torts & damages
INTRODUCTION
NAGUIAT V NLRC (National Organization of Workingmen
and Galang)
269 SCRA 565
PANGANIBAN; March 13, 1997
NATURE
Special civil action in the Supreme Court, certiorari
FACTS
- Clark Field Taxi, Inc. held a concessionaire’s contract with the Army Air
Force Exchange Services for the operation of taxi services within Clark Air
Base. Sergio Naguiat was the president of CFTI while Antolin Naguiat was
its vice president. Like Naguiat Enterprises, Inc. which was a trading firm, it
was also a family-owned corporation.
- Respondents were employed by the CFTI as taxicab drivers.
> They were required to pay a daily boundary fee of US$26.50 (for those
on duty from 1AM-12N) or US$27 (for those on duty from 12N to 12 MN)
> Incidental expenses were maintained by the drivers (including gasoline
expenses).
> Drivers worked 3-4 times a week depending on the availability of
vehicles and earned no less than US$15.00 a day. In excess of that
amount, they had to make cash deposits to the company which they could
withdraw every fifteen days.
- AAFES was dissolved because of the phase-out of the military bases in
Clark and the services of the respondents were officially terminated on
November 26, 1991.
- AAFES Taxi Drivers Association, the drivers union, and CFTI held
negotiations as regards separation benefits. They arrived at an agreement
that the separated drivers would be given P500 for ever year as severance
pay. Most of the drivers accepted this but some refused to do so.
- Those who did not accept the initial severance pay disaffiliated themselves
with drivers union and through the National Organization of Workingmen,
they filed a complaint against Sergio Naguiat under the name and style
Naguiat Enterprises, AAFES and AAFES union.
- The labor arbiter ordered the petitioner to pay the drivers P1,200 for every
year of service for humanitarian consideration, setting aside the earlier
agreement between the CFTI and the drivers union. It also rejected the idea
that the CFTI was forced to close it business due to great financial losses and
lose opportunity since at the time of its closure it was profitably earning. The
labor arbiter however did not award separation pay because to “impose a
monetary obligation to an employer whose profitable business was abruptly
shot (sic) shot down by force majeur would be unfair and unjust.”
- The NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter after respondents
appealed by granting separation pay to the private respondents. It said that
half of the monthly salary should be US$120 which should be paid in
Philippine pesos. Naguiat Enterprieses should be joined with Sergio and
Antolin Naguiat as jointly and severally liable.
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Petitioners’ Claim:
- Petitioners claim that the cessation of the business was due to the great
financial losses and lost business opportunity when Clark Air Base was
phased out due to the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement and
the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.
- They admitted that CFTI had agreed with the drivers union to grant the taxi
drivers separation pay equivalent to P500 for every year of service.
- They allege that Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process
beause the petitioners were not furnished copies of the appeal to the NLRC.
- They also allege that NOWM cannot make legal representation in behalf of
the respondents because the latter should be bound by the decision of the
drivers union.
Respondents’ Comments:
- The drivers alleged that they were employees of Naguiat Enterprises
although their individual applications were approved by CFTI. They claimed
to have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by
CFTO and that Naguia Enterprises managed, controlled and supervised their
employment.
- They averred that they should be entitled to separation pay based on their
latest daily earnings or US$15 for working 16 days a month.
ISSUES
1. WON the NLRC acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in granting separation pay
2. WON NOWM was authorized to represent the private respondents
3. WON Naguiat Enterprieses, Sergio Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat were
liable
4. WON Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process
HELD
1. NO, the NLRC did not act in excess of jurisdiction or with abuse of
discretion.
Ratio Findings of fact of administrative bodies and quasi-judicial bodies are
afforded great respect by the Court and are binding except when there is a
showing of grave abuse of discretion or the decision was arrived at arbitrarily.
Reasoning
- Respondents showed that their monthly take home pay amounted to no less
than $240 and this was not disputed by petitioners.
- There is no record or evidence which shows that the closure of the taxi
business was brought about by great financial losses no thanks to the
Pinatubo eruption. It was rather brought about by the closure of the military
bases.
- Art. 283 of the CC provides that separation pay shall be equivalent to 1
month pay or at least ½ month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. The NLRC ruling was correct in terms of US$120 as the computed
separation pay.
2. Petitioners can no longer question the authority of NOWM and are held in
estoppel.
Reasoning
- NOWM was already representing the respondents before the labor arbiter
and the petitioners did not assail their juridical personality then.
- Petitioners also acknowledged before the Court that the taxi drivers are
themselves parties in the case.
3. Naguiat Enterprises is not liable, Antolin Naguiat is not personally liable
whereas Sergio Naguiat is solidarily liable.
prof. casis
- Re: Naguiat Enterprises’ liability
Reasoning
- The respondents were regular employees of CFTI who received wages on a
boundary basis. They offered no evidence that Naguiat Enterprises
managed, supervised and controlled their employment. They instead
submitted documents which had to do with CFTI, not Naguiat Enterprises.
- Labor-only contractors are those where 1) the person supplying workers to
the employer does no have substantial capital or investment in the form of
tools or machinery and 2) the workers recruited and placed by such person
are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of
the employer.
- Independent contractors are those who exercise independent employment,
contracting to do a piece of work according to their own methods without
being subject to the control of their employer except as to the result of their
work.
- Sergio Naguiat was a stockholder and director of Naguiat Enterprises but, in
supervising the taxi drivers and determining their employment terms, he was
carrying out his responsibility as president of CFTI.
- Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while CFTI was in the taxi
business.
- The Constitution of the CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers Association states that the
members of the union are employees of CFTI and for collective and
bargaining purposes, the employer is also CFTI.
- Re: Antolin Naguiat’s liability
Reasoning
- Although he carried the title of general manager, it has not been shown that
he had acted in such capacity.
- No evidence on the extent of his participation in the management or
operation of the business was proferred.
- Re: Sergio Naguiat’s liability
Ratio A director or officer may be held solidarly liable with a corporation by a
specific provision of law because a corporation, being a juridical entity, may
act only through its directors and officers. Obligations incurred by them,
acting as such corporation agents, are not theirs but the direct
accountabilities of the corporation they represent. In the absence of definite
proof of who clearly are the officers of the corporation, the assumption falls
on the President of the corporation.
Reasoning
- In his capacity as President, Sergio Naguiat cannot be exonerated.
- An employer is defined to be any person acting in the interest of an
employer, directly or indirectly.
- Case in point is A.C. Ransom Labor Union CCLU vs. NLRC held that the
identified employer A.C. Ransom Corporation, being an artificial person, must
have an officer and in the absence of proof, the president is assumed to be
the head of the corporation.
- Both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were close family corporations owned
by the same family. To the extent that stockholders are actively engaged in
the management or business affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders
shall be held to strict fiduciary duties to each other and among themselves.
Said stockholders shall be liable for corporate torts unless the corporation
has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance.
> Nothing in the records indicate that CFTI obtained reasonable adequate
liability insurance.
> Jurisprudence is wanting in the definition of corporate tort. Tort
essentially consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a
duty imposed by law. Tort is a breach of legal duty.
torts & damages
> Art. 238 mandates the employer to grant separation pay to employees in
case of cessation of operations or closure of the business not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses which is the condition on this
case.
4. There was no denial of due process.
Reasoning
- Even if the individual Naguiats were not impleaded as parties of the
complaint, they could still be held liable because of jurisprudence (A.C.
Ransom case).
- Both also voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter when they filed a position paper.
DISPOSITION The petition is partly granted. 1) CFTI and Sergio Naguiat are
ordered to pay jointly and severally the individual respondents of US$120 for
every year of service and 2) Naguiat Enterprises and Antolin Naguiat are
absolved from liability.
BARREDO V GARCIA
BOCOBO; July 8, 1942
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages for death pf Faustino
Garcia caused by negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by
Fausto Barredo
- May 3, 1936 – in road between Malabon and Navotas, head-on collision
between taxi of Malate Taxicab and carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis
thereby causing overturning of the carretela and the eventual death of Garcia,
16-yo boy and one of the passengers
- Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and separate civil action is
reserved
- Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole proprietor of Malate
Taxicab as employer of Fontanilla
- CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanilla’s negligence apparent as he
was driving on the wrong side of the road and at a high speed
> no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of the family as Barredo is
careless in employing (selection and supervision) Fontanilla who had been
caught several times for violation of Automobile Law and speeding
> CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil liability arising from
crime bec this is under obligations arising from wrongful act or negligent acts
or omissions punishable by law
- Barredo’s defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF liability only
subsidiary and bec no civil action against Fontanilla TF he too cannot be held
responsible
ISSUE
WON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action against Barredo
making him primarily liable and directly responsible under A1903CC as
employer of Fontanilla
HELD
YES
- There are two actions available for parents of Garcia. One is under the
A100RPC wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable for the damages
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arising from the crime thereby first exhausting the properties of Fontanilla.
The other action is under A1903CC (quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana) wherein
as the negligent employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held primarily liable
subject to proving that he exercising diligence of a good father of the family.
The parents simply took the action under the Civil Code as it is more practical
to get damages from the employer bec he has more money to give than
Fontanilla who is yet to serve his sentence.
Obiter
Difference bet Crime and Quasi-delict
1) crimes – public interest; quasi-delict – only private interest
2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil Code by means of
indemnification merely repairs the damage
3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are only punished if there
is a penal law; quasi-delicts include any kind of fault or negligence intervenes
NOTE: not all violations of penal law produce civil responsibility
e.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game laws, infraction of rules of
traffic when nobody is hurt
4) crime – guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil – mere preponderance of
evidence
- Presumptions:
1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there instantly arises presumption
of negligence of master or employer in selection, in supervision or both
2) presumption is juris tantum not juris et de jure TF may be rebutted by
proving exercise of diligence of a good father of the family
- basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior bu the relationship of pater
familias
- motor accidents – need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of
owners of motor vehicles
ELCANO V HILL
77 SCRA 98
BARREDO; May 26, 1977
NATURE
Appeal from an order of the CFI Quezon City
FACTS
- Reginald Hill, a minor yet married at the time of occurrence, was criminally
prosecuted for the killing of Agapito Elcano (son of Pedro), and was acquitted
for “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.”
- Pedro Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of damages from Reginald and
his father Atty Marvin. CFI dismissed it.
ISSUES
1. WON the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed
2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last par) of the CC can be applied against Atty.
Hill, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the occurrence, Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was
already legally married
HELD
1. NO
prof. casis
-The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action
against him.
-Barredo v Garcia (dual character—civil and criminal— of fault or negligence
as a source of obligation):
"The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come
under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the
agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the
subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of
a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it
was the employer and not the employee who was being sued."
"It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of
the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of
a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an
entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1402 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate
individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been
fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case aria
for which, after un a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability
arising from his crime.”
-Culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of
a penal law, whether voluntary or negligent.
-ART 1162: "Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by
special laws." More precisely, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
"ART 277. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising front negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant."
- According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177)
through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we
consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquilian' or quasi-delict,
of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality,
separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or 'cuasi-delito' has been sustained
by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound
and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore,
under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence,
but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article
forestalls a double recovery,"
- Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of
negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that
upholds "the spirit that giveth life" rather than that which is literal that killeth
the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that me preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil
Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a
civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 12) from the civil
responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule
111, contemplate also the same separability, it’s "more congruent with the
torts & damages
spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress",
to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
- Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary.
- Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
2. YES (but…)
- Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by
marriage of Reginald. (However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is
now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.)
- While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the
child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes
place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not
really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall
enable the minor to administer his property as though he was of age, but he
cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the
consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court
only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
- Under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company."
- In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married,
was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to
and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
- It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the
joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article
2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in
order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons.
- On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a
minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued
without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not
carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise
to judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.
CINCO V CANONOY
90 SCRA 369
Melencio-Herrera; May 31, 1979
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
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- Cinco filed on Feb 25, 19701 a complaint for recovery of damages on
account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven
by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.
- Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot
arising from the same accident.
- At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to
suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit.
- The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case.
Petitioner’s MFR having been denied, he elevated the matter on Certiorari to
the CFI Cebu., which in turn dismissed the petition.
Plaintiff’s claims:
- it was the fault r negligence of the driver in the operation of the jeepney
owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision.
- Damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision
- There was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered
and the fault and negligence of private respondents.
Respondents’ Comments:
- They observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees,
particularly of Romeo Hilot.
ISSUE
WON there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during
the pendency of the criminal action
HELD
YES
- Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as a
separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Art 2177
of the Civil Code.
- The separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict is also clearly
recognized in sec 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
Sec 2. Independent civil action. – In the cases prvided for in Articles
31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code f the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
- Petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of
quasi-delict, as enunciated in Art 2176 of the Civil Code, is so broad
that in includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to
property. It makes no distinction between “damage to persons” on the
one hand and “damage to property” on the other. The word damage is
used in two concepts: the “harm” done and “reparation” for the harm
done. And with respect to “harm” it is plain that it includes both injuries
to person and property since “harm” is not limited to personal but also
to property injuries.
DISPOSITION Writ of Certiorari granted.
BAKSH V CA (Gonzales)
219 SCRA 115
DAVIDE, JR; Feb.19, 1993
prof. casis
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari to review and set aside the CA decision which affirmed in
toto the RTC’s decision
FACTS
- Private respondent Marilou Gonzales (MG) filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh for the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married.
**MG’s allegations in the complaint:
- That she is a 22 yr. old Filipina, single, of good moral character and
respected reputation in her community.
- That Baksh is an Iranian citizen, residing in Dagupan, and is an exchange
student taking up medicine at the Lyceum in Dagupan.
- That Baksh later courted and proposed to marry her. MG accepted his love
on the condition that they would get married. They later agreed to get married
at the end of the school semester. Petitioner had visited MG’s parents to
secure their approval of the marriage. Baksh later forced MG to live with him.
A week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner started maltreating her
even threatening to kill her and as a result of such maltreatment, she
sustained injuries. A day before the filing of the complaint, Baksh repudiated
their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and
that he is already married to someone in Bacolod. She prayed for payment
for damages amounting to Php 45,000 plus additional costs.
- Baksh answered with a counterclaim, admitting only the personal
circumstances of the parties in the complaint but denied the rest of the
allegations. He claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be
married; neither sought the consent of her parents nor forced her to live in his
apt.; did not maltreat her but only told her to stop coming to his place after
having discovered that she stole his money and passport. He also prayed for
25,000 as moral damages plus misc. expenses.
- The RTC, applying Art. 21 CC decided in favor of private respondent.
Petitioner was thus ordered to pay Php 20,000 as moral damages and 3,000
pesos atty’s. fees plus litigation expenses. Petitioner appealed this decision
to respondent CA, contending that the trial court erred in not dismissing the
case for lack of factual and legal basis and in ordering him to pay moral
damages, atty’s fees, etc.
- Respondent CA promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the
trial court’s ruling which prompted Baksh to file this petition for certiorari,
raising the single issue of WON Art. 21 applies to this case.
ISSUE
WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the
basis of Art.21 of the Civil Code
HELD
1. YES
Ratio In a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral
seduction, Art. 21 may be applied.
Reasoning
- Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and
that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could
justify the award of damages pursuant to Art.21 not because of such promise
torts & damages
to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however,
that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.
- In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live
with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise,
and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to
their supposed marriage. In short, the private respondent surrendered her
virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust
but because of moral seduction. The petitioner could not be held liable for
criminal seduction punished under either Art.337 or Art.338 of the RPC
because the private respondent was above 18 years of age at the time of the
seduction.
- Moreover, it is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb
the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court
having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe
closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had
plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case. Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us
that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance
or value which could alter the result of the case.
**Obiter: on Torts and Quasi-delicts
- The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New
Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is
set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code,
from which We quote:
“The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to
marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus
vs. Syquia. The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men...”
- This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which
is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish
in the statute books.
- As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
“But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible
that there are
countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury,
the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to
incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
“Art.21 Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.”
“An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A' seduces
the nineteen-year old daughter of 'X.' A promise of marriage either has not
been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the
present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above 18 yrs of age. Neither can
any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though
the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and although the girl and her
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family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot
bring any action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her
parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes.”
- Art.2176 CC, which defines a quasi-delict, is limited to negligent acts or
omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict,
known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept
while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much
broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but
intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal
system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil
Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to
be covered by Art.2176 CC. In between these opposite spectrums are
injurious acts which, in the absence of Art.21, would have been beyond
redress. Thus, Art.21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with
Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Art.21 has greatly broadened the scope
of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable
than the Anglo-American law on torts.
DISPOSITION finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the
instant petition is hereby DENIED
PEOPLE V BALLESTEROS
285 SCRA 438
ROMERO; January 29, 1998
NATURE
An appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery.
FACTS
- evening of May 28, 1991, Carmelo Agliam, his half-brother Eduardo
Tolentino, Ronnel Tolentino, Vidal Agliam, his brother Jerry Agliam, Robert
Cacal, Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid converged at a carinderia owned
by Ronnel Tolentino. They proceeded to attend a dance but did not stay long
because they sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his companions
who were giving them dagger looks. In order to avoid trouble, especially
during the festivity, they decided to head for home instead of reacting to the
perceived provocation of Galo and his companions.
- The group had barely left when their owner jeep was fired upon from the
rear. Vidal Agliam was able to jump out from the jeep and landed just beside
it, scurried to the side of the road and hid in the ricefield. His younger brother
Jerry also managed to jump out, but was shot in the stomach and died.
Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained injuries.
Eduardo Tolentino was not even able to move from his seat and was hit with
a bullet which punctured his right kidney which caused his death.
- Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal Agliam, warrants for the
arrest of Ballesteros, Galo and Bulusan were issued. - All pleaded not guilty.
Paraffin tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros produced positive
results. Bulusan was not tested for nitrates.
prof. casis
- In his testimony, Galo claimed that he did not even talk to Bulusan or any of
his companions. Having been found with gunpowder residue in his hands,
Galo attempted to exculpate himself from the results by confessing that he
had been a cigarette smoker for the past ten years and had, in fact, just
consumed eight cigarette sticks prior to the test., and that his hand may have
been contaminated by a nitrogenous compound, the source of which is
urine. Lastly, he said that he was not even present at the crime scene
- Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi, that he went to a nearby store
to purchase some cigarettes. He returned home and cleaned his garlic bulbs
before retiring at 9:00 o’clock. The next morning, he busied himself with
some chores, which included fertilizing his pepper plants with sulfate. He
handled the fertilizers without gloves. He said that he uses his left hand in
lighting cigarettes and he had no motive to kill the victims.
- Bulusan echoed the defense of alibi of Galo and Ballesteros
- The trial court found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, qualified by treachery, and ordered them to pay jointly and solidarily:
1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00, and actual
damages in the amount of P35,755.00, with interest;
2. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr., compensatory damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00, and
actual damages in the total amount of P61,785.00, with interest;
3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of P2,003.40, and moral
damages in the amount of P10,000.00, with interest;
4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, moral damages in
the amount of P5,000.00 each, with interest.
5. The costs.
ISSUES
1. WON the trial court was correct in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt
2. WON the Court correctly ruled in finding that the offense was qualified by
treachery
3. WON the Court was correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the
victims
HELD
1. YES
Ratio Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to convict a person
of a criminal charge. The doubt to the benefit of which an accused is entitled
in a criminal trial is a reasonable doubt, not a whimsical or fanciful doubt
based on imagined but wholly improbable possibilities and unsupported by
evidence. Reasonable doubt is that engendered by an investigation of the
whole proof and inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy
upon the certainty of guilt.
Reasoning
- In their testimonies, Carmelo and Vidal Agliam both described the area to
be well illumined by the moon. Considering the luminescence of the moon
and the proximity between them, the victims could distinctly identify their
assailants. Also, the constant interaction between them through the years (in
the buying and selling of cattle and Bulusan was a classmate of Vidal) would
necessarily lead to familiarity with each other such that, at the very least, one
would have been able to recognize the other easily
- That accused-appellants had no motive in perpetrating the offense is
irrelevant. Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a
definite result. Intent, on the other hand, is the purpose to use a particular
torts & damages
means to effect such result. The prosecution need not prove motive on the
part of the accused when the latter has been positively identified as the
author of the crime.
- on their excuses regarding the source of the gunpowder traces found on
their hands: Experts confirm the possibility that cigarettes, fertilizers and urine
may leave traces of nitrates, but these are minimal and, unlike those found in
gunpowder, may be washed off with tap water.
- on the defense of alibi: for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must
prove, not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission
of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. This accused-appellants failed to
satisfactorily prove. Positive identification prevails over denials and alibis.
- None of them attempted to corroborate their alibi through the testimony of
witnesses. In fact, they never attempted to present as witnesses those who
could have testified to having seen them elsewhere on the night in question.
2. YES
Ratio The requisites of treachery are twofold: (1) (t)hat at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the
offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack
employed by him.
Reasoning
- Here, it is obvious that the accused-appellants had sufficient opportunity to
reflect on their heinous plan. The facts show that the attack was well-planned
and not merely a result of the impulsiveness of the offenders. Manifestations
of their evil designs were already apparent as early as the time of the
dance. They were well-armed and approached the homebound victims,
totally unaware of their presence, from behind. There was no opportunity for
the latter to defend themselves
3. YES
Ratio Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation,
recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise
expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the
breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Actual or compensatory
damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or
injury sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked when the
complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical
suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these
were the proximate result of the offender’s wrongful act or omission.
Reasoning
- In granting actual or compensatory damages, the party making a claim for
such must present the best evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and
the like, as corroborated by his testimony. Here, the claim for actual damages
by the heirs of the victims is not controverted, the same having been fully
substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the court.
Therefore, the award of actual damages is proper. However, the order
granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo
Tolentino Sr. must be amended. Consistent with the policy of this Court, the
amount of P 50,000.00 is given to the heirs of the victims by way of
indemnity, and not as compensatory damages. As regards moral damages,
the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury caused to the heirs of
the victims, although inestimable, may be determined by the trial court in its
discretion. Hence, we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this matter.
DISPOSITION The decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION.
CUSTODIO V CA (Heirs Of Mabasa)
A2010
prof. casis
-5-
253 SCRA 483
REGALADO; February 9, 1996
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA
FACTS
- The plaintiff-appellee Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door
apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas,
Tagig, Metro Manila. As access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property,
there are 2 possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately
one meter wide and is about 20m distant from Mabasa's residence to P.
Burgos St. Such path is passing in between the row of houses of defendants.
The second passageway is about 3m in width. In passing thru said
passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with
5-6m in length, has to be traversed.
- When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants
occupying the remises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as
tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenants vacated
the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw
that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it
narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants
Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway.
Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said
fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. And it was
then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area.
Defendant Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because
there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled
by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first passageway.
She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having at the front of her
house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would
bang their doors and windows. Some of their footwear were even lost.
- TC ordered (a) defendant-appellants Custodios and Santoses to give
plaintiff permanent access — ingress and egress, to the public street; (b) the
plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses P8,000 as indemnity for
the permanent use of the passageway.
- Private respondents, went to CA raising the sole issue of WON lower court
erred in not awarding damages in their favor. CA affirming TC judgment with
modification, awarding damages to plaintiffs (P65K as actual damages, P30K
as moral damages and P10K as exemplary damages). Mfr denied. Hence
this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper
2. WON CA erred in awarding damages to plaintiff-appellee Mabasa
HELD
1. Ratio Whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has
not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative
relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court
Reasoning
- Petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not
appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the
right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication
therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the
issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
2. YES
Ratio There is no cause of action for acts done by one person (in this case,
upon his own property) in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts
incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such
damage or loss is damnum absque injuria.
Reasoning
[1] To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action
for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the
plaintiff therefrom.
[2] Obiter: There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury
is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury
in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation
of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
[3] In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act
must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. The
injury must result from a breach of duty or a legal wrong.
[4] In this case, although there was damage, there was no legal injury.
Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to
have violated the principle of abuse of right (Art.21 CC)
[5] The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid
exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is
within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property
(See Art.430 CC).
DISPOSITION The appealed decision of CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the judgment of the trial court is REINSTATED.
THE CONCEPT OF QUASIDELICT
GARCIA V FLORIDO
[CITATION]
ANTONIO; [DATE]
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental, dismissing petitioners' action for damages against
respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, "without prejudice
to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal
case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte", and
from the order of said Court dated January 21, 1972, denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.
FACTS
- On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis
Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester
Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car with
plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino
torts & damages
Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a roundtrip from
Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference
of chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and
bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City.
- At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the
national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga
del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with
plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc.
and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision,
petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their
medical treatment and hospitalization.
- Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the
time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a
reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic
rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU
car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco,
filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the
private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the
passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary
attachment.
- The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. et. al to in a motion to
dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11,
1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages,
respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the
Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by
the Chief of Police and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no
civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has
been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the
liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final
judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of
negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art
33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the
negligent act or imprudence of the driver.
- The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. et. Al. and dismissed the complaint
ISSUES
1. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages on the
ground that since no express reservation was made by the complainants, the
civil aspect of the criminal case would have to be determined only after the
termination of the criminal case
2. WON the lower court erred in saying that the action is not based on quasidelict since the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be
tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations and
because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the
defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory and
exemplary damages
.
HELD
1. YES
Ratio An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained independently
from a criminal action. By instituting a civil action based on a quasi-delict, a
complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to press recovery for
damages in the criminal case.
Reasoning
A2010
prof. casis
-6-
- In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in
the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro
Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by
conviction or acquittal of said accused.
- It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for
damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery
for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in
the present civil case.
- As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents
to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly
an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal
case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his
right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For
by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.
- As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages
may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasidelict or culpa extracontractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law,
while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had
its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in
accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may
proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and
regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule
111 with reference to . . . Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary
to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted . . .
and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what
is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be
regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33
and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in
the proviso."
- But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for
recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one
that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of
the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering
that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement
of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their
right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil
action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of
the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the
offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action,
under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal
justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.
2. YES, because the action in fact satisfies the elements of quasi-delict.
Ratio An action shall be deemed to be based on a quasi-delict when all the
essential averments under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are
present, namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents;
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of
the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the
collision of the bus with the passenger car;
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of
the collision;
d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice
and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties.
Reasoning
- The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic
rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly
negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due
regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract
from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana.
The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to
observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which
failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in
violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same
negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police
with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by
petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in
both complaints would substantially be the same. It should be emphasized
that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability
arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an
action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the
New Civil Code. This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs.
Garcia, et all (73 Phil. 607, 620-621).
- It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Court which became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases
provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action,
may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal
case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it
should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111
fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made.
SEPARATE OPINION
BARREDO [concur]
- Article 2176 and 2177 definitely create a civil liability distinct and different
from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised
Penal Code. Since Civil Case No. 2850 is predicated on the above civil code
articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code, I
cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As to the
specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is my
considered view that the latter provision is inoperative, it being substantive in
character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate,
and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of
its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature
superseding the Rules of 1940.
- Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should be deemed as the
reservation required, there being no showing that prejudice could be caused
by doing so.
- Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the
trial court in order that Civil Case No. 2850 may proceed, subject to the
limitation mentioned in the last sentence of Article 2177 of the Civil Code,
which means that of the two possible judgments, the injured party is
entitled exclusively to the bigger one.
ANDAMO V IAC (Missionaries Of Our Lady Of La Salette,
Inc)
191 SCRA 195
torts & damages
FERNAN; November 6, 1990
NATURE
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
FACTS
- Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a
parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that
of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious
corporation.
- Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances,
including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and
eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners'
crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed
plants and other improvements to destruction.
- In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi,
Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of respondent
corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the
Revised Penal Code.
- On February 22, 1983, petitioners filed a civil case for damages with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent
corporation. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the
land.
- On April 26, 1984, the trial court issued an order suspending further
hearings in the civil case until after judgment in the related Criminal Case.
And later on dismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal
case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved.The
decision was based on Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which
provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the
civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action."
- Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
- On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court affirmed the order of the
trial court. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the
Appellate Court .
ISSUE
WON a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water
conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and
damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the
resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case
HELD
Ratio YES. As held in In Azucena vs. Potenciano, in quasi-delicts, "(t)he
civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles
33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this,
for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the
result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal —
would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and
the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
Reasoning
A2010
prof. casis
-7-
- A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is one
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the
elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the
plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
by the plaintiff.
- The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are
alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an
assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths
and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes
fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
- In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, the Court applied Article 1902, now
Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due
authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication
between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to
a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an
indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
- While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain
and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact
remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have
sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the
complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or
omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or
negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with
no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case
of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
- It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations.
Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make
use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC
UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners
have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own
land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and
interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and
maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to
adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of
nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or
a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage
suffered.
- Article 2176 1 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for
damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence.
- Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
- The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 21772 of the Civil Code.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision
though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we
consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa
extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain ... In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this
Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution
under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasidelicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages
may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil
Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely
irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal
where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose
did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry
with it the extinction of the civil liability.
TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC
16 PHIL 8
CARSON; March 22, 1910
NATURE
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries,
instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative.
FACTS
- The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street
railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. The plaintiff, David
Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years
of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy
of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.
- On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel
Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del
Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine.
Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled
apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which
both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about
the company's premises.
- After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the
defendant's coal, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of
the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its
furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps
scattered on the ground. They are intended for use in the explosion of
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
2
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
1
torts & damages
blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable
explosive power. they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it
was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the
cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion
followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when
the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel
had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by
several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to
such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were
called in to care for his wounds.
- The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came
to be on the defendant's premises, nor how long they had been there when
the boys found them.
- No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to
prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises
unattended, when they felt disposed so to do.
- The trial court's decision, awarding damages to the plaintiff, upon the
provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902,
1903, and 1908 of that code.
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasicontracts, and illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of
fault or negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the
damage so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those
of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who live with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused —
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with
due diligence, and for kindling of explosive substances which may not
have been placed in a safe and proper place.
- Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his
contention that the facts proven at the trial do not established the liability of
the defendant company under the provisions of these articles.
ISSUE
WON the defendants negligence is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries
HELD
NO
- We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the
negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was
not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff.
- We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the
generally accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action
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such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery,
must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some
person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the
damage.
- These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of
discussion, the real difficulty arising in the application of these principles to
the particular facts developed in the case under consideration.
- It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating
caps been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner
had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is
equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own
pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and
strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and
had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which
he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one
of the caps and applied a match to its contents.
- But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and
inexperience, his entry upon defendant company's premises, and the
intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving
the caps exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his
injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident,
which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in
leaving the caps exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff,
and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the
injuries sustained by him.
- In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid
down in many of the courts of last resort in the United States in the cases
known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based
thereon.
- As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein
the principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for in injury
received by an infant while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for
purposes of amusement, if such injury was, under circumstances, attributable
to the negligence of the company), the principles on which these cases turn
are that "while a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in
regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to
passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such
strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and
that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same
rule which governs that of adult. While it is the general rule in regard to an
adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the
fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such
is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution
required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to
be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case."
- The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously
controverted and sharply criticized in several courts. But the doctrine of the
case is controlling in our jurisdiction.
- This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is
contention that a man has a right to do what will with his own property or that
children should be kept under the care of their parents or guardians, so as to
prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in
doubt.
- But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property
without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved
defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without
other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the
defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the
negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was
not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore
was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant,"
and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open
the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause
of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and
that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus
incurred. Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo
cases, that because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action between
the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held to
have contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we can not
agree with this proposition, although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable
and Torpedo cases, that we have thought proper to discuss and to consider
that doctrine at length in this decision.
- In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown
youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy
of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day
as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the
record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take
care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite
his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the
cap with which he was amusing himself.
- True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature
of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of
the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he
incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be
expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly
produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his
maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might
reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be
held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and
understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself
when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the
sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and
appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which
would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and
that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and
immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be
true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence
act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises,
nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the
accident which inflicted the injury.
TAYAG V ALCANTARA
98 SCRA 723
CONCEPCION; July 23, 1980
NATURE
torts & damages
Petition for review on certiorari the order of CFI Tarlac (dismissing petition for
damages)
FACTS
- Pedro Tayag was riding a motorcycle when he was bumped by a Philippine
Rabbit Bus, driven by Romeo Villa, which caused his instantaneous death.
Pending the criminal case against the driver, the heirs of Tayag instituted a
civil action to recover damages from the company (Phil Rabbit Bus Inc) and
the driver. In turn, the company and driver filed a motion to suspend trial of
the civil case on the ground that the criminal case was still pending. Judge
Alcantara granted this motion.
- In the criminal case, the driver as acquitted based on reasonable doubt. The
company and driver then filed for dismissal of the civil case on the ground
that the heirs do not have a cause of action because of the acquittal. Judge
Alcantara granted this and dismissed the civil case.
ISSUE
WON Judge Alcantara correctly dismissed the civil case on the ground of no
cause of action due to the acquittal of the driver
HELD
1. NO
Ratio The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict, the
acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution for
damages based on quasi-delict
Reasoning
- Art. 31, NCC provides: “When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter”
- Evidently, this provision refers to a civil action based on an obligation arising
from quasi-delict. The complaint itself shows that the claim was based on
quasi-delit, viz:
“6. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lino, Inc., has failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees, particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan. Otherwise, the
accident in question which resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and
damage to his property would not have occurred;”
All the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action are present:
(1) act or omission constituting fault /negligence on the part of respondent
(2) damage caused by the said act or omission
(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission and
(4) no preexisting contractual relation between the parties.
Citing Elcano v Hill: a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, WON he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both
scores
DISPOSITION petition granted. Order of CFI Tarlac set aside, case
REMANDED to lower court for further proceedings.
SEPARATE OPINION
AQUINO [concur]
- I concur because petitioners' action for damages is based on article 2177 of
the Civil Code, under which according to the Code Commission, "acquittal
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from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or
not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability from
criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana".
Article 33 of the Civil Code also justifies the petitioners' independent civil
action for damages since the term "physical injuries" therein embraces death
(Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
- Moreover, the acquittal of Romeo Villa was based on reasonable doubt. The
petitioners, as plaintiffs in the civil case, can amend their complaint and base
their action also on article 29 NCC which allows an independent civil action
for damages in case of acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt.
- The requirement in section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court that there should
be a reservation in the criminal cases of the right to institute an independent
civil action is contrary to law.
PEOPLE V LIGON
152 SCRA 419
YAP; July 29, 1987
NATURE
Appeal from the judgment of the RTC Manila
FACTS
- February 17, 1986, RTC convicted Fernando Gabat, of Robbery with
Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua where he robbed and
killed Jose Rosales y Ortiz, a seventeen-year old working student who was
earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was allegedly robbed of his
cigarette box containing cigarettes worth P300.00 more or less. Rogelio
Ligon,the co-accused, was never apprehended and is still at large.
- October 23, 1983 - at about 6:10 p.m. Gabat, was riding in a 1978
Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father and driven by the other accused,
Ligon which was coming from España Street going towards the direction of
Quiapo. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before
turning left towards the underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, they stopped.
While waiting, Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor, Rosales to buy some
cigarettes from him. Rosales approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two
sticks of cigarettes. While this transaction was occurring, the traffic light
changed to green, and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved
forward. As to what precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at
the crucial moment, and immediately thereafter, is the subject of
conflicting versions by the prosecution and the defense. It is not
controverted, however, that as the Kombi continued to speed towards
Quiapo, Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently lost
his grip and fell down on the pavement. Rosales was rushed by some
bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated for
multiple physical injuries and was confined thereat until his death on October
30, 1983.
- Following close behind (about 3 meters) the Kombi at the time of the
incident was a taxicab driven by Castillo. He was traveling on the same lane
in a slightly oblique position. The Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down
on the pavement near the foot of the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped
towards Roxas Boulevard, beeping his horn to make the driver stop. When
they reached the Luneta near the Rizal monument, Castillo saw an ownertype jeep with two persons in it. He sought their assistance in chasing the
Kombi, telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao." The two men in the jeep joined
the chase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo
prof. casis
was able to overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red. He
immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right behind it. The
two men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers, Patrolmen
Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns and told the driver,
Rogelio Ligon, and his companion, Fernando Gabat, to alight from the Kombi.
It was found out that there was a third person inside the Kombi, a certain
Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear seat.
- The three were all brought by the police officers to the Western Police
District and turned over to Pfc. Fermin Payuan. The taxicab driver, Prudencio
Castillo, also went along with them. Payuan also prepared a Traffic Accident
Report, dated October 23, 1983.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias
were released early morning the following day, but Rogelio Ligon was
detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation.
- December 6, 1983 - Investigating Fiscal Cantos, filed an information against
Rogelio Ligon charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.
- October 31, 1983 - an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of
NBI which stated the cause of death of Rosales as "pneumonia hypostatic,
bilateral, secondary to traumatic injuries of the head."
- June 28, 1984 - Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information against
Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide based on a
Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo and a joint affidavit of Armando
Espino and Romeo Castil, cigarette vendors, who allegedly witnessed the
incident . These affidavits were already prepared and merely sworn to before
Fiscal Cantos on January 17, 1984.
- prosecution tried to establish, through the sole testimony of the taxicab
driver that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose
the latter's hand from the window of the Kombi, resulting in the latter falling
down and hitting the pavement.
- The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version, stating that
there can be no doubt that Gabat forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box
from Rosales because, otherwise, there could be no reason for the latter to
run after the Kombi and hang on to its window. The court also believed
Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of
Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi, otherwise, the latter could not have
fallen down, having already been able to balance himself on the stepboard.
- On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of
Gabat that the cigarette vendor placed the cigarette box on the windowsill of
the Kombi, holding it with his left hand, while he was trying to get from his
pocket the change for the 5peso bill of Gabat. The court said that it is of
common knowledge that cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets do
not let go of their cigarette box; no vendor lets go of his precious box of
cigarettes in order to change a peso bill given by a customer.
ISSUE
WON the prosecution’s set of facts should be given credence
HELD
NO
- a careful review of the record shows that certain material facts and
circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into
account, would alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an
element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal.
- While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a disinterested witness with
no motive, according to the court a quo, "other than to see that justice be
done," his testimony, even if not tainted with bias, is not entirely free from
doubt because his observation of the event could have been faulty or
torts & damages
mistaken. The taxicab which Castillo was driving was lower in height
compared to the Kombi in which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted by Castillo
at the trial.
- Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the rear windshield of the
1978 Volkswagon Kombi is on the upper portion, occupying approximately
one-third (1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle, thus making it visually difficult for
Castillo to observe clearly what transpired inside the Kombi at the front end
where Gabat was seated. These are circumstances which must be taken into
consideration in evaluating Castillo's testimony as to what exactly happened
between Gabat and the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment before
the latter fell down. As the taxicab was right behind the Kombi, following it at
a distance of about three meters, Castillo's line of vision was partially
obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. His testimony that he saw Gabat
grab the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand
from the windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable doubt,
specially considering that this occurrence happened in just a matter of
seconds, and both vehicles during that time were moving fast in the traffic.
- Considering the above circumstances, the Court is not convinced with moral
certainty that the guilt of the accused Fernando Gabat has been established
beyond reasonable doubt. In our view, the quantum of proof necessary to
sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as robbery with homicide has
not been met in this case. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable
doubt.
- However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also
free from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution
must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action for damages.
- Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or
omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:
"The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases
him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal
system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice,
where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as
to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the
civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not
proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
"This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate
and distinct from each other, One affects the social order and the other,
private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while
the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The
two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the
present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon
the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of
the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that,
for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense
should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved
beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private
right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also
punishable by the criminal law?
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- 10 -
DISPOSITION Appellant acquitted for the crime of robbery and homicide, but
sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz.
282 SCRA 188
FRANCISCO; 1997
PADILLA V CA (Vergara)
129 SCRA 558
GUTIERREZ; [date]
NATURE
Civil action for damages in a medical malpractice suit.
NATURE
Petition of rcertiorari to revies the decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- Petitioners, on or about February 8, 1964, went to the public market to
execute an alleged order of the Mayor to clear the public market of stalls
which were considered as nuisance per se. The stall of one Antonio Vergara
was demolished pursuant to this order. In the process however the stock in
trade and certain furniture of Vergara were lost and destroyed.
- The petitioners were found guilty of grave coercion after trial at the CFI and
were sentenced to five months and one day imprisonment and ordered to pay
fines.
