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SHAME IN THE CONTEXT OF SIN:
AUGUSTINE ON THE FEELING OF SHAME
IN DE CIVITATE DEI1
Tianyue WU
Abstract
The topic of shame has attracted little attention in Augustinian scholarship.
This article will provide a detailed analysis of Augustine’s case studies of Lucretia’s rape and Adam’s act of covering himself after the Fall in De ciuitate Dei. It
will be argued that Augustine’s subtle depiction of shame-feeling in the context
of guilt and sin offers us an illuminating interpretation of shame and its intimate relation to personal identity.
The term «shame-culture» was originally introduced by anthropologists to describe societies such as Japan, which accept public esteem
or external sanctions as the standard of moral behaviour, thus in
contrast to the guilt-culture of western society2. In his famous study
of the Greek mental world, E. R. Dodds extends the notion of
1. This article would not have been possible without the encouragement and direction of Professor Carlos Steel, who had first suggested this topic to me in his course on
Aristotle’s Rhetoric. I have benefited from his valuable comments and advices on earlier
versions of this article. I am especially grateful to Professor Mathijs Lamberigts for his
helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks are also due to Professor Russell Friedman for both his careful correction of many errors in my English expression and his helpful comments on the text, in particular his reference to Augustine’s earlier works. Certainly all remaining errors are the author’s.
2. A classic statement of the shame-culture versus guilt-culture antithesis is offered by
R. BENEDICT in her influential study of Japanese culture, The Chrysanthemum and the
Sword, Boston 1946, see especially pp. 222-224; As is mentioned in Douglas L. Cairns’
introduction to his study of «aidos» in ancient Greek culture, the theoretical basis for this
classification of cultures goes back to M. MEAD’s 1937 collection, Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples. See D. L. CAIRNS, Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of
Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature, Oxford 1993, esp. pp. 27-47. Cairns
offers a critical overview of the early formulation of this antithesis by anthropologists,
with special reference to its application to Homeric society.
Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 74(1), 1-31. doi: 10.2143/RTPM.74.1.2022835
© 2007 by Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales. All rights reserved.
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shame-culture to the Homeric society3. Since then, it has been
argued that the emphasis upon the moral significance of shame
(aidos) persists even into the fifth century B.C. and later strongly
affects Plato’s and Aristotle’s moral philosophy4. In current studies of
Greek culture, the feeling of shame is still conceived of as a core of
Greek morality, as suggested by the title of Bernard Williams’ book,
Shame and Necessity, although he provides a totally different and
more internalized interpretation of shame5. In contrast to shamecultures, guilt-cultures are thought to rely on an internalized conviction of sin, regardless of external sanctions. Therefore it might seem
quite evident that Augustine, the most enthusiastic advocate of original sin, has hardly anything positive to say about the phenomenon
of shame-feeling in his discussions on human nature in the context
of original sin and the Fall. Actually the topic of shame has attracted
relatively little attention in Augustinian scholarship, especially its
significance in Augustine’s moral philosophy6. And it is generally
accepted as self-evident that shame has no independent place in his
value system and that shame is only something negative as a punishment of the original sin. However, it has recently been suggested
that Augustine’s struggle in youth and his final conversion to
catholic Christianity was oriented more by a feeling of shame than
3. E. R. DODDS, The Greeks and the Irrational, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1951, See esp.
pp. 43-47.
4. A. W. H. ADKINS, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values, Oxford 1960,
esp. pp. 154sqq.
5. B. WILLIAMS, Shame and Necessity, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1993, See esp. Chapter 4
on shame and autonomy, pp. 75-102.
6. Only F.-J. THONNARD provides a survey of the psychology of shame (pudor,
pudeur) with special reference to Book XIV of De ciuitate Dei in his complementary notes
to De nuptiis et concupiscentia. See Bibliothèque Augustinienne 23, pp. 671-675; Following
M. Müller, A. Zumkeller notes in his excellent comments on De nuptiis et concupiscentia,
that the sexual shame-feeling shows the powerlessness of human beings in confront of the
sexual impulse. See M. MÜLLER, Die Lehre des hl. Augustinus von der Paradiesehe, Regensburg 1954, esp. pp. 24sqq. and AUGUSTINUS, Schriften gegen die Pelagianer, Bd. III, (edd.
A. KUNZELMANN, A. ZUMKELLER), Würzburg 1977, esp. pp. 413-414; D. CAPPS’ articles
discuss the role of shame in Augustine’s own psychological development, see «Augustine's
Confessions: The Scourge of Shame and the Silencing of Adeodatus», «Augustine as Narcissist: Of Grandiosity and Shame», both in: D. CAPPS & J.E. DITTES (edd.), The Hunger
of the Heart. Reflections on the Confessions of Augustine, West Lafayette 1990, pp. 69-94,
169-184; D. TROUT re-exams Augustine’s account of Lucretia’s rape in its historical background. «Re-textualizing Lucretia: Cultural Subversion in the City of God», in: Journal of
Early Christian Studies 2 (1994), pp. 53-70.
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by a feeling of guilt7. Certainly, we have to concede that most of
Augustine’s discussions of shame are placed in the context of original sin and its consequent punishment of carnal concupiscence (carnis concupiscentia)8. But this does not detract from Augustine’s incisive comments on the phenomenon of shame, in particular his
profound analysis of the psychological and ontological foundation
for the occurrence of shame-feeling after the Fall of the first human
beings. In De ciuitate Dei, Augustine not only exhibits his essential
insights on the first shame-feeling of Adam and Eve, which is
echoed in his recounting of the story of the human Fall in his other
exegeses and treatises against Pelagians, but also devotes a section of
the first book to a critical reexamination of the ancient legend of
Lucretia, whose rape and suicide out of shame had long been canonized as an exemplum uirtutis in the shame-culture of ancient Rome9.
A detailed study of Augustine’s accounts and diagnoses of these two
cases in De ciuitate Dei, I believe, will shed some new light on the
understanding of shame-feeling.
At the end of this short introduction, an important point should
be noted concerning the focus of this essay. Although the discussions
on shame first occur in anthropological contexts, in our reconsideration of Augustine’s meditations on shame, shame is first of all a
philosophical topic. As is well known, shame is not an unfamiliar
theme for contemporary philosophers. At the beginning of last century, Max Scheler devoted a long unfinished essay to exploring the
location of the feeling of shame (Scham und Schamgefühl) and its
essential relation to man’s way of existence10. Levinas points out that
shame uncovers the radical impossibility of fleeing oneself to hide
from oneself, and the unalterably binding presence of the I to itself
7. See D. CAPPS «Augustine’s Confessions: The Scourge of Shame and the Silencing
of Adeodatus» and «Augustine as Narcissist: Of Grandiosity and Shame», esp. p. 176.
8. See for instance, AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, XIV, 17-26; De Genesi ad litteram,
XI, 31, 40-34, 46; De nuptitia et concupiscentia, I, 4, 5-6,7; Contra Julianum, IV, 16, 82;
Contra Julianum opus imperfectum, IV, 44.
9. Cf. D. TROUT, «Re-textualizing Lucretia: Cultural Subversion in the City of God»,
esp. p. 61.
10. M. SCHELER, «Shame and Feelings of Modesty», in: M. S. FRINGS (ed.), Person
and Self-Value: Three Essays, Dordrecht 1987, pp. 1-86. The German manuscript of this
essay was written in 1913 and was contained in Vol.10 of the German Collected Edition,
edited by Maria Scheler.
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(du moi à soi-même)11. Sartre also emphasizes the role of shame
(honte) in the existence of the self and the Other12. In Anglo-Saxon
philosophy, Gabriele Taylor takes up Scheler’s and Sartre’s cases to
stress that shame is an emotion of self-protection which is very
closely related to the possession of self-respect and thereby to the
agent’s values13. More recently, starting from Augustine’s analysis of
the genesis of Adam’s shame in De ciuitate Dei, David Velleman
reduces shame to a particular negative self-assessment of one «as less
than a self-presenting person», especially in the occasion of failures of
privacy14. In this essay, I would like to follow this tradition in the following reconstruction of Augustine’s thoughts on shame, to lay more
emphasis on the relation between shame and self-assessment, shame
and self-identity. Hopefully this essay will reveal the insight of
Augustine’s retextualization of shame in the context of sin and its significance for our own current thinking about the feeling of shame
and our understanding of self in this world.
1. The Dilemma of Lucretia’s Shame
The legendary tale of Lucretia’s rape and suicide was of great moral
and political importance to the Romans, although its authenticity is
considered dubious nowadays15. The story was frequently recounted
by Roman statesman, poets, historians, and philosophers to reveal
some crucial ideas about the nature of liberty (whether personal or
public) and virtue, especially that of chastity. Among these accounts,
11. E. LEVINAS, On Escape: De l’évasion (trans. B. BERGO), Stanford 2003, esp. p. 64.
The French text was published in 1935 in Recherches Philosophiques.
12. J.-P. SARTRE, L’être et le néant, Paris 1943, esp. pp. 275-277.
13. G. TAYLOR, Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment, Oxford 1985,
esp. pp. 81-84.
