Running head: EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES The Effects of the Normalization of Radical Political Ideologies on Political Tolerance and Collective Angst for the Right and Left Silas Xuereb 2019 Carleton University A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE BACHELOR OF ECONOMICS COMBINED HONOURS IN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY DEGREE Abstract In the current research, I test the idea that normalization of radical political groups by mainstream media presents a group-based existential threat to political moderates. The resulting collective angst—a group-based emotional response to existential threat, should increase opposition and intolerance toward political opinions that differ from one’s own (to defend against the existential threat). To test this idea, two survey studies (n = 303 and n = 330) were conducted. In Study 1 half of all participants were primed with the normalization of radical political groups from the political right. In Study 2, half of all participants were primed with the normalization of radical political groups from the political left. In both studies, the other half were placed in a control condition. Although my manipulation was ineffective, aggregate results suggest that perceived normalization of the extreme political groups increases political intolerance of moderate political opposition voices. Furthermore, collective angst mediated this relationship. Differences in political tolerance between liberals and conservatives are discussed. ii EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES Acknowledgements First, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Michael Wohl for all his feedback, support and patience throughout the process of writing my thesis. I would also like to thank my cosupervisor, Nima Orazani, for allowing me to support his research and helping me understand political psychology. I greatly appreciate the countless hours you both spent reviewing and editing my work which began with an extremely rough draft. I would also like to thank my parents for their continuous support and for always believing in me. Finally, thank you to Siobhán for your patience throughout my long nights spent working. iii EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ iii Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... iv List of tables .....................................................................................................................................v List of figures ................................................................................................................................. vi List of appendices ......................................................................................................................... vii Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1 Perceived Normalization ..............................................................................................................2 Normalization and Collective Angst ............................................................................................4 Political Tolerance and Freedom of Speech .................................................................................6 Political Affiliation and Political Tolerance.................................................................................8 Study 1 ...........................................................................................................................................11 Method .......................................................................................................................................11 Results ........................................................................................................................................13 Discussion ..................................................................................................................................16 Study 2 ...........................................................................................................................................17 Method .......................................................................................................................................17 Results ........................................................................................................................................19 Discussion ..................................................................................................................................23 Extended Analysis .........................................................................................................................24 General Discussion ........................................................................................................................25 Implications ................................................................................................................................28 Limitations .................................................................................................................................29 Future Research ..........................................................................................................................31 Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................32 References ......................................................................................................................................33 Appendices .....................................................................................................................................40 iv EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES List of Tables Table 1: Correlations between all measured variables in Study 1 .................................................14 Table 2: Correlations between all measured variables in Study 2 .................................................20 v EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES List of Figures Figure 1: Mediation effects in Study 1 ..........................................................................................15 Figure 2: Mediation effects in Study 2 ..........................................................................................21 vi EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES List of Appendices Appendix A: Ethics Approval ....................................................................................................... 40 Appendix B: Consent Form .......................................................................................................... 43 Appendix C: Debriefing Form ...................................................................................................... 45 Appendix D: Priming Manipulation ............................................................................................. 46 Appendix E: Political Affiliation Measure ................................................................................... 47 Appendix F: Political Intolerance Measure .................................................................................. 48 Appendix G: Willingness to Restrict Freedom of Speech Measure ............................................. 49 Appendix H: Willingness to Restrict Access to Mainstream Media Measure.............................. 50 Appendix I: Collective Angst Measure......................................................................................... 52 vii EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 1 The Impact of the Normalization of Radical Political Ideologies on Political Tolerance and Collective Angst for the Right and Left Recently, radical left as well as radical right political ideologies have received increased public exposure in the United States (Cammeron, 2017; Romero, 2018) and around the world (Grierson, 2018). White supremacists, neo-Nazis, and white nationalists are examples of groups with radical right-wing ideologies that are typically characterized by xenophobia, nationalism and anti-establishment rhetoric (Caiani & Kröll, 2017; Fagerholm, 2018). In the current political climate in the United States, these groups have increasingly organized public rallies and received extensive coverage by mainstream news media (e.g. The New York Times, CNN), in part, due to the use of violence against counter-protestors (Jones, 2018). The Unite the Right rally held in Charlottesville, Virginia, and the murder of a counter-protestor by a far-right sympathizer is an example of a strong and emboldened appearance of radical right-wing ideology. Groups with radical left-wing ideologies, which are typically characterized by anti-capitalism and antifascism, with an affinity toward socialism (Fagerholm, 2018), have also engaged in protests and received widespread mainstream media attention. For example, Antifa (an acronym for antifascist), a group that situationally endorses violence to combat fascism, has experienced an uptick in mainstream media attention, in part, as a result of their vocal and physical counterprotest in Charlottesville. Considering the increased exposure of radical ideologies, some on the more moderate right and left have voiced concern that the radical version of their political opponent’s ideology is becoming normalized (i.e., non-mainstream ideas or actions become accepted and embedded in existing social knowledge and practice; Boykoff, 2013; Gunther, 1998). EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 2 To date, there has been very little research attention directed at the consequences of the perceived normalization of radical political ideologies. I contend that the perceived normalization of radical opposing political views is likely to elicit anxiety about the future vitality of one’s political group, a phenomenon known as collective angst (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). Collective angst should lead to actions that protect the future of the ingroup such as restricting radicals’ freedom of speech. This protects one’s ingroup because many people hold zero-sum beliefs in the realm of politics— for example that increased support for the right necessarily means a fall for the left (Bar-tal & Halperin, 2013). Thus, if people think the political fortunes of those on the opposite side of the political spectrum are on the rise, it will cue collective angst for the future of one’s own political views. I tested this idea in the current research. Specifically, I hypothesized that political ingroup members will become less tolerant of their political opponent when radical versions of their political opponent’s ideology are framed as becoming normalized. This political intolerance can manifest itself as individuals’ willingness to restrict their opponents’ right to freedom of speech or right to appear in mainstream media— an effect mediated by collective angst. I tested this idea within the context of American politics. Perceived Normalization According to May’s (2006; 2009) normalization process theory new practices can be successfully embedded into social contexts through continuous efforts from various individuals or groups. Specifically, continual exposure to a practice can normalize that practice, which will increase its uptake. In a similar vein, I argue that radical political ideas that were previously deemed too extreme to be taken seriously may become embedded