Running head: EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
The Effects of the Normalization of Radical Political Ideologies on Political Tolerance
and Collective Angst for the Right and Left
Silas Xuereb
2019
Carleton University
A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE BACHELOR OF ECONOMICS
COMBINED HONOURS IN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY DEGREE
Abstract
In the current research, I test the idea that normalization of radical political groups by
mainstream media presents a group-based existential threat to political moderates. The resulting
collective angst—a group-based emotional response to existential threat, should increase
opposition and intolerance toward political opinions that differ from one’s own (to defend
against the existential threat). To test this idea, two survey studies (n = 303 and n = 330) were
conducted. In Study 1 half of all participants were primed with the normalization of radical
political groups from the political right. In Study 2, half of all participants were primed with the
normalization of radical political groups from the political left. In both studies, the other half
were placed in a control condition. Although my manipulation was ineffective, aggregate results
suggest that perceived normalization of the extreme political groups increases political
intolerance of moderate political opposition voices. Furthermore, collective angst mediated this
relationship. Differences in political tolerance between liberals and conservatives are discussed.
ii
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
Acknowledgements
First, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Michael Wohl for all his feedback, support
and patience throughout the process of writing my thesis. I would also like to thank my cosupervisor, Nima Orazani, for allowing me to support his research and helping me understand
political psychology. I greatly appreciate the countless hours you both spent reviewing and
editing my work which began with an extremely rough draft.
I would also like to thank my parents for their continuous support and for always
believing in me. Finally, thank you to Siobhán for your patience throughout my long nights spent
working.
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EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
Table of Contents
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ iii
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... iv
List of tables .....................................................................................................................................v
List of figures ................................................................................................................................. vi
List of appendices ......................................................................................................................... vii
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1
Perceived Normalization ..............................................................................................................2
Normalization and Collective Angst ............................................................................................4
Political Tolerance and Freedom of Speech .................................................................................6
Political Affiliation and Political Tolerance.................................................................................8
Study 1 ...........................................................................................................................................11
Method .......................................................................................................................................11
Results ........................................................................................................................................13
Discussion ..................................................................................................................................16
Study 2 ...........................................................................................................................................17
Method .......................................................................................................................................17
Results ........................................................................................................................................19
Discussion ..................................................................................................................................23
Extended Analysis .........................................................................................................................24
General Discussion ........................................................................................................................25
Implications ................................................................................................................................28
Limitations .................................................................................................................................29
Future Research ..........................................................................................................................31
Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................32
References ......................................................................................................................................33
Appendices .....................................................................................................................................40
iv
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
List of Tables
Table 1: Correlations between all measured variables in Study 1 .................................................14
Table 2: Correlations between all measured variables in Study 2 .................................................20
v
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
List of Figures
Figure 1: Mediation effects in Study 1 ..........................................................................................15
Figure 2: Mediation effects in Study 2 ..........................................................................................21
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EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
List of Appendices
Appendix A: Ethics Approval ....................................................................................................... 40
Appendix B: Consent Form .......................................................................................................... 43
Appendix C: Debriefing Form ...................................................................................................... 45
Appendix D: Priming Manipulation ............................................................................................. 46
Appendix E: Political Affiliation Measure ................................................................................... 47
Appendix F: Political Intolerance Measure .................................................................................. 48
Appendix G: Willingness to Restrict Freedom of Speech Measure ............................................. 49
Appendix H: Willingness to Restrict Access to Mainstream Media Measure.............................. 50
Appendix I: Collective Angst Measure......................................................................................... 52
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EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
1
The Impact of the Normalization of Radical Political Ideologies on Political Tolerance
and Collective Angst for the Right and Left
Recently, radical left as well as radical right political ideologies have received increased
public exposure in the United States (Cammeron, 2017; Romero, 2018) and around the world
(Grierson, 2018). White supremacists, neo-Nazis, and white nationalists are examples of groups
with radical right-wing ideologies that are typically characterized by xenophobia, nationalism
and anti-establishment rhetoric (Caiani & Kröll, 2017; Fagerholm, 2018). In the current political
climate in the United States, these groups have increasingly organized public rallies and received
extensive coverage by mainstream news media (e.g. The New York Times, CNN), in part, due to
the use of violence against counter-protestors (Jones, 2018). The Unite the Right rally held in
Charlottesville, Virginia, and the murder of a counter-protestor by a far-right sympathizer is an
example of a strong and emboldened appearance of radical right-wing ideology. Groups with
radical left-wing ideologies, which are typically characterized by anti-capitalism and antifascism, with an affinity toward socialism (Fagerholm, 2018), have also engaged in protests and
received widespread mainstream media attention. For example, Antifa (an acronym for antifascist), a group that situationally endorses violence to combat fascism, has experienced an
uptick in mainstream media attention, in part, as a result of their vocal and physical counterprotest in Charlottesville. Considering the increased exposure of radical ideologies, some on the
more moderate right and left have voiced concern that the radical version of their political
opponent’s ideology is becoming normalized (i.e., non-mainstream ideas or actions become
accepted and embedded in existing social knowledge and practice; Boykoff, 2013; Gunther,
1998).
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
2
To date, there has been very little research attention directed at the consequences of the
perceived normalization of radical political ideologies. I contend that the perceived
normalization of radical opposing political views is likely to elicit anxiety about the future
vitality of one’s political group, a phenomenon known as collective angst (Wohl & Branscombe,
2008). Collective angst should lead to actions that protect the future of the ingroup such as
restricting radicals’ freedom of speech. This protects one’s ingroup because many people hold
zero-sum beliefs in the realm of politics— for example that increased support for the right
necessarily means a fall for the left (Bar-tal & Halperin, 2013). Thus, if people think the political
fortunes of those on the opposite side of the political spectrum are on the rise, it will cue
collective angst for the future of one’s own political views. I tested this idea in the current
research. Specifically, I hypothesized that political ingroup members will become less tolerant of
their political opponent when radical versions of their political opponent’s ideology are framed
as becoming normalized. This political intolerance can manifest itself as individuals’ willingness
to restrict their opponents’ right to freedom of speech or right to appear in mainstream media—
an effect mediated by collective angst. I tested this idea within the context of American politics.
Perceived Normalization
According to May’s (2006; 2009) normalization process theory new practices can be
successfully embedded into social contexts through continuous efforts from various individuals
or groups. Specifically, continual exposure to a practice can normalize that practice, which will
increase its uptake. In a similar vein, I argue that radical political ideas that were previously
deemed too extreme to be taken seriously may become embedded into the social fabric of society
by the same normalization process.
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
3
At any given time, there is a range of ideas that is accepted in the public discourse—this
range is often referred to as the Overton Window (Szałek, 2013). These ideas are discussed by
media outlets and politicians, while ideas outside this range are ignored. To normalize an idea
that lies outside this range, individuals or groups must perceive it as a legitimate idea to be put
forth in the public sphere. A similar idea was developed by Hallin (1986), who argued that
political discourse can be divided into three spheres: the sphere of consensus, the sphere of
legitimate controversy, and the sphere of deviance. The sphere of consensus and sphere of
legitimate controversy receive validating media coverage, while ideas within the sphere of
deviance are either mocked and ridiculed by the media, or completely ignored. When extreme
political ideas that previously were considered deviant begin to receive more coverage by
mainstream media, and be espoused by politicians, they begin to shift into the sphere of
legitimate controversy. Furthermore, as extreme views gain a greater share of the mainstream
discourse, people become desensitized towards them (Soral, Bilewicz, & Winiewski, 2018).
There is evidence to suggest that the media is biased in favour of publishing populist,
anti-establishment rhetoric (Wettstein, Esser, Schulz, Wirz, & Wirth, 2018), and this is a catalyst
for the normalization of these (usually far-right) views (Bos, Van Der Brug, & De Vreese, 2010).
This media bias may be partially caused by the negativity bias—the tendency for negative events
to have stronger effects on individuals than equivalent positive events (Royzman & Rozin,
2001). This process also appears to have occurred in the United States throughout the past 5-10
years. Individuals with radical right-wing political ideas have not only received legitimate news
coverage from media outlets (Phillips, 2018), but politicians who achieved positions of power
within the government have supported their ideas (e.g. Steve Bannon, co-founder of alt-right
news website Breitbart, became the White House Chief Strategist). These developments have
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
4
contributed to embedding previously radical right-wing ideas (e.g. banning all citizens of a
country from entering the United States) into public discourse and even public policy. The net
effect may be the belief among people on the political left that their political views are at risk of
being marginalized. Similarly, right-wing individuals’ zero-sum political beliefs may cause them
to worry that there is no place for their beliefs in the public discourse when they perceive that the
media covers the radical right more harshly than the radical left, or when they observe the
success of democratic socialists such as Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.