14. J. D. VELLEMAN, «The Genesis of Shame», first published in: Philosophy and
Public Affairs 30, no.1 (2001), pp. 27-52; reprinted in: ID., Self to Self: Selected Essays,
New York 2006, pp. 45-69. On the one hand, Velleman regards Augustine as the philosopher who comes closest to understanding shame by his emphasis on the insubordination
of the body to the will. On the other hand, Velleman disagrees with Augustine’s insistence
on the uncontrolled lust and the powerless will as the decisive factors of shame phenomenon, emphasizing that it is rather the recognition of one’s failure of self-presentation in
public that occasions the feeling of shame.
15. I. DONALDSON, The Rapes of Lucretia: A Myth and its Transformations, Oxford
1982, pp. 5-12.
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the most influential surviving narratives are those of Livy, of the
Greek rhetorician Dionysius of Halicarnassus, of Ovid and of
Plutarch. They are obviously based upon some older source which
today exists only in fragments if at all16. As has been confirmed by
Augustinian scholars, Augustine’s Lucretia was primarily Livy’s17.
This version of the legend can be reconstructed as follows18:
One night during the siege of Ardea, some Roman noblemen
began to boast about the virtues of their wives. One of them, Tarquinius Collatinus insisted that his wife Lucretia was superior to all
the rest, and he urged his young comrades to pay their wives an
unexpected visit. The young men galloped first to Rome and found
their spouses passing their time in feasting; at Collatia, however, they
discovered Lucretia «sitting at her wool work in the hall». But, the
victory of Lucretia was fatal for her, because her beauty (forma) and
her chastity (castitas) inflamed the evil lust (mala libido) of Sextus
Tarquin, son of Rome’s seventh king Tarquinius Superbus.
A few days afterwards, Sextus Tarquin returned with one companion to Collatia. In that night, he entered Lucretia’s room with a
naked sword in hand. Tarquin used menaces as well as entreaties to
influence Lucretia’s heart. After all of these failed, he threatened to
kill her and lay beside her the naked corpse of a slave, declaring that
they had been caught in foul adultery. Overwhelmed by this potential disgrace, Lucretia yielded, but the next day she summoned her
father and her husband Collatinus, asking them to come, each with a
trusted friend. Lucretia told them her story, asserting, «only the body
has been violated, the soul is pure; death shall bear witness to
that»19. After making them pledge to avenge her rape, Lucretia
stabbed herself in the heart. Later on, the death of virtuous Lucretia
became an eloquent reminder of Tarquins’ tyranny. The Roman people rose in anger against the royal family and inaugurated the Repub16. Ibid., p. 5.
17. S. ANGUS, The Sources of the First Ten Books of Augustine’s De civitate Dei, Princeton 1906, esp. p. 28; See also H. HAGENDAHL, Augustine and the Latin Classics, Göteborg
1967, 1: pp.195-206, 2: pp. 650-666. The above sources are quoted from D. TROUT,
«Re-Textualizing Lucretia: Cultural Subversion in the City of God», pp. 55-56.
18. See LIVY, Ab urbe condita, I, 57-60 (edd. R. S. CONWAY/C. F. WALTERS), Oxford
1914, English trans. by REV. CANON ROBERTS, Everyman's Library, London 1912.
19. LIVY, Ab urbe condita, I. 58 «ceterum corpus est tantum uiolatum, animus
insons; mors testis erit»
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lic under the leadership of Junius Brutus, who had come with Collatinus to witness the suicide of Lucretia.
Livy’s vivid depiction of Lucretia’s rape and death as an exemplum
virtutis was quite influential in ancient Rome. As is asserted by
Dennis Trout, «For Valerius Maximus, Seneca, Quintillian, and
Plutarch, her name was synonymous with chastity and a courage
deemed unusually masculine»20. Even among the early Christian
Fathers, Lucretia’s constellation of virtues remained bright. Tertullian employed Lucretia as one of his favorite examples to shame
Christians into greater chastity21. Lucretia also takes her place in
Jerome’s list of his admired women, who valued their chastity so
dearly that they killed themselves rather than live on in shame22.
Nevertheless, Lucretia’s voluntary death out of shame became problematic in Augustine’s apology for the Christian women who survived the sack of Rome in 410. A number of Christian women suffered the same miserable fate during the sack bud did not commit
suicide out of shame. The case of Lucretia could possibly be
employed by Augustine’s adversaries as a way to shame those illfated women23. As a bishop, Augustine felt obliged to defend the
purity of his fellow Christians against the pagans’ praise of the modesty of Lucretia. The pastoral aim to bring consolation to the victims of the war is the background to Augustine’s investigation into
the moral significance or implication of Lucretia’s suicide24.
For now we must put aside Augustine’s apology for Christian
women’s chastity after the rape and go directly to his reconsideration
of the ancient legend of Lucretia in De ciuitate Dei I, 19. After a brief
recount of Livy’s version of Lucretia, Augustine unsympathetically
poses the question, «Should she be judged an adulteress or a chaste
20. See D. CAPPS «Re-Textualizing Lucretia», p. 61 for correspondent references.
21. TERTULLIAN, Ad martyras 4; De exhortatione castitatis 13; De monogamia 17; Ad
uxorem I, 6, quoted from E. A. CLARK «Sex, Shame, and Rhetoric: Engendering Early
Christian Ethics», in: Journal of the American Academy of Religion 59 (1992), pp. 221-45,
esp. p. 225. See also D. CAPPS «Re-Textualizing Lucretia», p. 61.
22. JEROME, Ad Jouinianum, I, 46, 49; See I. DONALDSON, The Rapes of Lucretia, p.
25 and D. CAPPS «Re-Textualizing Lucretia», p. 62.
23. AUGUSTINE, De civitate Dei, I, 16; I, 19, (edd. B. DOMBART/A. KALB), reprinted
in CCSL XLVII-XLVIII. For the English translation of this work, I mainly quote with
slight modification from The City of God against the Pagans (ed. and trans. R. W. DYSON,
Cambridge 1998).
24. Ibid., I, 16.
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woman»25? Augustine is quite aware that the answer to this question
would seem obvious to ancient Romans and the question itself worthless, for an old comment on this story says, «There were two people,
but only one of them committed adultery»26. It is certain that Augustine also approves of the moral implication of this judgment that the
virtue of chastity cannot be destroyed solely by bodily violence. This
point had been highlighted in Livy’s narrative of Lucretia’s final
words, «Only the body has been violated, the soul is pure»27. For
Livy, sexual purity or chastity is located in the seat of the soul. Augustine never displays any doubt about the correctness of this idea and
even incorporates it into his theory of the consent of will. In Augustine’s eyes, if the will remains steadfast and never yields to the powerful impulse of lust (libido), even though the mind cannot get rid of
the appetite and the consequent bodily pleasure, aroused involuntarily by another agent, the sufferer of such lust would be absolutely
guiltless28. This point of view will be deepened in our later discussion
of Augustine’s analysis of the rape of Christian women in captivity.
However, when Augustine returns to the case of Lucretia with this
viewpoint in mind, her self-inflicted death sentence seems to be completely incomprehensible. If Lucretia did not commit adultery by giving her consent to the lust aroused by such violation, her suicide as a
self-imposed punishment to this unfounded or even non-existent guilt
would be unjust for an innocent woman. Even worse in Augustine’s
eyes, suicide as a form of killing, and in this special case, as a form of
killing an innocent and chaste woman, is evidently a severe sin29. On
the other hand, if we grant the suicide to be a just punishment, we
will be forced to admit that Lucretia was not guiltless of the shameful
adultery, which is obviously inconceivable to the above-mentioned
tradition of crowning Lucretia as a heroine of chastity. Moreover, even
in this case, suicide as a form of killing is still unforgivable since it is
only an attempt to get rid of a sin by committing another severe sin.
25. Ibid., I, 19, «Quid dicemus? Adultera haec an casta iudicanda est?»
26. Ibid., I, 19, «Duo, inquit, fuerunt, et adulterium unus admisit».
27. See note 19.
28. AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, I, 16.
29. For a more detailed discussion on Augustine’s view of suicide, see G. BARDY «La
question du suicide», in: Bibliothèque Augustinienne 33, 773-775; P. BAUDET «L’opinion
de saint Augustin sur le suicide», in: P. RANSON (ed.), Saint Augustin, Lausanne 1988, pp.
125-152.
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The death of Lucretia, here is revealed as an insolvable dilemma30.
Augustine hence comes to his conclusion, «It is not possible to find
a way out of this dilemma. One can only ask: If she was an adulteress, why is she praised? If she was pure, why was she slain»31?
Augustine’s unkind treatment of this legendary heroine would
have seemed anachronistic and unjust to a woman living in an
ancient shame-culture32. We also have to bear in mind that the first
book of De civitate Dei was written in 413 as an apologetic work in
reaction to pagan criticism of Christianity in the aftermath of 410.
Evidently this is not an appropriate context for an objective evaluation of pagan virtues such as the chastity and the courage of
Lucretia33. It is quite easy for us to think that we can better understand the situation of a virtuous woman in that kind of society,
which emphasizes the value of honor and shame over all others.
The public esteem, even a mistaken or a hostile judgment, could be
decisive, even fatal for a person who cares about the image of his or
her self before audience. He or she cannot tolerate the pain of losing face before his or her people. Moreover, we know that in
ancient Rome, a woman’s chastity was associated with the honor of
her male kin34, and that the violation of the body, whether adultery
or rape, means the destruction of both her chastity and the honor
30. AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, I, 19; See I. DONALDSON, The Rapes of Lucretia, esp.
Chapter 2 «The Questioning of the Myth (1): Augustine’s ‘Dilemma’», pp. 21-39, for a
more detailed account of Augustine’s analysis and the impact of these arguments on the
development of the story of Lucretia.
31. AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, I, 19, «nec omnino inuenitur exitus, ubi dicitur: ‘Si
adulterata, cur laudata; si pudica, cur occisa?’».
32. W. EMPSON describes Augustine’s attack simply as ‘caddish’, presumably distressed
by Augustine’s apparent failure to achieve a position of tolerant moral relativism. See his
introduction to the Poems of Shakespeare in: S. BARNET (ed.), The Complete Signet Classic Shakespeare, New York 1972, p.1670; quoted from I. DONALDSON, The Rapes of Lucretia, p. 29.
33. For a more detailed and comprehensive account of Augustine’s attitude to pagan
virtues, please see TCHANG TCHE WANG ( 王昌祉 )’s classic study, Saint Augustin et les
Vertus des Païens, Paris 1938. Wang points out incisively that despite of the insistence on
the Christian caritas and fides as the only foundation to the true virtue, Augustine never
denies or dismisses the objective goodness of pagan virtues. See esp. pp. 99-136.
34. Cf. S. DIXON, «Women and Rape in Roman Law», in: Kønsroller, parforhold og
samlivsformer: Arbejdsnotat 3 (1982); S. B. ORTNER, «The Virgin and the State», in:
Feminist Studies 4.3 (1978): pp. 19-35, quoted from S. R. JOSHEL «The Body Female and
the Body Politic: Livy’s Lucretia and Verginia», in: L. K. MCCLURE (ed.), Sexuality and
Gender in the Classical World: Readings and Sources, Oxford 2002, p. 174.
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of her husband35. Therefore, the suicide is deemed the ‘rational’ choice
in such situations so as to avoid the victim of rape being mistaken for
a lover of adultery. Lucretia herself also declares that she refuses to be
an example by which truly unchaste women might claim the right to
live36. Nevertheless, given the patience to follow Augustine’s reevaluation of the traditional virtue of chastity, we will find that his somewhat
extreme and biased opinion cannot simply be reduced to an anachronistic interpretation of shame-culture in terms of sin.
Augustine does not stop at uncovering the inherent dilemma of
Lucretia’s self-murder, he continues to give his diagnosis of the motivation of this ill-destined woman. First, Augustine admits that Lucretia did not grant her consent to the lust of the adulterer, but he
points out at once, «she did this [suicide] not from love of chastity
(pudicitiae caritas), but because of a weakness arising from shame
(pudoris infirmitas)»37. This is a very significant differentiation for
understanding Augustine’s reevaluation of the pagan virtue of
chastity. It is evident here that for Augustine, shame (pudor) by itself
cannot be seen to be a virtue like love (caritas) or chastity (pudicitia
or verecundia). Although Lucretia’s feeling of shame took its origin in
her refusal to be identified with the violation of her body and the
disturbance of her uncontrolled lust, — she felt shamed about the
possibility of being regarded as an adulteress and she believed that
her true self was certainly higher than that — nevertheless, this
shame was a spontaneous and defensive reaction that betrays its own
innate weakness. We can follow Augustine’s distinction between
shame and chastity to elaborate this point in the way that follows.
First of all, as an old proverb states, «shame dwells in the eyes»38.
Lucretia made great endeavour to defend her self-image of being a
chaste woman even to the extent of killing herself because of a sense
of shame. However, this image of self was primarily dependent upon
35. See «The Body Female and the Body Politic», p. 179; also see I. DONALDSON,
The Rapes of Lucretia, p. 23.
36. LIVY, op.cit. I, 58, «ego me etsi peccato absoluo, suppicio non libero; nec ulla
deinde impudica Lucretiae exemplo uiuet».
37. AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, I, 19, «Quod ergo se ipsam, quoniam adulterum
pertulit, etiam non adultera occidit, non est pudicitiae caritas, sed pudoris infirmitas»
cited with slight modification from Dyson’s translation.
38. See ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric, II, 6, 1384a35 (trans. W. RHYS ROBERTS), in: J. BARNES
(ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. II, Princeton 1984.
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public esteem and social conventions. It is more like a response to
the critical sights of other people rather than a perspective assessment
of self-value. It is a fear of the potent menace of losing face before an
audience rather than a love of one’s profound ground for being an
individual in the world. Augustine also demonstrates that this
Roman noble lady was «excessively eager for praise» (laudis auida
nimium) and that she judged that «she must use self-punishment to
exhibit the state of her mind to the eyes of men to whom she could
not show her conscience»39. «The eyes of men» reveals the inherent
futility of this kind of shame-feeling. For the shame by itself cannot
bring into view the innermost conscience of this virtuous woman.
The window of her mind is opaque and cannot be seen through by
other people, and shame cannot overcome the gap between separated
minds. The feeling of shame, which should safeguard the purity of
the genuine self against possible judgments from others, eventually
brought about the termination of life upon the agent itself, just
because of the fear of these existent or imaginary judgments from a
real or fictitious audience.
In contrast to this weakness of shame in the case of Lucretia,
Augustine insists that the Christian women in captivity not only
manifested the glory of chastity (gloria castitatis), but also expressed
their feeling of shame in a more appropriate way. Let us return to
Augustine’s comments in Chapter 16, Book I of De ciuitate Dei,
which deserve a full quotation here: «In the first place, then, let this
be stated and affirmed: that the virtue by which life is lived rightly
has its seat in the mind (ab animi sede); that it directs the members
of the body from there; that the body is made holy by the use of a
holy will; and that, while this will remains unshaken and steadfast,
nothing that another takes out of the body, or does in the body, that
the sufferer has no power to avert without sinning in turn, is the
fault of the sufferer. Not only the infliction of pain, but also the gratification of lust (libido), is possible upon the body of another; but
when anything of this kind is done, the chastity (pudicitia) to which
39. AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, I, 19 «Puduit enim eam turpitudinis alienae in se
commissae, etiamsi non secum, et Romana mulier, laudis auida nimium, uerita est ne
putaretur, quod uiolenter est passa cum uiueret, libenter passa si uiueret. Vnde ad oculos
hominum testem mentis suae illam poenam adhibendam putauit, quibus conscientiam
demonstrare non potuit».
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the most resolute mind holds fast is not struck down. Nevertheless, it
strikes shame lest it might be believed that an act, which perhaps
could not have been undergone without some carnal pleasure,
occurred with the will of the mind also (cum mentis etiam voluntate)»40.
As an introduction to these comments, Augustine declares that
what is at stake in these cases is not the virtue of chastity, but a discussion between shame and reason (pudor atque ratio)41. As we have
mentioned earlier, Augustine insists also that the virtue of chastity is
based upon the decision of the mind. According to Augustine’s theory of action, the mind makes its decisions and takes its control over
the body through the command of the will42. Therefore the virtue of
the mind cannot be contaminated without the consent of the will.
Moreover, the decision of the will, even that of rape victims cannot
be forced by the invader of the body, otherwise, the decision of the
mind would not be free and the will could not be called his or her
own will. For it is obviously absurd to talk about a compulsive volition43. Hence in the case of Christian women who survived the sack,
there is no need to dispute about the faith, godliness, and the virtue
40. AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, I, 16, «Sit igitur in primis positum atque firmatum
uirtutem, qua recte uiuitur, ab animi sede membris corporis imperare sanctumque corpus
usu fieri sanctae uoluntatis, qua inconcussa ac stabili permanente, quidquid alius de corpore uel in corpore fecerit, quod sine peccato proprio non ualeat euitari, praeter culpam
esse patientis. Sed quia non solum quod ad dolorem, uerum etiam quod ad libidinem
pertinet, in corpore alieno perpetrari potest: quidquid tale factum fuerit, etsi retentam
constantissimo animo pudicitiam non excutit, tamen pudorem incutit, ne credatur factum cum mentis etiam uoluntate, quod fieri fortasse sine carnis aliqua uoluptate non
potuit». I made some alterations to Dyson’s translation here, especially that of the last
sentence in order to follow more literally Augustine’s thought on shame and will.
41. Ibid., «Hic uero non fides, non pietas, non ipsa uirtus, quae castitas dicitur, sed
nostra potius disputatio inter pudorem atque rationem quibusdam coartatur angustiis» In
Dyson’s translation, «pudor» is rendered as «modesty».
42. See for instance, AUGUSTINE, Confessiones, VIII, 8, 19-9,21; De Trinitate, Book
XI; De ciuitate Dei, XIV, 6; XIV, 24; De Genesi ad litteram, VIII, 21, 40-42. For secondary literature on it, see A. DIHLE, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity, Berkeley-Los
Angeles 1982; G. J. P. O’DALY, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, London 1987; N. W. DEN
BOK, «Freedom of the Will: A systematic and biographical Sounding of Augustine’s
Thoughts on Human Willing», in: Augustiniana 44 (1994), pp. 237-270.
43. Cf. AUGUSTINE, De libero arbitrio, III, 1, 2-3; III, 17, 48-59; Confessiones, VIII,
9, 21; De ciuitate Dei, XII, 7. Augustine emphasizes that we should not look for any efficient cause of the evil will and the decision of the will can be forced by nothing, even the
faculty of the will itself.