into the social fabric of society by the same normalization process. EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 3 At any given time, there is a range of ideas that is accepted in the public discourse—this range is often referred to as the Overton Window (Szałek, 2013). These ideas are discussed by media outlets and politicians, while ideas outside this range are ignored. To normalize an idea that lies outside this range, individuals or groups must perceive it as a legitimate idea to be put forth in the public sphere. A similar idea was developed by Hallin (1986), who argued that political discourse can be divided into three spheres: the sphere of consensus, the sphere of legitimate controversy, and the sphere of deviance. The sphere of consensus and sphere of legitimate controversy receive validating media coverage, while ideas within the sphere of deviance are either mocked and ridiculed by the media, or completely ignored. When extreme political ideas that previously were considered deviant begin to receive more coverage by mainstream media, and be espoused by politicians, they begin to shift into the sphere of legitimate controversy. Furthermore, as extreme views gain a greater share of the mainstream discourse, people become desensitized towards them (Soral, Bilewicz, & Winiewski, 2018). There is evidence to suggest that the media is biased in favour of publishing populist, anti-establishment rhetoric (Wettstein, Esser, Schulz, Wirz, & Wirth, 2018), and this is a catalyst for the normalization of these (usually far-right) views (Bos, Van Der Brug, & De Vreese, 2010). This media bias may be partially caused by the negativity bias—the tendency for negative events to have stronger effects on individuals than equivalent positive events (Royzman & Rozin, 2001). This process also appears to have occurred in the United States throughout the past 5-10 years. Individuals with radical right-wing political ideas have not only received legitimate news coverage from media outlets (Phillips, 2018), but politicians who achieved positions of power within the government have supported their ideas (e.g. Steve Bannon, co-founder of alt-right news website Breitbart, became the White House Chief Strategist). These developments have EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 4 contributed to embedding previously radical right-wing ideas (e.g. banning all citizens of a country from entering the United States) into public discourse and even public policy. The net effect may be the belief among people on the political left that their political views are at risk of being marginalized. Similarly, right-wing individuals’ zero-sum political beliefs may cause them to worry that there is no place for their beliefs in the public discourse when they perceive that the media covers the radical right more harshly than the radical left, or when they observe the success of democratic socialists such as Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. There is evidence to support political moderates’ concern about the radicalization of political ideologies. Indeed, public opinion has shifted towards the extremes on several issues. For example, according to Pew Research Center (2014, 2018), the percentage of Americans who think there should be no restrictions on abortions (a far-left view) has increased from 19% to 25% between 2014 and 2018 while the percentage of Americans who think all abortions should be illegal (a far-right view) has increased from 14% to 15% over the same time period. What is the consequence of making not only this radical shift salient, but also that radical ideologies are becoming normalized? Herein, I contend that people will experience collective angst—a groupbased emotion that reflects concern about the future of their group). Normalization and Collective Angst When an individual believes the future of their ingroup is under threat, they experience collective angst (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). The consequence of this group-based emotion is the support of action that is deemed able to protect the ingroup’s future vitality (Halperin, Porat, & Wohl, 2013). These actions can differ depending on the context of the threat. When the threat is external, collective angst improves cohesion with group norms (Halperin et al., 2013; Jetten & Wohl, 2012), but when those norms are themselves detrimental to the vitality of the group, EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 5 collective angst can increase dissent within the group (Dupuis, Wohl, & Packer, 2016). Furthermore, when the threat is external, collective angst can increase opposition and intolerance towards threatening outgroups (Jetten & Wohl, 2012). In the context of radical political group normalization, the latter is most relevant. I contend that collective angst will increase political intolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of speech among political ingroup members. This is supported by research on intergroup threat between the left and the right in the United States. Political group members often exhibit increased levels of political intolerance toward political opponents when under threat (Bloom & Bagno-Moldavsky, 2015; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Nail, Mcgregor, Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson, 2009). The effects of collective angst are in line with the predicted effects of intergroup threat in intergroup threat theory (Stephan, Stephan, & Gudykunst, 1999). This theory identifies many potential sources of intergroup threat and their consequences. In the words of Stephan and his colleagues (1999), symbolic threats are “threats to the worldviews of the ingroup” (p. 7), which includes threats to the morals and values of one’s group. In the political context, partisans may perceive the normalization of radical opposing political groups as threatening the values and morals of their ingroup. For example, the normalization of radical right-wing views (e.g. advocating deportation of asylum seekers or abolishing social security) threatens the values of social justice and equality that many liberals hold. Similarly, the normalization of radical leftwing views, such as that college tuition should be free, threatens the conservative value of personal responsibility. Because these processes threaten political group members’ values, they are likely to experience collective angst. Intergroup threat theory also provides some clues about how the resulting support of actions which protect the ingroup’s future vitality will manifest. The theory argues that when an EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 6 outgroup poses a threat to an ingroup, the ingroup will exhibit negative, exaggerated behavioural and emotional responses (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006) towards the outgroup (Corenblum & Stephan, 2001; Stephan et al., 1999). In the context of normalization of radical right-wing views, liberals will respond to this threat with negative attitudes (e.g. belief that their views should not be considered) and negative behavioural responses towards the far-right (e.g. petitioning for restrictions on their right to speak and appear publicly). Furthermore, physically distant outgroups (e.g. Alternative for Germany, a far-right German political group) which threaten the ingroup (e.g. liberals in the U.S.) can cause negative attitudes towards local outgroups (Bouman, van Zomeren, & Otten, 2015). Threats from foreign groups can cause negative responses towards local groups that are perceived as similar. It has yet to be explored whether this effect generalizes to other types of similar outgroups. I argue that this effect may cause negative reactions among the left towards moderate conservatives in the context of far-right normalization, or negative reactions among the right towards moderate liberals in the context of far-left normalization. Even though the threat is not being posed by the moderates, people will associate the radical outgroup with the moderate outgroup, causing them to restrict freedom of speech and exhibit political intolerance towards both groups. Political Tolerance and Freedom of Speech Political tolerance has long been thought of as one of the central pillars of a free democratic society (Gibson, 1992; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). This includes respecting the rights of minority groups to speak, assemble and vote, all of which are essential democratic rights. However, high levels of intolerance towards left-wing and communist groups have been noted dating back decades (see Stouffer, 1955). This is an example of a relative manifestation of political tolerance because it is directed at a specific group. Over the decades that followed EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 7 Stouffer’s seminal work, the concept of political tolerance was refined and expanded to encompass general attitudes towards civil liberties, which became known as universal political tolerance (Gibson, 2013; Todosijević, 2016). This paper will use Sullivan and Transue’s (1999) definition of political tolerance: the willingness to put up with, or permit, opposing political ideas in the public sphere. This conceptualization does not restrict tolerance to attitudes towards a single group. By using this definition, I can determine whether the perceived normalization of extreme opposing views influences individuals’ levels of political tolerance towards outgroup members overall, not only towards those with extreme opposing ideologies. I will also examine relative manifestations of political tolerance, specifically, the willingness to restrict freedom of speech of specific groups. Willingness to allow freedom of speech is one aspect of political tolerance of critical importance in today’s political climate. This construct is the most discussed aspect of political tolerance in the media and is the subject of much heated debate (Chong & Levy, 2019). This construct is distinguished from political tolerance in that it does not include the right to assemble or hold political office (Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Freedom of speech is a prerequisite of the normalization of extreme views. That is, normalization cannot occur if people restrict their political opponents’ right to freedom of speech. Therefore, restricting freedom of speech is one tool that groups can use to slow or prevent the normalization of an opposing ideology. Circumstantial evidence indicates that this tool is currently being used as there is an increasing amount of calls from left-wing individuals to restrict speech of extreme right individuals, particularly on college campuses and on social media. EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 8 A further aspect of political tolerance that is especially intriguing in today’s political climate is media coverage of radical political groups. As discussed above, radical political groups are receiving more mainstream media attention than ever before and can reach an incredibly wide audience directly through social media. There is growing evidence to suggest that exposure on mainstream media and social media helps radical political movements grow (Allen, 2017; Doroshenko, 2018). Public pressure has mounted for social media companies to remove users who espouse hateful and