THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES DID NOT
POSITIVELY IDENTIFY HIM;
II.
THE
TRIAL
COURT
ERRED
IN
DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF DENIAL
AND ALIBI INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT;
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS UNDER A
SHADOW OF DOUBT.38
Apropos the first issue, appellant claims that although
Edwin and Rey positively identified Petronilla as the one
who asked them about Ramon and his address shortly
before the incident occurred, the two, nevertheless, failed
to identify appellant as Petronilla’s companion during the
said questioning. He also argues that Aleine’s testimony
identifying him as the one who shot Ramon during the
incident is not morally certain because Aleine narrated that
she saw only the side portion of his face and the color of
the shirt he wore during the incident.39
It appears that Edwin and Rey did not actually see appellant
shoot Ramon during the incident. Nonetheless, Aleine saw
appellant shoot Ramon on that fateful night. Her positive
identification of appellant and direct account of the shooting
incident is clear, thus:
ATTY. A. OLIVETTI (DIRECT EXAMINATION)
Q. Aleine Mercado, are you the same Aleine
Mercado who is listed as one of the witnesses in
this case?
WITNESS
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the accused in this case?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. If they are inside the courtroom, will you
identify them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you please look around and point before
the Honorable Court the person of the accused
in this case?
A. Yes, sir. That man wearing yellow T-shirt and
that lady who is also wearing yellow shirt.
(witness pointing to a man who when asked of his
name identified himself as Angelo Zeta and to a
lady beside Angelo Zeta who when asked of her
name identified herself as Petronilla Zeta.)
xxx
Q. On October 28, 1995, at about 2:15 in the
morning, do you remember if there was an
unusual incident that happened?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you please tell the Court briefly what that
unusual incident was?
A. Tito Ramon Garcia was shot, Sir.
Q. And who is this Tito Ramon Garcia that you
are talking about?
A. He is the live-in partner of my aunt Cristy.
Q. A while ago you mentioned that you have
been living with your auntie and Tito Ramon
Garcia in Gen. Tinio, La Loma, Quezon City. Will
you please describe before the Honorable Court
the residence or your house at that time where
you were living with your auntie and Tito Ramon
Garcia?
A. It is a small house we were living in. It has a
mezzanine and it measures 4 x 3 meters, sir.
xxxx
Q. Do you know the person who shot your Tito
Ramon Garcia?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you please tell the Honorable Court the
name of the person who shot Ramon Garcia?
A. Angelo Zeta.
Q. Where in particular did Mr. Angelo Zeta shot
Mr. Ramon Garcia?
A. Inside our house, sir.
Q. And how was he able to enter your house?
A. Our door then was opened, sir.
Q. Why was your door opened at that time?
A. I heard a woman calling for my Tito Ramon
and so I opened the door, sir.
Q. What time was this Madam Witness?
A. 2:15.
Q. 2:15 in the afternoon?
A. 2:15 in the morning, your honor.
xxxx
ATTY. A. OLIVETTI
Q. And who was that woman that you saw was
outside calling Mr. Ramon Garcia?
A. Petronilla Zeta, sir.
Q. When you opened the door and you saw this
woman, what happened between you and her?
A. She asked me if a certain Ramon Garcia was
there.
Q. What was your reply?
A. I told her he was sleeping. He was upstairs.
Q. And what did the woman do after that if she
did anything?
A. She told me to call for my Tito Ramon.
Q. What did you do after she asked you to call
Mr. Ramon Garcia?
A. I told her to enter before I call my Tito Ramon
but they answered that they will remain outside.
Q. And so after they refused to enter the house,
what did you do as they were asking you to call
Mr. Ramon Garcia?
A. I told them to wait and then I went upstairs.
Q. What did you do upstairs?
A. I knocked at the door to wake up my Tito
Ramon.
xxxx
Q. And was your Tito Ramon able to wake up?
A. When I felt that they were awakened, I went
downstairs.
Q. Where in particular downstairs did you go?
A. Near our dining table, sir.
Q. How long was it from the door? How far was it
from the door?
A. Two-arms-length, sir, or "dalawang dipa," sir.
Q. And what happened as you stood by
downstairs?
A. While Tito Ramon was going down, sir, Angelo
Zeta suddenly entered our house and
immediately shot him several times.
Q. How far were you from Mr. Angelo Zeta when
you saw him?
I withdraw that.
How far were you from Mr. Angelo Zeta when you
saw him suddenly entered the house and shot
Mr. Ramon Garcia?
A. Less than one meter, sir.
x x x x.
Q. Where was Petronilla Zeta at that time that the
shooting occurred?
A. She was outside the door, sir.
xxxx
Q. What did you do as you were standing and
while Mr. Angelo Zeta was shooting Mr. Ramon
Garcia inside the house?
A. When I heard two shots, I run to the C.R. or
comfort room.
Q. As you were in the C.R., what happened?
A. I heard successive shots, sir.
Q. How long did you stay in the C.R.?
A. Until the shots had stopped . . . Until the firing
had stopped, sir.
Q. And you sensed that the firing had stopped,
what did you do?
A. I slowly opened the door to take a look if
Angelo Zeta and companion were still there.
Q. And what did you see?
A. They were no longer there, sir.
Q. And you saw that they have guns, what did
you do?
A. I went out of the C.R. and I returned to the
place where I was before where I was previously
standing.
Q. And what did you see when you reached that
portion that you are talking about?
A. I saw Tito Ramon lying frustrate and blooded.
Q And what did you do when you see (sic) him
on that particular condition?
A. I peeped at the door to find out if Angelo Zeta
and companion were still there.
Q. And what did you see?
A. They were no longer there.
Q. And what did you do after that?
A. I knocked at the door of the owner of the house
to ask for help.40
It should be emphasized that the testimony of a single
witness, if positive and credible, as in the case of Aleine, is
sufficient to support a conviction even in the charge of
murder.41
Appellant’s argument that Aleine’s testimony identifying him
as the one who shot Ramon is not morally certain because
she saw only the side portion of his face and the color of
the shirt he wore during the incident, deserves scant
consideration. A person can still be properly identified and
recognized even by merely looking at the side portion of his
face. To be sure, Aleine recognized and identified appellant
in the police line-up and during trial as the one who shot
Ramon. Experience dictates that precisely because of the
unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes,
witnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the
identity of criminals at any given time.42 A startling or
frightful experience creates an indelible impression in the
mind that can be recalled vividly.43 It bears stressing that
Aleine was less than one meter away from appellant when
the latter shot Ramon. The crime scene was also welllighted during the incident because there was a fluorescent
bulb inside the house.44
The testimonies of Aleine and of the other prosecution
witnesses are in harmony with the documentary and object
evidence submitted by the prosecution. The RTC and the
Court of Appeals found their testimonies to be credible and
trustworthy. The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded
respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such
findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial
court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court,
said findings are generally binding upon this Court.45
Anent the second and third issues, appellant contends that
his conviction is unwarranted based on the following
reasons: (1) the prosecution failed to establish any possible
motive for the appellant to kill Ramon; (2) there is an
inconsistency in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
regarding the type and color of the car boarded by appellant
and Petronilla before and after the incident. Edwin testified
that appellant and Petronilla left the scene on board a goldcolored Mitsubishi Lancer; while SPO2 Magundacan
narrated that he apprehended appellant while the latter was
about to board a blue Toyota Corona Macho; (3) Jose
could have been the one who fatally shot Ramon and
appellant could have been mistakenly identified as Jose
because they have the same physical appearance and
facial features; (4) if appellant was indeed the one who shot
Ramon, he could have immediately confessed such crime
to the police just like what he did after killing Jose; and (5)
there is no proof that appellant is the husband of a certain
"Mely." Ramon’s dying declaration to Aleine was that it was
the husband of "Mely," his former neighbor in Las Pinas,
who shot him. Further, Petronilla’s nickname could either
be "Nellie" or "Nelia" and not "Mely" as referred to by
Ramon.46
Lack of motive does not preclude conviction when the crime
and the participation of the accused in the crime are
definitely shown, particularly when we consider that it is a
matter of judicial knowledge that persons have killed or
committed serious offenses for no reason at all. Motive
gains importance only when the identity of the culprit is
doubtful.47Where a reliable eyewitness has fully and
satisfactorily identified the accused as the perpetrator of the
felony, motive becomes immaterial to the successful
prosecution of a criminal case.48 It is obvious from the
records that Aleine positively and categorically identified
appellant as the person who shot Ramon during the
incident. Her testimony was corroborated on relevant points
by Edwin and Rey.
There is no inconsistency in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses regarding the car boarded by
appellant and Petronilla in leaving the crime scene and,
subsequently, at the time they were apprehended. Edwin
testified that appellant and Petronilla left the scene after the
incident which was between 2:15 and 2:30 in the morning
on board a gold-colored Mitsubishi Lancer.49SPO2
Magundacan told the court that he apprehended appellant
at around 10:55 in the morning of the same day while the
latter was about to board a blue Toyota Corona
Macho.50 In his affidavit attached to the records, Jan Ryan
Zeta, son of Jose, narrated that Jose was shot by appellant
at about 4:00 in the morning of the same date. 51 Appellant
admitted that after shooting Jose on the early morning of 28
October 1995, he took the latter’s Toyota Corona Macho
and left.52 Thus, it is probable that after leaving the crime
scene at La Loma on board a gold Mitsubishi Lancer at
about 2:15 or 2:30 in the morning, appellant and Petronilla
then proceeded to Marikina and took Jose’s blue Toyota
Corona Macho. This explains why the car of appellant and
Petronilla used in leaving the crime scene was different
from that which they used at the time of their apprehension.
Appellant’s theory of alibi that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the crime scene in La Loma when the
incident occurred because he was in Marikina, and that
Jose could have been the one who fatally shot Ramon is
flimsy and cannot prevail over the positive and credible
testimony of Aleine. Appellant was mistakenly identified as
Jose because they have the same physical appearance
and facial feature. In addition, the empty bullet shells and
slugs recovered from the crime scene were found to have
the same characteristics as those of the bullets of
appellant’s caliber .45 Llama pistol. Further, there is no
testimonial or documentary proof showing that it was Jose
who shot Ramon. Appellant himself testified that he met
Jose in the latter’s house in Marikina at about 2:30 in the
morning of 28 October 1995. On the other hand, the
shooting of Ramon at La Loma, Quezon City occurred at
about 2:15 in the morning of the same date. Hence, it was
impossible for Jose to be at La Loma, Quezon City and to
have shot Ramon at such time and place.
It is insignificant whether Petronilla was referred to by
Ramon in his dying declaration as "Mely" or "Nellie." As
correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, Ramon
sustained twelve gunshot wounds and was catching his
breath when he uttered the name or nickname of Petronilla
as the wife of appellant. Thus, understandably, he could not
have spoken clearly in such a difficult situation. Moreover,
Ramon referred to "Nellie" or "Mely" as his former neighbor
in Las Piñas. Likewise, appellant and Petronilla admitted
that Ramon was their former neighbor in Las Piñas.53
We now go to the propriety of the penalty imposed and the
damages awarded by the RTC which the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
The RTC held that the killing of Ramon qualifies as murder
because of the presence of the aggravating circumstances
of evident premeditation and nighttime or nocturnity. It is a
rule of evidence that aggravating circumstances must be
proven as clearly as the crime itself.54
Evident premeditation qualifies the killing of a person to
murder if the following elements are present: (1) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an
act manifestly indicating that the culprit clung to his resolve;
and (3) a sufficient interval of time between the
determination or conception and the execution of the crime
to allow him to reflect upon the consequence of his act and
to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his
will if he desired to hearken to its warning.55
The first two elements of evident premeditation are present
in the case at bar.
The time manifesting Petronilla and appellant’s
determination to kill Ramon was when they, at about 2:00
in the morning of 28 October 1995, repeatedly asked Edwin
about Ramon and the latter’s address, and when they
subsequently proceeded to the house of Ramon.
The fact that appellant and Petronilla waited for Ramon,
and appellant’s subsequent act of shooting him at around
2:15-2:30 in the morning of 28 October 1995 indicate that
they had clung to their determination to kill Ramon.
The third element of evident premeditation, however, is
lacking in the instant case. The span of thirty minutes or half
an hour from the time appellant and Petronilla showed their
determination to kill Ramon (2:00 in the morning of 28
October 1995) up to the time appellant shot to death Ramon
(2:15-2:30 in the morning of 28 October 1995) could not
have afforded them full opportunity for meditation and
reflection on the consequences of the crime they
committed.56 We have held that the lapse of thirty minutes
between the determination to commit a crime and the
execution thereof is insufficient for a full meditation on the
consequences of the act.57
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the
criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and
reflection on the resolution to carry out the criminal intent
during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment. To justify the inference of deliberate
premeditation, there must be a period sufficient in a judicial
sense to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection
and to allow the conscience of the actor to overcome the
resolution of his will if he desires to hearken to its warning.
Where no sufficient lapse of time is appreciable from the
determination to commit the crime until its execution,
evident premeditation cannot be appreciated.58
Nonetheless, we find that treachery attended the killing of
Ramon.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against a person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim
might make.59 The essence of treachery is a deliberate and
sudden attack that renders the victim unable and
unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness
and severity of the attack. Two essential elements are
required in order that treachery can be appreciated: (1) the
employment of means, methods or manner of execution
that would ensure the offender’s safety from any retaliatory
act on the part of the offended party who has, thus, no
opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) a
deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods or
manner of execution. Further, this aggravating
circumstance must be alleged in the information and duly
proven.60
In the case at bar, treachery was alleged in the information
and all its elements were duly established by the
prosecution.
It has been established that Ramon, still groggy after having
been awakened by Aleine, was walking down the stairs
when appellant suddenly shot him. The suddenness and
unexpectedness of the appellant’s attack rendered Ramon
defenseless and without means of escape. Appellant
admitted that he was a member of a gun club and was
proficient in using his caliber .45 Llama pistol. 61 In fact, he
was good at shooting a moving target during his
practice.62 He also stated that he owned five
firearms.63 Evidently, appellant took advantage of his
experience and skill in practice shooting and in guns to
exact the death of Ramon. There is no doubt that
appellant’s use of a caliber .45 Llama pistol, as well as his
act of positioning himself in a shooting stance and of
shooting Ramon several times on the chest area and on
other parts of body, were obviously adopted by him to
prevent Ramon from retaliating or escaping. Considering
that Ramon was unarmed, groggy from sleep, and was
casually walking down narrow stairs unmindful of the
danger that lurked behind, there was absolutely no way for
him to defend himself or escape.
As regards the appreciation by the RTC of the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, it should be underscored that
nocturnity or nighttime is, by and of itself, not an
aggravating circumstance. It becomes so only when (1) it
was especially sought by the offender; or (2) it was taken
advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitated the commission of
the crime by ensuring the offender’s immunity from
capture.64
Although the crime in the instant case was committed
between 2:15 and 2:30 in the morning, no evidence was
presented showing that nighttime was especially and
purposely sought by appellant to facilitate the commission
of the crime, or that it was availed of for the purpose of
impunity. Moreover, the crime scene was well-lighted by a
fluorescent bulb. We have held that nocturnity is not
aggravating where the place of the commission of the crime
was well-illuminated.65
Even if we were to assume that nocturnity was present in
the case at bar, this cannot still be appreciated in view of
the presence of treachery that attended the killing of
Ramon. Nighttime cannot be considered an aggravating
circumstance separate from treachery, since nighttime is
absorbed in treachery.66
Accordingly, the death penalty imposed by the RTC on
appellant should be modified. Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code states that murder is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Article 63 of the same Code provides
that if the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties,
as in the instant case, and there are no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be
applied. Since there is no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance in the instant case, and treachery cannot be
considered as an aggravating circumstance as it was
already considered as a qualifying circumstance, the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.67
The award of damages and its corresponding amount
rendered by the RTC should also be modified in line with
current jurisprudence.
In addition to the civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 for Ramon’s
death, the award of moral damages amounting to
₱50,000.00 is also proper since it is mandatory in murder
cases, without need of proof and allegation other than the
death of the victim.68
The heirs of Ramon are also entitled to exemplary damages
in the amount of ₱25,000.00, since the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was firmly established.69
The amount of actual damages should be reduced from
₱146,000.00 to ₱115,473.00 per computation of the official
receipts attached to the records.701avvphi1
The heirs of Ramon should also be indemnified for loss of
earning capacity pursuant to Article 2206 of the New Civil
Code.71 Consistent with our previous decisions,72 the
formula for the indemnification of loss of earning capacity
is:
Net Earning = Life Expectancy x Gross
Capacity
Annual Income (GAI) - Living
Expenses
= 2/3 (80 - age of deceased) x
(GAI - 50% of GAI).
Ramon’s death certificate states that he was 37 years old
at the time of his demise.73 A certification from Ramon’s
employer, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
shows that Ramon was earning an annual gross income of
₱164,244.00.74
Applying the above-stated formula, the indemnity for the
loss of earning capacity of Ramon is ₱2,354,163.99,
computed as follows:
Net
Earning = 2/3 (43) x (₱164,244.00 Capacity
₱82,122.00)
= 28.66 x ₱82,122.00
= ₱2,354,163.99
WHEREFORE, after due deliberation, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 June 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 02054 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on
appellant is lowered to reclusion perpetua; (2) appellant is
ordered to pay the heirs of Ramon Garcia the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages; (3) the award of actual damages is
reduced to ₱115,473.00; and (4) the indemnity for Ramon’s
loss of earning capacity is increased to ₱2,354,163.99. The
award of civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00 is
maintained.
was already considered as a qualifying circumstance, the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.
Appellant’s caliber .45 Llama pistol with Serial Number C27854 is hereby confiscated in favor of the Government.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
On or about the 28th day of October 1995 in Quezon City,
Angelo Zeta and his wife Petronilla Zeta was found
conspiring together, confederating with and helping one
another, with intent to kill, attacked, assaulted and
employed personal violence to Ramon Garcia by shooting
the latter with a .45 caliber pistol hitting him on the different
parts of his body which ultimately caused his death.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that Ramon’s killing was
attended by the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and nocturnity.
On December 24, 2002, Petronilla filed a Notice of Appeal
with the Regional Trial Court stating that there are no
testimonial evidence presented before the lower court that
could sufficiently served as justifiable basis to warrant the
reversal of the appealed decision rendered insofar as
Petronilla is concerned but then upon being informed of the
health predicament of the undersigned counsel, Petronilla
voluntarily decided to withdraw the appeal, the appeal is
dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation in the commission of the crime.