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of chastity, because it would be quite cruel and thoughtless to believe
that they entirely yielded to the brute force and enjoyed the bodily
pleasure imposed by their enemies. Obviously, by not yielding to the
disturbing lust of their body, these women kept their chastity
unshaken in the soul and they committed no sin at all while enduring their violation. It is accordingly not right for them to feel guilty
before God, who witnesses both their suffering and their virtue.
However, the absence of the feeling of guilt does not consequently
cancel the justification for feeling ashamed on such occasions. The
victims of bodily violation suffered against their will not only the
infliction of the pain, but also the gratification of the lust and the
corresponding carnal pleasure. Augustine maintains that lustful disobedience (concupiscentialis inoboedientia) can move itself as if by its
own law, apart from the decision of our will, for instance in our
dreams. Certainly, there is no guilt in the body of one who does
not consent to the lust44. Nevertheless, under such conditions, the
feeling of shame could be aroused as a visible signal to indicate the
hidden internal decision of the will, which is already stressed in
Augustine’s last comment on the chastity of the ill-fated women at
the end of the above quotation. It is not difficult for us to take a step
further to disclose Augustine’s profound understanding of the nature
of shame-feeling implied in his comment on the occurrence of shame
in guiltless people. First, the feeling of shame distances the self from
the turbulent impulses, which happen to the mind after the bodily
violation by others. Shame discloses that the sufferer never degraded
herself and let herself become a puppet of the carnal desire like an
animal, since she clearly felt embarrassed in the face of it and could
not take it for granted. This uncomfortable feeling of disturbance
echoed silently the will’s rejection of the carnal concupiscence, which
was not brought about by the decision of the will. Here shame was
such an immediate and spontaneous reaction to the carnal lust that
it could not ground itself on the rational deliberation of mind. It is
44. AUGUSTINE, De civitate Dei, I, 25, «Quod si illa concupiscentialis inoboedientia,
quae adhuc in membris moribundis habitat, praeter nostrae voluntatis legem quasi lege
sua mouetur, quanto magis absque culpa est in corpore non consentientis, si absque culpa
est in corpore dormientis». For the problem of responsibility in dream, see Confessiones,
X, 30, 41 and I. HAJI, «On Being Morally Responsible in a Dream», in: G. B.
MATTHEWS (ed.), The Augustinian Tradition, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1999, pp. 166-182.
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quite obvious that we cannot, on the basis of deliberation decide
exactly when, where, and for what we should feel ashamed. The feeling of shame often comes suddenly at an unexpected moment.
Shame exhibits itself as an immediate feeling in intimate relation to
the mind that can be independent from the rational deliberation of
the intellect and the choice of the will. Therefore, what is in question
in the happening of shame-feeling is first of all the condition of the
mind and its self-evaluation, although the mind cannot determine
shame-feeling by means of deliberative choice. Certainly, the relation
between shame and mind is still obscure and needs further elaboration, but it is already evident that the feeling of shame first and foremost originates in the innermost condition of the mind rather than
in public esteem and social conventions. A virtuous and self-confident person should calmly hold these conventional issues in contempt. For this reason, we can easily understand that in Augustine’s
view, these Christian women only felt the disturbance of lust within
themselves and became ashamed in the sight of God45. This point
has already been rightly stressed by Elisabeth A. Clark in her study of
the rhetoric of shame in early Christian ethics, «The ultimate shamer
of all Christians was, however, God. The All-Seeing Eye was constant
witness to the inner thoughts as well as the outer deeds of Christians»46. Therefore, the conscience of the sufferer is no longer hidden
to the eye of this Omnipotent Observer and there is no longer the
need to inflict an extreme act upon oneself out of shame as a testimony of his or her own conscience. The chastity arising from the
love for God and human beings, and the spontaneous feeling of
shame were enough for these women to rid themselves of the fear of
the lurking scandal of human suspicion47. This is a more powerful
and more authentic feeling of shame, which defends one’s innermost
self-evaluation from the possible malicious judgment of other people.
What is in question here is the subject’s own self-image based upon
the consent and identification of the will, rather than the supposed
self-image according to social conventions and judgments of others.
45. See AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, I, 19.
46. E. A. CLARK, «Sex, Shame, and Rhetoric», p. 235.
47. AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, I, 19, «habent autem coram oculis Dei sui nec
requirunt amplius, ubi quid recte faciant non habent amplius, ne deuient ab auctoritate
legis diuinae, cum male deuitant offensionem suspicionis humanae».
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Augustine stresses that a great soul can in the light of a pure conscience
hold human judgment in contempt, especially that of the vulgar, which
is so commonly wrapped in the darkness of error, such as envy48.
A new puzzle emerges, however, in Augustine’s interpretation of
shame reconstructed above: If the soul withholds its consent from
lust and is convinced of its own chastity and accordingly of its own
innocence, why does it nevertheless feel embarrassed and disturbed
in the feeling of shame? Shame is never a comfortable thing for us.
Something must have happened to the interior self so that shame
occurs as a sign of the innermost mind. Even with the virtue of
chastity being assured, the feeling of shame comes about all the same,
although this shame is more authentic and more intimate to the
mind. The preceding account of Augustine’s reconsideration of the
case of Lucretia, only exhibits his penetrating insight into the phenomenon of shame and its essential relation to conscience and selfevaluation. It has not touched the central issue of the psychological
and ontological origins of shame-feeling. This problem directs us to
Augustine’s account in Book XIV of De ciuitate Dei of the primordial
shame of Adam and Eve, which uncovers the inherent tension of the
innermost self and the existential condition of human beings.
2. Shame and Carnal Concupiscence in Adam and Eve
Augustine composed Book XIV of De ciuitate Dei in about 418 to
420 during his controversy with the Pelagians49. It discusses some
varied but interconnected themes, among which is an important
account of Adam’s sin and its punishment; of carnal desire, sin, and
procreation50. In his account of Adam’s Fall, Augustine traces back to
48. Ibid., I, 22, «maiorque animus merito dicendus est, qui uitam aerumnosam magis
potest ferre quam fugere et humanum iudicium maximeque uulgare, quod plerumque
caligine erroris inuoluitur, prae conscientiae luce ac puritate contemnere»
49. See G. BARDY, «Introduction Générale», in: BA 33, La Cité de Dieu, Livres I-V,
Paris 1959, p. 29, «Le livre XIV, de son côté, est signalé dans le Contra adversarium legis
et prophetarum qui date des environs de 420 et pourrait être un peu postérieur». See also
P. BROWN, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1967 (a new edition
with an epilogue 2000), p. 283; G. O’DALY, Augustine’s City of God: A Reader’s Guide,
Oxford 1999, p. 34-35.
50. G. O’DALY, Augustine’s City of God: A Reader’s Guide, Oxford 1999, p. 153.
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the origin of the human race and human society as accepted by all
Christians51 and sheds new light on the occurrence of shame, which
goes beyond the framework of the presence of others, whether real or
imaginary.
First of all, Augustine emphatically points out that there was
no feeling of shame in Paradise before the Fall. It is explicitly written in Genesis, «And they were naked, and were not ashamed»52.
However, after they had violated God’s commandment by their
overt transgression of eating the forbidden fruit, it is written of
them, «The eyes of them both were opened and they knew that they
were naked; and they sewed fig-leaves together, and made themselves aprons»53. Augustine recognizes this act of covering themselves as a natural expression of their embarrassment and shame
after becoming aware of their nudity. The feeling of shame was
acknowledged by the author of Genesis to be absolutely absent from
Paradise before their transgression, hence something must have
happened to Adam and his wife so that this novelty was noticed by
«their eyes». That «the eyes of them both were opened» obviously
cannot be interpreted literally as that they had been blind before
their fall. For Adam saw the animals to which he gave names and
Eve saw that the tree was good for food and that it was pleasant to
the eyes54. This sentence is one of Augustine’s favorite biblical citations in his later works, especially in those against Julian, who was
the most distinguished disciple of Pelagius and the most powerful
51. Augustine emphasizes that although man was created as one individual, the
human race is more than any other species, at once social by nature, because Adam was
not left alone. In the intimate relation between Adam and Eve, the unity of human society was symbolized. See AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, XII, 22; XII, 28.
52. Genesis, 2, 25, cited in AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, XIV, 17, «Nudi errant, et
non confundebantur». The version of the Bible used by Augustine here is slightly different from that in AUGUSTINE, De Genesi ad litteram, XI, 1, which explicitly employs
the verb pudere (shame): «Et errant ambo nudi Adam et mulier ejus et non pudebat
illos».
53. Genesis, 3, 7, cited in AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, XIV, 17, «Et aperti sunt oculi
amborum et agnouerunt quia nudi errant, et consuerunt folia fici et fecerunt sibi
campestria».
54. See Genesis, 2, 20; 3, 6, cited in AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, XIV, 17. «quando
quidem et ille uidit animalia, quibus nomina inposuit, et de illa legitur: Vidit muler quia
bonum lignum in escam et quia placet oculis ad uidendum». It is also emphasized in Augustine’s literal exegesis of Genesis that Adam and Eve were able to see before their first sin.
See AUGUSTINE, De Genesi ad litteram, XI, 40.
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adversary of Augustine until Augustine’s death55. In the first
response to Julian’s accuse of his denial of marriage’s goodness, De
nuptiis et concupiscentia, which was composed about the same time
as Book XIV of De civitate Dei, Augustine comments on this sentence in particular, «the eyes of both of them were opened, in the
sense that their attention was drawn to notice and recognize the new
condition that came about in the body, their body which certainly
was naked everyday and quite familiar to their open eyes»56.
