South Korea and Japan since World War II:
Between Ideological Discord and Pragmatic
Cooperation*
Shale Horowitz
Since the end of World War II, relations between South Korea and Japan
have gone through significant changes – from distant and hostile in the
1950s, to cooperative and increasingly close through about 2005, to the last
decade of serious deterioration. Three frameworks are used to understand
change and continuity in South Korea–Japan relations: a realist perspective
emphasizing either structural military power relations or “revealed” patterns
of military threat; an institutional perspective that emphasizes similarities or
differences in political institutions; and an ideological regime-type perspective that includes ideologies as well as institutions as influences on government or leadership preferences. The third framework captures two types of
ideological factors that have exerted significant influences on South Korea–
Japan relations: the existence of a small range of competitive ideological
regime types or government types specifying national ideals and national
development roadmaps; and historical legacies of intense conflict, which tend
to produce ideological and diversionary frictions that cause conflict to persist
or recur. Only the last factor, the history issue, is readily subject to policy
control: the best way forward to restore cooperative and stable relations is
for South Korean and Japanese leaders to agree informally on truthful and empathetic norms governing historical judgments, and for Japanese political and
opinion elites to agree informally to marginalize those that defy such norms.
Key words: South Korea, Japan, bilateral relations, alliances, regime type,
ideology, conflict history, diversionary politics.
From the perspective of standard theories of international relations and alliances,
relations between South Korea and Japan are puzzling – even bizarre.1 Realist or
neo-realist theories emphasize the importance of power and threat patterns – with
*
The subtitle of this article follows Byung-chul Koh, Between Discord and Cooperation: Japan and
the Two Koreas (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2007).
1
Sheryn Lee, “Burying the Hatchet? The Sources and Limits of Japan-South Korea Security
Cooperation,” Asian Security, 9-2 (May 2013), pp. 93–110.
Pacific Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 1 (April 2016), 79–99.
doi: 10.1111/pafo.12066
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79
80 / Pacific Focus
stronger common threats tending to yield closer relations.2 Yet, in the 1950s, when
both countries faced a serious common threat from the communist bloc, South
Korea, the more gravely threatened of the two states, refused even normal diplomatic and economic relations with Japan. Only from the 1960s, when the immediate
crisis of the Korean War had passed and an effective deterrence framework seemed
established, did South Korea initiate a rapprochement. More recently, around 2005,
relations began to deteriorate seriously, not after the communist threat receded, but
as a new China threat emerged.
Liberal institutionalist theories emphasize the difference between democracies
and authoritarian regimes, and to some extent, also institutional differences among
these types. More prominently, the Democratic Peace literature suggests that
democracies are unlikely to fight each other, and by extension, are more likely to
be reliable allies in the face of common threats.3 Yet South Korea–Japan relations
have been most consistently warm when the two countries were farthest from
ideals of consolidated democracy – when South Korea was governed by military
dictatorships and Japan was under one-party, if still democratic, rule. More
recently, relations between consolidated democracies, in which both countries
see regular turnover in power of democratically elected leaders and parties, have
had an adverse action–reaction dynamic, in which provocations by one side lead
to hostile reactions by the other, tending to produce a broadening and hardening
of bad feelings.
Today, while South Korea and Japan are still managing to cooperate in practical
areas, such as indirect military cooperation via the US alliance system, economic
relations, and societal ties in areas such as tourism and popular culture, there is a
danger that mutual alienation will damage the core national security interests of
both sides. Are South Korea–Japan relations doomed to revert back to the bad
old days of the 1950s? If not, what factors will tend to prevent further deterioration, or to restore the improving trend of relations evident only a decade or so ago?
To address these questions, this paper follows liberal and constructivist literatures that take ideology seriously, in at least two different forms. First, institutional
regime type provides incomplete information about ideological regime type or
government type. At certain points in historical time in given regions of the world,
there are usually only a limited number of competing ideological models that offer
national ideals and related developmental roadmaps. These ideological models
provide additional information that make it easier to understand which regimes
are greater threats to one another, and which are more likely to cooperate, either
2. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Kenneth
N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).
3. Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review, 80-4
(December 1986), pp. 1151–1169; Brett A. Leeds, “Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation,” American Journal of Political Science, 43-4 (October 1999),
pp. 979–1002; Charles Lipson, Reliable Partners (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
© 2016 Center for International Studies, Inha University
South Korea and Japan since World War II / 81
as allies or via pragmatic coexistence.4 This approach makes it possible to
understand the tendency in Northeast Asia for communist regimes to ally against
both democratic regimes and non-communist, but authoritarian, developmental
regimes. It also makes it easier to understand characteristic forms of friction that
develop among regimes of the same institutional type – such as one-party
authoritarian regimes or democracies.
Second, historical legacies of intense conflict tend to produce both ongoing
ideological hostility and diversionary political incentives and dynamics. Such a
history of conflict is important in South Korea–Japan relations, helping to explain
why South Korea tends to harbor more hostile feelings toward Japan; why South
Korean leaders are more likely than Japanese leaders to initiate change in bilateral
relations; and why consolidated democracy may in this case have a paradoxical
tendency to worsen bilateral relations. Understanding the historical legacy of
conflict is also the most promising route to arresting deteriorating relations and
restoring the more cooperative trend evident from the 1960s through the early
2000s. A more truthful and empathetic understanding of history has the potential
to mollify Koreans’ national grievances, while also being most compatible with
widely supported national interest ideals in both countries.
The next section reviews the major theoretical frameworks used to understand
conflict and alliance relations, and applies them to South Korea–Japan relations.
We then describe continuity and change in relations since World War II – identifying three main phases. Next, we assess how well the major theoretical frameworks
account for the historical evidence. The last section summarizes conclusions about
theory and evidence, and suggests policy implications for improving relations in
the future.
South Korea–Japan Relations: Theories and Implications
To explain variation in post–World War II relations between South Korea and
Japan, we rely first on the alliances literature. We are most interested in the debate
between realists on the one hand, and liberals or constructivists on the other. For
realists, the core predictor of whether countries have more or less strong alliance
relations is objective relative power or relative severity of threats. The stronger
the common threat faced by any two countries, relative to any threat that the two
countries may pose to each other, the more likely the countries are to ally with
one another.5 The strength of these threats can be predicted either using material
measures of power, or taking a “revealed threat” approach, by using current or
4. Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (Garden City, NY: Anchor,
1973), pp. 90, 131; John M. Owen IV, “When Do Ideologies Produce Alliances? The Holy Roman
Empire, 1517–1555,” International Studies Quarterly, 49-1 (March 2005), pp. 73–99.
5. Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in
International Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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recent conflict and tensions as necessary conditions to activate the potential threats
of material relative power.
How does this logic apply to South Korea–Japan relations? From the end of
World War II, and certainly with the Korean War, the Soviet Union, and after
1949 also the People’s Republic of China, posed the most significant common
threats. Both South Korea and Japan responded primarily via bilateral alliances
with the United States. Given the importance of Japanese bases to the defense of
South Korea, and to a lesser extent the value of South Korea as a barrier to attacks
on Japan, we would expect a strong tendency for the two countries to ally. This
was not counteracted by any comparable tendency of the two countries to be a
threat to one another. South Korea was too weak to be a significant threat to Japan,
and Japan was constrained by its dependence on US support and the greater threat
posed by the Soviet Union and China. The common threat remained relatively high
throughout the Cold War, despite some ups and downs due to events such as the
Sino–Soviet split or the retreat of US power and will in the late 1970s.
The next major change occurred with the reform and then collapse of the USSR.
The USSR withdrew its support for North Korea, and then itself collapsed. China
was by then a decade into regime transformation, which disengaged from the Soviet-led international communist movement, and refocused inward on political stability and market-based economic development. As the Soviet Union retreated and
collapsed, China provided some compensating increase in aid to the North. Yet the
North faced mass starvation, and its Stalinist regime too looked to be on the brink
of collapse.
The Dengist regime in China had its own near-death experience at the same
time. While China’s strength continued to grow, its leaders remained focused on
internal stability and development. Abroad, Deng’s guideline of “concealing
strength” and “never being the highlight” meant above all avoiding conflict with
the United States and its allies, so as to be able to profit from open and stable international trade, investment, and technology transfers.
Despite a massive military build-up and an ideological turn toward traditional
nationalism (“patriotic education”) beginning after the Tiananmen Square massacre, China’s foreign policy did not change significantly until the mid-2000s, during
the middle years of the Hu Jintao period. Hu adopted a more confrontational
posture with US treaty allies, such as the Philippines and above all, Japan. China
encouraged or tolerated more frequent public demonstrations or riots against
Japan, and began regular sea and air incursions into the area around the Japan-held,
China-claimed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. China claimed to oppose North Korea’s
nuclear weapons program. Yet China did not use its overwhelming economic
leverage to pressure the North to stop, and even appears to have assisted and
protected the North’s efforts. The first North Korean nuclear test occurred in
2006, and the North continues to upgrade its nuclear and missile delivery capabilities, and to proliferate them to US enemies, such as Iran and Syria. Across a series
of territorial disputes stretching from the Sea of Japan through the South China Sea
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South Korea and Japan since World War II / 83
to the Himalayan frontier with India, China’s rhetoric and actions are similar but
even more assertive under Hu’s successor, Xi Jinping.6
Realist theoretical implications for South Korea–Japan relations: Large
changes in the relative strength of common threats predict that South Korea–Japan
relations should improve with the outbreak of the Korean War, deteriorate with the
end of the Cold War, and improve with increasingly aggressive Chinese foreign
policies from the mid-2000s.7
Unlike realist theories, liberal and constructivist theories do not assume that
states have more or less homogeneous preferences. Differences in state preferences
become the sources of threats, activating or deactivating the potential threats
created by the various configurations of relative power. Where do these foreign
policy preferences come from? Liberal theories traditionally emphasize political
institutions, while constructivist ones usually focus on ideologies. Thus, the liberal
theory of Democratic Peace is anchored in the difference between democratic and
authoritarian political institutions. Constructivist theories often emphasize the
metaphor of socialization of individuals, in which socially created norms and rules
have the international analog of norms and regimes of international order. But in
practice, this distinction blurs. Liberals typically concede that institutions become
associated with norms and ideologies that add significant content, and coexist in
an enmeshed relationship in which causation runs in both directions.8 Constructivists, for their part, acknowledge a similar interdependence of ideologies with
institutions.9
A purely institutional approach has limited explanatory power. The strongest
prediction – derived from the Democratic Peace literature – is that democracies
are unlikely to fight each other, and therefore are more likely to be allies against
common threats. Such common threats are expected to come from authoritarian
regimes – but it is not clear when authoritarian regimes are expected to threaten
each other or other democracies. Thus, a purely institutional approach defaults
back into a realist “revealed threat” approach when it comes to explaining behavior
of authoritarian regimes. For South Korea–Japan relations, it has the same
implications as “revealed threat” realism, except that the predicted direction of
change for the period of South Korea’s military dictatorship is less clear.
6. Shale Horowitz, “Why China’s Leaders Benefit from a Nuclear, Threatening North Korea:
Preempting and Diverting Opposition at Home and Abroad,” Pacific Focus, 30-1 (April 2015),
pp. 10–32.
7. For the prediction that China’s rise will improve South Korea–Japan relations, see Bhubindar
Singh, “Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations,” Korean
Journal of Defense Analysis, 27-1 (Spring 2015), pp. 21–39.
8. For example, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russet, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic
Peace, 1946–1986,” American Political Science Review, 87-3 (September 1993), pp. 624–638.
9. For example, Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in
World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Stephen Krasner, ed., International
Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, Krasner, 1983).
© 2016 Center for International Studies, Inha University
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We here synthesize the liberal and constructivist approaches by looking at the
combination of political institutions with more or less situational ideologies, which
we call ideological regime types. In given regions at given points in time, there are
typically only a limited number of such ideological regime types that effectively
compete for state power. In Northeast Asia since World War II, there have been
three main ideal types: communist authoritarianisms; non-communist developmental authoritarianisms; and democracies. In theory, the communist regimes implement communist ideals of economic, social and political organization within,
and support the spread of communist ideology abroad via alliances of communist
states against all other state types. In practice, we know that genuinely independent
communist states have frequently failed to ally, and have sometimes fallen into
conflict, due to intra-bloc independence and leadership disputes and other issues.