- On appeal, the CA reversed the findings of the CFI and acquitted the
appellants based on reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered them to pay
P9,600.00 as actual damages. The decision of the CA was based on the fact
that the petitioners were charged with coercion when they should have been
more appropriately charged with crime against person. Hence, the crime of
grave coercion was not proved in accordance with the law.
- The petitioner filed the appeal to the SC questioning the grant of actual
damages despite a no guilty verdict.
ISSUE
WON the CA committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay
civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal
charge
HELD
NO
- The SC, quoting Section 3 (C) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and various
jurisprudence including PNB vs Catipon, De Guzman vs Alvia, held that
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that
the facts from which the civil action might arise did not exist. In the case at
bar, the judgment of not guilty was based on reasonable doubt. Since the
standard of proof to be used in civil cases is preponderance of evidence, the
court express a finding that the defendants’ offenses are civil in nature.
- The Court also tackled the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code to clarify
whether a separate civil action is required when the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. The SC took the position that the said provision
merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an
acquittal for the same criminal act. The acquittal extinguishes the criminal
liability but not the civil liability particularly if the finding is not guilty based on
reasonable ground.
CRUZ V CA (UMALI)
FACTS
- Rowena Umali De Ocampo accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help
Clinic and General Hospital. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by
the petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a
hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991.
- Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991
as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and
the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant
for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with. Because of the untidy state of
the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the
operation.
- The following day, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be
postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a
conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that
she must be operated on as scheduled.
- Rowena and her other relatives waited outside the operating room while
Lydia underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of
the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which
Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one hour had passed when Dr.
Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They
bought type "A" blood and the same was brought by the attendant into the
operating room.
- After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the
operation was finished. The operating staff then went inside the petitioner's
clinic to take their snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of
the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the
other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not
able to comply with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood
available in the blood bank.
- Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to
Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen
tank, gasping for breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and
Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the
San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of
oxygen as soon as it arrived.
- At around 10pm, she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to
60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo
District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further
examined. The transfer to the San Pablo City District Hospital was without the
prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out
about the intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to
the San Pablo District Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded
a tricycle and followed the ambulance.
- Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into
the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her
because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. The attending
physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and
Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. However, when
torts & damages
Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her
blood pressure was already 0/0. While petitioner was closing the abdominal
wall, the patient died. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate
cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the
antecedent cause.
ISSUE
WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction
against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide
HELD
NO
- The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails
to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that
it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless
imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree
of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
- WON has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of
his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by
other members of the profession in good standing under similar
circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the
time of treatment or the present state of medical science.
- For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of
skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a
matter of expert opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of
qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual
technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently
evaluating. Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the
circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct falling
below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing
when performing the same operation. It must be remembered that when the
qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an
inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary
precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his
clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established. This presumption is
rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench.
- Even without expert testimony, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in
the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of
these circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the
fourth element of reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or
property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence.
- In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of
negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon
as well as a casual connection of such breach and the resulting death of his
patient.
PHIL. RABBIT V PEOPLE
[citation]
PANGANIBAN; April 14, 2004
A2010
- 11 -
NATURE
Petition for Review
FACTS
- Napoleon Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and
damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years, 9
months and 11 days to 6 years, and to pay damages. But in the event the
the accused becoems insolvent, Phil. Rabbit will be held liable for the civil
liabilities. But admittedly, the accused jumped bail and remained at large.
ISSUE
WON an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accusedemployee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the
accused
HELD
NO
- The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily
submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days
from notice of the judgment against them. While at large, they cannot seek
relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal. In the
case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender
to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and
executory.
- After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the
winning party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within
the prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of the case.
- In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it
participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that
the employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to
appeal, but it was not denied its day in court. In fact, it can be said that by
jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the
right to appeal.
- On Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment:
- Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily
liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the
latter’s insolvency.
- To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would
enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal
conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result in
improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
- The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil
liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot
be separated from that of the employee.
DISPOSITION Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO
38 Phil 768
FISHER; October 14, 1918
prof. casis
NATURE
An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance disallowing the claim
of the plaintiff for P1,000 against the estate of the deceased James P.
McElroy.
FACTS
- Jose Cangco, was employed by Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He
lived in San Mateo, Rizal, located upon the line of the defendant railroad
company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of
Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which
entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge.
- January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily
labors; and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo the plaintiff while
making his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the
coach.
- On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station
there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient
some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of
said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As
the train slowed down another passenger, Emilio Zuniga, also an employee
of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point
where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When Jose
Cangco stepped off, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of
watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell
violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was
drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and
lacerated. After the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward
possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
- The accident occurred on a dark night, and the train station was lit dimly by
a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the
accident occurred were difficult to discern, especially to a person emerging
from a lighted car.
- The sack of melons on the platform is because it was the customary season
for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station
for shipment to the market. This row of sacks was so placed that there was a
space of only about two feet between the sacks of melons and the edge of
the platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that
his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon
the platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness
is readily to be credited.
- The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and
with serious injuries. He was immediately brought to a hospital where an
examination was made and his arm was amputated. The plaintiff was then
carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the
member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. Expenses
reached the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for
other expenses in connection with the process of his curation.
- August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the CFI Manilato recover
damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence
of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of
melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace
to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the
hearing in the CFI, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above
stated, and although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason
of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers
torts & damages
passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to
use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from
recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant
company, and the plaintiff appealed.
ISSUE
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
HELD
NO
Ratio In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing
such act - that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly
- the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances
necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered.
Reasoning
- The employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling
these sacks on the platform. Their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he
alighted from the train; and that they constituted an effective legal cause of
the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It follows that the defendant company is
liable for the damage unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own
contributory negligence.
- The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has
suffered arises from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of
defendant to exercise due care in its performance.
- Its liability is direct and immediate, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil
Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their
selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to
obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations
- In commenting upon article 1093, Manresa clearly points out the difference
between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the
source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal
tie" and culpa considered as an "accident in the performance of an obligation
already existing . . .."
- In the Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. the court was made to rest
squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 is not applicable to acts of
negligence which constitute the breach of a contract.
- Under the Spanish law, in cases imposed upon employers with respect to
damages due to the negligence of their employees to persons to whom they
are not bound by contract, such is not based upon the principle of respondent
superior - but upon the principle announced in article 1902 which imposes
upon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the
obligation of making good the damage caused.
- The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a
voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence
or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all
possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the
qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is
his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby
performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties,
and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his
servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third persons
suffer damage. Article 1903 presumes negligence, but that presumption is
refutable.
- In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, an action is brought upon the theory of the
extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage caused
A2010
prof. casis
- 12 -
by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his
employment The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the
Civil Code, said: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection
of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or
both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and
consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer
shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption
is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
- Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual.
Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those
mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon its members, or which
arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of
society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal
rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding
legal duties, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other
members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful
intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, gives rise to an obligation
to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between
obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon
the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or
negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in
contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the
voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual
relation.
- The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting
that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the
platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of
approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the
injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to
wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the
doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case, if the
accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed
upon defendant, whereas if the accident was caused by defendant's
negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the
damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if
defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
- The Court is of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is
that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence:
"The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of
negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of
ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily
prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have
acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the
evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should
be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary
prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury."
- In considering the probability of contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform
was constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the
surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where
the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus
reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The cement
platform also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to
alight. The plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood,
and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet
moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. The
place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to get on
and off the train at this station. There could be no uncertainty in his mind with
regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the
character of the platform where he was alighting. It is the Court’s conclusion
that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet
slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he
was not guilty of contributory negligence.
DISPOSITION The decision of the lower court is reversed, and judgment is
hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both
instances.
SEPARATE OPINION
MALCOLM, [dissent]
- With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of full accord, namely, "It
may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop
before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have
occurred." With the general rule relative to a passenger's contributory
negligence, we are likewise in full accord, namely, "An attempt to alight from
a moving train is negligence per se." Adding these two points together, we
have the logical result - the Manila Railroad Co. should be absolved from the
complaint, and judgment affirmed.
FORES V MIRANDA
[citation]
REYES, J.B.L.; March 4, 1959
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio
Luga. While the vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an
excessive rate of speed, the driver lost control thereof, causing it to swerve
and to hit the bridge wall. The accident occurred on the morning of March 22,
1953. Five of the passengers were injured, including the respondent who
suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. He was taken to the National
Orthopedic Hospital for treatment, and later was subjected to a series of
operations; the first on May 23, 1953, when wire loops were wound around
the broken bones and screwed into place; a second, effected to insert a metal
splint, and a third one to remove such splint. At the time of the trial, it appears
that respondent had not yet recovered the use of his right arm.
- The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced
accordingly.
ISSUE
WON the defendant is entitled to moral damages
HELD
NO.
torts & damages
Ratio Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on
a breach of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of
the new Civil Code, which provide as follows:
"ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
xxx
xxx
xxx
ART. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding
moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstance, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith."
Reasoning
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of
bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is
essential to justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the
description term "analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only because Art.
2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused by contractual
breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Act. 2176 of the Code
expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisting contractual
relation between the parties."
"ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission caused damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pro-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter."
- In sum the rule is:
Delict (breach of contract)
Gen. Rule: no moral damages
- Reason: the advantageous position of a party suing a carrier for breach of
the contract of transportation explains, to some extent, the limitation imposed
by the new Code on the amount of the recovery. The action for breach of
contract imposes on the defendant carrier a presumption of liability upon
mere proof of injury to the passenger; that latter is relieved from the duty to
establish the fault of the carrier, or of his employees, and the burden is
placed on the carrier to prove the it was due to an unforeseen event or to
force majeure (Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768 777). Moreover,
the carrier, unlike in suits for quasi-delict, may not escape liability by proving
that it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees
- Exception: with moral damages if:
 defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith
 result in the death of a passenger in which case Article 1764 makes the
common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that entitles
the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger
to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death
of the deceased"
- The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as well as the codal
concept of quasi-delict as essentially extra contractual negligence, compel us
to differentiate between action ex contractu, and actions quasi ex delicto, and
prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously
embodying an action on tort.
DISPOSITION The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by
eliminating the award of P5.000.00 by way of moral damages
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prof. casis
- 13 -
M.H. RAKES V THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC
COMPANY
7 Phil 359
TRACEY; January 23, 1907
NATURE
Action for damages
FACTS
- the plaintiff, Rakes, one of a group of 8 African-American laborers in the
employment of defendant, Atlantic, was at work transporting iron rails from
the harbor in Manila. The men were hauling the rails on 2 hand cars, some
behind or at it sides and some pulling the cars in the front by a rope. At one
point, the track sagged, the tie broke, the car canted and the rails slid off and
caught the plaintiff who was walking by the car’s side, breaking his leg, which
was later amputated at the knee.
- the plaintiff’s witness alleged that a noticeable depression in the track had
appeared after a typhoon. This was reported to the foreman, Mckenna, but it
had not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or had any proper
system of inspection. Also, there were no side guards on the cars to keep the
rails from slipping off.
- However, the company’s officers and 3 of the workers testified that there
was a general prohibition frequently made known to all against walking by the
side of cars. As Rakes was walking along the car’s side when the accident
occurred, he was found to have contributed in some degree to the injury
inflicted, although not as the primary cause.
- Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through negligence lies only in a
criminal action against the official directly responsible and that the employer
be held only subsidiarily liable.
ISSUES
1. WON Atlantic is only subsidiarily liable
2. WON there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner and if so,
WON it bars him from recovery
HELD
1. NO
- By virtue of culpa contractual, Atlantic may be held primarily liable as it
failed in its duty to provide safe appliances for the use of its employees.
Petitioner need not file charges with the foreman to claim damages from
Atlantic; a criminal action is not a requisite for the enforcement of a civil
action.
2. YES
- Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite a prohibition to do so
by the foreman. However, the contributory negligence of the party injured will
not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise
of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the
injured party's negligence. Petitioner’s negligence contributed only to his own
injury and not to the principal occurrence—it was merely an element to the
damage caused upon him. Had it been otherwise, “…parties being mutually
in fault, there can be no appointment of damages. The law has no scales to
determine in such cases whose wrongdoing weighed most in the compound
that occasioned the mischief” (Railroad v Norton). In this case, petitioner may
recover from the defendant, less a sum deemed suitable equivalent for his
own imprudence.
- Damages are awarded to petitioner at Php5,000, deducting Php 2,500, the
amount fairly attributable to his own negligence.
SEPARATE OPINION
WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent]
-the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient to cause the
accident—it also required the negligence of the plaintiff. Because of this,
plaintiff should not be afforded relief
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V CA
241 SCRA 671
VITUG; February 23, 1995
NATURE
Petition for review
FACTS
- In October 1986, Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a
FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company
("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a
supplemental card to Clarita S. Luna.
- In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was forthwith informed.
In order to replace the lost card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In
cases of this nature, the bank's internal security procedures and policy would
appear to be- to meanwhile so record the lost card, along with the principal
card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.
- On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend, a
Fil-Am, and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel
Intercon Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to
the attending waiter who promptly had it verified through a telephone call to
the bank's Credit Card Department. Since the card was not honored, Luis
was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt
embarrassed by this incident.
- In a letter, dated 11 Oct. 1988, Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from
FEBTC the payment of damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a VP of the bank,
expressed the bank's apologies to Luis in his letter which stated that: In cases
when a card is reported to our office as lost, FAREASTCARD undertakes the
necessary action to avert its unauthorized use to protect its cardholders.
However, it failed to inform him about its security policy. Furthermore, an
overzealous employee of the Bank's Credit Card Department did not consider
the possibility that it may have been him who was presenting the card at that
time (for which reason, the unfortunate incident occurred).
- Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to
assure the latter that Luis was a "very valued clients" of FEBTC. William
Anthony King, F&B Manager of the Intercon, wrote back to say that the
credibility of Luis had never been "in question." A copy of this reply was sent
to Luis by Festejo.
- Still evidently feeling aggrieved, Luis filed a complaint for damages with the
RTC of Pasig against FEBTC.
- On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig ordered FEBTC to pay private
respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary
damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
torts & damages
- On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision
of the trial court.Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition for review.
ISSUE
WON the petitioner is entitled to moral and exemplary damages
HELD
NO
- In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the
defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of
the contract. The Civil Code provides:
- Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
- Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence.
Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in
case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed ) of
the common carrier.
- Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform
Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing in the findings of the trial court
and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate
intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. Neither
could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be
considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith.
- Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a
wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the
negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.
- Article 21 states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
- Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed, contemplates a conscious act
to cause harm. Thus, even if we are to assume that the provision could
properly relate to a breach of contract, its application can be warranted only
when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate
as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud
or bad faith. Most importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general
principle in human relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the
specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of
moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or
bad faith.
- Fores vs. Miranda explained with great clarity the predominance that we
should give to Article 2220 in contractual relations; we quote:
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same
must be discarded. We have repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not
recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of
transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which
provide as follows:
- Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
xxx xxx xxx
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prof. casis
- 14 -
- Art. 2220. Wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
- By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes
apparent that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad
faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is
essential to justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the
descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only because Art.
2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused contractual
breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code
expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisitng contractual
relations between the parties."
- Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a
mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in which case Article 1764
makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that
entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger
to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased. But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident
that where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not
recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad
faith. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver
does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the
part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such
malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To
award moral damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad
faith or malice on the part of the defendant, as required by Art. 2220, would
be to violate the clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted
judicial legislation.
xxx xxx xxx
- The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate
or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too
fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-1172); their consequences
being clearly differentiated by the Code.
- Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the
obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties
have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation
was constituted.
- In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation.
- It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary,
that this difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when in Art. 2220 they
limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. It is
true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice;
but the fact must be shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is not to be
lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through
negligence of the carrier's employees.
- The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict
can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the
application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing
contract between the plaintiff and the defendant This doctrine, unfortunately,
cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where
the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort
independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be
deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where,
without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can
nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are
contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to
the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on
their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission
complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action
or as an independent actionable tort.
- Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to serve as an
example or as correction for the public good in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, Civil Code. In criminal
offenses, exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code). In quasidelicts, such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to have been so
guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice. In contracts and quasicontracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is found
to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner (Art. 2232, Civil Code).
- Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here obtaining, it
would also be just as arduous to sustain the exemplary damages granted by
the courts below.
- Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to honor its
credit card issued to private respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a
measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code
providing thusly:
- Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him.
- Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court deems such
recovery to be just and equitable (Art. 2208, Civil Code). We see no issue of
sound discretion on the part of the appellate court in allowing the award
thereof by the trial court.
DISPOSITION The appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the award of
moral and exemplary damages to private respondents; in its stead, petitioner
is ordered to pay private respondent Luis A. Luna an amount of P5,000.00 by
way of nominal damages. In all other respects, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED.
AIR FRANCE V CA (Carrascoso, Et. Al)
18 SCRA 155
SANCHEZ; September 28, 1966
NATURE
PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
torts & damages
- Carrascoso, a civil engineer, left Manila for Lourdes w/ 48 other Filipino
pilgrims. Air France, through PAL, issued plaintiff a “first class” round trip
airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso
traveled in “first class” but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline
forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because,
in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man',
who, the Manager alleged, had a 'better right' to the seat. When asked to
vacate his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused,
and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his
dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento,
many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they
found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white
man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr.
Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white man; and plaintiff reluctantly gave his
'first class' seat in the plane."
- both TC and CA decided in favor of Carrascoso
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the CA failed to make a complete findings of fact on all the issues
properly laid before it, and if such, WON the Court could review the questions
of fact
Substantive
2. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the “first class” seat he claims, as proved
by written documents (tickets…)
3. WON Carrascoso was entitled to moral damages, when his action is
planted upon breach of contract and thus, there must be an averment of fraud
or bad faith which the CA allegedly failed to find
4. WON moral damages could be recovered from Air France, granted that
their employee was accused of the tortuous act
5. WON damages are proper in a breach contract
6. WON the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso regarding the account made
by the air-carrier’s purser is admissible in evidence as hearsay
7. WON Carrascoso was entitled to exemplary damages
8. WON Carrascoso was entitled to attorney’s fees
9. WON the amounts awarded to Carrascoso was excessive
HELD
1. NO, NO
Ratio A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not
confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals,
contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it. is no error for said
court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the
evidence for the defense"."The mere failure to specify (in the decision) the
contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is
not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions
of law and the Constitution"; "only questions of law may be raised" in an
appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Obiter.
- Constitution mandates that a judgment determining the merits of the
case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based" and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain
complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before".xxx The
law, however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts"
upon which the court's conclusion is drawn.
A2010
- 15 -
prof. casis
- FINDINGS OF FACT: "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found
by the court and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered
thereon".16 They consist of the court's "conclusions with respect to the
determinative facts in issue"
- QUESTION OF LAW: one which does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties
2. YES, the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any
reservation whatever.
Ratio .A written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word
could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations
between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is
desirable.
Reasoning
- Petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete
intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not
have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he
had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class
ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such
would depend upon the availability of first class seats. However, CA held that
Air France should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored
or not. The trial court also accepted as evidence the written documents
submitted by Carrasco and even the testimony of the air-carrier’s employees
attested that indeed, Carrasco was issued a “first class ticket”.
- If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first
class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is
therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands
of an airline.
-Also, when Carrascoso was asked to confirm his seat in Bangkok, he was
granted the “first class” seat. If there had been no seat, and if the “white man”
had a better right to the seat, then why did they confirm Carrasco his seat?
3. YES
Ratio. It is (therefore) unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is
sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages.
Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An
amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required.
faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes
4. YES
- The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need
not. be essayed. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager,
petitioner, his employer, must answer.
5. YES
- Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso, is one attended with public duty. The
stress of Carrascoso's. action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful
expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier-a case
of quasi-delict. Damages are proper. (note: it was held that it was a case of
quasi-delict even though it was a breach of contract)
Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and
degree from any other contractual relation.43 And is, because of the relation
which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the
travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and I advantages it
offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended
with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Reasoning
- Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to
be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal
misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees.
So it is, that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees
towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the
carrier.
6. YES, if forms part of the res gestae
Ratio. Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of the
best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible.
- also…From a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue
happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued
to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this
environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. For, they grow "out of
the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant".
Reasoning
- There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering,
amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, said contract was
breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and Third, there was bad faith when petitioner's employee
compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he
was already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which
he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby
causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
- Air France did not present evidence that the “white man” made a prior
reservation, nor proved that the “white man” had “better right” over the seat;
also, if the manager’s actions could be justified, they should have presented
the manager to testify in court – but they did not do so
- The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first
class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from
his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class
compartment-just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has
not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith
has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad
Reasoning
- Carrascoso testified that the purser of the air-carrier made an entry in his
notebooks reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class
against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene". The petitioner
contents that it should not be admitted as evidence, as it was only hearsay.
However, the subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Also,
the said entry was made outside the Philippines and by an employee of
petitioner. It would have been easy for Air France to contradict Carrascoso’s
testimony if they had presented the purser.
7. YES
Ratio The Civil Code gives the Court ample power to grant exemplary
damages-in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition is that
defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive,
or malevolent manner".
Reasoning
- The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat
fits into this legal precept
8. YES
torts & damages
Ratio. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar Judgment for
attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is
but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given.\
9. NO
Ratio. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. The
dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because,
the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.
DISPOSITION On balance, we, say that the judgment of the Court of
Appeals does not suffer from 'reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm
the same. Costs against petitioner.
PSBA V CA
[citation]
PADILLA; February 4, 1992
NATURE
Petition to review the decision of Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- A stabbing incident on August 30, 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos
Bautista on the premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration
(PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Manila RTC.
It was established that his assailants were not members of the school’s
academic community but were outsiders.
- The suit impleaded PSBA, its President, VP, Treasure, Chief of Security and
Assistant Chief of Security. It sought to adjudge them liable for the victim’s
death due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions.
- Defendants (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed alleging that
since they are presumably sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the
complaint states no cause of action against them since academic institutions,
like PSBA, are beyond the ambit of that rule.
- Respondent Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. And the MFR was
similarly dealt with. Petitioners the assailed the trial court’s dispositions
before the respondent appellate court which affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
ISSUE
WON respondent court is correct in denying dismissal of the case
HELD
Ratio Although a school may not be liable under Art. 2180 on quasi-delicts, it
may still be liable under the law on contracts.
Reasoning
- The case should be tried on its merits. But respondent court’s premise is
incorrect. It is expressly mentioned in Art. 2180 that the liability arises from
acts done by pupils or students of the institution. In this sense, PSBA is not
liable. But when an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, the
school makes itself responsible in providing their students with an
atmosphere that is conducive for learning. Certainly, no student can absorb
the intricacies of physics or explore the realm of arts when bullets are flying
or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and
limb.
A2010
DISPOSITION the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent wit
this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
SYQUIA V CA (Mla Memorial Park)
217 SCRA 624
CAMPOS, JR.; January 27, 1993
NATURE
Petition for review of CA decision dismissing Syquia family’s complaint for
damages against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (Mla Memorial)
FACTS
- Juan SYQUIA, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia, authorized and
instructed the defendant to inter the remains of deceased.
- After about a month, preparatory to transferring the remains to a newly
purchased family plot also at the same cemetery, the concrete vault encasing
the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche underground. As the
concrete vault was being raised to the surface, the Syquias discovered that
the vault had a hole approx 3 in. in diameter near the bottom and it appeared
that water drained out of the hole.
- Pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal Court of Parañaque, they
caused the opening of the concrete vault and discovered that:
(a) the interior walls showed evidence of total flooding;
(b) coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth and silt causing the wooden
parts to separate and to crack the viewing glass panel located directly above
the head and torso of the deceased;
(c) entire lining of coffin, clothing of the deceased, and the exposed parts of
the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled.
- SYQUIAS base their claim for damages against Mla Memorial on either: (1)
breach of its obligation to deliver a defect-free concrete vault;
(2) gross negligence in failing to seal the concrete vault (Art. 2176)
- Whatever kind of negligence it has committed, MLA MEMORIAL is deemed
to be liable for desecrating the grave of the dead.
Trial Court’s Ruling
- Contract between the parties did not guarantee that the cement vault would
be waterproof.
- No quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or
negligence, and because there was a pre-existing contractual relation
between the Syquias and Mla Memorial.
- The father himself, Juan Syquia, chose the gravesite despite knowing that
said area had to be constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass green
and that water would eventually seep through the vault.
- The act of boring a hole in the vault was necessary so as to prevent the
vault from floating away.
- CA affirmed judgment of dismissal; MFR was also denied.
ISSUES
1. WON Mla Memorial breached its contract with petitioners,
or alternatively
2. WON it can be liable for culpa aquiliana
HELD
1. NO
prof. casis
- 16 -
Ratio Parties are bound by the terms of their contract, which is the law
between them. A contracting party cannot incur a liability more than what is
expressly specified in his undertaking. It cannot be extended by implication,
beyond the terms of the contract. (RCBC v CA)
Reasoning
- They entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of
Perpetual Care." Mla Memorial bound itself to provide the concrete box to be
sent in the interment.
- Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of MLA MEMORIAL provides that:
“Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an
outer wall of stone, brick or concrete, the actual installment of which shall be
made by the employees of the Association.” Pursuant to this, a concrete vault
was installed and after the burial, the vault was covered by a cement lid.
- Syquias claim that there was a breach of contract because it was stated in
the brochures that “lot may hold single or double internment underground in
sealed concrete vault."
- "Sealed" meant "closed." Standard dictionaries define seal as any of various
closures or fastenings that cannot be opened without rupture and that serve
as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening.
- "Sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". When the terms of the
contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting
parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control.
2. NO
Ratio Negligence is defined by law as the "omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." In the absence of
stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be
observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a
good father of a family.
Reasoning
- Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not
preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, circumstances of the case do not
show negligence. The reason for the boring of the hole was explained by
Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who said that: “When the vault was placed
on the grave a hole was placed on the vault so that water could come into the
vault because it was raining heavily then because the vault has no hole the
vault will float and the grave would be filled with water.”
- Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have
resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave. Finding no evidence of
negligence, there is no reason to award damages.
Dispositive CA decision affirmed in toto.
NEGLIGENCE
PICART V SMITH
[citation]
STREET; March 15, 1918
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union
FACTS
torts & damages
- On December 12, 1912, plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan
Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union.
- Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the
opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve
miles per hour.
- As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the plaintiff and blew his horn to
give warning of his approach.
- He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge, he gave two
more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback
before him was not observing the rule of the road.
- The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
- However, given the novelty of the apparition and the rapidity of the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of
the bridge instead of going to the left.
- He did this because he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to
the other side.
- As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine.
- In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the
other side.
- The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for
the automobile to stop.
- Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering
to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to
approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.
- When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse
getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing
where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such
close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body
across the bridge with its head toward the railing.
- In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the
car and the limb was broken.
- The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
- As a result of its injuries the horse died.
- The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness
and required medical attention for several days.
- CFI absolved defendant from liability
- Hence, the appeal
ISSUE
WON the defendant, in maneuvering his car in the manner above described,
was guilty of negligence that would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done
HELD
YES
- As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that
the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved
toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this
would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too
late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle.
- In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile
was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was no longer within
the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of
greater safety.
A2010
- The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it
was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there
were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass
sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
- The defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was,
the court thinks, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet
exhibited fright.
- But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk
that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might
get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him.
- When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger, he
was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
- The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence.
- The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the
imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.
- The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference
to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
- The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a
given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human
experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Could a
prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result
of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
- Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of
negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a
prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that
an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
- Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case,
negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the
defendant, would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing
was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse
and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against
the threatened harm.
- The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. It will be noted
however, that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other
party.
DISPOSITION Appealed decision is reversed.
TAYLOR V MANILA RAILROAD
prof. casis
- 17 [citation]
CARSON; March 22, 1910
NATURE
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries,
instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative.
FACTS
- The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street
railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is
situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city
of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be reached
by boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly
end of the island.
- The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the same time when he received the
injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer,
more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable
aptitude and training in mechanics.
- On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel
Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge of the Isla del
Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who had promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine.
Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled
apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which
both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about
the company's premises. The visit made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does
not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house
where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.
- After watching the operation of the traveling crane used in handling the
defendant's coal, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of
the place where the company dumped the cinders and ashes from its
furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps
scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and
appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long
thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity.
They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite,
and have in themselves considerable explosive power. After some discussion
as to the ownership of caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up
all they could find, hung them of a stick, of which each took one end, and
carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named
Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the
boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They
thrust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no
result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked
for a hammer, but could not find one. They then opened one of the caps with
a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got
matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the
contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all
three. Jessie, who, when the boys proposed purring a match to the contents
of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut
in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was
struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which
injured his right eye to such an extent as to necessitate its removal by the
surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
torts & damages
- The Defendant Company’s defense that the caps were under the duty of
independent contractors deserves scant consideration since these workers
have been under the supervision of one of the company’s foremen.
- Plaintiff Taylor appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his
decision in plaintiff's favor, upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil
Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that Code.
- "ART. 1089.
Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by
quasi—contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any
kind of fault or negligence occurs."
- "ART. 1902.
Any person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair
the damage so done.
- "ART. 1903.
The obligation imposed by the preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omission, but also for those of
the persons for whom they should be responsible.
- "The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who alive with them.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprises are equally liable for
the damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to avoid the damage."
- "ART. 1908.The owners shall be also be liable for the damages caused —
"1.
By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for
with due diligence, and for kindling of explosive substance which may not
have been placed in a safe and proper place."
- In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relied on the doctrine laid
down in many of the courts of last result in the United States in the cases
known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based
thereon.In the typical cases, the question involved has been whether a
railroad company is liable for an injury received by an infant of tender years,
who from mere idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, enters upon the
railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad company's
premises, at a place where the railroad company knew, or had a good reason
to suppose, children who would likely to come, and there found explosive
signal torpedoes left exposed by the railroad company's employees, one of
which when carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or where
such infant found upon the premises a dangerous machine, such as a
turntable left in such condition as to make it probable that children in playing
with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant
did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine.
In these, and in a great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority
holds the owner of the premises liable.
- As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout ( 17 Wall. (84 U.S.), 657), (wherein
the principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for an injury
received by an infant while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for
purposed of amusement, if such injury was, under the circumstances,
attributable to the negligence of the company), the principles on which these
cases turn are that "while railroad company is not bound to the same degree
of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that
it owes to passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to
such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts;"
and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the
A2010
- 18 -
same rule which governs that of an adult. While it is the general rule in regard
to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from
the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault,
such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and
caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and
this is to be determined in such case by the circumstances of the case."
- The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously
controverted and sharply criticized in severally state courts, saying that (1)
That the owner of land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries
sustained by them, not due to his wanton or willful acts; (2) that no exception
to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery
naturally calculated to attract them to the premises; (3) that an invitation of
license to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on the mere
fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice; (4) that
there is no difference between children and adults of an invitation or a license
to enter upon another's premises. However, after an exhaustive and critical
analysis and review of may of the adjudged cases, both English and America,
formally declared that it adhered "to the principles announced in the case of
Railroad Co. vs. Stout." Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the
supreme court of Michigan, in the case of Powers vs. Marlow, said that:
“Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts
and impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution
toward them must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If
they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be
tempting to them, and which they in their immature judgment might naturally
suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that
liberty to be taken."
- The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are
exposed, or upon which the public are expressively or impliedly permitted to
enter to or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely
to roam about for pastime and in play, "must calculate upon this, and take
precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be
heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without
his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty
or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to
prevent the child form entering premises at a place where he knows or ought
to know that children are accustomed to roam about or to which their childish
instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an
implied license to enter, and where the child does not enter under such
conditions the owner's failure to make reasonable precaution to guard the
child against the injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such
premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, a negligent omission, for
which he may and should be held responsible, if the child is actually injured,
without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a
stranger without his express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would
be expose to all the children in the community to unknown perils and
unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or occupants of land upon
which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter.
ISSUE
1. WON the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries,
making the company liable
HELD
1. NO
prof. casis
- Just because the kids trespassed doesn’t mean that the company is not
liable for anything bad that might happen to them. However, we also have to
look at the proximate cause and the maturity of the plaintiff if it was his
negligence that contributed to the principal occurrence of the tragedy. In the
case at bar, the Court said that it is of the opinion that under all the
circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury
received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking,
"attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we
are satisfied that plaintiff's action in cutting open the detonating cap and
putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and
of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant,
therefore, is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. "While it is
the general rule in regard to an adult that entitle him to recover damages for
an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself
have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender
years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity
and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the
circumstance of the case."
- As regards the maturity of the child, this has to be examined on a case-tocase basis. In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was well—
grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the
average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn
P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was
incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well
qualified to take care. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that,
despite his denials on the witness stands, he well knew the explosive
character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of
experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as
described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His
attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to
explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors
brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show
clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable
doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous,
in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was with him at the
time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened
and ran away.
- We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate
cause of the explosion , the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was
his own act of putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having
"contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he
can not recover."
DISPOSITION The petition is DISMISSED.
JARCO MARKETING CORP V CA (AGUILAR)
DAVIDE; December 21, 1999
FACTS
- Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel's Department
Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo
are the store's branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor,
respectively. Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth
Aguilar.
torts & damages
- On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2 nd flr or Syvel’s Dept.
Store. Criselda momentarily let go of her daughter’s hand to sign her credit
card slip at the payment and verification counter. She suddenly felt a gust of
wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and saw her daughter on
the floor, pinned by the gift-wrapping counter. Zhieneth was crying and
screaming for help. Criselda was able to ask people to help her and bring her
daughter to the hospital.
- She was operated on immediately at the hospital. Gonzales, a former
employee of Syvel’s Dept Store who helped bring Zhieneth to the hospital,
heard her tell the doctor that she “nothing. I did not come near the counter
and the counter just fell on me,” when asked “what did you do?” She died 14
days later, on the hospital bed. She was 6 years old. The cause of her death
was attributed to the injuries she sustained.
- After the burial of their daughter, the Aguilars demanded from the petitioners
the reimbursement of hospital and medical bills, and wake and funeral
expenses. Petitioners refused to pay. So the Aguilars filed a complaint for
damages wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86 for actual
damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney's fees and an
unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages.
- RTC – for Jarco Marketing Corp, et al. RTC mfr – for the Aguilars. CA and
CA mfr – for the Aguilars.
- Jarco Mktg Corp, et al’s side:
Criselda was negligent in taking care of
her daughter for allowing her to roam freely. Zhieneth was guilty of
contributory negligence because she tried to climb the counter. The counter
was made of sturdy wood with a strong base and was used without incident
for the past 15 years. It was deliberately placed at a corner to avoid such
accidents. The testimony of two former employees, Gonzales and Guevarra,
should not be believed because he might have ill feelings towards petitioners.
The testimony of the present employees (that Zhieneth climbed the counter
so it fell) should instead be believed.
- The Aguilars’ side:
While in the dept store, Criselda never let go of her
daughter except to sign the credit card slip. Gonzales testified that the gift
wrapping counter was right beside the verification counter where Criselda
was signing. Both Gonzales and Guevarra testified to the structural instability
and shakiness of the counter which is in the shape of and inverted “L,” with a
base smaller than the top. The protruding part of the counter was at the
costumer side. They both had informed management (while they were still
working there) that the counter should be nailed to the floor. The
management did nothing.
ISSUE
1. WON the incident is accident or attributable to negligence
2. If negligence, who was negligent?
HELD
1. NEGLIGENCE.
- An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence
attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or
happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening
wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens."
- On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the failure to
observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of
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prof. casis
- 19 -
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury."
- Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with
the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary
care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have
been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.
- The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the
landmark case of Picart v. Smith, thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.
- Gonzales’ testimony about what Zhieneth said to the doctor should be
accepted because at the time she said it, she was in so much pain and she
answered right away. This means she wasn’t making it up. It is axiomatic that
matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a
physician are generally considered declarations and admissions. All that is
required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made
or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the
time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who
testified in court. Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for
ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a
doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to
Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that
facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or
omission to secure or make stable the counter's base.
2. JARCO MKTG, ET AL.
- Petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of
the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete
action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees
and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done.
Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge
the due diligence required of a good father of a family.
No contributory negligence from Zhieneth
- The conclusive presumption favors children below nine (9) years old in that
they are incapable of contributory negligence. In our jurisdiction, a person
under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without
discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same
presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a
person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he
has acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasidelict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or
civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to
be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment
or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen
years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a
child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of
contributory negligence as a matter of law. (Sangco)
- Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that
she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept
petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the
truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The
physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals
and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal that it was not durable after
all. Shaped like an-inverted "L" the counter was heavy, huge, and its top
laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its
base was not secured.
No contributory negligence from Criselda
- CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence.
Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand.
CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she
signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and
usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at time ZHIENETH was
pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and
the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. The
time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and
did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even
admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do
anything; the counter just fell on her.
Disposition The instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
MAGTIBAY V TIANGCO
74 Phil 756
BOCOBO; February 28, 1944
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance Batangas
FACTS
- Defendant-appellant Tiangco, a minor under 18 years of age, pleaded guilty
to an information for homicide through reckless negligence in that he had
recklessly driven an automobile and thereby caused the death of Magtibay, of
whom plaintiffs-appellees are the lawful heirs. The Court of First Instance
(CFI) Batangas found Tiangco guilty as charged, but as he was under 18
years of age, the sentence was suspended, and he was committed to the
care and custody of Atty. Abaya, until Tiangco would reach his majority,
subject to the supervision of the Superintendent of Public Schools of the
Province. Subsequently, Abaya, in view of Tiangco’s good conduct
recommended the dismissal of the case. The CFI dismissed the criminal
case, but reserved such right as the heirs of the deceased might have to
recover damages in a civil action against said Tiangco. Accordingly, the civil
action in the instant case was filed against defendant-appellant for damages
in the sum of P2,000 for the death of Magtibay. The CFI gave judgment for
plaintiffs for P2,000 as damages. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE
WON the suspension of the sentence under Art. 80 of the RPC, after
appellant had pleaded guilty, exonerated him from the crime charged
HELD
NO
- The suspension of the sentence under Art.80 of the Revised Penal Code,
after appellant herein had pleaded guilty, did not wipe out his guilt, but merely
put off the imposition of the corresponding penalty, in order to give the
delinquent minor a chance to be reformed. When, therefore, after he had
observed good conduct, the criminal case was dismissed, this did not mean
that he was exonerated from the crime charged, but simply that he would
suffer no penalty. Nor did such dismissal of the criminal case obliterate his
civil liability for damages. Liability of an infant for his torts is imposed as a
mode, not of punishment, but of compensation. If property has been
destroyed or other loss occasioned by a wrongful act, it is just that the loss
torts & damages
should upon the estate of the wrongdoer rather than that of a guiltless
person, and that without reference to the question of moral guilt.
Consequently, for every tortuous act of violence or other pure tort, the infant
tort-feasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner
and to the same extent as an adult.
DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed.
DEL ROSARIO V MANILA ELECTRIC CO.
57 PHIL 478
STREET; November 5, 1932
FACTS
***This action was instituted by Julian del Rosario for the purpose of
recovering damages from Meralco for the death of his son, Alberto, resulting
from a shock from a wire used by the defendant for the transmission of
electricity.
- Aug 4, 1930 – 2pm: a wire used by the defendant on Dimas- Alang St for
the purpose of conducting electricity used in lighting the City of Manila and its
suburbs.
- Jose Noguera saw that the wire was burning and its connections smoking.
One of the ends of the wire fell to the ground among some shrubbery close to
the way.
- As soon as Noguera took cognizance of the trouble, he stepped into a
garage which was located nearby and asked Jose Soco to telephone the
Malabon station of MERALCO that an electrical wire was burning at that
place.
- Soco transmitted the message at 2.25 p.m. and received answer from the
station to the effect that they would send an inspector.
- At the time that message was sent the wire had not yet parted, but from the
testimony of Demetrio Bingao, one of the witnesses for the defense, it is clear
that the end of the wire was on the ground shortly after 3 p.m.
- At 4 p. m. the neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went
home.
- Alberto del Rosario, 9 yrs old, who was a few paces ahead of his
classmates, Jose Salvador and Saturnino Endrina, all members of the
second grade in the public school.