Evidently, their act of concealing the sexual organs indicates the
part of the body that was the focus of this novel feeling of embarrassment. As Augustine frequently mentions, the genital organ in Latin
is also referred to as membra pudenda (shameful member). However,
for Augustine, this shameful part of the body by itself cannot be
blamed as the sole source of shame. First, from a theological point of
view, Adam and Eve only felt ashamed after their primordial rebellion against the commandment of God. It is certain for Augustine
that this transgression or disobedience is a sin committed by our soul
via the decision of our will. Augustine lays great stress on the point
that the cause of sin, especially this primordial sin, proceeds from the
soul, not from the body57. It’s the consent of the will to the temptation of living according to man rather than according to God that
caused Adam and Eve to ignore the commandment of God. Correspondingly, a just punishment for this mental rebellion should also
be situated primarily in the seat of the mind rather than in the body.
55. For a general account of Augustine’s controversy with Julian, see G. BONNER,
«Pelagius/ Pelagianischer Streit», in: Theologische Realenzyklopädie 26 (1996), pp. 176185; See also M. LAMBERIGTS, «Julianus von Aeclanum», in: Reallexikon für Antike und
Christentum 19 (1999); For a more detailed and comprehensive study of Julian’s life and
works, see J. LÖSSL, Julian von Aeclanum: Studien zu seinem Leben, seinem Werk, seiner
Lehre und ihrer Überlieferung, Leiden 2001, esp. pp. 250-318 for his controversy with
Augustine.
56. AUGUSTINE, De nuptiis et concupiscentia, I, 5, 6. «Aperti sunt oculi amborum,
intellegere debemus adtentos factos ad intuendum et agnoscendum quod nouum in
eorum corpore acciderat, quod utique corpus patentibus eorum oculis et nudum cotidie
subiacebat et notum». The English translation is by R. J. TESKE, in: AUGUSTINE, Answer
to the Pelagians, II: Marriage and Desire, Answer to the Two Letters of the Pelagians, Answer
to Julian (ed. R. J. TESKE), New York 1998.
57. See for instance, AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, XII, 6-8 on the evil will of angels as
the decisive element for the fall of these noble beings with lighter and hierarchically
higher bodies or with no bodies at all. Ibid., XIV, 3 on the cause of sin located in the soul,
rather than in the flesh.
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Moreover, the whole human body, including the shameful member,
is created by God and is consequently good in-and-of itself. The genital organ which already existed in the Paradise cannot be rebuked for
causing the disturbance in the occurrence of shame. Accordingly, the
new condition that inspired the feeling of shame should be located in
the soul which decisively affected the once intimate and harmonious
relationship between body and soul found in Paradise.
The theological emphasis upon the goodness of creatures leads
Augustine into a more careful consideration of the happening of
shame. The phenomenon of shame uncovers the hidden disturbance
and discordance within human beings which primarily appeared in
the motion of sexual organs. For Augustine, what changed after the
Fall of human beings is what drives or motivates this natural bodily
movement. As Augustine claims in his earlier discussion of the punishment for the first offence of Adam and Eve, «for though their members remained the same as they were at first, they had not originally
been a source of shame to them. They became aware, therefore of a
new stirring of their flesh, which had become disobedient to them as
a punishment in requital of their own disobedience to God»58.
This new urge is named ‘lust’ (libido or concupiscentia)59, as it
inflamed the flesh regardless of the decision of will60. This statement
can also be confirmed in our experience: the carnal desire or lust can
arouse the genital organ even though we did not will so, on the other
hand, when we are still burning with the strong will for intercourse,
the capricious desire sometimes fails us61. In the preceding analysis of
58. Ibid., XIII, 13, «quae prius eadem membra erant, sed pudenda non erant.
Senserunt ergo nouum motum inoboedientis carnis suae, tamquam reciprocam poenam
inoboedientiae suae».
59. As a general principle, when referred to sexual desire, libido and concupiscentia are
virtually interchangeable in Augustine. See G. BONNER, Libido and concupiscentia in St.
Augustine: God’s Decree and Man’s Destiny. Studies on the Thought of Augustine of Hippo,
London 1987, IX, pp. 303-314. In AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, Augustine used the term
«libido» more frequently. However, in his controversy against the Pelagians, especially in
that against Julian, «concupiscentia carnalis» occurs more often.
60. AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, XIV, 17, «Quod itaque aduersus damnatam culpa
inoboedientiae uoluntatem libido inoboedenter mouebat, uerecundia pudenter tegebat».
61. Ibid., XIV, 16, «Sed neque ipsi amatores huius uoluptatis siue ad concubitus
coniugales siue ad inmunditias flagitiorum cum uoluerint commouentur; sed aliquando
inportunus est ille motus poscente nullo, aliquando autem destituit inhiantem, et cum in
animo concupiscentia ferueat, friget in corpore».
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the case of Christian women during the sack of Rome, we also
observed that the carnal lust could hold its own law against the decision of the will. Adhering to the apostolic tradition, Augustine calls
it «the law of sin» (lex peccati), which wars against the mind62. Here,
Augustine situated the emergence of shame into the context of the
uncontrolled lust and the powerlessness of the will. To explore the
nature of shame-feeling in Augustine’s moral psychology, we must
understand, first, the disturbance of lust or carnal desire, next the
role of the will in its relation to shame, and finally we can approach
the image of the self as revealed by shame.
Lust or concupiscence (libido or concupiscentia) is one of the most
significant themes in Augustine’s debates with the Pelagians63. This
term prima facie has a sexual connotation for Augustine. He also follows everyday usage of these words insofar as he says that, when they
are used without any addition signifying the object of lust, the only
thing that usually occurs to the mind is the lust that arouses the
impure parts of the body64. Therefore to clarify the meaning of this
driving force of the genital, it is worth noting from the outset that the
term concupiscentia or libido has a broader meaning than a purely sexual connotation in Augustine’s writings. This point has already been
emphasized by Gerald Bonner and Mathijs Lamberigts, among other
Augustinian scholars65. First, Augustine recognizes some concupiscentia as good, «At times, however, one ought to boast over what is called
concupiscence, because there is also the concupiscence of the spirit
62. See Rom. 7, 23, in De ciuitate Dei, XIV, 17 «Cognouerunt ergo quia nudi erant,
nudati scilicet ea gratia, qua fiebat ut nuditas corporis nulla eos lege peccati menti eorum
repugnante confunderet».
63. See G. BONNER, St. Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies, Norwich 1963
(third edition 2002), pp. 374sqq. See also J. LÖSSL, Julian von Aeclanum: Studien zu
seinem Leben, seinem Werk, seiner Lehre und ihrer Überlieferung, Leiden 2001, pp. 250318. For an excellent study of the conception of concupiscentia in Augustine’s early writings, see M. VERSCHOREN, «The Appearance of the Concept Concupiscentia in Augustine's Early Antimanichaean Writings (388-391)», in: Augustiniana 52 (2002) pp.
199-240. I am especially grateful to Professor Lamberigts for the last reference.
64. AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, XIV, 16, «tamen cum libido dicitur neque cuius rei
libido sit additur, non fere adsolet animo occurrere nisi illa, qua obscenae partes corporis
excitantur».
65. See G. BONNER, «Concupiscentia», in: Augustinus-Lexikon vol.1, Basel 1993, pp.
1113-1122; M. LAMBERIGTS, «A Critical Evaluation of Critiques of Augustine’s View of
Sexuality», in: R. DODARO/G. LAWLESS (edd.), Augustine and His Critics: Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner, London-New York 2000, pp. 176-197, esp. p. 180.
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against the flesh, and there is the concupiscence of wisdom»66. Alongside this, Augustine also talks about concupiscentia naturalis which
refers to the natural desire for happiness67. Moreover, Augustine enumerates various forms of lust (libido): lust for vengeance (anger), lust
for money (avarice), lust for victory at any price (obstinacy), lust for
glory (vanity), lust for mastery, etc68. It is evident that although the
lust or concupiscence manifests itself primarily in sexual matters, the
derogatory connotation of this term does not solely consist in the
region of sex. As Augustine himself indicates incisively, what grounds
these different forms of lust is a longing of human beings to pursue
the goods of the body or of their own mind, namely a desire to live
according to man rather than according to the truth of God69. In
short, it is a sinful desire which drags a person away from God70. As
is well known, this refers definitely to amor sui which serves as the
foundation of the earthly city in contrast to amor Dei71. Therefore,
libido here cannot be rigorously identified with sexual desire or sexual
appetite. It is shameful not because it is sexual, but because it is a
powerful driving force which tears the body away from the control of
the will and which arouses the flesh to live according to its own law.
It is this strong disposition of the soul that after their transgression
came upon Adam and Eve as something novel and disturbing. What
is identified here as the punishment for the first offence and the
source of shame is not a natural sexual appetite but a rebellious disposition of the soul which does not care about the spiritual value of
human beings.
A question emerges naturally from this interpretation of concupiscence or lust: why does the lust involved in sexuality mostly
(although not exclusively) make us blush, while other inordinate and
turbulent lusts do not, even though the latter can be more evil and
66. AUGUSTINE, De nuptiis et concupiscentia, II, 10, 23, «in concupiscentiae autem
nomine aliquando gloriandum est, quia est et concupiscentia spiritus aduersus carnem,
est et concupiscentia sapientiae».