There is evidence to support political moderates’ concern about the radicalization of
political ideologies. Indeed, public opinion has shifted towards the extremes on several issues.
For example, according to Pew Research Center (2014, 2018), the percentage of Americans who
think there should be no restrictions on abortions (a far-left view) has increased from 19% to
25% between 2014 and 2018 while the percentage of Americans who think all abortions should
be illegal (a far-right view) has increased from 14% to 15% over the same time period. What is
the consequence of making not only this radical shift salient, but also that radical ideologies are
becoming normalized? Herein, I contend that people will experience collective angst—a groupbased emotion that reflects concern about the future of their group).
Normalization and Collective Angst
When an individual believes the future of their ingroup is under threat, they experience
collective angst (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). The consequence of this group-based emotion is
the support of action that is deemed able to protect the ingroup’s future vitality (Halperin, Porat,
& Wohl, 2013). These actions can differ depending on the context of the threat. When the threat
is external, collective angst improves cohesion with group norms (Halperin et al., 2013; Jetten &
Wohl, 2012), but when those norms are themselves detrimental to the vitality of the group,
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
5
collective angst can increase dissent within the group (Dupuis, Wohl, & Packer, 2016).
Furthermore, when the threat is external, collective angst can increase opposition and intolerance
towards threatening outgroups (Jetten & Wohl, 2012). In the context of radical political group
normalization, the latter is most relevant. I contend that collective angst will increase political
intolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of speech among political ingroup members. This
is supported by research on intergroup threat between the left and the right in the United States.
Political group members often exhibit increased levels of political intolerance toward political
opponents when under threat (Bloom & Bagno-Moldavsky, 2015; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014;
Nail, Mcgregor, Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson, 2009).
The effects of collective angst are in line with the predicted effects of intergroup threat in
intergroup threat theory (Stephan, Stephan, & Gudykunst, 1999). This theory identifies many
potential sources of intergroup threat and their consequences. In the words of Stephan and his
colleagues (1999), symbolic threats are “threats to the worldviews of the ingroup” (p. 7), which
includes threats to the morals and values of one’s group. In the political context, partisans may
perceive the normalization of radical opposing political groups as threatening the values and
morals of their ingroup. For example, the normalization of radical right-wing views (e.g.
advocating deportation of asylum seekers or abolishing social security) threatens the values of
social justice and equality that many liberals hold. Similarly, the normalization of radical leftwing views, such as that college tuition should be free, threatens the conservative value of
personal responsibility. Because these processes threaten political group members’ values, they
are likely to experience collective angst.
Intergroup threat theory also provides some clues about how the resulting support of
actions which protect the ingroup’s future vitality will manifest. The theory argues that when an
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
6
outgroup poses a threat to an ingroup, the ingroup will exhibit negative, exaggerated behavioural
and emotional responses (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006) towards the outgroup (Corenblum &
Stephan, 2001; Stephan et al., 1999). In the context of normalization of radical right-wing views,
liberals will respond to this threat with negative attitudes (e.g. belief that their views should not
be considered) and negative behavioural responses towards the far-right (e.g. petitioning for
restrictions on their right to speak and appear publicly).
Furthermore, physically distant outgroups (e.g. Alternative for Germany, a far-right
German political group) which threaten the ingroup (e.g. liberals in the U.S.) can cause negative
attitudes towards local outgroups (Bouman, van Zomeren, & Otten, 2015). Threats from foreign
groups can cause negative responses towards local groups that are perceived as similar. It has yet
to be explored whether this effect generalizes to other types of similar outgroups. I argue that this
effect may cause negative reactions among the left towards moderate conservatives in the
context of far-right normalization, or negative reactions among the right towards moderate
liberals in the context of far-left normalization. Even though the threat is not being posed by the
moderates, people will associate the radical outgroup with the moderate outgroup, causing them
to restrict freedom of speech and exhibit political intolerance towards both groups.
Political Tolerance and Freedom of Speech
Political tolerance has long been thought of as one of the central pillars of a free
democratic society (Gibson, 1992; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). This includes respecting the rights
of minority groups to speak, assemble and vote, all of which are essential democratic rights.
However, high levels of intolerance towards left-wing and communist groups have been noted
dating back decades (see Stouffer, 1955). This is an example of a relative manifestation of
political tolerance because it is directed at a specific group. Over the decades that followed
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
7
Stouffer’s seminal work, the concept of political tolerance was refined and expanded to
encompass general attitudes towards civil liberties, which became known as universal political
tolerance (Gibson, 2013; Todosijević, 2016). This paper will use Sullivan and Transue’s (1999)
definition of political tolerance: the willingness to put up with, or permit, opposing political ideas
in the public sphere. This conceptualization does not restrict tolerance to attitudes towards a
single group. By using this definition, I can determine whether the perceived normalization of
extreme opposing views influences individuals’ levels of political tolerance towards outgroup
members overall, not only towards those with extreme opposing ideologies.
I will also examine relative manifestations of political tolerance, specifically, the
willingness to restrict freedom of speech of specific groups. Willingness to allow freedom of
speech is one aspect of political tolerance of critical importance in today’s political climate. This
construct is the most discussed aspect of political tolerance in the media and is the subject of
much heated debate (Chong & Levy, 2019). This construct is distinguished from political
tolerance in that it does not include the right to assemble or hold political office (Sullivan &
Transue, 1999).
Freedom of speech is a prerequisite of the normalization of extreme views. That is,
normalization cannot occur if people restrict their political opponents’ right to freedom of
speech. Therefore, restricting freedom of speech is one tool that groups can use to slow or
prevent the normalization of an opposing ideology. Circumstantial evidence indicates that this
tool is currently being used as there is an increasing amount of calls from left-wing individuals to
restrict speech of extreme right individuals, particularly on college campuses and on social
media.
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
8
A further aspect of political tolerance that is especially intriguing in today’s political
climate is media coverage of radical political groups. As discussed above, radical political
groups are receiving more mainstream media attention than ever before and can reach an
incredibly wide audience directly through social media. There is growing evidence to suggest
that exposure on mainstream media and social media helps radical political movements grow
(Allen, 2017; Doroshenko, 2018). Public pressure has mounted for social media companies to
remove users who espouse hateful and extreme views on their platforms, likely due to collective
angst about the impact this widespread exposure could have. After long rejecting any
responsibility for content posted on their platforms, major social media platforms such as Twitter
and Facebook have begun to cave to these demands and ban users who espouse offensive speech,
such as Milo Yiannopolous.
I hypothesize that the normalization of extreme opposing views will increase individuals’
political intolerance, willingness to restrict moderate outgroup and radicals’ freedom of speech
and willingness to restrict radicals’ access to mainstream media outlets, all effects mediated by
collective angst.
Political Affiliation and Political Tolerance
Until now, I have argued that these effects will occur equivalently for the normalization
of the left or the right. Recent research, however, has studied differences in levels of tolerance
between left and right-wing individuals, and whether these groups react differently under threat.
Results show that conservatives have an inherent need to reduce uncertainty and maintain the
status quo which leads to reduced levels of universal political tolerance (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski,
Sulloway, & Will, 2003; Lindner & Nosek, 2009; Sweetser, 2014). Liberals, however, exhibit
political intolerance as much as conservatives only when they perceive themselves as under
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
9
threat (Nail et al., 2009). This is known as the reactive-liberals hypothesis (Jost, Napier, &
Gosling, 2007; Nail et al., 2009).
Another possible contributing factor to conservatives’ increased levels of political
intolerance is their increased levels of religious and ethnic homogeneity (Mason, 2018).
According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), people integrate aspects of the social
groups to which they belong into their personal identity, which strengthens their connections to
their ingroup. When multiple social identities are aligned in a single group (e.g. religion,
ethnicity and political ideology), connections to the group become stronger, and tolerance of
outgroup members diminishes (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Accordingly, American conservatives,
who are largely white and Christian, may exhibit higher levels of identity with their political
group and higher levels of intolerance towards outgroup members.
On the other hand, the ideological conflict hypothesis (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers,
Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014) posits that both liberals and conservatives exhibit similar levels of
political intolerance towards groups with conflicting ideologies (Crawford & Pilanski, 2014).