- As the three neared the place where the wire was down, Saturnino made a
motion as if it touch it.
- Jose, who happened to be the son of an electrician, knew never to touch a
broken electrical wire (as his dad told him so!)- stopped Saturnino- telling him
that the wire might be charged.
- Saturnino yielded to this admonition and stopped, but Alberto, who was
somewhat ahead, said, “I have for some time been in the habit of touching
wires”.
- Jose rejoined that he should into touch wires as they carry a current, but
Alberto, no doubt feeling that he was challenged in the matter, put out his
index finger and touch the wire.
- He immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming "Ay! madre".
- The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the
post.
- A crowd soon collected, and some one cut the wire and disengaged the
body. Upon being taken to St. Luke's Hospital the child was pronounced
dead.
A2010
prof. casis
- 20 -
- The wire was an ordinary number 6 triple braid weather proof wire, such as
is commonly used by the defendant company for the purpose of conducting
electricity for lighting.
- The wire was cased in the usual covering, but this had been burned off for
some distance from the point where the wire parted.
- The engineer of the company says that it was customary for the company to
make a special inspection of these wires at least once in six months, and that
all of the company's inspectors were required in their daily rounds to
keep a lookout for trouble of this kind.
- There is nothing in the record indicating any particular cause for the parting
of the wire.l
not subject to criminal prosecution for the act complained of, the question
assumes a vastly different aspect.
- There should be a distinction between the civil liability of an ordinary person
who, by wrongful act, has caused the death of another; and the civil liability of
a corporation, organized primarily for profit, which has caused the death of a
person by failure to exercise due care in the prosecution of its business.
- The liability of such a corporation for damages must be regarded as a part
of the risks which it assumes when it undertakes to promote its own business;
and just as it is entitled to earn adequate profits from its business, so it should
be made adequately to compensate those who have suffered damage by its
negligence.
ISSUE
WON Manila Electric is liable
YLARDE V AQUINO
[citation]
GANCAYCO; July 29, 1988
HELD
YES
Reasoning
- When notice was received at the Malabon station at 2.25 p. m., somebody
should have been dispatched to the scene of the trouble at once, or other
measures taken to guard the point of danger; but more than an 1 ½ hours
passed before anyone from MERALCO appeared on the scene, and in the
meantime Alberto had been claimed as a victim.
- The mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of Jose (8 yrs old),
doesn’t alter the case.
- But even supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be
properly imputed to the deceased, such negligence would not be wholly fatal
to the right of action in this case, not having been the determining cause of
the accident. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil., 359.)
- With respect to the amount of damages recoverable, Julian is entitled to
recover P250 for expenses incurred in connection with the death and burial
of the boy.
- Citing Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Company: Julian should recover the sum
of P1,000 as general damages for loss of service.
Disposition judgment reversed
SEPARATE OPINION
ABAD SANTOS [concur in part and dissent in part]
- He concurs that MERALCO is held liable for the death of Alberto, but
dissents in so far as the decision allows the recovery of the father of the sum
of P1,250 only as damages. It should be P 2250.
- His reasoning: It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an action will lie to
recover damages for death caused by the wrongful act. (Manzanares vs.
Moreta, 38 Phil., 821.)
- In criminal cases- indemnity to the heirs of the deceased is equivalent to
P1,000
- Whatever may be the reasons for the rule followed in criminal cases, I am of
the opinion that those reasons do not obtain in fixing the amount of the
damages recoverable in the present case.
- The indemnity allowed in criminal case is merely incidental to the main
object sought, which is the punishment of the guilty party.
- In a civil action, the principal object is the recovery of damages for
wrongful death; and where, as in this case, the defendant is a corporation,
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Soriano was principal. Aquino was a teacher. The school was littered with
concrete blocks. Teacher Banez started burying them. Aquino gathered 18
male pupils to help. He ordered them to dig. Work was unfinished.
- Ff day, Aquino called 4 of the 18 to continue. Aquino continued digging
while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil. Aquino
left the children to level the loose soil and borrowed a key from Banez.
Aquino told the kids not to touch the stone.
- 3 of the 4 kids jumped into the pit. The remaining Abaga jumped on the
concrete block causing it to slide down. 2 were able to escape but student
Ylarde sustained injuries. 3 days later he died.
Parents filed suit against Aquino and Soriano. Lower court dismissed and CA
affirmed and said child Ylarde was negligent.
ISSUE
WON Aquino and Soriano can be held liable for damages
HELD
- Principal Soriano cannot be held liable, being head of academic school and
not school of arts and trades, in line with Amadora case and Art 2180 of Civil
Code. It is only the teacher who should answer for torts committed by their
students. Besides, Soriano did not order the digging.
- Based on Article 2180, Aquino can be held liable. However, petition is
based on Article 2176. Did the acts/omissions of Aquino cause the death of
Ylarde? Yes. He is liable for damages. The work required adult laborers.
He required the children to remain in the pit after they finished digging. He
ordered them to level the soil when a huge stone was at brink of falling. He
went to another place and left the kids.
- Left by themselves, IT WAS BUT NATURAL FOR THE CHILDREN TO
PLAY AROUND. IN RULING THAT YLARDE WAS IMPRUDENT, THE
LOWER COURT DID NOT CONSIDER HIS AGE AND MATURITY. A
MINOR SHOULD NOT BE HELD TO THE SAME DEGREE OF CARE AS AN
ADULT.
- Aquino also said the digging was part of Work Education. This is
unacceptable. Work is too dangerous and it was not even in the lesson plan.
torts & damages
CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO V PHILIPPINE
MOTORS CORPORATION
[citation]
STREET; November 3, 1930
NATURE
Appeal from decision of the CFI
FACTS
- Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in Manila and plaintiff was
the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline.
- Cranston decided to have the engine on the Gwendoline changed from a
gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. He had a conference with Quest,
Phil. Motors manager, who agreed to do the job, with the understanding that
payment should be made upon completion of the work.
- The work was begun and conducted under the supervision of Quest, chiefly
by a mechanic whom Quest took with him to the boat. Quest had the
assistance of the members of the crew of the Gwendoline, who had been
directed by Cranston to place themselves under Quest's directions.
- Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest concluded that a new
carburetor was needed and thus installed a Zenith carburetor. The engine
was tried with gasoline and the result was satisfactory. The next problem was
to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil
mixed with distillate. A temporary tank to contain the mixture was placed on
deck above and at a short distance from the compartment covering the
engine. This tank was connected with the carburetor by a piece of tubing,
which was apparently not well fitted at the point where it was connected with
the tank. The fuel mixture leaked from the tank and dripped sown into the
engine compartment. The new fuel line and that already in use between the
gasoline tank and carburetor were so fixed that it was possible to change
from the gasoline fuel to the mixed fuel. This arrangement enables the
operator to start the engine on gasoline and then, after the engine had been
operating for a few moments, to switch to the new fuel supply.
- It was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or
other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part to the carburetor to the
floor. This fact was called to Quest's attention, but he said that, when the
engine had gotten to running well, the flooding would disappear.
- The boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The engine stopped a
few times during the first part of the course, owing to the use of an improper
mixture of fuel. In the course of the trial, Quest remained outside of the
engine compartment and occupied himself with making distillate, with a view
to ascertaining what proportion of the two elements would give best results in
the engine.
- As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine stopped, and
connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start.
After this had been done the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the tube
connecting with the new mixture. A moment later a back fire occurred in the
cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and
instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of
flames, which the members of the crew were unable to subdue. The salvage
from, the wreck, when sold, brought only the sum of P150. The value of the
boat, before the accident occured, as the court found, was P10,000.
- CFI gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff to recover of the defendant the
sum of P9,850, with interest at 6 per centum per annum from the date of the
filing of the complaint, until satisfaction of the judgment, with costs.
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prof. casis
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DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from affirmed.
ISSUE
WON the loss of the boat is chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of
Quest
HELD
YES
Ratio When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things
requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to
exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which
he attempts to do.
Reasoning
- The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was apparently at
too great an elevation from the carburetor, so that when the fuel line was
opened, the hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor was greater than the
delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain. This was the cause of the
flooding of the carburetor; and the result was that; when the back fire
occurred, the external parts of the carburetor, already saturated with
gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was quickly communicated to the
highly inflammable material near-by. The leak along the pipe line and the
flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent
mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken precautions to
avoid. The back fire may have been due either to the fact that the spark was
too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed.
- Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of
automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in
the doing of similar work on boats. Possibly the dripping of the mixture form
the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind
an adequate impression of the danger of fire. Quest did not use the skill that
would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline
engines on boats. There was here, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy
antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence.
The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident,
but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have
occured but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not
whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free
from blame.
- The trial judge seems to have proceeded on the idea that, inasmuch as
Quest had control of the Gwendoline during the experimental run, the
defendant corporation was in the position of a bailee and that, as a
consequence, the burden of proof was on the defendant to exculpate itself
from responsibility by proving that the accident was not due to the fault of
Quest. As a rule workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owner's yard, or
a mechanic who repairs a coach without taking it to his shop, are not bailees,
and their rights and liabilities are determined by the general rules of law,
under their contract. The true bailee acquires possession and what is usually
spoken of as special property in the chattel bailed. As a consequence of such
possession and special property, the bailee is given a lien for his
compensation. These ideas seem to be incompatible with the situation now
under consideration.
- This action was instituted about two years after the accident had occured,
and after Quest had ceased to be manager and had gone back to the US.
Upon these facts, the defendant bases the contention that the action should
be considered stale. It is sufficient reply to say that the action was brought
within the period limited by the statute of limitations and the situation is not
one where the defense of laches can be properly invoked.
UNITED STATES V PINEDA
37 Phil 456
MALCOLM; January 22, 1918
NATURE
Appeal requiring a construction and an application, for the first time, of the
penal provisions of the Pharmacy Law.
FACTS
- Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner
of a drug store located at Calle Santo Cristo, Manila. Feliciano Santos,
having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription obtained from
Dr. Richardson, and which on other occasions Santos had given to his
horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. The prescription
read: "clorato de potasa - 120 gramos - en seis papelitos de 20 gramos, para
caballo." Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and
returned to Santos in the form of six papers marked, "Botica Pineda - Clorato
potasa - 120.00 - en seis papeles - Para caballo- Sto. Cristo , Binondo,
Manila." Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium
chlorate which he had asked for, put two of the packages in water and gave
the doses to two of his sick horses. Another package was mixed with water
for another horse, but was not used. The two horses, to which had been
given the preparation, died shortly afterwards. Santos, thereupon, took the
three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. Drs.
Peña and Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, found that the packages
contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate. At the instance of
Santos, the two chemists also went to the drug store of the defendant and
bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium
chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a poison; potassium chlorate
is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses,
and found that death was the result of poisoning.
ISSUES
1. WON the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the chemist Peña
and Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate at the drug store of
the accused, which proved to be barium chlorate
2. WON the lower court erred in finding that the substance sold by the
accused to Feliciano Santos was barium chlorate and not potassium chlorate
3. WON the lower court erred in finding that the accused has been proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of an infraction of the Pharmacy Law, Act
No. 597, section 17, as amended
HELD
1. NO
Ratio On the trial of a criminal case where the question relates to the
tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or to
explain the conduct of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the
part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere with, unless it
manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the
question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused.
Reasoning
- What appellant is relying on is the maxim res inter alios acta. As a general
rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is
torts & damages
inadmissible. But appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with
certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to convict the accused of a
second offense. Nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away from the
point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant's case. The purpose is to
ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence. If the
defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in
good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified and fraudulent intent
may even be established. It has been said that there is no better evidence of
negligence than the frequency of accidents.
2. NO
Reasoning The proof demonstrates the contrary.
3. NO
Ratio In view of the tremendous and imminent danger to the public from the
careless sale of poisons and medicines, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to
hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another
whether it be through negligence or mistake.
Reasoning
- The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the
skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business
which the law demands.
- Turning to the law, certain points therein as bearing on our present facts
must be admitted. Thus, defendant is a pharmacist. As a pharmacist, he is
made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And
finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison
under any "fraudulent name." It is the word "fraudulent" which has given the
court trouble. What did the Legislature intend to convey by this restrictive
adjective?
- Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to convict any druggist of a violation of the law. The
prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable degree of certainty that the
druggist made a material representation; that it was false; that when he made
it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its
truth and as a positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it
should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted in reliance
upon it, and that the purchaser suffered injury. Such a construction with a
literal following of well-known principles on the subject of fraud would strip the
law of at least much of its force. It would leave the innocent purchaser of
drugs, who must blindly trust in the good faith and vigilance of the
pharmacist, at the mercy of any unscrupulous vendor. We should not,
therefore, without good reason so devitalize the law.
- The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs.
The vendor and the vendee do not stand at arms length as in ordinary
transactions. An imperative duty is on the druggist to take precautions to
prevent death or serious injury to anyone who relies on his absolute honesty
and peculiar learning. The nature of drugs is such that examination would not
avail the purchaser any thing. It would be idle mockery for the customer to
make an examination of a compound of which he can know nothing.
Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the
drug called for.
- Remembering particularly the care and skill which are expected of
druggists, that in some jurisdictions they are liable even for their mistake and
in others have the burden placed upon them to establish that they were not
negligent, it cannot be that the Philippine Legislature intended to use the
word "fraudulent" in all its strictness. A plea of accident and mistake cannot
excuse for they cannot take place unless there be wanton and criminal
carelessness and neglect. How the misfortune occurs is unimportant, if under
A2010
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all the circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributable to the druggist as a
legal fault. Rather considering the responsibility for the quality of drugs which
the law imposes on druggists and the position of the word "fraudulent" in
juxtaposition to "name," what is made unlawful is the giving of a false name to
the drug asked for. This view is borne out by the Spanish translation, which
we are permitted to consult to explain the English text. In the Spanish
"supuesto" is used, and this word is certainly not synonymous with
"fraudulent." The usual badges of fraud, falsity, deception, and injury must be
present - but not scienter.
Dispositive Judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to pay a
fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs, is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant,
without prejudice to any civil action which may be instituted.
BPI V CA
216 SCRA 51
GUTIERREZ; November 26, 1992
FACTS
- In the afternoon of October 9, 1981, a person purporting to be Eligia G.
Fernando, who had a money market placement as evidenced by a
promissory note with a maturity date of November 11, 1981 and a maturity
value of P2,462,243.19, called BPI's Money Market Department. The caller
wanted to preterminate the placement, but Reginaldo Eustaquio, Dealer
Trainee in BPI's Money Market Department, told her "trading time" was over
for the day, which was a Friday, and suggested that she call again the
following week. The promissory note the caller wanted to preterminate was a
roll-over of an earlier 50-day money market placement that had matured on
September 24, 1981.
- Later that afternoon, Eustaquio conveyed the request for pretermination to
the officer who before had handled Eligia G. Fernando's account, Penelope
Bulan, but Eustaquio was left to attend to the pretermination process.
- On October 12, 1981, the caller of the previous Friday followed up with
Eustaquio, merely by phone again, on the pretermination of the placement.
Although not familiar with the voice of the real Eligia G. Fernando, Eustaquio
"made certain" that the caller was the real Eligia G. Fernando by "verifying"
that the details the caller gave about the placement tallied with the details in
"the ledger/folder" of the account. Eustaquio knew the real Eligia G. Fernando
to be the Treasurer of Philippine American Life Insurance Company
(Philamlife) since he was handling Philamlife's corporate money market
account. But neither Eustaquio nor Bulan who originally handled Fernando's
account, nor anybody else at BPI, bothered to call up Fernando at her
Philamlife office to verify the request for pretermination.
- Informed that the placement would yield less than the maturity value
because of its pretermination, the caller insisted on the pretermination just the
same and asked that two checks be issued for the proceeds, one for
P1,800,000.00 and the second for the balance, and that the checks be
delivered to her office at Philamlife. Eustaquio, thus, proceeded to prepare
the "purchase order slip" for the requested pretermination as required by
office procedure, and from his desk, the papers, following the processing
route, passed through the position analyst, securities clerk, verifier clerk and
documentation clerk, before the two cashier's checks, nos. 021759 and
021760 for P1,800,000.00 and P613,215.16, respectively, both payable to
Eligia G. Fernando, covering the preterminated placement, were prepared.
The two cashier's checks, together with the papers consisting of the money
prof. casis
market placement was to be preterminated and the promissory note (No.
35623) to be preterminated, were sent to Gerlanda E. de Castro and
Celestino Sampiton, Jr., Manager and Administrative Assistant, respectively,
in BPI's Treasury Operations Department, both authorized signatories for
BPI, who signed the two checks that very morning. Thereafter, the checks
went to the dispatcher for delivery.
- Later in the same morning, however, the same caller changed the delivery
instructions; instead of the checks being delivered to her office at Philamlife,
she would herself pick up the checks or send her niece, Rosemarie
Fernando, to pick them up. Eustaquio then told her that if it were her niece
who was going to get the checks, her niece would have to being a written
authorization from her to pick up the checks. This telephone conversation
ended with the caller's statement that "definitely" it would be her niece,
Rosemarie Fernando, who would pick up the checks. Thus, Eustaquio had to
hurriedly go to the dispatcher, Bernardo Laderas, to tell him of the new
delivery instructions for the checks; in fact, he changed the delivery
instruction on the purchase order slip, writing thereon "Rosemarie Fernando
release only with authority to pick up.”
- It was, in fact Rosemarie Fernando who got the two checks from the
dispatcher, as shown by the delivery receipt. As it turned out, the same
person impersonated both Eligia G. Fernando and Rosemarie Fernando.
Although the checks represented the termination proceeds of Eligia G.
Fernando's placement, not just a roll-over of the placement, the dispatcher
failed to get or to require the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the
placement. There is also no showing that Eligia G. Fernando's purported
signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the latter authorizing
Rosemarie Fernando to pick up the two checks, both of which letters were
presumably handed to the dispatcher by Rosemarie Fernando, was
compared or verified with Eligia G. Fernando's signature in BPI's file. Such
purported signature has been established to be forged although it has a
"close similarity" to the real signature of Eligia G. Fernando. In the afternoon
of October 13, 1981, a woman who represented herself to be Eligia G.
Fernando applied at China Banking Corporation's Head Office for the opening
of a current account. She was accompanied and introduced to Emily Sylianco
Cuaso, Cash Supervisor, by Antonio Concepcion whom Cuaso knew to have
opened, earlier that year, an account upon the introduction of Valentin Co, a
long-standing "valued client" of CBC. What Cuaso indicated in the application
form, however, was that the new client was introduced by Valentin Co, and
with her initials on the form signifying her approval, she referred the
application to the New Accounts Section for processing. As finally proceeds,
the application form shows the signature of "Eligia G. Fernando", "her" date of
birth, sex, civil status, nationality, occupation ("business woman"), tax
account number, and initial deposit of P10,000.00. This final approval of the
new current account is indicated on the application form by the initials of
Regina G. Dy, Cashier, who did not interview the new client but affixed her
initials on the application form after reviewing it.
- On October 14, 1981, the woman holding herself out as Eligia G. Fernando
deposited the two checks in controversy with Current Account No. 126310-3.
Her endorsement on the two checks was found to conform with the
depositor's specimen signature. CBC's guaranty of prior endorsements
and/or lack of endorsement was then stamped on the two checks, which CBC
forthwith sent to clearing and which BPI cleared on the same day.
- Two days after, withdrawals began on Current Account No. 26310-3: On
October 16, 1981, by means of Check No. 240005 dated the same day for
P1,000,000.00, payable to "cash", which the woman holding herself out as
Eligia G. Fernando encashed over the counter, and Check No. 240003 dated
torts & damages
October 15, 1981 for P48,500.00, payable to "cash" which was received
through clearing from PNB Pasay Branch; on October 19, 1981, by means of
Check No. 240006 dated the same day for P1,000,000.00, payable to "cash,"
which the woman identifying herself as Eligia G. Fernando encashed over the
counter; on October 22, 1981, by means of Check No. 240007 dated the
same day for P370,000.00, payable to "cash" which the woman herself also
encashed over the counter; and on November 4, 1981, by means of Check
No. 240001 dated November 3, 1981 for P4,100.00, payable to "cash," which
was received through clearing from Far East Bank. The last withdrawal on
November 4, 1981 left Current Account No. 26310-3 with a balance of only
P571.61.
- On November 11, 1981, the maturity date of Eligia G. Fernado's money
market placement with BPI, the real Eligia G. Fernando went to BPI for the
roll-over of her placement. She disclaimed having preterminated her
placement on October 12, 1981. She executed an affidavit stating that while
she was the payee of the two checks in controversy, she never received nor
endorsed them and that her purported signature on the back of the checks
was not hers but forged. With her surrender of the original of the promissory
note (No. 35623 with maturity value of P2,462,243.19) evidencing the
placement which matured that day, BPI issued her a new promissory note
(No. 40314 with maturity date of December 23, 1981 and maturity value of
P2,500.266.77) to evidence a roll-over of the placement.
- On November 12, 1981, supported by Eligia G. Fernando's affidavit, BPI
returned the two checks in controversy to CBC for the reason "Payee's
endorsement forged". CBC, in turn, returned the checks for reason "Beyond
Clearing Time". These incidents led to the filing of this case with the
Arbitration Committee.
- The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of BPI and ordered CBC to pay the
former the amount of P1,206,607.58 with interest thereon at 12% per annum
from August 12, 1983.
- However, upon CBC’s motion for reconsideration, the Board of Directors of
the PCHC reversed the Arbitration Committee's decision and dismissed the
complaint of BPI while ordering it to pay CBC the sum of P1,206,607.58.
- BPI then filed a petition for review with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
who dismissed said petition but modified the award by including a provision
for attorney’s fees in favor of CBC, among others.
- The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUES
1. WON the collecting bank has absolute liability on a warranty of the validity
of all prior endorsements stamped at the back of the checks
2. In the event that the payee's signature is forged, WON the drawer/drawee
bank (in this case BPI) may claim reimbursement from the collecting bank
which earlier paid the proceeds of the checks after the same checks were
cleared
HELD
1. NO
- BPI contends that respondent CBC's clear warranty that "all prior
endorsements and/or lack of endorsements guaranteed" stamped at the back
of the checks was an unrestrictive clearing guaranty that all prior
endorsements in the checks are genuine. Under this premise petitioner BPI
asserts that the presenting or collecting bank, respondent CBC, had an
unquestioned liability when it turned out that the payee's signature on the
checks were forged. With these circumstances, petitioner BPI maintains that
considerations of relative negligence become totally irrelevant.
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- 23 -
- In presenting the checks for clearing and for payment, the collecting bank
made an express guarantee on the validity of "all prior endorsements." Thus,
stamped at the back of the checks are the clear warranty: ALL PRIOR
ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED.
Without such warranty, the drawee bank would not have paid on the checks.
No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of the warranty. As
the warranty has proven to be false and inaccurate, the defendant is liable for
any damage arising out of the falsity of its representation.
- Apropos the matter of forgery in endorsements, this Court has emphasized
that the collecting bank or last endorser generally suffers the loss because it
has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior endorsements
considering that the act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is
an assertion that the party making the presentment has done its duty to
ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements. If the drawee-bank
discovers that the signature of the payee was forged after it has paid the
amount of the check to the holder thereof, it can recover the amount paid
from the collecting bank. However, the point that comes uppermost is
whether the drawee bank was negligent in failing to discover the alteration or
the forgery.
- The general rule under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is to
the effect that a forged signature is "wholly inoperative", and payment made
"through or under such signature" is ineffectual or does not discharge the
instrument. The exception to this rule is when the party relying in the forgery
is "precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority. In this
jurisdiction we recognize negligence of the party invoking forgery as an
exception to the general rule.
- In the present petition the payee's names in the checks were forged.
Following the general rule, the checks are "wholly inoperative" and of no
effect. However, the underlying circumstances of the case show that the
general rule on forgery is not applicable. The issue as to who between the
parties should bear the loss in the payment of the forged checks necessities
the determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties involved in the
controversy in relation to the forged checks.
- The records show that petitioner BPI as drawee bank and respondent CBC
as representing or collecting bank were both negligent resulting in the
encashment of the forged checks.
- The Arbitration Committee in its decision analyzed the negligence of the
employees of petitioner BPI involved in the processing of the pre-termination
of Eligia G. Fernando's money market placement and in the issuance and
delivery of the subject checks in this wise: a) The impostor could have been
readily unmasked by a mere telephone call, which nobody in BPI bothered to
make to Eligia G. Fernando, a vice-president of Philamlife; b) The officer who
used to handle Eligia G. Fernando's account did not do anything about the
account's pre-termination; c) Again no verification appears to have been
made on Eligia G. Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the
pre-termination and the letter authorizing her niece to pick-up the checks, yet,
her signature was in BPI's file; and d) Another step that could have foiled the
fraud, but which BPI neglected to take, was requiring before the two checks
in controversy were delivered, the surrender of the promissory note
evidencing the money market placement that was supposedly pre-terminated.
The Arbitration Committee, however, belittled petitioner BPI's negligence
compared to that of respondent CBC which it declared as graver and the
proximate cause of the loss of the subject checks to the impostor who
impersonated Eligia G. Fernando.
- The PCHC Board of Directors, however, stated that “these withdrawals,
without any further showing that the CBC employees ‘had actual knowledge
prof. casis
of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts’ (Sec. 56, Negotiable
Instruments Law) that their action in accepting their checks for deposit and
allowing the withdrawals against the same ‘amounted to bad faith’ cannot be
considered as basis for holding CBC liable.”
- Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the very
nature of their work the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness
expected of their employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary
clerks and employees. For obvious reasons, the banks are expected to
exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of
their employees.
- In the present case, there is no question that the banks were negligent in
the selection and supervision of their employees. The Arbitration Committee,
the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower court, however disagree in the
evaluation of the degree of negligence of the banks. While the Arbitration
Committee declared the negligence of respondent CBC graver, the PCHC
Board of Directors and the lower courts declared that petitioner BPI's
negligence was graver. To the extent that the degree of negligence is
equated to the proximate cause of the loss, we rule that the issue as to
whose negligence is graver is relevant. No matter how many justifications
both banks present to avoid responsibility, they cannot erase the fact that
they were both guilty in not exercising extraordinary diligence in the selection
and supervision of their employees.
2. NO
- The next issue hinges on whose negligence was the proximate cause of the
payment of the forged checks by an impostor. Petitioner BPI insists that the
doctrine of last clear chance should have been applied considering the
circumstances of this case. Under this doctrine, where both parties were
negligent and such negligence were not contemporaneous, the person who
has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence
of the other party.
- Applying these principles, petitioner BPI's reliance on the doctrine of last
clear chance to clear it from liability is not well-taken. CBC had no prior notice
of the fraud perpetrated by BPI's employees on the pretermination of Eligia G.
Fernando's money market placement. Moreover, Fernando is not a depositor
of CBC. Hence, a comparison of the signature of Eligia G. Fernando with that
of the impostor Eligia G. Fernando, which respondent CBC did, could not
have resulted in the discovery of the fraud. Hence, respondent CBC had no
way to discover the fraud at all. In fact the records fail to show that
respondent CBC had knowledge, actual or implied, of the fraud perpetrated
by the impostor and the employees of BPI.
- BPI further argues that the acts and omissions of respondent CBC are the
cause "that set into motion the actual and continuous sequence of events that
produced the injury and without which the result would not have occurred."
Petitioner BPI anchors its argument on its stance that there was "a gap, a
hiatus, an interval between the issuance and delivery of said checks by
petitioner BPI to the impostor and their actual payment of CBC to the
impostor. Petitioner BPI points out that the gap of one (1) day that elapsed
from its issuance and delivery of the checks to the impostor is material on the
issue of proximate cause. At this stage, according to petitioner BPI, there was
yet no loss and the impostor could have decided to desist from completing
the same plan and could have held to the checks without negotiating them.
- Petitioner BPI's contention that CBC alone should bear the loss must fail.
The gap of one (1) day between the issuance and delivery of the checks
bearing the impostor's name as payee and the impostor's negotiating the said
forged checks by opening an account and depositing the same with
torts & damages
respondent CBC is not controlling. It is not unnatural or unexpected that after
taking the risk of impersonating Eligia G. Fernando with the connivance of
BPI's employees, the impostor would complete her deception by encashing
the forged checks. There is therefore, greater reason to rule that the
proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor was due
to the negligence of petitioner BPI. This finding, notwithstanding, we are not
inclined to rule that petitioner BPI must solely bear the loss of P2,413,215.16,
the total amount of the two (2) forged checks. Due care on the part of CBC
could have prevented any loss.
- The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC employees closed their eyes
to the suspicious circumstances of huge over-the-counter withdrawals made
immediately after the account was opened. The opening of the account itself
was accompanied by inexplicable acts clearly showing negligence. And while
we do not apply the last clear chance doctrine as controlling in this case, still
the CBC employees had ample opportunity to avoid the harm which befell
both CBC and BPI. They let the opportunity slip by when the ordinary
prudence expected of bank employees would have sufficed to seize it.
- Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their
employees resulting in the encashment of the forged checks by an impostor.
Both banks were not able to overcome the presumption of negligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees. It was the gross negligence of
the employees of both banks which resulted in the fraud and the subsequent
loss. While it is true that petitioner BPI's negligence may have been the
proximate cause of the loss, respondent CBC's negligence contributed
equally to the success of the impostor in encashing the proceeds of the
forged checks. Under these circumstances, we apply Article 2179 of the Civil
Code to the effect that while respondent CBC may recover its losses, such
losses are subject to mitigation by the courts.
Disposition The questioned Decision and Resolution are MODIFIED. BPI
shall be responsible for 60% while CBC shall share 40% of the loss of
P2,413,215.16
E.M. WRIGHT V MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO.
28 Phil 122
MORELAND; October 1, 1914
NATURE
An action to recover damages for injuries sustained in an accident
FACTS
- Defendant Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in operating an electric
street railway
- Plaintiff’s residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which
defendant’s tracks run. To enter his premises from the street, plaintiff must
cross defendant’s tracks.
- One night, plaintiff drove home in a calesa and, in crossing the tracks to
enter his premises, the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, throwing the
plaintiff from the vehicle and causing injuries
- At the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks, the rails were above-gruond,
and the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half
of their depth out of the ground, making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6
inches or more above the level of the street.
- It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks, but
defendant claims the plaintiff was also negligent in that he was so
intoxicated, and such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident
A2010
prof. casis
- 24 -
- Trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that plaintiff’s
negligence was not as great as defendant’s, awarded plaintiff P1,000.
ISSUE
WON the negligence of plaintiff contributed to the “principal occurrence” or
“only to his own injury.” (If the former, he cannot recover; if the latter, the trial
court was correct in apportioning damages)
HELD
NO
Ratio Intoxication in itself is not negligence. It is but a circumstance to be
considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence.
Reasoning
- Intoxication in itself is not negligence, and no facts, other than the fact that
Wright was intoxicated, are stated which warrant the conclusion that the
plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not
have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to
say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the
conditions described.
- A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of
the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing
and falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a
wheel, might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what
his condition; and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man
would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which
enters the realm of speculation and guesswork.
DISPOSITION Plaintiff not negligent. No facts to merit a higher award of
damages to plaintiff.
US V BAGGAY
20 PHIL 142
TORRES; September 1, 1911
NATURE
Appeal by the defendant from the judgment rendered on April 28, 1910,
whereby he was declared exempt from criminal liability but was obliged to
indemnify the heirs if the murdered woman, Bil-liingan, in the sum of P1,000,
to pay the costs in the case and to be confined in an institution for the insane
until further order of the court.
FACTS
- About the 4th of October, 1909, several persons were assembled in the
defendant's house in the township of Penarrubia, Abra, Province of Ilocos
Sur, for the purpose of holding a song service called "buni" according to the
Tinguian custom, when he, the non-Christian Baggay, without provocation
suddenly attacked the woman Bil-liingan with a bolo, inflicting a serious
wound on her head from which she expired immediately; and with the same
bolo he like wise inflicted various wounds on the women named Calabayan,
Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini, and on his own mother, named Dioalan.
- For this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the court of Ilocos
Sur, dated February 15, charging the non-Christian Baggay, jr., with murder,
because of the violent death of the woman Bil-liingan. This cause was
instituted separately from the other, No. 1109, for lesiones. After trial and
proof that the defendant was suffering from mental aberration, the judge on
April 28 rendered the judgment cited above, whereupon the defendant's
counsel appealed to this court.
ISSUE
WON an insane person, exempt from criminal liability can still be civilly liable
HELD
YES
Ratio Civil liability accompanies criminal liability, because every person liable
criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage
and for indemnification of the harm done, but there may be civil liability
because of acts ordinarily punishable, although the law has declared their
perpetrators exempt from criminal liability.
Reasoning
- Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his
irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind,
is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of
his acts, even though they be performed unwittingly, for the reason that his
fellows ought not to suffer for the disastrous results of his harmful acts more
than is necessary, in spite of his unfortunate condition. Law and society are
under obligation to protect him during his illness and so when he is declared
to be liable with his property for reparation and indemnification, he is still
entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his decent maintenance, but
this protection does not exclude liability for damage caused to those who may
have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his acts.
- Article 17 of the Penal Code states:
Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly
liable.
- Article 18 of the same code says:
The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 of
article 8 does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced, subject to the following:
(1) In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly liable for acts
committed by a lunatic or imbecile, or a person under 9 years of age, or
over this age and under 15, who has not acted with the exercise of
judgment, are those who have them under their authority, legal
guardianship or power, unless they prove that there was no blame or
negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal
guardian, or power, if such person be insolvent, the said lunatics,
imbeciles, or minors shall answer with their own property, excepting that
part which is exempted for their support in accordance with the civil law.
DISPOSITION Therefore, the judgment appealed from being in accordance
with law, affirmation thereof is proper, and it is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellant.
AMEDO V RIO
[citation]
CONCEPCION; May 24, 1954
FACTS
- This case was instituted on October 18, 1950. In her original complaint,
plaintiff Elena Amedo sought to collect from defendant Rio y Olabarrieta, Inc.,
the sum of P2,038.40 as compensation for the death of her son, Filomeno
Managuit, who worked for the defendant as a seaman of the M/S Pilar II. The
main allegation of said original complaint was:
torts & damages
“That on May 27, 1949 at about 11:30 o'clock in the morning, while the
deceased Filomeno Managuit was on board M/S "Pilar II" as such seaman,
he jumped into the water to retrieve a 2-peso bill belonging to him, and as a
consequence of which, he was drowned.”
- this however was dismissed due to lack of a cause of action which
defendant filed stating that the allegation does not show that the death of
plaintiff's son was due to an "accident arising out of and in the course of
employment,".
- she was allowed to file an amended complaint which was remanded to the
trial court.
- her amended complaint stated: “That on May 27, 1949, at or about 11:30
o'clock in the morning while the said Filomeno Managuit was in the course of
his employment, performing his duties as such ordinary seaman on
defendant's M/S "Pilar II", which was anchored then about 1 1/2 miles from
the seashore of Arceli Dumarang, Palawan, his two-peso bill was blown by
the breeze into the sea and in his effort to retrieve the same from the waters
he was drowned.
ISSUE
WON Amedo could claim compensation from employer Rio
HELD
NO
- Plaintiff’s basis for appeal is the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Sections 2
and 4 of which:
Sec. 2. Grounds for compensation. — When any employee receives a
personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment, or
the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay
compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.
Sec. 4. Injuries not covered. — Compensation shall not be allowed for injuries
caused (1) by the voluntary intent of the employee to inflict such injury upon
himself or another person; (2) by drunkenness on the part of the laborer who
had the accident; (3) by notorious negligence of the same.
- from these provisions three conditions are essential to hold an employer
liable. These are: (1) the accident must arise out of the employment; (2) it
must happen in the course of the employment; and (3) it must not be caused
by the "notorious negligence" of the employee. Point in question is whether
the accident was committed under these 3 conditions
- "The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident and
are descriptive of its character, while the words `in the course of' refer to the
time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place
- it may be conceded that the death of Filomeno took place "in the course of"
his employment, in that it happened at the "time" when, and at the "place"
where-according to the amended complaint-he was working. However, the
accident which produced this tragic result did not "arise out of" his
employment. The blowing of his 2-peso bill may have grown out of, or arisen
from, his employment. It was the result of a risk peculiar to his work as a
seaman or incidental to such work. But, his death was the consequence of
his decision to jump into the water to retrieve said bill. The hazardous nature
of this act was not due specially to the nature of his employment. It was a risk
to which any person on board the M/S Pilar II, such as a passenger thereof or
an ordinary visitor, would have been exposed had he, likewise, jumped into
the sea, as Filomeno had.
- was the accident caused by Filomeno’s “notorious negligence”?
- "notorious negligence" has been held to be tantamount to "gross
negligence", which, in turn, has been defined as follows:
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- By gross negligence is meant "such entire want of care as to raise a
presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the probable
consequences of carelessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger of
injury to person or property of others." (Wall vs. Cameron [1882] 6 Colo.,
275; see, also, The Law Governing Labor Disputes in the Philippines by
Francisco, 2nd ed., p. 877.)
- It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea, one mile and a half from the
seashore of Arceli, Dumarang, Palawan, Filomeno failed to exercise "even
slight care and diligence," that he displayed a "reckless disregard of the
safety" of his person, that he could not have been but conscious of the
probable consequences" of his carelessness and that he was "indifferent, or
worse, to the danger of injury.
- case provides for other jurisprudence which describe instances of gross
negligence attributable to employee (see case).
- this is distinguishable from cases wherein the act done is not dangerous per
se such as when an employee drops a cigarette on the pavement and picks it
up. So, also, if, while Filomeno Managuit was working, his 2-peso bill merely
fell from his pocket, and as he picked up the bill from the floor something
accidentally fell upon him and injured him, he would surely be entitled to
compensation, his act being obviously innocent.
- since the act done by Filomeno was dangerous, his accident could be
attributed to his gross negligence.
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS V WORKMEN’S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION
99 PHIL 48
BENGZON; June 30, 1956
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the WCC
FACTS
- A truck driven by Procopio Macunat, belonging to Marinduque, turned over
and hit a coconut tree resulting in the death of Pedro Mamador and injury to
the other laborers.
- Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and was sentenced to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased. He has paid nothing, however, to the latter.
- Deceased’s wife now seeks compensation by Marinduque as the employer.
ISSUE
1. WON Mamador has a right to compensation by Marinduque
2. WON there was notorious negligence by the deceased for having violated
the employer’s prohibition to ride haulage trucks
HELD
1. YES
- Petitioner alleges that the criminal case sentencing Macunat to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased was a suit for damages against a third person,
thereby having the effect of releasing the employer from liability.
prof. casis
- The criminal case, however, was not a suit for damages against third
persons because the heirs did not intervene therein and they have not
received the indemnity ordered by the court.
- At any rate, even if the case was against a third person, the court already
decided in Nava vs. Inchausti that criminal prosection of the "other person"
does not affect the liability of the employer.
- Petitioner also contends that the amicable settlement entered into by
Mamador's widow and Macunat barred the widow's claim against the
employer because she has already elected one of the remedies.
- This contention cannot be sustained because what the widow waived was
the offender's criminal proscution and not all civil action for damages.
2. NO
- Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence,
ordinarily. It couldn't be, because transportation by truck is not dangerous per
se.
- Although the employer prohibited its employees to ride the haulage trucks,
its violation does not constitute negligence per se, but it may be an evidence
of negligence.
- Under the circumstance, however, it cannot be declared negligence
because the proibition had nothing to do with the personal safety of the riders.
- Notorious negligence means the same as gross negligence which implies
"conscious indifferenece to consequences", "pursuing a course of conduct
which would naturally and probably result in injury".
Disposition Award for compensation by WCC affirmed
LAYUGAN V IAC
167 SCRA 363
SARMIENTO; November 14, 1968
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of IAC decision
FACTS
- Plaintiff Pedro Layugan testified that while in Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, he
and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was
parked along the right side of the National Highway. Defendant's truck driven
recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff
was injured and hospitalized. Due to said injuries, his left leg was amputated
so he had to use crutches to walk.
- Defendant Godofredo Isidro admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved
in the accident driven by Daniel Serrano. Defendant said that the plaintiff was
merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver
of said truck; that the truck allegedly being repaired was parked, occupying
almost half of the right lane towards Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, right after the
curve; that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of
the parked truck in installing the early warning device,
- Daniel Serrano, defendant driver, said that he knew the responsibilities of a
driver; that before leaving, he checked the truck. The truck owner used to
instruct him to be careful in driving. He bumped the truck being repaired by
Pedro Layugan, plaintiff, while the same was at a stop position. From the
evidence presented, it has been established clearly that the injuries sustained
by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver, Daniel Serrano. Serrano
also testified that, “When I was a few meters away, I saw the truck which was
loaded with round logs. I stepped on my foot brakes but it did not function
torts & damages
with my many attempts. I have (sic) found out later that the fluid pipe on the
rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not function.”