extreme views on their platforms, likely due to collective angst about the impact this widespread exposure could have. After long rejecting any responsibility for content posted on their platforms, major social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook have begun to cave to these demands and ban users who espouse offensive speech, such as Milo Yiannopolous. I hypothesize that the normalization of extreme opposing views will increase individuals’ political intolerance, willingness to restrict moderate outgroup and radicals’ freedom of speech and willingness to restrict radicals’ access to mainstream media outlets, all effects mediated by collective angst. Political Affiliation and Political Tolerance Until now, I have argued that these effects will occur equivalently for the normalization of the left or the right. Recent research, however, has studied differences in levels of tolerance between left and right-wing individuals, and whether these groups react differently under threat. Results show that conservatives have an inherent need to reduce uncertainty and maintain the status quo which leads to reduced levels of universal political tolerance (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, Sulloway, & Will, 2003; Lindner & Nosek, 2009; Sweetser, 2014). Liberals, however, exhibit political intolerance as much as conservatives only when they perceive themselves as under EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 9 threat (Nail et al., 2009). This is known as the reactive-liberals hypothesis (Jost, Napier, & Gosling, 2007; Nail et al., 2009). Another possible contributing factor to conservatives’ increased levels of political intolerance is their increased levels of religious and ethnic homogeneity (Mason, 2018). According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), people integrate aspects of the social groups to which they belong into their personal identity, which strengthens their connections to their ingroup. When multiple social identities are aligned in a single group (e.g. religion, ethnicity and political ideology), connections to the group become stronger, and tolerance of outgroup members diminishes (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Accordingly, American conservatives, who are largely white and Christian, may exhibit higher levels of identity with their political group and higher levels of intolerance towards outgroup members. On the other hand, the ideological conflict hypothesis (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014) posits that both liberals and conservatives exhibit similar levels of political intolerance towards groups with conflicting ideologies (Crawford & Pilanski, 2014). These researchers argue that the methodologies used to measure intolerance in the studies supporting the reactive-liberals hypothesis were flawed. Turning to relative manifestations of political intolerance, despite the current political climate where conservatives are portrayed as defenders of free speech and liberals are portrayed as endorsing censorship, liberals have historically been more vocal proponents of free speech (Davis & Silver, 2004; Lindner & Nosek, 2009). Furthermore, past research has demonstrated that conservatives are more willing to engage in censorship than liberals (Sniderman, Tetlock, Glaser, Green, & Hout, 1989). As a historical example, during the Cold War when left-wing communists received considerable media attention, conservatives were very willing to restrict EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 10 freedom of speech of communists, as well as other left-wing groups such as atheists (Stouffer, 1955), even though they largely endorsed freedom of speech in general (i.e. they showed evidence of universal political tolerance). Another potential explanation for this difference between liberals and conservatives is that liberals are more likely to see rights as absolute, whereas conservatives perceive rights as context-dependent (McClosky & Brill, 1983). As with universal political tolerance, conservatives are also more likely to support authority and the status quo, which can lead to support for suppressing alternative viewpoints (Jost et al., 2003; Sullivan, Marcus, & Piereson, 1982). It is possible that the Right’s current embrace of freedom of speech is not an inherent value, but merely a reflection that it is politically beneficial for them. Given the conflict between the current popular portrayal of freedom of speech as a conservative value and the historical research, this paper compared levels of political intolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of speech between liberals and conservatives. Overview In Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups. The first group was primed with the normalization of the far-right through a short report. Their levels of political tolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of speech of conservatives and the radical right were compared to those of a control group. In Study 2, participants were randomly assigned to a prime group, where participants were primed with the normalization of the far-left by reading a short report, or to a control group. I compared levels of the same variables, modified for the context of the radical left, between the two groups. I hypothesized that members of the left and right would exhibit similar overall levels of political intolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of speech. When experiencing threat (the EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 11 normalization of an opposing radical political group), liberals and conservatives should display increased levels of political intolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of speech, an effect mediated by increased collective angst. Study 1 Method Participants. I recruited 303 Americans via Mechanical Turk (MTurk). After excluding nine participants who were not born in the United States, two who were not native English speakers, and eight who spent significantly more time to complete the survey (univariate outlier analysis; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), 284 participants were retained for data analysis (160 female, two opted not to specify, age M = 39.92, SD = 12.90, Range = 17-77). Participants received $0.50 for completing the survey. Procedure. After obtaining their consent, all participants completed a 12-item scale to assess political affiliation (Everett, 2013). Next, participants in the prime condition were presented with a short report explaining that controversial far-right political figures had been receiving increased mainstream media coverage, while participants in the control condition proceeded directly to the measures. All participants then completed the measures described below on 1-9 visual analog scales. Participants also responded to other measures regarding exposure to right-wing media outlets that are not included in this paper. Demographic questions were presented at the end of the survey, followed by a debriefing. Items of each scale were presented in randomized order. Unless noted otherwise, the scale endpoints were labeled Completely Disagree and Completely Agree. According to exploratory factor analyses, scales were unidimensional as intended. Materials. EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 12 Political affiliation. The 12-Item Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (Everett, 2013) was used to measure participants’ political affiliation. This scale asks participants to convey their opinion on several issues that differentiate between conservatives and liberals, including abortion, limited government, religion, welfare benefits, gun ownership, and traditional marriage (α = .90, M = 5.83, SD = 1.60). Scale endpoints were labeled “Completely Negative” and “Completely Positive”. Several items were reverse-coded and the resulting measure ranges from 1 (completely liberal) to 9 (completely conservative). Collective angst. Adapted from Wohl and Branscombe (2009), five items measured to what extent participants were concerned about the future of liberal values (e.g. “I think the liberal ideas are in jeopardy due to the spread of conservatism.” or “I think the future of liberalism is under thread by conservatives.”; α = .90, M = 4.77, SD = 2.20). Political intolerance. Adapted from Haas and Cunningham (2014), seven items measured the extent to which people were open to hear dissimilar political views (e.g., “We need to actively oppose those who disagree with us.” or “When people are obviously wrong in their opinions, they need to be corrected.”; α = .79, M = 4.63, SD = 1.47). Willingness to restrict freedom of speech. Four items (e.g., “No matter how controversial or contentious are people’s attitudes, they should be able to express it without any restriction.” [reverse scored] or “Freedom of speech should be restricted for those whose opinions endanger society.”) measured to what extent participants were willing to grant freedom of speech to conservatives (α = .80, M = 3.35, SD = 1.83) and far-right figures (α = .86, M = 3.98, SD = 2.32). Willingness to restrict far-right from mainstream media. Five items measured the extent to which participants were willing to restrict far-right figures from appearing on mainstream media outlets (e.g. “It is morally wrong to give far-right political figures a platform on EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 13 mainstream media” or “Giving far-right political figures a platform on mainstream media legitimizes their extreme attitudes”; α = .81, M = 5.36, SD = 1.76). Results All analyses were conducted using SAS 9.4. To determine the effectiveness of the manipulation, I compared participants’ levels of collective angst in the prime condition (M = 4.80, SD = 2.05) and the control condition (M = 4.75, SD = 2.35). No significant difference was found in levels of collective angst between the two conditions, t(282) = 0.18, p = 0.85, indicating that our manipulation was not effective. I then tested whether the manipulation influenced the dependent variables. Levels of political tolerance did not vary significantly between the control condition (M = 4.52, SD = 1.41) and the prime condition (M = 4.75, SD = 1.53), t(282) = 1.32, p = 0.19. Willingness to restrict far-right figures’ freedom of speech also did not vary significantly between the control condition (M = 4.03, SD = 2.32) and the prime condition (M = 3.94, SD = 2.33), t(282) = -0.33, p = 0.74, nor did willingness to restrict the far-right from mainstream media outlets (control: M = 5.45, SD = 1.71), t(282) = 0.92, p = 0.36. These results imply that the manipulation had no effect on any of the measured variables, not only collective angst. For this reason, the remainder of my analyses were conducted with the data collapsed across conditions. Table 1 presents correlations between all measured variables in Study 1 collapsed across conditions. 14 EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES Table 1. Correlations between all measured variables in Study 1 Variable 1. Political Affiliation 2. Collective angst 3. Political Intolerance 4. Restrict far-right freedom of speech 5. Restrict liberals’ freedom of speech 1 2 3 4 5 6 1.0000 -0.4168 1.0000 (<.0001) -0.2929 0.4802 1.0000 (<.0001) (<.0001) -0.4211 0.4694 0.4598 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) -0.2909 0.4375 0.4087 0.8035 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 6. Restrict -0.4314 0.4295 0.4669 far-right media (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) appearances Note: p-values are displayed in parentheses. 