HELD:
No, the court held that the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. Evident
premeditation qualifies the killing of a person to murder if
the following evidence are present: (a) the time when the
offender determined to commit the crime; (b)an act
manifestly indicating that the culprit clung to his resolve;
and (c) a sufficient interval of the time between the
determination or conception and the execution of the crime
to allow him to reflect upon the consequence of his act and
to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his
will if he desired to hearken to its warning.
In the case at bar, the third element of premeditation is
lacking. The span of 30 minutes or half an hour from the
time appellant shot Ramon could not have afforded them
full opportunity for meditation and reflection on the
consequences of the crime they committed. The court held
that the lapse of 30 minutes between the determination to
commit a crime and the execution is insufficient for a full
meditation on the consequences of the act.
The Court modified the death penalty imposed by the RTC.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code states that murder is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the
same Code provides that if the penalty is composed of two
indivisible penalties, as in the instant case, and there are
no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the lesser
penalty shall be applied. Since there is no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance in the instant case, and treachery
cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance as it
G.R. No. 129291
July 3, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plainti-appellee, vs.
4
ENRICO A. VALLEDOR, accused-appellant.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
1
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, in
Criminal Case Nos. 9359, 9401, and 9489, convicting
accused- appellant of the crimes of murder, attempted
murder and frustrated murder, respectively.
The informations led against accused-appellant read: In
Criminal Case No. 9359, for murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991, in
the afternoon, at Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto
Princesa City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused,
with
treachery
and
evident
premeditation, with intent to kill and while armed
with a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith
one Elsa Villon Rodriguez thereby inicting upon
the latter stabbed (sic) wound on the chest, which
was the immediate cause of her death.
2
CONTRARY TO LAW. In Criminal Case No.9401, for
attempted murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991, in
the afternoon, at Bgy. Tagumpay, Puerto
Princesa City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premiditation (sic) and while armed with
a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith one
Ricardo Maglalang thereby inicting upon the
latter physical injuries on the dierent parts of his
body, thus commencing the commission of the
crime of murder directly by overt acts and does
not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony by reason of some causes or
accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Ricardo Maglalang
which prevented his death.
3
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No.9489, for frustrated murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991 at
Bgy. Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court the above-named accused, with
intent to kill with treachery and evidence (sic)
premeditation and while armed with a butcher
knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith on
(sic) Roger Cabiguen, hitting him on his right
forearm, thus performing all the acts of execution
which produce the crime of murder as a
consequence but which nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of
his will, that is, by the timely and able medical
attendance rendered to him which saved his life.
After his arrest, accused-appellant was intermittently
conned at the National Center for Mental Health. Thus, he
was arraigned only on February 19, 1993 wherein he
5
pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the cases were archived
until November 15, 1994, when accused- appellant was
6
declared mentally t to withstand trial. This time, accusedappellant admitted commission of the crimes charged but
invoked the exempting circumstance of insanity. The lower
court thus conducted reverse and joint trial, at which the
following facts were established:
On March 6, 1991, at around 1:45 in the afternoon, Roger
Cabiguen was in his house at Burgos Street, Barangay
Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City. He was working on a
lettering job inside his bedroom together with his first
cousin, then 25-year old Elsa Rodriguez, and his friends,
Simplicio Yayen and Antonio Magbanua. Roger was
working at his table and seated on his bed while Elsa was
across the table. Antonio was on the left side, while
Simplicio was seated near the door, on the right side of
7
Roger.
All of a sudden, accused-appellant entered the room;
uttered Roger's nickname ("Jer") and immediately attacked
him with a knife, but Roger was able to parry the thrust and
was stabbed instead on the right forearm. Accusedappellant then stabbed Elsa Rodriguez on the chest and
said, "Ako akabales den, Elsa." (I had my revenge, Elsa).
Thereafter, accused- appellant ed, leaving the stunned
8
Simplicio and Antonio unharmed.
Roger and Elsa were immediately brought to the hospital.
On their way out, Antonio noticed a commotion and saw
that Ricardo Maglalang, a neighbor of the victim, was
wounded. Antonio learned from the by-standers that
9
Ricardo was likewise stabbed by accused- appellant.
Upon reaching the hospital, Elsa was declared dead on
arrival. Roger on the other hand was treated for the 510
centimeter wound sustained by him on his right forearm.
Prosecution witness Roger Cabiguen testied that sometime
in 1980, accused-appellant suspected him of killing his pet
dog. In 1989, accused-appellant courted Elsa but she jilted
him. On one occasion, Elsa spat on and slapped accused11
appellant.
Accused-appellant's defense of insanity was anchored on
the following facts:
Accused-appellant, then 30 years of age, was a resident of
Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City, and employed
as provincial jail guard at the Palawan Provincial Jail.
Sometime in January 1990, Pacita Valledor, his mother
noticed that accused-appellant was behaving abnormally.
For days he was restless and unable to sleep. He likewise
complained that their neighbors were spreading rumors that
he was a rapist and a thief. This prompted Pacita to bring
his son to Dr. Deriomedes de Guzman, a medical
practitioner. Pacita disclosed to Dr. de Guzman that
insanity runs in their family. After examining accusedappellant, Dr. de Guzman diagnosed him as suering from
12
"psychosis with schizophrenia."
He prescribed a
depressant known as Thoracin, which kept accused13
appellant sane for a period two months.
On March 4, 1991, Pacita noticed that accused-appellant
was again acting strangely. She left to buy Thoracin but
14
when she returned he was nowhere to be found.
On March 6, 1991, at around 6:00 in the morning, accusedappellant was seen swimming across the river of Barangay
Caruray, San Vicente, Palawan. Barangay Captain Runo
Nuñez and Barangay Councilman Antonio Sibunga took
accused-appellant out of the water and took him on board
a pump boat. Inside the boat, accused-appellant kept on
crying and uttering words to the eect that his family will be
killed. Suspecting that accused-appellant was mentally ill,
Barangay Captain Nuñez, asked Councilman Sibunga to
accompany accused-appellant to Puerto Princesa City.
Sibunga acceded and thereafter took a jeepney with
accused-appellant at Barangay Bahile. At about 1:00 in the
afternoon, they reached Junction I at the intersection of the
National Highway and Rizal Avenue, Puerto Princesa City.
Suddenly, accused-appellant jumped o the jeepney.
Sibunga tried but failed to chase accused-appellant, who
immediately boarded a tricycle. Later that day, he learned
15
that accused-appellant killed and harmed somebody.
Meanwhile, at around 2:00 in the afternoon of March 6,
1991, Pacita Valledor was awakened by her daughter who
told her that accused-appellant has returned. She rushed
out of the house and saw him standing in the middle of the
road, dusty and dirty. She asked him where he came from
but his answer was "Pinatay niya kayong lahat." Pacita
dragged him inside the house and later learned that he
killed and wounded their neighbors. Thirty minutes later,
accused-appellant was arrested and detained at the city
16
jail.
On March 11, 1991, Dr. Manuel Bilog, City Health Officer I
of Puerto Princesa City interviewed accused-appellant and
thereafter made the following conclusions and
recommendation, to wit:
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
Cooperative; talkative but incoherent Disoriented
as to time, place and person
DISPOSITION AND RECOMMENDATION:
Respectfully recommending that subject patient
be committed to the National Mental Hospital,
Metro Manila for proper medical care and
17
evaluation soonest.
The defense offered in evidence the April 27, 1992 medical
findings on accused-appellant by Dr. Guia Melendres of the
National Center for Mental Health, pertinent portion of
which reads:
REMARKS AND RECCOMENDATION:
In view of the foregoing history, observations,
physical mental and psychological examinations
the patient Enrico Valledor y Andusay is found
suffering from Psychosis or Insanity classied
under Schizophrenia. This is a thought disorder
characterized by deterioration from previous
level of functioning, auditory hallucination, ideas
of reference, delusion of control, suspiciousness,
poor judgment and absence of insight.
Likewise, he is found to be suffering from
Psychoactive Substance Use Disorder, Alcohol,
abuse. This is characterized by a maladaptive
pattern of psychoactive substance use indicated
by continued use despite knowledge of having a
persistent or recurrent social, occupational,
18
psychological or physical problems.
Dr. Oscar Magtang, a psychiatrist assigned at the Medical
Service of the PNP, Puerto Princesa City was likewise
presented by the defense to interpret the aforecited findings
19
of Dr. Melendres.
On February 28, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed
judgment of conviction. The dispositive portion thereof
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
accused ENRICO A. VALLEDOR is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
MURDER in Criminal Case No. 9359; of
FRUSTRATED MURDER in Criminal Case No.
9489; and of ATTEMPTED MURDER in Criminal
Case No. 9401 as charged herein. Accordingly
he is hereby sentenced to suer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 9359;
reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 9489;
and imprisonment of from EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10) YEARS in Criminal
Case No. 9401. It is understood that the accused
shall serve these penalties successively or one
after the other.
The accused is also ordered to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased victim Elsa Villon
Rodriguez the sum of P50,000.00 and to
indemnify the victim Roger Cabiguen, the sum of
P14,000.00 as actual damages, and the sum
P15,000.00 for loss of income.
Considering that the accused is found to be
suering from a serious mental disorder at present
as certied to by the National Center for Mental
Health, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila, the
service of his sentence is hereby ordered
SUSPENDED pursuant to Article 12 and 79 of
the Revised Penal Code. He (Enrico Valledor) is
ordered shipped to and conned at the National
Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City,
Metro Manila, for his treatment, until such time
that he becomes t for the service of his sentence
at the national penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila. As to his civil liability, the same is subject
to execution after this judgment shall have
become nal executory.
20
IT IS ORDERED.
Accused-appellant interposed this appeal and raised the
lone assignment of error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FACT THAT
WHEN HE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE
OFFENSE CHARGED HE WAS MENTALLY ILL,
OUT OF HIS MIND OR INSANE AT THE (sic)
21
TIME.
The appeal has no merit.
In considering a plea of insanity as a defense, the starting
premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound
mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be
voluntary, and it is improper to presume that acts were done
22
unconsciously.
23
In People v. Estrada,
it was held that:
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there
is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act. Mere abnormality of the
mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The
accused must be "so insane as to be incapable
of entertaining a criminal intent." He must be
deprived of reason and act without the least
discernment because there is a complete
absence of the power to discern or a total
deprivation of freedom of the will.
Since the presumption is always in favor of
sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance must prove it by clear and positive
evidence. And the evidence on this point must
refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition
of the mental faculties which is manifested in language and
conduct. An insane person has no full and clear
understanding of the nature and consequences of his acts.
Hence, insanity may be shown by the surrounding
circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as
evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct
and appearance, his acts and conduct consistent with his
previous character and habits, his irrational acts and
beliefs, as well as his improvident bargains. The vagaries
of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by means
of which we read thoughts, motives and emotions of a
person, and through which we determine whether the acts
24
conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to discharge the
burden of overcoming the presumption of sanity at the time
of the commission of the crime. The following
circumstances clearly and unmistakably show that
accused-appellant was not legally insane when he
perpetrated the acts for which he was charged: 1) Simplicio
Yayen was positioned nearest to accused-appellant but the
latter chose to stab Roger and Elsa; 2) Accused-appellant
called out the nickname of Roger before stabbing him; 3)
Simplicio Yayen and Antonio Magbanua who were likewise
inside the room were left unharmed; 4) Accused-appellant,
a spurned suitor of Elsa, uttered the words, "Ako akabales
den, Elsa." (I had my revenge, Elsa) after stabbing her; and
5) Accused-appellant hurriedly left the room after stabbing
the victims.
Evidently, the foregoing acts could hardly be said to be
performed by one who was in a state of a complete absence
of the power to discern. Judging from his acts, accusedappellant was clearly aware and in control of what he was
doing as he in fact purposely chose to stab only the two
victims. Two other people were also inside the room, one of
them was nearest to the door where accused-appellant
emerged, but the latter went for the victims. His obvious
motive of revenge against the victims was accentuated by
calling out their names and uttering the words, "I had my
revenge" after stabbing them. Finally, his act of immediately
eeing from the scene after the incident indicates that he was
aware of the wrong he has done and the consequence
thereof.
Accused-appellant's acts prior to the stabbing incident to
wit: crying; swimming in the river with his clothes on; and
jumping o the jeepney; were not sufficient to prove that he
was indeed insane at the time of the commission of the
crime. As consistently held by this Court, "A man may act
crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that
25
he is legally so." Then, too, the medical findings showing
that accused-appellant was suffering from a mental
disorder after the commission of the crime, has no bearing
on his liability. What is decisive is his mental condition at
the time of the perpetration of the oense. Failing to
discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane
when he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for
his felonious acts.
In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant should be
held liable only for attempted murder and not frustrated
murder. The wound sustained by Roger Cabiguen on his
right forearm was not fatal. The settled rule is that where
the wound inicted on the victim is not sucient to cause his
death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the
accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would
26
have brought about death.
Pursuant to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty to be imposed upon the principal of an attempted
crime shall be lower by two degrees than that prescribed for
the consummated felony. Before its amendment by R.A.
No. 7659, Article 248 provided that the penalty for murder
was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
Under Article 61(3), the penalty two degrees lower would
be prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium.
As there is no modifying circumstance, the medium period
of the penalty, which is prision mayor minimum, should be
imposed. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accusedappellant is entitled to a minimum penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correcional in its medium
period, the penalty next lower than the penalty for
27
attempted murder.
For the murder of Elsa Rodriguez, in Criminal Case No.
9359, the trial court correctly imposed upon accusedappellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua, considering
that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was proven
by the prosecution.
Accused-appellant's civil liability must be modied. Not being
substantiated by evidence, the award of P14,000.00 as
actual damages, and P15,000.00 for loss of income, to
Roger Cabiguen in Criminal Case No. 9489, should be
deleted. However, in lieu thereof, temperate damages
under Article 2224 of the Civil Code may be recovered, as
it has been shown that Roger Cabiguen suered some
pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved
with certainty. For this reason, an award of P10,000.00 by
28
way of temperate damages should suce.
In addition to the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
which was properly awarded by the trial court in Criminal
Case No. 9359, the heirs of Elsa Rodriguez are entitled to
another P50,000.00 as moral damages which needs no
proof since the conviction of accused- appellant for the
29
crime of murder is sucient justication for said award. The
heirs of the deceased are likewise entitled to the amount of
30
P29,250.00 representing actual damages based on the
31
agreement of the parties.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa
City, Branch 47, is MODIFIED as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 9359, accused-appellant Enrico A.
Valledor is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Elsa Rodriguez the following amounts:
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P29,250.00 as actual damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt only of the crime of
attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum; and to indemnify Roger Cabiguen in
the amount of P10,000.00 by way of temperate damages;
3. In Criminal Case No. 9401, accused-appellant is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted
murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
Facts:
On March 6, 1991, at around 1:45 in the
afternoon, Roger Cabiguen was in his house at Burgos
Street, Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City together
with his cousin Elsa Rodriguez, and his friends, Simplicio
Yayen and Antonio Magbanua. All of a sudden, Enrico A.
Valledor entered the room, uttered Roger's nickname
("Jer") and immediately attacked him with a knife, inflicting
a wound on his right forearm. Accused-appellant then
stabbed Elsa Rodriguez on the chest and said, "Ako
akabales den, Elsa." (I had my revenge, Elsa). On their way
out, Antonio learned from by-standers that Ricardo
Maglalang was likewise stabbed by accused- appellant.
Elsa was declared dead on arrival in the hospital.
Accused-appellant's defense of insanity was anchored on
the following facts:
Pacita Valledor, mother of the accused, attested that prior
to the incident, she brought him to a medical practitioner
who diagnosed him as suffering from “psychosis with
schizophrenia.” On the morning of March 6, 1991, the
accused was witnessed swimming across a river, crying
and uttering words to the effect that his family will be killed,
and jumped off a jeepney. On trial, the defense offered in
evidence the April 27, 1992 medical findings on accusedappellant by Dr. Guia Melendres of the National Center for
Mental Health that accused was found to be suffering from
Psychosis or Insanity classified under Schizophrenia and
Psychoactive Substance Use Disorder, Alcohol abuse. Dr.
Oscar Magtang, a psychiatrist assigned at the Medical
Service of the PNP, Puerto Princesa City was likewise
presented by the defense to interpret the aforecited findings
of Dr. Melendres.
The Regional Trial Court convicted Valledor.
Issue:
Whether or not Enrico Valledor was sane at the
time of the commission of the crime and is therefore liable
for murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder
Ruling:
23
In People v. Estrada,
it was held that:
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there
is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act. Mere abnormality of the
mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The
accused must be "so insane as to be incapable
of entertaining a criminal intent." He must be
deprived of reason and act without the least
discernment because there is a complete
absence of the power to discern or a total
deprivation of freedom of the will.
Since the presumption is always in favor of
sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance must prove it by clear and positive
evidence. And the evidence on this point must
refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to discharge the
burden of overcoming the presumption of sanity at the time
of the commission of the crime. The following
circumstances clearly and unmistakably show that
accused-appellant was not legally insane when he
perpetrated the acts for which he was charged: 1) Simplicio
Yayen was positioned nearest to accused-appellant but the
latter chose to stab Roger and Elsa; 2) Accused-appellant
called out the nickname of Roger before stabbing him; 3)
Simplicio Yayen and Antonio Magbanua who were likewise
inside the room were left unharmed; 4) Accused-appellant,
a spurned suitor of Elsa, uttered the words, "Ako akabales
den, Elsa." (I had my revenge, Elsa) after stabbing her; and
5) Accused-appellant hurriedly left the room after stabbing
the victims.
Evidently, the foregoing acts could hardly be said to be
performed by one who was in a state of a complete absence
of the power to discern. Judging from his acts, accusedappellant was clearly aware and in control of what he was
doing as he in fact purposely chose to stab only the two
victims. Two other people were also inside the room, one of
them was nearest to the door where accused-appellant
emerged, but the latter went for the victims. His obvious
motive of revenge against the victims was accentuated by
calling out their names and uttering the words, "I had my
revenge" after stabbing them. Finally, his act of immediately
fleeing from the scene after the incident indicates that he
was aware of the wrong he has done and the consequence
thereof.