- Plaintiff points to the negligence of the defendant driver while Isidro points to
the driver of parked truck as negligent, and says that absent such proof of
care, it would, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, evoke the presumption
of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his
helper, the petitioner herein, who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck.
ISSUES
1. WON defendant driver Serrano was negligent
2. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case
HELD
1 NO
- (Procedural) Ratio Findings of fact are entitled to great respect and will not
ordinarily be disturbed by this Court unless it falls down under the exceptions
provided by the Court to merit review of the facts.
Reasoning
- This is a question of fact. But this case is an exception since: 1) the finding
are grounded entirely on speculation, surmise, or conjecture; 2) the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, 3) the judgment is based on misapprehension
of facts; 4) CA findings are contrary to those of the trial court; 5) the said
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; and 6) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted on record. Hence,
SC entertained review of the factual question.
- (Substantive) Ratio The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence.
Reasoning
[1] Negligence defined. Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do
[2] Applying the definition and the test, it is clear that the absence or want of
care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing
evidence. Whether cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the
shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into account the warning device
consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed 3-4m from the back of the
truck. But despite this warning, the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano, still
bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such
accident Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot.
2. NO
Note that for our purposes this was not raised as an issue in this case.
Therefore this only Obiter Dicta. But as far as we’re concerned and relevant
to our discussion in the outline, I formulated it in an issue-type. This is what
the Court actually said in the case to prove its just obiter, and its relevant to
the main issue on negligence: “At this juncture, it may be enlightening and
helpful in the proper resolution of the issue of negligence to examine the
doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur. “
Obiter
[1] What is the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur? Two ways to put it:
(a) This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is
shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is
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such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have
the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care, and
(b) According to Black’s Law dictionary, “Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks
for itself Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent,
which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's
exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not
happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence
whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact
that accident happened provided character of accident and circumstances
attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would
not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been
under management and control of alleged wrongdoer.”
[2] In our jurisdiction, and the way we apply it in cases, particularly in the law
of negligence: Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established
without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a
mere procedural convenience. The doctrine merely determines and regulates
what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of
plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be
invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct
evidence is absent and not readily available. So, it is inapplicable where
plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific
act of negligence which is the cause of the injury, or where there’s direct
evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and
circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. And once the
actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, no presumptions will
be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances
show that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made,
whatever the source of the evidence.
In this case it is inapplicable because it was established by clear and
convincing evidence the negligence of the defendant driver.
Disposition Petition GRANTED with costs against private respondents.
RAMOS V CA
[citation]
KAPUNAN; December 29, 1999
NATURE
Petition For Certiorari
FACTS
- In the case at bar, the Court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon, an
anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate
comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy.
- Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except for occasional
complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a
stone in her gall bladder she was as normal as any other woman. Because
the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways, she sought
professional advice. She was advised to undergo an operation for the
removal of a stone in her gall bladdershe underwent a series of examinations
which included blood and urine tests which indicated she was fit for surgery.
She and her husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. Orlino Hozaka, one of
prof. casis
the defendants in this case, on June 10, 1985. They agreed that their date at
the operating table at the De Los Santos Medical Center, would be on June
17, 1985 at 9:00 A.M.. Dr. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a
“cholecystectomy” operation after examining the documents presented to
him. Rogelio E. Ramos, however, asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good
anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka, in turn, assured Rogelio that he will get a good
anesthesiologist. She was admitted in the hospital and was with her sister-inlaw, Herminda Cruz, who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the
Capitol Medical Center, was also there for moral support. After praying, she
was given injections. At the operating room, Herminda saw about two or three
nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, the other defendant, who was to
administer anesthesia. Although not a member of the hospital staff,
Herminda introduced herself as Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol
Medical Center who was to provide moral support to the patient, to them.
Herminda was allowed to stay inside the operating room.
- Hours later at about 12:15 P.M., Herminda Cruz, who was inside the
operating room with the patient, heard somebody say that “Dr. Hosaka is
already here.” She then saw people inside the operating room “moving,
doing this and that, [and] preparing the patient for the operation”. As she held
the hand of Erlinda Ramos, she then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the hapless
patient. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, “ang hirap ma-intubate nito,
mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan” (id., p. 17). Because of
the remarks of Dra. Gutierrez, she focused her attention on what Dr.
Gutierrez was doing. She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the
nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka
approached her. She then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to
call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. After Dr. Calderon arrived at the
operating room, she saw this anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient.
The patient’s nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed in a
trendelenburg position. Immediately thereafter, she went out of the operating
room, and she told Rogelio E. Ramos “that something wrong was x x x
happening”. Dr. Calderon was then able to intubate the patient.
- Herminda Cruz immediately rushed back, and saw that the patient was still
in trendelenburg position. At almost 3:00 P.M. of that fateful day, she saw the
patient taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU).
- Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by the hospital to explain
what happened to the patient. The doctors explained that the patient had
bronchospasm. Erlinda Ramos stayed for about four months in the hospital,
she incurred hospital bills amounting to P93,542.25. She has been in a
comatose condition. After being discharged from the hospital, she has been
staying in their residence, still needing constant medical attention, with her
husband Rogelio incurring a monthly expense ranging from P8,000.00 to
P10,000.00. She was also diagnosed to be suffering from “diffuse cerebral
parenchymal damage”.
- Petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City against herein private respondents alleging negligence in the
management and care of Erlinda Ramos.
- During the trial, both parties presented evidence as to the possible cause of
Erlinda’s injury. Plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz
and Dr. Mariano Gavino to prove that the damage sustained by Erlinda was
due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her
airway by private respondents during the anesthesia phase. On the other
hand, private respondents primarily relied on the expert testimony of Dr.
Eduardo Jamora, a pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain
damage was Erlinda’s allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent, Thiopental
Sodium (Pentothal).
torts & damages
- Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Court of
Appeals reversed.
- The decision of the Court of Appeals was received on 9 June 1995 by
petitioner Rogelio Ramos who was mistakenly addressed as “Atty. Rogelio
Ramos.” No copy of the decision, however, was sent nor received by the
Coronel Law Office, then counsel on record of petitioners. Rogelio referred
the decision of the appellate court to a new lawyer, Atty. Ligsay, only on 20
June 1995, or four (4) days before the expiration of the reglementary period
for filing a motion for reconsideration. On the same day, Atty. Ligsay, filed
with the appellate court a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration was submitted on 4 July
1995. However, the appellate court denied the motion for extension of time in
its Resolution dated 25 July 1995. Meanwhile petitioners engaged the
services of another counsel, Atty. Sillano, to replace Atty. Ligsay. Atty.
Sillano filed on 7 August 1995 a motion to admit the motion for
reconsideration contending that the period to file the appropriate pleading on
the assailed decision had not yet commenced to run as the Division Clerk of
Court of the Court of Appeals had not yet served a copy thereof to the
counsel on record. Despite this explanation, the appellate court still denied
the motion to admit the motion for reconsideration of petitioners in its
Resolution, dated 29 March 1996, primarily on the ground that the fifteen-day
(15) period for filing a motion for reconsideration had already expired.
- A copy of the above resolution was received by Atty. Sillano on 11 April
1996. The next day, or on 12 April 1996, Atty. Sillano filed before this Court a
motion for extension of time to file the present petition for certiorari under
Rule 45. The Court granted the motion for extension of time and gave
petitioners additional thirty (30) days after the expiration of the fifteen-day
(15) period counted from the receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals
within which to submit the petition. The due date fell on 27 May 1996. The
petition was filed on 9 May 1996, well within the extended period given by the
Court.
ISSUES
1. WON it should be dismissed for being filed later than allowable 15 day
period for the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration
2. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable
3. WON the Court of Appeals erred in finding that private respondents were
not negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase of the
operation and, if in the affirmative, whether the alleged negligence was the
proximate cause of Erlinda’s comatose condition. Corollary thereto, we shall
also determine if the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the testimonies of
the witnesses for the private respondents
4. What is the cost for the damages
HELD
1. NO
- A careful review of the records reveals that the reason behind the delay in
filing the motion for reconsideration is attributable to the fact that the decision
of the Court of Appeals was not sent to then counsel on record of petitioners,
the Coronel Law Office. In fact, a copy of the decision of the appellate court
was instead sent to and received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos on 9 June
1995 wherein he was mistakenly addressed as Atty. Rogelio Ramos. Based
on the other communications received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos, the
appellate court apparently mistook him for the counsel on record. Thus, no
copy of the decision of the appellate court was furnished to the counsel on
record. Petitioner, not being a lawyer and unaware of the prescriptive period
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for filing a motion for reconsideration, referred the same to a legal counsel
only on 20 June 1995.
- It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel, all notices
should be sent to the party’s lawyer at his given address. With a few
exceptions, notice to a litigant without notice to his counsel on record is no
notice at all. In the present case, since a copy of the decision of the appellate
court was not sent to the counsel on record of petitioner, there can be no
sufficient notice to speak of. Hence, the delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration cannot be taken against petitioner. Moreover, since the Court
of Appeals already issued a second Resolution, dated 29 March 1996, which
superseded the earlier resolution issued on 25 July 1995, and denied the
motion for reconsideration of petitioner, we believe that the receipt of the
former should be considered in determining the timeliness of the filing of the
present petition. Based on this, the petition before us was submitted on time.
2. YES
- We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. As
will hereinafter be explained, the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain
prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application
of res ipsa loquitur.
- Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is
injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the
immediate and exclusive control of the physicians, we hold that a practical
administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur. Upon
these facts and under these circumstances the Court would be able to say, as
a matter of common knowledge and observation, if negligence attended the
management and care of the patient. Moreover, the liability of the physicians
and the hospital in this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to
secure the desired results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the
diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment was ever
performed on Erlinda. Thus, upon all these initial determination a case is
made out for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
- Nonetheless, in holding that res ipsa loquitur is available to the present case
we are not saying that the doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where
injury occurs to a patient while under anesthesia, or to any and all anesthesia
cases. Each case must be viewed in its own light and scrutinized in order to
be within the res ipsa loquitur coverage.
- Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself.” The phrase “res ipsa loquitur” is a maxim for the
rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence,
or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing which caused the
injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant
or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.
- The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that,
as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain
types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the
person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of
some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is
grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis
of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from
the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied
in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.
prof. casis
- However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of
substantive law and, as such, does not create or constitute an independent or
separate ground of liability. Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary or
in the nature of a procedural rule. It is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere
procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a
plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. In other
words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with
the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of
such proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the
accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine,
creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and to thereby place on
the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. Still, before resort to
the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily
shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone’s negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff
responsible is eliminated.
- In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the “control of the
instrumentality” which caused the damage. Such element of control must be
shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. In order to have the
benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving injury or damage, must
show a situation where it is applicable, and must establish that the essential
elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident.
- In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to
find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without
the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common
knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where common
knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have
occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of
negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show
not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is
appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the
particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under
the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce
expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa
loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary
conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
- It does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to
mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not
guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary
doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied,
depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to
situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of
common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional
care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been
exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results,
and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the
service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in
that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon
which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The
physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular
torts & damages
diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not
produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a
malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation
or treatment was not accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether
or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual
event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the
regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations, which, if
unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the
negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. If there was such
extraneous interventions, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and
the defendant is called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of
exculpation, if he could.
3. YES
- The CA commited a reversible error. Private respondents were unable to
disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda
and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition.
- Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. In the case at bar,
respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on
the day of the operation itself, on 17 June 1985. Before this date, no prior
consultations with, or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her.
Until the day of the operation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez was unaware of the
physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. She was likewise not properly
informed of the possible difficulties she would face during the administration
of anesthesia to Erlinda. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez’ act of seeing her
patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative
procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional
irresponsibility. The measures cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing
with human lives lie at the core of the physician’s centuries-old Hippocratic
Oath. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia
of her negligence.
- Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view that the cerebral anoxia
which led to Erlinda’s coma was due to bronchospasm mediated by her
allergic response to the drug, Thiopental Sodium, introduced into her system.
Towards this end, they presented Dr. Jamora, a Fellow of the Philippine
College of Physicians and Diplomate of the Philippine Specialty Board of
Internal Medicine, who advanced private respondents' theory that the oxygen
deprivation which led to anoxic encephalopathy, was due to an unpredictable
drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate. We find the theory of private
respondents unacceptable.
- First of all, Dr. Jamora cannot be considered an authority in the field of
anesthesiology simply because he is not an anesthesiologist. Since Dr.
Jamora is a pulmonologist, he could not have been capable of properly
enlightening the court about anesthesia practice and procedure and their
complications. Dr. Jamora is likewise not an allergologist and could not
therefore properly advance expert opinion on allergic-mediated processes.
Moreover, he is not a pharmacologist and, as such, could not have been
capable, as an expert would, of explaining to the court the pharmacologic and
toxic effects of the supposed culprit, Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).
- An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm
properly falls within the fields of anesthesia, internal medicine-allergy, and
clinical pharmacology. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the
field of neurology. On the basis of the foregoing transcript, in which the
pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not testify about the drug with
medical authority, it is clear that the appellate court erred in giving weight to
Dr. Jamora’s testimony as an expert in the administration of Thiopental
Sodium.
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- Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is
proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the
evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part in
bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or
damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of
the act or omission. It is the dominant, moving or producing cause.
- Respondent Dr. Hosaka’s negligence can be found in his failure to exercise
the proper authority (as the “captain” of the operative team) in not
determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In
fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka
verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient.
Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had
scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as
Erlinda’s cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the
latter’s operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he
was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares
equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda’s condition.
- We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in this particular incident.
The unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with
attending and visiting “consultants,” who are allegedly not hospital
employees, presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence in
medical malpractice cases. However, the difficulty is only more apparent
than real.
- In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing
of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital premises.
Doctors who apply for “consultant” slots, visiting or attending, are required to
submit proof of completion of residency, their educational qualifications;
generally, evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate),
evidence of fellowship in most cases, and references. These requirements
are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a
review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject the
application. This is particularly true with respondent hospital.
- After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending consultant, he
is normally required to attend clinico-pathological conferences, conduct
bedside rounds for clerks, interns and residents, moderate grand rounds and
patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities, for the privilege of
being able to maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the privilege of
admitting patients into the hospital. In addition to these, the physician’s
performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review
committee on the basis of mortality and morbidity statistics, and feedback
from patients, nurses, interns and residents. A consultant remiss in his
duties, or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards
acceptable to the hospital or its peer review committee, is normally politely
terminated.
- In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over
their attending and visiting “consultant” staff. While “consultants” are not,
technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying
all responsibility for the patient’s condition, the control exercised, the hiring,
and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an
employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages.
In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is
determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the
purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an
prof. casis
employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their
attending and visiting physicians. This being the case, the question now
arises as to whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with
respondent doctors for petitioner’s condition.
- The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence
of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a
person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others
based on the former’s responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas.
Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that
they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent
damage. In other words, while the burden of proving negligence rests on the
plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents
(parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove that they observed
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
- In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its
responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and
supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the
degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to
offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent hospital thereby
failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180.
Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily
responsible with its physicians for Erlinda’s condition.
- Upon these disquisitions we hold that private respondents are solidarily
liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
4. Given these considerations, the amount of actual damages recoverable in
suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost
of proper care, not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to
undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy.
- Art. 2199. - Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he
has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.
- Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the
time of litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence
has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these
provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as in this case, where
the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future complications
directly arising from the injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict.
- In these cases, the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they
are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one
which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of
trial; and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but
which could not, from the nature of the case, be made with certainty. In other
words, temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or
compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no
incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided
for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
- As it would not be equitable - and certainly not in the best interests of the
administration of justice - for the victim in such cases to constantly come
before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the
compensatory damages previously awarded - temperate damages are
appropriate. The amount given as temperate damages, though to a certain
extent speculative, should take into account the cost of proper care.
torts & damages
- In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide only home-based
nursing care for a comatose patient who has remained in that condition for
over a decade. Having premised our award for compensatory damages on
the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation, it would be now
much more in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for
temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their
loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care. They should
not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home
without the aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly
inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in
temperate damages would therefore be reasonable.
- Meanwhile, the actual physical, emotional and financial cost of the care of
petitioner would be virtually impossible to quantify. Even the temperate
damages herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner’s condition
remains unchanged for the next ten years.
- The husband and the children, all petitioners in this case, will have to live
with the day to day uncertainty of the patient’s illness, knowing any hope of
recovery is close to nil. They have fashioned their daily lives around the
nursing care of petitioner, altering their long term goals to take into account
their life with a comatose patient. They, not the respondents, are charged
with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The family’s moral
injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. For the foregoing
reasons, an award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be appropriate.
- Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of the
instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney’s fees valued at P100,000.00
are likewise proper.
DISPOSITION the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed
from are hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily
against private respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual
damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a
monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos
expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3)
P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.
BATIQUIN V CA (Villegas)
258 SCRA 334
DAVIDE; July 5, 1996
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's
private patient sometime before September 21, 1988. In the morning of
September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, along with other physicians and nurses,
performed a caesarian operation on Mrs. Villegas and successfully delivered
the latter’s baby.
- After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and
complained of being feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, so she
consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain
medicines. However, the pains still kept recurring. She then consulted Dr.
Ma. Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr Kho suggested that Mrs. Villegas
submit to another surgery.
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- When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitishyellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries
which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber
material on the right side of the uterus, embedded on the ovarian cyst. The
piece of rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. This was the cause
of all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort
suffered by Mrs. Villegas
- The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court, and Dr. Kho
testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination. Aside
from Dr. Kho's testimony, the evidence which mentioned the piece of rubber
are a Medical Certificate, a Progress Record, an Anesthesia Record, a
Nurse's Record, and a Physician's Discharge Summary. The trial court,
however, regarded these documentary evidence as mere hearsay, "there
being no showing that the person or persons who prepared them are
deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein stated
- There was also doubts as to the whereabouts of the piece of rubber, as 2
versions arose from Dr. Kho’s testimony: 1) that it was sent to the Pathologist
in Cebu as testified to in Court by Dr. Kho and (2) that Dr. Kho threw it away
as told by her to Defendant. The failure of the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two
different versions served only to weaken their claim against Defendant
Batiquin. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. The CA reversed the
decision.
ISSUES
Procedural
WON the court can review questions of fact
Substantive
WON Dr. Batiquin is liable
HELD
Procedural
YES
- While the rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari, there are exceptions, among which are when the factual
findings of the trial court and the appellate court conflict, when the appealed
decision is clearly contradicted by the evidence on record, or when the
appellate court misapprehended the facts
Substantive
- The focal point of the appeal is Dr. Kho’s testimony. There were
inconsistencies within her own testimony, which led to the different decision
of the RTC and CA. The CA was correct in saying that the trial court erred
when it isolated the disputed portion of Dr. Kho’s testimony and did not
consider it with other portions of Dr. Kho’s testimony. Also, the phrase relied
upon by the trial court does not negate the fact that Dr. Kho saw a piece of
rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen, and that she sent it to a
laboratory and then to Cebu City for examination by a pathologist.
Furthermore, Dr. Kho's knowledge of the piece of rubber could not be based
on other than first hand knowledge for, as she asserted before the trial court.
- It is also worth noting that the trial court paid heed to Dr. Batiquin’s
testimony, that there was neither any tear on Dr. Batiquin's gloves after the
operation nor blood smears on her hands upon removing her gloves. But the
trial court failed to recognized that these were mere denials or negative
testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger than
negative testimony.
- While the petitioners claim that contradictions and falsities punctured Dr.
Kho's testimony, a reading of the said testimony reveals no such infirmity and
establishes Dr. Kho as a credible witness. Dr. Kho was frank throughout her
turn on the witness stand. Furthermore, no motive to state any untruth was
ever imputed against Dr. Kho, leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired. The
trial court's following declaration shows that while it was critical of the lack of
care with which Dr. Kho handled the piece of rubber, it was not prepared to
doubt Dr. Kho's credibility, thus only supporting out appraisal of Dr. Kho's
trustworthiness.
- Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible witness, her
positive testimony prevails over the negative testimony in favor of the
petitioners. As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore.
- This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown
to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence
of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of
care."
- In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are
present. First, the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the
exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were
bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the
foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas' body, which,
needless to say, does not occur unless through the intervention of
negligence. Second, since aside from the cesarean section, private
respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused
the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that
such could only have been a by-product of the cesarean section performed
by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece
of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse
effects thereof
DISPOSITION Decision affirmed
D.M. CONSUNJI V CA
KAPUNAN; April 20, 2001
NATURE
Appeal from CA affirming decision of RTC ordering defendant D.M. Consunji,
Inc. to pay damages to plaintiff Maria J. Juego
FACTS
- At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker
of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City
to his death. Investigation disclosed that while victim Jose A. Juego together
with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo were performing their work on board a
steel platform with plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four
corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin
which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the platform came
loose causing the whole platform assembly and the victim to fall down to the
basement of the elevator core of the building under construction, save his 2
companions who luckily jumped out for safety.
- On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the RTC of Pasig a
complaint for damages against D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised,
torts & damages
among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the
State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
widow. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
in toto.
ISSUES
1. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to prove petitioner’s
negligence
2. WON respondent is precluded from recovering damages under the Civil
Code
HELD
1. YES
Ratio As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the
law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. It is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of
the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the
accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has
no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in
general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in
order to establish negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it
applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the
following requisites are present:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement
while performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent;
thus, the first requisite is present. As explained earlier, the construction site
with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is
under the exclusive control and management of appellant; thus, the second
requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the
appellee’s deceased husband; thus, the last requisite is also present. A
reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises.
Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any evidence to rebut the inference or
presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or
to establish any defense relating to the incident.
2. NO
Ratio Claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the
provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of
one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation
under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under
the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been
paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages
under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments
occurring after he opted for the first remedy. The choice of a party between
inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Waiver requires a
knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an
awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and
intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. There is no
showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when
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prof. casis
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the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent
testified that she was not aware of her rights.
DISPOSITION The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that
of the ECC, whereupon payments already made to private respondent
pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other
respects, the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V REMONQUILLO
99 PHIL 117
MONTEMAYOR; May 18, 1956
NATURE
Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- August 22, 1950: Efren Magno went to the house of Antonio Peñaloza, hid
stepbrother, on Rodriguez Lanuza St, Manila, to repair a leaking “media
agua.” The “media agua” was just below the window of the third story.
- Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from his son thru the
window a 3’x6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion. The lower
end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila
Electric Company parallel to the media agua and 2 ½ feet from it, causing his
death by electrocution.
- his widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the company.
Trial court rendered judgment in their favor. Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision.
- The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire
stretched between poles pm the street and carrying a charge of 3600 volts. It
was installed there some two years ago before Peñaloza’s house was
constructed. During the construction of said house a similar incident took
place, with less tragic consequences. The owner of the house complained to
defendant about the danger which the wire presented, and defendant moved
one end of the wire farther from the house by means of a brace, but left the
other end where it was.
- Regulations of the City required that “all wires be kept three feet from the
building.”
- There was no insulation that could have rendered it safe, because there is
no insulation material in commercial use for such kind of wire (according to
appellant, and this was not refuted).
Petitioner’s Claim
- Owner of the house exceeded the limit for the construction of the “media
agua” (17% more).
Respondent’s Comment
Owner was given final permit despite the excess of the “media agua”.
Reasoning
- The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence, and in
some measure by the too close proximity of the “media agua” to the electric
wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by
the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the “media
agua.” Had the house owner followed the terms of the permit given him by
the city for the construction of his
“media agua”, the distance from the wires to the edge of said “media agua”
would have been 3ft and 11 3/8 inches.
- The company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal
construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said
construction, and to change the installation of its wires so as to preserve said
distance.
- The violation of the permit for the construction was not the direct cause of
the accident. It merely contributed to it. The real cause of the accident or
death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. It is to be
presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. He
had training and experience for the job. He could not have been entirely a
stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them.
- To hold the defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such
supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and
principal cause of the accident.
Disposition The appealed decision of the CA is reversed, and complaint
against the Company dismissed.
BERNARDO V LEGASPI
29 Phil 12
MORELAND; December 23, 1914
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila dismissing the complaint on the merits
filed in an action to recover damages for injuries
FACTS
- Due to a collision between the respective automobiles of Bernardo and
Legaspi, the former filed an action to recover damages for injuries sustained
by his car which he alleged were by reason of Legaspi's negligence in
causing said collision.
Legaspi, on the other hand, filed a cross-complaint alleging it was Bernardo's
fault. He also asks for damages.
- The lower court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the
defendant were negligent in handling their automobiles and that said
negligence was of such a character and extent on the part of both as to
prevent either from recovering.
ISSUE
WON Manila Electric is guilty of negligence.
ISSUE
WON the parties may recover damages
HELD
NO
- It was the victim who was guilty of negligence
Ratio the liability of electric companies for damages or personal injury is
governed by the rules of negligence, nevertheless such companies are not
insurers of the safety of the public.
HELD
1. NO
- Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions, collide on turning a
street corner, and it appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court
that the drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally to the
torts & damages
principal occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither can recover of
the other for damages suffered.
BERNAL V HOUSE
54 PHIL 327
MALCOLM; January 30, 1930
FACTS
- Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal went to
Tacloban, Leyte to attend the procession of Holy Friday.
- After the procession, they, accompanied by two other persons, passed
along a public street named Gran Capitan.
- The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother
and her friends.
- While in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an
automobile appeared on which frightened the child. She turned to run, but fell
into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch
coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House.
- When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found her
face downward in the hot water.
- The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. Despite his efforts, the child
died that same night.
- It was certified that the cause of death was "Burns, 3rd Degree, whole
Body", and that the contributory causes were "Congestion of the Brain and
visceras of the chest & abdomen.”
- The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of
the street Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities;
that the cause of death was other than the hot water; and that in the death
the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence.
- The trial judge, however, after examination of the evidence presented by
the defendants, failed to sustain their theory of the case, except as to the last
mentioned special defense. He nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of
the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.
ISSUE
WON the action should be dismissed due to the contributory negligence of
the plaintiffs
HELD
NO
- The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting
hot water to flow through the public streets, there to endanger the lives of
passers-by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it
- The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of
Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held.
- There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces
in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an
automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch
filled with hot water.
- The doctrines announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic,
Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil
Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child
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and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its
strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.
DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from was in part be reversed and in the
court of origin another judgment was issued in favor of Fortunata Enverso
and against J.V. House for the amount of P1,000, and for the costs of both
instances.
SEPARATE OPINION
ROMUALDEZ [dissent]
- Even taking the finding that the defendant by its negligence helped to bring
about the accident which resulted in the death of the child Purificacion Bernal,
plaintiff, by negligence, contributed to that most regrettable result.
- Judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V CHATTO
210 SCRA 18
DAVIDE JR.; June 16, 1992
FACTS
- Plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, Lina Delza E.
Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by
defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation.
- Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony
collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium
ensued.
- Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As
soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU
Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day.
- The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto
was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza
Chatto from June 5 to 11.
- Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to
Illinois, USA in July 1982 for further treatment. She was treated at the Cook
County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about three (3)
months during which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital five
(5) or, six (6) times.
- Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of
its theater was done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did
not suffer from any structural or construction defect.
- The trial court awarded actual or compensatory and moral damages and
attorney's fees to the plaintiffs.
- Respondent Court found the appeal later filed to be without merit.
- Its motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the
respondent Court, petitioner filed the petition in the SC.
ISSUE
WON the collapse of the ceiling was caused by force majeur
HELD
NO
- Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was
due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness,
Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why the
prof. casis
ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to
prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. That Mr. Ong
could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure.
- Definitions of force majeure as cited in Pons y Compañia vs. La Compañia
Maritima:
1. Blackstone, in his Commentaries on English Law: Inevitable accident or
casualty; an accident produced by any physical cause which is irresistible;
such as lightning. tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, or earthquake; the
sudden illness or death of a person.
2. Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudenci,:
The event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as for example, the
lightning stroke, hail, inundation, hurricane, public enemy, attack by robbers;
Vis major est, says Cayo, ea quae consilio humano neque provideri neque
vitari potest. Accident and mitigating circumstances.
3. Bouvier: Any accident due to natural cause, directly exclusively without
human intervention, such as could not have been prevented by any kind of
oversight, pains and care reasonably to have been expected.
4. Corkburn, chief justice, in a well considered English case, said that were a
captain uses all the known means to which prudent and experienced captains
ordinarily have recourse, he does all that can be reasonably required of him;
and if, under such circumstances, he is overpowered by storm or other
natural agency, he is within the rule which gives immunity from the effects of
such vis major. The term generally applies, broadly speaking, to natural
accidents, such as those caused by lightning, earthquake, tempests, public
enemy ,etc.
-The real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that
either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he isincompetent.
He is not an engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the
government's examination.
- Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the
present proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial court,
affirmed by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction
defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding.
- The building was constructed barely 4 years prior to the accident in
question. It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as force
majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the
ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner
exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises.
But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate
inspection of the premises before the date of the accident.
- That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by
the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were
issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction,
especially as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to
prove that it was ever inspected at all.
- It is settled that:
The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly
warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are
safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being
subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not
contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or
reasonable means.
- This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that:
Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is
injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively
under the control and management of the defendant, and the accident
torts & damages
is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if
proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or
permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant.
- That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner.
- Even assuming that the cause of the collapse was due to force majeure,
petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the
trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and
Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from any
liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have
been guilty of negligence.
Disposition Judgment was denying the instant petition with costs against
petitioner.
PLDT V CA (SPS ESTEBAN)
REGALADO; September 29, 1989
[CITATION]
NATURE
Petition for certiorari to review the resolution of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- July 30, 1968 – Jeep of Esteban spouses ran over a mound of earth and fell
into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the
installation of its underground conduit system. The complaint alleged that
respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left
uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning
light or signs.
- Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face,
leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent husband
suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered.
- PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries
sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and
that the entity which should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and
Company, an independent contractor which undertook the said construction
work.
- TC ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas the CA reversed the ruling.
ISSUE
WON the Esteban spouses can claim damages from PLDT
HELD
NO
Ratio A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the
burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof.
The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by
competent evidence.
Reasoning
- The accident was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio
Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner
PLDT.
> Jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had
remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the accident mound
> That plaintiffs’ jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the
ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture showing
Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDEN MOUND.
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> Plaintiffs’ jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff
husband claimed. At that speed, he could have braked the vehicle the
moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND.
> If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast
on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly
to the right and had to climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND, then plaintiff
husband had not exercised the deligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the accident.
- The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio
Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but
goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its
determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages.
Disposition resolutions of respondent CA, dated March 11, 1990 and
September 3, 1980, are hereby SET ASIDE, Its original decision,
promulgated on September 25, 1979, is hereby REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.
GENOBIAGON V CA (PEOPLE OF THE PHILS)
178 SCRA 422
GRIÑO-AQUINO; October 22, 1957
NATURE
Petition for review of the CA’s decision affirming the conviction of the
petitioner of the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
FACTS
- On Dec 31, 1959, at about 7:30 PM, a rig driven by Genobiagon bumped an
old woman who was crossing the street. The appellant's rig was following
another at a distance of two meters. The old woman started to cross when
the first rig was approaching her, but as appellant's vehicle was going so fast
not only because of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because he
was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him, the appellant's rig bumped the old
woman, who fell at the middle of the road. The appellant continued to drive
on, but a by-stander Mangyao saw the incident and shouted at the appellant
to stop. He ran after appellant when the latter refused to stop. Overtaking the
appellant, Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his
answer was, 'it was the old woman that bumped him.' The appellant went
back to the place where the old woman was struck by his rig. The old woman
was unconscious. She was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital
where she died 3 hours later.
- Genobiagon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. CA
affirmed
- Genobiagon claims CA erred in not finding that the reckless negligence of
the victim was the proximate cause of the accident which led to her death
ISSUES
WON contributory negligence can be used as defense by Genobiagon
HELD
NO
- The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate
the accused.
- "The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases
committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the
negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence (People vs.
Orbeta, CA-G.R. No. 321, March 29, 1947)." (People vs. Quiñones, 44 O.G.
1520)
Disposition the appealed decision is affirmed with modification as to the civil
liability of the petitioner which is hereby increased to P30,000. Costs against
petitioner.
RAKES V ATLANTIC
[CITATION]
[PONENTE]
NATURE
Action for damages
FACTS
- The plaintiff, Rakes, one of a group of 8 African-American laborers in the
employment of defendant, Atlantic, was at work transporting iron rails from
the harbor in Manila. The men were hauling the rails on 2 hand cars, some
behind or at it sides and some pulling the cars in the front by a rope. At one
point, the track sagged, the tie broke, the car canted and the rails slid off and
caught the plaintiff who was walking by the car’s side, breaking his leg, which
was later amputated at the knee.
- The plaintiff’s witness alleged that a noticeable depression in the track had
appeared after a typhoon. This was reported to the foreman, Mckenna, but it
had not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or had any proper
system of inspection. Also, there were no side guards on the cars to keep the
rails from slipping off.
- However, the company’s officers and 3 of the workers testified that there
was a general prohibition frequently made known to all against walking by the
side of cars. As Rakes was walking along the car’s side when the accident
occurred, he was found to have contributed in some degree to the injury
inflicted, although not as the primary cause.
- Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through negligence lies only in a
criminal action against the official directly responsible and that the employer
be held only subsidiarily liable.
ISSUE
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner
HELD
YES
- Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite a prohibition to do so
by the foreman.
-The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but not being
one of the determining causes of the principal accident, does not operate as
a bar to recovery, but only in reduction of his damages. Each party is
chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault.
- Trial court assessed that damages to plaintiff amount to PhP5,000. SC
deducted PhP2,500, the amount fairly attributable to his own negligence.
SEPARATE OPINION
WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent]
torts & damages
- the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient to cause the
accident—it also required the negligence of the plaintiff. Because of this,
plaintiff should not be afforded relief
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE V CA (ROMMEL’S
MARKETING CORP.)
269 SCRA 695
HERMOSISIMA JR; March 14, 1997
NATURE
Petition for review challenging the CA decision affirming the RTC decision in
a civil case
FACTS
- the case stems from a complaint filed by Rommel’s Marketing Corporation
(RMC) to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) the
sum of P304,979.74 representing various deposits it had made in its current
account with the bank but which were not credited, and were instead
deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the gross
and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank.
ISSUE
What is the proximate cause of the loss, to the tune of P304,979.74, suffered
by the private respondent RMC — petitioner bank's negligence or that of
private respondent's?
HELD
- The proximate cause of the loss was the negligent act of the bank, thru its
teller Ms. Azucena Mabayad, in validating the deposit slips, both original and
duplicate, presented by Ms. Yabut to Ms. Mabayad, notwithstanding the fact
that one of the deposit slips was not completely accomplished.
Ratio Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter
Reasoning
- There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the
plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
by the plaintiff.
- In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the
private respondent. Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would do.
- Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts
the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a
given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
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prof. casis
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actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that.
- Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena
Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the
deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact
that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the selfimposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of
deposit slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself.
- The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in
accepting deposits should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. The
odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information
— that of the name of the account holder — should have already put Ms.
Mabayad on guard. Rather than readily validating the incomplete duplicate
copy, she should have proceeded more cautiously by being more probing as
to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate slip
was left blank while that in the original was filled up. She should not have
been so naive in accepting hook, line and sinker the too shallow excuse of
Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy was only for her
personal record, she would simply fill up the blank space later on. 11 A
"reasonable man of ordinary prudence" 12 would not have given credence to
such explanation and would have insisted that the space left blank be filled
up as a condition for validation. Unfortunately, this was not how bank teller
Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge losses to the private respondent.
- Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the
part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms.
Mabayad. In the testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the
Pasig Branch of the petitioner, to the effect that, while he ordered the
investigation of the incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips
were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures.
- It was in fact only when he testified in this case in February, 1983, or after
the lapse of more than seven (7) years counted from the period when the
funds in question were deposited in plaintiff's accounts (May, 1975 to July,
1976) that bank manager Bonifacio admittedly became aware of the practice
of his teller Mabayad of validating blank deposit slips. Undoubtedly, this is
gross, wanton, and inexcusable negligence in the appellant bank's
supervision of its employees.
- It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence
of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which
was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, and
not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as insisted by
the petitioners.
- Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Bank of the
Phil. Islands v. Court of Appeals, 17 defines proximate cause as "that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. . . ." In this case, absent the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently
validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut
would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme
with impunity.
- LAST CLEAR CHANCE: under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also
referred to, at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"),
petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence,
states that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the
one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. The rule would
also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the
recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense
against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance,
could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting
cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to
defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied
that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert
the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their selfimposed validation procedure.
- In the case of banks, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a
good father of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship
with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their
clients with the highest degree of care.
- The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that, indeed, private
respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of
account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the series
of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage would
definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly
Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs.
This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall
mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent 23 under
A2179 CC, to wit:
. . . When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but
the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In view of this, we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied
by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. Thus, 40% of the damage
awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P25,000.00
attorney's fees, shall be borne by private respondent RMC; only the balance
of 60% needs to be paid by the petitioners. The award of attorney's fees shall
be borne exclusively by the petitioner.
Disposition the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is modified by
reducing the amount of actual damages private respondent is entitled to by
40%. Petitioners may recover from Ms. Azucena Mabayad the amount they
would pay the private respondent. Private respondent shall have recourse
against Ms. Irene Yabut. In all other respects, the appellate court's decision is
AFFIRMED.
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA [dissent]
- It seems that an innocent bank teller is being unduly burdened with what
should fall on Ms. Irene Yabut, RMC's own employee, who should have been
charged with estafa or estafa through falsification of private document. Why is
RMC insulating Ms. Irene Yabut from liability when in fact she orchestrated
the entire fraud on RMC, her employer?
- Going back to Yabut's modus operandi, it is not disputed that each time
Yabut would transact business with PBC's tellers, she would accomplish two
(2) copies of the current account deposit slip. PBC's deposit slip, as issued in
1975, had two parts. The upper part was called the depositor's stub and the
torts & damages
lower part was called the bank copy. Both parts were detachable from each
other. The deposit slip was prepared and signed by the depositor or his
representative, who indicated therein the current account number to which
the deposit was to be credited, the name of the depositor or current account
holder, the date of the deposit, and the amount of the deposit either in cash
or in checks.
- Since Yabut deposited money in cash, the usual bank procedure then was
for the teller to count whether the cash deposit tallied with the amount written
down by the depositor in the deposit slip. If it did, then the teller proceeded to
verify whether the current account number matched with the current account
name as written in the deposit slip.
- In the earlier days before the age of full computerization, a bank normally
maintained a ledger which served as a repository of accounts to which debits
and credits resulting from transactions with the bank were posted from books
of original entry. Thus, it was only after the transaction was posted in the
ledger that the teller proceeded to machine validate the deposit slip and then
affix his signature or initial to serve as proof of the completed transaction.
- It should be noted that the teller validated the depositor's stub in the upper
portion and the bank copy on the lower portion on both the original and
duplicate copies of the deposit slips presented by Yabut. The teller, however,
detached the validated depositor's stub on the original deposit slip and
allowed Yabut to retain the whole validated duplicate deposit slip that bore
the same account number as the original deposit slip, but with the account
name purposely left blank by Yabut, on the assumption that it would serve no
other purpose but for a personal record to complement the original validated
depositor's stub.
- Thus, when Yabut wrote the name of RMC on the blank account name on
the validated duplicate copy of the deposit slip, tampered with its account
number, and superimposed RMC's account number, said act only served to
cover-up the loss already caused by her to RMC, or after the deposit slip was
validated by the teller in favor of Yabut's husband. Stated otherwise, when
there is a clear evidence of tampering with any of the material entries in a
deposit slip, the genuineness and due execution of the document become an
issue in resolving whether or not the transaction had been fair and regular
and whether the ordinary course of business had been followed by the bank.