Non-communist developmental authoritarianisms have sought to maintain internal
political stability while building national strength via economic development. This
variant of authoritarianism has been largely a defensive reaction against internal
and external threats – since World War II, typically communist threats. However,
it is possible that such authoritarianisms will also harbor offensive objectives
toward other states. Democracies tend toward inward-looking politics, in which
more socially conservative, market-friendly parties are pitted against those that
are more socially liberal and supportive of stronger regulatory and welfarist policies. International relations are more reactive and defensive in nature. Unless
threats are very strong and relatively certain, defensive reactions by democracies
are expected to be more uncertain and variable. More conservative, marketfriendly governments and leaders are expected to support stronger defensive
reactions, while more liberal, interventionist governments are expected to prioritize
internal interventionist policies. This configuration of ideological regime types
predicts that communist regimes will tend to threaten both non-communist authoritarianisms and democracies, and in some cases, also other communist regimes;
and that democracies will react more uncertainly and variably to communist
threats, especially as the latter diminish from high levels.
With the end of World War II and the Soviet-assisted victory of communist
forces in China’s civil war, a large communist threat emerged in the late 1940s.
This threat intensified with the Korean War. In 1961, South Korea’s weak democratic regime was replaced by a non-communist developmental regime led by
conservative military leaders. The communist threat did not diminish significantly
until the late 1980s – with Gorbachev’s internal reforms and then the 1991 Soviet
collapse. After Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping and his successors changed China’s
authoritarian regime type from the communist to the non-communist developmental type. Under Deng and Jiang Zemin, China became increasingly powerful, but
remained more inward looking. Under Hu Jintao and especially Xi Jinping, China
continued to gain strength, but adopted more assertive rhetoric and policies across
the entire range of territorial disputes on its eastern, southeastern, and southern
peripheries. Nevertheless, China and its North Korean client do not threaten South
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South Korea and Japan since World War II / 85
Korea and Japan in the same way. On the one hand, China props up the North and
thus prevents Korean unification. Yet China no longer supports Northern conquest
or subversion of the South, because China’s new regime appears to prefer the
status quo of partition. Thus China seeks to coexist with the South, and emphasizes
economic cooperation. By contrast, Japan is more unambiguously threatened by
China’s ratcheting up of hostile rhetoric and incursions around the Diaoyus/Senkakus.
Theoretical implications for South Korea–Japan relations of changing ideological regime types and threats (communist regime and threat changes): Large
changes in the existence and strength of communist regime threats predict that
South Korea–Japan relations should improve with the outbreak of the Korean
War and deteriorate with the end of the Cold War.
Theoretical implications for South Korea–Japan relations of changing ideological regime types and threats (South Korean and Chinese regime and threat
changes): South Korea’s military coup is expected to improve South Korea–Japan
relations; South Korea’s democratization is expected, on average, but with
direction and timing dependent on government and leadership changes, to worsen
South Korea–Japan relations. China’s regime change is not expected to have the
potential to improve South Korea–Japan relations until China showed not only
rising relative power, but also more offensive objectives, from the mid-2000s.
Even then, China’s objectives are a more unambiguous threat to Japan and a more
ideologically contestable one to South Korea.
The simplest diversionary politics literature faces limitations similar to realist
theories. Governments, upon losing popularity, are expected to resort more to
diversionary conflicts with other countries.10 One obvious question is, which other
country or countries? One cannot simply say that the biggest threat is the most likely
diversionary target. As discussed, one must explain the pattern of threat, for example,
in the manner of the ideological regime type approach above. Moreover, the biggest
threat (whether “revealed” or explained) might be a more attractive ideological
target, but it is likely to be more dangerous to provoke. This is because it is more
likely to lash out in a way that threatens the incumbent regime or government,
thereby counteracting the benefits of the internal “rally-around-the-flag” effect.
There are at least two other possible target types in diversionary politics.
Countries with which one’s own has a history of intense and recent conflict are also
promising targets, even if they are relatively low on reasonable rankings of current
threats. The more serious the historical threat, the greater the diversionary
resonance. Thus, Japan’s conquest and rule of Korea in 1905–1945 makes Japan
an attractive diversionary target in South Korean politics. On the other hand, the
destructive legacy of World War II has exerted a restraining force on Japanese
10. Jack Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook
of War Studies (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1989), pp. 259–288; Ahmer Tarar,
“Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War,” International Studies Quarterly,
50-1 (March 2006), pp. 169–188.
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attitudes and policies towards Korea. Thus, the ideological and political payoff of
diversionary targeting is expected to be much higher in South Korea than in Japan,
because it was Japan that threatened South Korea’s independence and national
identity, rather than the other way around. Yet the deterring effect of World War
II in Japanese politics can be expected to fade over time. This is not to say that
Japan is likely to revert to an aggressive policy. Rather, Japanese politicians and
public opinion should become less likely to suppress their own hostility or
contempt, and more likely to respond in kind to South Korean hostility.
Another diversionary target type has been allies – particularly more powerful
allies. Any relations of dependence with a senior alliance partner are fraught with
tensions and disagreements. In the context of the Cold War and post–Cold War
periods, left governments are more prone to take advantage of such tensions for
ideological reasons. Right governments tended to take harder lines against communist threats, and to justify market-friendly policies partially as means of building
and maintaining greater strength against these threats. By contrast, left governments are more likely to be critical of America, the symbolic “homeland of
capitalism,” both to help legitimize their internal interventionist agenda, and to
counteract the right’s tendency to legitimize its market-friendly agenda by focusing on the communist threat. While both the South Korean and the Japanese left
would be expected to make the United States a diversionary target, Japan’s relative
power and historical role also make it an attractive South Korean diversionary
target on these grounds. For the same reasons, the United States and Japan become
more attractive diversionary targets when they are led by center-right or farther
right governments.11
Theoretical implications for South Korea–Japan relations of historical legacies
of conflict and ideological and diversionary politics: After World War II, South
Korea should be more likely to make Japan an ideological and diversionary target
than the reverse. Under democracy, the expectation is strengthened as South
Korean governments are farther to the left, and as Japanese governments are
farther to the right. Over time, potential for ideological and diversionary targeting
is likely to become more symmetrical, as the ideological impact of historical events
recedes.