Accused-appellant's acts prior to the stabbing incident to
wit: crying; swimming in the river with his clothes on; and
jumping off the jeepney; were not sufficient to prove that he
was indeed insane at the time of the commission of the
crime. As consistently held by this Court, "A man may act
crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that
he is legally so." Then, too, the medical findings showing
that accused-appellant was suffering from a mental
disorder after the commission of the crime, has no bearing
on his liability. What is decisive is his mental condition at
the time of the perpetration of the offense. Failing to
discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane
when he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for
his felonious acts.
In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant should be
held liable only for attempted murder and not frustrated
murder. The wound sustained by Roger Cabiguen on his
right forearm was not fatal. The settled rule is that where
the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause
his death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the
accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would
have brought about death.
For the murder of Elsa Rodriguez, in Criminal Case No.
9359, the trial court correctly imposed upon accusedappellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua, considering
that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was proven
by the prosecution.
Accused is convicted for murder and two counts of
attempted murder.
[G. R. No. 149028-30. April 2, 2003]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
ARMANDO
CABALLERO,
RICARDO
CABALLERO, MARCIANO CABALLERO, JR.,
and ROBITO CABALLERO, accused.
ARMANDO CABALLERO, RICARDO CABALLERO, and
MARCIANO CABALLERO, JR., appellants.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the
Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental, Branch 57, convicting appellants
Armando Caballero, Ricardo Caballero and Marciano
Caballero, Jr. of murder in Criminal Cases Nos. RTC-1217
and RTC-1218 and meting on each of them the supreme
penalty of death and ordering them to pay damages; and of
frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. RTC-1219 and
imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Antecedents
Teresito (Dodong) Mondragon and his family lived in
a compound surrounded by a barbed-wire fence at New
Sumakwel, Broce Street, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental. Living in the same compound were Ricardo
Caballero and his family; and Myrna Bawin, the sister of
Eugene Tayactac, and her family. Beside the compound
was the house of Leonilo Broce, a nephew of Wilma Broce.
In the afternoon of August 3, 1994, Armando (Baby),
Robito (Bebot) and Marciano, Jr. (Jun), all surnamed
Caballero, were having a drinking spree in the house of
their brother Ricardo in the Mondragon Compound. At
about 7:00 p.m. of said date, Eugene Tayactac and Arnold
Barcuma arrived in the sari-sari store of Wilma Broce which
was across the Mondragon Compound. Eugene had dinner
in the store while Arnold proceeded to the house of Susana
Broce, Eugene’s girlfriend, for a chat. Susana’s house was
about 15 meters away from the store of Wilma.
Momentarily, Armando arrived in the store and asked
Eugene in an angry tone: “Gene mopalit ka?” (Gene, will
you buy?). Eugene replied: “What is this all about? We
don’t have any quarrel between us.” Armando left the store
but stood by the gate of the barbed-wired fence of the
Mondragon Compound. His brothers Ricardo, Robito and
Marciano, Jr. joined him. Ricardo and Robito were armed
with knives. When Wilma told Eugene that she was closing
the store already, he stood up and left the store on his way
to Susana’s house. At that time, Myrna Bawin, who was
standing by the window of their house saw her brother
Eugene going out of the store and proceeding to the house
of Susana. She called out to him and advised him to go
home. Myrna then left the window to pacify her crying
baby.
As Eugene walked by the gate of the Mondragon
Compound, Armando suddenly grabbed Eugene towards
the compound. Eugene resisted. Spontaneously, Ricardo,
Marciano, Jr. and Robito joined Armando and assaulted
Eugene. Armando took the wooden pole supporting the
clothesline and hit Eugene with it. The latter tried to parry
the blows of the Caballero brothers, to no avail. In the
process, Eugene was stabbed three times. As Eugene was
being assaulted, Myrna returned to the window of her house
and saw the Caballero brothers assaulting Eugene. She
shouted for help for her hapless brother. Wilma, who
witnessed the whole incident, was shocked to immobility at
the sudden turn of events.
From the nearby house of Susana, Arnold saw the
commotion and rushed to the scene to pacify the
protagonists. Arnold told the Caballero brothers:
“Bay, what is
the trouble between you and
Eugene?” However, Ricardo accosted Arnold and stabbed
the latter on the left side of his body. Forthwith, Robito,
Marciano, Jr. and Armando ganged up on Arnold. Two of
them stabbed Arnold on his forearm. Arnold fled for his life
and hid under the house of a neighbor.
For his part, Leonilo rushed from his house to where
the commotion was. He was, however, met by Robito who
stabbed him on the chest. Wounded, Leonilo retreated and
pleaded to his uncle Lucio Broce for help: “Tio, help me
because I am hit.” The commotion stopped only upon the
arrival of Teresito Mondragon who was able to pacify the
Caballero brothers. They all returned to the compound.
In the meantime, Lucio Broce, the uncle of Leonilo
brought the injured Eugene, Leonilo and Arnold to the
Planters Hospital for medical treatment. Eugene and
Leonilo eventually died from the stab wounds they
sustained.
Dr. Filped A. Maisog performed an autopsy on the
cadaver of Eugene. He signed a postmortem report
containing the following findings:
POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION
Name: Eugenio Tayactac, 22 years old, male, single
Address: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.
Place of Incident: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg.
Occ.
Place of Examination: San Carlos City Hospital
Date & Time of Incident: August 3, 1994 @ 8:30 P.M.
Date & Time Examined: August 3, 1994 @ 10:40 P.M.
Post-Mortem Findings:
= Stab wound (L) anterior chest 2 cm.
5th ICS MCL directed postero laterally,
lacerating (L) auricle of the heart, and
the (L) pulmonary artery and the left
middle lobe of the lungs;
=
Stab wound (R) anterior chest 2 cm. long
5th ICS parasternal line directed
posteriorly;
=
Stab wound (R) posterior chest level
7th ICS 2 cm. long directed anteriorly.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Severe Hemorrhage
secondary to Multiple Stab wounds with
Massive Hemothorax (L) and
Hemopneumothorax (R).[2]
He testified that the stab wounds could have been
caused by a sharp-edged single-bladed or double-bladed
instrument, or by three instruments.[3]
Dr. Jose Carlos L. Villarante performed an autopsy
on the cadaver of Leonilo. He signed a postmortem report
containing the following findings:
upon said Leonilo Broce physical injury described as
follows:
=
Stabbed wound (R) chest penetrating thoracic cavity.
POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION
Name: Leonilo Broce, 22 years old, male, married
Address: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.
Place of Incident: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg.
Occ.
Place of Examination: San Carlos City Hospital
Date & Time of Incident: Aug. 3, 1994 @ 8:30 P.M.
Date & Time Examined: Aug. 3, 1994 @ 8:45 P.M.
Post-mortem findings:
=
Stab wound, (R) post chest, about the
level of the 6th and 7th RICS, post.
axillary line.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hypovolemic shock
secondary to multiple organ injury.[4]
Dr. Edgardo B. Quisumbing attended to and operated
on Arnold Barcuma. He signed a medical certificate stating
that Arnold sustained the following injuries:
and which injury caused massive hemorrhage which
resulted to the death of Leonilo Broce.
That an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength is attendant in the commission of the offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
They were also charged with the same crime for the
death of Eugene Tayactac in an Information docketed as
Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, which reads:
That on or about 8:00 o’clock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at
New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
helping one another, armed with pieces of wood and
hunting knives, and with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of said weapons,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person
of one EUGENE TAYACTAC, by striking the latter with
use of pieces of wood and stabbing him thereby inflicting
upon said Eugene Tayactac physical injuries which
resulted to the death of the latter.
That an aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength is attendant in the commission of the offense.
=
Lacerated wound 2 cm. (R) forearm middle 3rd
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
=
Incised wound 2 inches (L) forearm middle 3rd
Another Information was filed against the Caballero
brothers for frustrated murder for the injuries of Arnold
Barcuma. Docketed as Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, it
reads:
=
Stabbed wound, 2 inches in length (L)
chest, anterior axillary line at the level
of the 7th intercostal space,
penetrating thoracic cavity and
abdominal cavity.
... [5]
On the witness stand, Dr. Quisumbing testified that
the wounds sustained by Arnold could have been caused
by three different sharp-pointed instruments.[6] He further
testified that Arnold would have died because of the stab
wound on his chest, were it not for the timely medical
intervention.
On August 5, 1994, Armando, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr.
and Robito, were charged with Murder for the death of
Leonilo Broce. The Information, docketed as Criminal
Case No. RTC 1217 reads:
That on or about 8:00 o’clock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at
New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
helping one another, armed with pieces of wood and
hunting knives, and with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of said weapons,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person
of one LEONILO BROCE, by striking the latter with the
use of pieces of wood and stabbing him, thereby inflicting
That on or about 8:00 o’clock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at
New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
helping one another, armed with pieces of wood and
hunting knives, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence upon the person of one ARNOLD
BARCUMA, by striking him with the use of pieces of wood
and stabbing him, thereby inflicting upon the latter
physical injuries which would have resulted to the death of
said Arnold Barcuma, thus performing all the acts of
execution, which would have produced the crime of
“Murder”, as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it, by reason of causes independent of the will of
the accused that is, the timely medical
assistance rendered to said Arnold Barcuma.
That an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength is attendant in the commission of the offense.[9]
Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr., assisted by
counsel, were arraigned on September 15, 1994. They
pleaded not guilty to all the charges. Robito Caballero
remained at-large.
Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr. invoked the
defenses of denial and alibi. They adduced evidence that
Ricardo was employed as electrician in the Office of the City
Engineer of San Carlos City. Armando was a motor cab
driver. Robito resided in H.C. Rigor Street, San Carlos City
while Marciano, Jr. was a resident of Don Juan Subdivision,
San Carlos City and was employed with the Victorias Milling
Corporation.
with no award as to damages, no evidence having been
introduced to establish, the same; and
On August 3, 1994, at 8:00 a.m., Robito left San
Carlos City and went to Bacolod City. Armando went to the
house of his brother Ricardo to help in the construction of
the latter’s house and to take care of Ricardo’s fighting
cocks while he was in his office. Ricardo arrived home at
8:00 p.m. and had dinner with his family and
Armando. Momentarily, their sister Mila and their younger
brother Marciano, Jr. arrived in the house of
Ricardo. Marciano, Jr. allegedly was mauled by a group of
men and sustained an abrasion, a contusion and swelling
of the left side of his face. Ricardo and Armando brought
their brother Marciano, Jr. to the hospital for treatment. On
August 4, 1994, Marciano, Jr. was treated for:
In convicting the accused, the trial court found that all
of them conspired to kill Eugene and Leonilo and cause
injuries to Arnold. While the trial court stated that it was
only appellant Armando who stabbed Eugene, and only the
accused Robito who stabbed Leonilo, however, it
concluded that all of them were equally liable for the deaths
of Leonilo and Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold.
=
Linear abrasion (L) scapula region;
=
Contusion (R) lower lip lateral side;
=
Swelling left face.
4. To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In their Brief, the accused, now appellants assail the
decision of the trial court contending that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS.
1217-1219 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEIR GUILT
WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
No. of days of healing: 5-7 days barring complication.[10]
Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr. denied killing
Eugene and assaulting Arnold. They also denied having
any altercation with the victims. They also denied stabbing
Leonilo. They had no idea why Wilma, Arnold and Myrna
would implicate them for the deaths of Leonilo and Eugene
and for the injuries of Arnold.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND ABUSE OF
SUPERIOR STRENGTH ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT
INDEED ACCUSED-APPELLANTS KILLED THE
VICTIMS.
III
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered
judgment on May 7, 2001 finding all the three accused, now
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of
the crimes charged, the decretal portion of which reads:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING
THE DEATH PENALTY UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED THEY KILLED
THE VICTIMS.[12]
WHEREFORE, accused Armando Caballero, alias “Baby”,
Ricardo Caballero, alias “Ricky” and Marciano Caballero,
Jr., alias “Jun”, having been found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offenses charged them as
principals, are hereby sentenced to suffer:
The Court will delve into and resolve the first two
assignments of errors.
1. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1217 for the murder of
Leonilo Broce, there being no mitigating circumstance
present, with the attendant aggravating circumstances of
treachery and abuse of superior strength, the maximum
penalty of death and to pay the heirs of Leonilo Broce the
sum of P75,000.00 as indemnity;
2. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, for the murder of
Eugene or Eugenio Tayactac, there being no mitigating
circumstance present, with the attendant aggravating
circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior
strength, the maximum penalty of death; and to pay the
heirs of Eugene Tayactac the sum of P75,000.00 as
indemnity; and
3. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, for Frustrated Murder,
for having seriously inflicted injuries upon the person of
Arnold Barcuma which nearly resulted to his death, there
being no mitigating circumstance present, an
imprisonment of twelve (12) years, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day,
The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt their respective guilt for the
deaths of Eugene and Leonilo and for the injuries sustained
by Arnold. They assert that the trial court committed
reversible error in rejecting their defenses of denial and
alibi. They claim that at the time of the incident they were
in the San Carlos Hospital for the treatment of the injuries
of appellant Marciano, Jr.
The appellants are partly correct.
The trial court correctly found that all the appellants
conspired to kill Eugene and assault Arnold; hence, they
are criminally liable for the death of Eugene and for the
injuries sustained by Arnold. Article 8 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it. Conspiracy is always predominantly mental in
composition because it consists primarily of a meeting of
minds and intent.[13] Conspiracy must be proved with the
same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is, by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.[14] However, direct proof is
not required. Conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial
evidence. Conspiracy may be proved through the
collective acts of the accused, before, during and after the
commission of a felony, all the accused aiming at the same
object, one performing one part and another performing
another for the attainment of the same objective, their acts
though apparently independent were in fact concerted and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association,
concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.[15] The
overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or
may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
moving them to execute or implement the criminal
plan.[16] Direct proof of a person in agreement to commit a
crime is not necessary. It is enough that at the time of the
commission of a crime, all the malefactors had the same
purpose and were united in their execution.[17] Once
established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as coprincipals regardless of the degree of participation of each
of them for in contemplation of the law, the act of one is the
act of all.[18]
Criminal conspiracy must always be founded on
facts, not on mere inferences, conjectures and
presumptions.[19] Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or
approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one party to a
conspiracy absent the intentional participation in the act
with a view to the furtherance of the common objective and
purpose.[20] Moreover, one is not criminally liable for his act
done outside the contemplation of the conspirators. Coconspirators are criminally liable only for acts done
pursuant to the conspiring on how and what are the
necessary and logic consequence of the intended crime.[21]
In this case, when appellant Armando asked Eugene
at the store of Wilma whether the latter was going to buy
something from the store, Eugene was peeved and
remonstrated that he and Armando had no quarrel between
them. Appellant Armando was likewise irked at the
reaction of Eugene because from the store, appellant
Armando stationed himself by the gate of the Mondragon
Compound near the sari-sari store of Wilma. Appellants
Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito joined their brother,
appellant Armando at the gate. Appellant Ricardo and
accused Robito were armed with knives. When Eugene
passed by the gate to the compound, appellant Armando
pulled Eugene to the gate but when the latter resisted, all
the appellants ganged up on Eugene. Appellant Armando
took the wooden support of the clothesline and hit Eugene
with it. Eugene was stabbed three times on his chest even
as he tried to parry the thrusts. When Arnold rushed to
the situs criminis to pacify the appellants and accused
Robito, appellant Ricardo stabbed him on the left side of his
body. The other appellants and accused Robito joined
appellant Ricardo and ganged up on Arnold. They stabbed
Arnold anew twice on his forearm. Teresito Mondragon,
the father-in-law of appellant Ricardo intervened and
forthwith, all the appellants, including accused Robito
returned to the Mondragon Compound. Patently, all the
appellants by their simultaneous collective acts before and
after the commission of the crimes were united in one
common objective, to kill Eugene, and cause injuries to
Arnold
for
trying
to
intervene
and
prevent
bloodshed. Hence, all the appellants are criminally liable
for the death of Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold. It
does not matter who among the appellants stabbed Eugene
or inflicted injuries on Arnold. The act of one is the act of
the others.
However, for the death of Leonilo, the Court believes
that the appellants are not criminally liable. The
prosecution failed to adduce evidence that the appellants
and the accused Robito conspired to kill Leonilo. The
appellants did not actually see Leonilo rushing out from his
house to the situs criminis. They had no foreknowledge that
the accused Robito would stab Leonilo. There was no
evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that all the
appellants assisted the accused Robito in killing Leonilo. It
must be recalled that Leonilo rushed out of his house when
he saw the commotion, with the intention of aiding the victim
or pacifying the protagonists. He was, however, stopped
by accused Robito who suddenly stabbed him on the
chest. Leonilo retreated and asked for help. Wilma Broce
testified that only the accused Robito stabbed Leonilo:
Q
After that, what happened next?
A
Leonilo Broce came out of his house.
Q
Where is the house of Leonilo Broce?
A
Still located at Sumakwel.
Q
In that case, the very house where Eugene
Tayaktak leaned on when he was
ganged up by the four?
A
Yes.
Q
What happened after that?
A
When he came out from the house and
saw that it was Eugene Tayaktak, he
proceeded to approach them but he was
not able to approach them because he
was met by Robit “Bebot” Caballero and
stabbed by Robito Caballero.
Q
Was LeoniloBroce (sic) hit when he was
stabbed by Robito Caballero?
A
Yes. He immediately ran back and
said: “Tio, help me because I am hit.”
INTERPRETER’S (observation)
Witness demonstrating by holding her left
armpit.
Q
Was Eugene Tayaktak able to escape
from the attach (sic) of the Caballero
brothers?
A
Not (sic).
Q
Now what happened to Eugene Tayaktak?
A
He appeared very weak and he was
staggering.
Q
Do you know where Eugene Tayaktak
now?
A
Already dead.
Q
What happened to Leonilo Broce, where is
he now?
A
The two of them were (sic) already dead.
Q
Now, when did the trouble stop if it
stopped?
A
It stopped when Dodong Mondragon
arrived.
Q
What did the accused do after the trouble
was stopped?
A
They went inside the compound of his (sic)
father.
Q
What happened next?
A
Nothing happened. Both of them were
brought to the hospital.[22]
In sum, the trial court committed reversible error in
convicting the appellants of murder for the death of
Leonilo. As this Court held in People v. Flora:[23]
However, we cannot find Edwin Flora similarly responsible
for the death of Emerita Roma and the injury of Flor
Espinas. The evidence only shows conspiracy to kill
Ireneo Gallarte and no one else. For acts done outside
the contemplation of the conspirators only the actual
perpetrators are liable. In People v. De la Cerna, 21
SCRA 569, 570 (1967), we held:
“ ... And the rule has always been that co-conspirators
are liable only for acts done pursuant to the
conspiracy. For other acts done outside the
contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the
necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime,
only the actual perpetrators are liable. Here, only Serapio
killed (sic) Casiano Cabizares. The latter was not even
going to the aid of his father Rafael but was fleeing away
when shot.”