1.0000 1.0000 0.5371 0.3854 (<.0001) (<.0001) 1.0000 For exploratory purposes, I conducted mediation analyses to determine if collective angst mediated the relationship between political affiliation and the dependent variables. Results of the mediation analyses are displayed in Figure 1. All reported confidence intervals were generated using bootstrapping with 5000 iterations. I applied Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure to establish a mediation. Simple linear regression models established that correlations existed between the independent variable (political affiliation), the mediator (collective angst), and each of the dependent variables. The regression model with political affiliation and collective angst as predictors of political intolerance was statistically significant, F(2, 281) = 44.61, p < 0.0001, R2 15 EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES Collective angst 0.29** -0.57** -0.27** (-0.10**) Political affiliation Political intolerance Collective angst 0.32** -0.57** -0.33** (-0.15*) Political affiliation Restrict conservative speech Collective angst 0.38** -0.57** -0.61 ** (-0.40**) Political affiliation Restrict radical right speech Collective angst 0.24** -0.57** Political affiliation -0.48 ** (-0.33**) Restrict radical right media appearances Figure 1. Mediation effects in Study 1. Collective angst mediates the effect of political affiliation on political intolerance, willingness to restrict conservatives’ and radicals’ freedom of speech, and willingness to restrict the radical right from appearing on mainstream media. The displayed numbers are the estimated slopes between two linked variables, numbers in parentheses indicate the direct effect, after controlling for collective angst. ** indicates estimates significant at p ≤ .01. * indicates estimates significant at p ≤ .05. = 0.24. The coefficient associated with political affiliation was borderline significant, β = -0.10, t(282) = -1.96, p = 0.05, while the coefficient associated with collective angst was significant, β = 0.29, t(282) = 7.58, p < 0.0001. Collective angst significantly mediated the effect of political EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 16 affiliation on political intolerance. The indirect effect was estimated at -0.17, with 95% confidence limits of -0.11 and -0.24. Political affiliation and collective angst also significantly predicted restricting far-right freedom of speech, F(2, 281) = 55.14, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.28. Both the coefficient associated with political affiliation, β = -0.40, t(282) = -4.91, p < 0.0001, and with collective angst β = 0.38, t(282) = 6.39, p < 0.0001, were significant. The indirect effect of political affiliation on restricting far-right speech was estimated at -0.22, with 95% confidence limits of -0.13 and -0.32. Collective angst and political affiliation also significantly predicted willingness to restrict conservatives’ speech, F(2, 281) = 36.37, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.21. The coefficients associated with political affiliation significant, β = -0.15, t(282) = -2.25, p =0.026, and collective angst, β = 0.32, t(282) = 6.54, p < 0.0001, were both significant. The indirect effect was estimated at -0.18, with 95% confidence limits of -.28 and -0.11. Finally, political affiliation and collective angst significantly predicted willingness to prevent far-right figures from appearing in media, F(2,281) = 49.77, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.26. The coefficient associated with political affiliation was significant, β = -0.33, t(282) = -5.42, p < 0.0001, as was the coefficient associated with collective angst, β = 0.24, t(282) = 5.36, p < 0.0001. The indirect effect of political affiliation on restricting far-right appearances in mainstream media was -0.14, with 95% confidence limits at -0.08 and -0.22. Discussion Unfortunately, the failure of the prime in Study 1 limited my ability to analyze the effect of perceived normalization on the other measured variables. However, the results display many interesting findings that merit further investigation. Most importantly, I found that the links between political affiliation (i.e. being conservative/liberal), political intolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of speech are mediated by collective angst. Specifically, liberals are more EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 17 willing to restrict the speech of radical right-wing groups because of their increased levels of collective angst. Moreover, this effect is not restricted to radical right-wing groups. Collective angst also mediates the relationship between political affiliation and willingness to restrict freedom of speech of moderate conservatives, and reduces liberals’ universal political intolerance. The next study will examine whether these same effects arise under the context of the normalization of the far-left. To ensure results could be aggregated across the two studies, the priming condition was not altered in Study 2. The potential causes of the failure of the prime will be discussed in the General Discussion. Study 2 Method A total of 330 Americans were recruited via Mechanical Turk (MTurk). After excluding 10 participants who were not born in the United States, two who were not native English speakers, twelve who spent significantly more time to complete the survey (univariate outlier analysis; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), and twelve who provided the default response for a majority of their answers, 294 participants were retained for data analysis (172 female, two opted not to specify their gender, age M = 38.14, SD = 12.83, Range = 18-99). Procedure. As in Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to either the prime or the control condition. First, all participants completed a 12-item scale to assess political affiliation (Everett, 2013). Participants in the prime condition then read a report explaining that far-left political figures were receiving increased mainstream media coverage. All participants then completed the measures described below on 1-9 visual analog scales. Participants also responded to other measures regarding exposure to left-wing media outlets that are not included in this 18 EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES paper. Demographic questions were presented at the end of the survey, followed by a debriefing. Unless noted otherwise, the scale endpoints were labeled Completely Disagree and Completely Agree. According to exploratory factor analyses, scales were unidimensional as intended. Materials. Political affiliation. The 12-Item Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (Everett, 2013) to measure participants’ political affiliation. This scale asks participants to convey their opinion on several issues that differentiate between conservatives and liberals such as abortion, limited government, religion, welfare benefits, gun ownership and traditional marriage (α = .87, M = 5.85, SD = 1.61). Two items were removed due to factor loadings being below 0.4. Scale endpoints were labeled “Completely Negative” and “Completely Positive”. Several items were reverse-coded and the resulting measure ranges from 1 (completely liberal) to 9 (completely conservative). Collective angst. Adapted from Wohl and Branscombe (2009), five items measured to what extent participants were concerned about the future of conservative values (e.g. “I think the conservative ideas are in jeopardy due to the spread of liberalism.” or “I think the future of conservatism is under thread by liberals.”; α = .91, M = 4.53, SD = 2.17). Political intolerance. Adapted from Haas and Cunningham (2014), seven items measured the extent to which people were open to hear dissimilar political views (e.g., “We need to actively oppose those who disagree with us.” or “When people are obviously wrong in their opinions, they need to be corrected.”; α = .78, M = 4.54, SD = 1.53). Two items were removed due to low factor loadings (< 0.4). Willingness to restrict freedom of speech. Four items (e.g., “No matter how controversial or contentious are people’s attitudes, they should be able to express it without any restriction.” EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 19 [reverse scored] or “Freedom of speech should be restricted for those whose opinions endanger society.”) measured participants’ willingness to restrict freedom of speech of liberals (α = .75, M = 3.10, SD = 1.66) and far-left figures (α = .79, M = 3.36, SD = 1.88). Willingness to restrict far-left from mainstream media. Five items measured the extent to which participants were willing to restrict far-left figures from appearing on mainstream media outlets (e.g. “It is morally wrong to give far-left political figures a platform on mainstream media” or “Giving far-left political figures a platform on mainstream media legitimizes their extreme attitudes”; α = .78, M = 5.45, SD = 1.56). Results Once again, I compared levels of collective angst between the prime condition (M = 4.74, SD = 2.00) and the control condition (M = 4.36, SD = 2.30). I found no significant difference t(292) = -1.49, p = 0.14 between the conditions, indicating that the manipulation was ineffective. Furthermore, the manipulation had no effect on the dependent variables. Levels of political tolerance in the control condition (M = 4.45, SD = 1.53) did not differ from the prime condition (M = 4.63, SD = 1.53), t(292) = -0.98, p = 0.33. Willingness to restrict freedom of speech of the far-left did not differ between the control (M = 5.49, SD = 1.70), and prime conditions (M = 5.41, SD = 1.39), t(292) = 0.38, p = 0.70, nor did willingness to restrict the farleft’s access to mainstream media outlets (control: M = 3.40, SD = 1.94, prime: M = 3.32, SD = 1.81), t(292) = 0.38, p = 0.70. Table 2 presents the correlations between all measured variables in study 2. 20 EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES Table 2. Correlations between all measured variables in study 2. Variable 1. Political Affiliation 1 1.0000 2. Collective angst 0.4932 2 3 4 5 6 1.0000 (<.0001) 3. Political Intolerance -0.0250 0.2244 (0.6688) (0.0001) 1.0000 4. Restrict 0.1192 0.3337 0.3438 radical left freedom of (0.0411) (<.0001) (<.0001) speech 5. Restrict 0.1840 0.3340 0.3618 liberals’ freedom of (0.0015) (<.0001) (<.0001) speech 6. Restrict 0.1142 0.3182 0.1811 radical left media (0.0505) (<.0001) (0.0018) appearances Note: p-values are displayed in parentheses. 