These researchers argue that the methodologies used to measure intolerance in the studies
supporting the reactive-liberals hypothesis were flawed.
Turning to relative manifestations of political intolerance, despite the current political
climate where conservatives are portrayed as defenders of free speech and liberals are portrayed
as endorsing censorship, liberals have historically been more vocal proponents of free speech
(Davis & Silver, 2004; Lindner & Nosek, 2009). Furthermore, past research has demonstrated
that conservatives are more willing to engage in censorship than liberals (Sniderman, Tetlock,
Glaser, Green, & Hout, 1989). As a historical example, during the Cold War when left-wing
communists received considerable media attention, conservatives were very willing to restrict
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
10
freedom of speech of communists, as well as other left-wing groups such as atheists (Stouffer,
1955), even though they largely endorsed freedom of speech in general (i.e. they showed
evidence of universal political tolerance). Another potential explanation for this difference
between liberals and conservatives is that liberals are more likely to see rights as absolute,
whereas conservatives perceive rights as context-dependent (McClosky & Brill, 1983). As with
universal political tolerance, conservatives are also more likely to support authority and the
status quo, which can lead to support for suppressing alternative viewpoints (Jost et al., 2003;
Sullivan, Marcus, & Piereson, 1982).
It is possible that the Right’s current embrace of freedom of speech is not an inherent
value, but merely a reflection that it is politically beneficial for them. Given the conflict between
the current popular portrayal of freedom of speech as a conservative value and the historical
research, this paper compared levels of political intolerance and willingness to restrict freedom
of speech between liberals and conservatives.
Overview
In Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups. The first group
was primed with the normalization of the far-right through a short report. Their levels of
political tolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of speech of conservatives and the radical
right were compared to those of a control group. In Study 2, participants were randomly assigned
to a prime group, where participants were primed with the normalization of the far-left by
reading a short report, or to a control group. I compared levels of the same variables, modified
for the context of the radical left, between the two groups.
I hypothesized that members of the left and right would exhibit similar overall levels of
political intolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of speech. When experiencing threat (the
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
11
normalization of an opposing radical political group), liberals and conservatives should display
increased levels of political intolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of speech, an effect
mediated by increased collective angst.
Study 1
Method
Participants. I recruited 303 Americans via Mechanical Turk (MTurk). After excluding
nine participants who were not born in the United States, two who were not native English
speakers, and eight who spent significantly more time to complete the survey (univariate outlier
analysis; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), 284 participants were retained for data analysis (160
female, two opted not to specify, age M = 39.92, SD = 12.90, Range = 17-77). Participants
received $0.50 for completing the survey.
Procedure. After obtaining their consent, all participants completed a 12-item scale to
assess political affiliation (Everett, 2013). Next, participants in the prime condition were
presented with a short report explaining that controversial far-right political figures had been
receiving increased mainstream media coverage, while participants in the control condition
proceeded directly to the measures. All participants then completed the measures described
below on 1-9 visual analog scales. Participants also responded to other measures regarding
exposure to right-wing media outlets that are not included in this paper. Demographic questions
were presented at the end of the survey, followed by a debriefing. Items of each scale were
presented in randomized order. Unless noted otherwise, the scale endpoints were labeled
Completely Disagree and Completely Agree. According to exploratory factor analyses, scales
were unidimensional as intended.
Materials.
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
12
Political affiliation. The 12-Item Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (Everett,
2013) was used to measure participants’ political affiliation. This scale asks participants to
convey their opinion on several issues that differentiate between conservatives and liberals,
including abortion, limited government, religion, welfare benefits, gun ownership, and traditional
marriage (α = .90, M = 5.83, SD = 1.60). Scale endpoints were labeled “Completely Negative”
and “Completely Positive”. Several items were reverse-coded and the resulting measure ranges
from 1 (completely liberal) to 9 (completely conservative).
Collective angst. Adapted from Wohl and Branscombe (2009), five items measured to
what extent participants were concerned about the future of liberal values (e.g. “I think the
liberal ideas are in jeopardy due to the spread of conservatism.” or “I think the future of
liberalism is under thread by conservatives.”; α = .90, M = 4.77, SD = 2.20).
Political intolerance. Adapted from Haas and Cunningham (2014), seven items measured
the extent to which people were open to hear dissimilar political views (e.g., “We need to
actively oppose those who disagree with us.” or “When people are obviously wrong in their
opinions, they need to be corrected.”; α = .79, M = 4.63, SD = 1.47).
Willingness to restrict freedom of speech. Four items (e.g., “No matter how controversial
or contentious are people’s attitudes, they should be able to express it without any restriction.”
[reverse scored] or “Freedom of speech should be restricted for those whose opinions endanger
society.”) measured to what extent participants were willing to grant freedom of speech to
conservatives (α = .80, M = 3.35, SD = 1.83) and far-right figures (α = .86, M = 3.98, SD = 2.32).
Willingness to restrict far-right from mainstream media. Five items measured the extent
to which participants were willing to restrict far-right figures from appearing on mainstream
media outlets (e.g. “It is morally wrong to give far-right political figures a platform on
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
13
mainstream media” or “Giving far-right political figures a platform on mainstream media
legitimizes their extreme attitudes”; α = .81, M = 5.36, SD = 1.76).
Results
All analyses were conducted using SAS 9.4. To determine the effectiveness of the
manipulation, I compared participants’ levels of collective angst in the prime condition (M =
4.80, SD = 2.05) and the control condition (M = 4.75, SD = 2.35). No significant difference was
found in levels of collective angst between the two conditions, t(282) = 0.18, p = 0.85, indicating
that our manipulation was not effective.
I then tested whether the manipulation influenced the dependent variables. Levels of
political tolerance did not vary significantly between the control condition (M = 4.52, SD = 1.41)
and the prime condition (M = 4.75, SD = 1.53), t(282) = 1.32, p = 0.19. Willingness to restrict
far-right figures’ freedom of speech also did not vary significantly between the control condition
(M = 4.03, SD = 2.32) and the prime condition (M = 3.94, SD = 2.33), t(282) = -0.33, p = 0.74,
nor did willingness to restrict the far-right from mainstream media outlets (control: M = 5.45, SD
= 1.71), t(282) = 0.92, p = 0.36. These results imply that the manipulation had no effect on any
of the measured variables, not only collective angst. For this reason, the remainder of my
analyses were conducted with the data collapsed across conditions. Table 1 presents correlations
between all measured variables in Study 1 collapsed across conditions.
14
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
Table 1. Correlations between all measured variables in Study 1
Variable
1. Political
Affiliation
2.
Collective
angst
3. Political
Intolerance
4. Restrict
far-right
freedom of
speech
5. Restrict
liberals’
freedom of
speech
1
2
3
4
5
6
1.0000
-0.4168
1.0000
(<.0001)
-0.2929
0.4802
1.0000
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
-0.4211
0.4694
0.4598
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
-0.2909
0.4375
0.4087
0.8035
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
6. Restrict
-0.4314
0.4295
0.4669
far-right
media
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
appearances
Note: p-values are displayed in parentheses.
1.0000
1.0000
0.5371
0.3854
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
1.0000
For exploratory purposes, I conducted mediation analyses to determine if collective angst
mediated the relationship between political affiliation and the dependent variables. Results of the
mediation analyses are displayed in Figure 1. All reported confidence intervals were generated
using bootstrapping with 5000 iterations. I applied Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure to
establish a mediation. Simple linear regression models established that correlations existed
between the independent variable (political affiliation), the mediator (collective angst), and each
of the dependent variables. The regression model with political affiliation and collective angst as
predictors of political intolerance was statistically significant, F(2, 281) = 44.61, p < 0.0001, R2
15
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
Collective angst
0.29**
-0.57**
-0.27** (-0.10**)
Political affiliation
Political intolerance
Collective angst
0.32**
-0.57**
-0.33** (-0.15*)
Political affiliation
Restrict conservative
speech
Collective angst
0.38**
-0.57**
-0.61 ** (-0.40**)
Political affiliation
Restrict radical right
speech
Collective angst
0.24**
-0.57**
Political affiliation
-0.48 ** (-0.33**)
Restrict radical right
media appearances
Figure 1. Mediation effects in Study 1. Collective angst mediates the effect of political
affiliation on political intolerance, willingness to restrict conservatives’ and radicals’ freedom of
speech, and willingness to restrict the radical right from appearing on mainstream media. The
displayed numbers are the estimated slopes between two linked variables, numbers in parentheses
indicate the direct effect, after controlling for collective angst. ** indicates estimates significant at p ≤
.01. * indicates estimates significant at p ≤ .05.