To conclude, appellant Edwin Flora is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt only of the murder of Ireneo
Gallarte. He has no liability for the death of Emerita Roma
nor the injuries of Flor Espinas caused by his co-accused
Hermogenes Flora.
Crimes Committed by Appellants
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants are
guilty as co-principals by direct participation of murder,
qualified by treachery. In order that treachery may be
considered as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is
burdened to prove that:
.... (1) the employment of means of execution that give
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberately
or consciously adopted.[24]
Even a frontal attack is treacherous if it is sudden and
the victim is unarmed. The essence of treachery is a swift
and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim.[25]
In this case, Eugene was unarmed. He had no
inkling that he would be waylaid as he sauntered on his way
to his girlfriend Susana’s house. On the other hand,
appellant Armando was armed with a wooden pole while
appellant Ricardo and accused Robito were armed with
knives. The attack on the hapless Eugene was swift and
unannounced. Undeniably, the appellants killed Eugene
with treachery.
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are
guilty of frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to
Article 6, first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code which
reads:
A felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all
the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
1.
The offender performs all the acts
of execution;
2.
All the acts performed would
produce the felony as a consequence;
3.
4.
By reason of causes independent
of the will of the perpetrator.[26]
In the leading case of United States v.
Eduave,[27] Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court,
distinguished an attempted from frustrated felony. He said
that to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender
must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which
intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment
when he has performed all the acts which should produce
the crime as a consequence, which act it is his intention to
perform.
The subjective phase in the commission of a crime is
that portion of the acts constituting the crime included
between the act which begins the commission of the crime
and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior
acts, should result in the consummated crime. Thereafter,
the phase is objective.
In case of an attempted crime, the offender never
passes the subjective phase in the commission of the
crime. The offender does not arrive at the point of
performing all of the acts of execution which should produce
the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause
apart from his voluntary desistance.
On the other hand, a crime is frustrated when the
offender has performed all the acts of execution which
should result in the consummation of the crime. The
offender has passed the subjective phase in the
commission of the crime. Subjectively, the crime is
complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while passing
through the subjective phase. He did all that is necessary
to consummate the crime. However, the crime is not
consummated by reason of the intervention of causes
independent of the will of the offender. In homicide cases,
the offender is said to have performed all the acts of
execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and
could cause the death of the victim barring medical
intervention or attendance.[28]
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter
survives, the crime committed is either consummated
physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the
victim or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated
murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill
the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a)
motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the
commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of
wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was
committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the time
the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.
In this case, appellant Armando was armed with a
wooden pole. Appellant Ricardo and accused Robito used
knives. Dr. Quisumbing, who attended to and operated on
Arnold, testified that the stab wound sustained by Arnold on
the left side of his body was mortal and could have caused
his death were it not for the timely and effective medical
intervention:
Q
And how about the size and the depth of
the wounds and how big is each wound
and how deep.
A
The first wound is 2 cm. and the 2nd is
about 2 inches and the 3rd is 2 inches in
the left, penetrating the chest near the
thorax along the lateral line.
The essential elements of a frustrated felony are as
follows:
Elements:
But the felony is not produced;
Q
So, aside from the 3rd wound there are
wounds which are not really very
serious?
A
As I said before, the most serious is the
3rd wound.
Q
So even without the other wounds the
3rd wound - - it could be the cause of the
death of the victim?
A
Yes, Sir.[29]
It cannot be denied that the appellants had the
intention to kill Arnold. The appellants performed all the acts
of execution but the crime was not consummated because
of the timely medical intervention.
Treachery attended the stabbing of Arnold because
he was unarmed and the attack on him was swift and
sudden. He had no means and there was no time for him
to defend himself. In sum, the appellants are guilty of
frustrated murder.
The appellants’ denial of the crimes charged in
Criminal Case Nos. RTC-1218 and RTC-1219 cannot
prevail over Wilma’s and Arnold’s positive and
straightforward testimonies that the appellants killed
Eugene and stabbed Arnold. Moreover, Wilma and Arnold
had no motive to falsely implicate the appellants for the said
crimes; hence, their testimony must be accorded full
probative weight.[30]
Equally barren of merit is appellants’ defense of alibi.
Alibi as a defense is inherently weak for it is easy to
fabricate and difficult to disprove. To merit approbation, the
appellants were burdened to prove with clear and
convincing evidence that at the time the crimes were
committed, they were in a place other than the situs of the
crimes such that it was physically impossible for them to
have committed said crimes.[31] The appellants dismally
failed in this respect. They testified that they were at the
house of appellant Ricardo, which was conveniently near
the place where Eugene was killed and Arnold was
assaulted. Moreover, the records show that Marciano, Jr.
was treated for his superficial injuries on August 4, 1996, a
day after the incident. This belies the claim of appellants
Ricardo and Armando that they were allegedly in the
hospital at the time of the incident.
Penalties Imposable on Appellants
The trial court imposed the death penalty on
appellants in Criminal Case No. RTC-1218 on its finding
that treachery and abuse of superior strength were
attendant in the killing of Eugene. The Solicitor General
does not agree with the trial court and contends that abuse
of superior strength was absorbed by treachery; hence,
should not be considered as a separate aggravating
circumstance in the imposition of the penalty on the
appellants. The Court agrees with the Solicitor
General. Abuse of superior strength, concurring with
treachery is absorbed by treachery.[32]
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659,
is reclusion perpetua to death. Since aside from the
qualified circumstance of treachery, no other modifying
circumstance was attendant in the commission of the crime,
the proper penalty for the crime is reclusion
perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, for frustrated
murder, the Solicitor General contends that the
indeterminate penalty of from 12 years of reclusion
temporal as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal as maximum, imposed on the
appellants is not correct. The Court agrees with the
Solicitor General. The penalty for frustrated murder is one
degree lower thanreclusion perpetua to death, which
is reclusion temporal.[33] The latter penalty has a range of
12 years and 1 day to 20 years. The maximum of the
indeterminate penalty should be taken fromreclusion
temporal, the penalty for the crime taking into account any
modifying circumstances in the commission of the
crime. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be
taken from the full range of prision mayor which is one
degree lower than reclusion temporal. Since there is no
modifying circumstance in the commission of frustrated
murder, the appellants should be meted an indeterminate
penalty of from nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision
mayor in its medium period as minimum to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum.
Civil Liabilities of Appellants
The trial court ordered the appellants in Criminal
Case No. RTC-1218 to pay in solidum the heirs of the victim
Eugene Tayactac, the amount of P75,000 by way of
indemnity. The trial court did not award moral damages to
said heirs. This is erroneous. Since the penalty imposed
on the appellants is reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity
should be only P50,000. The heirs of the victim should also
be awarded the amount of P50,000 as moral damages.[34]
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the trial court did not
award moral damages to the victim Arnold Barcuma on its
finding that the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence
to prove said damages. The Court disagrees with the trial
court. The victim Arnold Barcuma himself testified on his
injuries.[35] He is entitled to moral damages in the amount of
P25,000.[36] Having suffered injuries and undergone
medical treatment he is, as well entitled to actual damages,
which in the absence of evidence would, nevertheless,
entitle him to an award of temperate or moderate damages,
herein fixed at P10,000.
The Verdict of the Court
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City (Negros
Occidental), Branch 57, in Criminal Cases Nos. RTC-1217
up to RTC-1219 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1217, the Court,
finding the appellants not guilty of the crime
charged for failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
REVERSES the judgment of the trial court
and ACQUITS them of the said charge.
2. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the
appellants are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified
by treachery, and are sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered to pay in solidum the heirs of the
victim Eugene Tayactac, the amounts
of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000
as moral damages.
3. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the
appellants are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated murder
under Article 248 in relation to Article 6,
first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code
and are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from nine (9)
years and four (4) months of prision
mayor in its medium period, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as maximum. The appellants are
hereby ordered to pay in solidum to the
victim Arnold Barcuma the amount
of P25,000
as
moral
damages
and P10,000 as temperate or moderate
damages.
The commotion stopped only upon the arrival of
Teresito Mondragon who was able to pacify the Caballero
brothers. They all returned to the compound.
In the meantime, Lucio Broce (Leonilo’s uncle)
brought the injured Eugene, Leonilo, and Arnold to the
Planters Hospital for medical treatment. Eugene and
Leonilo eventually died from the stab wounds they
sustained. Arnold would have died because of the stab
wound on his chest, were it not for the timely medical
intervention.
The trial court found Armando, Ricardo, and
Marciano, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offenses charged them as principal.
1.
Costs de oficio.
2.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
Facts:
In the afternoon of August 3, 1994, Armando,
Robito, and Marciano, Jr., all surnamed Caballero, were
having a drinking spree in the house of their brother Ricardo
in the Mondragon Compound. At about 7:00 p.m., Eugene
Tayactac and Arnold Barcuma arrived in the sari-sari store
of Wilma Broce, which was across the Mondragon
Compound. Eugene had dinner in the store, while Arnold
proceeded to the house of Susana Broce (Eugene’s
girlfriend), which was about 15 meters away from the store.
3.
(CC No. RTC-1217) For the murder of
Leonilo, with the attendant aggravating
circumstances of treachery and abuse
of superior strength, the maximum
penalty of death + indemnity;
(CC No. RTC-1218) For the murder of
Eugene,
with
the
attendant
aggravating
circumstances
of
treachery and abuse of superior
strength, the maximum penalty of
death + indemnity;
(CC No. RTC-1219) For frustrated
murder, for having seriously inflicted
injuries upon the person of Arnold
which nearly resulted to his death, an
imprisonment of 12 years, as
minimum, to 17 years, four months,
and one day.
Momentarily, Armando arrived in the store and
asked Eugene in an angry tone: “Gene mopalit ka?” (Gene,
will you buy?). Eugene replied: “What is this all about? We
don’t have any quarrel between us.” Armando left the store,
but stood by the gate of the Mondragon Compound.
Ricardo, Robito, and Marciano, Jr. joined him. Ricardo and
Robito were armed with knives.
In their appeal, the appellants contended the trial
court’s appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and abuse of superior strength.
On Eugene’s way to Susana’s house, as he
walked by the gate of the Mondragon Compound, Armando
suddenly grabbed him toward the compound. Eugene
resisted. Spontaneously, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr., and
Robito joined Armando and assaulted Eugene. Armando
took the wooden pole supporting the clothesline and hit
Eugene with it. The latter tried to parry the blows of the
Caballero brothers, to no avail. In the process, Eugene was
stabbed three times.
Whether or not treachery and abuse of superior
strength were attendant in the crimes committed.
As Eugene was being assaulted, Myrna Bawin
(Eugene’s sister) saw the Caballero brothers assaulting
Eugene from the window of her house. She shouted for help
for her hapless brother. Wilma, who witnessed the whole
incident, was shocked to immobility at the sudden turn of
events.
From the nearby house of Susana, Arnold saw
the commotion and rushed to the scene to pacify the
protagonists. Ricardo accosted Arnold and stabbed the
latter on the left side of his body. Forthwith, Robito,
Marciano, Jr. and Armando ganged up on Arnold. Two of
them stabbed Arnold on his forearm. Arnold fled for his life
and hid under the house of a neighbor.
Leonilo Broce (Wilma’s nephew) rushed from his
house to where the commotion was. He was, however, met
by Robito who stabbed him on the chest. Wounded, Leonilo
retreated.
Issue
Ruling
The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court
that all the appellants conspired to kill Eugene and assault
Arnold; hence, they are criminally liable for the death of
Eugene and for the injuries of sustained by Arnold.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that there is
conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proved
with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that
is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, direct
proof is not required. Conspiracy may be proved by
circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy may be proved
through the collective acts of the accused, before, during,
and after the commission of a felony, all the accused aiming
at the same object, one performing one part and another
performing another for the attainment of the same
objective.
Direct proof of a person in agreement to commit
a crime is not necessary. It is enough that at the time of the
commission of a crime, all the malefactors had the same
purpose and were united in their execution. Once
established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-
principals regardless of the degree of participation of each
of them for in contemplation of the law. The act of one is the
act of all.
Moreover, one is not criminally liable for his act
done outside the contemplation of the conspirators. Coconspirators are criminally liable only for acts done
pursuant to the conspiring on how and what the necessary
and logic consequence of the intended crime are.
In this case, all the appellants by their
simultaneous collective acts before and after the
commission of the crimes were united in one common
objective, i.e., to kill Eugene and cause injuries to Arnold for
trying to intervene and prevent bloodshed. Hence, all the
appellants are criminally liable for the death of Eugene and
for the injuries of Arnold. It does not matter who among the
appellants stabbed Eugene or inflicted injuries on Arnold.
The act of one is the act of the others.
However, for the death of Leonilo (Criminal
Case No. RTC-1217), the appellants are not criminally
liable. The prosecution failed to adduce evidence that the
appellants and the accused Robito conspired to kill Leonilo.
There was no evidence presented by the prosecution to
prove that all the appellants assisted the accused Robito in
killing Leonilo. As held in People v Flora, for acts done
outside the contemplation of the conspirators, only the
actual perpetrators are liable.
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants
are guilty as co-principals by direct participation of murder,
qualified by treachery. For treachery to be considered as a
qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to
prove that (1) the employment of means of execution that
give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted.
Even a frontal attack is treacherous if it is sudden
and the victim is unarmed. The essence of treachery is a
swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim.
In this case, Eugene was unarmed. He had no
inkling that he would be waylaid as he sauntered on his way
to his girlfriend Susana’s house. On the other hand,
appellant Armando was armed with a wooden pole, while
appellant Ricardo and accused Robito were armed with
knives. The attack on the hapless Eugene was swift and
unannounced. Undeniably, the appellants killed Eugene
with treachery.
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants
are guilty of frustrated murder. It cannot be denied that the
appellants had the intention to kill Arnold. The appellants
performed all the acts of execution but the crime was not
consummated because of the timely medical intervention.
Treachery attended the stabbing of Arnold
because he was unarmed and the attack on him was swift
and sudden. He had no means and there was no time for
him to defend himself. In sum, the appellants are guilty of
frustrated murder.
The Supreme Court agrees with the Solicitor
General that the abuse of superior strength was
absorbed by treachery; hence should not be considered
as a separate aggravating circumstance in the imposition of
the penalty on the appellants. Abuse of superior strength
concurring with treachery is absorbed by treachery.
G.R. No. 165483
September 12, 2006
RUJJERIC
Z.
PALAGANAS,1 petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For what is a man, what has he got?
If not himself, then he has naught.
To say the things he truly feels;
And not the words of one who kneels.
The record shows I took the blows And did it my way!
The song evokes the bitterest passions. This is not the first
time the song "My Way"2 has triggered violent behavior
resulting in people coming to blows. In the case at bar, the
few lines of the song depicted what came to pass when the
victims and the aggressors tried to outdo each other in their
rendition of the song.
That on or about January 16, 1998, in the
evening at Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused armed with an unlicensed
firearm, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, conspiring together, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot
MICHAEL FERRER alias "Boying Ferrer",
inflicting upon him gunshot wound on the right
shoulder, the accused having thus performed all
the acts of execution which would have produced
the crime of murder as a consequence, but which
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the
causes independent of the will of the accused
and that is due to the medical assistance
rendered to said Michael "Boying" Ferrer
which prevented his death, to his damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY to Art. 248 in relation with Arts. 6
and 50, all of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9610
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner Rujjeric Z. Palaganas
prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22689 dated 30 September
2004,4 affirming with modification the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, in Criminal Cases No. U-9608, U-9609, and
U-9610 and U-9634, dated 28 October 1998,5 finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and
two (2) counts of Frustrated Homicide under Article 249 in
relation to Articles 6 and 50 of the same Code.
That on or about January 16, 1998, in the
evening at Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused armed with an unlicensed
firearm, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, conspiring together, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot
MELTON FERRER alias "TONY FERRER",
inflicting upon him mortal gunshot wounds in the
head
and
right
thigh
which
caused
the instantaneous death of said Melton "Tony"
Ferrer, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
On 21 April 1998, petitioner and his older brother,
Ferdinand Z. Palaganas (Ferdinand), were charged under
four (4) separate Informations6 for two (2) counts of
Frustrated Murder, one (1) count of Murder, and one (1)
count for Violation of COMELEC Resolution No.
29587 relative to Article 22, Section 261, of the Omnibus
Election Code,8 allegedly committed as follows:
CONTRARY to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. 7659.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9608
That on or about January 16, 1998, in the
evening at Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused armed with an unlicensed
firearm, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, conspiring together, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot
SERVILLANO FERRER, JR. y Juanatas,
inflicting upon him "gunshot wound penetrating
perforating abdomen, urinary bladder, rectum
bullet sacral region," the accused having thus
performed all the acts of execution which would
have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence, but which nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of the causes independent
of the will of the accused and that is due to the
timely medical assistance rendered to said
Servillano J. Ferrer, Jr. which prevented his
death, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY to Art. 248 in relation with Arts. 6
and 50, all of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9609
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9634
That on or about January 16, 1998 which is within
the election period at Poblacion, Manaoag,
Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
bear and carry one (1) caliber .38 without first
securing the necessary permit/license to do the
same.
CONTRARY to COMELEC RES. 2958 in relation
with SEC. 261 of the OMNIBUS ELECTION
CODE, as amended.9 (Underscoring supplied.)
When arraigned on separate dates,10 petitioner and
Ferdinand entered separate pleas of "Not Guilty." Upon
motion of Ferdinand,11 the four cases were consolidated
and were assigned to Branch 46 of the RTC in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan.12
The factual antecedents as viewed by the prosecution, are
summarized in the Comment dated 18 April 2005 of the
Office of the Solicitor General,13to wit:
On January 16, 1998, around 8:00 in the
evening, brothers Servillano, [Melton] and
Michael, all surnamed Ferrer were having a
drinking spree in their house because [Melton],
who was already living in San Fernando, La
Union, visited his three brothers and mother at
their house in Sitio Baloking, Poblacion,
Manaoag, Pangasinan. At 9:45 in the evening,
the three brothers decided to proceed to Tidbits
Videoke bar located at the corner of Malvar and
Rizal Streets, Poblacion, Manaoag to continue
their drinking spree and to sing. Inside the
karaoke bar, they were having a good time,
singing and drinking beer.