67. IDEM, Contra Julianum Opus Imperfectum, IV, 67, cited from M. LAMBERIGTS,
«A Critical Evaluation of Critiques of Augustine’s View of Sexuality», p. 409.
68. AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, XIV, 15.
69. See ibid., 4; XIV, 28.
70. Cf. M. LAMBERIGTS, «A Critical Evaluation of Critiques of Augustine’s View of
Sexuality», p. 409.
71. See AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, XIV, 28.
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more compulsive? For instance, a strong desire for revenge could be
more destructive than the lust of an adulterer. Augustine is quite sensitive to this issue: «Again, chastity (uerecundia) does not conceal the
acts of anger and the words and deeds associated with the other passions in the same way that it conceals the acts of lust (opera libidinis)
which are performed by the sexual organs. But is this not simply
because, in the case of the other passions, the body’s members are not
set in motion by the passions themselves, but by the will, after it has
consented to the passions? For the will has mastery over the use of
such members. For no one who utters a word in anger, or, indeed,
strikes another, could do so if his tongue or hand were not in some
way set in motion by the command of his will; and those members
are set in motion by the same will even when there is no anger. But
the sexual organs have somehow fallen so completely under the sway
of lust that they have no power of movement at all if this passion is
absent, and unless it has either arisen of its own accord or been
aroused by another. It is this that makes us ashamed; it is this that
causes us to avoid the eye of onlookers, blushing»72.
For Augustine, what matters here is clearly the role of will. In the
case of anger, the will keeps its full control over the body and functions as the decisive factor of bodily movements which are connected
closely with the expression of emotions or passions73. This assertion
by Augustine is based upon his voluntaristic interpretation of passions
in De ciuitate Dei. Following classical discussions of passions, especially Cicero’s, Augustine defines passions or disturbances as «motions
72. Ibid., XIV, 19, «Quod autem irae opera aliarumque affectionum in quibusque
dictis atque factis non sic abscondit uerecundia, ut opera libidinis, quae fiunt genitalibus
membris, quid causae est, nisi quia in ceteris membra corporis non ipsae affectiones, sed,
cum eis consenserit, uoluntas mouet, quae in usu eorum omnino dominatur? Nam
quisquis uerbum emittit iratus vel etiam quemquam percutit, non posset hoc facere, nisi
lingua et manus iubente quodam modo uoluntate mouerentur; quae membra, etiam cum
ira nulla est, mouentur eadem uoluntate. At uero genitales corporis partes ita libido suo
iuri quodam modo mancipauit, ut moueri non ualeant, si ipsa defuerit et nisi ipsa uel
ultro uel excitata surrexerit. Hoc est quod pudet, hoc est quod intuentium oculos
erubescendo deuitat».
73. For the terminology of emotion in Augustine’s writings, see ibid., IX, 4, «… his
animi motibus, quae Graeci páqj, nostri autem quidam, sicut Cicero, perturbationes,
quidam affectiones uel affectus, quidam uero, sicut iste (sc. Apuleius) de Graeco expressius, passiones uocant». Cf. ibid., VIII, 17; XIV, 5; AUGUSTINE, Confessiones, X, 21sqq.
See also G. O’DALY’s and A. ZUMKELLER’s excellent essay on these terms, «Affectus (passio, perturbatio)», in Augustinus-Lexikon vol.1, pp. 166-180, esp. pp.166sq.
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of mind contrary to reason» (motus animi contra rationem)74. Beasts
are therefore denied passions or emotions because of their lack of reason75. Augustine also insists that these disturbances cannot be reduced
only to the body, or more exactly, to the corruptions of the body, as
Virgil suggested by expanding Platonic doctrine in his verses76. Passions are, first of all, commotions of rational souls which go against
their own rational nature. In human souls passions occur as irrational
inclinations of mind, which disturb the domination of the faculty of
reason. Passions essentially belong to soul or mind, since we can feel
these disturbances within our mind even without bodily senses or
bodily movements. Further, for Augustine, our decision to act or to
refrain from acting is ascribed to the faculty of the will, which establishes itself as the motivational power of mind. Therefore the consent
or the dissent of the will is crucial to the occurrence of passions.
«The will is engaged in all of them [passions]; indeed, they are all
no more than acts of the will (uoluntates). For what is desire and joy
but an act of will in agreement with what we wish for? And what is
fear and grief but an act of will in disagreement with what we do not
wish for? […] And universally, as a man’s will is attracted or repelled
by the variety of things which are pursued or avoided, so it changes
and turns into affections of one kind or the other»77.
Apparently, Augustine’s voluntaristic interpretation of passion
comes close to the Stoic theory of the consent of the soul as the
foundation of passions. Passions always act with the approval of the
mind and are never mere impulses of the mind without our will78.
74. Cf. CICERO, Tusculanarum disputationum, IV, 6, 11, here Cicero follows Zeno’s
definition of páqov to define perturbation as «auersa a recta ratione contra naturam animi
commotion». See also AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, VIII, 17; IX, 4; XIV, 5sqq.
75. De ciuitate Dei, VIII, 17.
76. See Aeneid, 6, 730sqq., cited in AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, XIV, 3.
77. AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, XIV, 6, «Voluntas est quippe in omnibus; immo
omnes nihil aliud quam uoluntates sunt. Nam quid est cupiditas et laetitia nisi voluntas
in eorum consensione quae uolumus? Et quid est metus atque tristitia nisi uoluntas in
dissensione ab his quae nolumus? (…) Et omnino pro uarietate rerum, quae appetuntur
atque fugiuntur, sicut allicitur uel offenditur uoluntas hominis, ita in hos uel illos affectus mutatur et uertitur».
78. See for instance Seneca’s interpretation of anger as a voluntary act based on the
uoluntas. SENECA, De ira, II, 1, 4 and II, 4, 1-2. Doubtless, Augustine’s understanding of
the faculty of the will (uoluntas) is quite distinct from the Stoic’s consent, even though
they sometimes employ the same term of uoluntas. The most significant difference lies in
Augustine’s refusal to identify uoluntas purely as a rational assent or rational desire of the
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Therefore the passion of anger accordingly reveals our will to revenge
ourselves after being offended. And the corresponding motions of the
body to vent this anger are caused primarily by the faculty of the
will. For instance, the movement of tongue and hands all obey the
command of the will in this situation. In stark contrast to this, even
when we have a strong will to procreate, the necessary movement of
sexual organs for the fulfillment of this will, Augustine insists, is not
entirely in obedience to the order of the will. It falls completely in
the reign of lust, which arises of its own accord without any respect
for the power of the will79.
With this interpretation of the relation between passion and will in
mind, we return to the puzzling link between passion and shame. Definitely we should concede that we do feel embarrassed or even blush
when we come to realize that we have vented our anger unjustly upon
the wrong person, especially when the victims are those whom we really
care about. However, this feeling only comes about after our passions
receded. According to Augustine, when we were completely possessed by
these passions, we did not feel ashamed for their arousal, for we did not
think that our acts were entirely out of the control of the will at that
moment80. Following Augustine’s emphasis on the role of the will in the
occurrence of passions, we can elaborate on the difference between the
uncomfortable feeling of shame in carnal concupiscence and the feeling
soul. Augustine would like to emphasize the independence of the uoluntas as a faculty distinct from intellect and appetite. Here, we cannot discuss in depth the limitations of
Augustine’s voluntaristic theory of emotions, which seems to simplify varied forms of
emotions and overemphasize the control of the will in the formation of passions. To
approach the occurrence of passions, contemporary philosophy of mind would prefer a
direct contrast between irrational impulse and reason without the mediation of the will.
However, an apparent advantage of Augustine’s and the Stoic theory of passions is that
they can explain how our soul is actively involved in the occurrence of passions. In this
essay, we only take this voluntaristic interpretation for granted to exhibit how Augustine
solves the aforementioned puzzle concerning shame and passion.
79. Augustine’s distinction between sexual lust and other passions had already been
questioned by Julian in their debate. Augustine’s view on this issue and Julian’s critique
has been well studied, see for instance, R. SORABJI, Emotion and Peace of Mind, Oxford
2000, esp. Chap. 26 «Augustine on Lust and the Will». And J. C. CAVADINI’s most recent
reconsideration of this problem, «Feeling Right: Augustine on the Passions and Sexual
Desire», in: Augustinian Studies 36:1 (2005), pp. 195-217. For a detailed analysis of this
issue with special reference to Sorabji’s evaluation, see T. Wu, «Did Augustine Lose the
Philosophical Battle in the Debate with Julian of Eclanum on Concupiscentia Carnis and
Voluntas?», in: Augustiniana 57 (2007), pp. 185-208.