= 0.24. The coefficient associated with political affiliation was borderline significant, β = -0.10,
t(282) = -1.96, p = 0.05, while the coefficient associated with collective angst was significant, β
= 0.29, t(282) = 7.58, p < 0.0001. Collective angst significantly mediated the effect of political
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
16
affiliation on political intolerance. The indirect effect was estimated at -0.17, with 95%
confidence limits of -0.11 and -0.24. Political affiliation and collective angst also significantly
predicted restricting far-right freedom of speech, F(2, 281) = 55.14, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.28. Both
the coefficient associated with political affiliation, β = -0.40, t(282) = -4.91, p < 0.0001, and with
collective angst β = 0.38, t(282) = 6.39, p < 0.0001, were significant. The indirect effect of
political affiliation on restricting far-right speech was estimated at -0.22, with 95% confidence
limits of -0.13 and -0.32. Collective angst and political affiliation also significantly predicted
willingness to restrict conservatives’ speech, F(2, 281) = 36.37, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.21. The
coefficients associated with political affiliation significant, β = -0.15, t(282) = -2.25, p =0.026,
and collective angst, β = 0.32, t(282) = 6.54, p < 0.0001, were both significant. The indirect
effect was estimated at -0.18, with 95% confidence limits of -.28 and -0.11. Finally, political
affiliation and collective angst significantly predicted willingness to prevent far-right figures
from appearing in media, F(2,281) = 49.77, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.26. The coefficient associated
with political affiliation was significant, β = -0.33, t(282) = -5.42, p < 0.0001, as was the
coefficient associated with collective angst, β = 0.24, t(282) = 5.36, p < 0.0001. The indirect
effect of political affiliation on restricting far-right appearances in mainstream media was -0.14,
with 95% confidence limits at -0.08 and -0.22.
Discussion
Unfortunately, the failure of the prime in Study 1 limited my ability to analyze the effect
of perceived normalization on the other measured variables. However, the results display many
interesting findings that merit further investigation. Most importantly, I found that the links
between political affiliation (i.e. being conservative/liberal), political intolerance and willingness
to restrict freedom of speech are mediated by collective angst. Specifically, liberals are more
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
17
willing to restrict the speech of radical right-wing groups because of their increased levels of
collective angst. Moreover, this effect is not restricted to radical right-wing groups. Collective
angst also mediates the relationship between political affiliation and willingness to restrict
freedom of speech of moderate conservatives, and reduces liberals’ universal political
intolerance.
The next study will examine whether these same effects arise under the context of the
normalization of the far-left. To ensure results could be aggregated across the two studies, the
priming condition was not altered in Study 2. The potential causes of the failure of the prime will
be discussed in the General Discussion.
Study 2
Method
A total of 330 Americans were recruited via Mechanical Turk (MTurk). After excluding
10 participants who were not born in the United States, two who were not native English
speakers, twelve who spent significantly more time to complete the survey (univariate outlier
analysis; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), and twelve who provided the default response for a
majority of their answers, 294 participants were retained for data analysis (172 female, two opted
not to specify their gender, age M = 38.14, SD = 12.83, Range = 18-99).
Procedure. As in Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to either the prime or the
control condition. First, all participants completed a 12-item scale to assess political affiliation
(Everett, 2013). Participants in the prime condition then read a report explaining that far-left
political figures were receiving increased mainstream media coverage. All participants then
completed the measures described below on 1-9 visual analog scales. Participants also responded
to other measures regarding exposure to left-wing media outlets that are not included in this
18
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
paper. Demographic questions were presented at the end of the survey, followed by a debriefing.
Unless noted otherwise, the scale endpoints were labeled Completely Disagree and Completely
Agree. According to exploratory factor analyses, scales were unidimensional as intended.
Materials.
Political affiliation. The 12-Item Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (Everett,
2013) to measure participants’ political affiliation. This scale asks participants to convey their
opinion on several issues that differentiate between conservatives and liberals such as abortion,
limited government, religion, welfare benefits, gun ownership and traditional marriage (α = .87,
M = 5.85, SD = 1.61). Two items were removed due to factor loadings being below 0.4. Scale
endpoints were labeled “Completely Negative” and “Completely Positive”. Several items were
reverse-coded and the resulting measure ranges from 1 (completely liberal) to 9 (completely
conservative).
Collective angst. Adapted from Wohl and Branscombe (2009), five items measured to
what extent participants were concerned about the future of conservative values (e.g. “I think the
conservative ideas are in jeopardy due to the spread of liberalism.” or “I think the future of
conservatism is under thread by liberals.”; α = .91, M = 4.53, SD = 2.17).
Political intolerance. Adapted from Haas and Cunningham (2014), seven items measured
the extent to which people were open to hear dissimilar political views (e.g., “We need to
actively oppose those who disagree with us.” or “When people are obviously wrong in their
opinions, they need to be corrected.”; α = .78, M = 4.54, SD = 1.53). Two items were removed
due to low factor loadings (< 0.4).
Willingness to restrict freedom of speech. Four items (e.g., “No matter how controversial
or contentious are people’s attitudes, they should be able to express it without any restriction.”
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
19
[reverse scored] or “Freedom of speech should be restricted for those whose opinions endanger
society.”) measured participants’ willingness to restrict freedom of speech of liberals (α = .75, M
= 3.10, SD = 1.66) and far-left figures (α = .79, M = 3.36, SD = 1.88).
Willingness to restrict far-left from mainstream media. Five items measured the extent
to which participants were willing to restrict far-left figures from appearing on mainstream
media outlets (e.g. “It is morally wrong to give far-left political figures a platform on mainstream
media” or “Giving far-left political figures a platform on mainstream media legitimizes their
extreme attitudes”; α = .78, M = 5.45, SD = 1.56).
Results
Once again, I compared levels of collective angst between the prime condition (M = 4.74,
SD = 2.00) and the control condition (M = 4.36, SD = 2.30). I found no significant difference
t(292) = -1.49, p = 0.14 between the conditions, indicating that the manipulation was ineffective.
Furthermore, the manipulation had no effect on the dependent variables. Levels of
political tolerance in the control condition (M = 4.45, SD = 1.53) did not differ from the prime
condition (M = 4.63, SD = 1.53), t(292) = -0.98, p = 0.33. Willingness to restrict freedom of
speech of the far-left did not differ between the control (M = 5.49, SD = 1.70), and prime
conditions (M = 5.41, SD = 1.39), t(292) = 0.38, p = 0.70, nor did willingness to restrict the farleft’s access to mainstream media outlets (control: M = 3.40, SD = 1.94, prime: M = 3.32, SD =
1.81), t(292) = 0.38, p = 0.70. Table 2 presents the correlations between all measured variables
in study 2.
20
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
Table 2. Correlations between all measured variables in study 2.
Variable
1. Political
Affiliation
1
1.0000
2. Collective
angst
0.4932
2
3
4
5
6
1.0000
(<.0001)
3. Political
Intolerance
-0.0250
0.2244
(0.6688)
(0.0001)
1.0000
4. Restrict
0.1192
0.3337
0.3438
radical left
freedom of
(0.0411)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
speech
5. Restrict
0.1840
0.3340
0.3618
liberals’
freedom of
(0.0015)
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
speech
6. Restrict
0.1142
0.3182
0.1811
radical left
media
(0.0505)
(<.0001)
(0.0018)
appearances
Note: p-values are displayed in parentheses.