Thereafter, at 10:30 in the evening, Jaime
Palaganas arrived together with Ferdinand
Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista. At that time, only
the Ferrer brothers were the customers in the
bar. The two groups occupied separate tables.
Later, when Jaime Palaganas was singing,
[Melton] Ferrer sang along with him as he was
familiar with the song [My Way]. Jaime however,
resented this and went near the table of the
Ferrer brothers and said in Pangasinan dialect
"Asif you are tough guys." Jaime further said
"You are already insulting me inthat way." Then,
Jaime struck Servillano Ferrer with the
microphone, hitting the back of his head. A
rumble ensued between the Ferrer brothers on
the one hand, and the Palaganases, on the other
hand. Virgilio Bautista did not join the fray as he
left the place. During the rumble, Ferdinand went
out of the bar. He was however pursued by
Michael. When Servillano saw Michael, he also
went out and told the latter not to follow
Ferdinand. Servillano and Michael then went
back inside the bar and continued their fight with
Jaime.
Meantime, Edith Palaganas, sister of Jaime and
the owner of the bar, arrived and pacified them.
Servillano noticed that his wristwatch was
missing. Unable to locate the watch inside the
bar, the Ferrer brothers went outside. They saw
Ferdinand about eight (8) meters away standing
at Rizal Street. Ferdinand was pointing at them
and said to his companion, later identified as
petitioner [Rujjeric] Palaganas, "Oraratan paltog
mo lara", meaning "They are the ones, shoot
them." Petitioner then shot them hitting Servillano
first at the left side of the abdomen, causing him
to fall on the ground, and followed by [Melton]
who also fell to the ground. When Servillano
noticed that [Melton] was no longer moving, he
told Michael "Bato, bato." Michael picked up
some stones and threw them at petitioner and
Ferdinand. The latter then left the place.
Afterwards, the police officers came and the
Ferrer brothers were brought to the Manaoag
Hospital and later to Villaflor Hospital in
Dagupan. Servillano later discovered that
[Melton] was fatally hit in the head while Michael
was hit in the right shoulder.
On the other hand, the defense, in its Appellant's Brief
dated 3 December 1999,14 asserted the following set of
facts:
On January 16, 1998, at around 11:00 in the
evening, after a drinking session at their house,
the brothers Melton (Tony), Servillano (Junior)
and Michael (Boying), all surnamed Ferrer,
occupied a table inside the Tidbits Café and
Videoke Bar and started drinking and singing.
About thirty minutes later, Jaime Palaganas
along with his nephew Ferdinand (Apo) and
friend Virgilio Bautista arrived at the bar and
occupied a table near that of the Ferrers'.
After the Ferrers' turn in singing, the microphone
was handed over to Jaime Palaganas, who then
started to sing. On his third song [My Way], Jaime
was joined in his singing by Tony Ferrer, who
sang loudly and in an obviously mocking manner.
This infuriated Jaime, who then accosted Tony,
saying, "You are already insulting us." The
statement resulted in a free for all fight between
the Ferrers', on one hand, and the Palaganases
on the other. Jaime was mauled and Ferdinand,
was hit on the face and was chased outside of
the bar by Junior and Boying Ferrer.
Ferdinand then ran towards the house of the
appellant Rujjeric Palaganas, his brother, and
sought the help of the latter. Rujjeric, stirred from
his sleep by his brother's shouts, went out of his
house and, noticing that the van of his uncle was
in front of the Tidbits Videoke Bar, proceeded to
that place. Before reaching the bar, however, he
was suddenly stoned by the Ferrer brothers and
was hit on different parts of his body, so he turned
around and struggled to run towards his house.
He then met his brother, Ferdinand, going
towards the bar, so he tugged him and urged him
to run towards the opposite direction as the
Ferrer brothers continued pelting them with large
stones. Rujjeric then noticed that Ferdinand was
carrying a gun, and, on instinct, grabbed the gun
from the latter, faced the Ferrer brothers and fired
one shot in the air to force the brothers to retreat.
Much to his surprise, however, the Ferrer
brothers continued throwing stones and when
(sic) the appellant was again hit several times.
Unable to bear the pain, he closed his eyes and
pulled the trigger.
On 28 October 1998, the trial court rendered its Decision
finding petitioner guilty only of the crime of Homicide and
two (2) counts of Frustrated Homicide.15 He was, however,
acquitted of the charge of Violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2958 in relation to Section 261 of the
Omnibus Election Code.16 On the other hand, Ferdinand
was acquitted of all the charges against him.17
In holding that petitioner is liable for the crimes of Homicide
and Frustrated Homicide but not for Murder and Frustrated
Murder, the trial court explained that there was no
conspiracy between petitioner and Ferdinand in killing
Melton and wounding Servillano and Michael.18According
to the trial court, the mere fact that Ferdinand "pointed" to
where the Ferrer brothers were and uttered to petitioner
"Araratan, paltog mo lara!" (They are the ones, shoot
them!), does not in itself connote common design or unity
of purpose to kill. It also took note of the fact that petitioner
was never a participant in the rumble inside the Tidbits Cafe
Videoke Bar (videoke bar) on the night of 16 January 1998.
He was merely called by Ferdinand to rescue their uncle,
Jaime, who was being assaulted by the Ferrer brothers. It
further stated that the shooting was instantaneous and
without any prior plan or agreement with Ferdinand to
execute the same. It found that petitioner is solely liable for
killing Melton and for wounding Servillano and Michael, and
that Ferdinand is not criminally responsible for the act of
petitioner.
Further, it declared that there was no treachery that will
qualify the crimes as murder and frustrated murder since
the Ferrer brothers were given the chance to defend
themselves during the shooting incident by stoning the
petitioner and Ferdinand.19 It reasoned that the sudden and
unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the
part of the victims, was absent. In addition, it ratiocinated
that there was no evident premeditation as there was no
sufficient period of time that lapsed from the point where
Ferdinand called the petitioner for help up to the point of the
shooting of the Ferrer brothers.20 Petitioner was sleeping at
his house at the time he heard Ferdinand calling him for
help. Immediately, petitioner, still clad in pajama and
sleeveless shirt, went out of his room to meet Ferdinand.
Thereafter, both petitioner and Ferdinand went to the
videoke bar where they met the Ferrer brothers and, shortly
afterwards, the shooting ensued. In other words, according
to the trial court, the sequence of the events are so fast that
it is improbable for the petitioner to have ample time and
opportunity to then plan and organize the shooting.
Corollarily, it also stated that petitioner cannot successfully
invoke self-defense since there was no actual or imminent
danger to his life at the time he and Ferdinand saw the
Ferrer brothers outside the videoke bar.21It noted that when
petitioner and Ferdinand saw the Ferrer brothers outside
the videoke bar, the latter were not carrying any weapon.
Petitioner then was free to run or take cover when the
Ferrer brothers started pelting them with stones. Petitioner,
however, opted to shoot the Ferrer brothers. It also stated
that the use by petitioner of a gun was not a reasonable
means to prevent the attack of the Ferrer brothers since the
latter were only equipped with stones, and that the gun was
deadlier compared to stones. Moreover, it also found that
petitioner used an unlicensed firearm in shooting the Ferrer
brothers.22
As regards the Violation of COMELEC Resolution No.
2958, in relation to Section 261 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the trial court acquitted the petitioner of the offense
as his use and possession of a gun was not for the purpose
of disrupting election activities.23 In conclusion, the trial
court held:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered
as follows:
1. Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9610, [Rujjeric]
PALAGANAS is hereby CONVICTED beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE (Not
Murder) with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
The penalty imposable is in its maximum period
which is 20 years. The Court sentences [Rujjeric]
Palaganas to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Temporal in its maximum period or 20 years of
imprisonment; and to pay the heirs of [MELTON]
Ferrer the sum of P7,791.50 as actual medical
expenses of [MELTON] Ferrer; P500,000.00 as
moral damages representing unearned income
of [MELTON]; P50,000.00 for the death of
[MELTON]; P50,000.00 for exemplary damages
and P100,000.00 for burial and funeral
expenses.
Ferdinand Palaganas is hereby ACQUITTED for
failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy and
likewise, for failure to prove the guilt of Ferdinand
Palaganas beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9608, [Rujjeric]
PALAGANAS is hereby CONVICTED beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE (Not Frustrated Murder), with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, the Court sentences
him to suffer the penalty of Prision Mayor in its
maximum period or 12 years of imprisonment
and to pay Servillano Ferrer the sum
of P163,569.90 for his medical expenses
and P50,000.00 for exemplary damages;
Ferdinand Palaganas is ACQUITTED for failure
of the prosecution to prove conspiracy and
likewise, for failure to prove the guilt of Ferdinand
Palaganas beyond reasonable doubt.
3. Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9609, [Rujjeric]
PALAGANAS is hereby CONVICTED beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE (Not Frustrated Murder), with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, the Court sentences
him to suffer the penalty of Prision Mayor in its
maximum period or 12 years of imprisonment;
and to pay Michael Ferrer the sum of P2,259.35
for his medical expenses and P50,000.00 for
exemplary damages;
Ferdinand Palaganas is ACQUITTED for failure
of the prosecution to prove conspiracy and
likewise, for failure to prove the guilt of Ferdinand
Palaganas beyond reasonable doubt.
Ordering accused [Rujjeric] Palaganas to pay
Mrs. Elena Ferrer, the mother of the Ferrer
brothers, the amount of P100,000.00 as
attorney's fees in CRIM. CASES NOS. U-9608,
U-9609, U-9610.
4. Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9634, for failure of
the prosecution to prove the guilt of [Rujjeric]
Palaganas beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 in
relation with Section 261 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the Court ACQUITS [RUJJERIC]
PALAGANAS.24
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the foregoing Decision
of the RTC dated 28 October 1998, before the Court of
Appeals. In its Decision dated 30 September 2004, the
Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the assailed
RTC Decision. In modifying the Decision of the trial court,
the appellate court held that the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender under Article 13, No. 7, of the Revised
Penal Code should be appreciated in favor of petitioner
since the latter, accompanied by his counsel, voluntarily
appeared before the trial court, even prior to its issuance of
a warrant of arrest against him.25 It also stated that the
Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied in imposing
the penalty upon the petitioner.26 The dispositive portion of
the Court of Appeals' Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is
hereby
AFFIRMED,
subject
to
the
MODIFICATION that the penalty to be imposed
for the crimes which the appellant committed are
as follows:
(1) For Homicide (under Criminal Case No. U9610), the appellant is ordered to suffer
imprisonment of ten (10) years of prision
mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Appellant is also ordered to pay the
heirs of Melton Ferrer civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 without need of proof and
actual damages in the amount of P43,556.00.
(2) For Frustrated Homicide (under Criminal
Case No. U-9609), the appellant is hereby
ordered to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correcional as
minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as
maximum. Appellant is also ordered to pay
Michael Ferrer actual damages in the amount
of P2,259.35 and moral damages in the amount
of P30,000.00.
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or
rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur;
(3) For Frustrated Homicide (under Criminal
Case No. U-9608), the appellant is hereby
penalized with imprisonment of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correcional as minimum
to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum.
Appellant is also ordered to pay Servillano Ferrer
actual damages in the amount of P163,569.90
and
moral
damages
in
the
amount
of P30,000.00.27
First. Unlawful aggression;
On 16 November 2004, petitioner lodged the instant
Petition for Review before this Court on the basis of the
following arguments:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT ON THE GROUND OF LAWFUL
SELF-DEFENSE.28
Anent the first issue, petitioner argued that all the elements
of a valid self-defense are present in the instant case and,
thus, his acquittal on all the charges is proper; that when he
fired his gun on that fateful night, he was then a victim of an
unlawful aggression perpetrated by the Ferrer brothers; that
he, in fact, sustained an injury in his left leg and left shoulder
caused by the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers; that
the appellate court failed to consider a material evidence
described as "Exhibit O"; that "Exhibit O" should have been
given due weight since it shows that there was slug
embedded on the sawali wall near the sign "Tidbits Café
and Videoke Bar"; that the height from which the slug was
taken was about seven feet from the ground; that if it was
true that petitioner and Ferdinand were waiting for the
Ferrer brothers outside the videoke bar in order to shoot
them, then the trajectory of the bullets would have been
either straight or downward and not upward considering
that the petitioner and the Ferrer brothers were about the
same height (5'6"-5'8"); that the slug found on the wall was,
in fact, the "warning shot" fired by the petitioner; and, that if
this exhibit was properly appreciated by the trial court,
petitioner would be acquitted of all the charges.29
Moreover, petitioner contended that the warning shot
proved that that the Ferrer brothers were the unlawful
aggressors since there would have been no occasion for
the petitioner to fire a warning shot if the Ferrer brothers did
not stone him; that the testimony of Michael in the trial court
proved that it was the Ferrer brothers who provoked
petitioner to shoot them; and that the Ferrer brothers pelted
them with stones even after the "warning shot."30
Petitioner's contention must fail.
Article 11, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code
provides for the elements and/or requisites in order that a
plea of self-defense may be validly considered in absolving
a person from criminal liability, viz:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. following do not incur any criminal liability:
The
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself. x x x.
As an element of self-defense, unlawful aggression refers
to an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent
and immediate manner, which places the defendant's life in
actual peril.31 It is an act positively strong showing the
wrongful intent of the aggressor and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude.32 It is also described as
a sudden and unprovoked attack of immediate and
imminent kind to the life, safety or rights of the person
attacked.33
There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
when he puts in actual or imminent peril the life, limb, or
right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be
actual physical force or actual use of weapon. 34 In order to
constitute unlawful aggression, the person attacked must
be confronted by a real threat on his life and limb; and the
peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not
merely imaginary.35
In the case at bar, it is clear that there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers that justified
the act of petitioner in shooting them. There were no actual
or imminent danger to the lives of petitioner and Ferdinand
when they proceeded and arrived at the videoke bar and
saw thereat the Ferrer brothers. It appears that the Ferrer
brothers then were merely standing outside the videoke bar
and were not carrying any weapon when the petitioner
arrived with his brother Ferdinand and started firing his
gun.36
Assuming, arguendo, that the Ferrer brothers had provoked
the petitioner to shoot them by pelting the latter with stones,
the shooting of the Ferrer brothers is still unjustified. When
the Ferrer brothers started throwing stones, petitioner was
not in a state of actual or imminent danger considering the
wide distance (4-5 meters) of the latter from the location of
the former.37 Petitioner was not cornered nor trapped in a
specific area such that he had no way out, nor was his back
against the wall. He was still capable of avoiding the stones
by running away or by taking cover. He could have also
called or proceeded to the proper authorities for help.
Indeed, petitioner had several options in avoiding dangers
to his life other than confronting the Ferrer brothers with a
gun.
The fact that petitioner sustained injuries in his left leg and
left shoulder, allegedly caused by the stones thrown by the
Ferrer brothers, does not signify that he was a victim of
unlawful aggression or that he acted in selfdefense.38 There is no evidence to show that his wounds
were so serious and severe. The superficiality of the injuries
sustained by the petitioner is no indication that his life and
limb were in actual peril.39
Petitioner's assertion that, despite the fact that he fired a
warning shot, the Ferrer brothers continued to pelt him with
stones,40 will not matter exonerate him from criminal
liability. Firing a warning shot was not the last and only
option he had in order to avoid the stones thrown by the
Ferrer brothers. As stated earlier, he could have run away,
or taken cover, or proceeded to the proper authorities for
help. Petitioner, however, opted to shoot the Ferrer
brothers.
It is significant to note that the shooting resulted in the death
of Melton, and wounding of Servillano and Michael. With
regard to Melton, a bullet hit his right thigh, and another
bullet hit his head which caused his instant death.41 As
regards Servillano, a bullet penetrated two of his vital
organs, namely, the large intestine and urinary
bladder.42 He underwent two (2) surgeries in order to
survive and fully recover.43 Michael, on the other hand,
sustained a gunshot wound on the right shoulder.44 It must
also be noted that the Ferrer brothers were shot near the
videoke bar, which contradict petitioner's claim he was
chased by the Ferrer brothers. Given the foregoing
circumstances, it is difficult to believe that the Ferrer
brothers were the unlawful aggressors. As correctly
observed by the prosecution, if the petitioner shot the Ferrer
brothers just to defend himself, it defies reason why he had
to shoot the victims at the vital portions of their body, which
even led to the death of Melton who was shot at his
head.45 It is an oft-repeated rule that the nature and number
of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and
unremittingly considered important indicia to disprove a
plea of self-defense.46
Let it not be forgotten that unlawful aggression is a
primordial element in self-defense.47 It is an essential and
indispensable requisite, for without unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim, there can be, in a jural sense, no
complete or incomplete self-defense.48 Without unlawful
aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and
this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be
appreciated, even if the other elements are present.49 To
our mind, unlawful aggression, as an element of selfdefense, is wanting in the instant case.
The second element of self-defense requires that the
means employed by the person defending himself must be
reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression of the victim. The reasonableness of the means
employed may take into account the weapons, the physical
condition of the parties and other circumstances showing
that there is a rational equivalence between the means of
attack and the defense.50 In the case at bar, the petitioner's
act of shooting the Ferrer brothers was not a reasonable
and necessary means of repelling the aggression allegedly
initiated by the Ferrer brothers. As aptly stated by the trial
court, petitioner's gun was far deadlier compared to the
stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers.51
Moreover, we stated earlier that when the Ferrer brothers
allegedly threw stones at the petitioner, the latter had other
less harmful options than to shoot the Ferrer brothers. Such
act failed to pass the test of reasonableness of the means
employed in preventing or repelling an unlawful aggression.
With regard to the second issue, petitioner asserts that the
Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting him on the ground
of lawful self-defense.
Petitioner's argument is bereft of merit.
In resolving criminal cases where the accused invokes selfdefense to escape criminal liability, this Court consistently
held that where an accused admits killing the victim but
invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon the accused to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in
self-defense.52 As the burden of evidence is shifted on the
accused to prove all the elements of self-defense, he must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution.53
As we have already found, there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers which justified
the act of petitioner in shooting them. We also ruled that
even if the Ferrer brothers provoked the petitioner to shoot
them, the latter's use of a gun was not a reasonable means
of repelling the act of the Ferrer brothers in throwing stones.