Another notable influence is economic interdependence, which increases the
cost of frictions, and thus creates an incentive to avoid conflict and maintain more
cooperative relations. Given that existing economic benefits have a more potent
influence than potential ones, economic interdependence is expected to have an
increasingly favorable impact on bilateral relations as it increases. Japanese and
South Korean economic interdependence rose sharply from the 1960s, but then
11. In contrast to much of the diversionary politics literature, it is assumed here that diversionary
politics serves ideological as well as political purposes. Successful diversionary politics not only
increases popularity, but also increases the rulers’ ability to achieve their ideological objectives.
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South Korea and Japan since World War II / 87
plateaued and declined somewhat in relative importance with the rising importance
of the China market from the 1990s.12
Three Phases of South Korea–Japan Relations
Bilateral relations went through three main phases. From 1948 to 1960, South
Korean president Rhee Syngman adopted a broadly hardline policy toward Japan.
Rhee annexed the contested Dokdo/Takeshima Islands in 1952, and declared an
expansive maritime demarcation line – which South Korea called the “Peace
Line,” but which came to be known internationally as the “Rhee Line” – that far
exceeded international norms for maritime territory. The Rhee Line encompassed,
among other areas, the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, along with the surrounding 8
nautical miles of sea. South Korea then regularly used live fire and boat seizures
to drive Japanese fishing vessels from the disputed area around the islands.13 Rhee
also refused to establish formal diplomatic relations and severely restricted trade.
Japan did not accept the South Korean claim to the islands and insisted on its
own sovereignty. Japan pursued various diplomatic tracks to assert its claim,
alongside repeated public statements. Nevertheless, Japanese leaders’ rhetoric
about the islands was more restrained. The most confrontational Japanese statements were made about colonial and World War II history in Korea. Against a
background of carefully measured, more correct statements of empathetic regret,
contradictory sentiments occasionally appeared. Most notably, early post-Korean-War efforts to normalize relations were damaged when Japan’s negotiator,
Kubota Kanichiro, suggested that South Korea should compensate Japan for colonial-era infrastructure investment and economic development in Korea. To take another example, Ikeda Hayato, Japan’s Prime Minister from 1960 to 1964, denied
“wrongdoings committed by Japan since the annexation of Korea.”14
The second and longest phase in bilateral relations was one of diplomatic rapprochement and increasing economic cooperation.15 Efforts to improve relations
began under the short-lived Second Republic in 1960–1961, but did not make significant progress until after the 1961 military coup. The new South Korean military
regime, led by Park Chung-hee, sought to restore good relations with Japan as part
12. Byung-chul Koh, op. cit., pp. 276–277; Hidehiko Mukoyama, “Japan-South Korea Relations
Grow Stronger in a Globalized Environment,” Pacific Business and Industries, 12-43 (2012), pp.
2–22.
13. From 1951 to 1965, South Korea captured 326 Japanese fishing boats and arrested over 3,000 fishermen. Northeast Asian History Foundation, Dokdo in the East Sea (Seoul: Northeast Asian History
Foundation), at <http://contents.nahf.or.kr/english/item/level.do?levelId=eddok_003e_0030_0030>
(searched date: 5 September 2015). According to Japan’s Shimane Prefecture, 44 fishermen were
killed in the enforcement actions.
14. Dal-joong Chang, “The End of the Cold War and the Future of South Korea-Japan Relations: A
More Strained Relationship?” Korea and World Affairs, 16-3 (Fall 1992), p. 507.
15. Chong-sik Lee, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution
Press, 1985).
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88 / Pacific Focus
of its efforts to build South Korea’s economic and military strength. The result was
the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations and five related agreements, in which the two
countries established formal diplomatic relations and normalized economic
relations. Japan agreed to pay one-time compensation – $300 m in grants and
$500 m in loans – for colonial-era and wartime damages inflicted on Korea. The
Dokdo/Takeshima dispute was frozen or set aside, with each side maintaining its
claim. A compromise was reached on area fisheries, in which both sides accepted
a “Joint Regulation Zone” beyond a 12-mile territorial zone. There was explosive
growth of bilateral trade, which rose about 10-fold over the first post-normalization
decade. By 1973, Japan accounted for 60% of accumulated foreign direct investment in Korea.16
Various flare-ups in Japan–South Korea relations occurred over time. These
included Korean intelligence’s 1973 kidnapping of Korean dissident Kim Dae-jung
in Tokyo; a Japan-based, North Korean-guided attempt to assassinate Park
Chung-hee (which killed Park’s wife); Japanese history textbook disputes in 1982
and 2001; visits by Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine; and most importantly,
a series of statements by Japanese politicians that minimized or denied various
aspects of historical Japanese aggression and brutality.
But relations generally remained positive and friendly through the end of Kim
Dae-jung’s term as South Korea’s president (1998–2003). The dominant note in
Japanese official statements about history was correctly contrite and conciliatory.
During a 1983 visit to South Korea, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro affirmed
Japan’s “need for a penitent attitude toward the unfortunate past.” Similar but
stronger statements were made by Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi in 1992 and
Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro in 1993. The 1995 Murayama Statement went
farthest, stating that,
[Japan ], through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the
people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake
be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and
express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology.17
Apart from the history issue, the other traditionally fraught issue was the territorial dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima and the surrounding seas. This issue too
created problems, but was handled effectively. In 1974, Japan and South Korea
agreed on continental shelf boundaries, and 5 years later, began jointly exploring
for oil and natural gas. In 1996, pursuant to ratifying the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Japan and South Korea declared conflicting exclusive
economic zones. As usual, grassroots sentiments and protests were much stronger
16. Byung-chul Koh, op. cit., pp. 271–280.
17. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, ‘On the
Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the War’s End’ ” (15 August 1995), at <http://www.mofa.go.
jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html> (searched date: 24 August 2015).
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South Korea and Japan since World War II / 89
in South Korea. South Korean President Kim Young-sam and Japanese Prime
Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro agreed to reduce tensions and resume negotiations,
which proved to be long and difficult. In 1997, Japan began seizing Korean fishing
boats that violated its newly expanded maritime territory. In 1998, President Kim
Dae-jung and Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo agreed to revise the 1965 fisheries
agreement to take account of the new UNCLOS guidelines. The two countries’
territorial seas were expanded, but the compromise on the jointly administered
fisheries zone that surrounded Dokdo/Takeshima was left intact.