1.0000
0.8806
1.0000
(<.0001)
0.1511
0.1056
(0.0095)
(0.0705)
1.0000
Next, I conducted mediation analyses to determine whether collective angst mediated the
relationships between political affiliation and the dependent variables. Figure 2 presents the
results of the mediation analyses. All reported confidence intervals were generated using
bootstrapping with 5000 iterations. A simple linear regression model established a relationship
between political affiliation and willingness to restrict far-left figures’ freedom of speech,
although the effect was extremely small, F(1, 292) = 4.21, p = 0.04, R2 = 0.01. Political
affiliation significantly predicted willingness to restrict liberals’ freedom of speech, F(1, 292) =
10.23, p = 0.0015, R2 = 0.03. The relationship between political affiliation and willingness to
21
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
Collective angst
0.22**
0.67**
-0.02 (-0.17*)
Political affiliation
Political intolerance
Collective angst
0.31**
0.67**
0.14* (-0.07)
Political affiliation
Restrict radical left
speech
Collective angst
0.25**
0.67**
0.19* (0.03)
Political affiliation
Restricting liberal speech
Collective angst
0.25**
0.67**
Political affiliation
0.11* (-0.06)
Restricting radical left
media appearances
Figure 2. Mediation effects in Study 2. Collective angst mediates the effect of political
affiliation on political intolerance, willingness to restrict liberals’ and radicals’ freedom of speech,
and willingness to restrict the radical left from appearing on mainstream media. The displayed
numbers are the estimated slopes between two linked variables, numbers in parentheses indicate
the direct effect, after controlling for collective angst. ** indicates estimates significant at p ≤ .01. *
indicates estimates significant at p ≤ .05.
restrict the far-left’s mainstream media appearances was marginally significant, F(1, 292) = 3.86,
p = 0.05, R2 = 0.01, while political affiliation did not predict political intolerance, F(1, 292) =
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
22
0.18, p = 0.67.
Using collective angst and political affiliation as predictors of restricting the far left’s
freedom of speech produced a significant model, F(2, 291) = 18.74, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.11. The
coefficient associated with political affiliation was no longer significant, β = -0.07, t(292) = 0.95, p = 0.35, while the coefficient associated with collective angst was significant, collective
angst was significant, β = 0.31, t(292) = 5.73, p < 0.0001. The indirect effect of political
affiliation on restricting freedom of speech was estimated at 0.21 with 95% confidence limits of
0.13 and 0.31. The equivalent model for liberals’ freedom of speech was significant, F(2, 291) =
18.37, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.11, although the coefficient of political affiliation was not significant,
β = 0.03, t(292) = 0.40, p = 0.69. The coefficient associated with collective angst was significant,
β = 0.25, t(292) = 5.06, p < 0.0001. The indirect effect was significant, 0.16, with 95%
confidence limits of 0.09 and 0.25. Collective angst and political affiliation also significantly
predicted restricting the far left’s mainstream media access, F(2, 291) = 16.82, p < 0.0001, R2 =
0.10. The coefficient associated with political affiliation was no longer significant, β = -0.06,
t(292) = -0.89, p = 0.37, while the coefficient associated with collective angst was significant, β
= 0.25, t(292) = 5.42, p < 0.0001. The indirect effect of political affiliation on restricting
mainstream media appearances was estimated at 0.17 with 95% confidence limits of 0.09 and
0.25.
Although political affiliation was not a significant predictor of political intolerance,
modern mediation techniques (Mackinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000) imply that a mediation
effect can occur without a significant relationship between the independent and dependent
variables due to suppression effects. A suppression effect occurs when the independent variable
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
23
and the mediating variable have opposing effects on the dependent variable, effectively
canceling each other out (Mackinnon et al., 2000). After entering collective angst into the model
with political affiliation, the model was significant, F(2, 291) = , p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.07, with
political affiliation, β = -0.17, t(292) = -2.77, p = 0.006, and collective angst significantly
predicting political intolerance, β = 0.22, t(292) = 4.83, p < 0.0001.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 support the results obtained in Study 1 under the context of the
normalization of the radical left. Collective angst mediated the relationship between political
affiliation and the dependent variables. Conservatives were more willing to restrict freedom of
speech of far-left figures due to their increased levels of collective angst for the future of
conservatism. Likewise, they were more willing to restrict freedom of speech of moderate
liberals and showed higher levels of intolerance towards those they disagreed with due to higher
levels of collective angst. Interestingly, unlike in the previous study, there was no direct
relationship between political affiliation and political intolerance until collective angst was added
to the model. After collective angst was added, political affiliation and political intolerance were
negatively related, implying that increased liberalism was associated with increased intolerance.
There was no direct effect of political affiliation on political intolerance because the effect was
being suppressed by the increased collective angst of the conservatives.
This observation, combined with the relationships between collective angst and the
dependent variables being stronger in Study 1, imply that liberals are currently overall slightly
more willing to restrict freedom of speech and slightly less politically tolerant. This finding
supports the current anecdotal claim that conservatives are more supportive of freedom of speech
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
24
than liberals. The extended analysis below will examine this difference more deeply by
collapsing the results across the two studies.
Furthermore, the extended analysis will examine whether the failure of the normalization
prime was due to priming effects from the prior measures presented to participants. It is possible
that earlier measures which mentioned radical opposing political groups (e.g. the far-right in
Study 1) primed participants in both conditions for normalization, thereby negating the effect of
the condition (prime vs. control).
Extended Analysis
To examine the possible inadvertent priming effect, I studied the interaction effect
between Study (1 vs. 2., with Study 1 coded as 1) and political affiliation on political intolerance.
The same scale was used for political intolerance in both studies, so if there was an interaction
effect, this would be solely due to priming effects of seeing other measures discussing the farright in Study 1 and seeing other measures discussing the far-left in Study 2. The model
including Study, political affiliation and an interaction term was significant, F(3, 574) = 8.32, p <
0.0001, R2 = 0.04. The interaction term had a significant negative effect, t(576) = -3.21, p =
0.001, β = -0.25, while the main effect of Study had a significant positive effect, t(576) = 3.29, p
= 0.001, β = 1.52. That is, for every unit increase in political affiliation (increasing
conservatism), being in Study 1 (and primed for the radical right) as opposed to Study 2 was
predicted to lower political intolerance by 0.25.
To further explore the data, I collapsed data across the two studies to analyze whether
political affiliation had a direct impact on the dependent variables. In each analysis, I controlled
for collective angst, condition (prime vs. control) and study (1 vs. 2). As in the individual
studies, condition had no effect on any of the dependent variables, so it was removed from the
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
25
models. The model including political affiliation as a predictor of intolerance was significant,
F(3, 574) = 50.95, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.15, and political affiliation was a strong predictor of
political intolerance, β = -0.16, t(576) = -4.40, p < 0.0001, indicating that those on the left were
more likely to be politically intolerant than those on the right. Including the same variables as
predictors of restricting radicals’ speech resulted in a significant model, F(3, 574) = 53.49, p <
0.0001, R2 = 0.22, with political affiliation being a strong predictor, t(576) = -5.13, p < 0.0001, β
= -0.25. The model significantly predicted restricting moderates’ speech, F(3, 574) = 36.49, p <
0.0001, R2 = 0.16, with political affiliation acting as a marginal predictor, t(576) = -2.02, p =
0.043, β = -0.08. Finally, the model significantly predicted willingness to restrict radicals’
mainstream media appearances, F(3, 574) = 41.01, p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.18, and political affiliation
was a significant predictor, t(576) = -4.9, p < 0.0001, β = -0.19. These four results imply that
liberalism predicts slightly higher levels of political intolerance and willingness to restrict
freedom of speech.
General Discussion
This research generated three intriguing results: perceived normalization of opposing
radical political groups reduces political tolerance, collective angst partially mediates the effect
of political affiliation on political tolerance (and willingness to restrict freedom of speech), and
liberals exhibit slightly higher overall levels of intolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of
speech. I will discuss each of these findings in turn.
First, although I was unable to directly study the effects of perceived normalization, the
extended analysis provides some hope that perceived normalization of opposing radical groups
does in fact reduce political tolerance. By collapsing the data across the two studies, the results
showed that increasing conservatism was related to higher political intolerance in Study 2, and
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
26
that increasing liberalism was related to higher political intolerance in Study 1. The measure of
political intolerance was identical across the two studies, so the only difference created by being
in a different study was the previous measures presented in the survey discussing the radical
right (Study 1) or the radical left (Study 2). The interaction between Study and political
affiliation implies that these prior measures primed participants to think about radical political
groups (radical right in Study 1, radical left in Study 2), which increased levels of political
intolerance for those on the opposite side of the political spectrum, but not for those who were
more politically aligned with the radical groups. This finding implies that merely priming
individuals to think about radical opposing political groups can increase their universal political
intolerance. Although this does not imply that normalization increases intolerance (my original
hypothesis), it appears likely that normalization of opposing radical groups would prime
individuals to think about these groups frequently, thereby increasing intolerance.
Because individuals in both the prime and control conditions were inadvertently primed
for the increased prevalence of radical opposing groups by the prior measures, this may explain
why no differences were found between individuals in each condition. However, further research
is necessary to explain the link between normalization and political intolerance and examine
whether collective angst plays a mediating role. Adaptations to this research design necessary for
future research, and limitations of the current research, will be discussed in the Future Research
and Limitations sections, respectively.