1.0000 0.8806 1.0000 (<.0001) 0.1511 0.1056 (0.0095) (0.0705) 1.0000 Next, I conducted mediation analyses to determine whether collective angst mediated the relationships between political affiliation and the dependent variables. Figure 2 presents the results of the mediation analyses. All reported confidence intervals were generated using bootstrapping with 5000 iterations. A simple linear regression model established a relationship between political affiliation and willingness to restrict far-left figures’ freedom of speech, although the effect was extremely small, F(1, 292) = 4.21, p = 0.04, R2 = 0.01. Political affiliation significantly predicted willingness to restrict liberals’ freedom of speech, F(1, 292) = 10.23, p = 0.0015, R2 = 0.03. The relationship between political affiliation and willingness to 21 EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES Collective angst 0.22** 0.67** -0.02 (-0.17*) Political affiliation Political intolerance Collective angst 0.31** 0.67** 0.14* (-0.07) Political affiliation Restrict radical left speech Collective angst 0.25** 0.67** 0.19* (0.03) Political affiliation Restricting liberal speech Collective angst 0.25** 0.67** Political affiliation 0.11* (-0.06) Restricting radical left media appearances Figure 2. Mediation effects in Study 2. Collective angst mediates the effect of political affiliation on political intolerance, willingness to restrict liberals’ and radicals’ freedom of speech, and willingness to restrict the radical left from appearing on mainstream media. The displayed numbers are the estimated slopes between two linked variables, numbers in parentheses indicate the direct effect, after controlling for collective angst. ** indicates estimates significant at p ≤ .01. * indicates estimates significant at p ≤ .05. restrict the far-left’s mainstream media appearances was marginally significant, F(1, 292) = 3.86, p = 0.05, R2 = 0.01, while political affiliation did not predict political intolerance, F(1, 292) = EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 22 0.18, p = 0.67. Using collective angst and political affiliation as predictors of restricting the far left’s freedom of speech produced a significant model, F(2, 291) = 18.74, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.11. The coefficient associated with political affiliation was no longer significant, β = -0.07, t(292) = 0.95, p = 0.35, while the coefficient associated with collective angst was significant, collective angst was significant, β = 0.31, t(292) = 5.73, p < 0.0001. The indirect effect of political affiliation on restricting freedom of speech was estimated at 0.21 with 95% confidence limits of 0.13 and 0.31. The equivalent model for liberals’ freedom of speech was significant, F(2, 291) = 18.37, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.11, although the coefficient of political affiliation was not significant, β = 0.03, t(292) = 0.40, p = 0.69. The coefficient associated with collective angst was significant, β = 0.25, t(292) = 5.06, p < 0.0001. The indirect effect was significant, 0.16, with 95% confidence limits of 0.09 and 0.25. Collective angst and political affiliation also significantly predicted restricting the far left’s mainstream media access, F(2, 291) = 16.82, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.10. The coefficient associated with political affiliation was no longer significant, β = -0.06, t(292) = -0.89, p = 0.37, while the coefficient associated with collective angst was significant, β = 0.25, t(292) = 5.42, p < 0.0001. The indirect effect of political affiliation on restricting mainstream media appearances was estimated at 0.17 with 95% confidence limits of 0.09 and 0.25. Although political affiliation was not a significant predictor of political intolerance, modern mediation techniques (Mackinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000) imply that a mediation effect can occur without a significant relationship between the independent and dependent variables due to suppression effects. A suppression effect occurs when the independent variable EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 23 and the mediating variable have opposing effects on the dependent variable, effectively canceling each other out (Mackinnon et al., 2000). After entering collective angst into the model with political affiliation, the model was significant, F(2, 291) = , p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.07, with political affiliation, β = -0.17, t(292) = -2.77, p = 0.006, and collective angst significantly predicting political intolerance, β = 0.22, t(292) = 4.83, p < 0.0001. Discussion The results of Study 2 support the results obtained in Study 1 under the context of the normalization of the radical left. Collective angst mediated the relationship between political affiliation and the dependent variables. Conservatives were more willing to restrict freedom of speech of far-left figures due to their increased levels of collective angst for the future of conservatism. Likewise, they were more willing to restrict freedom of speech of moderate liberals and showed higher levels of intolerance towards those they disagreed with due to higher levels of collective angst. Interestingly, unlike in the previous study, there was no direct relationship between political affiliation and political intolerance until collective angst was added to the model. After collective angst was added, political affiliation and political intolerance were negatively related, implying that increased liberalism was associated with increased intolerance. There was no direct effect of political affiliation on political intolerance because the effect was being suppressed by the increased collective angst of the conservatives. This observation, combined with the relationships between collective angst and the dependent variables being stronger in Study 1, imply that liberals are currently overall slightly more willing to restrict freedom of speech and slightly less politically tolerant. This finding supports the current anecdotal claim that conservatives are more supportive of freedom of speech EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 24 than liberals. The extended analysis below will examine this difference more deeply by collapsing the results across the two studies. Furthermore, the extended analysis will examine whether the failure of the normalization prime was due to priming effects from the prior measures presented to participants. It is possible that earlier measures which mentioned radical opposing political groups (e.g. the far-right in Study 1) primed participants in both conditions for normalization, thereby negating the effect of the condition (prime vs. control). Extended Analysis To examine the possible inadvertent priming effect, I studied the interaction effect between Study (1 vs. 2., with Study 1 coded as 1) and political affiliation on political intolerance. The same scale was used for political intolerance in both studies, so if there was an interaction effect, this would be solely due to priming effects of seeing other measures discussing the farright in Study 1 and seeing other measures discussing the far-left in Study 2. The model including Study, political affiliation and an interaction term was significant, F(3, 574) = 8.32, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.04. The interaction term had a significant negative effect, t(576) = -3.21, p = 0.001, β = -0.25, while the main effect of Study had a significant positive effect, t(576) = 3.29, p = 0.001, β = 1.52. That is, for every unit increase in political affiliation (increasing conservatism), being in Study 1 (and primed for the radical right) as opposed to Study 2 was predicted to lower political intolerance by 0.25. To further explore the data, I collapsed data across the two studies to analyze whether political affiliation had a direct impact on the dependent variables. In each analysis, I controlled for collective angst, condition (prime vs. control) and study (1 vs. 2). As in the individual studies, condition had no effect on any of the dependent variables, so it was removed from the EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 25 models. The model including political affiliation as a predictor of intolerance was significant, F(3, 574) = 50.95, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.15, and political affiliation was a strong predictor of political intolerance, β = -0.16, t(576) = -4.40, p < 0.0001, indicating that those on the left were more likely to be politically intolerant than those on the right. Including the same variables as predictors of restricting radicals’ speech resulted in a significant model, F(3, 574) = 53.49, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.22, with political affiliation being a strong predictor, t(576) = -5.13, p < 0.0001, β = -0.25. The model significantly predicted restricting moderates’ speech, F(3, 574) = 36.49, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.16, with political affiliation acting as a marginal predictor, t(576) = -2.02, p = 0.043, β = -0.08. Finally, the model significantly predicted willingness to restrict radicals’ mainstream media appearances, F(3, 574) = 41.01, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.18, and political affiliation was a significant predictor, t(576) = -4.9, p < 0.0001, β = -0.19. These four results imply that liberalism predicts slightly higher levels of political intolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of speech. General Discussion This research generated three intriguing results: perceived normalization of opposing radical political groups reduces political tolerance, collective angst partially mediates the effect of political affiliation on political tolerance (and willingness to restrict freedom of speech), and liberals exhibit slightly higher overall levels of intolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of speech. I will discuss each of these findings in turn. First, although I was unable to directly study the effects of perceived normalization, the extended analysis provides some hope that perceived normalization of opposing radical groups does in fact reduce political tolerance. By collapsing the data across the two studies, the results showed that increasing conservatism was related to higher political intolerance in Study 2, and EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 26 that increasing liberalism was related to higher political intolerance in Study 1. The measure of political intolerance was identical across the two studies, so the only difference created by being in a different study was the previous measures presented in the survey discussing the radical right (Study 1) or the radical left (Study 2). The interaction between Study and political affiliation implies that these prior measures primed participants to think about radical political groups (radical right in Study 1, radical left in Study 2), which increased levels of political intolerance for those on the opposite side of the political spectrum, but not for those who were more politically aligned with the radical groups. This finding implies that merely priming individuals to think about radical opposing political groups can increase their universal political intolerance. Although this does not imply that normalization increases intolerance (my original hypothesis), it appears likely that normalization of opposing radical groups would prime individuals to think about these groups frequently, thereby increasing intolerance. Because individuals in both the prime and control conditions were inadvertently primed for the increased prevalence of radical opposing groups by the prior measures, this may explain why no differences were found between individuals in each condition. However, further research is necessary to explain the link between normalization and political intolerance and examine