It must also be emphasized at this point that both the trial
court and the appellate court found that petitioner failed to
established by clear and convincing evidence his plea of
self-defense. In this regard, it is settled that when the trial
court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court,
said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this
Court.54 In the present case, we find no compelling reason
to deviate from their findings. Verily, petitioner failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled
to an acquittal on the ground of lawful self-defense.
On another point, while we agree with the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that petitioner is guilty of the crime of
Homicide for the death of Melton in Criminal Case No. U9610, and Frustrated Homicide for the serious injuries
sustained by Servillano in Criminal Case No. U-9608, we
do not, however, concur in their ruling that petitioner is guilty
of the crime of Frustrated Homicide as regards to Michael
in Criminal Case No. U-9609. We hold that petitioner
therein is guilty only of the crime of Attempted Homicide.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states and defines the
stages of a felony in the following manner:
ART.
6. Consummated, frustrated,
and attempted felonies.
Consummated
felonies, as well as those which are frustrated
and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for the for its execution and
accomplishment
are
present;
and
it
is frustratedwhen the offender performs all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony
as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do
not produce it by reason or causes independent
of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance (italics supplied).
Based on the foregoing provision, the distinctions between
frustrated and attempted felony are summarized as follows:
1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has
performed all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony as a consequence; whereas
in attempted felony, the offender merely
commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of
execution.
2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the nonaccomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the
other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for
the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or
accident other than the offender's own
spontaneous desistance.
In addition to these distinctions, we have ruled in several
cases that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault,
and his victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not
die because of timely medical assistance, the crime
committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide
depending on whether or not any of the qualifying
circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
are present.55 However, if the wound/s sustained by the
victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime
committed is only attempted murder or attempted
homicide.56 If there was no intent to kill on the part of the
accused and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not
fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious or
slight physical injury.57
Based on the medical certificate of Michael, as well as the
testimony of the physician who diagnosed and treated
Michael, the latter was admitted and treated at the Dagupan
Doctors-Villaflor Memorial Hospital for a single gunshot
wound in his right shoulder caused by the shooting of
petitioner.58 It was also stated in his medical certificate that
he was discharged on the same day he was admitted and
that the treatment duration for such wound would be for six
to eight days only.59Given these set of undisputed facts, it
is clear that the gunshot wound sustained by Michael in his
right shoulder was not fatal or mortal since the treatment
period for his wound was short and he was discharged from
the hospital on the same day he was admitted therein.
Therefore, petitioner is liable only for the crime of attempted
homicide as regards Michael in Criminal Case No. U-9609.
With regard to the appreciation of the aggravating
circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm, we agree with
the trial court and the appellate court that the same must be
applied against petitioner in the instant case since the same
was alleged in the informations filed against him before the
RTC and proven during the trial. However, such must be
considered as a special aggravating circumstance, and not
a generic aggravating circumstance.
Generic aggravating circumstances are those that
generally apply to all crimes such as those mentioned in
Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19
and 20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the effect of
increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum period,
but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree.
It must always be alleged and charged in the information,
and must be proven during the trial in order to be
appreciated.60 Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary
mitigating circumstance.
On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are
those which arise under special conditions to increase the
penalty for the offense to its maximum period, but the same
cannot increase the penalty to the next higher degree.
Examples are quasi-recidivism under Article 160 and
complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. It does not change the character of the offense
charged.61 It must always be alleged and charged in the
information, and must be proven during the trial in order to
be appreciated.62 Moreover, it cannot be offset by an
ordinary mitigating circumstance.
It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of
generic and special aggravating circumstances are exactly
the same except that in case of generic aggravating, the
same CAN be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance
whereas in the case of special aggravating circumstance, it
CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
Aside
from
the
aggravating
circumstances
abovementioned, there is also an aggravating
circumstance provided for under Presidential Decree No.
1866,63 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294,64 which is a
special law. Its pertinent provision states:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned
that such provision is "silent as to whether it is generic or
qualifying."65 Thus, it ruled that "when the law is silent, the
same must be interpreted in favor of the accused."66 Since
a generic aggravating circumstance is more favorable to
petitioner compared to a qualifying aggravating
circumstance, as the latter changes the nature of the crime
and increase the penalty thereof by degrees, the trial court
proceeded to declare that the use of an unlicensed firearm
by the petitioner is to be considered only as a generic
aggravating
circumstance.67 This
interpretation
is
erroneous since we already held in several cases that with
the passage of Republic Act. No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the
use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now
considered as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and
not a generic aggravating circumstance.68 Republic Act No.
8294 applies to the instant case since it took effect before
the commission of the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore,
the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner in the
instant case should be designated and appreciated as a
SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not merely a
generic aggravating circumstance.
As was previously established, a special aggravating
circumstance cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance. Voluntary surrender of petitioner in this case
is merely an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Thus, it
cannot offset the special aggravating circumstance of use
of unlicensed firearm. In accordance with Article 64,
paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
imposable on petitioner should be in its maximum period.69
As regards the civil liability of petitioner, we deem it
necessary to modify the award of damages given by both
courts.
In Criminal Case No. U-9610 for Homicide, we agree with
both courts that the proper amount of civil indemnity
is P50,000.00, and that the proper amount for moral
damages
is P50,000.00
pursuant
to
prevailing
jurisprudence.70 However, based on the receipts for
hospital, medicine, funeral and burial expenses on record,
and upon computation of the same, the proper amount of
actual
damages
should
be P42,374.18,
instead
of P43,556.00. Actual damages for loss of earning capacity
cannot be awarded in this case since there was no
documentary
evidence
to
substantiate
the
same.71 Although there may be exceptions to this
rule,72none is availing in the present case. Nevertheless,
since loss was actually established in this case, temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 may be awarded to
the heirs of Melton Ferrer. Under Article 2224 of the New
Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss
was suffered but its amount cannot be proved with
certainty. Moreover, exemplary damages should be
awarded in this case since the presence of special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was
already established.73Based on prevailing jurisprudence,
the award of exemplary damages for homicide
is P25,000.00.74
In Criminal Cases No. U-9608 and U-9609, we agree with
both courts as to the award of actual damages and its
corresponding amount since the same is supported by
documentary proof therein. The award of moral damages is
also consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. However,
exemplary damages should be awarded in this case since
the presence of special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm was already established. Based on
prevailing jurisprudence, the award of exemplary damages
for both the attempted and frustrated homicide shall
be P25,000.00 for each.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. U-9609, the petitioner is found
guilty of the crime of attempted homicide. The penalty
imposable on the petitioner is prision correccional under
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code.75 There being a
special aggravating circumstance of the use of an
unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence of Law, the penalty now becomes four (4) years
and two (2) months of arresto mayor as minimum period to
six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum period. As
regards the civil liability of petitioner, the latter is hereby
ordered to pay Michael Ferrer exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 in addition to the actual damages
and moral damages awarded by the Court of Appeals.
(2) In Criminal Case No. U-9608, the penalty imposable on
the petitioner for the frustrated homicide is prision
mayor under Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code.76 There
being a special aggravating circumstance of the use of an
unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty now becomes six (6) years
of prision correccional as minimum period to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as maximum period. As regards the
civil liability of petitioner, the latter is hereby ordered to pay
Servillano Ferrer exemplary damages in the amount
of P25,000.00 in addition to the actual damages and moral
damages awarded by the Court of Appeals.
(3) In Criminal Case No. U-9610, the penalty imposable on
petitioner for the homicide is reclusion temporal under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.77 There being a
special aggravating circumstance of the use of an
unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty now is twelve (12) years
of prision mayor as minimum period to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal as maximum period. As regards the
civil liability of petitioner, the latter is hereby ordered to pay
Melton Ferrer exemplary damages in the amount
of P25,000.00 in addition to the actual damages and moral
damages awarded by the Court of Appeals. The actual
damages likewise awarded by the Court of Appeals is
hereby reduced to P42,374.18.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Ynares-Santiago, AustriaMartinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.
CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
On January 16, 1998, brothers Servillano,
Melton, and Michael, all surnamed Ferrer, were having a
drinking spree and decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke
Bar. At 10:30 in the evening, Jaime Palaganas along with
his nephew Ferdinand (Apo) and friend Virgilio Bautista
arrived at the bar and occupied a table near that of the
Ferrers'. When Jaime Palaganas was singing, Melton
Ferrer sang along with him. Jaime resented this and went
near the table of the Ferrer brothers. A fight ensued
between the two groups. Virgilio Bautista did not join the
fight, whereas Jaime was mauled and Ferdinand was
chased outside of the bar by Michael. Ferdinand then ran
towards the house of the appellant Rujjeric Palaganas, his
brother, and sought for his help. They went to the bar and
were stoned by the Ferrer brothers. Rujjeric then grabbed
the gun from Ferdinand, faced the Ferrer brothers and fired
one shot in the air to force the brothers to retreat. The Ferrer
brothers continued throwing stones, so Rujjeric shot them.
Melton was killed, Servillano was fatally wounded, and
Michael was shot in his right shoulder. The RTC declared
the petitioner guilty of the crimes of Homicide and two (2)
counts of Frustrated Homicide. The Court of Appeals
affirmed with modifications to the penalty.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
3.
Whether or not Rujjeric Palaganas is guilty of the
crimes of homicide and 2 counts of frustrated
murder.
Whether or not accused-appellant is acquitted on
the ground of lawful self-defense.
Whether or not the use of the unlicensed firearm
is a special aggravating circumstance which
should be appreciated by the court at the case at
bar.
RULING:
In the first issue, the SC affirms the decision of
the RTC and CA. However, they do not concur in their ruling
that petitioner is guilty of the crime of Frustrated Homicide
as regards to Michael. SC holds that petitioner therein is
guilty only of the crime of Attempted Homicide since the
gunshot wound sustained by Michael in his right shoulder
was not fatal or mortal and was discharged from the
hospital on the same day he was admitted therein.
In the second issue, petitioner’s contention of
self-defense fails.
ART. 11 of RPC. Justifying circumstances. - The
following do not incur any criminal liability:
Anyone who acts in defense of his person or
rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur; (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself.
Petitioner was not in a state of actual or imminent
danger considering the wide distance (4-5 meters) and was
not cornered nor trapped in a specific area such that he had
no way out, nor was his back against the wall. He was still
capable of avoiding the stones by running away or by taking
cover. He could have also called or proceeded to the proper
authorities for help. Also, petitioner's act of shooting the
Ferrer brothers was not a reasonable and necessary
means of repelling the aggression allegedly initiated by the
Ferrer brothers. The petitioner's gun was far deadlier
compared to the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers.
For the third issue, there is an aggravating
circumstance provided for under Republic Act No. 8294. Its
provision states: “If homicide or murder is committed with
the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.” Thus, the award of exemplary damages for
both the attempted and frustrated homicide shall
be P25,000.00 for each.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
(1) The petitioner is found guilty of attempted homicide of
Michael Ferrer with a penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of arresto mayor as minimum period to six (6) years
of prision correccional as maximum period with costs to
damages.
(2) The petitioner is found guilty of frustrated homicide of
Sevillano Ferrer with a penalty of six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum period to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor as maximum period with costs to
damages.
(3) The petitioner is found guilty of homicide of Melton
Ferrer with a penalty of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor as minimum period to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum period with costs to damages.
G.R. No. 139542
June 21, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
INOCENCIO GONZALEZ, JR., accused-appellant.
DISSENTING OPINION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Many unfortunate tragedies would not have happened if the
improvident use of a firearm did not exacerbate a simple
altercation over traffic. This is one of them.
On a day intended to pay homage to the dead, a pregnant
woman was shot to death in the course of her husband’s
altercation with the accused-appellant and his son along
the Garden of Remembrance within the Loyola Memorial
Park in Marikina. The trial court found the accused guilty of
the complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated
murder and accordingly sentenced him to death. This case
is before us on automatic review.
The details of what actually transpired in the few seconds
immediately preceding the shooting are controverted by
both parties but the events leading to this tragedy are not
disputed.
In the afternoon of October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m. both
the families of the private complainant Noel Andres and that
of the accused-appellant Inocencio Gonzalez were on their
way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. The appellant
was driving a white Isuzu Esteem with his grandson and
three housemaids, while the private complainant was
driving a maroon Toyota FX with his pregnant wife Feliber
Andres, his two year old son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin
and his sister-in-law, Francar Valdez. At the intersection
near the Garden of Remembrance, while the accusedappellant Gonzalez was turning left towards the exit and the
complainant Noel Andres was headed straight along the
road to the exit their two vehicles almost collided. Noel
Andres was able to timely step on the brakes. The appellant
continued driving along his way while Noel Andres drove
behind the appellant’s vehicle for some time and cut him off
when he found the opportunity to do so.1 Noel Andres then
got out of his vehicle and knocked on the appellant’s car
window.2 This is as far as their versions of the incident
coincide.
The prosecution’s version of the incident is that Noel
Andres calmly told the appellant to be careful with his
driving and informed the latter that he, Andres, is with his
family and to this Gonzalez allegedly replied, "Accidents are
accidents, what’s your problem." Andres stated that he saw
the appellant turning red in anger so he decided to go back
to his vehicle when he was blocked by the appellant’s son
who said, "Anong problema mo sa erpat ko." Andres
testified that he felt threatened and so he immediately
boarded his vehicle, sat at the driver’s seat, closed the door,
and partially opened the car window just wide enough to
talk back to appellant’s son, Dino. Suddenly, one of his
passengers said "Binaril kami". He turned to his wife Feliber
Andres and saw her bloodied and unconscious. He turned
around and saw his son Kenneth and nephew Kevin were
also wounded. Andres admitted in court that he and Dino
were shouting at each other so that he did not hear the shot.
Andres then got out of his vehicle to warn the appellant not
to flee. He then took the wounded members of his family to
the exit where there was an ambulance standing by. The
three were then taken to the Sta. Monica Hospital and were
later transferred to the Quezon City Medical Center.
The defense’s version of the incident is that Andres cut the
appellant’s path by positioning his FX obliquely along the
appellant’s lane from the latter’s left side. Andres then got
out of his vehicle, stood beside the appellant’s car window,
and repeatedly cursed the appellant, "Putang ina mo, ang
tanda-tanda mo na hindi ka pa marunong magmaneho. Ang
bobo-bobo mo."3 The appellant stayed inside his car and
allegedly replied, "Pasensiya ka na hindi kita nakita,
nasilaw ako. Aksidente lang." The appellant Gonzalez and
another witness for the defense, Quidic, testified that Noel
Andres went back to his vehicle to move it in such a way
that it is straight in front of the appellant’s car. Andres
allegedly got out of his vehicle again and continued
shouting and cursing at the appellant.4 Dino, the appellant’s
son, who rode in another vehicle decided to go back when
he did not see his father’s car behind him. When Dino
arrived at the scene he confronted Andres and the two had
an altercation. Both Dino and the appellant stated that
Andres remained outside his vehicle during the altercation
with Dino. When Andres suddenly reached for something
inside his vehicle, Dino froze on the spot where he stood.
This prompted the appellant to get his gun from the glove
compartment and feeling that his son was threatened he
got out of his car ready to shoot. When he saw that Andres
did not have a weapon he put down his hand holding the
gun. This is when the appellant’s daughter Trisha who was
riding in Dino’s car arrived at the scene, walked past Dino
and Andres, and pushed the appellant away. She hugged
her father and in the process held his hand holding the gun.
The appellant tried to free his hand and with Trisha’s
substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant
lost his balance and the gun accidentally fired. The accused
stated that he did not know he shot somebody until the
private complainant’s sister-in-law, Francar Valdez, got out
of the vehicle carrying a bloodied small boy. The defense
claims that the appellant did not try to flee and even told the
complainant’s sister-in-law to take the wounded to the
hospital.
On November 4, 1998 an Information for the complex crime
of Murder, Double Frustrated Murder and Attempted
Murder was filed against herein accused-appellant:
"That on or about the 31st day of October 1998,
in the city of Marikina, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill,
attack, assault and employ personal violence by
means of treachery and abuse of superior
strength upon the person of Noel Andres y
Tomas, by then and there shooting him with a
Glock cal. 9mm pistol but instead hitting one
Feliber Andres y Ordoño, on the left back portion
of her head, thereby inflicting upon her serious
and mortal wound which directly caused her
death, as well as hitting John Kenneth Andres y
Ordoño and Kevin Valdez y Ordoño physical
injuries which ordinarily would have caused their
death, thus performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of murder
as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of some cause or causes,
independent of their will, that is, the timely and
able medical assistance rendered to John
Kenneth Andres y Ordoño and Kevin Valdez y
Ordoño to their damage and prejudice as well as
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
Feliber Andres y Ordoño."
On arraignment the accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty"
to the crimes charged.
The case records show that Feliber Andres, the wife of Noel
Andres did not die instantaneously. She lived to give birth
to a baby girl5 by caesarian section and died the following
morning on November 1, 1998. The Autopsy
Report6 states:
son of the accused; Forth is when, Inocencio
seeing his son having confrontation with Noel,
got his gun to protect Dino; and Fifth is when
Inocencio had a struggle with his daughter.
Trisha Gonzalez, who tried to reach for the gun
and as a result of which Inocencio lost his
balance and as he was falling backward to his
side, his right arm holding the gun hit the rear
window of the Tamaraw FX van and the gun
accidentally went off hitting the victim, who were
all then inside the van.
"FINDINGS: Fairly nourished, fairly developed
female cadaver, with post mortem lividity.
Conjunctivae are pale. Lips and nail beds are
cyanotic. Surgical incisions were noted at left
tempero-parietal region. Surgical incisions is also
noted at the abdominal region secondary to a
caesarian section.
The court likewise take judicial notice on the
feature of the automatic pistol used in this case
which
is
capable
of
unquestionable
demonstration or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. Practically, the
stages before an automatic firearm would be
capable of firing are as follows: 1) the loading of
a bullet into the chamber of the gun; 2) the
cocking of the hammer, if uncocked; 3) the
releasing of the safety pin; 4) the pressing of the
trigger to unleash the hammer so that the firing
pin will hit the cartridge to propel the bullet out to
hit the target. Realistically, it demonstrates that a
gun will not fire even if the bullet is loaded in its
chamber if the hammer is uncocked; or even if
cocked if the safety pin is engaged; or even if the
safety pin is disengaged if the trigger will not be
pressed. However, even if the gun is fired if it is
not aimed and leveled to the target, the purpose
of firing it shall not be achieved. Contrarily, once
a gun is drawn against a person, the means
methods and forms employed for its execution is
already conceived. And once it is tended directly
and specifically to insure its execution, it
consequently produces the conscious and
deliberate intention. Finally if all the acts of
execution had been effectively done without risk
on the part of the offender arising from any
defense coming from the offended party,
treachery results. In brief, there is treachery
when the offender commits any crime against
persons, employing means, methods and forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the
offended party might make (People vs. Mesa 276
SCRA 407; People vs. Carlos Patrolla, Jr. G. R.