Next, in each study, the results confirmed the idea that individuals exhibit more political
intolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of speech towards opposing radical groups than
aligned radical groups, and that this is mediated by collective angst. Liberals are more intolerant
towards far-right groups because they are anxious about the future of the left, and conservatives
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
27
are more intolerant towards far-left groups because they are anxious about the future of the right.
For today’s increasingly polarized political climate (Pew Research Center, 2014), this has farreaching implications: if partisans become more concerned for the viability of their political
group, they may exhibit increasing intolerance. There are several mechanisms which could be
increasing partisans’ concern for the future of their group. Although this paper was unable to
prove the link between perceived normalization and collective angst, the normalization of radical
groups is one possible mechanism which could be increasing political group members’ collective
angst. Other potential causes will be discussed in the future research section. However, no matter
the cause of collective angst, it is something to be monitored in the current political climate. If
political group members do not feel that the future of their group is safe, they are less likely to
engage in civil, reasoned public debate and more likely to attempt to restrict others’ participation
in the political system.
Finally, the extended analysis found that liberalism is a predictor of universal political
intolerance and willingness to restrict freedom of speech (of both moderates and radicals). This
is surprising given the historical precedents that present liberals as more tolerant and more
supportive of freedom of speech (Davis & Silver, 2004; Jost et al., 2003), and contradicts my
hypothesis that liberals and conservatives would not differ in their levels of universal or relative
political intolerance. However, this finding does support the current portrayal of the left as
proponents of “safe spaces” and the right as defenders of free speech. It is possible that the
positions of the left and right with regards to free speech have been shifting over time, or that
this is merely a reaction to the recent rise of radical right-wing groups. Liberals may simply be
reacting because they feel threatened, while conservatives do not feel this same threat from the
radical left. Because of this political context, the inadvertent priming of the radical right in Study
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
28
1 may have had a greater impact on liberals than the inadvertent priming of the radical left in
Study 2 had on conservatives.
Implications
These preliminary results have implications for the current political landscape. First, my
results imply that mainstream media (and other sources of media such as online bloggers) should
exercise caution when deciding to cover radical political groups. Regular coverage of radical
political groups can prime viewers to think of the normalization of radical groups, thereby
leading to increased levels of intolerance. This coverage may be one driver of today’s political
polarization and lack of cooperation between the left and the right. The old media adage that all
ideas deserve a platform so that the public can determine what’s right and wrong may do more
harm than good. Unfortunately, the media is becoming more and more incentivized by ratings
and clicks, and radical political ideas often draw large audiences. New funding structures may be
necessary to ensure media companies can survive without being reliant on news which could be
damaging to society. However, structural change of this manner may be difficult to achieve.
Another way to mitigate the damaging effects of exposure to radical political groups is to
ensure all political groups feel comfortable about their future. This includes not only the right
and left, but ethnic and religious minorities, those who live in urban and rural areas, and any
other group someone may identify with politically. If each group were confident in their
respective future, they would not become so anxious when hearing about the rise of other groups.
Achieving this would require politicians and media to stop portraying politics as an “us vs. them”
zero-sum game. Decreased use of social media and increased political discourse in face-to-face
public forums could also contribute to a more inclusive democracy. Face-to-face interactions can
humanize others and allow a deeper understanding of each other’s perspectives (Suler, 2004).
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
29
Despite these studies’ intriguing results and implications, they suffered from several
limitations.
Limitations
The most glaring limitations of these studies include the failure of the manipulation,
problems with the two-study research design, and the restricted samples used.
The possibility of inadvertent priming masking the effects of the priming manipulation
has already been discussed, but there are other plausible reasons which could have led to the
manipulation being ineffective. First, the manipulation simply may not have been strong enough.
A report from a valid news source or that included statistical evidence of the increased
prevalence of radical groups may have been more effective. Another option would be to alter the
study design to compare levels of collective angst and intolerance between individuals in regions
that have experienced a recent increase in the prevalence of radical political groups, to
individuals in other (matched) regions that have not experienced a recent rise in radical political
groups. This change would also allow measures of intolerance towards radical opposing groups
to be used without causing inadvertent priming because the differences in intolerance caused by
the different groups’ lived experiences should outweigh the priming effect. Furthermore, a
simple manipulation check, or a measure asking participants to indicate the degree to which they
believe radical opposing groups are being normalized could be used. This would allow
correlational analysis to be performed even if the manipulation was ineffective.
The two-study research design also presented some potential confounds and limitations
for data analysis. First, because the two studies were conducted at different times, there may
have been different political contexts at the time of each study which may have influenced
participants’ responses. A news story regarding radical political groups that occurred prior to one
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
30
study but not the other could have confounded the results. Next, the collective angst measure
only asked participants about the collective angst they felt for the future of the left in Study 1,
and for the future of the right in Study 2. These measures were used because collective angst for
the future of the left and the right, respectively, are the only types of collective angst that should
be manipulated by perceived normalization in each study. However, this restricted my ability to
use collective angst as an explanatory variable in the extended analysis, where the data is
collapsed across the two studies. Using measured collective angst as a predictor in this analysis
would not provide a full picture of participants’ collective angst (e.g. if a conservative reported
low collective angst for the future of the left in Study 1 but had high collective angst for the
future of the right).
Finally, although samples obtained from MTurk have proven to have characteristics
closer to those of the general population than college samples (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012),
MTurk samples are not representative of the American population. MTurk samples under-sample
older people, African Americans and conservatives (Huff & Tingley, 2015). This implies that
results generated from this research may not be generalizable to the American population.
Furthermore, across both studies, 32 participants (over 5% of total participants surveyed) were
removed for dishonest answers or completing the survey in extreme amounts of time. The
removal of these participants can create biased datasets because participants who engage in these
types of response patterns often have systematically different traits than the overall population
(Ward, Meade, Allred, Pappalardo, & Stoughton, 2017). To support the findings of these studies,
future research should use samples from other sources, including nationally representative
samples wherever possible.
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
31
Future Research
Due to this study’s limitations in analyzing the effects of perceived normalization, future
research should attempt to rectify these problems. In order to prevent the problem of measures
priming radical political groups in the future, one could use the strategies presented in the
Limitations section. If a similar research design to this one is desired, one could present the
political tolerance measure I used (which does not refer to any specific political groups) in
advance of any measures referring to specific political groups. This method is also feasible for
measures of intolerance directed at opposing moderates (e.g. willingness to restrict moderates’
freedom of speech) which do not mention radical opposing groups. To examine measures of
intolerance towards radical opposing groups (e.g. willingness to restrict radicals’ freedom of
speech), significant adaptations to this research design are needed.
Normalization research should clarify the hypothesized relationship with political
intolerance, and examine whether it is mediated by collective angst. It should also seek to
understand in what contexts normalization can affect intolerance. Does the medium (e.g. social
media, cable news) in which radical political groups are discussed affect the consequences of
normalization? Is mentioning radical political groups enough to increase intolerance in any
context or only when individuals already believe that these groups are becoming normalized?
Further research is also necessary to elucidate the causes of collective angst within
political groups. Especially due to the demonstrated effect that collective angst increases
censorship of moderate political groups, this research will have important implications for
avenues through which political intolerance can be mitigated, and civil public debate can be
strengthened. In addition to perceived normalization, factors such as the hostile media bias
(when individuals on the left and right view the same news as biased against them; Lin,
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
32
Haridakis, & Hanson, 2016) and zero-sum beliefs may contribute to collective angst for the
future of political groups. Methods to mitigate the effect of the hostile media bias and to increase
perceptions that politics is not a zero-sum game should be explored.
The path through which collective angst increases intolerance in the political sphere
should also be investigated. Research has shown that collective angst can increase cooperation
with outgroups when this cooperation mitigates the threat to the ingroup (Halperin et al., 2013).
Would collective angst for the future of a political group increase cooperation with the opposing
political group when the Houses of Congress are divided, so compromise was necessary to
accomplish the goals of the ingroup? Can collective angst be channeled into productive dialogue,
instead of opposition and intolerance? The consequences of collective angst in the political
sphere have significant implications which should be explored.
Conclusion
The reported research provides cautious support for the hypothesis that perceived
normalization of radical opposing ideologies increases political intolerance, but the failure of the
manipulation renders the evidence far from conclusive. The results also provide evidence that
collective angst is a predictor of universal political intolerance and willingness to restrict
freedom of speech of opposing groups. I hope this research can provide a starting point for
investigation into the effects of perceived normalization and collective angst in the political
sphere, a timely yet underserved research area.