- The legal or proximate cause of RMC's loss was when Yabut, its employee,
deposited the money of RMC in her husband's name and account number
instead of that of RMC, the rightful owner of such deposited funds. Precisely,
it was the criminal act of Yabut that directly caused damage to RMC, her
employer, not the validation of the deposit slip by the teller as the deposit slip
was made out by Yabut in her husband's name and to his account.
- LAST CLEAR CHANCE: As for the doctrine of "last clear chance," it is my
considered view that the doctrine assumes that the negligence of the
defendant was subsequent to the negligence of the plaintiff and the same
must be the proximate cause of the injury. In short, there must be a last and a
clear chance, not a last possible chance, to avoid the accident or injury. It
must have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably prudent man
in like position to have acted effectively to avoid the injury and the resulting
damage to himself.
- In the case at bar, the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending monthly
bank statements to private respondent RMC so that any error or discrepancy
in the entries therein could be brought to the bank's attention at the earliest
opportunity. Private respondent failed to examine these bank statements not
because it was prevented by some cause in not doing so, but because it was
purposely negligent as it admitted that it does not normally check bank
statements given by banks.
A2010
- 34 -
- It was private respondent who had the last and clear chance to prevent any
further misappropriation by Yabut had it only reviewed the status of its current
accounts on the bank statements sent to it monthly or regularly. Since a
sizable amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut, private respondent should, at
least, have taken ordinary care of its concerns, as what the law presumes. Its
negligence, therefore, is not contributory but the immediate and proximate
cause of its injury.
JUNTILLA V FONTANAR
136 SCRA 624
GUITERREZ JR; May 31, 1985
NATURE
Petition to review the decision of CFI of Cebu
FACTS
- Petitioner Roberto Juntilla was sitting a the front seat of a jeepney (driven by
one Berfol Camoro, registered under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar, but
actually owned by Fernando Banzon) when its right rear tire exploded
causing it to turn turtle. Plaintiff was thrown out of the vehicle and lost
consciousness upon landing on the ground. When he came back to his
senses, he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm, injuries on
his left arm, right thigh and on his back and also found this “Omega” wrist
watch was lost. He went to Danao city and upon arrival there he entered the
City Hospital to attend to his injuries and asked his father-in-law to go to site
of the accident to look for his watch but the watch was nowhere to be found.
- Petitioner then filed a civil case for breach of contract with damages before
the City Court of Cebu against Fontanar, Banzon, and Camoro, who filed
their answer, alleging that the accident was beyond their control taking into
account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and slightly used at the
time it blew up.
- City Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. The respondents then
appealed to the CFI of Cebu, which reversed the judgment upon a finding
that the accident in question was due to a fortuitous event. Petitioner’s MFR
was denied, hence this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON the CFI erred in absolving the carrier from any liability upon a finding
that the tire blow out is a fortuitous event
2. WON the accident was due to a fortuitous event
HELD
1. YES
- The CFI relied on the ruling of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line
Transportation Co., that “a tire blow-out does not constitute negligence unless
the tire was already old and should not have been used at all.” This
conclusion is based on a misapprehension of overall facts. In La Mallorca and
Pampanga Bus Co. v De Jesus, et al, We held that, “ not only are the rulings
of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Trans. Co. not binding on this Court but
they were also based on considerations quite different from those that obtain
in the case at bar.” In the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on
the part of the respondents. The records show that the passenger jeepney
turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately after its right rear tire
exploded. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a
very fast speed before the accident. We agree with the observation of the
prof. casis
petitioner that a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not
jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. There is also evidence to
show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident.
The petitioner stated that there were 3 passengers in the front seat and 14 in
the rear.
- While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the
grooves of the tire were still visible, this fact alone does not make the
explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence was presented to show
that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were
taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause
accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too
much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney
was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.
2. NO
Ratio A caso fortuito (fortuitous event) presents the following essential
characteristics:
1. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure
of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human
will
2. It must be impossible to foresee the even which constitutes the caso
fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid
3. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in a normal manner
4. The obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation
of the injury resulting to the creditor
Reasoning
- In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence
was not independent of the human will. The accident was caused either
through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the
tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles
not to exceed safe and legal speed limits and to know the correct measures
to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all
times.
- Relative to the contingency of mechanical defects, we held in Necesito, et
al. v. Paras, et al, that: “The preponderance of authority is in favor of the
doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an
injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer,
whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the
carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the circumstances
was incumbent upon it. with regard to inspection and application of the
necessary tests. For the purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer is
considered as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier, as far as
regards the work of constructing the appliance. According to this theory, the
good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability.
- It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of a common carrier's legal liability
is the contract of carriage, and by entering into the said contract, it binds itself
to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with a due
regard for all the circumstances. The records show that this obligation was
not met by the respondents.
Disposition Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Decision of City Court is REINSTATED
HERNANDEZ V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
179 SCRA 39
torts & damages
CRUZ; November 6, 1989
NATURE
A petition to reverse Commission on Audit’s denial of relief
FACTS
- Teodoro M. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and special disbursing
officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism Authority in
Cavite. He went to the main office in Manila to encash 2 checks covering the
wages of the employees and the operating expenses of the Project. He
estimated that the money would be available by 10am and that he would be
back in Ternate by about 2pm of the same day. However, the processing of
the checks was completed only at 3pm. The petitioner decided nevertheless
to encash them because the Project employees would be waiting for their pay
the following day. And so, he collected the cash value of the checks. The
petitioner had two choices: (1) return to Cavite that same afternoon and arrive
there in the early evening; or (2) take the money with him to his house in
Marilao, Bulacan, spend the night there, and leave for Ternate the following
morning. He opted for the second, thinking it the safer one. He took a
passenger jeep bound for his house in Bulacan. It was while the vehicle was
along EDSA that two persons with knives boarded and forcibly took the
money he was carrying. Hernandez, after the initial shock, immediately
followed in desperate pursuit. He caught up with Virgilio Alvarez and
overcame him after a scuffle. Alvarez was subsequently charged with robbery
and pleaded guilty. But the hold-upper who escaped is still at large and the
stolen money he took with him has not been recovered.
- the petitioner, invoking the foregoing facts, filed a request for relief from
money accountability under Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code.3
- however, the Commission on Audit, through then Chairman Francisco S.
Tantuico, jr. denied the petitioner's request, observing inter alia:
In the instant case, the loss of the P10,175.00 under the accountability of Mr.
Hernandez can be attributed to his negligence because had he brought the
cash proceeds of the checks (replenishment fund) to the Beach Park in
Ternate immediately after encashment for safekeeping in his office, which is
the normal procedure in the handling of public funds, the loss of said cash
thru robbery could have been aborted.
- In the petition at bar, Hernandez claims that the respondent COA acted with
grave abuse of discretion in denying him relief and in holding him negligent
for the loss of the stolen money. He avers he has done only what any
reasonable man would have done and should not be held accountable for
a fortuitous event over which he had no control.
- On his decision to take the money home that afternoon instead of returning
directly to Ternate, he says that the first course was more prudent as he saw
it, if only because his home in Marilao was much nearer than his office in
Ternate; that the likelihood of robbery during the time in question was
stronger in Ternate than in Marilao; that what happened was a fortuitous
Section 638. Credit for loss occurring in transit or due to casualty — Notice to Auditor. — When a loss
of government funds or property occurs while the same is in transit or is caused by fire, theft, or other
casualty, the officer accountable therefor or having custody thereof shall immediately notify the Auditor
General, or the provincial auditor, according as a matter is within the original jurisdiction of the one or
the other, and within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor, or provincial auditor, may in the
particular case allow, shall present his application for relief, with the available evidence in support
thereof. An officer who fails to comply with this requirement shall not be relieved of liability or allowed
credit for any such loss in the settlement of his accounts.
3
A2010
- 35 -
event that could not have reasonably been foreseen, especially on that busy
highway.
- then Solicitor-General argued that Hernandez was negligent in the
safekeeping of the stolen funds. Later, however, his successor sided with the
petitioner, agreeing that Hernandez had not committed any negligence or,
assuming he was guilty of contributory negligence, had made up for it with his
efforts to retrieve the money and his capture of one of the robbers, who was
eventually convicted.
- COA insists that the petitioner should not be relieved from his money
accountability because it was his own negligence that led to the loss of the
cash he had sought to take not to Ternate but to Marilao. Its contention is that
the petitioner should not have encashed the checks as the hour was already
late and he knew he could not return to Ternate before nightfall. The memo
concludes that in deciding to take the money with him to Marilao after
imprudently withdrawing it from the main office, the petitioner was assuming a
risk from which he cannot now be excused after the loss of the money as a
result of the robbery to which it was unreasonably exposed.
ISSUE
WON petitioner’s acts are so tainted with negligence or recklessness as to
justify the denial of the petitioner's request for relief from accountability for the
stolen money
HELD
NO
- This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions,
something that could not have been reasonably foreseen although it could
have happened, and did. For most of us, all we can rely on is a reasoned
conjecture of what might happen, based on common sense and our own
experiences, or our intuition, if you will, and without any mystic ability to peer
into the future. So it was with the petitioner.
- It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court feels he should not
be blamed for that. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and
was one that could be expected of a reasonable and prudent person.
Disposition The petitioner is entitled to be relieved from accountability for
the money forcibly taken from him. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is
GRANTED.
GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V CHATTO
210 SCRA 18
DAVIDE JR; June 16, 1992
NATURE
Petition for Review
FACTS
- In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old
daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at
Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation.
They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats
considering the number of people patronizing the movie. Hardly ten (10)
minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The
prof. casis
theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. Shocked and
hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they
were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where
they were confined and treated for one (1) day.
- The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto
was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza
Chatto from June 5 to 11. Per Medico Legal Certificate (Exh, "C") issued by
Dr. Ernesto G. Brion, plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto suffered the following
injuries:
- Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of
its theater was done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did
not suffer from any structural or construction defect.
ISSUES
1. WON Jesus Lim Ong’s investigation maybe given weight in the trial
2. WON the collapse was due to force majeure
HELD
1. NO
- there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and
structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the theater's ceiling,
Jesus Lim Ong is not an engineer, He is a graduate of architecture from the
St. Louie University in Baguio City. It does not appear he has passed the
government examination for architects. In fine, the ignorance of Mr. Ong
about the cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their theater cannot be
equated, as an act, of God. To sustain that proposition is to introduce
sacrilege in our jurisprudence.
2. NO
- Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was
due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness,
Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why the
ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to
prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could not
have collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation
does not imply force majeure. Petitioner could have easily discovered the
cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. To Our mind, the
real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either
he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is, as the respondent
Court impliedly held, incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who
had not even passed the government's examination. Verily, post-incident
investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings.
What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent
Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no
evidence offered to overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely
four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown that any of
the causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at
the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been easily
discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and
maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there
was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident.
His answers to the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the
exact dates of said. inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. That
the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the
City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were
issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction,
torts & damages
especially as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to
prove that it was ever inspected at all.
- It is settled that - The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement
impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are
safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject
to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against
unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means.
- This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that - Where a patron of a
theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that
caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of events would not have happened if proper care had been
exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of
negligence on the part of the defendant.
Disposition judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the instant petition with
costs against petitioner.
SERVANDO V PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO
117 SCRA 832
ESCOLIN; 1982
NATURE
This appeal, originally brought to the Court of Appeals, seeks to set aside the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Cases
Nos. 7354 and 7428, declaring appellant Philippine Steam Navigation liable
for damages for the loss of the appellees' cargoes as a result of a fire which
gutted the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental.
FACTS
- On November 6, 1963, appellees Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando
loaded on board the appellant's vessel for carriage from Manila to
Pulupandan, Negros Occidental several cargoes (cavans of rice, colored
papers, toys etc) as evidenced by the corresponding bills of lading issued by
the appellant. Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan, in the morning of
November 18, 1963, the cargoes were discharged, complete and in good
order, unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. At about 2:00 in the
afternoon of the same day, said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown
origin, destroying appellees' cargoes. Before the fire, however, appellee Uy
Bico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice Appellees' claims for the
value of said goods were rejected by the appellant.
- On the bases of the foregoing facts, the lower court rendered a decision,
ordering Philippine Steam to pay for damages. The court a quo held that the
delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of
Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736; and since the
burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of
the goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable against the appellant.
Philippine Steam on the other hand relies on the following:
Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to
shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage is due to
negligence of carrier. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage
caused by force majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters;
war; public enemies; . . . fire . ...
A2010
WON the above stipulation validly limits the liability of the shipowner in this
case
HELD
YES
Ratio The parties may stipulate anything in the contract for so long as the
stipulation is not contrary to law, morals, public policy. The stipulation which
merely iterates the principle of caso fortuito is for all intents and purposes
valid.
Reasoning
- We sustain the validity of the above stipulation; there is nothing therein that
is contrary to law, morals or public policy.
- Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them
because it was printed in fine letters on the back-of the bills of lading; and
that they did not sign the same. This argument overlooks the pronouncement
of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated June 29, 1979, 3
where the Court held that while it may be true that petitioner had not signed
the plane ticket , he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. 'Such
provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage, and valid
and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge
or assent to the regulation'. It is what is known as a contract of 'adhesion', in
regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party
imposes a ready made form of contract on the other, as the plane ticket in the
case at bar, are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the
contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his
consent." (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. IV, 1962 Ed., p. 462, citing Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, Lawyer's Journal, Jan. 31, 1951, p. 49).
- Besides, the agreement contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a mere
iteration of the basic principle of law written in Article 1 1 7 4 of the Civil
Code4 Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and
proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability for nonperformance. The Partidas, the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code,
defines 'caso fortuito' as 'an event that takes place by accident and could not
have been foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected
fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers.'
- In its dissertation of the phrase 'caso fortuito' the Enciclopedia Juridicada
Espanola 5 says: "In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to
contracts, a 'caso fortuito' presents the following essential characteristics: (1)
the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of
the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human
will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso
fortuito', or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the
occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor." In the
case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary
event which happened independently of the will of the appellant. The latter
could not have foreseen the event.
- There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier ,incurred in
delay in the performance of its obligation. It appears that appellant had not
only notified appellees of the arrival of their shipment, but had demanded that
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
4
ISSUE
prof. casis
- 36 -
the same be withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such demand, appellee Uy Bico
had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse.
Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence. The
storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof
by the appellees was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent.
Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government, it
would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant, the latter having no
control whatsoever over the same.
Disposition judgment appealed from is hereby set aside.
SEPARATE OPINION
AQUINO [concur]
- I concur. Under article 1738 of the Civil Code "the extraordinary liability of
the common carrier continues to be operative even during the time the goods
are stored in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination, until the
consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had
reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of
them".
- From the time the goods in question were deposited in the Bureau of
Customs' warehouse in the morning of their arrival up to two o' clock in the
afternoon of the same day, when the warehouse was burned, Amparo C.
Servando and Clara Uy Bico, the consignees, had reasonable opportunity to
remove the goods. Clara had removed more than one-half of the rice
consigned to her. Moreover, the shipping company had no more control and
responsibility over the goods after they were deposited in the customs
warehouse by the arrastre and stevedoring operator. No amount of
extraordinary diligence on the part of the carrier could have prevented the
loss of the goods by fire which was of accidental origin.
NATIONAL POWER CORP V CA (RAYO ET AL)
DAVIDE JR; May 21, 1993
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
FACTS
- When the water level in the Angat dam went beyond the allowable limit at
the height of typhoon Kading NPC opened three of the dam’s spillways to
release the excess water in the dam. This however caused the inundation of
the banks of the Angat river which caused persons and animals to drown and
properties to be washed away.
- The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the
defendants of water through the spillways of the Angst Dam (Hydroelectric
Plant).
Plaintiffs claim:
- NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the
Angat River
- despite the defendants' knowledge of the impending entry of typhoon
"Kading," they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at
the dam
- when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the
height of the typhoon, the defendants suddenly, negligently and recklessly
opened three (3) of the dam's spillways, thereby releasing a large amount of
torts & damages
water which inundated the banks of the Angat River causing the death of
members of the household of the plaintiffs, together with their animals
Respondents comments:
- NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and
maintenance of the hydroelectric plant
- NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its
employees
- written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning
the residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of water
with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advising them to take the necessary
Precautions
- the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse
of the dam and avoid greater damage to people and property
- in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they
could still not contain or control the flood that resulted
- the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a
fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and character of
damnum absque injuria.
ISSUES
1. WON NPC was guilty of negligence
2. WON (applying the ruling of NAkpil & Sons v. CA) NPC is liable given that
the inundation was caused by force majeure
HELD
1. YES
- A similar case entitled National Power Corporation, et al. vs, Court of
Appeals, et al.," involving the very same incident subject of the instant
petition. The court there declared that the proximate cause of the loss and
damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein--who were similarly situated as the
private respondents herein-was the negligence of the petitioners,
- on the basis of its meticulous analysis and evaluation of the evidence a
dduced by the parties in the cases subject of CA-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-93,
public respondent found as conclusively established that indeed, the
petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight,
imprudence and negligence in the management and operation of Angat
Dam," and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the
magnitude of the water released, are all but products of defendants-appellees
headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness."and that the 24 October 1978
'early warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected municipalities, the
same notice involved in the case at bar, was insufficient.
2. YES
- given that NPC is guilty of negligence. Juan F. Nakipil & Sons vs. Court of
Appeals is still good law as far as the concurrent liability of an obligor in the
case of force majeure is concerned.
- In the Nakpil case it was held that "To exempt the obligor from liability under
Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an 'act of
God,' the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation
must be independent of the will of the debtor, (b) the event must be either
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d)
the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury
to the creditor. Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of
God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or
contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in
Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor
cannot escape liability.
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- The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the
act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all
human agencies are, to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause
of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is
found to be in part the result of the participation of man whether it be from
active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is
thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to the
acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175).
Disposition Petition dismissed.
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE V CA
PURISIMA; July 10, 1998
NATURE
Petition for review seeking to set aside the Decision promulgated on July 31,
1996, and Resolution dated September 12, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in
“Juanita de Jesus vda. de Dimaano, et al. vs. Southeastern College, Inc.”,
which reduced the moral damages awarded below from P1,000,000.00 to
P200,000.00. The Resolution under attack denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS
- Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay
City, while petitioner owns a four-storey school building along the same
College Road. On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a
powerful typhoon “Saling” hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds,
the roof of petitioner’s building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing
on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents’ house. After
the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was
conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official, Engr.
Jesus L. Reyna. Pertinent aspects of the latter’s Reporti[5] dated October 18,
1989 stated, as follows:
“5. One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the
formation of the buildings in the area and the general direction of the wind.
Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped formation of 4-storey
building. Thus, with the strong winds having a westerly direction, the
general formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like structure, the
one situated along College Road, receiving the heaviest impact of the
strong winds. Hence, there are portions of the roofing, those located on
both ends of the building, which remained intact after the storm.
6. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of
the roofings structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said
trusses to the roof beams. The 1/2” diameter steel bars embedded on the
concrete roof beams which serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor
nailed to the trusses. Still, there are other steel bars which were not even
bent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are not anchored at all to the roof
beams.”
- It then recommended that “to avoid any further loss and damage to lives,
limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity,” the fourth floor of subject
school building be declared as a “structural hazard.”
- In their Complaintii[6] before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch
117, for damages based on culpa aquiliana, private respondents alleged that
the damage to their house rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them to
stay temporarily in others’ houses. And so they sought to recover from
petitioner P117,116.00, as actual damages, P1,000,000.00, as moral
prof. casis
damages, P300,000.00, as exemplary damages and P100,000.00, for and as
attorney’s fees; plus costs.
- In its Answer, petitioner averred that subject school building had withstood
several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past, without its
roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it has not been remiss in its
responsibility to see to it that said school building, which houses school
children, faculty members, and employees, is “in tip-top condition”; and
furthermore, typhoon “Saling” was “an act of God and therefore beyond
human control” such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages
wrought thereby, absent any negligence on its part.
- The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the ocular
inspection made by the city engineer. Thus, this appeal.
ISSUES
WON the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting
from the impact of the falling portions of the school building’s roof ripped off
by the strong winds of typhoon “Saling”, was, within legal contemplation, due
to fortuitous event
HELD
YES
- Petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages suffered by the private
respondents. This conclusion finds support in Article 1174 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
“Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.”
- The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas
which defines it as “an event which takes place by accident and could not
have been foreseen.”iii[9] Escriche elaborates it as “an unexpected event or
act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted.” Civilist Arturo M.
Tolentino adds that “[f]ortuitous events may be produced by two general
causes: (1) by nature, such as earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics, fires,
etc. and (2) by the act of man, such as an armed invasion, attack by bandits,
governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc.”iv
- In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is
necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by
reason of which the loss may have been occasioned.. An act of God cannot
be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross
negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences.
When a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage
or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that
the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous
event. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of
man – whether it be from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act – the
whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules
applicable to acts of God.
- After a thorough study and evaluation of the evidence on record, this Court
believes otherwise, notwithstanding the general rule that factual findings by
the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding
and conclusive upon this Court. After a careful scrutiny of the records and the
pleadings submitted by the parties, we find exception to this rule and hold
that the lower courts misappreciated the evidence proffered.
- There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural
occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of
torts & damages
foresight, diligence or care. In order to be exempt from liability arising from
any adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no
human participation amounting to a negligent act. In other words, the person
seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence.
Negligence, as commonly understood, is conduct which naturally or
reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It may be the failure to
observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand,v[17] or the omission to do something which a
prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do. From these premises, we
proceed to determine whether petitioner was negligent, such that if it were
not, the damage caused to private respondents’ house could have been
avoided?
- At the outset, it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the
negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or
negligence causative of his injury or loss. The facts constitutive of negligence
must be affirmatively established by competent evidence,vi[19] not merely by
presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact. Private respondents, in
establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the aforementioned
report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioner’s
school building after the typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection is
one by means of actual sight or viewing.vii[20] What is visual to the eye though,
is not always reflective of the real cause behind. For instance, one who
hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded person, cannot always definitely
conclude that a third person shot the victim. It could have been self-inflicted
or caused accidentally by a stray bullet. The relationship of cause and effect
must be clearly shown.
- In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation
was conducted to determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of
petitioner’s school building. Private respondents did not even show that the
plans, specifications and design of said school building were deficient and
defective. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the approved
plans and specifications. Nor did they conclusively establish that the
construction of such building was basically flawed.
- Moreover, the city building official, who has been in the city government
service since 1974, admitted in open court that no complaint regarding any
defect on the same structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to
the institution of the case at bench. It is a matter of judicial notice that
typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject school
building’s roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not
have withstood long years and several typhoons even stronger than “Saling.”
- In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain
the judgment of the appellate court. We thus hold that petitioner has not
been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance
of its school building in question and that typhoon “Saling” was the proximate
cause of the damage suffered by private respondents’ house.
AFIALDA V HISOLE
85 Phil 67
REYES; November 29, 1949
NATURE
Appeal from judgment of CFI Iloilo
FACTS
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- This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal.
Loreto Afialda was the caretaker of the carabaos of spouses Hisole. While
tending the animals, he was “gored by one of them and later died as
consequence of his injuries.” The action was filed by the sister of Loreto, and
contended that the mishap was due neither to Loreto’s own fault nor to force
majeure.
- She uses Art.1905, CC (now Art.21835) as ground for the liability:
“The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for
any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him
or stray away.
“This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force
majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.”
- Spouses moved for dismissal for lack of cause of action, which the CFI
granted. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE
WON the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is caused to its
caretaker (as opposed to a stranger)
HELD
1. NO
Ratio It was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from
causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by
the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation
which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences.
Reasoning
- The lower court took the view that under the abovequoted provision of the
CC, the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a
stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the
owner would be liable of fault under article 1902 only if he had been negligent
or at the same code.
- Claiming that the lower court was in error, plaintiff contends that art. 1905
does not distinguish between damage caused to a stranger and damage
caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not he has
been negligent or at fault.
- The distinction (between stranger and caretaker) is important. For the
statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for
“any damages it may cause” and this for the obvious reason that the
possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore
the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.
- In the present case, the animal was in the custody and under the control of
the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the
caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or
damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under
those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had
voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
- On the other hand, if action is to be based on Art. 1902, it is essential that
there be fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the
animal that caused the damage. But the complaint contains no allegation on
those points.
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in
case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage.
5
prof. casis
- In a decision of the Spanish SC, cited by Manresa, the death of an
employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take
to his establishment was by said tribunal declared to be “a veritable accident
of labor” which should come under the labor laws rather than under article
1905, CC. The present action, however, is not brought under labor laws in
effect, but under Art.1905.
Disposition Judgment AFFIRMED.
ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY V CA (LUIS ET AL)
179 SCRA 5
PARAS; November 6, 1989
FACTS
- 5- 6AM June 29, 1967 - strong typhoon "Gening" in Ilocos Norte brought
floods and heavy rain. Isabel Lao Juan, (Nana Belen) went to her store, Five
Sisters Emporium, to look after the merchandise to see if they were
damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood, Juan suddenly screamed "Ay" and
quickly sank into the water. Her companions, two girls (sales girlls) attempted
to help, but were afraid because they saw an electric wire dangling from a
post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Yabes, the son-in law,
upon hearing the electrocution of his mother-in-law, passed by the City Hall of
Laoag to request the police to ask Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO
to cut off the electric current. The body was recovered about two meters from
an electric post.
- 4AM June 29, 1967- Engineer Juan, Power Plant Engineer of NPC at the
Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter
which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines.
- 6-6:30AM June 29, 1967- he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an
inspection and saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were
hanging from the posts to the ground. When he went to INELCO office, he
could not see any INELCO lineman.
- Engr. Juan attempted to resuscitate Nana Belen but his efforts proved futile.
Rigor mortis was setting in. On the left palm of the deceased, there was a
hollow wound. In the afternoon, the dangling wire was no longer there.
- Dr. Castro examined the body and noted that the skin was grayish or
cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor
found an "electrically charged wound" or a first degree burn. About the base
of the thumb on the left hand was a burned wound. The cause of' death was
,'circulatory shock electrocution"
- In defense and exculpation, INELCO presented the testimonies of its
officers and employees, which sought to prove that (1) on and even before
June 29, 1967 the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole
franchise area did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to
life and property. (2) The service lines and devices had been newly-installed
prior to the date in question. (3) Also, safety devices were installed to prevent
and avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural
calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others. (4) 12 linesmen are
charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas
respectively assigned to them. (5) They also presented own medical expert
and said that cyanosis could not have been the noted 3 hours after the death
because it is only manifest in live persons. (6) Lastly, the deceased could
have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence
attributable only to herself and not to INELCO because of the installation of a
burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate
and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current
torts & damages
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whenever the switch is on. The switch must have been left on, hence,
causing the deceased's electrocution when she tried to open her gate that
early morning of June 29, 1967
- CFI: awarded P25,000 moral damages; P45,000 attys fees
- CA: P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for the victim's death and
P18,229.45 for funeral expenses); P50,000 in compensatory damages,
computed in accordance with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit case (31
SCRA 511) with the base of P15,000 as average annual income of the
deceased; P10,000 in exemplary damages; P3,000 attorney's fees
defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not
have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission"
Disposition CA decision, except for the slight modification that actual
damages be increased to P48,229.45, is AFFIRMED.
ISSUE
WON the legal principle of "assumption of risk" bars private respondents from
collecting damages from INELCO
NATURE
Appeal from a CA decision
HELD
NO
Ratio The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no
application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding
circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof
and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by the salesgirls, the deceased
went to the Five Star Emporium "to see to it that the goods were not flooded."
As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her property
from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she
assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a
person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents
to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is
found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril, or when he seeks
to rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as
the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an
impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident
occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to
INELCO’s consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise.
Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering
damages as a result of the death caused by INELCO’s negligence
Reasoning
- INELCO can be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are
fortuitous events. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered
Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said
eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the
intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place.
- In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City on the
night of June 28 until the early hours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary
diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or
avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does
not show that defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that
there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor even
manning its office.
- INELCO was negligent in seeing that no harm is done to the general
public"... considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the
measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with
or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of
diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be"
The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself
from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous
event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the
RAMOS V PEPSI COLA
19 SCRA 289
1967
FACTS
- The facts with regard the accident that Andres Bonifacio caused is not in the
case. The Court limited its ruling on the decision of the CA to absolve
defendant Pepsi Cola from liability under Article 2180 6 of the Civil Code.
There was, however, a finding that Bonifacio was in fact negligent.
- The petiton for appeal questioned the testimony of one Anasco with regard
the process and procedures followed by Pepsi in the hiring and supervision of
its drivers. The SC ruled that the issue brought before it with regard the
credibility of Anasco is one of fact and not of law. It went on to stay that the
CA is a better judge of the facts.
ISSUE
WON Pepsi Cola is liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability
HELD
NO
- The Court ruled that based on the evidence and testimonies presented
during the trial, Pepsi Cola exercised the due diligence of a good father in the
hiring and supervision of its drivers. This being the case, the Company is
relieved of any responsibility from the accident.
Reasoning
- In its ruling, the court citing its ruling on Bahia as follows:
“ From this article (2180) two things are apparent:
(1) that when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant
or
employee there instantly arise a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the employer or
master either n the
selection of the servant or employee, or in
the supervision over him
after the selection, or both, and
(2) that they presumption is juris tantum ( so much or so little of law) and
not juris et de jure (of law and from law), and consequently may be
rebutted .
- It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the
court that in the selection and supervision he has exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of the family, the presumption is overcome and he
is relieved from liability.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible,
…
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
…
The responsibility treated of this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
6
prof. casis
- It was shown in this case that Pesi Cola did not merely satisfy itself that
Bonifacio possessed a driver’s license. A background check was done and
he was required to submit various clearances, previous experience, and
medical records. He was also made to undergo both theoretical and practical
driving tests prior to being hired as driver. In terms of the aspect of
supervision, the petitioners raised no questions. Given this, the proof called
for under Article 2180 to show diligence of a good father of a family has been
met.
Disposition Decision of the CA is affirmed.
METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP V CA (CUSTODIA)
223 SCRA 521
REGALADO; June 21, 1993
FACTS
- At about six o'clock in the morning of August 28, 1979, plaintiff-appellant
Nenita Custodio boarded as a paying passenger a public utility jeepney, then
driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-defendant Victorino
Lamayo, bound for her work, where she then worked as a machine operator
earning P16.25 a day.
- While the jeepney was travelling at a fast clip along DBP Avenue, Bicutan,
Taguig, another fast moving vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC)
bus driven by defendant Godofredo C. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew
Road, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila bound for its terminal at Bicutan.
- As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP Avenue and
Honeydew Road they failed to slow down and slacken their speed; neither did
they blow their horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a consequence, a
collision between them occurred, the passenger jeepney ramming the left
side portion of the MMTC bus. The collision impact caused plaintiff-appellant
Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passenger jeepney and
(she) was thrown out therefrom, falling onto the pavement unconscious with
serious physical injuries.
- She was brought to the Medical City Hospital where she regained
consciousness only after one (1) week. Thereat, she was confined for twentyfour (24) days, and as a consequence, she was unable to work for three and
one half months (31/2).
- A complaint for damages was filed by herein private respondent, who being
then a minor was assisted by her parents, against all of therein named
defendants following their refusal to pay the expenses incurred by the former
as a result of the collision.
- Said defendants denied all the material allegations in the complaint and
pointed an accusing finger at each other as being the party at fault. Further,
herein petitioner MMTC, a government-owned corporation and one of the
defendants in the court a quo, along with its driver, Godofredo Leonardo,
contrarily averred in its answer with cross-claim and counterclaim that the
MMTC bus was driven in a prudent and careful manner by driver Leonardo
and that it was the passenger jeepney which was driven recklessly
considering that it hit the left middle portion of the MMTC bus, and that it was
defendant Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney and employer of driver Calebag,
who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees and should thus be held solidarily liable for damages caused to
the MMTC bus through the fault and negligence of its employees.
- Defendant Victorino Lamayo alleged that the damages suffered by therein
plaintiff should be borne by defendants MMTC and its driver, Godofredo
Leonardo, because the latter's negligence was the sole and proximate cause
torts & damages
of the accident and that MMTC failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees.
ISSUES
1. WON the oral testimonies of witnesses even without the presentation
documentary evidence, prove that driver Leonardo had complied with all the
hiring and clearance requirements and had undergone all trainings, tests and
examinations preparatory to actual employment, and that said positive
testimonies spell out the rigid procedure for screening of job applicants and
the supervision of its employees in the field
2. WON petitioner exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of
its employees
HELD
1. While there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence, to hold
sway, must be corroborated by documentary evidence, or even subject
evidence for that matter, inasmuch as the witnesses' testimonies dwelt on
mere generalities, we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive
proof that there was observance of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees.
- Petitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection
and supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was
unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object or documentary,
which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony.
- It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own
affirmative assertion by the degree of evidence required by law. The party,
whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the
burden of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence required by law to
obtain a favorable judgment. It is entirely within each of the parties discretion,
consonant with the theory of the case it or he seeks to advance and subject
to such procedural strategy followed thereby, to present all available
evidence at its or his disposal in the manner which may be deemed
necessary and beneficial to prove its or his position, provided only that the
same shall measure up to the quantum of evidence required by law. In
making proof in its or his case, it is paramount that the best and most
complete evidence be formally entered.
- Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has been observed
by petitioner is a matter of proof which under the circumstances in the case at
bar has not been clearly established. It is not felt by the Court that there is
enough evidence on record as would overturn the presumption of negligence,
and for failure to submit all evidence within its control, assuming the putative
existence thereof, petitioner MMTC must suffer the consequences of its own
inaction and indifference.
2. In any event, we do not find the evidence presented by petitioner
sufficiently convincing to prove the diligence of a good father of a family,
which for an employer doctrinally translates into its observance of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees but which
mandate, to use an oft-quoted phrase, is more often honored in the breach
than in the observance.
- Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's procedure for
screening job applicants and supervising its employees in the field, through
the testimonies of Milagros Garbo, as its training officer, and Christian
Bautista, as its transport supervisor, both of whom naturally and expectedly
testified for MMTC.
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- Their statements strike us as both presumptuous and in the nature of petitio
principii, couched in generalities and shorn of any supporting evidence to
boost their verity.
- The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Article 2176 and 2177, in
relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code provisions on quasi-delicts as all the
elements thereof are present, to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (2)
fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he
must respond, and (3) the connection of cause and effect between fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by plaintiff. It is to be
noted that petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver Leonardo
under Article 2180.
- Article 2180 applicable only where there is an employer-employee
relationship, although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged in
business or industry. Employer is liable for torts committed by his employees
within the scope of their assigned tasks. But, it is necessary first to establish
the employment relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to
hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his
assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that
the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. The diligence of
a good father of a family required to be observed by employers to prevent
damages under Article 2180 refers to due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees in order to protect the public.
- With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against the
defendant driver and of an employer-employee relation between him and his
co-defendant MMTC in this instance, the case in undoubtedly based on a
quasi-delict under Article 2180. When the employee causes damage due to
his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris
tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of
observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. For failure to rebut
such legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of
employees, the employer is likewise responsible for damages, the basis of
the liability being the relationship of pater familias or on the employer's own
negligence.
- Due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of
suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and
persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees
and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in
case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts
indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer.
- In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to
emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on
hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the
presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the
burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of
employees but also in the actual supervision of their work.
- Finally, we believe that respondent court acted in the exercise of sound
discretion when it affirmed the trial court's award, without requiring the
payment of interest thereon as an item of damages just because of delay in
the determination thereof, especially since private respondent did not
specifically pray therefor in her complaint. Article 2211 of the Civil Code
provides that in quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may be
awarded in the discretion of the court, and not as a matter of right.
prof. casis
KRAMER VS CA (TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES)
178 SCRA 289
GANCAYCO; October 13, 1989
FACTS
- The F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta
Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near
Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an
inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned byTrans-Asia Shipping
Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking
with it its fish catch.
- The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch
was due to the negligence of the employees of Trans-Asia. The Kramers
instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent before
Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City. Trans-Asia filed a
motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription.
He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period
for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a
maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners should
have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of
action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place,
and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted
beyond the four-year prescriptive period.
Petitioner’s claim:
- that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only
persons with special skill, training and experience like the members of the
Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve
- that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the
marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982,
the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the
M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the four-year prescriptive
period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said
date.
ISSUE
WON a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the
private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by presciption
HELD
YES
- Under A1146 CC, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted
within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasidelict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, this Court ruled that in an action
for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being
based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted
from the day of the collision.
- In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, this Court
held: The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which
consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the
part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part
of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last
element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action
has arisen. From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period
must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the
torts & damages
time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the
plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises. It is therefore
clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of 2 vessels the
4 year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The
aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body
like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or
negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages.
Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the
courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel
of the other vessel. Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action
of petitioner has prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The
complaint for damages was filed in court only on May 30, 1 985, was beyond
the 4 year prescriptive period.
Disposition petition is dismissed.
ALLIED BANKING V CA (YUJUICO)
178 SCRA 526
GANCAYCO; October 13, 1989
NATURE
Petition seeking the reversal of the decision of CA in "Joselito Z. Yujuico vs.
Hon. Domingo D. Panis, RTC Judge of Manila and Allied Banking Corp.,"1
and the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said
decision.
FACTS
- Mar 25, 1977 - Respondent Yujuico, a ranking officer in General Bank and
Trust Company (GENBANK) and a member of the family owning control of
the said bank, obtained a loan from the said institution in the amount of 500K.
Private respondent issued a promissory note in favor of GENBANK.
- March 25, 1977 – the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued a
resolution forbidding GENBANK from doing business in the Phil. It was
followed by another resolution ordering the liquidation of GENBANK.
- In the Memorandum of Agreement between Allied Banking Corp (Allied) and
Amulfo Aurellano as liquidator of GENBANK, Allied acquired all the assets
and assumed the liabilityies of GENBANK, including the receivable due from
Yujuico.
- Yujuico failed to comply with his obligation prompting Allied to file a
complaint for the collection of a sum of money before the CFI Manila (now
RTC).
- First case: CA affirmed RTC decision in a special proceeding finding that
the liquidation of GENBANK was made in bad faith. This decision declared as
null and void the liquidation of GENBANK. It was then that Yujuico filed the
third party complaint to transfer liability for the default imputed against him by
the petitioner to the proposed third-party7 defendants because of their tortious
acts which prevented him from performing his obligations.
- Second and current proceeding (1987) – Yujuico filed a motion to admit
Ammended/Supplemental Answer and a Third Party Complaint to impead the
Central Bank and Aurellano as third-party defendants. The complaint alleged
A third-party complaint is a procedural device whereby a "third-party" who is neither a party nor privy
to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave of court, by the
defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the plaintiffs claim. The third party
complaint is independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint.
7
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that by reason of the tortuous interference by the CB with the affairs of
GENBANK, he was prevented from performing his obligation such that he
should not be held liable thereon. RTC Judge Mintu denied the third-party
complaint but admitted the amended/supplemental answer. The case was
re-raffled where presiding Judge Panis reiterated the order made by Judge
Mintu. Both parties filed for motions of partial reconsideration, which were
both denied.
- CA, in a petition for certiorari questioning the denied motions, rendered a
decision nullifying the RTC order. The RTC judge was found to be in grave
abuse of discretion and was ordered to admit the third-party complaint.
- Petitioner claims that the cause of action alleged in the third-party complaint
has already prescribed. Being founded on what was termed as "tortious
interference," petitioner asserts that under the CC on quasi-delict" the action
against third-party defendants should have been filed within four (4) years
from the date the cause of action accrued. On the theory that the cause of
action accrued on March 25, 1977, the date when the Monetary Board
ordered GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines, petitioner
maintains that the claim should have been filed at the latest on March 25,
1981. On the other hand, private respondent relies on the "Doctrine of
Relations" or "Relations Back Doctrine" to support his claim that the cause of
action as against the proposed third-party defendant accrued only on
December 12,1986 when the decision in CA (first case)became final and
executory. It is contended that while the third party complaint was filed only
on June 17,1987, it must be deemed to have been instituted on February 7,
1979 when the complaint in the case was filed.