No. 112445, March 7, 1996). To appreciate
treachery two (2) conditions must be present, to
wit: 1) the employment of means of execution
that give the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or retaliate; and 2) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted. (People vs. Azugue, 268 SCRA 711;
People vs. Peña, G. R. No. 116022, July 1, 1998,
p. 1)
HEAD: (1) gunshot wound, point of entry, left
fronto-temporal region, measuring 1 by 0.9 cm, 9
cm from the anterior midline, with a uniform
abraided collar measuring 0.2 cm., directed
posteriorwards,
slightly
downwards,
and
medialwards, fracturing the frontal, and left
temporal bones, lacerating the left cerebral
hemisphere, with a deformed slug fragment
embedded and recovered at the posterior lobe of
the left cerebral hemisphere. (2) hematoma, left
orbital region, measuring 4.5 by 2 cm, 4 cm from
the anterior midline. There are subdural and
subarachnoidal hemorrages. Stomach contains
1 ½ glassful of partially digested food particles
mostly rice and meaty material.
CONCLUSION: Cause of death is gunshot
wound on the head."
Kenneth and Kevin were treated for extraction of metallic
fragments on their faces. They were discharged from the
hospital six days later or on November 6, 1998.
On June 25, 1999 the trial court rendered judgement finding
that the shooting was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and held the appellant guilty of
the complex crime of murder for the death of Feliber Andres
and for two counts of frustrated murder for the injuries
sustained by Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez and
sentenced the appellant to the maximum of the imposable
penalty which is death. The trial court held:
"Beforehand, the Court takes note of the judicial
admissions on the verbal declarations of the
accused that the court ‘a quo’ has jurisdiction
over the case; that he owns the black Gluck 9
mm. automatic pistol; that the said gun will never
fire even if he drops it; that only one bullet was
fired from his gun; and that the victim Feliber
Andres is already dead. With this exegesis and
the declarations in open court of the eyewitness
of both the prosecution and some of the defense,
there is no real dispute on the antecedent facts
showing that the accused fired on Noel Andres
but instead hit and caused the fatal injuries to the
victims John Kenneth Andres, Kevin Valdez and
Feliber Andres resulting to the ultimate death of
the latter. The court takes further judicial
admissions of the accused made in their
memorandum demonstrating the existence of
five (5) sequences of events leading to the death
of Feliber Andres and the wounding of John
Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez which are as
follows: First is when Noel Andres overtook the
car driven of the accused and cut cross his path;
Second is when Noel Andres alighted from his
vehicle and confronted Inocencio; Third is when
Noel had an argument with Dino Gonzalez, the
In the case at bar and guided with the abovequoted doctrinal cases, logically, the accused is
positive of the crime charged against him. When
he alighted with a drawn gun to protect his son
and released all the safety measures of his gun
as he fired and missed at Noel who was then
unarmed, but instead hit Kevin Valdez, John
Kenneth Andres and Feliber Andres which
resulted to the death of the latter, demonstrate
that the accused has executed the two (2)
conditions to generate treachery enough to
qualify the crime committed to murder."
XXXX
XXXXX
XXXX
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,
the accused Inocencio Gonzalez, Jr., y Esquivel
is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the complex crime of Murder with Double
Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder
penalized under Art. 248, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659 in relation to Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to
suffer the maximum penalty of Death by lethal
injection.
The accused is further ordered to pay the
following civil liabilities:
1. To the private complainant Noel Andres:
a) the amount of P50,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of Feliber
Andres;
b) the amount of P3,363,663.60 as
indemnity for the loss of earning
capacity of the deceased Feliber
Andres;
c) the amount of P98,384.19 as funeral
expenses;
d) the amount of P271,800.56 for the
hospitalization expenses incurred for
the injuries sustained by the deceased
Feliber Andres and the amount of
P23,622.58
representing
the
expenses for the untimely delivery of
the child Ma. Clarisse Andres;
"1. The trial court committed reversible error
when it found that treachery was present.
2. The trial court committed reversible error when
it presumed that there was treachery by taking
judicial notice of the feature of the automatic
pistol involved in this case.
3. The trial court committed reversible error when
it violated the constitutional right of the accusedappellant to due process when it took judicial
notice of the feature of the automatic pistol
involved in this case without notice.
4. The trial court committed reversible error when
it found Accused-Appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder
with Double Frustrated Murder.
5. The trial court committed reversible error when
it failed to appreciate the mitigating
circumstances of passion or obfuscation, lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong,
provocation or threat on the part of the offended
party immediately preceded the act, incomplete
defense of relative, and voluntary surrender.
6. The trial court committed reversible error when
it failed to find that the shooting incident was
accidental.
7. The trial court committed reversible error when
it gave credence to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Elmer Ramos and Moises
Castro.
e) the amount of P51,566.00
representing
the
hospitalization
expenses for the injuries sustained by
the victim John Kenneth Andres;
8. The trial court committed reversible error when
it disregarded the basic principle that the
accused is presumed innocent and his guilt must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
f) the amount of P150,000.00 as moral
damages suffered for the untimely
death of his wife Feliber Andres and for
the injuries caused to his son John
Kenneth Andres;
9. The trial court committed reversible error when
it ordered Accused-Appellant to pay for the civil
liabilities."
g) the amount of P50,000.00 as and by
way of attorney’s fees and a fee of
P2,000.00 per appearance; and
h) the costs of the suit.
2. To the private complainant Nicasio Valdez:
a) the amount of P73,824.75 as actual
damages for the injuries sustained by
the victim Kevin Valdez; and
b) the amount of P75,000.00 as and by
way of moral damages.
SO ORDERED."
In his appeal, Gonzalez submits the following assignments
of error:
The appellant seeks a reversal and prays that judgment be
rendered exempting him from criminal and civil liabilities.
Appellant declared that he had no intention to shoot Noel
Andres much less his wife nor the children. He lost his
balance when his daughter Trisha approached and pushed
him backwards to stop him from joining Dino and Noel
Andres but the appellant tried to free his right hand holding
the gun and it accidentally fired. The single bullet fired hit
the last window on the left side of the Tamaraw FX. The
appellant claims that he did not see the passengers inside
the vehicle at the time of the shooting. This is corroborated
by the testimony of two witnesses for the prosecution who
testified that the windows of Andres’ vehicle are heavily
tinted so that a person outside the vehicle would not be able
to see if there are people inside. It is also argued that had
the appellant intended to shoot Noel Andres he could have
simply done so by shooting at him directly. The defense
asserts that the evidence for the prosecution failed to
establish the attendance of treachery and without the
attendance of the said qualifying circumstance the crime
committed is homicide, not murder.
The appellant also points out that the trial court made the
factual finding that the shooting happened in a matter of
seconds and that it was preceded by a heated argument
between the parties. Such being the case, it is argued that
the shooting could not have been attended by treachery.
There was no time for the appellant to consciously and
deliberately employ the mode of attack against Noel
Andres, nor against any one of the actual victims, to insure
its execution and at the same time to eliminate any form of
retaliation from the alleged intended victim. And yet, the trial
court, contrary to the evidence on record, held that the
loading of the bullet into the chamber of the gun, the
cocking of the hammer, the release of the safety pin and
the pulling of the trigger by the appellant of his automatic
pistol constitute conscious and deliberate effort to employ
the gun as a means of committing the crime and resultantly,
qualified its commission by treachery. Such a finding
presupposes that the appellant loaded the gun to shoot
Noel Andres only that very moment when his son Dino and
Noel Andres were arguing. This conclusion has no basis on
record. The appellant testified that his gun was loaded
before he left the house and two witnesses for prosecution
stated in court that a few seconds after Noel Andres and
Dino started shouting at each other, the appellant got out of
his car and shot at the last window on the left side of the
complainant’s vehicle. Further, the appellant assigns as
error the procedure adopted by the trial court in taking
judicial notice that the gun used by the appellant is an
automatic pistol and as such, it will not fire unless aimed at
the intended target. The procedure taken by the trial court
is contrary to Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court.7 The trial court should have given both parties the
opportunity to present evidence, expert evidence, if
necessary, to inform the court on the subject matter. The
appellant argues that the factual finding borne by such
erroneous procedure is equally erroneous. The gun used
by the appellant is a semi-automatic and not an automatic
pistol which means that the pistol used has no external
safety pin to be released and that the hammer need not be
cocked. The pulling of the trigger, intentional or not, will fire
the gun. The use of a semi-automatic pistol does not
necessarily imply treachery.
Appellant also argues that the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Castro and Ramos were improperly given
credence by the trial court. The appellant contends that a
reading of their testimonies would show that their narration
of the incident is rather absurd and would show that they
did not witness the actual shooting. Defense witnesses,
Gonzalez and his daughter, Trisha, on the other hand,
testified that Castro and Ramos arrived at the scene only
after the shooting.
These admitted circumstances show that the appellant was
not in his proper state of mind at the time of the shooting.
First, he was angered by Andres’ abusive language and
later he got out of his car with a loaded gun to protect his
son from a perceived danger. The appellant clams that his
willingness to help the injured and his voluntary surrender
to the police should likewise be considered as mitigating
circumstances in the imposition of penalties.
The Solicitor-General agrees with the appellant that the
crime was not attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery and hence the crime committed by the appellant
for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide, not murder. The
appellee takes into consideration that the shooting was
preceded by a heated argument and that the supposed
victim was placed on guard that attack was imminent. It also
appears that the shooting was done impulsively. There is
no evidence that the appellant deliberately employed the
means of attack to insure execution of the crime and at the
same time eliminate the risk of retaliation from the private
complainant. The appellee also agrees with the appellant
that the trial court erred in equating the use of an automatic
pistol with treachery. The trial court made the factual finding
that the appellant’s automatic pistol would not fire unless
aimed and the trigger is deliberately pulled and hence
treachery attended the shooting. The appellee submits that
if we follow the reasoning of the trial court it would appear
that the appellant intended to shoot at the complainant’s
vehicle only as the shot was fired at the last window on the
left side of the FX away from where Andres was allegedly
seated. The fact that the gun was drawn and fired does not
mean that the mode of attack was consciously and
deliberately employed.
However, with respect to the injuries sustained by Kevin
and Kenneth, the appellee disagrees with the contention
that the appellant is liable only for slight physical injuries.
The injuries sustained by both children are head injuries
and could have caused their death if not for the immediate
medical attention given them. The number of days spent in
the hospital is not determinative of the severity of the
wounds. Their nature and location should instead be
considered. The appellant cannot escape liability for
frustrated homicide for the injuries of the two children on the
ground that he fired a single shot at the vehicle of Noel
Andres. He is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful
act even if the crime committed is different from that
intended.
As regards the injuries sustained by Kevin and Kenneth, it
is argued that considering that there was no intent to kill and
that they stayed in the hospital only for six days, the crime
committed is physical injuries. It is argued that the trial court
erred in awarding damages. The bunch of receipts
allegedly representing the medical expenses incurred for
the injuries sustained by the victims was erroneously
admitted in evidence, without first requiring the prosecution
to establish the authenticity of the receipts. The appellant
also points out that the award for loss of earning capacity
has no basis as the deceased was unemployed at the time
of the incident.
As regards the pleaded mitigating circumstances, appellee
asserts that none can be considered in favor of the
appellant. There is evidence on record that the appellant
did not voluntarily surrender to the police and it appears
from the testimonies of witnesses that he entertained the
possibility of flight but his car was stuck in traffic along the
exit of the memorial park. His pretense of incomplete
defense of a relative is belied by his own admission that
when he saw that Noel Andres did not have a gun he
lowered his hand holding the gun. There was allegedly no
threat on the life of his son at the time of the shooting, no
uncontrollable fear nor irresistible force that would mitigate
the commission of the offense.
Finally, the appellant assigns as error the trial court’s
rejection of the mitigating circumstances pleaded by the
defense which allegedly attended the commission of the
crime, i.e., lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong,
passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative
and voluntary surrender. The appellant asserts that these
mitigating circumstances were duly proven during the trial
and are supported by the evidence on record. The private
complainant Noel Andres testified that he saw the appellant
getting red in anger after they, Andres and the appellant,
had a heated argument immediately prior to the shooting.
The Solicitor-General also seeks to uphold the pecuniary
awards granted by the trial court. The appellee alleges that
it is not denied by the appellant that Feliber Andres was a
38 year old registered nurse at the time of the shooting.
Although she was then unemployed on account of her
pregnancy, she still had earning capacity and the trial court
properly applied the salary of a government nurse under the
salary standardization scheme in the computation of
damages for the loss of earning capacity. The receipts
presented in evidence by the prosecution to establish
hospitalization and other medical expenses incurred by the
private complainants by reason of the injuries suffered by
the victims were duly authenticated by the prosecution
witnesses and there is no dispute that they are exact copies
of the original receipts presented in court. The objections
raised by the appellant in this regard were duly met by the
evidence presented by the private complainants.
In sum, the appellee asserts that considering that the
appellant fired a single shot and in the process committed
four offenses the appellant should be held liable for the
complex crime of homicide for the death of Feliber Andres,
double frustrated homicide against Kevin and Kenneth and
attempted homicide against Noel Andres. Under the rules
on complex crimes the penalty for the gravest offense,
i.e., reclusion temporal for homicide, should be imposed in
its maximum period.
The appeal has merit.
Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code is defined as the deliberate employment of means,
methods or forms in the execution of a crime against
persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the intended victim might raise. For
treachery to be appreciated two elements must concur: 1)
the employment of means of execution that would insure
the safety of the accused from retaliatory acts of the
intended victim and leaving the latter without an opportunity
to defend himself and 2) the means employed were
deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.8 The
suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the wound from
behind the victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the
time the attack was made or the fact that the victim was
unarmed do not by themselves render the attack as
treacherous.9This is of particular significance in a case of
an instantaneous attack made by the accused whereby he
gained an advantageous position over the victim when the
latter accidentally fell and was rendered defenseless.10 The
means employed for the commission of the crime or the
mode of attack must be shown to have been consciously or
deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the
consummation of the crime and at the same time eliminate
or reduce the risk of retaliation from the intended
victim.11 Accordingly, it has been consistently held by this
court that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes
committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded
by heated altercations are generally not attended by
treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to
deliberately employ a treacherous mode of attack.12 Thus,
the sudden attack made by the accused due to his
infuriation by reason of the victim’s provocation was held to
be without treachery. Sudden attacks made by the accused
preceded by curses and insults by the victim or acts
taunting the accused to retaliate or the rebellious or
aggressive behavior of the victim were held to be without
treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of
reprisal.13 For the rules on treachery to apply the sudden
attack must have been preconceived by the accused,
unexpected by the victim and without provocation on the
part of the latter.14
This Court has also had occasion to state that whether or
not the attack succeeds against its intended victim or
injures another or whether the crime committed is graver
than that intended is immaterial, as long as it is shown that
the attack is attended by treachery, the said qualifying
circumstance may still be considered by the court.15 Thus,
the determining factor on whether or not the commission of
a crime is attended by treachery is not the resulting crime
committed but the mode of attack employed in its
execution.16
Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner
of attack must be shown to have been attended by
treachery as conclusively as the crime itself.17
We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that
the shooting was not attended by treachery and accordingly
the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is
homicide and not murder.
The encounter between Noel Andres and the appellant was
a chance encounter. They were total strangers before their
vehicles almost collided at an intersection inside the
memorial park. Unfortunately, heated exchange of remarks
that followed the near collision was fanned by a short
temper, which in the case of the appellant, was augmented
by the improvident use of a firearm.
From a reading of the transcript of the testimonies of the
witnesses, it would appear that Noel Andres, who had his
pregnant wife and child with him, among others, on board
the Tamaraw FX provoked the altercation. After the near
collision of his vehicle with that of the appellant, he tailed
behind the latter’s car towards the exit until he had the
chance to cut him off to scold him for his failure to observe
traffic rules.18 Andres stated in court that he calmly told the
appellant to be careful with his driving and denied that he
was angry when he alighted from his vehicle to confront the
appellant.19 His statement is belied by the witnesses, two
prosecution witnesses included, who uniformly testified that
Andres quarreled with or shouted and cursed at the
appellant for the latter’s recklessness at the
intersection.20 The appellant narrated in court that Andres
repeatedly shouted at him, "Putang ina mo, ang tandatanda mo na gago ka pa".21 Andres’ hostile behavior
towards the appellant is evident from his statement in court
that he noticed the appellant turning red in anger.22 It is
highly improbable for Gonzalez to have turned red in anger
had Andres been polite, as he claims he was, in scolding
Gonzalez. Andres could have simply communicated to the
appellant his disgust for the latter’s bad driving when he
overtook the appellant’s car near the scene of the shooting
but instead he chose to block the appellant’s path, insult
and virtually provoke the appellant to retaliate.
Andres stated in court that when he noticed Gonzalez’
infuriation he immediately walked towards his vehicle,
because according to him the altercation was over. On his
way to his FX he met another man, whom he later found out
to be the appellant’s son, Dino. It appears that the
altercation was far from over because again Andres had a
shouting match this time with Dino.23 In a matter of
seconds, the appellant alighted from his car and fired a
single shot at the last window on the left side of Andres’
vehicle at an angle away from Noel Andres. The single
bullet fired hit Feliber Andres on the forehead near the
temporal region above the left eye and the two children with
metallic fragments of the bullet on their faces, one at the
cheek and the other below his left eye.
The prosecution did not present evidence as to the exact
seating arrangement of the victims inside the vehicle;
suffice it to say, that an examination of the pictures of the
vehicle24 one of which shows a mass of blood stains on the
left side (towards the driver’s seat) of the white seat cover
below the head rest25, would show that the deceased
Feliber must have been seated at the front passenger’s
seat and the children at the middle row behind the driver’s
seat.26 Another picture shows a bullet hole on the last
window on the left side of the vehicle27 and another shows
that the front windshield appears undamaged.28 A ballistics
expert appeared in court for the prosecution and testified
that the bullet fired at the FX came from the appellant’s gun,
which fact was admitted by the defense. The prosecution
did not inquire from the ballistics expert regarding the
trajectory of the bullet or the approximate distance of the
appellant from the FX when he fired his gun to establish
whether or not the appellant aimed for Noel or Feliber or
simply fired indiscriminately at the latter’s vehicle.29
At first blush it would seem that the shooting of Feliber
Andres was attended by treachery as she was inside the
FX witnessing her husband’s altercation, first, with the
appellant then with the appellant’s son, totally defenseless
from the shot that came suddenly from her left side. Public
outrage over the death of Feliber was heightened by the
fact that she was then pregnant with her second child and
her death left a new born baby girl and a two year old boy
motherless.