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
33
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Appendix A: Ethics Approval
Appendix A1: Update of Previous Ethics Clearance
Office of Research Ethics
5110 Human Computer Interaction Bldg | 1125 Colonel By Drive
| Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6
613-520-2600 Ext: 4085
ethics@carleton.ca
CERTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS CLEARANCE
The Carleton University Research Ethics Board-B (CUREB-B) has granted ethics clearance for
the changes to protocol to research project described below and research may now proceed.
CUREB-B is constituted and operates in compliance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement:
Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS2).
Ethics Clearance ID: Project # 108285
Principal Investigator: Nima Orazani
Co-Investigator(s) (If applicable): Nima Orazani (Primary Investigator)
Amanda Feige (Other)
Silas Xuereb (Other)
Michael Wohl (Research Supervisor)
Project Title: The effects of normalization on people's attitudes toward political intolerance
[Seyed Nima Orazani]
Funding Source:
Effective: October 31, 2018 Expires: December 31, 2018.
Upon reasonable request, it is the policy of CUREB, for cleared protocols, to release the name of
the PI, the title of the project, and the date of clearance and any renewal(s).
During the course of the study, if you encounter an adverse event, material incidental finding,
protocol deviation or other unanticipated problem, you must complete and submit a Report of
Adverse Events and Unanticipated Problems Form, found here:
https://carleton.ca/researchethics/forms-and-templates/
Please email the Research Compliance Coordinators at ethics@carleton.ca if you have any
questions.
CLEARED BY:
Bernadette Campbell, PhD, Chair, CUREB-B
Natasha Artemeva, PhD, Vice Chair, CUREB-B
Date: October 31, 2018
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
41
Appendix A2: Renewal of Ethics Clearance
Office of Research Ethics
5110 Human Computer Interaction Bldg | 1125 Colonel By Drive
| Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6
613-520-2600 Ext: 4085
ethics@carleton.ca
CERTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS CLEARANCE
The Carleton University Research Ethics Board-B (CUREB-B) has granted ethics clearance for
the changes to protocol to research project described below and research may now proceed.
CUREB-B is constituted and operates in compliance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement:
Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS2).
Title: The effects of normalization on people's attitudes toward political intolerance [Seyed
Nima Orazani]
Protocol #: 108285
Principal Investigator: Nima Orazani
Department and Institution: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences\Psychology (Department of),
Project Team (and Roles): Nima Orazani (Primary Investigator)
Amanda Feige (Other)
Silas Xuereb (Other)
Michael Wohl (Research Supervisor)
Funding Source (If applicable):
Effective: December 10, 2018 Expires: December 31, 2019.
Upon reasonable request, it is the policy of CUREB, for cleared protocols, to release the name of
the PI, the title of the project, and the date of clearance and any renewal(s).
Please ensure the study clearance number is prominently placed in all recruitment and
consent materials: CUREB-B Clearance # 108285.
Restrictions:
This certification is subject to the following conditions:
1. Clearance is granted only for the research and purposes described in the application.
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
42
2. An annual application for the renewal of ethics clearance must be submitted and cleared
by the above date. Failure to submit the Annual Status Report will result in the closure of
the file. If funding is associated, funds will be frozen.
3. Any modification to the approved research must be submitted to CUREB-B. All changes
must be approved prior to the continuance of the research.
4. A closure request must be sent to CUREB-B when the research is complete or
terminated.
5. During the course of the study, if you encounter an adverse event, material incidental
finding, protocol deviation or other unanticipated problem, you must complete and
submit a Report of Adverse Events and Unanticipated Problems Form, found here:
https://carleton.ca/researchethics/forms-and-templates/
6. It is the responsibility of the student to notify their supervisor of any adverse events,
changes to their application, or requests to renew/close the protocol.
7. Failure to conduct the research in accordance with the principles of the Tri-Council
Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans 2nd edition and the
Carleton University Policies and Procedures for the Ethical Conduct of Research may
result in the suspension or termination of the research project.
Upon reasonable request, it is the policy of CUREB, for cleared protocols, to release the name of
the PI, the title of the project, and the date of clearance and any renewal(s).
Please email the Research Compliance Coordinators at ethics@carleton.ca if you have any
questions.
CLEARED BY:
Bernadette Campbell, PhD, Chair, CUREB-B
Natasha Artemeva, PhD, Vice Chair, CUREB-B
Date: December 10, 2018
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
43
Appendix B: Consent Form
Informed Consent Form
The purpose of an informed consent is to ensure that you understand the purpose of the study and
the nature of your involvement. The informed consent must provide sufficient information such
that you have the opportunity to determine whether you wish to participate in the study.
Present study: Appearance of radical political ideologies on mainstream media
Research Personnel. The following people are involved in this study, and may be contacted at
any time if you have questions or concerns:
Nima Orazani (Principal Investigator; nimaorazani@cmail.carleton.ca)
Dr. Michael Wohl (Faculty Supervisor; michael.wohl@carleton.ca; +1-613-520-2600, ext.
2908).
Silas Xuereb (Other research personnel; silas.xuereb@cmail.carleton.ca)
Bernhard Leidner (Other research personnel; bleidner@psych.umass.edu)
Amanda Feige (Other research personnel; amanda.feige@carleton.ca)
Concerns. Should you have any ethical concerns with the study, please contact Dr. Bernadette
Campbell, Chair, Carleton University Research Ethics Board-B (by phone: 613-520-2600 ext.
4085 or by email: ethics@carleton.ca). For all other questions about the study, please contact the
researcher.
Task Requirements. During this study you will be asked to indicate your opinion about radical
political figures' appearance on mainstream media. Then we will ask you to answer a variety of
questions related to this issue. You will complete the study online and your participation will
take approximately 30 minutes. Your responses will be completely anonymous.
Benefits/compensation. We are offering eligible participants who complete the study US $0.50
for participating.
Potential Risk/Discomfort. There are no physical or psychological risks to participating in this
study. However, there is always the possibility that you might not like or approve of the
questions we ask. If you feel any discomfort or distress, you may choose not to answer specific
questions. You will not be penalized in any way if you do this. Additionally, if you feel any
emotional distress or anxiety after participating in this study, please feel free to contact one of
the helplines nearest to your location. A list of helplines by town and state can be found at
https://www.befrienders.org/directory?country=US
Anonymity/Confidentiality. Your participation in this study is anonymous. No identifying
information (e.g., name, IP address) will be collected as part of your participation in this study.
All data on the Qualtrics server is encrypted and protected using multiple layers of security (e.g.,
encrypted websites and password protected storage). For more information about the security of
data on Qualtrics, please see the Qualtrics security and privacy policy, which can be found at the
following link: http://www.qualtrics.com/security-statement/
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
44
Your data will be stored and protected by Qualtrics servers located in Toronto, but may be
disclosed via a court order or data breach. In view of this we cannot absolutely guarantee the full
confidentiality and anonymity of your data. With your consent to participate in this study you
acknowledge this.
Data Storage and Sharing. The data collected in this study are strictly confidential. There will be
no personal information attached to your data that can be used identify you personally. The data
will be stored on the computers of the researchers and research assistants involved with this
project. As there will be no personal information associated with the data, this dataset will be
stored electronically and kept indefinitely.
Right to withdraw: Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. At any point during the
study, you have the right to withdraw with no penalty whatsoever. If you wanted to withdraw in
the middle of the study, simply click “proceed” at the bottom of each page. At the end of the
survey you will see the debriefing form and the consent form which allows you to inform us
whether or not you want your data to be used. Then, you will be given a completion code. By
sending this code MTurk will be able to pay you for your participation. In case you did not send
the code your survey will be considered incomplete and according to MTurk policy we will not
be able to pay you. If you withdraw, you have the right to request that your data be deleted. If,
after participating, you decide you want your data withdrawn, please email one of the researchers
identified on the debriefing form. The researcher will then delete any record of your participation
in this study, as well as the email you sent. Once the study is complete, all identifying
information will be deleted and thus researchers will have no way of identifying your responses.
In this situation, the researchers will not be able to delete your data. If you would like to
withdraw from the study and NOT have your data deleted, simply follow the instructions stated
below:
To withdraw at any point, simply click the “proceed” button at the bottom of each page until you
reach the debriefing. In the debriefing, you can learn more about the study and retrieve your
Completion Code.
Research Funding. This research is supported by a research grant from the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada to Dr. Wohl.