ISSUE
1. WON there was ground to admit the third-party complaint
2. WON the cause of action under the third-party complaint prescribed
HELD
1. YES
- The first instance is allowable and should be allowed if it will help in
clarifying in a single proceeding the multifarious issues involved arising from
a single transaction.
- The judgment of the CA in its first decision is the substantive basis of private
respondent's proposed third-party complaint. There is merit in private
respondent's position that if held liable on the promissory note, they are
seeking, by means of the third-party complaint, to transfer unto the third-party
defendants liability on the note by reason of the illegal liquidation of
GENBANK which was the basis for the assignment of the promissory note. If
there was any confusion at all on the ground/s alleged in the third-party
complaint, it was the claim of third-party plaintiff for other damages in addition
to any amount which he may be called upon to pay under the original
complaint. While these allegations in the proposed third-party complaint may
cause delay in the disposition of the main suit, it cannot be outrightly asserted
that it would not serve any purpose.
- The tests to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a third-party claim
is "in respect of plaintiff 's claim" are: (a) whether it arises out of the same
transaction on which the plaintiff's claim is based, or whether the third-party's
claim, although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is
connected with the plaintiffs claim; (b) whether the third-party defendant
would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs
claim against the original defendant, although the third-party defendant's
liability arises out of another transaction; or (c) whether the third-party
prof. casis
defendant may assert any defense which the third-party plaintiff has, or may
have against plaintiffs claim. (Capayas v CFI Albay)
The claim of third-party plaintiff, private respondent herein, can be
accommodated under tests (a) and (b) abovementioned.
2. YES
- The action for damages instituted by private respondent arising from the
quasidelict or alleged "tortious interference" should be filed within four 4 years
from the day the cause of action accrued.
- It is from the date of the act or omission violative of the right of a party when
the cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period
must be reckoned. (Español vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Admistration)
- While the third party complaint in this case may be admitted as above
discussed, since the cause of action accrued on March 25, 1980 when the
Monetary Board ordered the GENBANK to desist from doing business in the
Philippines while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17, 1987,
consequently, the action has prescribed. The third party complaint should not
be admitted.
Disposition petition is GRANTED. The decision of CA denying the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner are hereby reversed and set aside and
declared null and void, and another judgment is hereby rendered sustaining
the orders of the RTC denying the admission of the third party complaint
CAUSATION
BATACLAN V MEDINA
102 PHIL 181
MONTEMAYOR; October 22, 1957
FACTS
- Juan Bataclan rode Bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation, driven by
Saylon, shortly after midnight. While the bus was running very fast on a
highway, one of the front tires burst. The bus fell into a canal and turned
turtle. Four passengers could not get out, including Bataclan. It appeared that
gasoline began to leak from the overturned bus. Ten men came to help. One
of them carried a torch and when he approached the bus, a fierce fire started,
burning the four passengers trapped inside.
- The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned
the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it;
that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered
physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were
awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him.
ISSUES
What is the proximate cause of death of the four passengers?
HELD
The proximate cause of death is the overturning of the bus.
- see definition of proximate cause under A1
- It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a
passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, "If through some event,
unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by
lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and
the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate
torts & damages
cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in
the present case and under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do
not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not
only on 'Its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from
the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a
lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves,
and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers
had to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch, the most
handy and available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers
should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and
effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men
with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the
overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for
outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be
attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor.
According to the witnesses, the driver and the conductor were on the road
walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have
known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could
and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and
around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially
over a large area, can be smelt and detected -even from a distance, and yet
neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken
steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
-(I guess this case says, if not for the overturning of the bus… then the leak
and the fire wouldn’t have happened)
FERNANDO V CA (City of Davao)
208 SCRA 714
MEDIALDEA; May 8, 1992
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition
request with the Chief of Property for the re-emptying of the septic tank of
Agdao. Invitations to bid for cleaning out the tanks were issued, which was
won by Bascon. However, before the date they were to work, one of the
bidders, Bertulano, and four other companions including an Alberto Fernando
were found dead inside the septic tank. The City Engineer’s office, upon
investigation, found that the men entered without clearance or consent of the
market master. They apparently did the re-emptying as the tank was nearly
empty. The autopsy showed that the victims died of asphyxia caused by lack
of oxygen supply in the body. Their lungs had burst due to their intake of toxic
sulfide gas produced from the waste matter in said tank.
*Di nakalagay sa case, pero mukhang kinasuhan ni Sofia Fernando yung
Davao City for negligence in a previous case dahil namatay yung asawa nya
- Upon dismissal of the case by the TC, petitioners appealed to then IAC
(now CA) which set aside the judgment and rendered a new one, granting the
families of the deceased men P30k each in compensatory damages, P20k
each as moral damages and P10k for attorney’s fees.
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- Both parties filed their separate MFRs; the CA rendered an amended
decision granting Davao City’s MFR, dismissing the case. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
1. WON Davao City is guilty of negligence
2. WON such negligence is the proximate cause of the deaths of the victims
HELD
1. NO
- Although public respondent had been remiss in its duty to re-empty the tank
annually (for almost 20 years), such negligence was not a continuing one.
Upon learning from the market master about the need to clean said tank, it
immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. Public
respondent lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation.
Also, public respondent’s failure to empty the tank had not caused any
sanitary accidents despite its proximity to several homes and the public
market as it was covered in lead and was air-tight. In fact, the public toilet
connected to it was used several times daily all those years, and all those
people have remained unscathed which is ironically evidenced by the
petitioner’s witnesses. The only indication that the tank was full was when
water began to leak, and even then no reports of casualties from gas poising
emerged.
- Petitioners in fussing over the lack of ventilation in the tanks backfired as
their witnesses were no experts. Neither did they present competent
evidence to corroborate their testimonies and rebut the city government
engineer Alindada’s testimony that safety requirements for the tank had been
complied with.
- The Court also does not agree with petitioner’s contention that warning
signs of noxious gas should be placed around the area of the toilets and
septic tank. As defined in Art 694 of the NCC, they are not nuisances per se
which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public.
- Petitioner’s contention that the market master should have been supervising
the area of the tank is also untenable. Work on the tank was still forthcoming
since the awarding to the winning bidder was yet to be made by the
Committee on Awards—hence, there was nothing to supervise.
2. NO
- Proximate cause is defined as that cause which in natural and continuous
sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred. To be entitled to
damages, one must prove under Art 2179 of the NCC that the defendant’s
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. A test for such a
relationship is given in Taylor v Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. which
states that a distinction must be made between the accident and the injury,
between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident,
and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing to his own proper hurt.
- A toxic gas leakage could only have happened by opening the tank’s cover.
The accident is thus of the victims’ own doing—an ordinarily prudent person
should be aware of the attended risks of cleaning out the tank. This was
especially true for the victim, Bertulano, since he was an old hand to septic
services and is expected to know the hazards of the job. The victims’ failure
to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of
the accident.
- When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring
professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the
care and skill required in what he attempts to do. As the CA observed, the
prof. casis
victims would not have died, had they not opened the tank which they were
not authorized to open in the first place. They find it illogical that the septic
tank which had been around since the 50’s would be the proximate cause of
an accident which occurred only 20 years later, especially since no other
deaths or injuries related to the tank had ever occurred.
Disposition amended decision of the CA is AFFIRMED
URBANO V IAC
157 SCRA 1
GUTIERREZ JR; January 7, 1988
NATURE
Petition to review the decision of the then IAC
FACTS
ON oct. 23, 1980, Marcelo Javier was hacked by the Filomeno Urbano using
a bolo. As a result of which, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his
right palm.
On November 14, 1981, which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier
was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the
hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo
Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious
condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing
wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. On
November 15, 1980, Javier died in the hospital.
- In an information, Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before
the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City.
- The trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. The lower courts held that
Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful
act. He was sentenced accordingly.
- The then IAC affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal.
- Appellant alleges that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to
his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly
healed, and that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first
week of November, 1980. He states that the proximate cause of the death of
Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found
no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after
two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his
bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
ISSUE
WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was
wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death
HELD
YES.
- The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally
responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural
and logical consequences resulting therefrom."
- The record is clear that - The evidence on record does not clearly show
that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the
infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which
was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal
torts & damages
ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound
was infected is not clear from the record.
- PROXIMATE CAUSE "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result therefrom."
- The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the
appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However,
over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short
incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within
2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
- Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and
headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting
complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty
swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients
often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the
commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar
descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes
generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity
and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion
of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury.
In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree,
and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle
groups affected.
- Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an
interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period,
a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused
by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which
increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of
muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous.
As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more
intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration
may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles
which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible
central nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and
an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia
is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe
tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is
marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation
remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus
include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe
trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized
convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition,
pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
- Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's
body depends on the incubation period of the disease.
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prof. casis
- 43 -
- In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm
when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident
took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he
suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The
following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already
infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that
Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because
the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident
or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset
time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the
second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the
time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus
that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have
been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected
by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we
are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The
medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of
the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the
time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
- Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the
remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's
death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
- A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of
the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause
DISPOSITION :. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. (CARBONEL) VS. IAC
(DIONISIO)
148 SCRA 353
FELICIANO, MARCH 10, 1987
NATURE
Petition for review
FACTS
-About 1:30 am, Leonardo Dionisio (DIONISIO) was driving home (he lived in
Bangkal, Makati) from cocktails/dinner meeting with his boss where he had
taken “a shot or two” of liquor. He had just crossed the intersection of General
Lacuna and General Santos Sts. At Bangkal, Makati (not far from his home)
and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street without headlights when he
hit a dump truck owned by Phoenix Construction Inc. (PHOENIX), which was
parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (DIONISIO’s lane).
The dump truck was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the
street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor
any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump
truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven
home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel (CARBONEL), its regular driver,
with the permission of his employer PHOENIX, in view of work scheduled to
be carried out early the following morning, DIONISIO claimed that he tried to
avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car
smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, DIONISIO suffered
some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous
breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
DIONISIO’s claim: the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the
negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to
him by his employer Phoenix
PHOENIX + CARBONEL’s claim: the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries
was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while
under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew
pass; if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was
parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that
private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening,
efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained.
TC: in favor of Dionisio, awarded damages in favor of Dionisio
IAC: in favor of Dionisio, reduced the damages awarded
ISSUES
Factual issues: (court discussed this to administer substantial justice without
remanding the case to the lower court – since both TC and IAC did not
consider defenses set by petitioners)
1. WON private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for
that eventful night
2. WON Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the
dump truck;
3. WON Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact
with the dump truck
4. WON Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
Substantial Issues:
5. WON the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's
injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was
parked
a. WON the driver’s negligence was merely a "passive and static condition"
and that Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause," and
that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal
and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of
Carbonel
b. WON the court, based on the “last clear chance” doctrine, should hold
Dionisio alone responsible for his accident
6. WON Phoenix has successfully proven that they exercised due care in the
selection and supervision of the dump truck driver
7. WON the amount of damages awarded should be modified
HELD
FACTUAL
torts & damages
1. NO. none was found with Dionisio. He was not able to produce any curfew
pass during the trial. (It is important to determine if he had a curfew pass to
shed light to the 2nd and 3rd factual issues)
-Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken DIONISIO to Makati Med
testified that none was found with Dionisio. Although Dionisio offered a
certification attesting that he did have a valid curfew pass, the certification did
not specify any serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed
curfew pass.
2. YES. Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno attesting that people gathered at the
scene of the accident told him that Dionisio’s Car was MOVING FAST and
that he DID NOT have its HEADLIGTS ON.
Ratio. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official
records exception to the hearsay rule but rather as part of the res gestae.
Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule consists of
excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or event
sufficiently startling in nature so as to render inoperative the normal reflective
thought processes of the observer and hence made as a spontaneous
reaction to the occurrence or event, and not the result of reflective thought.
-Dionisio claimed that he was traveling at 30kph and had just crossed the
intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had started
to accelerate when his headlights failed just before the collision took place.
He also asserts that Patrolman Cuyno’s testimony was hearsay and did not
fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts
he testified to were not acquired by him through official information and had
not been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
-BUT: an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a
stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to
evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from observers who
happened to be around at that time. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was
therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should have been
considered by the trial court. Clearly, substantial weight should have been
ascribed to such testimony, even though it did not, as it could not, have
purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at which Dionisio was
travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck.
3. YES. Phoenix’s theory more credible than Dionisio’s.
DIONISIO’S CLAIM: he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment,
these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off,
although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split
seconds before contact with the dump truck
PHOENIX’s CLAIM: Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he
reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police
precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from
the intersection (less than 200m away).
4. NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE ANYTHING.
EVIDENCE PRESENTED: Patrolman Cuyno attested that Dionisio smelled of
liquor at the time he was taken to Makati med + Dionisio admitted he had
taken “a shot or two”
- not enough evidence to show how much liquor Dionisio had in fact taken
and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or
mental alertness. "One shot or two" of hard liquor may affect different people
differently.
SUBSTANTIAL
5. YES. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump track was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. Private respondent
Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
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proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care"
and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though
such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts
a. NO. Besides, this argument had no validity under our jurisdiction and even
in the United States, the distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have
already been "almost entirely discredited.
- the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition"
was rather an indispensable and efficient cause; Dionisio's negligence,
although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore
closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent
cause. The petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio
and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck
driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and
overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact
between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to
sever the juris vinculum of liability.
FROM PROF. PROSSER AND KEETON: "Cause and condition. Many courts have
sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing
"conditions" upon which that cause operated If the defendant has created only a
passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to
be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary
antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result, it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since,
as is invariably the case the latter am the result of other active forces which have gone
before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but
the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the
gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and
since that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the defendant will not escape
responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition"
remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway
may still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward. "Cause" and
"condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is
now almost entirely discredited So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the
type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a
position of apparent safety. and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it
is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important, but the
nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause."
"Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary
human experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has
reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent,
among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be
negligent only for that reason Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that
an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising later will spread it beyond the defendant's
own property, and therefore to take precautions to prevent that event. The person who
leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the
risk of fire from some independent source. x x x In all of these cases there is an
intervening cause combining with the defendant's conduct to produce the result
and in each case the defendant's negligence consists in failure to protect the
plaintiff against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or
a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected
the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the
scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are
quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not
supersede the defendant's responsibility.
Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the usual weather of
the vicinity, including all ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or rain, or snow or
frost or fog or even lightning; that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a
railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it; x x x.
The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable
negligence of others. x x x [T]he standard of reasonable conduct may require the
prof. casis
defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that occasional negligence which is one
of the ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be anticipated.' Thus, a
defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the
plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is
run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an
automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when
another negligently drives into it - - "
b. NO. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into
our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to
what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last
clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common
law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery
by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
-The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the
defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors
that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the
nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and
gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the
community.
ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE: The historical function of that
doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another
common law doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence. The common
law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff
who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor
as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The
common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to
a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the
last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so.
6. NO. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its track driver to bring the
dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the
following morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the
part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked
when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in
vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
7. YES. Taking into account the comparative negligence ot DIONISIO
and the petitioners, the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by
allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. As to the other awards
of damages, sustain.
20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the
award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's
fees and costs, shall be home by private respondent Dionisio; only the
balance of 800% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who
shall be solidarily liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary
damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be home exclusively by
the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from
Carbonel.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is
modified by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss
of expected income and moral damages private respondent Dionisio is
entitled to by 20% of such amount. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
torts & damages
PILIPINAS BANK V CA (REYES)
234 SCRA 435
PUNO; July 25, 1994
NATURE
- Petition for review of CA decision
FACTS
- FLORENCIO REYES issued two postdated checks. These are for WINNER
INDUSTRIAL CORP. in amount of P21T due Oct.10, 1979 and for Vicente
TUI in amount of P11.4T due Oct.12.
- To cover the face value of the checks, he requested PCIB Money Shop's
manager to effect the withdrawal of P32T from his savings account and have
it deposited with his current account with PILIPINAS BANK.
- PILIPINAS BANK’S Current Account Bookkeeper made an error in
depositing the amount: he thought it was for a certain FLORENCIO
AMADOR. He, thus, posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing
that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES.
- On Oct.11, the Oct.10 check in favor of WINNER INDUSTRIAL was
presented for payment. Since the ledger of Florencio REYES indicated that
his account had only a balance of P4,078.43, it was dishonored and the
payee was advised to try it for next clearing.
- It was redeposited but was again dishonored. The same thing happened to
the Oct.12 check. The payee then demanded a cash payment of the check’s
face value which REYES did if only to save his name.
- Furious, he immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate
verification of his account. That was only when they noticed the error.
RTC: ordered petitioner to pay P200T compensatory damages, P100T moral
damages, P25T attorney’s fees, as well as costs of suit.
CA: modified amount to just P50T moral damages and P25T attorney’s fees
and costs of suit.
ISSUE
WON Art.21798 of NCC is applicable
HELD
NO
- For it to apply, it must be established that private respondent's own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury.
Definition of Proximate Cause: "any cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result
complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it
ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of
ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would
result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence."
Reasoning The proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's
employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the
name of another depositor who had a similar first name.
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
8
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prof. casis
- 45 -
- The bank employee is deemed to have failed to exercise the degree of care
required in the performance of his duties.
Dispositive Petition denied.
QUEZON CITY V DACARA
PANGANIBAN; JUNE 15, 2005
NATURE
Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
-On February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., owner of
’87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan, while driving the said vehicle, rammed into
a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was
then being repaired by the Quezon City government.
-As a result, Dacara, Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle
suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
-Indemnification was sought from the city government, which however,
yielded negative results.
-Fulgencio P. Dacara, for and in behalf of his minor son, filed a Complaint for
damages against Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon.
-Defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but alleged that the
subject diggings was provided with a mound of soil and barricaded with
reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible
during the incident.
-In short, defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the
area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident, and that the
reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely because
of the latter’s negligence and failure to exercise due care.
-RTC ruled in favor of Dacara, ordering the defendants to indemnify the
plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand pesos as actual/compensatory damages,
P10,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and other costs of suit.
-Upon appeal, CA agreed with the RTC’s finding that petitioners’ negligence
was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent.
-Hence, this Petition
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner’s negligence is the proximate cause of the
incident
2. WON moral damages are recoverable
3. WON exemplary damages and attorney’s fees are recoverable
HELD
1. Yes.
-Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, such that the result would not have occurred
otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case,
upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent.
-What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue that
this Court cannot pass upon, absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of
judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis
for their conclusions.
-The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that
petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars us from
supplanting their findings and substituting these with our own.
-That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident
was aptly discussed in the lower court’s finding:
“Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February
28, 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when
his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging done
relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a
reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an
adequate warning to motorists especially during the thick of the night where
darkness is pervasive. Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the
defense that there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could
not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to
stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed.
If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it be explained that
according to the report even of the policeman, none was found at the scene
of the accident.
-“The provisions of Article 2189 9 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the
responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and
bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure
of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision is tantamount to
negligence which renders the City government liable
-Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at the speed of
60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the accident. This speed was
allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on “city streets with
light traffic,” as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
Thus, petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr., having violated a traffic regulation,
should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code.
-These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any time during
the trial. It is evident from the records that they brought up for the first time in
their Motion for Reconsideration.
-It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. To consider their
belatedly raised arguments at this stage of the proceedings would trample on
the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process.
-Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts’ findings, which are amply
substantiated by the evidence on record, clearly point to petitioners’
negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondent’s
car. No adequate reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion.
2. No.
-To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied with proof of the
following requisites: (1) an injury--whether physical, mental, or psychological-clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or omission factually
established; (3) a wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages
predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219.
-Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasidelicts, provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries. There can
be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in physical
injury.
-In the present case, the Complaint alleged that respondent’s son Fulgencio
Jr. sustained physical injuries.
. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered
by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or supervision.
9
torts & damages
-It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts,
however, that no other evidence (such as a medical certificate or proof of
medical expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr.’s bare assertion of
physical injury. Thus, there was no credible proof that would justify an award
of moral damages based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code.
-Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate
and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person.
-Well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded in the
absence of proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, or similar injury. The award of moral damages must be solidly
anchored on a definite showing that respondent actually experienced
emotional and mental sufferings.
3. Yes.
-Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; they can be
awarded only after claimants have shown their entitlement to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages.
-In the case before us, respondent sufficiently proved before the courts a quo
that petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the incident, thereby
establishing his right to actual or compensatory damages. He has adduced
adequate proof to justify his claim for the damages caused his car.
-Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.
-Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a presumption
that the persons at fault must have been conscious of the probable
consequences of their carelessness, and that they must have nevertheless
been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to the person or property of
others. The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of
persons or property.
-Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case.
-The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any
adverse consequence of their failure to install even a single warning device at
the area under renovation.
-Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. The award of
these damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially deleterious actions.
Dispositive
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with the modification that
the award of moral damages is deleted.
GABETO V. ARANETA
42 Phil 252. October 17, 1921 Street
Facts:
Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza
Gay, in the City of Iloilo, with a view to going to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in
the same City. When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and
started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out
into the street, and laying his hands on the reins, stopped the horse, at the
same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata
first. The driver, one Julio Pagnaya, replied to the effect that he had not heard
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prof. casis
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or seen the call of Araneta, and that he had taken up the two passengers
then in the carromata as the first who had offered employment. At or about
the same time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from
the control of Agaton Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing,
however, to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the
rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the
horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out, which he
did, in order to fix the bridle. The horse was then pulled over to near the curb,
by one or the other — it makes no difference which — and Pagnaya tried to
fix the bridle.
While he was thus engaged, the horse, being free from the
control of the bit, became disturbed and moved forward, in doing which he
pulled one of the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed
Julio Pagnaya over. After going a few yards further the side of the carromata
struck a police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk, upon
which the box came down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an
extent that he set out at full speed up the street.
Meanwhile one of the passengers, to wit. Basilio Ilano, had
alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside the sidewalk; but the other,
Proceso Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after the
runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission
Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing
received injuries from which he soon died.
This action was brought by Consolacion Gabeto, in her own right
as widow of Proceso Gayetano, and as guardian ad litem of the three
children, Conchita Gayetano, Rosita Gayetano, and Fermin Gayetano, for the
purpose of recovering damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the
death of the said Proceso Gayetano, supposedly caused by the wrongful act
of the defendant Agaton Araneta.
Judge awarded damages to the widow to which decision Araneta
appealed.
Issue: WON the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the
street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be
considered the legal or proximate cause thereof
Held: NO. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of
which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. it was Julio
who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth;
and Julio, after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and proceeded to fix
the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when the
horse, feeling himself free from control, started to go away.
Disposition: Judgment is REVERSED.
URBANO V IAC (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES)
157 SCRA 1
GUTIERREZ; January 7, 1988
Nature : This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court
Facts:When Filomeno Urbano found the place where he stored his palay
flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had
overflowed he went to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier
admitted that he was the one responsible for what happened. Urbano then
got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel
between them ensued. Urbano hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of
his hand . Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was
overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with
the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg.
On November 14,1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital
in a very serious condition. Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the
latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the
presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected
by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 Javier died in the hospital.
Appellant’s claim:
-there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased
was wounded to the time of his death
-the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in
going back to work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that
he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November,
1980
- Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his
farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound
to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
ISSUE:
WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was
wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death
HELD:
Yes. The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of
the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the
time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
Reasoning:
-The case involves the application of Article 410 of the Revised Penal Code.
-The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by
Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound.
The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at
the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got
infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not
clear from the record.
-In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the
following definition of proximate cause:
"x x x A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38,
pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffsappellants in
their brief. It is as follows:
"x x x 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, the proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or
Art. 4. Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended x x x." Pursuant to this provision "an
accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom
10
torts & damages
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom.' (at pp. 185-186)
-The court looked into the nature of tetanus to determine the cause
-Medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body
depends on the incubation period of the disease.
- Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the
bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October
23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms
of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15,
1980, he died.
If,therefore,the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected
by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should
have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms
of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than
14 days after the infliction of the wound.
-Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible
conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant,
the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently,
Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound
could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days
before he died. The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection
was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v.
Cardenas, supra)
As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remaquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"'A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances, which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is
the proximate cause. '(45 C.J. pp. 931-932)." (at p. 125)
FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA (PPA)
297 SCRA 30
REGALADO; October 1, 1998
NATURE
Review on certiorari the CA decision affirming TC decision holding FESC and
Gavino solidarily liable
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FACTS
- On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the
USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC),
arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00
o'clock in the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila
International Port, as its berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was
tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel.
Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots'
Association (MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the
vessel to Berth No. 4.
- Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed
himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside
him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel
and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and
proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind
was ideal for docking maneuvers.
- When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North
Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped.
When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered
the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel
on the bow. The left anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However, the
anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not
slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. A brief
conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino
inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino that
there was nothing to it.
- After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the
engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron noticed that
the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the
anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code.
Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of
the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to
the pier. The vessel sustained damage too. Kavankov filed his sea protest.
Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the
Philippine Ports Authority. Abellana likewise submitted his report of the
incident.
- The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the
amount of P1,126,132.25.
PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE
- The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under
compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section 8, Article III of Philippine Ports
Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85:
SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. — For entering a harbor and
anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage
district, as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting
from one berth or another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign
trade shall be under compulsory pilotage.
- In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and responsibilities of
the compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same
regulation:
SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. — On compulsory
pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall
be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at
ports due to his negligence or fault. He can only be absolved from liability
if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided
prof. casis
he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize
damage.
The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage
grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command
of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage caused to a
vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence
of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered
owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said
Master
Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be
determined by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the light
of the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association.
— The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the
time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or
berthed safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at
the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order.
- Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier
likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the responsibilities of pilots:
Par. XXXIX. — A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a
vessel from the time he assumes control thereof until he leaves it
anchored free from shoal; Provided, That his responsibility shall cease at
the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his instructions.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Par. XLIV. — Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels
under their control when requested to do so by the master of such
vessels.
ISSUE
WON both the pilot and the master were negligent
HELD
YES.
- The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object and
a moving object, there is a presumption of fault against the moving object
(based on common sense and logic). It then went on to determine who
between the pilot and the master was negligent.
PILOT
- A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a
vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. He is an expert who’s
supposed to know the seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not know
because the pilot is familiar with the port. He is charged to perform his duties
with extraordinary care because the safety of people and property on the
vessel and on the dock are at stake.
- Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court found that his reaction
time (4 minutes) to the anchor not holding ground and the vessel still going
too fast was too slow. As an expert he should’ve been reacting quickly to any
such happenings.
MASTER
- In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the
vessel. The master, however may intervene or countermand the pilot if he
deems there is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot
or if the pilot is drunk.
torts & damages
- Based on Capt. Kavankov’s testimony, he never sensed the any danger
even when the anchor didn’t hold and they were approaching the dock too
fast. He blindly trusted the pilot. This is negligence on his part. He was right
beside the pilot during the docking, so he could see and hear everything that
the pilot was seeing and hearing.
- The master’s negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel, and in
turn means negligence on the part of FESC.
CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS
- As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need
not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence,
concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the
proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to
produce injuries, person is not relieved from liability because he is
responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the
person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would
not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not
attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent
tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone,
without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor.
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an
efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury
may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had
against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more
culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the
same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because
it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is
responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole
cause of the injury.
- There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary
since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although
acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion
each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole
injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a
third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the
resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
Disposition Petition denied. CA affirmed. Capt. Gavino and FESC are
solidarily liable.
SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V CUSTODIO, ET AL
17 SCRA 1088
CONCEPCION; August 31, 1966
NATURE
Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
In Barrio Halang, , two trucks, one driven by Mudales and belonging to
Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Lagunda and owned
by Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a road
curve. Custodia, LTB bus passenger who was riding on the running board as
truck was full of passengers, was sideswiped by the truck driven by Lagunda.
As a result, Custodio was injured and died.
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prof. casis
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To avoid any liability, Lagunda and Sabido throw all the blame on Mudales.
However, Makabuhay, widoy of Custodio, testified that the 6 x 6 truck was
running fast when it met the LTB Bus. And Lagunda had time and opportunity
to avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because
the two trucks never collided with each other. By simply swerving to the right
side of the road, the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting Custodio.
The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow passengers took place
on broad daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of June 9, 1955 when the LTB
bus with full load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy
and sliding downward a slope, whereas the six by six truck was climbing up
with no cargoes or passengers on board but for three helpers, owner Sabido
and driver Lagunda (tsn. 308-309, Mendoza). LTB passengers had testified
to the effect that the 6 x 6 cargo truck was running at a fast rate of speed.
Driver Lagunda admitted that three passengers rode on the running board of
the bus when his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus.
Despite the presence of a shallow canal on the right side of the road which he
could pass over with ease, Lagunda did not avert the accident simply
because to use his own language the canal "is not a passage of trucks.
Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court
of Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. — hereinafter
referred to as the carrier — and its driver Mudales (none of whom has
appealed), had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio,
whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by
reason of which all of them were held solidarity liable.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners were guilty of negligence
2. WON petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its
driver
HELD
1. YES. The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of the truck and its
location at the time of the accident are in the nature of findings of fact, which
we cannot disturb in a petition for review by certiorari, such as the one at bar.
At any rate, the correctness of said findings is borne out by the very
testimony of petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers
riding on the running board of the bus while the same was still five or seven
meters away from the truck driven by him. Indeed, the distance between the
two vehicles was such that he could have avoided sideswiping said
passengers if his truck were not running at a great speed.
Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its
execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of
negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. In fact,
the negligence of the first two would not have produced this result without the
negligence of petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners' negligence was
the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's
bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction, so
that, in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear chance.
2. YES. Where the carrier bus and its driver were clearly guilty of contributory
negligence for having allowed a passenger to ride on the running board of the
bus, and where the driver of the other vehicle was also guilty of contributory
negligence, because that vehicle was running at a considerable speed
despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being
close to its right side of the road, it was driven on its middle portion thereof
and so near the passenger bus coming from the opposite as to sideswipe a
passenger on its running board, the owners of the two vehicles are liable
solidarily for the death of the passenger, although the liability of one arises
from a breach of contract, whereas that of the other springs from a quasidelict. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two
or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in
combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third
person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed
to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act
alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might
have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor.
Dispositive Judgment affirmed.
VDA. DE BATACLAN VS. MEDINA
102 PHIL 181
MONTEMAYOR; October 22, 1957
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Cavite
FACTS
- Shortly after midnight, a bus of the Medina Transportation, operated by its
owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience,
left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular
chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about 18 passengers, including the
driver and conductor.
- At about 2am, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus,
Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell
into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle.
- the three passengers Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman
behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned
bus.
- Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard
groans and moans from inside the bus. Calls or shouts for help were made to
the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one
of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end,
evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the
overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all
but consuming the bus, including the 4 passengers trapped inside it. It would
appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from
the gasoline tank.
- That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside
the bus were removed and duly identified that of Bataclan. His widow, Salud
Villanueva brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the
total amount of P87,150.
- the CFI awarded P1,000 plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value
of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan
ISSUES
torts & damages
1. WON there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his
agent, the driver Saylon, thus making him liable.
2. WON the the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus.
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was
speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact
that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the
defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal
where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150
meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in
order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have
been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it
fell into the canal and turned turtle.
Reasoning Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of
common carrier to its passengers and their goods.11
2. YES
Ratio Tthe proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result therefrom.
Reasoning under the circumstances obtaining in the case, we do not
hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this
for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely
on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response
to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by
the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about
2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming
as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not
available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should
innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue
requested from them. Neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to
have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted
torch too near the bus.
- According to the evidence, one of the passengers who, because of the
injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was
visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit, she
overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to
have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were already
old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to change the
said tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions. If this be true, it
goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the
necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers
ART. 1733
ART. 1755
ART. 1759
ART. 1763
11
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- The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned
the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it;
that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered
physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were
awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him.
- In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued,
this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the promotion of the safety of
passengers on public utility buses.
Note: This case was under the heading “but for”. I don’t know if the
italicized phrases are pertinent, but these were the only ones that
contained “but for”.
DISPOSITION
In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the
damages awarded by the trial court are increased to P6,000
and P800, for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's
fees, respectively.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC v. IAC & CASIANO
PASCUA, ET AL.,
189 SCRA 158
MEDIALDEA/August 30, 1990
NATURE: CERTIORARI
FACTS:
- This case is for recovery of damages for the 3 jeepney passengers who
died as a result of the collision between the Phil. Rabbit’s bus driven by
Tomas delos Reyes and the jeepney driven by Tranquilino Manalo.
- Other passengers of the jeepney sustained physical injuries.
- It was said that upon reaching a certain barrio, the jeepney’s right rear
wheel detached which caused it to run in an unbalanced position.
-Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of which, the jeepney which was
then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading
and eventually stopping on the western lane of the road in such a manner
that the jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and its rear
faced the north (towards where it was going).
-The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the greater portion of the
western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north,
among which was Bus No. 753 of Rabbit
- Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn and
encroached on the western lane of the highway, or after stopping for a couple
of minutes, the bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney
which resulted in the said deaths and injuries.
- At the time and in the vicinity of the accident, there were no vehicles
following the jeepney, neither were there oncoming vehicles except the bus.
The weather condition of that day was fair.
- A criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide.
- Manalo was eventually convicted and was imprisoned. The case against
delos Reyes was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.
***As regards the damages.
prof. casis
- Three cases were filed and in all 3 the spouses (owners of the jeepney)
Mangune and Carreon, (jeepney driver)Manalo, Rabbit and (Rabbit’s
driver)delos Reyes were all impleaded as defendants.
- Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and
Manalo on their contractual liability.
- As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs based their suits on their
culpability for a quasi-delict.
- Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. (the insurer of the jeepney)
was also impleaded as additional defendant in the civil case filed by the
Pascuas.
- Damages sought to be claimed in the 3 cases were for medical expenses,
burial expenses, loss of wages, for exemplary damages, moral damages and
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
- Rabbit filed a cross-claim for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
- On the other hand, spouses Mangune and Carreon filed a cross-claim for
the repair of the jeepney and for its non-use during the period of repairs.
- TC: found the couple and Manalo to be NEGLIGENT and held that there
was a breach of the contract of carriage with their passengers; ordered them
to pay the damages. Filriters was jointly and severally liable as it was the
jeepney’s insurer. Rabbit was to be paid by the jeepney party for actual
damages.
- IAC reversed this ruling in the sense that it found delos Reyes to be
negligent; ordered to pay jointly and severally with Rabbit the plaintiffs;
Applied primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2) the presumption
that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the
accident unless contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the substantial factor
test to conclude that delos Reyes was negligent.
ISSUE: WON THE JEEPNEY OWNERS AND ITS DRIVER ARE LIABLE
FOR THE INJURIES AND DEATH SUFFERED BY THE PASSENGERS OF
THE JEEPNEY
HELD: YES. BUT ONLY THE SPOUSES AND FILRITERS ARE LIABLE.
REASONING:
TC WAS CORRECT IN APPRECIATING THE FF FACTS CONCERNING
MANALO’S NEGLIGENCE.
(1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger Caridad Pascua that the
Mangune jeepney was "running fast" that his passengers cautioned driver
Manalo to slow down but did not heed the warning
(2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police Investigator Tacpal of the San
Manuel (Tarlac) Police who found that the tracks of the jeepney ran on the
Eastern shoulder (outside the concrete paved road) until it returned to the
concrete road at a sharp angle, crossing the Eastern lane and the (imaginary)
center line and encroaching fully into the western lane where the collision
took place as evidenced by the point of impact;
(3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda also of the San
Manuel Police that the path of the jeepney they found on the road \was
shown by skid marks which he described as "scratches on the road caused
by the iron of the jeep, after its wheel was removed;"
(4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious
Physical Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence by the
CFI of Tarlac, as a result of the collision, and his commitment to prison and
service of his sentence
(5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa loquitar attesting to the
circumstance that the collision occured on the right of way of the Phil. Rabbit
Bus.
torts & damages
SC:
-The principle about "the last clear" chance would call for application in a suit
between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise
where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent
driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was
likewise guilty of negligence. (Anuran, et al. v. Buño et al.)
-On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty
and the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence: would
have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made by
the jeepney was abrupt. Delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden
U-turn executed by Manalo.
***With regard to the substantial factor test:
- The IAC held that
“. . . It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the
actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another,
the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the
extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent
him from being liable (Restatement, Torts, 2d).
Here, We find defendant bus running at a fast speed when the
accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid the
accident, . . . . The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing
about harm to the passengers of the jeepney, not only because he was
driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid the mishap but also because it
was the bus which was the physical force which brought about the injury and
death to the passengers of the jeepney.”
-The speed of the bus was even calculated by the IAC. But the SC was not
convinced. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when
the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour,
assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed
in highways.
- Delos Reyes cannot be faulted for not having avoided the collision because
as was shown, the jeepney left a skid mark of about 45 meters, measured
from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to the point of collision.
- Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50 kph at the time
of the accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45
meters in 3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour,
delos Reyes would have covered that distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily,
he had little time to react to the situation.
- To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him.
Aside from the time element involved, there were no options available to him.
- Also, It was shown by the pictures that driver delos Reyes veered his
Rabbit bus to the right attempt to avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney. That it
was not successful in fully clearing the Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left
front hit said jeepney must have been due to limitations of space and time.
- That delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also have swerved to its left
(eastern lane) to avoid bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on the
western lane: Under such a situation, he would run the greater risk of running
smack in the Mangune jeepney either head on or broadside as the jeepney
then was abruptly making a U-turn.
-SC: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo
and spouses Mangune and Carreon. They all failed to exercise the
precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice.
A2010
- 50 -
- In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier
is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this
disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had
observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and
1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or that the death or injury of the passenger was
due to a fortuitous event 3 (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657).
- To escape liability, defendants Mangune and Carreon offered to show thru
their witness Natalio Navarro, an alleged mechanic, that he periodically
checks and maintains the jeepney of said defendants, the last on Dec. 23, the
day before the collision, which included the tightening of the bolts. This
notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while in
transit. As to the cause thereof no evidence was offered. Said defendant did
not even attempt to explain, much less establish, it to be one caused by a
caso fortuito. . . .
-In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to
safely carry his passenger to his destination, an accident caused either by
defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver, is not a caso
fortuito which would avoid the carriers liability for damages (Son v. Cebu
Autobus Company, 94 Phil. 892 citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657;
Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75).
***On the sole liability of the Jeepney Owners (excluding Manalo)
-the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the
event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to
the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver
(Viluan v. CA, et al., April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742).
- if the driver is to be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that
would make the carrier's liability personal, contradictory to the explicit
provision of A 2181 of the NCC.
DISPOSITION: TC’ S DECISION WAS REINSTATED and AFFIRMED BUT
MODIFICATION THAT ONLY THE COUPLE AND THE FILRITERS
GUARANTY ASSURANCE CORP. INC WERE LIABLE. AFFIRMED TOO
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BUT MODIFIED THE INDEMNITY FOR
LOSS OF LIFE FROM 3K (AS PER A1746 TO A2206 NCC) TO 30K.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC v IAC (DIONISIO)
148 SCRA 353
FELICIANO; Mar 10, 1987
Nature:
Petition to review the decision of the IAC
Facts:
- at about 1:30 am on November 15 1975, Leonardo Dionisio was on his
way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss. Dionisio had
taken "a shot or two" of liquor.
- Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed an
intersection when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He
switched his headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck about
21/2meters away from his car.
- The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of Phoenix
Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of the
street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction
prof. casis
toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. It
was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to
stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There
were no lights or any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set
anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear.
- The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner
Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his
employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the
following morning.
- Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the
left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck.
- As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries
including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of
two gold bridge dentures.
- Trial court ruled in favor of Dionisio. IAC affirmed the lower court’s ruling,
with modification on award of damages.
Petitioners’comments
- the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in
driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor,
without his headlights on and without a curfew pass.
- if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was
parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and
that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an
intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the
injuries he sustained. (NOTE: this was the contention of petitioners which
SC noted in is decision)
Private respondent’s comments
- the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in
which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his
employer Phoenix
Issue:
WON the proximate cause of the accident was Dionisio’s negligence (driving
faster than he should have, and without headlights) or the negligence of the
driver in parking the truck.
Held:
- it is the driver’s negligence. (see previous digest)
- ON CAUSE v CONDITION (under IV A 3c, page 5 of outline)
- petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older
cases in various jurisdictions in the United States. These arguments,
however, do not have any validity in this jurisdiction.