However, a meticulous review of the evidence prevents a
conclusive finding of treachery and any doubt must be
resolved, like the fact of the commission of an offense, in
favor of the accused. The pictures indicate that Gonzalez
fired at the FX at an angle away from Noel Andres and that
Gonzalez was not aiming at anybody in particular. It is not
disputed that the appellant’s car was directly behind the
complainant’s FX and that Gonzalez who was then seated
at the driver’s seat alighted from his car, took a few steps
then fired at the left side of the FX. Whether Noel Andres
was seated at the driver’s seat inside his vehicle when
Gonzalez fired at the FX, as the prosecution asserts, or was
standing by the door of the driver’s seat outside his vehicle,
as the defense submits, it is clear that the shot was fired
away from Noel Andres. The bullet hit Feliber near her
temple above the left eye indicating that she was facing left
towards her husband when the shot was fired.30 The direct
hit on Feliber’s head shows that the angle of the shot was
indeed away from Noel Andres. Even the eyewitness for the
prosecution testified that had the appellant intended to kill
Noel Andres he could have shot directly at him, considering
that Noel Andres was just a few steps away from him 31 and
that Noel Andres was visible from the outside because his
window was partially open.32 The pictures show that the
bullet hole was on the third window on the left side of the
Tamaraw FX33 belying any attempt to shoot Noel Andres.
Two prosecution witnesses Ramos and Castro
unequivocally declared that "nothing or no one" prevented
Gonzalez from shooting directly at Noel Andres and that
Gonzalez could have simply done so if he wanted to. But
after alighting from his car, Gonzalez took a few steps and
shot at the left side window of the FX.34
The fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the
victim does not by itself amount to treachery. There is no
evidence on record that the appellant deliberately
positioned himself behind the victim to gain advantage over
him when he fired the shot. On the contrary, the evidence
before us reveals that the position of the appellant’s car was
not of his own doing but it became so when Noel Andres
overtook his car and cut off his path.
We note further, that the appellant did not act belligerently
towards Noel Andres even after the latter cut off the
appellant’s path. Andres stated in court that the appellant
did not alight from his car nor opened his window until he,
Andres, tapped on it.35 For his part Gonzalez categorically
stated in court that he did not point his gun nor threatened
Andres during their short spat.36 Gonzalez, although he had
his gun in his car, did not react to Andres’ cursing until the
latter was having an altercation with the appellant’s son,
Dino. Gonzalez claimed that he perceived that his son was
in imminent danger.37 Whether he overreacted or he shot at
Andres’ vehicle out of rage over Andres’ aggressive
behavior, one thing appears clear to us, that the shooting
was not done in cold blood. It is undisputed that the
windows of the FX are heavily or darkly tinted so that a
person outside would not see if anybody was inside. 38 The
pictures of the FX39 on record confirm the testimonies of
both prosecution and defense witnesses that the other
passengers of the FX were not visible from the outside.
Gonzalez admitted in court that Noel Andres mentioned
that he has passengers with him while he was shouting and
cursing at Gonzalez but there is no indication that Gonzalez
had any opportunity to see the passengers when he fired
the shot. The totality of the evidence on record fails to
support a conclusion that Gonzalez deliberately employed
the mode of attack to gain undue advantage over the
intended nor the actual victim. Without any decisive
evidence to the contrary, treachery cannot be considered;
thus the crime committed is homicide.40
The trial court’s finding that the loading of the gun, the
cocking of the hammer and finally the pulling of the trigger
constitute a deliberate effort on the part of appellant to use
the gun as a means of a treacherous attack is patently
erroneous. A single and continuous attack cannot be
divided into stages to make it appear that treachery was
involved.41 The entire incident happened in a matter of
minutes, as testified to by witnesses, and as noted by the
trial court.42 It was error to our mind for the trial court to
divide the assault in stages to arrive at the conclusion that
the mode of attack was consciously employed by the
appellant. Contrary to the finding of the trial court that the
appellant prepared the gun before getting out of his car, the
appellant testified that he loaded his gun before he left the
house and that it was ready to fire when he alighted his car.
There was no time for him to reflect on the mode of attack
since he just picked up his gun and alighted from his car
and shot at the FX a few seconds after Dino and Noel
Andres started shouting at each other.43 We note further
that the trial court pointed out that from the fact that the
appellant prepared his gun to shoot, this was an indication
of the deliberate employment of the gun as a means to kill;
i.e. that the use of an automatic pistol shows that the
shooting was attended by treachery.
We do not agree that the weapon used, by itself, is
determinative of treachery, unless it is shown, and it is not
herein shown, that the appellant deliberately used the gun
to insure the commission of the crime and to render the
unarmed victim defenseless. As discussed above, the
encounter between the appellant and the Andresses was a
chance encounter and the appellant’s gun was in the glove
compartment of his car even before he left his house. The
shooting was clearly a spur of the moment or impulsive
decision made by the appellant preceded by a heated
altercation at the instance of the private complainant.
Jurisprudence teaches us that under the circumstances,
treachery is not obtaining. In the case of People vs.
Valles,44 the accused, a security guard, fired his Armalite
and mortally wounded the victim when the latter
approached the accused four times insisting on entering the
workplace wearing improper uniform, then cursed and
insulted and challenged the accused to a fight. We held that
the shooting was not attended by treachery as the shooting
was preceded by a heated altercation at the instance of the
victim. It is to be noted that the kind of weapon used against
an unarmed victim was not taken into consideration in
determining the attendance of treachery; it is the mode of
attack employed by the accused under the particular
circumstances of a case that determines its attendance in
the commission of a crime. We find that the prosecution has
not discharged its burden to show that the shooting was
attended by treachery and we are convinced that the crime
committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide.
As regards the injuries sustained by the two children we find
that the crime committed are two counts of slight physical
injuries. The intent to kill determines whether the crime
committed is physical injuries or homicide and such intent
is made manifest by the acts of the accused which are
undoubtedly intended to kill the victim.45 In a case wherein
the accused did not know that a person was hiding behind
a table who was hit by a stray bullet causing superficial
injuries requiring treatment for three days, the crime
committed is slight physical injuries.46 In case of doubt as
to the homicidal intent of the accused, he should be
convicted of the lesser offense of physical injuries. 47We
have earlier pointed out that the intent to kill is absent in this
case. It was also found that one small metallic fragment was
extracted from Kenneth below his left eye while another
fragment was extracted from Kevin "immediately below the
level of his skin before the cheek bone".48 An examination
of the testimonies of the attending physicians, showed that
the wounds sustained by the two children from the metallic
fragments are not in themselves fatal but may cause death
if left untreated. One of the attending physician testified in
court that the fragments themselves "will not cause
complication, it is the entry of the fragment" or the open
wound that is susceptible to infection.49 Two small
fragments were no longer extracted from the face of Kevin
Valdez, as the doctor deemed it to be without danger of
complication.50 We note that the various sizes of the
metallic fragments were not established, at least to give an
indication of the severity of the wounds sustained. Both
children were discharged after six days of treatment and
there is no showing that they required subsequent
treatment or that they were immobilized for a greater
number of days by reason of the injuries sustained.
Considering the nature and location of their injuries and the
number of days required for their treatment, we find that the
crime committed for the injuries sustained by the children
are two counts of slight physical injuries under Art. 266 of
the Revised Penal Code which imposes a penalty of arresto
menor or imprisonment for 1 to 30 days for injuries
sustained that has incapacitated the victim for one to nine
days or required medical attendance for the same period.
For evident lack of criminal intent to kill the complainant,
Noel Andres, as above stated, the information for attempted
homicide must fail.
The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender,
passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative
and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded by
the defense, were not convincingly proved and none can be
considered in the imposition of penalties. The testimony of
prosecution witness contradicts the appellant’s pretense of
voluntary surrender. Witness Ramos testified that the
appellant drove away towards the gate of the memorial park
while he was questioning him after the shooting and had
not Noel Andres and onlookers blocked his path the
appellant could have fled the scene of the crime.51
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is
also not obtaining. For this mitigating circumstance to be
considered, it must be shown that (1) an unlawful act
sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was
committed by the intended victim; (2) that the crime was
committed within a reasonable length of time from the
commission of the unlawful act that produced the
obfuscation in the accused’s mind; and that (3) "the passion
and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from
a spirit of lawlessness or revenge".52 Noel Andres’ act of
shouting at the appellant’s son, who was then a nurse and
of legal age, is not sufficient to produce passion and
obfuscation as it is claimed by the accused. Besides, the
appellant’s son, Dino was shouting back at Noel Andres. It
was not a case wherein the appellant’s son appeared
helpless and oppressed that the appellant lost his reason
and shot at the FX of Noel Andres. The same holds true for
the appellant’s claim of provocation on the part of Noel
Andres. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to
commit the wrong committed and that the provocation must
be commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency
of provocation varies according to the circumstances of the
case.53 The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards
the appellant and his son may be demeaning or humiliating
but it is not sufficient provocation to shoot at the
complainant’s vehicle.
The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance
of incomplete defense of a relative is also unmeritorious
since the act of Andres in cursing and shouting at the
appellant and his son do not amount to an unlawful
aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez. Finally, the plea
for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of
merit. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there
is a notable disparity between the means employed by the
accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime
committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon
used, the mode of attack employed and the injury sustained
by the victim.54 The appellant’s use of a gun, although not
deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should
have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of the
possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun is
sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.
For the death of Feliber Andres, and in the absence of any
mitigating circumstance, the appellant is hereby sentenced
to an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, in its medium period, as minimum to 14 years 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as maximum. For each count of the slight physical
injuries committed against Kenneth Andres and Kevin
Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to 20 days of
arresto menor in its medium period.
The rules on the imposition of penalties for complex crimes
under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code are not applicable
in this case. Art. 48 applies if a single act constitutes two or
more grave and less grave felonies or when an offense is a
necessary means of committing another; in such a case,
the penalty for the most serious offense shall be imposed
in its maximum period. Art. 9 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Art. 25 defines grave felonies as those to which
the law attaches the capital punishment or afflictive
penalties from reclusion perpetua to prision mayor; less
grave felonies are those to which the law attaches a penalty
which in its maximum period falls under correctional
penalties; and light felonies are those punishable by arresto
menor or fine not exceeding two hundred pesos.
Considering that the offenses committed by the act of the
appellant of firing a single shot are one count of homicide,
a grave felony, and two counts of slight physical injuries, a
light felony, the rules on the imposition of penalties for
complex crimes, which requires two or more grave and/or
less grave felonies, will not apply.
The pecuniary award granted by the trial court for actual
damages was duly established by the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses as supported by the original receipts
for hospitalization and other medical expenses presented
in evidence by the prosecution. The award for loss of
earning capacity is likewise sustained for the reason that
while Feliber Andres was pregnant and was unemployed at
the time of death, it is not disputed that she was a registered
nurse and had earning capacity. Noel Andres also testified
that he and his wife had plans to go back to Saudi Arabia
to work after Feliber had given birth to their second baby.
While there is no evidence as to Feliber’s actual income at
the time of her death, in view of her temporary separation
from work because of her pregnancy, we do not consider it
reversible error for the trial court to peg her earning capacity
to that of the salary of a government nurse under the salary
standardization law, as a fair estimate or reasonable
assessment of her earning capacity at the time of her death.
It would be grossly inequitous to deny her spouse and her
minor children damages for the support that they would
have received, considering clear evidence on record that
she did have earning capacity at the time of her death.
The awards for moral damages for the death of Feliber
Andres and for the injuries sustained by the two children,
which under the circumstances are reasonable, are
likewise sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby
MODIFIED. The appellant is hereby found guilty of
homicide for the death of Feliber Andres and is sentenced
to an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 14 years 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as maximum. For each count of the slight physical
injuries committed against Kenneth Andres and Kevin
Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to 20 days of
arresto menor.
The pecuniary awards granted by the trial court are hereby
sustained.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
Facts
On October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m., both the
families of Noel Andres (complainant) and that of Inocencio
Gonzalez, Jr. (accused-appellant) were on their way to the
exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. Gonzalez was driving a
white Isuzu Esteem with his grandson and three
housemaids, while Andres was driving a maroon Toyota FX
with his pregnant wife, Feliber Andres; his two-year-old son,
Kenneth; his nephew, Kevin; and his sister-in-law, Francar
Valdez. At an intersection, while Gonzalez was turning left
toward the exit and Andres was headed straight along the
road to the exit, their two vehicles almost collided. Gonzalez
continued driving along his way, while Andres drove behind
the appellant's vehicle for some time and cut him off when
he found the opportunity to do so. Andres got out of his
vehicle and knocked on Gonzalez's car window. An
altercation between the two then ensued.
Based on the defense’s version of the incident,
Dino, the appellant’s son who rode in another vehicle, then
arrived at the scene and confronted Andres. As the two
were arguing, Andres suddenly reached for something
inside his vehicle, prompting Gonzalez to get his gun (black
Gluck 9 mm) from the glove compartment. Feeling that his
son was threatened, Gonzalez got out of his car ready to
shoot. When he saw that Andres did not have a weapon,
he put down his hand holding the gun. This is when the
appellant's daughter, Trisha, who was riding in Dino's car,
arrived at the scene, walked past Dino and Andres, and
pushed the appellant away. She hugged her father, and in
the process, held his hand holding the gun. Gonzalez tried
to free his hand. With Trisha's substantial body weight
pushing against him, Gonzalez lost his balance and the gun
accidentally fired.
The single bullet fired hit the last window on the
left side of Andres’s heavily tinted vehicle, hitting
complainant’s wife, Feliber, on the forehead near the
temporal region above the left eye, which caused her death,
as well as Kenneth and Kevin with metallic fragments of the
bullet on their faces, one at the cheek and the other below
his left eye.
Of note is that the trial court took judicial notice
on the feature of the automatic pistol used in the case. The
stages before an automatic gun would be capable of firing
demonstrates that a gun will not fire even if the bullet is
loaded in its chamber if the hammer is uncocked; or even if
cocked if the safety pin is engaged; or even if the safety pin
is disengaged if the trigger will not be pressed. However,
even if the gun is fired if it is not aimed and leveled to the
target, the purpose of firing it shall not be achieved.
Contrarily, once a gun is drawn against a person, the
means methods and forms employed for its execution is
already conceived. And once it is tended directly and
specifically to insure its execution, it consequently produces
the conscious and deliberate intention. Finally, if all the acts
of execution had been effectively done without risk on the
part of the offender arising from any defense coming from
the offended party, treachery results.
On June 25, 1999, the trial court rendered
judgement finding that the shooting was attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. Gonzalez was found
guilty of the complex crime of murder (for the death of
Feliber Andres) with double frustrated murder (for the
injuries sustained by Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez)
and attempted murder, and sentenced to suffer the
maximum penalty of death by lethal injection.
In his appeal, Gonzalez asserted that the
attendance of treachery was not established, and thus,
without the attendance of the said qualifying circumstance,
the crime committed is homicide, not murder.
Issue
Whether or not the shooting was attended by
treachery and, accordingly, the crime committed is murder.
Ruling
Treachery (Par. 16 of Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code) is defined as the deliberate employment of
means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime
against persons, which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the intended victim might raise.
For treachery to be appreciated, two elements
must concur:
1)
2)
the employment of means of execution
that would insure the safety of the
accused from retaliatory acts of the
intended victim and leaving the latter
without an opportunity to defend
himself; and
the means employed (mode of attack)
were deliberately or consciously
adopted by the offender.
The Supreme Court ruled that the shooting
was not attended by treachery and, accordingly, the
crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is
homicide and not murder.
1.
The intent to kill is absent in this case. It is clear
that the shot was fired away from Noel Andres.
Had Gonzalez intended to kill Andres, he could
have shot directly at him, as he was just a few
steps away and Andres was visible from the
outside because his window was partially open.
2.
The fact that the appellant fired his gun from
behind the victim does not by itself amount to
treachery. There is no evidence on record that
Gonzalez deliberately positioned himself behind
the victim to gain advantage over him when he
fired the shot. On the contrary, the evidence
reveals that the position of the appellant's car
was not of his own doing but it became so when
Andres overtook his car and cut off his path.
The totality of the evidence on record fails to
support a conclusion that Gonzalez deliberately
employed the mode of attack to gain undue
advantage over the intended nor the actual
victim. Without any decisive evidence to the
contrary, treachery cannot be considered.
3.
The trial court's finding that the loading of the
gun, the cocking of the hammer, and, finally, the
pulling of the trigger constitute a deliberate effort
on the part of Gonzalez to use the gun as a
means of a treacherous attack is patently
erroneous. A single and continuous attack
cannot be divided into stages to make it appear
that treachery was involved.
The entire incident happened in a matter of
minutes. There was no time for Gonzalez to
reflect on the mode of attack since he just picked
up his gun and alighted from his car and shot at
the FX a few seconds after Dino and Andres
started shouting at each other.
The encounter between Gonzalez and Andres
was a chance encounter, and the appellant's gun
was in the glove compartment of his car even
before he left his house. The shooting was
clearly a spur of the moment or impulsive
decision made by Gonzalez preceded by a
heated altercation at the instance of Andres.
Jurisprudence (People v Valles, 267 SCRA 103)
teaches us that under the circumstances,
treachery is not obtaining.
The means employed for the commission of the
crime or the mode of attack must be shown to
have been consciously or deliberately adopted
by the accused to insure the consummation of
the crime and at the same time eliminate or
reduce the risk of retaliation from the intended
victim. Accordingly, it has been consistently held
by this court that chance encounters, impulse
killing or crimes committed at the spur of the
moment or that were preceded by heated
altercations are generally not attended by
treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused
to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of
attack.
4.
Weapon used, by itself, is not determinative of
treachery, unless it is shown that the appellant
deliberately used the gun to insure the
commission of the crime and to render the
unarmed victim defenseless. The kind of weapon
used against an unarmed victim is not taken into
consideration in determining the attendance of
treachery; it is the mode of attack employed by
the accused under the particular circumstances
of a case that determines its attendance in the
commission of a crime.