whether collective angst plays a mediating role. Adaptations to this research design necessary for future research, and limitations of the current research, will be discussed in the Future Research and Limitations sections, respectively. Next, in each study, the results confirmed the idea that individuals exhibit more political intolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of speech towards opposing radical groups than aligned radical groups, and that this is mediated by collective angst. Liberals are more intolerant towards far-right groups because they are anxious about the future of the left, and conservatives EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 27 are more intolerant towards far-left groups because they are anxious about the future of the right. For today’s increasingly polarized political climate (Pew Research Center, 2014), this has farreaching implications: if partisans become more concerned for the viability of their political group, they may exhibit increasing intolerance. There are several mechanisms which could be increasing partisans’ concern for the future of their group. Although this paper was unable to prove the link between perceived normalization and collective angst, the normalization of radical groups is one possible mechanism which could be increasing political group members’ collective angst. Other potential causes will be discussed in the future research section. However, no matter the cause of collective angst, it is something to be monitored in the current political climate. If political group members do not feel that the future of their group is safe, they are less likely to engage in civil, reasoned public debate and more likely to attempt to restrict others’ participation in the political system. Finally, the extended analysis found that liberalism is a predictor of universal political intolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of speech (of both moderates and radicals). This is surprising given the historical precedents that present liberals as more tolerant and more supportive of freedom of speech (Davis & Silver, 2004; Jost et al., 2003), and contradicts my hypothesis that liberals and conservatives would not differ in their levels of universal or relative political intolerance. However, this finding does support the current portrayal of the left as proponents of “safe spaces” and the right as defenders of free speech. It is possible that the positions of the left and right with regards to free speech have been shifting over time, or that this is merely a reaction to the recent rise of radical right-wing groups. Liberals may simply be reacting because they feel threatened, while conservatives do not feel this same threat from the radical left. Because of this political context, the inadvertent priming of the radical right in Study EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 28 1 may have had a greater impact on liberals than the inadvertent priming of the radical left in Study 2 had on conservatives. Implications These preliminary results have implications for the current political landscape. First, my results imply that mainstream media (and other sources of media such as online bloggers) should exercise caution when deciding to cover radical political groups. Regular coverage of radical political groups can prime viewers to think of the normalization of radical groups, thereby leading to increased levels of intolerance. This coverage may be one driver of today’s political polarization and lack of cooperation between the left and the right. The old media adage that all ideas deserve a platform so that the public can determine what’s right and wrong may do more harm than good. Unfortunately, the media is becoming more and more incentivized by ratings and clicks, and radical political ideas often draw large audiences. New funding structures may be necessary to ensure media companies can survive without being reliant on news which could be damaging to society. However, structural change of this manner may be difficult to achieve. Another way to mitigate the damaging effects of exposure to radical political groups is to ensure all political groups feel comfortable about their future. This includes not only the right and left, but ethnic and religious minorities, those who live in urban and rural areas, and any other group someone may identify with politically. If each group were confident in their respective future, they would not become so anxious when hearing about the rise of other groups. Achieving this would require politicians and media to stop portraying politics as an “us vs. them” zero-sum game. Decreased use of social media and increased political discourse in face-to-face public forums could also contribute to a more inclusive democracy. Face-to-face interactions can humanize others and allow a deeper understanding of each other’s perspectives (Suler, 2004). EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 29 Despite these studies’ intriguing results and implications, they suffered from several limitations. Limitations The most glaring limitations of these studies include the failure of the manipulation, problems with the two-study research design, and the restricted samples used. The possibility of inadvertent priming masking the effects of the priming manipulation has already been discussed, but there are other plausible reasons which could have led to the manipulation being ineffective. First, the manipulation simply may not have been strong enough. A report from a valid news source or that included statistical evidence of the increased prevalence of radical groups may have been more effective. Another option would be to alter the study design to compare levels of collective angst and intolerance between individuals in regions that have experienced a recent increase in the prevalence of radical political groups, to individuals in other (matched) regions that have not experienced a recent rise in radical political groups. This change would also allow measures of intolerance towards radical opposing groups to be used without causing inadvertent priming because the differences in intolerance caused by the different groups’ lived experiences should outweigh the priming effect. Furthermore, a simple manipulation check, or a measure asking participants to indicate the degree to which they believe radical opposing groups are being normalized could be used. This would allow correlational analysis to be performed even if the manipulation was ineffective. The two-study research design also presented some potential confounds and limitations for data analysis. First, because the two studies were conducted at different times, there may have been different political contexts at the time of each study which may have influenced participants’ responses. A news story regarding radical political groups that occurred prior to one EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 30 study but not the other could have confounded the results. Next, the collective angst measure only asked participants about the collective angst they felt for the future of the left in Study 1, and for the future of the right in Study 2. These measures were used because collective angst for the future of the left and the right, respectively, are the only types of collective angst that should be manipulated by perceived normalization in each study. However, this restricted my ability to use collective angst as an explanatory variable in the extended analysis, where the data is collapsed across the two studies. Using measured collective angst as a predictor in this analysis would not provide a full picture of participants’ collective angst (e.g. if a conservative reported low collective angst for the future of the left in Study 1 but had high collective angst for the future of the right). Finally, although samples obtained from MTurk have proven to have characteristics closer to those of the general population than college samples (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012), MTurk samples are not representative of the American population. MTurk samples under-sample older people, African Americans and conservatives (Huff & Tingley, 2015). This implies that results generated from this research may not be generalizable to the American population. Furthermore, across both studies, 32 participants (over 5% of total participants surveyed) were removed for dishonest answers or completing the survey in extreme amounts of time. The removal of these participants can create biased datasets because participants who engage in these types of response patterns often have systematically different traits than the overall population (Ward, Meade, Allred, Pappalardo, & Stoughton, 2017). To support the findings of these studies, future research should use samples from other sources, including nationally representative samples wherever possible. EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 31 Future Research Due to this study’s limitations in analyzing the effects of perceived normalization, future research should attempt to rectify these problems. In order to prevent the problem of measures priming radical political groups in the future, one could use the strategies presented in the Limitations section. If a similar research design to this one is desired, one could present the political tolerance measure I used (which does not refer to any specific political groups) in advance of any measures referring to specific political groups. This method is also feasible for measures of intolerance directed at opposing moderates (e.g. willingness to restrict moderates’ freedom of speech) which do not mention radical opposing groups. To examine measures of intolerance towards radical opposing groups (e.g. willingness to restrict radicals’ freedom of speech), significant adaptations to this research design are needed. Normalization research should clarify the hypothesized relationship with political intolerance, and examine whether it is mediated by collective angst. It should also seek to understand in what contexts normalization can affect intolerance. Does the medium (e.g. social media, cable news) in which radical political groups are discussed affect the consequences of normalization? Is mentioning radical political groups enough to increase intolerance in any context or only when individuals already believe that these groups are becoming normalized? Further research is also necessary to elucidate the causes of collective angst within political groups. Especially due to the demonstrated effect that collective angst increases censorship of moderate political groups, this research will have important implications for avenues through which political intolerance can be mitigated, and civil public debate can be strengthened. In addition to perceived normalization, factors such as the hostile media bias (when individuals on the left and right view the same news as biased against them; Lin, EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 32 Haridakis, & Hanson, 2016) and zero-sum beliefs may contribute to collective angst for the future of political groups. Methods to mitigate the effect of the hostile media bias and to increase perceptions that politics is not a zero-sum game should be explored. The path through which collective angst increases intolerance in the political sphere should also be investigated. Research has shown that collective angst can increase cooperation with outgroups when this cooperation mitigates the threat to the ingroup (Halperin et al., 2013). Would collective angst for the future of a political group increase cooperation with the opposing political group when the Houses of Congress are divided, so compromise was necessary to accomplish the goals of the ingroup? Can collective angst be channeled into productive dialogue, instead of opposition and intolerance? The consequences of collective angst in the political sphere have significant implications which should be explored. Conclusion The reported research provides cautious support for the hypothesis that perceived normalization of radical opposing ideologies increases political intolerance, but the failure of the manipulation renders the evidence far from conclusive. The results also provide evidence that collective angst is a predictor of universal political intolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of speech of opposing groups. I hope this research can provide a starting point for investigation into the effects of perceived normalization and collective angst in the political sphere, a timely yet underserved research area. EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 33 References Allen, C. (2017). Proscribing national action: Considering the impact of banning the british FarRight group. Political Quarterly, 88(4), 652–659. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12368 Bar-tal, D., & Halperin, E. (2013). 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EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 40 Appendix A: Ethics Approval Appendix A1: Update of Previous Ethics Clearance Office of Research Ethics 5110 Human Computer Interaction Bldg | 1125 Colonel By Drive | Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6 613-520-2600 Ext: 4085 ethics@carleton.ca CERTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS CLEARANCE The Carleton University Research Ethics Board-B (CUREB-B) has granted ethics clearance for the changes to protocol to research project described below and research may now proceed. CUREB-B is constituted and operates in compliance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS2). Ethics Clearance ID: Project # 108285 Principal Investigator: Nima Orazani Co-Investigator(s) (If applicable): Nima Orazani (Primary Investigator) Amanda Feige (Other) Silas Xuereb (Other) Michael Wohl (Research Supervisor) Project Title: The effects of normalization on people's attitudes toward political intolerance [Seyed Nima Orazani] Funding Source: Effective: October 31, 2018 Expires: December 31, 2018. Upon reasonable request, it is the policy of CUREB, for cleared protocols, to release the name of the PI, the title of the project, and the date of clearance and any renewal(s). During the course of the study, if you encounter an adverse event, material incidental finding, protocol deviation or other unanticipated problem, you must complete and submit a Report of Adverse Events and Unanticipated Problems Form, found here: https://carleton.ca/researchethics/forms-and-templates/ Please email the Research Compliance Coordinators at ethics@carleton.ca if you have any questions. CLEARED BY: Bernadette Campbell, PhD, Chair, CUREB-B Natasha Artemeva, PhD, Vice Chair, CUREB-B Date: October 31, 2018 EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 41 Appendix A2: Renewal of Ethics Clearance Office of Research Ethics 5110 Human Computer Interaction Bldg | 1125 Colonel By Drive | Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6 613-520-2600 Ext: 4085 ethics@carleton.ca CERTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS CLEARANCE The Carleton University Research Ethics Board-B (CUREB-B) has granted ethics clearance for the changes to protocol to research project described below and research may now proceed. CUREB-B is constituted and operates in compliance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS2). Title: The effects of normalization on people's attitudes toward political intolerance [Seyed Nima Orazani] Protocol #: 108285 Principal Investigator: Nima Orazani Department and Institution: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences\Psychology (Department of), Project Team (and Roles): Nima Orazani (Primary Investigator) Amanda Feige (Other) Silas Xuereb (Other) Michael Wohl (Research Supervisor) Funding Source (If applicable): Effective: December 10, 2018 Expires: December 31, 2019. Upon reasonable request, it is the policy of CUREB, for cleared protocols, to release the name of the PI, the title of the project, and the date of clearance and any renewal(s). Please ensure the study clearance number is prominently placed in all recruitment and consent materials: CUREB-B Clearance # 108285. Restrictions: This certification is subject to the following conditions: 1. Clearance is granted only for the research and purposes described in the application. EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 42 2. An annual application for the renewal of ethics clearance must be submitted and cleared by the above date. Failure to submit the Annual Status Report will result in the closure of the file. If funding is associated, funds will be frozen. 3. Any modification to the approved research must be submitted to CUREB-B. All changes must be approved prior to the continuance of the research. 4. A closure request must be sent to CUREB-B when the research is complete or terminated. 5. During the course of the study, if you encounter an adverse event, material incidental finding, protocol deviation or other unanticipated problem, you must complete and submit a Report of Adverse Events and Unanticipated Problems Form, found here: https://carleton.ca/researchethics/forms-and-templates/ 6. It is the responsibility of the student to notify their supervisor of any adverse events, changes to their application, or requests to renew/close the protocol. 7. Failure to conduct the research in accordance with the principles of the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans 2nd edition and the Carleton University Policies and Procedures for the Ethical Conduct of Research may result in the suspension or termination of the research project. Upon reasonable request, it is the policy of CUREB, for cleared protocols, to release the name of the PI, the title of the project, and the date of clearance and any renewal(s). Please email the Research Compliance Coordinators at ethics@carleton.ca if you have any questions. CLEARED BY: Bernadette Campbell, PhD, Chair, CUREB-B Natasha Artemeva, PhD, Vice Chair, CUREB-B Date: December 10, 2018 EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 43 Appendix B: Consent Form Informed Consent Form The purpose of an informed consent is to ensure that you understand the purpose of the study and the nature of your involvement. The informed consent must provide sufficient information such that you have the opportunity to determine whether you wish to participate in the study. Present study: Appearance of radical political ideologies on mainstream media Research Personnel. The following people are involved in this study, and may be contacted at any time if you have questions or concerns: Nima Orazani (Principal Investigator; nimaorazani@cmail.carleton.ca) Dr. Michael Wohl (Faculty Supervisor; michael.wohl@carleton.ca; +1-613-520-2600, ext. 2908). Silas Xuereb (Other research personnel; silas.xuereb@cmail.carleton.ca) Bernhard Leidner (Other research personnel; bleidner@psych.umass.edu) Amanda Feige (Other research personnel; amanda.feige@carleton.ca) Concerns. Should you have any ethical concerns with the study, please contact Dr. Bernadette Campbell, Chair, Carleton University Research Ethics Board-B (by phone: 613-520-2600 ext. 4085 or by email: ethics@carleton.ca). For all other questions about the study, please contact the researcher. Task Requirements. During this study you will be asked to indicate your opinion about radical political figures' appearance on mainstream media. Then we will ask you to answer a variety of questions related to this issue. You will complete the study online and your participation will take approximately 30 minutes. Your responses will be completely anonymous. Benefits/compensation. We are offering eligible participants who complete the study US $0.50 for participating. Potential Risk/Discomfort. There are no physical or psychological risks to participating in this study. However, there is always the possibility that you might not like or approve of the questions we ask. If you feel any discomfort or distress, you may choose not to answer specific questions. You will not be penalized in any way if you do this. Additionally, if you feel any emotional distress or anxiety after participating in this study, please feel free to contact one of the helplines nearest to your location. A list of helplines by town and state can be found at https://www.befrienders.org/directory?country=US Anonymity/Confidentiality. Your participation in this study is anonymous. No identifying information (e.g., name, IP address) will be collected as part of your participation in this study. All data on the Qualtrics server is encrypted and protected using multiple layers of security (e.g., encrypted websites and password protected storage). For more information about the security of data on Qualtrics, please see the Qualtrics security and privacy policy, which can be found at the following link: http://www.qualtrics.com/security-statement/ EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 44 Your data will be stored and protected by Qualtrics servers located in Toronto, but may be disclosed via a court order or data breach. In view of this we cannot absolutely guarantee the full confidentiality and anonymity of your data. With your consent to participate in this study you acknowledge this. Data Storage and Sharing. The data collected in this study are strictly confidential. There will be no personal information attached to your data that can be used identify you personally. The data will be stored on the computers of the researchers and research assistants involved with this project. As there will be no personal information associated with the data, this dataset will be stored electronically and kept indefinitely. Right to withdraw: Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. At any point during the study, you have the right to withdraw with no penalty whatsoever. If you wanted to withdraw in the middle of the study, simply click “proceed” at the bottom of each page. At the end of the survey you will see the debriefing form and the consent form which allows you to inform us whether or not you want your data to be used. Then, you will be given a completion code. By sending this code MTurk will be able to pay you for your participation. In case you did not send the code your survey will be considered incomplete and according to MTurk policy we will not be able to pay you. If you withdraw, you have the right to request that your data be deleted. If, after participating, you decide you want your data withdrawn, please email one of the researchers identified on the debriefing form. The researcher will then delete any record of your participation in this study, as well as the email you sent. Once