- Even in the United States, the distinctions between" cause" and
"condition" have already been "almost entirely discredited." Professors
Prosser and Keeton make this quite clear:
“Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active
"cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which
that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive
static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant
is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is
concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have
played an important part in producing the result, it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive
situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case the latter
(is) the result of other active forces which have gone before. The
defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a
torts & damages
"condition," but the act may be culpable because of the danger of
fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has done
quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that
is the very risk which the defendant has created, the defendant
will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable
time during which the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway
may still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward.
"Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the
decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited.
So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case
where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to
rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force
intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction
between "cause" and "condition" which is important, but the
nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause."
- the truck driver's negligence, far from being a "passive and static
condition", was an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision would
not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any
warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck
created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down that street
and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible.
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's
negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause. What the petitioners describe as an
"intervening cause" was only a foreseeable consequence of the risk created
by the truck driver’s negligence
MANILA ELECTRIC v REMOQUILLO
99 PHIL 117
MONTEMAYOR; May 18, 1956
NATURE
Review by certiorari of a CA decision
FACTS
- Efren Magno went to his stepbrother’s 3-story house to fix a leaking “media
agua,” (downspout). He climbed up to the media agua which was just below
the 3rd floor window and stood on it to receive a galvanized iron sheet through
the said window. After grabbing hold of the sheet, he turned around and a
portion of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an electric
wire of Manila Electric Company (the Company) strung 2.5 ft parallel to the
edge of the media agua, electrocuting him and killing him.
- His widow and children filed a suit to recover damages from the company
and the TC rendered judgment in their favor. The Company appealed to the
CA, which affirmed the judgment. It is this CA decision the Company now
seeks to appeal.
ISSUE
WON the Company’s negligence in the installation and maintenance of its
wires was the proximate cause of the death
HELD
A2010
No. It merely provided the condition from which the cause arose (it set the
stage for the cause of the injury to occur).
Ratio A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the condition or gives rise to
the occasion by which an injury was made possible) cannot be the basis of
an action if a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the injury
intervenes between such prior and remote cause and the injury.
If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.
Reasoning We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of
negligence or as lacking in due diligence. To us it is clear that the principal
and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a
remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning
around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution,
such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting
said iron sheet, considering the latter's length of 6 feet.
- The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of
Magno himself. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media
agua just below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his
age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or
carpenter and had had training and experience for the job. So, he could not
have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them.
But unfortunately, in the instant case, his training and experience failed him,
and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-ft iron sheet with both
hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and throwing all
prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms
with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution.
Disposition CA decision reversed. Complaint against company dismissed
RODRIGUEZA V. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
STREET; November 19, 1921
NATURE
Appeal from judgment of CFI
FACTS
Rodrigueza et al seek damages fr fire kindled by sparks fr a locomotive
engine. The fire was communicated to four houses nearby. All of these
houses were of light construction, except that of Rodrigueza which was of
strong materials. Plaintiffs say that the company failed to supervise their
employees properly and was negligent in allowing locomotive to operate
without smokestack protection for arresting sparks. They also say that the
sparks were produced by an inferior fuel used by the company – Bataan coal.
Defense said Rodigueza’s house stood partly within limits of land owned by
company. Rodrigueza didn’t mind the warnings from the company. His
house’s materials included nipa and cogon, this indicates contributory
negligence on his part.
Trial judge decided against Manila Railroad, which appealed.
ISSUE
WON damage was caused by Rodrigueza’s contributory negligence
HELD
prof. casis
- 51 -
Yes.
- Manila Railroad’s defense is not a bar to recovery by the other plaintiffs.
- There was no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfully intruded upon company’s
property. His house was there before the railroad company’s property. He
may be at risk for fire, but should not bear loss if the fire resulted from the
company’s negligence.
- The PROXIMATE AND ONLY CAUSE of the damage was the negligent act
of the company. That Rodrigueza’s house was near was an ANTECEDENT
CONDITION but that can’t be imputed to him as CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE because that condition was not created by himself and
because his house remained by the toleration and consent of company and
because even if the house was improperly there, company had no right to
negligently destroy it. The company could have removed the house through
its power of eminent domain.
MCKEE v IAC, TAYAG
211 SCRA 517
DAVIDE; July 16, 1992
NATURE
Appeal from decision of the IAC
FACTS
- A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck owned by private
respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by
Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee
and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher
Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
- When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the
southern approach of the bridge, two boys suddenly darted from the right side
of the road and into the lane of the car. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car,
swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the
headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to
his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision
occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said
bridge.
- Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31, 1977.
- On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of
"Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries
and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court.
- Judge Capulong found Galang guilty of the criminal charge and ordered him
to pay damages. Galang appealed to IAC. IAC affirmed decision.
- Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil cases and awarded private
respondents moral damages and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fee.
Petitioners appealed to IAC. In its consolidated decision of the civil cases, it
reversed the ruling of the trial court and ordered the defendants to pay
damages. The decision is anchored principally on the findings that it was
Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the accident.
The appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part
of the defendants, as employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision
of the latter; it was further asserted that these defendants did not allege in
their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in selecting and supervising the said employee.
- In an MFR, the decision for the consolidated civil cases was reversed.
Hence this petition.
torts & damages
ISSUES
WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolution are supported
by evidence or are based on mere speculations, conjectures and
presumptions.
HELD
YES
- Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals may be set
aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or when the trial
court failed to consider the material facts which would have led to a
conclusion different from what was stated in its judgment.
- The respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the
lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the
presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis
of this presumed negligence, IAC immediately concluded that it was Jose
Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the
collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners
convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it
approached the southern end of the bridge, two boys darted across the road
from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.
- Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do
- The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
- Using the test, no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable
and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two
boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean
entering the opposite lane.
- Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly
finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger,
is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in
which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.
- Assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause has
been defined as: that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred; the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
-
Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the
initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the
eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient
A2010
prof. casis
- 52 -
intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual
cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not
have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals
given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back
into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of
the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the given
circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car.
- The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that
his truck was running at 30 miles (48 km) per hour along the bridge while the
maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kph. Under Article
2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
- Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance
finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which
states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the
claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of
reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the
negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last
clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for
the consequences thereof.
- Last clear chance: The doctrine is that the negligence of the plaintiff does
not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears
that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's
negligence. The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a
person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury
results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. a person who has the last
clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the
opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the
accident. The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is
held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly
negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff's peril, or
according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in the reasonable
exercise of due care, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff
to avoid an accident.
- As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages.
The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their
employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de
jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage. The answers of the private
respondents in the civil cases did not interpose this defense. Neither did they
attempt to prove it.
On the separate civil and criminal actions
- The civil cases, which were for the recovery of civil liability arising from a
quasi-delict under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
were filed ahead of criminal case. They were eventually consolidated for joint
trial. The records do not indicate any attempt on the part of the parties, and it
may therefore be reasonably concluded that none was made, to consolidate
criminal case with the civil cases, or vice-versa.
- Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to avoid a multiplicity
of suits, guard against oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear
congested dockets to simplify the work of the trial court, or in short, attain
justice with the least expense to the parties litigants, would have easily
sustained a consolidation, thereby preventing the unseeming, if no ludicrous,
spectacle of two judges appreciating, according to their respective
orientation, perception and perhaps even prejudice, the same facts
differently, and thereafter rendering conflicting decisions. Such was what
happened in this case.
- The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. In the case of independent civil actions under the new Civil
Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would
be entirely irrelevant to the civil action. What remains to be the most
important consideration as to why the decision in the criminal case should not
be considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents were not
parties therein.
Dispositive Petition granted. Assailed decision set aside while its original is
REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is
increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and
Kim Koh McKee
TEAGUE VS. FERNANDEZ
51 SCRA 181
MAKALINTAL; June 4, 1973
FACTS
- The Realistic Institute, owned and operated by Mercedes M. Teague, was a
vocational school for hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor of
the Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice located at the
comer of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila. The second
floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square meters, and
although it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, it had eight
windows, each of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders, and the
presence of each of the fire exits was indicated on the wall.
- In the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a store for surplus
materials located about ten meters away from the institute. Soler Street lay
between that store and the institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the
students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic
ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant instructresses of the institute
were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to calm down the
students, who numbered about 180 at the time, telling them not to be afraid
because the Gil-Armi Building would not get burned as it is made of concrete,
and that the fire was anyway, across the street. They told the students not to
rush out but just to go down the stairway two by two, or to use the fireescapes. The panic, however, could not be subdued and the students kept on
rushing and pushing their way through the stairs, thereby causing stampede.
No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four
students, including Lourdes Fernandez, sister of plaintiffs, were found dead
and several others injured on account of the stampede.
- The CFI of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case. The
plaintiffs appealed to the CA, which by a divided vote of 3 to 2 (a special
division of five members having been constituted) rendered a judgment of
reversal and sentenced the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiffs in the
sum of P11,000, plus interest at the legal rate from the date the complaint
was filed.
- The CA declared that Teague was negligent and that such negligence was
the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of
negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 of
the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in
torts & damages
connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building. This
provision reads as follows:
"Sec. 491. Fireproof partitions, exits and stairways - All buildings and
separate sections of buildings or buildings otherwise known as accessorias
having less than three stories, having one or more persons domiciled therein
either temporarily or permanently, and all public or quasipublic buildings
having less than three stories, such as hospitals, sanitarium, schools,
reformatories, places of human detention, assembly halls, clubs, restaurants
or panciterias, and the like, shall be provided with at least two unobstructed
stairways of not less than one meter and twenty centimeters in width and an
inclination of not less than forty degrees from the perpendicular, in case of
large buildings more than two stairways shall likewise be provided when
required by the chief of the fire department, said stairways shall be placed as
far apart as possible."
The alleged violation of the ordinance consisted is that the second storey of
the building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least
1.2 meters each, although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had
a second stairway under construction.
ISSUES
1. WON Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila refers
only to public buildings and hence did not apply to the Gil-Armi building which
was of private ownership
2. WON the ordinance devolved upon the owners of the building and
therefore it is they and not the petitioner, who is a mere lessee, who should
be liable for the violation
3. WON the failure to comply with the requirement of the ordinance was the
proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio it is not ownership which determines the character of buildings subject
to its requirements, but rather the use or the purpose for which a particular
building, is utilized.
Reasoning Thus the same may be privately owned, but if it is devoted to any
one of the purposes mentioned in the ordinance - for instance as a school,
which the Realistic Institute precisely was - then the building is within the
coverage of the ordinance. Indeed the requirement that such a building
should have two (2) separate stairways instead of only one (1) has no
relevance or reasonable relation to the fact of ownership, but does have such
relation to the use or purpose for which the building is devoted.
2. NO.
Reasoning It was the use of the building for school purposes which brought
the same within the coverage of the ordinance; and it was the petitioner and
not the owners who were responsible for such use.
3. YES.
Ratio The violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the
cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of
the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which
the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.
Reasoning The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by settling other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
A2010
the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result there from. [Citing Bataclan v Medina]
- The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of
Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a
neighboring place; (3) shouts of "Fire!, Fire!"; (4) panic in the Institute; (5)
stampede; and (6) injuries and death. The violation of the ordinance, it is
argued, was only a remote cause, and cannot be the basis of liability since
there intervened a number of independent causes which produced the injury
complained of.
- A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because
of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause. [Citing MERALCO v Remoquillo]
- According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic and stampede were
independent causes with no causal connection at all with the violation of the
ordinance." The weakness in the argument springs from a faulty juxtaposition
of the events which formed a chain and resulted in the injury. It is true that the
petitioner's non-compliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and
prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense that it was coetaneous
with its occupancy of the building. But the violation was a continuing one,
since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific
situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. That
situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to
evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to
happen under emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available.
It is true that in this particular case there would have been no overcrowding in
the single stairway if there had not been a fire in the neighborhood which
caused the students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go
down. But it was precisely such contingencies or events that the authors of
the ordinance had in mind, for under normal conditions one stairway would be
adequate for the occupants of the building.
- To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the
injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more
accurate to say that the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate
cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by
requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. Under the doctrine
of the cases cited by the respondents, the principle of proximate cause
applies to such violation.
Dispositive Decision appealed from is affirmed.
PICART V SMITH
STREET; March 15, 1918
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union
FACTS
prof. casis
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On December 12, 1912, plaintiff was riding on his pony over the
Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union.
Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from
the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or
twelve miles per hour.
As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the plaintiff and blew his
horn to give warning of his approach.
He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge, he gave
two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on
horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However, given the novelty of the apparition and the rapidity of the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right
side of the bridge instead of going to the left.
He did this because he thought he did not have sufficient time to get
over to the other side.
As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left,
that being the proper side of the road for the machine.
In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to
the other side.
The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no
sign for the automobile to stop.
Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of
veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down,
continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of
speed.
When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the
horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his
car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the
railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed
in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and
turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing.
In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange
of the car and the limb was broken.
The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
As a result of its injuries the horse died.
The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
CFI absolved defendant from liability
Hence, the appeal
ISSUE
WON the defendant, in maneuvering his car in the manner above described,
was guilty of negligence that would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done
Ratio: The person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other part.
HELD
Yes.
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As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume
that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as
he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his
eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have
torts & damages
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perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front
of the moving vehicle.
In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the
automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was
no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by
going to a place of greater safety.
The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant;
and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or,
seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other
side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger
of collision.
The defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He
was, the court thinks, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse
had not yet exhibited fright.
But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable
risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles,
he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here
confronted him.
When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger, he
was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by
the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before
him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man
in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular
case. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee
harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of
the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable
foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence
of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent
when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have
foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to
warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case,
negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position
of the defendant, would have recognized that the course which he was
pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen
harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that
course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant
the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the
road. It will be noted however, that the negligent acts of the two parties
were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
A2010
prof. casis
- 54 -
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval.
Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last
fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.
Dispositive: Appealed decision is reversed.
BUSTAMANTE V CA (DEL PILAR AND MONTESIANO)
193 SCRA 603
MEDIALDEA; February 6, 1991
NATURE: petition for certiorari to review decision of CA
FACTS: a truck and a passenger bus sideswept each other, causing the
deaths of the passengers of the bus. This is the way the collision happened:
The bus, driven by Susulin, was traversing an inclined road when the driver
saw from 30 meters away an approaching truck (driven by Montesiano),
going very fast and the front wheels wiggling. The bus driver also observed
that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance
due to his belief that the truck driver was merely joking, Susulin shifted from
4th to 3rd gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus, which was
ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake a Kubota hand
tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway. While
the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the hand tractor and the
truck was approaching the bus, the two vehicles sideswiped each other at
each other's left side.
The heirs of the victims filed for damages. The RTC awarded damages,
saying that the negligent acts of both drivers were the cause of the accident,
thus their liability must be solidary. The driver and owner of the truck
appealed to the CA, which was denied at first, but was granted on MFR,
absolving the defendants based on the doctrine of last clear chance, saying
that the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, and that
his negligence was the proximate cause of the same.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA was correct in absolving the driver and owner of the truck
(answered by WON CA correctly applied the doctrine of last clear chance)
HELD:
1. NO
Ratio: The doctrine of last clear chance applies only between the negligent
parties. It does not apply in a case wherein a victim (who is an outsider to the
cause of the accident) demands liability from the negligent parties.
Reasoning: The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of
the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable
care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the
plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence. In other words, the doctrine
of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have
placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is
entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the
last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the
opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the
accident (Sangco).
A negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a
plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware
of the plaintiff's peril, or according to some authorities, should have been
aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due case, had in fact an opportunity
later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (Am. Jur).
As against 3rd persons, a negligent actor can’t defend by saying that another
had negligently failed to take action which would have avoided injury.
Disposition: Petition GRANTED. Defendants Del Pilar and Montesiano
ordered to pay damages with other defendants
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC V IAC (DIONISIO)
148 SCRA 353
FELICIANO; March 10, 1987
NATURE
PETITION for review of the decision of the IAC
FACTS
- 130AM 15 November 1975 - Leonardo Dionisio, driving his Volkswagen car,
was on his way home to Makati from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his
boss where had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Crossing the intersection of
General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from
his home, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He
switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck
looming some 21/2meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned and
registered by Phoenix Construction Inc. was parked askew (partly blocking
the way of oncoming traffic) on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street
facing the oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early
warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. The dump truck
had earlier that evening been driven home by Carbonel, its regular driver.
Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the
left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of
the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some
permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge
dentures.
- Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming that the legal and
proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel
had parked the dump truck. Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the
proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast
at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his
headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish
that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump
truck driver.
- CFI: in favor of Dionisio
- IAC: affirmed TC but modified amounts
ISSUE
(obiter) WON last clear chance doctrine should be applied therefore
exculpating Phoenix from paying any damages
HELD
NO
torts & damages
- We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only
contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury
remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject
to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Obiter
- Phoenix and Carbonel also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last
clear chance" doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while the
petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the "last
clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that
Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own
injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was
imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter for debate
whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to
mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of
contributory negligence. The common law rule of contributory negligence
prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the
plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act
or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance
permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent
provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty
and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the
common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the
common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in A2179 CC
- Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be
extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in
negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so.
Under A2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose
negligence-the plaintiff's or the defendant's-was the legal or proximate cause
of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in
chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms
like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the
continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or
omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account.
Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or
omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by
such act or omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that
the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from
responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff
failed to act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to
avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or
omission, To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the
fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable
consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts
seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them
among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' proposition must
tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
Disposition CA decision is modified by reducing the aggregate amount of
compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral damages
Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v CA (LIPANA)
269 SCRA 695
A2010
prof. casis
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HERMOSISIMA; March 14, 1997
Nature:
Petition to review decision of CA
Facts:
- Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC), represented by its President and
General Manager Romeo Lipana, filed a complaint to recover from the former
Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC), now absorbed by the Philippine
Commercial International Bank, P304, 979.74 representing various deposits
RMC made in its current account with said bank. The amount was not
credited to RMC’s account but was instead deposited to the account of one
Bienvenido Cotas.
- RMC maintained two separate current accounts with the Pasig Branch of
PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances.
- From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to have
entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his
secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current
accounts of RMC with PBC. It turned out, however, that these deposits, on all
occasions, were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to
Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas who likewise
maintains an account with the same bank.
- During this period, petitioner bank had been regularly furnishing private
respondent with monthly statements showing its current accounts balances.
Unfortunately, it had never been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these
monthly statements of account reposing complete trust and confidence on
petitioner bank.
-Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the deposit slip, an original and
a duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and
his current account number. On the duplicate copy was written the account
number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank.
PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp both the
original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original
copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy
was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After validation, Yabut
would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate
copy and change the account number written thereon, which is that of her
husband's, and make it appear to be RMC's account number. With the daily
remittance records also prepared by Ms. Yabut and submitted to private
respondent RMC together with the validated duplicate slips with the latter's
name and account number, she made her company believe that all the while
the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account when, in truth
and in fact, they were being deposited by her and credited by the petitioner
bank in the account of Cotas.
- Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner
bank the return of its money, but as its demand went unheeded, it filed a
collection suit before RTC Pasig, which found petitioner bank negligent and
ordered the bank and Mabayad to pay RMC jointly and severally
P304,979.72, plus damages, attornet’s fees and costs of suit.
- CA affirmed, but modified the award of damages.
Issue:
Whether the proximate cause of the loss, to the tune of P304,979.74,
suffered by the private respondent RMC is petitioner bank's negligence or
that
of
private
respondent's.
Held:
It was the negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of
the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which
was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent.
- There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the
plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
by the plaintiff.
- Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would do.
- Picart v. Smith. The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to
be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the
Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him.
The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the
man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
- the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating,
officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by
Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely
accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect
to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate.
- Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the
part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms.
Mabayad.
- Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Proximate
cause is "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. . . ." In this case, absent the act of Ms.
Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the
deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to
perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity.
- Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at
times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank
was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where
both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in
time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault
or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is
chargeable with the consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would
also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the
recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense
against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance,
could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting
cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to
defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied
torts & damages
that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert
the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their selfimposed
validation
procedure.
- While it is true that had private respondent checked the monthly statements
of account sent by the petitioner bank to RMC, the latter would have
discovered the loss early on, such cannot be used by the petitioners to
escape liability. This omission on the part of the private respondent does not
change the fact that were it not for the wanton and reckless negligence of the
petitioners' employee in validating the incomplete duplicate deposit slips
presented by Ms. Irene Yabut, the loss would not have occurred.
Considering, however, that the fraud was committed in a span of more than
one (1) year covering various deposits, common human experience dictates
that the same would not have been possible without any form of collusion
between Ms. Yabut and bank teller Mabayad. Ms. Mabayad was negligent in
the performance of her duties as bank teller nonetheless.
- it cannot be denied that private respondent was likewise negligent in not
checking its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company
would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against
RMC by its secretary. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to
such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even
a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to
contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be
awarded to the private respondent under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code
Disposition CA decision modified. The demands of substantial justice are
satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. Thus, 40% of the damage
awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P25,000.00
attorney's fees, shall be borne by private respondent RMC; only the balance
of 60% needs to be paid by the petitioners. The award of attorney's fees shall
be
borne
exclusively
by
the
petitioners.
PADILLA [dissent]
- the doctrine of "last clear chance" assumes that the negligence of the
defendant was subsequent to the negligence of the plaintiff and the same
must be the proximate cause of the injury. In short, there must be a last and a
clear chance, not a last possible chance, to avoid the accident or injury. It
must have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably prudent man
in like position to have acted effectively to avoid the injury and the resulting
damage to himself.
- the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending monthly bank statements to
private respondent RMC so that any error or discrepancy in the entries
therein could be brought to the bank's attention at the earliest opportunity.
Private respondent failed to examine these bank statements not because it
was prevented by some cause in not doing so, but because it was purposely
negligent as it admitted that it does not normally check bank statements given
by banks. It was private respondent who had the last and clear chance to
prevent any further misappropriation by Yabut had it only reviewed the status
of its current accounts on the bank statement sent to it monthly or regularly.
Since a sizable amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut, private respondent
should, at least, have taken care of its concerns, as what the law presumes.
Its negligence, therefore, is not contributory but the immediate and proximate
cause of its injury.
GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER AND HARDWARE V IAC (VDA.
DE CALIBO and kids)
A2010
- 56 -
GR No.70493
NARVASA; May 18, 1989
NATURE
Petition for certiorari praying for a reversal of the judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court which, it is claimed, ignored or ran counter to
the established facts.
FACTS
- Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and Maximo Patos were on
the jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at
the wheel, as it approached from the South Lizada Bridge going towards the
direction of Davao City at about 1:45 in the afternoon of July 4,1979. At about
that time, the cargo track, loaded with cement bags, GI sheets, plywood,
driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants, coming from the opposite
direction of Davao City and bound for Glan, South Cotabato, had just crossed
said bridge. At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and
the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while
Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As a
result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly damaged while the
left side of the jeep, including its fender and hood, was extensively damaged.
After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted
road a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck stopped on its
wheels on the road.
- On November 27, 1979, the instant case for damages was filed by the
surviving spouse and children of the late Engineer Calibo who are residents
of Tagbilaran City against the driver and owners of the cargo truck.
- Trial Court dismissed the complaint (and defendants' counterclaim) "for
insufficiency of evidence." The circumstances leading to the conclusion just
mentioned:
1. Moments before its collission with the truck being operated by Zacarias,
the jeep of the deceased Calibo was "zigzagging."
2. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to investigation by the
police, Calibo's companions who suffered injuries on account of the collision,
refused to be so investigated or give statements to the police officers. This,
plus Roranes' waiver of the right to institute criminal proceedings against
Zacarias, and the fact that indeed no criminal case was ever instituted in
Court against Zacarias, were "telling indications that they did not attribute the
happening to defendant Zacarias' negligence or fault."
3. Roranes' testimony, given in plaintiffs' behalf, was "not as clear and
detailed as that of Zacarias," and was "uncertain and even contradicted by
the physical facts and the police investigators Dimaano and Esparcia."
4. That there were skid marks left by the truck's tires at the scene, and none
by the jeep, demonstrates that the driver of the truck had applied the brakes
and the jeep's driver had not; and that the jeep had on impact fallen on its
right side is indication that it was running at high speed.
5. Even if it be considered that there was some antecedent negligence on the
part of Zacarias shortly before the collision, in that he had caused his truck to
run some 25 centimeters to the left of the center of the road, Engr. Calibo had
the last clear chance of avoiding the accident because he still had ample
room in his own lane to steer clear of the truck, or he could simply have
braked to a full stop.
- IAC reversed TC. It found Zacarias to be negligent on the basis of the
following circumstances, to wit:
1) "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep when
the collision occurred,' and although Zacarias saw the jeep from a distance of
prof. casis
about 150 meters, he "did not drive his truck back to his lane in order to avoid
collision with the oncoming jeep . . .;" what is worse, "the truck driver
suddenly applied his brakes even as he knew that he was still within the lane
of the jeep;" had both vehicles stayed in their respective lanes, the collision
would never have occurred, they would have passed "along side each other
safely;"
2) Zacarias had no license at the time; what he handed to Pfc. Esparcia, on
the latter's demand, was the 'driver's license of his co-driver Leonardo
Baricuatro;"
3) the waiver of the right to file criminal charges against Zacarias should not
be taken against "plaintiffs" Roranes and Patos who had the right, under the
law, to opt merely to bring a civil suit.
ISSUES
WON respondent court is correct in reversing the decision of trial court.
HELD
NO.
Ratio The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a
defense to accident liability. (Picart v Smith)
Reasoning Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of
each other's vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. Both
vehicles were travelling at a speed of approximately thirty kilometers per
hour. The private respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a
full stop when the jeep plowed into it. And they have not seen fit to deny or
impugn petitioners' imputation that they also admitted the truck had been
brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. From these facts
the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what
judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid
the accident, while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck,
by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of
which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty
kilometers per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that
opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect, as
the Appellate Court would have it, the truck to swerve and leave him a clear
path.
-Picart v Smith:
The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing an automobile ahead he
improperly pulled his horse over to the railing on the right. The driver of the
automobile, however guided his car toward the plaintiff without diminution of
speed until he was only few feet away. He then turned to the right but passed
so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened, jumped around and
was killed by the passing car. . . . .
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he
was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of
the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent;
and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of
the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable
interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable
with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other
party.
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED, and the complaint against herein
torts & damages
petitioners in Civil Case No. 3283 of the Court of First Instance of Bohol,
Branch IV, is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Voting Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC v CAR BASCOS
BAESA
179 SCRA 384
CORTES J.: November 1989
FACTS:
At about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of June 12, 1981, the spouses Ceasar
and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim, Marceline and Maricar,
together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and
seven other persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a
picnic at Malalam River, Ilagan, Isabela, to celebrate the fifth wedding
anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa.
Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right and proceeded to
MaIalam, River at a speed of about 20 kph. While they were proceeding
towards Malalam River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its
regular route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney's lane while negotiating a
curve, and collided with it.
- David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and their children,
Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died while the rest of the passengers
suffered injuries. The jeepney was extensively damaged. After the accident
the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez, boarded a car and
proceeded to Santiago, Isabela. From that time on up to the present, Ramirez
has never been seen and has apparently remained in hiding.
- Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O. Bascos and Fe O. Ico for
herself and for her minor children, filed separate actions for damages arising
from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. Other victims settled with Bus
Company.
-PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David Ico's alleged negligence
as the proximate cause of the accident, invoked the defense of due diligence
in the selection and supervision of its driver, Ambrosio Ramirez
-TC ruled against PANTRANCO and ordered them to pay damages.
-Pantranco appealed the decision. Appeal dismissed for lack of merit
ISSUE:
WON PANTRANCO is liable for damages.
HELD: YES
-Petitioner claims that under the circumstances of the case, it was the driver
of the passenger jeepney who had the last clear chance to avoid the collision
and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and
competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm.
-petitioner claims that the original negligence of its driver was not the
proximate cause of the accident and that the sole proximate cause was the
supervening negligence of the jeepney driver David Ico in failing to avoid the
accident
- The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a
claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where
it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might
have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence.
-The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior
or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to
A2010
prof. casis
- 57 -
avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the
consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the
plaintiff
- The above contention of petitioner is manifestly devoid of merit. Contrary to
the petitioner's contention, the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no
application in this case
- Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the doctrine of "last clear chance"
finds no application in this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is
necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to
avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with
exercise of due care, have been aware of it
- In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew
of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching
bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney
to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus
driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching
from the opposite direction.
- Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the
time of the accident the Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila. At the
time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not returning to its own
lane, it was already too late to swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an
accident.
- This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply
where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury
cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or
should have been discovered"
- Petitioner likewise insists that David Ico was negligent in failing to observe
Section 43 (c), Article III Chapter IV of Republic Act No. 4136** which
provides that the driver of a vehicle entering a through highway or a stop
intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching in either
direction on such through highway.
-Petitioner's misplaced reliance on the aforesaid law is readily apparent in this
case. The cited law itself provides that it applies only to vehicles entering a
through highway or a stop intersection. At the time of the accident, the
jeepney had already crossed the intersection and was on its way to Malalam
River
-On the issue of its liability as an employer, petitioner claims that it had
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage,
conformably to the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
-When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly
arises a presumption that the employer has been negligent either in the
selection of his employees or in the supervision over their acts. Although this
presumption is only a disputable presumption which could be overcome by
proof of diligence of a good father of a family, this Court believes that the
evidence submitted by the defendant to show that it exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family iti the case of Ramirez, as a company driver is far
from sufficient
ANURAN V BUÑO
17 SCRA 224
BENGZON, May 20, 1966
NATURE: Petition for Review by certiorari of CA decision.
FACTS
- On January 12, 1958, a passenger jeepney was parked on the road to Taal,
Batangas. Buño, driver of said jeepney stopped his vehicle in order to allow
one of his passengers to alight. But he parked his jeepney in such a way that
½ of its width (the left wheels) was on the asphalted pavement of the road
and the other half, on the right shoulder of the said road. A motor truck
speeding along, negligently bumped it from behind, which such violence that
three of its passengers died, even as 2 other passengers suffered injuries
that required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital for many days.
- Suits were instituted by the representatives of the dead and the injured, to
recover consequently damages against the drivers and the owners of the
trucks and also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney.
- CFI Batangas absolved the driver of the jeepney and its owners, but it
required the truck driver and the owners o make compensation. Plaintiffs
appealed to the CA insisting that the driver and the owners of the jeepney
should also be made liable for damages.
ISSUE
WON the driver and owners of the jeepney should also be made liable.
HELD
YES. An error of law was committed in releasing the jeepney from liability. It
must be remembered that the obligation of the carrier to transport its
passengers safely is such that the New Civil Code requires “utmost diligence”
from the carriers (Art. 1755) who are “presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they have observed
extraordinary diligence” (Art. 1756). In this instance, this legal presumption of
negligence is confirmed by the CA’s finding that jeepney driver in question
was at fault in parking the vehicle improperly. It must follow that the driver –
and the owners – of the jeepney must answer for injuries to its passengers.
Obiter on Application of Principle of Last Clear Chance: The principle about
the “last clear chance” applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of the
two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it
would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its
owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
This principle does not apply in this case.
DISPOSITION: Judgment modified.
CANLAS V, CA
Purisima; February 28, 2000
Nature
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Facts
-Sometime in August, 1982, Osmundo S. Canlas, and Vicente Mañosca,
decided to venture in business and to raise the capital needed therefor. The
former then executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing the latter to
mortgage two parcels of land situated in San Dionisio, (BF Homes)
Paranaque, Metro Manila, each lot with semi-concrete residential house in
the name of the SPS Canlas. Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the said
parcels of land to Vicente Mañosca, for and in consideration of P850,000.00,
P500,000.00 of which payable within one week, and the balance of
P350,000.00 to serve as his (Osmundo's) investment in the business. Thus,
Osmundo Canlas delivered to Vicente Mañosca the transfer certificates of
title of the parcels of land involved. Vicente Mañosca, as his part of the
transaction, issued two postdated checks in favor of Osmundo Canlas in the
torts & damages
amounts of P40,000.00 and P460,000.00, respectively, but it turned out that
the check covering the bigger amount was not sufficiently funded.
-On September 3, 1982, Vicente Mañosca was able to mortgage the same
parcels of land for P100,000.00 to a certain Attorney Manuel Magno, with the
help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses, Osmundo
Canlas and Angelina Canlas. On September 29, 1982, private respondent
Vicente Mañosca was granted a loan by the respondent Asian Savings Bank
(ASB) in the amount of P500,000.00, with the use of subject parcels of land
as security, and with the involvement of the same impostors who again
introduced themselves as the Canlas spouses. When the loan it extended
was not paid, respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage.
-On January 15, 1983, Osmundo Canlas wrote a letter informing the
respondent bank that the execution of subject mortgage over the two parcels
of land in question was without their (Canlas spouses) authority, and request
that steps be taken to annul and/or revoke the questioned mortgage. On
January 18, 1983, petitioner Osmundo Canlas also wrote the office of Sheriff
Maximo O. Contreras, asking that the auction sale scheduled on February 3,
1983 be cancelled or held in abeyance. But respondents Maximo C.
Contreras and Asian Savings Bank refused to heed petitioner Canlas' stance
and proceeded with the scheduled auction sale.
-Consequently, on February 3, 1983 the herein petitioners instituted the
present case for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; and on May 23, 1983, the trial
court issued an Order restraining the respondent sheriff from issuing the
corresponding Certificate of Sheriff's Sale.For failure to file his answer,
despite several motions for extension of time for the filing thereof, Vicente
Mañosca was declared in default. Lower court a quo came out with a decision
annulling subject deed of mortgage and disposing. Asian Savings Bank
appealed to the Court of Appeals and CA reversed the lower court decision.
Issue/s and Held
WON CA erred in holding that the mortgage is valid
Settled is the rule that a contract of mortgage must be constituted only
by the absolute owner on the property mortgaged; a mortgage,
constituted by an impostor is void. Considering that it was established
indubitably that the contract of mortgage sued upon was entered into
and signed by impostors who misrepresented themselves as the
spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas, the Court is of the
ineluctible conclusion and finding that subject contract of mortgage is a
complete nullity.
WON ASB must incur the resulting loss
Yes. The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable, the respondent
bank must suffer the resulting loss. In essence, the doctrine of last
clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are negligent but
the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of
the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who
had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to
do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated
differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does
not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening
negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
A2010
prof. casis
- 58 -
In the case under consideration, from the evidence on hand it can be gleaned
unerringly that respondent bank did not observe the requisite diligence in
ascertaining or verifying the real identity of the couple who introduced
themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. It is
worthy to note that not even a single identification card was exhibited by the
said impostors to show their true identity; and yet, the bank acted on their
representations simply on the basis of the residence certificates bearing
signatures which tended to match the signatures affixed on a previous deed
of mortgage to a certain Atty. Magno, covering the same parcels of land in
question.
Applying Art. 1173 It could be said that the degree of diligence required of
banks is more than that of a good father of a family in keeping with their
responsibility to exercise the necessary care and prudence in dealing even
on a registered or titled property. The business of a bank is affected with
public interest, holding in trust the money of the depositors, which bank
deposits the bank should guard against loss due to negligence or bad faith,
by reason of which the bank would be denied the protective mantle of the
land registration law, accorded only to purchasers or mortgagees for value
and in good faith.
Evidently, the efforts exerted by the bank to verify the identity of the couple
posing as Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas fell short of the
responsibility of the bank to observe more than the diligence of a good father
of a family. The negligence of respondent bank was magnified by the fact that
the previous deed of mortgage (which was used as the basis for checking the
genuineness of the signatures of the supposed Canlas spouses) did not bear
the tax account number of the spouses, as well as the Community Tax
Certificate of Angelina Canlas. But such fact notwithstanding, the bank did
not require the impostors to submit additional proof of their true identity.
For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions,
whose business is impressed with public interest, respondent Asian Savings
Bank has to bear the loss sued upon.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated September 30, 1993, in CA-G.R. CV No. 25242 SET ASIDE.
The Decision of Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil
Case No. M-028 is hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
CONSOLIDATED BANK V CA (L.C.DIAZ AND CO.)
GR No. 138569
CARPIO; September 11, 2003
NATURE
Review of the decision of the CA
FACTS
- LC Diaz is a professional partnership engaged in accounting. On 14 August
1991, LC diaz, thru its cashier, instructed their messenger, Calapre, to
deposit money in Solidbank. Calapre then deposited in Solidbank. Since the
transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz
with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. When he came back,
the teller told him that somebody else got the passbook. The next day, it was
learned that 300k was withdrawn from the account.
- An information for estafa was filed against one of their messengers (Ilagan)
and one Roscoe Verdazola. LC Diaz demanded SolidBank the return of their
money. The latter refused and a case for recovery of a sum of money was
filed against them
- TC applied rules on savings account written on the passbook. The rules
state that “possession of this book shall raise the presumption of ownership
and any payment or payments made by the bank upon the production of the
said book and entry therein of the withdrawal shall have the same effect as if
made to the depositor personally.” Also, they applied the rule that the holder
of the passport is presumed the owner. It was also held that Solidbank did not
have any participation in the custody and care of the passbook and as such,
their act was not the proximate cause of the loss. The proximate cause was
LC Diaz’ negligence.
- CA revered. It ruled that Solidbank’s negligence was the proximate cause. It
applied the provision on the CC on quasi delicts and found that the requisite
elements were present. They found that the teller made no inquiry upon the
withdrawal of 300k. The teller could have called up LC Diaz since the amount
being drawn was significant. The appellate court ruled that while L.C. Diaz
was also negligent in entrusting its deposits to its messenger and its
messenger in leaving the passbook with the teller, Solidbank could not
escape liability because of the doctrine of “last clear chance.” Solidbank could
have averted the injury suffered by L.C. Diaz had it called up L.C. Diaz to
verify the withdrawal.
ISSUES
WON Solidbank was liable
HELD
- For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence, or culpa
contractual, the bank is liable to its depositor.
- When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbank’s tellers during
withdrawals, the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher
degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook. Likewise, Solidbank’s
tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the
passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative
- In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a
presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on
the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. Solidbank failed
to discharge this burden. (they could have presented the teller to whom the
passbook was left, but they didn’t)
- L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the
impostor. Solidbank was in possession of the passbook while it was
processing the deposit. After completion of the transaction, Solidbank had
the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre, the
authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. SolidBank’s negligence in returning
the passbook was the proximate cause.
- The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the
other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss
but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the
antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering
damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had
the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence.
torts & damages
A2010
- We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present
case. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the
performance of its contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz. This is a case of culpa
contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his
last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from
liability. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff
merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not
exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract.
the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for
the consequences of the accident. But what has been shown is the presence
of an emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule. There
was no clear chance to speak of. Iran swerved to the left only to avoid
petitioner’s pick-up, which was already on a head to head position going
against Iran’s Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the vehicles collided. No
convincing proof was adduced by petitioner that Iran could have avoided a
head-on collision.
DISPOSITIVE
Decision affirmed, modification only to damages
Dispositive
The appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
ENGADA V CA
QUISUMBING, J.: June 20, 2003
STRICT LIABILITY
NATURE
Petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision of the CA which
affirmed with modification the judgment of the RTC of Iloilo City
VESTIL V IAC (UY)
179 SCRA 47
CRUZ; December 6, 1989
FACTS
- On November 29, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Edwin Iran was
driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City. On board was
Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of the Tamaraw. The Tamaraw
passengers allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pickup, driven by petitioner Rogelio Engada. When it was just a few meters away
from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-up’s right signal light flashed, at the same
time, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and
headed towards a head-on collision course with it. Seyan shouted at Iran to
avoid the pick-up. Iran swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its
right. Thus, the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right
front passenger side. The impact caused the head and chassis of the
Tamaraw to separate from its body. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw
and landed on a ricefield. Seyan incurred P130,000 in medical
expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney ended up in the junk heap. Its total
loss was computed at P80,000.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident
HELD
1. YES. Ratio It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for
the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the
duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot
do so in safety. For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed
on drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane, petitioner must be held liable.
Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he swerved
to his left. Petitioner’s acts had put Iran in an emergency situation which
forced him to act quickly. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty
of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his
own negligence.
Reasoning The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has
the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding
NATURE
Petition to reinstate the decision of the Appellate Court.