This study has received clearance by the Carleton University Research Ethics Board B (CUREBB Clearance # 108285)
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
45
Appendix C: Debrief Form
We would like to provide some further information about the purpose of the study and what we
expect to find.
It is important for you to know that any piece of information you may have read in the
beginning of this study was fictitious. The main goal of the survey was to examine how people
react when they think the future of their group (or the future of their opponent's group) are in
danger. Our hypothesis is that when people think that the future of their group is in danger they
become less politically tolerant of their opponent. We apologize for making you believe
otherwise and hope you understand that we had to do so to make sure your responses will not be
distorted by knowing it was fake.
You can withdraw from the study at any time but due to the MTurk terms and policy you will not
be compensated if you do not submit the survey in its entirety. Since we cannot link back your
personal email address to your IP address we will not be able to remove your data in case you
inform us about your decision via email and after you submitted your responses. Note that
Amazon Mechanical Turk generates a code as your email and we will be communicating through
this code, so we do not have access to your actual email address. The only way to withdraw your
responses from data analysis is to inform us at the end of this page.
If you have further questions about this project or if you have a research- related problem, you
may contact the primary investigator, Nima Orazani, by phone at (343) 777 -0904 or by email at
nimaorazani@cmail.carleton.ca. Should you have any ethical concerns regarding this study,
please contact Dr. Bernadette Campbell, Chair, Carleton University Research Ethics Board-B (by
phone: 613-520-2600 ext. 4085 or by email: ethics@carleton.ca). For all other questions about
the study, please contact the researcher. This study has received clearance by the Carleton
University Research Ethics Board-B (CUREB-B Clearance # 108285).
If you wish to consult with a counselor regarding potential distress you might feel, you may use
the following websites to locate a professional near you:
1. http://locator.apa.org
2. http://www.networktherapy.com/directory/find_therapist.asp
If, after reading this debriefing form, you are uncomfortable with your data being used in this
study, you have the option to withdraw your data from this study. If you would like the
researchers to remove your data from their analyses, please indicate that by saying so in the text
box below.
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
46
Appendix D: Priming Manipulation
Appendix D1: Priming Manipulation in Study 1
A heated debate: Is it normalization, or is it not?
Recently, there has been controversy, particularly among liberals, about booking far-right
political figures on TV shows. For example, Alex Jones—a far-right radio show host and
contributor to infowars.com—was on Sunday Night with Megyn Kelly on NBC, and Milo
Yiannopoulos—the former senior editor for the far-right Breitbart News and alt-right
activist—appeared on Real Time with Bill Maher on HBO.
Appendix D2: Priming Manipulation in Study 2
A heated debate: Is it normalization, or is it not?
Recently, there has been controversy, particularly among conservatives, about booking far-left
political figures on TV shows. For example, Alex U. Inn—a far-left activist and one of the
leaders of Antifa—was recently on the Sean Hannity Show on Fox expressing why her group can
make positive change in America. Bernie Sanders, an American politician who is to the left
even of Hillary Clinton, expressed similar extreme-left sentiments when he appeared on Tucker
Carlson Tonight on Fox.
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Appendix E: Political Affiliation Measure
Please indicate to what extent do you feel positive or negative toward the following issues.
1. Abortion.
Completely Negative
Completely Positive
Author’s note: The above visual analog scale was presented following each of the 12 items but is
only shown once here.
2. Limited government.
3. Military and national security.
4. Religion.
5. Welfare benefits.
6. Gun ownership.
7. Traditional marriage.
8. Traditional values.
9. Fiscal responsibility.
10. Business.
11. The family unit.
12. Patriotism.
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Appendix F: Political Intolerance Measure
Please read the statements below and indicate your answers. Note that in all statements by right
we mean true and by wrong we mean false.
1. When you have the right position on some issue, you should keep those with the wrong
opinion from being heard.
Completely False
Completely True
Author’s note: The above visual analog scale was presented following each of the 7 items but is
only shown once here.
2. Even if an idea seems wrong, it should have as much chance to influence people as an
idea that seems right.
3. I don’t mind at all when people have opinions about issues that I know are wrong.
4. We need to actively oppose those who disagree with us.
5. When people are obviously wrong in their opinions, they need to be corrected.
6. Some ideas are just more right than others, and our society should do all it can to see that
the right ideas win out over the wrong ideas.
7. The media should not pay much, if any, attention to people who clearly hold the wrong
opinions.
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Appendix G: Willingness to Restrict Freedom of Speech Measure
Appendix G1: Willingness to Restrict Freedom of Speech Measure for Study 1
Please read the statements below and convey your opinions once with regard to conservatives
and once with regard to far-right political figures.
1. Everyone should be able to exercise his/her right to freedom of speech regardless of
his/her opinion.
Completely Disagree
Completely Agree
Conservatives
Far-right figures
Author’s note: The above visual analog scales were presented following each of the 4 items in
Study 1.
2. No matter how controversial or contentious are people's attitudes they should be able to
express it without any restriction.
3. Freedom of speech should be restricted for those whose opinions endanger society.
4. To achieve a moral society, freedom of speech needs to have some restrictions.
Appendix G2: Willingness to Restrict Freedom of Speech Measure for Study 2
1. Everyone should be able to exercise his/her right to freedom of speech regardless of
his/her opinion.
Completely Disagree
Completely Agree
Liberals
Far-left figures
Author’s note: The above visual analog scales were presented following each of the 4 items.
2. No matter how controversial or contentious are people's attitudes they should be able to
express it without any restriction.
3. Freedom of speech should be restricted for those whose opinions endanger society.
4. To achieve a moral society, freedom of speech needs to have some restrictions.
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Appendix H: Willingness to Restrict Access to Mainstream Media Measure
Appendix H1: Willingness to Restrict Access to Mainstream Media Measure for Study 1
Please read the statements below and convey your opinion.
1. It is morally wrong to give far-right political figures a platform on mainstream media.
Completely Disagree
Completely Agree
()
Author’s note: The above visual analog scale was presented after each of the 5 items.
2. Giving far-right political figures a platform on mainstream media legitimizes their
extreme attitudes.
3. Giving far-right political figures a platform on mainstream media suggests to the public
that it is okay to hold their extreme views.
4. Giving far-right political figures a platform on mainstream media might make the public
less sensitive to the extremity of their attitudes.
5. Those who are not well-informed about social and political issues may be convinced by
far-right political ideas if political figures who give voice to these ideas appear on
mainstream media.
Giving far-left political figures a platform on mainstream media might encourage the public to
follow conservative media more often.
Appendix H2: Willingness to Restrict Access to Mainstream Media Measure for Study 2
Please read the statements below and convey your opinion.
6. It is morally wrong to give far-left political figures a platform on mainstream media.
Completely Disagree
Completely Agree
Author’s note: The above visual analog scale was presented after each of the 5 items.
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
51
7. Giving far-left political figures a platform on mainstream media legitimizes their extreme
attitudes.
8. Giving far-left political figures a platform on mainstream media suggests to the public
that it is okay to hold their extreme views.
9. Giving far-left political figures a platform on mainstream media might make the public
less sensitive to the extremity of their attitudes.
10. Those who are not well-informed about social and political issues may be convinced by
far-left political ideas if political figures who give voice to these ideas appear on
mainstream media.
11. Giving far-left political figures a platform on mainstream media might encourage the
public to follow conservative media more often.
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EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES
Appendix I: Collective Angst Measure
Appendix I1: Collective Angst Measure for Study 1
Please read the statements below and convey your opinion.
1. I think the future of liberalism is under threat by conservatives.
Completely Disagree
Completely Agree
Author’s note: The above visual analog scale was presented after each of the 5 items.
2. I believe that external sources are purposefully trying to undermine liberal ideas as a way
of thinking.
3. I feel anxious about the threats liberal ideals are currently facing from conservatives.
4. I am concerned about external threats to the future of liberalism.
5. I think that liberal ideas are in jeopardy due to the spread of conservatism.
Appendix I2: Collective Angst Measure for Study 2
1. I think the future of conservatism is under threat by liberals.
Completely Disagree
Completely Agree
Author’s note: The above visual analog scale was presented after each of the 5 items.
2. I believe that external sources are purposefully trying to undermine conservative ideas as
a way of thinking.
3. I feel anxious about the threats conservative ideals are currently facing from liberals.
4. I am concerned about external threats to the future of conservatism.
5. I think that conservative ideas are in jeopardy due to the spread of liberalism.