The third phase, in which relations deteriorated sharply, dates from the administration of South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008) through the
present, corresponding roughly to the tenures of Japanese Prime Ministers
Koizumi Junichiro (2001–2006) and Abe Shinzo (2006–2007, 2012–present). In
2004, Japan’s Shimane Prefecture assembly declared an annual Takeshima Day.
President Roh called this “an act of justifying the history of invasion.” From
2005, instead of following the longstanding precedent of trying to contain the
fallout of the various disputes, Roh adopted the opposite approach of escalating
his rhetorical responses. Following one of Koizumi’s annual visits to Yasukuni,
Roh declared that, “We dare to wage a diplomatic war with Japan.” Meeting with
the press after a June 2005 summit meeting, Roh publicly attacked Koizumi’s
history-related policies, while Koizumi emphasized areas of cooperation.18
In 2006, the situation worsened over ongoing disagreements about exclusive
economic zones, most controversially in the seas around Dokdo/Takeshima. South
Korea planned to submit Korean names for undersea features to an international
maritime body, and Prime Minister Koizumi responded by ordering Japanese
maritime research in the area. Roh then ordered South Korean naval vessels into
the area around Dokdo/Takeshima and authorized them to use force to keep
Japanese vessels out. Emergency negotiations then agreed to shelve both the
place-naming and the maritime research.19 On 28 April 2006, Roh fired a
dramatic rhetorical broadside against Japan:
Dokdo is our land. It is not merely a piece of our land but one that carries historic significance as a
clear testament to our 40 years of affliction…. As long as Japan continues to glorify its past
wrongs and claim rights based on such history, friendly relations between Korea and Japan
cannot stand. So long as Japan clings to these issues, we will be unable to trust any of its
rhetorical commitment to the future of Korea-Japan relations and peace in East Asia…. The
nature of this matter is such that no compromise or surrender is possible, whatever the costs
and sacrifices may be.20
18. Byung-chul Koh, op. cit., pp. 467–468, 473–475; Kentaro Nakajima, op. cit., pp. 23, 26.
19. Michael Weinstein, “South Korea-Japan Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute: Toward Confrontation,”
Japan Focus (10 May 2006).
20. “Special Message by President Roh Moo-hyun on Korea-Japan Relations,” Presidential Archives
(28 April 2006), at <http://16cwd.pa.go.kr/cwd/kr/archive/archive_view.php?meta_id=hot_dip_
etc&id=6acd4bd3647383f285862e6> (searched date: 28 August 2015).
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90 / Pacific Focus
President Roh here implicitly argues for setting aside the compromising
approach in place since the early 1960s. Normal relations are called into question
for as long as Japan claims the Dokdo/Takeshima islands; and for as long as Japan’s standard apologies for its colonial-era and World War II–era crimes are qualified by behavior such as official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, approval of
inappropriate textbooks, and inadequate acknowledgement of historical incidents,
such as those involving South Korean “comfort women.” Roh followed up by
suspending high-level talks with Japan.
Prime Minister Abe followed Roh with his own significant contribution to deteriorating relations. Most importantly, Abe made a number of statements minimizing Japan’s colonial- and World War II–era crimes, which went well beyond the
boundaries observed by his more nationalistic predecessors, such as Nakasone
and Koizumi. In 2007, Abe denied Japanese wrongdoing toward “comfort
women.”21 During his second, longer term in office, in 2013, he qualified the
Murayama Statement by arguing that there is no agreed international legal definition of aggression.22 Such statements heightened international and domestic
opposition to Abe’s efforts to revise Japan’s defense policy to allow broader
regional defense cooperation with allies, in which Japan could defend allies as well
as its own territory.
Although Abe was more confrontational and less conciliatory than Koizumi,
Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye showed greater restraint than Roh. Nevertheless, both adopted elements of Roh’s more confrontational approach. In 2012, Lee
made the first ever visit to the disputed islands by a South Korean Prime Minister,
and stated that Japan’s Emperor should not visit South Korea before making an
explicit apology. Both Lee and Park made public criticisms of Japan a more
regular and prominent part of public diplomacy, and both refused to return to
regular summit meetings with Abe. Both gave special prominence to the comfort
women issue, arguing that Japan must properly acknowledge the historical events.
On the other hand, Lee and Park sometimes resisted China’s diplomatic efforts to
take a stronger joint stance against Japan.23
In recent years, these disputes have qualitatively worsened public attitudes.
While South Koreans have long been relatively hostile toward Japan, their negative
opinion has worsened. Japanese public opinion, which has been more favorable or
indifferent toward South Korea, has reached new lows more similar to South
21. “Japanese PM Denies Wartime ‘Comfort Women’ Were Forced,” Telegraph (3 March 2007), at
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1544471/Japanese-PM-denies-wartime-comfort-womenwere-forced.html> (searched date: 24 August 2015).
22. “Abe Stands Firm on Definition of ‘Aggression’ amid International Outcry,” Asahi Shimbun
(13 May 2013), at <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201305100092> (searched
date: 1 September 2015).
23. David Kang and Bang Jiun, “Japan-Korea Relations: Sisyphus,” Comparative Connections, 14-1
(April 2012), pp. 129–138; Narushige Michishita, “Changing Security Relationship between Japan
and South Korea: Frictions and Hopes,” Asia-Pacific Review, 21-2 (July 2014), pp. 19–32.
© 2016 Center for International Studies, Inha University
South Korea and Japan since World War II / 91
Korean attitudes toward Japan. For the first time, Japanese in large numbers have
become seriously aggrieved over the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute.24
In this third, more confrontational period, we see a return to rhetoric, and in the
case of Dokdo/Takeshima, also actions or policies more like that of the first period
than the second. Roh’s statements and policies went far beyond any previous
Korean leader other than Rhee Syngman, tearing open old wounds. Abe did not
follow previous Japanese prime ministers in trying to minimize confrontation
and contain disputes. Although Roh’s successors were more restrained, they
responded to Abe with their own critical statements rather than actively seeking
to repair relations. Among all of its significant bilateral trading partners, South
Korea failed to negotiate a free-trade agreement with Japan alone – largely because
of overwhelmingly negative South Korean public sentiment.