80. See AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, XIV, 19. Cf. note 72.
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of embarrassment in other passions in the way that follows. The latter
appears as an afterthought, which is closer to repentance rather than
shame, because we are certain that it was a false decision of our will
directing us to act in such a way and that we can correct this error of the
will by deliberating more carefully next time. This feeling of embarrassment is more concerned with wrongful acts that can be minimized
rather than the lost of self-image or the frustration of self-evaluation. By
contrast, in the case of sexual lust, even when the turbulent concupiscence is employed for a justified end, namely for procreation in marriage, we still feel ashamed of the emergence of the sexual lust itself. For
although we believe that we can refuse to cave into these lusts, nonetheless, we cannot control our bodily movement that is so closely connected
with the gratification of sexual lust only by the decision of the will. Or
in Augustine’s words, «when they are held in check by temperance and
continence, their use is somewhat in the man’s power, but their movement is not»81. In sum, we feel ultimately powerless before stormy
attacks of carnal lust, since this lust moves the genital organs in its own
way. Even being capable of refraining from fulfilling such turbulent lust,
we know clearly that this bodily movement itself is not in our power. It
is this uncontrollability of the body motivated by sexual lust that causes
us to blush and to appeal to privacy even for legitimate intercourse. The
feeling of shame occurs as soon as we become aware of the existence of
the uncontrolled carnal lust. Before the fulfillment of this carnal concupiscence, the feeling of shame awakens our conscience to fight against
this inordinate impulse, which is threatening our self-value on account
of its uncontrollability. When this effort fails, we feel ashamed not only
for what we have done but most importantly for the emergence of this
lust which is obligatory for our sexual relations.
This difference between sexual lust and the other passions is also
evident in Augustine’s hierarchical framework of body and soul.
Augustine accepts the Platonic tradition, especially as it is recounted
by Cicero, that acknowledges lust and anger as lower parts of the soul,
which are inferior in dignity to reason. In particular, sexual lust and
the genitalia are conceived of as a creature that will not listen to rea81. AUGUSTINE, De nuptiis et concupiscentia, II, 7, 18, «Quae tamen etsi frenentur
temperantia uel continentia, usus eorum aliquantum, motus tamen eorum non est in
hominis potestate».
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son82. These turbulent and disorderly passions should be resisted by
mind and reason. When one of these passions, such as anger, takes the
domination of the soul, this can be explained as a revolt of the irrational soul against the rational soul. The soul is conquered by itself, by
its inferior parts. Even though this victory of the lower parts brings the
soul into miserable chaos, the soul is not alienated from itself as
though it is controlled by something heterogeneous. It can generate a
strong feeling of confusion and repentance, but not so much a feeling
of shame in the sense of a total loss of self-value. However, when the
soul is conquered by carnal lust, not only are mind and reason made
subordinate to the irrational commotions of the soul, but also the
body shakes off the moderation of the soul and only responds to the
impulse of lust. In the order of nature, according to Augustine’s reinterpretation of the Platonic hierarchical view of existence, the soul is
certainly placed above the body, since the former endows the latter
with life83. Hence, «the soul is less ashamed when its vicious parts disobey it than when the body does not yield to its will and command;
for the body is different from it and inferior to it, and its nature has
no life without it»84.
Therefore the source of shame in the experience of carnal lust is
revealed here as the corruption of the body and the weakness of will. In
Augustine’s account of the Fall of Adam and Eve, this source of shame
is naturally interpreted as the rightful punishment for human beings’
first voluntary disobedience against their Lord by the free decision of
their will. For in Paradise, Augustine believes that sexual organs could
be used like other bodily members, i.e. by the same command of the
will. Because there was no feeling of shame, no disturbances of passions
at all85. Even though sexual lust could have conceivably existed in
82. Cf. PLATO, Republic, 435Bsqq. 586D; 589Csqq.; IDEM, Timaeus, 41D-42D, 69Asqq.,
91B; CICERO, De re publica, III, 25, 37; AUGUSTINE, De civitate Dei, XIV, 19; XIV, 23.
83. AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, XIV, 23.
84. Ibid., «Minus tamen pudet, cum sibi animus ex uitiosis suis partibus non obtemperat, quam cum ei corpus, quod alterum ab illo est atque infra illum est et cuius sine illo
natura non uiuit, uolenti iubentique non cedit». Augustine emphasizes immediately after
this assertion that this does not signify the loss of moderation of the rational soul over
bodily lust. For the soul can still hold other bodily members back from participation in
the enjoyment of the carnal lust. This addition makes Julian’s later accusation of the complete passiveness of the soul before sexual desire clearly incorrect.
85. Ibid., XIV, 10; XIV, 24.
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Paradise, it must have been put under the full control of the will, otherwise the life in Paradise could not be called happy with respect to
capricious lust and uncontrollable bodily movements. The harmony
between the soul and the body, between the will and passions, including lust, witnesses the felicity of life in Paradise. However we cannot
demonstrate how this harmonious state of human persons is possible by
any example, since we only experience our life in the conflict between
the will and the carnal concupiscence86. In the foregoing analyses, we
laid stress upon the powerlessness of the will when confronted with the
compulsive force of carnal lust. This only exhibits the dark side of the
role of will in the phenomenon of shame. In the discussion that follows,
I want to illuminate the more active function of the will in its relation
to carnal concupiscence and shame-feeling. After a more comprehensive
display of the role of the will in shame, it will be clear that the feeling
of shame indicates vividly the gap between our ideal nature as first created in Paradise and our actual existence in this terrestrial world.
First, we should return to the symbolic meaning of the act of covering up in the story of Adam’s Fall. It is certain, as we have emphasized
before, that this act reveals the disobedience of a bodily movement
which should be concealed from the eyes of onlookers. On the other
hand, it is also an action commanded by the will to defend the dignity
of human beings from the criticism of others. It manifests the refusal of
mind and reason to identify with these rebellious movements of the
body. This perspective of shame-feeling is also strongly asserted in
Augustine’s later discussions of concupiscence and marriage against
Julian, «and so, when those first human beings felt this motion in their
flesh, which was indecent because disobedient, and were ashamed of
their nakedness, they covered those members with leaves of the fig tree.
In that way a decision (arbitrium) stemming from their shame veiled
what was aroused apart from a decision of their will, and because they
were ashamed at their indecent desire, they did what was decent in covering those members»87.
86. Ibid., XIV, 23.
87. AUGUSTINE, De nuptiis et concupiscentia, I, 6, 7, «Hunc itaque motum ideo indecentem quia inoboedientem, cum illi primi homines in sua carne sensissent et in sua
nuditate erubuissent, foliis ficulneis eadem membra texerunt, ut saltem arbitrio uerecundantium uelaretur quod non arbitrio uolentium mouebatur, et quoniam pudebat quod
indecenter libebat, operiendo fieret quod decebat».
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In this interpretation, the feeling of shame and the consequent act of
covering up those shameful organs are treated separately. The former is
only a natural and spontaneous reaction to the disturbances arising
from the disobedient body. However, the latter is an autonomous
response to the offence to personal dignity inherent in such turbulent
passions. Although the will lost its full control over the arousal and cessation of carnal lust which drives sexual organs independently, the will
is still capable of refusing to consent to the seductive force of the carnal
lust and of restraining other parts of the body from serving this passion.
To veil the shameful member voices exactly the inner decision of the
will and brings into light the obscure self-image first implied silently by
the sense of shame. Due to the spontaneous feeling of shame, the mind
becomes aware that something indecent has already emerged in the
natural motion of bodily members; by the external act of covering up,
the mind makes it clear that one’s genuine nature cannot be degraded
to such an inferior mode of existence, which is only impelled by the
carnal lust like a beast. The act of covering up is evidently a further step
to confirm the dignity of human beings, which is motivated by the
command of the will. On the other hand, the act of covering themselves is connected so closely with the feeling of shame, which indicates
clearly that the sense of shame is the first step towards the autonomy
that should be realized by a protective decision of the will. Based upon
such a decision, the virtue of chastity can be established to be a character excellence of human beings.
Therefore, in the feeling of shame, we not only gain an insight into
the natural weakness of the human soul and will in their confrontation
with carnal desire, but also affirm a dim but certainly existent light
by which we defend the dignity of our Self even after the Fall. The
phenomenon of shame reveals both the limitations and possibilities
of human existence. We are directed by the feeling of shame to an
awareness of our actual existence after the Fall, an awareness of both
the inherent weakness of the will and the potential autonomy of the
soul. Owing to this, shame is not only a turbulent and uncomfortable
emotion like other affections; it is also a feeling in close relation to the
identity of the self. For what is revealed in shame is actually who we
are. As Helen Merrell Lynd has pointed out in her study on shame and
its relation to identity, «shame is an experience that affects and is
affected by the whole self. This whole-self involvement is one of its
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distinguishing characteristics and one that makes it a clue to identity»88. The intimate link of shame with self makes us more concerned
of the privacy of shameful things even in legitimate occasions. Even the
children who have been born from it are not permitted to witness it.
For, the feeling of shame shuns the light of the eye, even though the
mind is quite aware of the legitimacy of his or her act of procreation89.
In Augustine’s opinion, this shame-feeling is, first of all, an immediate
and spontaneous awareness of the change that happened to the self
under such shameful conditions, not an afterthought which is essentially dependent upon conventional opinions and judgments of others.
The feeling of shame shuns all attention from eyes of others and protects the self from being exposed to and judged by others. Accordingly,
the social conventions, such as concealing the shameful parts, are based
upon the protective function of shame. It is not on the contrary that
the conventional opinion determines the natural expression of shame.
This point has already been demonstrated in our preceding analyses of
the rape of Lucretia and that of Christian women during Rome’s sacking. It is also for this reason that Augustine vigorously refutes the fallacy of the Cynics, who flagrantly held in contempt the natural feeling
of shame (pudor naturalis)90.