the study is complete, all identifying information will be deleted and thus researchers will have no way of identifying your responses. In this situation, the researchers will not be able to delete your data. If you would like to withdraw from the study and NOT have your data deleted, simply follow the instructions stated below: To withdraw at any point, simply click the “proceed” button at the bottom of each page until you reach the debriefing. In the debriefing, you can learn more about the study and retrieve your Completion Code. Research Funding. This research is supported by a research grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada to Dr. Wohl. This study has received clearance by the Carleton University Research Ethics Board B (CUREBB Clearance # 108285) EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 45 Appendix C: Debrief Form We would like to provide some further information about the purpose of the study and what we expect to find. It is important for you to know that any piece of information you may have read in the beginning of this study was fictitious. The main goal of the survey was to examine how people react when they think the future of their group (or the future of their opponent's group) are in danger. Our hypothesis is that when people think that the future of their group is in danger they become less politically tolerant of their opponent. We apologize for making you believe otherwise and hope you understand that we had to do so to make sure your responses will not be distorted by knowing it was fake. You can withdraw from the study at any time but due to the MTurk terms and policy you will not be compensated if you do not submit the survey in its entirety. Since we cannot link back your personal email address to your IP address we will not be able to remove your data in case you inform us about your decision via email and after you submitted your responses. Note that Amazon Mechanical Turk generates a code as your email and we will be communicating through this code, so we do not have access to your actual email address. The only way to withdraw your responses from data analysis is to inform us at the end of this page. If you have further questions about this project or if you have a research- related problem, you may contact the primary investigator, Nima Orazani, by phone at (343) 777 -0904 or by email at nimaorazani@cmail.carleton.ca. Should you have any ethical concerns regarding this study, please contact Dr. Bernadette Campbell, Chair, Carleton University Research Ethics Board-B (by phone: 613-520-2600 ext. 4085 or by email: ethics@carleton.ca). For all other questions about the study, please contact the researcher. This study has received clearance by the Carleton University Research Ethics Board-B (CUREB-B Clearance # 108285). If you wish to consult with a counselor regarding potential distress you might feel, you may use the following websites to locate a professional near you: 1. http://locator.apa.org 2. http://www.networktherapy.com/directory/find_therapist.asp If, after reading this debriefing form, you are uncomfortable with your data being used in this study, you have the option to withdraw your data from this study. If you would like the researchers to remove your data from their analyses, please indicate that by saying so in the text box below. EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 46 Appendix D: Priming Manipulation Appendix D1: Priming Manipulation in Study 1 A heated debate: Is it normalization, or is it not? Recently, there has been controversy, particularly among liberals, about booking far-right political figures on TV shows. For example, Alex Jones—a far-right radio show host and contributor to infowars.com—was on Sunday Night with Megyn Kelly on NBC, and Milo Yiannopoulos—the former senior editor for the far-right Breitbart News and alt-right activist—appeared on Real Time with Bill Maher on HBO. Appendix D2: Priming Manipulation in Study 2 A heated debate: Is it normalization, or is it not? Recently, there has been controversy, particularly among conservatives, about booking far-left political figures on TV shows. For example, Alex U. Inn—a far-left activist and one of the leaders of Antifa—was recently on the Sean Hannity Show on Fox expressing why her group can make positive change in America. Bernie Sanders, an American politician who is to the left even of Hillary Clinton, expressed similar extreme-left sentiments when he appeared on Tucker Carlson Tonight on Fox. 47 EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES Appendix E: Political Affiliation Measure Please indicate to what extent do you feel positive or negative toward the following issues. 1. Abortion. Completely Negative Completely Positive Author’s note: The above visual analog scale was presented following each of the 12 items but is only shown once here. 2. Limited government. 3. Military and national security. 4. Religion. 5. Welfare benefits. 6. Gun ownership. 7. Traditional marriage. 8. Traditional values. 9. Fiscal responsibility. 10. Business. 11. The family unit. 12. Patriotism. 48 EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES Appendix F: Political Intolerance Measure Please read the statements below and indicate your answers. Note that in all statements by right we mean true and by wrong we mean false. 1. When you have the right position on some issue, you should keep those with the wrong opinion from being heard. Completely False Completely True Author’s note: The above visual analog scale was presented following each of the 7 items but is only shown once here. 2. Even if an idea seems wrong, it should have as much chance to influence people as an idea that seems right. 3. I don’t mind at all when people have opinions about issues that I know are wrong. 4. We need to actively oppose those who disagree with us. 5. When people are obviously wrong in their opinions, they need to be corrected. 6. Some ideas are just more right than others, and our society should do all it can to see that the right ideas win out over the wrong ideas. 7. The media should not pay much, if any, attention to people who clearly hold the wrong opinions. 49 EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES Appendix G: Willingness to Restrict Freedom of Speech Measure Appendix G1: Willingness to Restrict Freedom of Speech Measure for Study 1 Please read the statements below and convey your opinions once with regard to conservatives and once with regard to far-right political figures. 1. Everyone should be able to exercise his/her right to freedom of speech regardless of his/her opinion. Completely Disagree Completely Agree Conservatives Far-right figures Author’s note: The above visual analog scales were presented following each of the 4 items in Study 1. 2. No matter how controversial or contentious are people's attitudes they should be able to express it without any restriction. 3. Freedom of speech should be restricted for those whose opinions endanger society. 4. To achieve a moral society, freedom of speech needs to have some restrictions. Appendix G2: Willingness to Restrict Freedom of Speech Measure for Study 2 1. Everyone should be able to exercise his/her right to freedom of speech regardless of his/her opinion. Completely Disagree Completely Agree Liberals Far-left figures Author’s note: The above visual analog scales were presented following each of the 4 items. 2. No matter how controversial or contentious are people's attitudes they should be able to express it without any restriction. 3. Freedom of speech should be restricted for those whose opinions endanger society. 4. To achieve a moral society, freedom of speech needs to have some restrictions. 50 EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES Appendix H: Willingness to Restrict Access to Mainstream Media Measure Appendix H1: Willingness to Restrict Access to Mainstream Media Measure for Study 1 Please read the statements below and convey your opinion. 1. It is morally wrong to give far-right political figures a platform on mainstream media. Completely Disagree Completely Agree () Author’s note: The above visual analog scale was presented after each of the 5 items. 2. Giving far-right political figures a platform on mainstream media legitimizes their extreme attitudes. 3. Giving far-right political figures a platform on mainstream media suggests to the public that it is okay to hold their extreme views. 4. Giving far-right political figures a platform on mainstream media might make the public less sensitive to the extremity of their attitudes. 5. Those who are not well-informed about social and political issues may be convinced by far-right political ideas if political figures who give voice to these ideas appear on mainstream media. Giving far-left political figures a platform on mainstream media might encourage the public to follow conservative media more often. Appendix H2: Willingness to Restrict Access to Mainstream Media Measure for Study 2 Please read the statements below and convey your opinion. 6. It is morally wrong to give far-left political figures a platform on mainstream media. Completely Disagree Completely Agree Author’s note: The above visual analog scale was presented after each of the 5 items. EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES 51 7. Giving far-left political figures a platform on mainstream media legitimizes their extreme attitudes. 8. Giving far-left political figures a platform on mainstream media suggests to the public that it is okay to hold their extreme views. 9. Giving far-left political figures a platform on mainstream media might make the public less sensitive to the extremity of their attitudes. 10. Those who are not well-informed about social and political issues may be convinced by far-left political ideas if political figures who give voice to these ideas appear on mainstream media. 11. Giving far-left political figures a platform on mainstream media might encourage the public to follow conservative media more often. 52 EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES Appendix I: Collective Angst Measure Appendix I1: Collective Angst Measure for Study 1 Please read the statements below and convey your opinion. 1. I think the future of liberalism is under threat by conservatives. Completely Disagree Completely Agree Author’s note: The above visual analog scale was presented after each of the 5 items. 2. I believe that external sources are purposefully trying to undermine liberal ideas as a way of thinking. 3. I feel anxious about the threats liberal ideals are currently facing from conservatives. 4. I am concerned about external threats to the future of liberalism. 5. I think that liberal ideas are in jeopardy due to the spread of conservatism. Appendix I2: Collective Angst Measure for Study 2 1. I think the future of conservatism is under threat by liberals. Completely Disagree Completely Agree Author’s note: The above visual analog scale was presented after each of the 5 items. 2. I believe that external sources are purposefully trying to undermine conservative ideas as a way of thinking. 3. I feel anxious about the threats conservative ideals are currently facing from liberals. 4. I am concerned about external threats to the future of conservatism. 5. I think that conservative ideas are in jeopardy due to the spread of liberalism.