Explaining the Three Phases
We begin with Syngman Rhee’s initial Japan policy, which maintained cold and
even hostile relations with Japan while struggling to consolidate and secure a
South Korean polity against the North Korean and internal communist threat. This
policy’s initial high level of hostility to Japan is not as easily explained by realist
theories, given the far greater communist threat, and Japan’s occupation by Rhee’s
US ally. It can be argued that, in the late 1940s, there was still great uncertainty
about Japan’s political future, such that a future Japanese threat could not easily
be dismissed.25 The strength of ideological and diversionary politics rooted in
the recent experience of Japanese rule also played an important role. Thus, Rhee’s
long political career was above all one of anti-Japanese activism for Korean
independence. Such an ideological orientation could not easily be abandoned overnight. Moreover, to do so would have exposed Rhee to the charge of being soft on
Japan, which would strengthen the communist and non-communist opposition.
It is more difficult to explain Rhee’s continued hostility to Japan after the
Korean War – and even while the South’s existence hung by a thread during
the War itself. Thus, Rhee annexed the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands and imposed
the Rhee Line in 1952. Even as Japan emerged from occupation as an inwardlooking democracy, with heightened autonomy and a continuing role as a vital
base area for the South’s defense, Rhee maintained his anti-Japanese policy to
the end of his rule in 1960. Rhee’s stubbornness is difficult to explain without
24. Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, The 3rd Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll
(2015): Analysis Report on Comparative Data (Seoul and Tokyo: Genron NPO and East Asia
Institute, 2015); Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East
Asian Security and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).
25. One might also argue that Japan could not be a threat while under US occupation. Yet US
occupation would predictably not last for more than a few years. After that, an independent Japan
would have to be dealt with.
© 2016 Center for International Studies, Inha University
92 / Pacific Focus
referring to an ideological hostility rooted in Korean identity and history,26 as
well as to the need for greater public support and legitimacy to compensate for
ineffective and corrupt governance. The ideological character of Rhee’s Japan
policy can also be seen from the more conciliatory, pragmatic policy adopted
under the brief Second Republic, after Rhee was ousted.
The sea change to more pragmatic and cooperative relations occurred with the
shift to military rule under Park Chung-hee. A more conciliatory Japan policy
meshed closely with the other elements of the Park regime’s ideology and policy
program – and also those of Park’s successor, Chun Doo-hwan. The main enemy
was emphatically North Korea. The ineffective and corrupt Rhee government and
its immediate successor, which seemed to be taking the South from stagnation and
weakness into dangerous political instability, was the main barrier to a more effective response. Following in the footsteps of the region’s earlier developmental
authoritarian models, such as Meiji Japan and the post-1949 Guomindang regime
in Taiwan, Park sought to use more market-friendly policies to build economic
strength and political legitimacy against a pressing external threat. Japan was both
a model for South Korean economic development, and a vital economic and
security partner in building strength against the communist threat. Neither the
timing nor the ideological and policy character of Park’s opening to Japan are
easily explained by relative power or historical legacies – which did not change
significantly in 1960–1961. Nor do diversionary incentives make much sense. If
anything, Park, as a willing participant in the old Japanese colonial order, could
more easily be attacked for humiliating Korea by absolving Japan’s sins in
exchange for economic scraps.27
The discussion so far reflects the South Korean initiative driven by South
Korean regime types and South Korean ideological and diversionary politics,
against the background of a more distant, unchanging and passive Japan. This
seems to reflect all the factors already discussed. Once Japan regained independence, little regime or political change occurred, as the dominant and moderate
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) quietly and successfully pursued economic
development. In this context, South Korea was less important geopolitically and
economically to Japan than Japan was to Korea. Japan was also more indifferent
to Korea on historical grounds. During the Rhee period, Japan was restrained from
responding in kind to South Korea by the post–World War II norm that Japan
could not legitimately show hostility toward other countries – especially former
colonies or wartime enemies. The South Korean military regime approached Japan
26. According to John Kie-chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and
Economic Development (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 61, the later, 1965 normalization of relations with Japan “would have been unimaginable under Rhee, who hated the Japanese
passionately.”
27. See the discussion in Van Jackson, “Getting Past the Past: Korea’s Transcendence of the anti-Japan
Policy Frontier,” Asian Security, 7-3 (2011), pp. 238–259.
© 2016 Center for International Studies, Inha University
South Korea and Japan since World War II / 93
more pragmatically and constructively, and Japanese leaders saw no reason to
withhold cooperation.
With the end of the Cold War, why was there no significant worsening of South
Korea–Japan relations? In particular, the left ideological alternative of emphasizing internal reform and targeting the United States and Japan rather than North
Korea and its allies was no longer politically out of bounds. The short answer is
that South Koreans first elected two center-right presidents, Roh Tae-woo and
Kim Young-sam – the first with ties to the old military regime and the second with
a relatively conservative outlook that emphasized domestic political reform. The
South’s first center-left president, Kim Dae-jung, was a relative moderate who
valued close relations with the United States and Japan. Nevertheless, the potential
for adverse change in relations was there, as became evident under Roh Moo-hyun.
Roh’s anti-Japanese policies were part of an across-the-board ideological move to
the left, including stronger demands for internal economic policy change,
anti-Americanism, and a softer line toward North Korea and China.
Roh’s policies cannot be explained by relative power and threat changes. It was
precisely at this time that China’s foreign policies became increasingly assertive
and North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. If anything, such geopolitical
changes would be expected to strengthen ties with the United States and Japan.
But ideology does not necessarily respond to changes in threat conditions,
especially if the threat is not an unambiguous and overwhelming one. Just as
Rhee’s anti-Japanese ideology and policy were not moved by the Korean War,
Roh’s anti-US and anti-Japanese inclinations were not moved by greater Chinese
and North Korean strength and assertiveness. While Roh’s declining domestic
popularity increased his likely gains from a diversionary policy, the direction of
his diversionary targeting is explained by ideology rather than by pure political
calculation. In other words, a center-right leader in Roh’s position seeking diversionary benefits would likely have pursued the more ideologically compatible
targets of China and especially North Korea, particularly given the more provocative Chinese and North Korean policies.