A last, but not the least, point should be clarified before we conclude our study of Augustine’s interpretation of shame in De civitate Dei: What kind of self is preserved in and protected by the
feeling of shame? In the foregoing, stress has been laid upon the
conflict between body and will, between flesh and spirit. It appears
quite attractive to describe the phenomenon of shame in the dualistic framework of body and soul or of body and spirit91. Obviously, a comprehensive treatment of Augustine’s understanding of
88. See H. M. LYND, On Shame and the Search for Identity, New York 1961, p. 49.
This point had already been stressed by Scheler, «For it is, first of all, the very function
of bodily shame to cover and veil, as it were, a living individual». «Shame is a feeling,
therefore, of guilt for a self in general». See M. SCHELER «Shame and Feelings of Modesty», pp. 6, 18.
89. See AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, XIV, 18, «Sic enim hoc recte factum ad sui notitiam lucem appetit animorum, ut tamen refugiat oculorum».
90. Ibid., XIV, 20.
91. See for instance, Scheler’s treatment of shame, «To the origin of the feeling of
shame there belongs something like an imbalance and disharmony in man between the
sense and the claim of spiritual personhood and embodied needs». M. SCHELER, «Shame
and Feelings of Modesty», p. 5.
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body, soul and spirit is a huge task, which goes beyond the scope of
this essay92. However, some essential points about this problem in
its relation to his analysis of shame can be suggested here.
First, as Augustine emphasizes frequently, the body also belongs
to the whole nature of man, «For they [bodies] are not an ornament, or employed as an external aid; rather, they belong to the
very nature of man»93. And Augustine also refuses to reduce evils of
mind to faults of the body, he insists that what is at stake here is
«the whole nature of man» (universa natura hominis)94. Secondly, in
the term «carnalis concupiscentia», the adjective carnalis primarily
means the tendency to desire contrary to the needs of the spirit.
Here, «caro» cannot be identified with the substance of the body,
because some desires or lusts essentially belonging to the soul, such
as avarice and vanity, can also be called carnal desires or lusts95.
Even though we have to concede some kind of tension between two
components of human nature here, it is obviously not one like the
Cartesian division between body and soul as two substances96.
Finally, the double-sided characteristic of shame exactly reveals our
actual existence in the world which goes beyond the body/soul
92. See M. R. Miles’ special study of Augustine’s viewpoint of the body: M. R.
MILES, Augustine on the body, Missoula 1979. Among other secondary literature on this
problem, I found these two summaries quite useful, J. M. RIST, Augustine: Ancient
Thought Baptized, Cambridge 1994, Chap. 4 «Soul, Body and Personal Identity». And P.
BROWN, The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity, New York 1988, Chap. 19 «Sexuality and Society: Augustine», pp. 387-427.
93. AUGUSTINE, De ciuitate Dei, I, 13, «Haec enim non ad ornamentum uel adiutorium, quod adhibetur extrinsecus, sed ad ipsam naturam hominis pertinent». This point
is emphasized in the context of the resurrection of the body.
94. Ibid., XIV, 3, «Quod si quisquam dicit carnem causam esse in malis moribus
quorumcumque uitiorum, eo quod anima carne affecta sic uiuit, profecto non uniuersam
hominis naturam diligenter aduertit».
95. See note 64.
96. Certainly in his earlier writings, Augustine also insists that the soul can be defined
as a rational substance which should rule the substance of the body, for instance, see
AUGUSTINE, De quantitate animae, 13, 22, «Si autem definiri tibi animum uis, et ideo
quaeris quid sit animus; facile respondeo. Nam mihi uidetur esse substantia quaedam
rationis particeps, regendo copori accommodate». It should be conceded that this definition of the human soul is strongly influenced by Platonic tradition and appears to be
dualistic. Nevertheless, in the context of the carnal concupiscence, what is in question is
not the opposition between soul and body, but the conflict between earthly desire and
spiritual demand. It is quite obvious that the latter is beyond the dichotomy between
body and soul. I am most grateful for the reference to Augustine’s De quantitate animae
in professor Russell Friedman’s comment on this passage.
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dichotomy97. On the one hand, the protective reaction of shame
reveals the hidden value of self which lies beyond the pure needs of
the body and directs us to the spiritual love of the true good in
opposition to the selfish love of bodily goods. In the context of
Augustine’s ideas on sin and redemption, shame points us to the
love of God, who is the only genuine Good and the real ground for
our self-value. On the other hand, the embarrassment inherent in
shame-feeling expresses not only our reluctance to identify with
these bodily lusts, but also that these impulses actually occurred in
us ourselves and we could not be born into this world without
them. These lusts also belong to us, although in a way different
from the will and its decisions, otherwise we would not feel
ashamed of possessing them. Without the involvement of our self,
we cannot feel embarrassed by the wrongful acts of others. These
lusts are essentially involuntary and come upon us like a disease, or
in Augustine’s terms, as a punishment afflicted on human existence
in this world. Augustine is quite sensitive to this inherent weakness
of human beings and recognizes it as the source of the soul’s conflict
within itself, the division of the will against itself98. For Augustine,
this weakness of human existence can only be remedied by the grace
of God, especially by the incarnation of Christ. Putting this eschatological concern aside, we can still appreciate Augustine’s more
realistic observation and analysis of human existence as a whole self
of body and soul, which runs through his interpretation of shame.
3. Conclusion:
In De ciuitate Dei, through case studies of Lucretia’s rape and
Adam’s act of covering himself after the Fall, Augustine offers us a
quite complicated and subtle depiction of the feeling of shame in the
context of guilt and sin, which stresses the inherent value of the
shame-feeling beyond social conventions and public esteem. Augustine articulates the protective function of shame to manifest its inti97. See P. FREDRIKSEN’s distinguished essay on this problem, «Beyond the body/soul
dichotomy: Augustine on Paul against the Manichees and the Pelagians», in: Recherches
Augustiniennes XXIII (1988), pp. 87-114.
98. Cf. AUGUSTINE, Confessiones, VIII, esp. VIII, 5, 10-12, VIII, 8, 20-10, 22.
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mate relation to self-value and self-identity. As briefly addressed in
the introduction to this study, it is this essential connection between
shame and self-identity that impelled contemporary philosophers to
investigate the sense of shame in various contexts. However, it has
become evident in our reconstruction of Augustine’s thoughts on
shame that his understanding of self and self-identity differs sharply
from those of contemporary philosophers. Take as an example of the
latter, Bernard Williams’ enthusiastic defense of the value of shame in
ancient Greek: Williams argues that an authentic sense of shame can
transcend both an assertive egoistic concern of one’s own honor and
a conventional concern for public opinion99. In experiencing shame,
our whole being is set in focus in an interactive context, which
involves the dialogue between self-assessment and self-image in the
sight of an internalized other. In contrast to guilt, we do not feel
ashamed primarily for what we have done and its consequence, but
essentially for that part of our self-image involved in these acts, especially for the possible change of the relation of our self to others. The
sense of shame not only reveals what I am, but also serves as one of
the mediations between oneself and the world100. It is evident here
that the intimate relation between shame and self-identity is
approached more in the context of inter-subjectivity. In contrast to
this, Augustine locates the sense of shame in its inherent relation to
the dynamic of the will. Due to his theological concern with the salvation of human beings, what matters in the issue of self-identity for
Augustine is the appearance of the human self as an individual person before All-seeing God. As has been stressed in the foregoing
study, Augustine asserts that this self-image is essentially based upon
the free decision of the will. Accordingly Augustine explores the phenomenon of shame in a more internal way, focusing on the role of
the will in the occurrence of passions, especially in that of carnal lust.
The sense of shame manifests both the failure of the will in its confrontation with lust, and the protective effort of the will to regain its
control over one’s whole being. This perspective of the ontological
origins of shame is ignored or carefully avoided in contemporary
approaches to the subject matter. We have to concede that to some
99. See B. WILLIAMS, Shame and Necessity, p. 81.
100. Ibid., p. 101.
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extent Augustine overemphasizes the faculty of the will and its
dominion over the whole self, especially in his voluntaristic reduction
of passions to acts of the will. His differentiation of carnal lust and
other passions can be established only upon a somewhat idiosyncratic
interpretation of carnalis concupiscientia, which signifies the sinful
tendency to revolt against the dominion of reason. Moreover, the
value of the body seems to be attached as something external to our
true self, although Augustine laid strong emphasis upon the original
goodness of the ideal body in Paradise, where it was completely subordinate to the command of reason and will. In Augustine’s analyses
of the origins of shame, the body never possesses an independent or
an inherent value of its own. The only significance of the body
resides in its obedience to the rational soul. Furthermore, most of
Augustine’s discussions about shame are limited to sexual shame,
which is conceived as the primary but not the only occasion for the
feeling of embarrassment. Nevertheless, a more patient and sympathetic reading of Augustine’s discussion on shame in this article indicates that Augustine also presents us with an absorbing and penetrating narrative of the phenomenon of shame in terms of body, soul
and will. In opposition to the tendency of contemporary philosophers to overestimate the sense of shame in its relation to self-identity, Augustine never exaggerates this perspective since he asserts that
shame is only a feeling, a spontaneous reaction to the turbulent lusts.
For Augustine, shame is only the first step towards a genuine self-love
and can never be identified with the virtue of chastity which grounds
itself upon the decision of the will. This expresses a more moderate
and more appropriate evaluation of the feeling of shame in its relation to our self-assessment. For this reason, Augustine’s insights into
the role of will, into the involvement of the self in shame feeling, are
still illuminating for our contemporary interests in self-identity, especially in the expression of self-assessment emotions such as shame.