Thus, Roh’s center-right successors, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, have
indeed drawn closer to the United States. Their efforts to limit damage to South
Korean–Japan relations have been hampered by the ideologically provocative
statements of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. Every time that Abe makes a statement
that seems to excuse or rationalize Japan’s historical aggression or brutality, China
launches a propaganda offensive to lure South Korea into a common front against
Japan, and indirectly, to distance the South from the United States. Abe’s statements are so ideologically inflammatory in the South, that even more conciliatory
center-right leaders cannot ignore them. Thus, President Lee seemed to lose
patience at the end of his term. President Park is in an even weaker political
position, given the South Korean left’s efforts to brand her father, Park Chung-hee,
as a virtual traitor for his colonial-era association with Japanese rule and his
rapprochement with Japan in the 1960s. The strength of anti-Japanese historical
© 2016 Center for International Studies, Inha University
94 / Pacific Focus
memory is still so great, that even South Korean leaders prone ideologically to
pragmatic cooperation are constrained by public opinion.
We now turn back to the Japanese side of the relationship since the end of the
Cold War. Here again we see that Japan is less concerned with Korea relations than
is South Korea with Japan relations. While bilateral economic relations continued
to blossom, South Korea became less important to Japan’s defense. Ideologically,
Korea was only one aspect of Japan’s colonial- and World War II–era history.
Periodically, Japanese politicians would bridle at an unambiguously negative
assessment, making statements that excused or rationalized Japanese policies, or
indirectly indicating such sentiments via visits to the Yasukuni Shrine or support
for revisionist textbooks. Such statements and actions were more likely to come
from center-right politicians. However, whenever relations with Korea began to
deteriorate significantly, leaders such as Hashimoto and Koizumi always made
conciliatory statements and diplomatic efforts. This pattern seemed to end with
Abe. He went farther in his revisionist statements than earlier Japanese Prime
Ministers, and for many years did little to repair damage and arrest negative trends
in bilateral relations and public sentiment.28
How can we account for these political dynamics on the Japanese side? Broadly,
the timing and content of Japanese diplomatic and policy changes are consistent
with a response to the rising China threat in the mid-2000s.29 However, revisionist sentiments recur regularly in the post–World War II period, long preceding the
mid-2000s. Moreover, historical revisionism is not only unnecessary to a more
forceful Japanese response to the China threat, but positively damaging. Historical
revisionism poisons relations with South Korea, and even injects difficulties into
the more vital relations with the United States. It also strengthens the hand of
the Japanese left in the internal political battle over whether Japan should weaken
its postwar norms and constraints against normalizing its diplomatic and defense
policies.
Diversionary motives alone are also an inadequate explanation. Japan’s economic stagnation and the LDP’s attendant loss of political hegemony go back to
the 1990s. Yet a succession of LDP leaders avoided the sort of strongly revisionist
statements made by Abe. It is true that Abe, as his popularity has declined, has had
greater need for diversionary political benefits. But this explains neither the timing
nor the direction of his statements. Abe’s statements and associations with historical revisionism predate his first term as prime minister. They are not easily
explained apart from his personal ideology and the weakening constraints imposed
28. In 2015, Abe and Park agreed that Japan is responsible for procuring Korean comfort women for
its soldiers while ruling over Korea, and that the Japanese government will pay $8.3 m in compensation to a foundation set up by the South Korean government. It is too early to say whether this thaw in
relations will continue.
29. Yoshinori Kaseda, “Japan’s Security Policy towards East Asia,” Perceptions, 17-4 (January
2012), pp. 27–48.
© 2016 Center for International Studies, Inha University
South Korea and Japan since World War II / 95
by memories of World War II. Just as democratization made it possible but not
inevitable that a leader like Roh Moo-hyun would arise to cater to latent anti-Japanese
memories and sentiments, the passage of time made it politically easier for one like
Abe, capitalizing on the desire of many that Japan become a “normal” country, to
indulge his own ideological belief that Japan’s colonial- and World War II–era history
had significant mitigating circumstances and redeeming features.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
The three main phases in South Korea–Japan relations are better explained by
regime and leadership change, with their associated ideological changes, than by
changes in the pattern of military power or threats. While military power and
threats are certainly important as constraints, both the pattern of military threats
and the nature of responses to them are dictated by ideologically defined goals
and preferences. Not the pure configuration of power, but rather the ideological
differences between communist regimes on the one hand and non-communist
democracies and developmental authoritarianisms on the other, determined the
Cold War pattern of threats and alliances. Post-communist threats are similarly
contingent on regime and leadership type. Neither the more democratic Yeltsin
governments nor the more authoritarian Putin regime has been viewed as a
significant threat by either South Korea or Japan. Nor was China widely viewed
as a threat until, in the mid-2000s, more assertive rhetoric and policies emerged
alongside rising economic and military power.
Even once the objectives of regional great powers are specified, we do not yet
converge toward more complete explanations of continuity and change in South
Korea–Japan relations. Thus, Rhee Syngman’s hostile policy toward Japan
persisted through the Korean War and long afterwards. If the Japan policies of Park
Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan are taken as “normal” in the Cold War threat
context, it is not clear why South Korea–Japan relations remained relatively close
for over a decade after the Soviet Union’s collapse. Nor is it clear why, since the
mid-2000s, no consensus has emerged in South Korea about whether to view
China as a rising threat. This has deprived South Korea and Japan of the more
favorable bilateral relations that tend to follow from emergence of a strong
common threat. Turning to Japan, the more constant, reactive policy toward South
Korea prevailing before Abe Shinzo is similarly difficult to explain in terms of
“revealed” threat patterns. Neither the Korean War nor the end of the Cold War
produced any significant changes in Japanese approaches. Nor is it clear that Abe’s
stronger historical revisionism assists Japan in constructing a broader, more
effective defensive alliance against the emerging threat from China.
Simple, non-ideological diversionary motives suffer from similar explanatory
limitations. They cannot account well for the direction of diversionary targeting,
since there are usually multiple targets that offer political diversion. Similarly,
© 2016 Center for International Studies, Inha University
96 / Pacific Focus
the direction of diversionary targeting is usually evident from the beginning of a
leader’s term of office, even if weakening political legitimacy often exaggerates
such ideological tendencies. For both South Korean and Japanese leaders, continuity of bilateral policy is typically much more pronounced than change attributable
to falling political fortune. Thus, the Japan policies of South Korean leaders from
Rhee through Kim Dae-jung were relatively constant over their tenures. The same
can be said both for more status quo–oriented and more change-oriented Japanese
prime ministers. Thus, Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine were a constant of
his term in office, as Abe’s revisionist statements have been. True, the Japan
policies of Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak became more hostile as their terms
went on and their popularity declined. Even in these two cases, though, the nature
and timing of change were also influenced by ideological and other factors.
Once regime and leadership ideologies are specified alongside patterns of potential military threat, and once historical legacies that strongly resonate with national
identity are taken into account, a much richer explanation becomes possible.
Rhee’s constant anti-Japanese policy was shaped by an ideology that grew from
the colonial-era decades of anti-Japanese activism. A different kind of historical
influence can be seen in the case of Park Chung-hee. Here, decades of working
within the colonial regime made it easier for an older Park to view Japan as a
model and partner for development and an informal security partner. The ideologies of Rhee and Park were influenced by the history of Japanese colonial rule,
but, as indicated by their divergent responses, clearly not determined by it. Without
referring to ideological differences, we cannot account for the sharp turns away
from and toward Japan. South Korea’s democratization, combined with the end
of the Cold War, predict a worsening of relations with Japan – as the common
threat rapidly recedes and unresolved historical legacy frictions become more
salient. However, this tendency remained dormant until South Korea elected a farther left president in the mid-2000s.
For Japan, a policy of “concealing strength” under the Untied States’ wing was
one possible response given the need to rebuild Japan’s economy, while both
avoiding the wartime excesses that had led to catastrophe and facing down the
communist threat. The policy’s success helps to explain its longevity. Japan’s
Korea policies were largely derivative and, similarly, changed little. Following
the end of the Cold War, against a background of receding memories of World
War II and economic stagnation, greater ideological variation is expected. The
timing of the more abrupt change under Abe is consistent with China’s emergence
as a clearer threat in the mid-2000s. But Abe had long been ideologically
predisposed to this type of policy change, and his historical revisionism goes
farther than is useful – far enough to be damaging to his own efforts at national
security policy adjustment.
As this discussion also indicates, strategic interaction also creates significant
limitations and opportunities. When one side pursued a more hostile policy – as
with Rhee, Roh Moo-hyun and Abe – there was less that the other side could
© 2016 Center for International Studies, Inha University
South Korea and Japan since World War II / 97
feasibly do to improve relations. The best that could be hoped for was silence or a
more restrained response to provocations. Because of the greater resonance of historical conflicts for Korean identity, restraint in the face of provocation is predictably more difficult for Korean leaders – both for ideological and diversionary
reasons.
What role has been played by economic interdependence? The Rhee case shows
the weakness of potential economic interdependence. How strongly do existing
high levels of interdependence favorably affect relations? While high levels of interdependence make strongly adverse policy changes less likely, they were not
much of a barrier to the policies of either Roh Moo-hyun or Abe. Moreover,
leaders find it easy to separate economic and security policies. Thus, Roh supported a free-trade agreement with the United States while pursuing an anti-American ideological agenda. Similarly, Abe has tried to protect economic relations
with China as he responds to a rising China threat on the geopolitical side. Finally,
high interdependence is no guarantee of continued movement toward openness, as
indicated by the stalled efforts to create a South Korea–Japan free-trade agreement.
If such a free-trade agreement happens, it will probably be through an indirect multilateral framework, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Poor relations with Japan endanger both South Korea’s national defense against
the North and the prospects for Korean unification. Assuming that these goals are
important enough to counteract historically grounded anti-Japanese ideological
tendencies and diversionary political incentives, what are the main elements of
an effective engagement strategy toward Japan? Most importantly, such a strategy
must be premised upon a Japanese national identity and policy objectives that will
command consensus support in Japan. This means that South Korea must accept
Japan as a “normal” country, both in terms of national security and symbolic or
ideological status. As memories of World War II fade, Japan will not accept permanent constraints on military capabilities and strategies viewed as necessary for
its defense. This now includes defense of the Diaoyus/Senkakus as well as the
Ryukyus and the Home Islands. And it includes cooperation with countries such
as the United States, the Philippines, Australia, and India, to protect vital sea-lanes
and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and elsewhere. More broadly,
Japan cannot be kept on probationary status forever. Japan has not committed aggression or war crimes for 70 years, and aspires to international recognition commensurate with its economic and geopolitical importance. Japanese will not view
South Korea as friendly and worthy of support if South Koreans seem bent on
keeping Japan as a permanent scapegoat. Prime Minister Abe has effectively
deflected attention from his reprehensible and counter-productive historical revisionism by emphasizing that, just like any other country, Japan has a right to
self-defense, and a right to be judged by its current and recent behavior. Denying
these rights only plays into the hands of Abe and other revisionists.
This does not mean that South Korea should ignore Japanese historical revisionism – and in any case, it is not politically feasible to do so in the South. On the
© 2016 Center for International Studies, Inha University
98 / Pacific Focus
contrary, the most reasonable and effective approach is to make acceptance of
Japan as a normal country conditional on opposing historical revisionism. This
symbolic deal or exchange, unfortunately, may not happen reliably without gentle
and persistent engagement by South Korea, the United States, and other countries.
Importantly, there are strong partners for this approach within Japan. Generally
speaking, Japanese Prime Ministers’ official positions about colonial- and World
War II–era history have been increasingly forthright and correct, particularly since
the 1990s. Just as Roh Moo-hyun was exceptional in recent South Korean politics,
Abe has been exceptional in recent Japanese politics. Just as Roh’s ideology can be
marginalized on the far left, Abe’s historical revisionism can be marginalized on
the far right. To do so, South Korean leaders, parties, and NGOs should seek out
their moderate partners in Japan, basing their cooperation upon acceptance of a
responsible Japanese polity as an equal partner. External pressure can support
the moderate Japanese mainstream against revisionists like Abe, but to be effective, they must work with Japanese partners that command majority support.30
Other bilateral issues are secondary. Economic, cultural and person-to-person
ties are important and helpful. But they cannot counterbalance failures to agree
on the history issue and on Japan’s symbolic and national security status.
Similarly, the Dokdo/Takeshima and related ocean resource issues are an important impediment. But here the status quo favors South Korea and it is best to keep
a low profile. The territorial dispute is too symbolically potent to be resolved by
direct negotiations, and will be exacerbated as long as the more central history
issue is unresolved. By the same logic, the territorial dispute is likely to fade away
with progress on the history issue and on accepting Japan as an equal partner.
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