FACTS
- July 29, 1975: Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a
child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of
Purita Vestil. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was
treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead.” She was discharged
after nine days but was re-admitted one week later due to "vomiting of
saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of
death was certified as broncho-pneumonia.
- Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the
dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately
caused her death, was a complication of rabies
- Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils
were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and
eventually killed their daughter.
- Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained
the defendants. IAC found that the Vestils were in possession of the house
and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil
Code for the injuries caused by the dog.
- On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link
between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily
established.
Petitioners’ Claim
The Vestils are liable for the death of Theness, since they own the dog that
bit her.
Respondents’ Comments
The dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame
animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness.
ISSUE
WON the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by the dog.
HELD
prof. casis
- 59 -
Ratio The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based
on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or
user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on
the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility,
pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may
cause.
Reasoning
ART. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the
same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage
should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage.
- While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still
part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband
were its possessors at the time of the incident in question.
- There is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the
house, once or twice weekly.
- Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the
dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately
caused her death, was a complication of rabies. The Court finds that the link
between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily
established.
- It does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the
child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but
covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged
provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at
the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might
have done to the animal.
- Obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the
negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of
the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the
principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility,
pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may
cause.
DISPOSITION
The Court approves the time.
DINGCONG vs. KANAAN
72 Phil. 14; G.R. No. L-47033
AVANCEÑA; April 25, 1941
NATURE
Petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA
FACTS
-The brothers Loreto and Jose Dingcong rented the house of Emilia Saenz (in
Jose Ma. Basa Street of the City of Iloilo) and established the Central Hotel.
Among the hotel's guests is Francisco Echevarria, paying P30 a month, and
occupying room no. 10 of said hotel. Kanaan, on the other hand, occupies the
ground floor of the hotel and established his "American Bazaar" dedicated to
the purchase and sale of articles and merchandise.
-Around 11pm of 19 September 1933, Echevarria, when retiring to bed,
carelessly left the faucet open that with only an ordinary basin without
drainage. That time, the pipes of the hotel were under repair; the water run off
torts & damages
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- 60 -
the pipes and spilled to the ground, wetting the articles and merchandise of
the "American Bazaar," causing a loss which the CFI sets at P1,089.61.
-The Kanaans (Halim, Nasri and Michael), representing the establishment
"American Bazaar," thereafter filed this complaint for damages against Loreto
Dingcong, Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria.
-CFI held Francisco Echevarria liable, and acquitted Jose Dingcong. CA
reversed and declared Jose Dingcong responsible, sentencing him to pay the
plaintiffs damages.
defendant the equal protection of the law, and impairs the obligation of the
contract between the defendant and Leopoldo Madlangbayan, and deprives
the Courts of First Instance of their probate jurisdiction over the estate of
deceased persons and nullifies Chapters XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII,
and XXXIV of the Civil Code Procedure and related articles of the Civil Code.
ISSUE
WON Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liable for damages
RULING
NO.
- As the deceased Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed on November 16, 1930
and Act No. 3812 was not approved until December 8, 1930, it is apparent
that the law which is applicable is Act No. 3428, section 23 of which reads as
follows:
When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due
to in the pursuance of the employment, or contracts any illness directly
caused by such employment or the result of the nature of such
employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to
the persons hereinafter specified.
- The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in
pursuance of his employment.
- At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not
in the pursuance of his employment with the defendant corporation, but was
on his way home after he had finished his work for the day and had left the
territory where he was authorized to take collections for the defendant.
- The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might
happen to an employee while in the course of the employment", and as a
general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries
resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his
place of employment, because such an accident does no arise out of and in
the course of his employment.
- The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act No.
3428 was changed in Act No. 3812 to "arising out of and in the course of".
Discussing this phrase, the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Mueller
Construction Co. vs. Industrial Board, said:
The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident,
and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of"
refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident
takes place. By the use of these words it was not the intention of the
legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental
injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the
employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of
the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the
workman's employment of incidental to such employment, and
accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or
hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by
reason of such employment. Risks to which all persons similarly
situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree
to the particular employment are excluded.
- If the deceased had been killed while going from house to house in San
Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of his employment, the plaintiffs would
undoubtedly have the right, prima facie, to recover.
- In the case at bar the deceased was going from work in his own
conveyance.
HELD
YES.
-Francisco Echevarria, the hotel guest, is liable for being the one who directly,
by his negligence in leaving open the faucet, caused the water to spill to the
ground and wet the articles and merchandise of the plaintiffs.
-Jose Dingcong, being a co-renter and manager of the hotel, with complete
possession of the house, must also be responsible for the damages caused.
He failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent
these damages, despite his power and authority to cause the repair of the
pipes.
Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed, with the costs against apellant.
AFABLE V SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY
58 PHIL 14
VICKERS; March 6, 1933
NATURE
Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila
FACTS
- Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine
Company in the district of San Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of
the City of Manila, and he was supposed to be residing in his district
according to the records of the company.
- One Sunday afternoon, Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a bicycle was
run over and fatally injured at the corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in
the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay.
- It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso St. in Manila
without notifying the company, and that at the time of his death he was
returning home after making some collections in San Francisco del Monte.
- According to the practice of the company, if collectors made collections on
Sunday they were required to deliver the amount collected to the company
the next morning.
- The widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought an action to
recover from the defendant corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by
Act. No. 3812, P100 for burial expenses and P1,745.12 for compensation.
- Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended, and they sought to recover
under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428 fifty per cent of P16.78 for 208
weeks of P1,745.12 plus P100 for burial expenses.
- Defendant as special defenses alleged that Leopoldo Madlangbayan at the
time that he sustained the injuries resulting in his death was violating an
ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibits work on Sunday; and that Act
No. 3428, as amended, is unconstitutional and void because it denies the
ISSUE
WON the employer is liable to pay the employee’s heirs.
prof. casis
- Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never notified the defendant
corporation of his removal from San Francisco del Monte of Manila, and that
the company did not know that he was living in Manila on the day of the
accident; that the defendant company did not require its employees to work
on Sunday, or furnish or require its agents to use bicycles.
- These are additional reasons for holding that the accident was not due to
and pursuance of the employment of the deceased. If the deceased saw fit to
change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make
use a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as the
defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one;
and if he made collections on Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his
employment, and his employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him.
DISPOSITION The decision appealed from was affirmed, with the costs
against the appellants.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS V CA (GERONIMO)
227 SCRA 292
DAVIDE, JR.; October 18, 1993
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the business of selling food and drinks to
children in the Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen located in Dagupan.
- August 12, 1989 - A group of parents complained that they found fibrous
material in the bottles of Coke and Sprite that their children bought from
Geronimo’s store. Geronimo examined her stock of softdrinks and found that
there were indeed fibrous materials in the unopened soda bottles. She
brought the bottles to the Department of Health office in their region and was
informed that the soda samples she sent were adulterated.
- Because of this, Geronimo’s sales plummeted with her regular sales of 10
cases day dwindling to about 2 or 3 cases. Her losses amounted to P200 to
P300 a day which later on forced her to close down her business on
December 12, 1989.
- She demanded payment of damages from plaintiff Coca-Cola but the latter
did not accede to her demands.
- The trial court ruled in favor of Coca-Cola, stating that the complaint was
based on a contract and not a quasi-delict because of pre-existing relation
between the parties. Thus the complaint should have been filed within 6
months from the delivery of the thing sold.
- The trial court however annulled the questioned orders of the RTC and
directed it to conduct further proceedings in the civil case. According to the
CA: “the allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is an action for
damages arising from respondent’s act of recklessly and negligently
manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be sol for public
consumption.” It also noted that the availability of an action for breach of
warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective goods.
Petitioners’ Claim:
- Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies and prescription.
- Since the complaint is for breach of warranty (under A1561, CC), it should
have been brought within 6 months from the delivery of the goods.
Respondents’ Comments:
torts & damages
- Geronimo alleges that her complaint is one for damages which does not
involve an administrative action.
- Her cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiff’s right which can be
brought within 4 years (based on A1146, CC).
ISSUE
WON the complaint is founded on a quasi-delict and pursuant to A1146(12),
CC, the action prescribes in 4 years
HELD
YES
Reasoning
- The vendee’s remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties
against hidden defects or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited
to those prescribed in A1567. The vendee may also ask for the annulment of
the contract upon proof of error or fraud in which case the ordinary rule on
obligations shall be applicable.
- Under American law, the liabilities of the manufacturer or seller of injurycausing products may be based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort or
other grounds.
DISPOSITION The instant petition is denied for lack of merit.
GILCHRIST v CUDDY
29 Phil 542
TRENT; February 18, 1915
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the CFI
FACTS
-Cuddy was the owner of the film “Zigomar”. Gilchrist was the owner of a
theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to
Gilchrist the Zigomar” for exhibition in his theatre for a week for P125.
- Cuddy returned the money already paid by Gilchrist days before the delivery
date so that he can lease the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and
receive P350 for the film for the same period.
- Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy, Espejo and
Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for
interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy.
ISSUE
WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga is liable for interfering with the contract
between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the time the identity of the
parties
HELD
YES
- Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the contract and
causing its breach. This liability arises from unlawful acts and not from
contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist.
- Article 1902 of the Civil Code provides that a person who, by act or
omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall
be obliged to pay for the damage done. There is nothing in this article which
requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that he must
A2010
prof. casis
- 61 -
know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage. No such
knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the
damages suffered.
DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed
becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of
another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if
a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the
use or enjoyment interfered with;
b) the invasion is substantial;
SON PING BUN vs CA (Tek Hua)
GR No. 120554
Quisumbing; September 21, 1999
NATURE
Appeal on certiorari for review of CA decision
FACTS
- In 1963, Tek hua Trading, through its Managing Director So Pek Giok,
entered into a lease agreement with D.C. Chuan covering four stalls in
Binondo. The contracts were initially for one year but after expiry of the
same, they continued on a month to month basis. In 1976, Tek Hua was
dissolved with the original members forming a new corporation, Tek Hua
Enterprises with Manuel Tiong as one of the incorporators.
- So Ping Bun, on the death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok, occupied the
same stalls under the business name, Trendsetter Marketing.
- In 1989, the lessor, DC Chuan sent a letter to Tek Hua advising it of a 25%
increase in rent effective September 1, 1989. A further rent increase of 30%
effective January 1, 1990 was implemented. Enclosed in both letters were
new lease contracts for signing. While the letters contained a statement that
the leases will be terminated if the contracts were not signed, the same were
not rescinded.
- In 1991, Tiong wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking him to vacate the four
stalls as the same were going to be used by them. Instead of vacating the
stalls, So was able to secure lease agreements from DC Chuan.
- Tek Hua filed an injunction and an action for nullification of the contracts
between Trendsetter and DC Chuan. The lower Court ruled in favor of Tek
Hua. The CA, on appeal, upheld the trial court. Both the trial court and the CA
awarded legal fees only.
ISSUE
- WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of contract
HELD- Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect for the
property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon
an unlawful interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other of his
private property. In the case at bar, petitioner, Trendsetter asked DC Chuan
to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived
respondent of the latter’s property right.
Reasoning- Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damges are
the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One
c) the defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of the invasion;
d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or
unintentional and actionable under the general negligence
rules.
- On the other hand, the elemts of tort interference are
a) existence of a valid contract
b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence
c) interference of the third party is without legal justification or
excuse
- Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua and DC Chuan,
Tek Hua in fact had property rights over the leased stalls. The action of
Trendsetter in asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor was
unlawful interference.
- The SC handled the question of whether the interference may be justified
considering that So acted solely for the purpose of furthering his own financial
or economic interest. It stated that it is sufficient that the impetus of his
conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives to
conclude that So was not a malicious interferer. Nothing on the record
imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the part of So. Hence the
lack of malice precludes the award of damages.
- The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous interference is Article
1314 which states that “ any third party who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party”. The Court
ratiocinated that the recovery of legal fees is in the concept of actual or
compensatory damages as provided in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. In this
casse, due to defendant’s action of interference, plaintiff was forced to seek
relief through the Court snd thereby incur expenses to protect his interests.
The Court, however, found the award exorbitant. It was reduced to Pesos
100,000.00
Disposition –
Petition denied. CA decision affirmed subject to the modified award of
attorney’s fees.
GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN
171 SCRA 382
SARMIENTO; Mar 21, 1989
Nature:
Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of CA
Facts:
torts & damages
- on July 25, 1978, Florentina Guilatco, a court interpreter, accidentally fell
into a manhole while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a
sidewalk at Perez Blvd. Her right leg was fractured, due to which she was
hospitalized, operated on, and confined.
- She averred that she suffered mental and physical pain, and that she has
difficulty in locomotion. She has not yet reported for duty as court
interpreter (at the time of filing of complaint) and thus lost income. She
also lost weight, and she is no longer her former jovial self. Moreover, she
has been unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities which
she used to do prior to the incident.
- Police confirmed existence of the manhole, which was partially covered by
a concrete flower pot by leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 ½ feet
wide or 42 cm wide by 75 cm long by 150 cm deep.
- City Engineer of Dagupan Alfredo Tangco admitted that the manhole is
owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which they are
found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National Government. He
said that he supervises the maintenance of said manholes and sees to it
that they are properly covered, and the job is specifically done by his
subordinates.
- Trial court ordered the city to pay Guilatco actual, moral and exemplary
damages, plus attorney’s fees. CA reversed the lower court’s ruling on the
ground that no evidence was presented to prove that City of Dagupan had
control or supervision over Perez Blvd.
- City contends that Perez Blvd is a national road that is not under the
control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should
attach to the city.
Issue
WON control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan
exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with
article 2189 CC.
Held
YES
- The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries
suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed
in the Civil Code as follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable
for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person
by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision.
- It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the
province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires
that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or
street.
- In this case, control or supervision is provided for in the charter of
Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer.
- The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liability of the city.
On the other hand, article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising
from “defective streets, public buildings and other public works.”
On Damages awarded
- Actual damages of P10000 reduced to proven expenses of P8053.65. The
trial court should not have rounded off the amount. The court can not rely
on “speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the amount.
A2010
- Moral damages of P150000 is excessive and is reduced to P20000.
Guilatco’s handicap was not permanent and disabled her only during her
treatment which lasted for one year.
- Exemplary damages of P50000 reduced to P10000.
- Award of P7420 as lost income for one year, plus P450 bonus remain the
same
- P3000 as attorney’s fees remain the same
Disposition Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside, decision of
trial court reinstated with modification.
PERSONS LIABLE
WORCESTER v OCAMPO
22 PHIL 42
Johnson; Feb. 27, 1912
NATURE
Appeal from judgment of CFI
FACTS
- Plaintiff Dean Worcester, member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines
and Secretary of the Interior of the Insular Government commenced an action
against defendants Ocampo, Kalaw, Santos, Reyes, Aguilar, Liquete, Palma,
Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto and Cansipit (owners, directors, writers,
editors and administrators of a certain newspaper known as “El
Renacimiento” or “Muling Pagsilang”) for the purpose of recovering damages
resulting from an alleged libelous publication.
- The editorial “Birds of Prey” was alleged to have incited the Filipino people
into believing that plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy
of the position which he held. The said editorial alluded to him as an eagle
that surprises and devours, a vulture that gorges himself on dead and rotten
meat, an owl that affects a petulant omniscience, and a vampire that sucks
the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless.
- After hearing the evidence adduced during trial, the judge of the CFI
rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, holding all the defendants (except
for Reyes, Aguilar and Liquete who were found to be editors but in a
subordinate position and found to have merely acted under the direction of
their superiors) liable jointly and severally for sustained damages on account
of petitioner’s wounded feelings, mental suffering and injuries to his standing
and reputation in the sum of P35,000 as well as P25,000 as punitive
damages.
- This judgment prompted defendants to appeal to the SC, claiming that the
CFI committed several errors in rendering said judgment among which was
that the lower court committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and
severally against the defendants.
ISSUE
WON the defendants, regardless of their participation in the commission of
the actual tort, may be held jointly and severally liable as joint tortfeasors
HELD
YES.
prof. casis
- 62 -
Ratio Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of
a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.
Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit.
They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same
manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.
***If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has
his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately,
because tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual.
Reasoning Defendants fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is
a tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tortfeasor is
not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also
jointly liable with his tortfeasors. The defendants might have been sued
separately for the commission of the tort. They might have sued jointly and
severally, as they were. It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a
direct, corporeal act. **note: Ponente used examples of torts as held under
common law** (In a case of assault and battery committed by various
persons, under the common law, all are principals). So also is the person who
counsels, aids, or assists in any way the commission of a wrong. Under the
common law, he who aided, assisted or counseled, in any way the
commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or
committed the actual tort.
- Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they
commit. The person injured may sue all of them, or any number less than all.
Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all, and altogether jointly liable
for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others
who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants;
nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant
as compared with that of the others.
- The courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tortfeasors
are liable and that others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack
of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort. And this is true even
though they are charged jointly and severally. However, in this case, the
lower court, committed no error in rendering a joint and several judgment
against the defendants. As recognized by Section 6 of Act 277 of the
Philippine Commission: “Every author, editor, or proprietor * * * is chargeable
with the publication of any words in any part * * * or number of each
newspaper, as fully as if he were the author of the same.
Disposition Judgment of the lower court modified. Ocampo, Kalaw, Palma,
Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit held jointly and severally
liable for the sum of P25, 000 with interest at 6%. Santos absolved from any
liability.
ARELLANO, C.J. and MAPA, J. [concurring]
- We concur, except with reference to the liability imposed upon Lichauco.
The real owner and founder, Ocampo, explicitly stated that the other socalled founders subscribed and paid sums of money to aid the paper but as
to Lichauco, he offered to contribute, but did not carry out his offer and in fact
paid nothing. It is incomprehensible how one could claim the right or title to
share the earnings or profits of a company when he had put no capital into it,
neither is it comprehensible how one could share in the losses thereof, and
still less incur liability for damages on account of some act of the said
company, an unrestricted liability to the extent of all his property, as though
he were a regular general partner when he was not such.
TORRES [dissenting in part]
torts & damages
- I concur in regard to the defendants Ocampo and Kalaw, but dissent as
regards Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit for they had
neither direct nor indirect participation in the act that gave rise to the present
suit for damages, nor were they owners or proprietors of the newspaper, its
press or other equipment. They were donors who merely contributed a sum
of money, as a genuine gift, for the purpose of founding, editing, and issuing
the said newspaper, it is improper to deduce that the contributors formed a
company of either a civil or commercial nature.
- After Ocampo had accepted the various amounts proffered, the donors
ceased to be the owners of and surrendered all right to the money donated
and to the objects that were acquired therewith. Therefore they can not incur,
jointly and severally with the director and manager.
CHAPMAN V UNDERWOOD
27 Phil 374
MORELAND; March 28, 1914
NATURE
Appeal from the judgment of trial court finding for the defendant
FACTS
- The plaintiff-appellant, Chapman, desired to board a certain "San Marcelino"
car coming from Sta. Ana and bound for Manila. Being told by his friend that
the car was approaching, he immediately, and somewhat hurriedly, passed
into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car. The car was
a closed one, the entrance being from the front or the rear platform. Plaintiff
attempted to board the front platform but, seeing that he could not reach it
without extra exertion, stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear
platform, and waited for it to come abreast of him in order to board. While in
this position he was struck from behind and run over by the defendant's
(Underwood) automobile.
- The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in his automobile
driven by his chauffeur, a competent driver. A street car bound from Manila to
Sta. Ana being immediately in front of him, he followed along behind it. Just
before reaching the scene of the accident the street car which was following
took the switch (there was a single-track street-car line running along Calle
Herran, with occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other)that is, went off the main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of the
main track. Thereupon the defendant either kept straight ahead on the main
street-car track or a bit to the right. The car which the plaintiff intended to
board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to that in
which the defendant was going. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car
was almost in front of the defendant's automobile, defendant's driver
suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff.
- The judgment of the trial court was for defendant.
ISSUE
WON Underwood is responsible for the negligence of his driver.
HELD
NO.
Ratio An owner who sits in his automobile or other vehicle, and permits his
driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent
acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct
that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts.
A2010
On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without
the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its
continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the
automobile, although present herein at5 the time the act was committed, is
not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefore. The act complained of
must be continued in the presence or the owner for such a length of time that
the owner by his acquiescence, makes his driver’s act his own.
Reasoning Defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and
over the plaintiff. He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side.
- The plaintiff needed only to watch for cars coming from his right, as they
were the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the
street car.
- in the case of Johnson vs. David, the driver does not fall within the list of
persons in Art.1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be
responsible.
Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the
time the alleged negligent acts were committed by the driver, the same rule
applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent act of the driver are
continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom.
- it appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to
meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small
as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver.
DISPOSITION
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
CAEDO V YU KHE THAI
GR NO. L-20392
MAKALINTAL; December 18, 1968
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the CFI of Iloilo
FACTS
- Bernardo is the driver of Yu Khe Thai. He was driving the latter’s
Cadillac along highway 54. On the other side of the road, Caedo was
driving his Mercury car. He was with his family.
- A carretela was in front of the Cadillac. Bernardo did not see the
carretela from afar. When he approached the carritela, he decided to
overtake it even though he had already seen the car of the Caedos’
approaching from the opposite lane. As he did so the curved end of
his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left
wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded
obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the oncoming
vehicle.
- The Caedos were injured. They filed a suit for recovery of damages
against Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai. The CFI ruled in favor of the
Caedos and held Bernardo and Yu solidarily liable.
ISSUES
prof. casis
- 63 -
WON Yu Khe Thai should be held solidarily liable as Bernardo’s
employer
HELD
No.
- Bernardo had no record of any traffic violation. No negligence of
having employed him maybe imputed to his master.
- Negligence on the employer’s part, if any, must be sought in the
immediate setting,, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from
pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger
but also sufficient time to act upon it.
- No negligence can be imputed. The car was running at a
reasonable speed. The road was wide and open. There was no
reason for Yu to be specially alert. He had reason to rely on the skill
of his driver. The time element was such that there was no
reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved
and warn the driver accordingly.
- The law does not require that a person must possess a certain
measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in
the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle.
The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his
omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him
he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception
is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver
that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear
to be entirely safe and commonplace to another
DISPOSITIVE
Decision modified. Yu Khe Thai is free from liability
CAEDO v. YU KHE THAI
GR No. L-20392
MAKALINTAL; December 18, 1968
FACTS
- Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in Quezon
City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for
Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming
from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver
Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his Parañaque home to
Wack Wack.
- The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering the
condition of the road and the absence of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50
kilometers per hour, and the Cadillac at approximately 48 to 56 kilometers.
Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the
Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned by a certain
Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short
rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the
other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.
- Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in
front of him, only eight meters away. This is the first clear indication of his
torts & damages
negligence. The carretela was provided with two lights, one on each side, and
they should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary
precautions. And even if he did not notice the lights, as he claimed later on at
the trial, the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from afar if he
had been careful, as it must have been in the beam of his headlights for a
considerable while.
- In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite
direction. Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind
the carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left in order to pass. As
he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim
of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded
obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. On his
part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed,
judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the
Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble —
beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela, or
else squeeze in between them in any case. It was a risky maneuver either
way, and the risk should have been quite obvious.
- It was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela
only eight meters in front of him, and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of
the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the
clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient. Its rear
bumper, as already stated, caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it
loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected situation, tried to avoid the
collision at the last moment by going farther to the right, but was
unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels
of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact.
ISSUE
1. WON defendant Rafael Bernardo is liable for the accident.
2. If YES, WON his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai, is solidarily liable with
him.
HELD
1. YES. There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to
Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the
damages suffered by the plaintiffs.
2. NO. If the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the
vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the
mishap by the exercise of due diligence.
- The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but
rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely
correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order
to prevent injury or damage.
- The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a
great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform
and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers.
- The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of
skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of
traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence,
within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the
evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the
accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level
imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one
A2010
prof. casis
- 64 -
passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another.
Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of
professional drivers by car owners who, by -their very inadequacies, have
real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.
- Rafael Bernardo had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations.
No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master.
Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate
setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the
driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the
danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such
negligence may be imputed. The car was not running at an unreasonable
speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning.
There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He
had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. The time element
was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess
the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly.
DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring
defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability, and is otherwise affirmed
with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs against the latter.
sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and
two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña, died as a
consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not
with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was
going to attend a parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after
the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.
SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE
CAPUNO
G.R. No. L-10068-70 June 29, 1957
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
RULING
YES.12
FACTS
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide
through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperiña and Amado
Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna. During the
trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperiña, reserved
her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused.
After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and, on
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante Capuno was only
fifteen (15) years old when he committed the crime.
In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action against
Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the
aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña.
Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the
death of Isidoro Caperiña, he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin
because at the time of the accident, the former was not under the control,
supervision and custody of the latter. This defense was sustained by the
lower court and, as a consequence, it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay
the damages claimed in the complaint. From this decision, plaintiff appealed
to the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to the Supreme Court on
the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law.
It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization
and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the
City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in honor of
Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor.
From the school Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the
same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in
question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the
latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he
was a minor and was then living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts
are not disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident. And so, plaintiff
contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability.
ISSUE
Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and
severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro
Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.
RATIO
Parents shall be liable for the tortious conduct of their minor children living
with them although at the time of the tort, the children were under the direct
control or supervision of an academic institution. (THIS IS A LANDMARK
DOCTRINE, WHICH WAS LATER MODIFIED BY J CRUZ IN AMADORA VS.
COURT OF APPEALS)
REASONING
The provision “Teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
their custody", only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any
academic educational institution.
Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and
as part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr.
Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in
connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some
companions and while driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances,
it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor,
could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a
student of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law.
The case involves an interpretation of Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5,
(school’s liability versus parental liability) which provides:
"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal
acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
12
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by
the minor children who live with them.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody."
torts & damages
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the
minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which
imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means",
while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in
moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by
which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage
(Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This defendants failed to
prove.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that
defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff, jointly and
severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as damages, and the costs of action.
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
I believe we should affirm the judgment relieving the father of liability. I
can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code to
teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial
difference is there between them in so far as concerns the proper supervision
and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an
academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do not
commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so long as they are in a
position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in
the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in
Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not qualify
"teachers" but only "heads of establishments". The phrase is only an updated
version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian
and French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of
negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents,
teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority,
it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective
authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one
answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very
reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the
school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is
under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.
I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no
way able to prevent, and which he had every right to assume the school
authorities would avoid. Having proved that he entrusted his child to the
custody of school authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over
him, the father has rebutted the presumption of Art. 1903 and the burden of
proof shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the
parent in order to render him liable.
Padilla and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.
SALEN V. BALCE
A2010
- 65 -
FUELLAS V. CADANO
Nature: Appeal from the Decision of the Trial Court making defendant
therein, now appellant Agapito Fuellas, the father of the minor who caused
the injuries to Pepito Cadano, also a minor, liable under Art. 2180 of the new
Civil Code for damages.
Facts: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant Agapito
Fuellas, were both 13 years old, on September 16, 1954. They were
classmates at St. Mary's High School, Dansalan City. They had a quarrel that
lead to Pepito’s injury, his right arm was broken after Rico pushed him on the
ground.
It is contended that in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay damages for the deliberate injury
caused by his son; that the said court held the petitioner liable pursuant to
par. 2 of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, in connection with Art. 2176 of the same
Code; that according to the last article, the act of the minor must be one
wherein "fault or negligence" is present; and that there being no fault or
negligence on the part of petitioner-appellant's minor son, but deliberate
intent, the above mentioned articles are not applicable, for the existence of
deliberate intent in the commission of an act negatives the presence of fault
or negligence in its commission. Appellant, therefore, submits that the
appellate Court erred in holding him liable for damages for the deliberate
criminal act of his minor son.
Issue: WON the father is liable civilly for the criminal act of his son?
Held: Yes. In an earlier case (Exconde vs. Capuno, et al., G.R. No. L-10132,
prom. June 29, 1957), holding the defendants jointly and severally liable with
his minor son Dante for damages, arising from the criminal act committed by
the latter, this tribunal gave the following reasons for the rule: —
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by the minor children who live
with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of
the parental authority they exercise over them which
imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them,
keeping them in their company, educating them in
proportion to their means", while on the other hand, gives
them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation"
(Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by
which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they
prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage (Art. 1903, last paragraph,
Spanish Civil Code). This, defendants failed to prove.
In another case, Salen and Salbanera vs. Jose Balce, the defendant Balce
was the father of a minor Gumersindo Balce, below 18 years of age who was
living with him. Gumersindo was found guilty of homicide for having killed
Carlos Salen, minor son of plaintiffs. The trial court rendered judgment
dismissing the case, stating that the civil liability of the minor son of defendant
arising from his criminal liability must be determined under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code and not under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code. In
reversing the decision, this tribunal held: —
It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father
is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the
latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, or over 9
but under 15 years of age, who acts without discernment, unless
prof. casis
it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is
because a son who commits the act under any of those
conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12,
subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to
leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil
liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his
legal authority or control. But a minor over 15 who acts with
discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason
the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents
should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to
the general law which is our Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the
pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the
instant case because it only covers obligations which arise
from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from
criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for
an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or
mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused
by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is
caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void apparently
exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this
particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned
from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal
or identical cases.
Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis
of the evidence submitted therein by both parties, independently of the
criminal case. And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176
upon which the action in the present case was instituted, is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault of negligence under the
Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as
heretofore stated, any discussion as to the minor's criminal responsibility is of
no moment.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is dismissed, the decision appealed from is
affirmed
GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ
MALCOLM; September 23, 1931
Nature:
an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against the five defendants, to recover damages in the amount of P10,000,
for physical injuries suffered as a result of an automobile accident.
Facts:
A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while
attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road
in the municipality of Las Piñas, Province of Rizal. The truck was driven by
the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and was owned by Saturnino Cortez. The
automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age,
and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel
Gutierrez. At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the
torts & damages
mother, together will several other members of the Gutierrez family, seven in
all, were accommodated therein. Narcisso Gutierrez was a passenger of the
bus. He had a fracture on his right leg.
It was conceded that the collision was caused by negligence
pure and simple. But, Narcisso Gutierrez blames both the bus and the car
while the truck blames the car and the car in turn blames the truck.
the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur, that he was
driving at an excessive rate of speed, and that, on approaching the bridge
and the truck, he lost his head and so contributed by his negligence to the
accident. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a
license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of
his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of
the Civil Code, the father alone and not the minor or the mother, would be
liable for the damages caused by the minor.
Issue:
1.
2.
Held:
1.
2.
WON the father of Bonifacio (car) is liable.
WON the owner of the truck is liable.
Yes. In the United States, it is uniformly held that the head of a
house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for the
general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by
one of his children, whom he designates or permits to run it,
where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury
for the pleasure of other members of the owner's family than the
child driving it. The theory of the law is that the running of the
machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within
the scope of the owner's business, so that he is liable for the
negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and
servant.
Yes. The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner of the truck, and
of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis,
namely, that of contract. The reason for this conclusion reaches
to the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the
truck on the bridge, the speed in operating the machine, and the
lack of care employed by the chauffeur. In its broader aspects,
the case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from
opposite directions, with neither being willing to slow up and give
the right of way to the other, with the inevitable result of a
collision and an accident
Disposition
In consonance with the foregoing rulings, the judgment appealed from will be
modified, and the plaintiff will have judgment in his favor against the
defendants Manuel Gutierrez, Abelardo Velasco, and Saturnino Cortez,
jointly and severally, for the sum of P5,000, and the costs of both instances.
RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA)
135 SCRA 242
ABAD SANTOS; February 28, 1985
NATURE: Petition to review a decision of CA
A2010
- 66 -
FACTS: Roberto Luna, a businessman, was killed in a vehicular collision
(between Luna, driving a gokart, and Luis dela Rosa, 13 years old, driving a
Toyota car without a license) at a gokart practice area.
Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis and his father, which
the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas, awarding P1,650,000 as unearned net
earnings of Luna, P12,000 compensatory damages, and P50,000 for loss of
his companionship (come on!!), with legal interest from date of the decision,
and attorney’s fees of P50,000 (no interest mentioned). (Note: father and son
solidarily liable for damages.)
The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA, which affirmed in toto the RTC. In a
MFR filed by the Dela Rosas, the CA modified the decision, this time
reducing the unearned income to P450,000. Both parties filed separate
petitions for review in the SC.
Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit. The instant petition is
the one filed by Lunas, contending that the CA erred in reducing the award
for unearned income, and that the award for atty’s fees should include legal
interest.
Pending the decision, the SC came out with a resolution ordering the Dela
Rosas, in the interest of justice (since the death took place in 1970, and 15
years after the process of litigation is still not over), to pay the Lunas
P450,000 for unearned net earnings, P12,000 compensatory damages,
P50,000 for loss of companionship, all with legal interest, and atty’s fees of
P50,000, within 30 days.
The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts, saying that they had no cash
money. The writ of execution produced only a nominal amount. In the
meantime, Luis is already of age, married, with 2 kids, and living in Spain but
only causally employed (“His compensation is hardly enough to support his
family. He has no assets of his own as yet”).
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income
2. WON the award for atty’s fees should have legal interest
HELD:
1. YES
Ratio: The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings had no basis,
thus is void.
Reasoning: the RTC based its computation of the net unearned earnings on
2 factors: life expectancy of the deceased of another 30 years, and an annual
net income of P55,000 (P75,000 gross income less P20,000 personal
expenses).
In coming out with the life expectancy, RTC considered the age and health of
the deceased. However, the CA modified this by factoring in the “engagement
of Luna in car racing,” thus lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years.
WRT to the gross income, RTC considered the various positions the
deceased held at the time of his death, and the trend of his earnings over the
span of his last few years, thus coming up with a potential gross income of
P75,000. However, the CA increased the annual personal expenses to
P30,000, due to the escalating gasoline expenses, thus lowering the net
annual unearned income to P45,000.
CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing reduced the life
expectancy. There is nothing on record that supports the claim that the car
racing was a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life
expectancy. “That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct
statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous
sport for go-karts are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly
prof. casis
larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances. It was error on the part
of the CA to have disturbed the determination of the RTC which it had
previously affirmed.”
Also, it was an error to increase the expenses without increasing the gross
income. “It stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should
increase because of the ‘escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in
Roberto R. Luna's social standing’ [a statement which lacks complete basis],
it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase
considering the manifold sources thereof”
2. YES
Ratio: The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a
quasi-delict case and under the circumstances, interest as part thereof may
be adjudicated at the discretion of the court.
(The atty’s fees should accrue interest from the date of filing of the
compliant.)
Obiter:
The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll, where the court held that
A2180 applied to Atty. Hill nothwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
his son, but since the son had attained majority, as a matter of equity, the
liability of Atty. Hill became merely subsidiarily to that of his son. The Dela
Rosas now invoke that the father should also be held only subsidiarily.
To this contention, the court is “unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law
because to do so will not serve the ends of justice. Luis is abroad and beyond
the reach of Philippine Courts. Also, he has no property in the Phils or
elsewhere.”
Disposition: resolution of CA SET ASIDE, reinstating the earlier decision
with slight modification regarding the award of atty’s fees.
LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SPS
GOTIONG)
214 SCRA 16
REGALADO; September 18,1992
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court.
FACTS
- respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at
the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died
on January 14,1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the
University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of
Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his
aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event on the same date.
- More than 2 years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi
were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with
Wendell after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible.
- January, 1979 - Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for
reconciliation but the Julie refused, prompting him to resort to threats against
her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend,
Malou Alfonso
torts & damages
- January 14,1979 - Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound
inflicted with the same firearm licensed under Cresencio Libi, father of
Wendell
- both set of parents came up with versions of the story
Gotiongs:
> Wendell caused her death by shooting her and thereafter turning the gun
on himself to commit suicide
Libis:
> an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or
antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell's death
and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid
identification
- CFI Cebu: Gotiongs filed civil case against the parents of Wendell to
recover damages arising from the latter's vicarious liability under A2180 CC.
CFI dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of the evidence.
- IAC: CFI decision set aside and found Libis subsidiarily liable
ISSUE
WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libi’s liable for vicarious liability
HELD
YES
Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent
and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in
supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from
his reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong.
Therefore, appellants are liable under A2180 CC.
Reasoning
- undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of
gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It
should be emphasized, however, that this is not the only circumstance to be
taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not as the
body was cleaned already in the funeral parlor
- Amelita Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi,
owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their
bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and
Amelita's key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell.
They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She
admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the
safety deposit box. We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that
petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of
a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten
hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently
left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the
other key was.
- A2180': The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their
minor children imposed by A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both
quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.'
- BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary
> if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of their minor children is
subsidiary, they they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the
defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of the family to
prevent damages. But if the liability id direct and primary, the diligence would
constitute a valid substantial defense. HENCE, LIABILITY OF PARENTS
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prof. casis
- 67 -
FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID
PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY
> applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the parent is also
solidarily liable with the child. THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR
FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY. A101 RPC SAYS
SO
> RULES:
+ for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority
and control or who live in the company of the parents: PRIMARY
= premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under or 9-15
but without discernment
= premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 15-21 (now 18)
+ liability effected against father or mother? BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE
WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR
= youth welfare code
= FC: responsibility of parents
+ for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors: same rules in
A2180 and A2182
Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio, Bundoc)
209 SCRA 518
Feliciano, J; 1992
NATURE
Appeal for review of CA decision
FACTS
- On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then aged ten, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. He was
charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but was acquitted
and exempted from criminal liability ob the ground that he had acted without
discernment. The adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil
complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc.
- The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the indispensable party
in the action as their son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on November 18,
1982 via an adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur. The trial Court
agreed with the respondents and dismissed the complaint.
- The case contained procedural questions which were raised in the appeal.
The SC however decided to hear the appeal based on substantial justice.
ISSUE
- WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the tort action under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
HELD- Yes. The Court held that parental authority did not retroactively transfer to
and vested in the adopting parents at the time the shooting incident occurred.
The adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the
time of the incident as they were then in the US were they live. To do so and
hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable.
Reasoning- The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against
him under Article 2176. However, because of his minority, the provision of
Article 2180 would be applicable. Article 2180 reads “ the obligation imposed
by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible… The father and,
incase of his death or incapacity, the mother are responsible for the damages
caused by the children who live in their company… The responsibility treated
of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.
- The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious liability or the
doctrine of imputed liability under the Anglo-American tort law. Thus, under
this doctrine, a person is not only liable for torts committed by him also torts
committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom
he is responsibility. Thus parental liability is made a natural or logical
consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the parents which include
the instructing, controlling, and disciplining of the child. The presumption
under law is that when a child under their care commits a tortuous act the
parents were negligent in the performance of these duties and
responsibilities. As stated, sufficient proof can be presented to overcome this
presumption.
Disposition –
Petition granted. Decision set aside.
MERCADO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING
L-14342
LABRADOR; May 30, 1960
NATURE
This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his co-plaintiffappellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L. Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado is
the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. Mercado, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.
and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on
Kanlaon, Quezon City.
- A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this case, may be described as an
empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. On February 22, 1956,
Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a "pitogo". As
a result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of
razor.
ISSUES
1. WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead
of the of the father since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on
respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time)
2. WON the moral damages fixed at P2,000 are excessive.
HELD
torts & damages
1. NO. The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which
petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should
be made liable, is as follows:
ART. 2180. . . .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
- It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody,"
contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher,
such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of
the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct
and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher;
and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil.
- Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go
to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents
after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of
Article 2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which
makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor
children.
2. YES. It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto
Mercado responsible for or guilty, of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries,
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. Even if we assume that
said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the
moral damages, yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's
resentment, which motivated the assault, was occasioned by the fact that
Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado
to get "his pitogo from Renato." It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate
cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or
negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo
from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)
After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we find that
none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which
authorizes the grant of moral damages, was shown to have existed.
Consequently, the grant of moral damages is not justified.
PALISOC VS. BRILLANTES
41 SCRA 548
TEEHANKEE; October 4, 1971
NATURE
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the
CFI Manila.
FACTS
- Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son, Dominador Palisoc,
and a student in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute filed
the action below for damages arising from the death of their son at the hands
of a fellow student, defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the
said Institute.
- the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were
classmates, and one afternoon, they, together with another classmate
Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. At
that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon
were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on
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at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a
foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face.
Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was
followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to
avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until
Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face
downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to
him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He
never regained consciousness; finally he died.
- Defendants were: Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the incident
occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute; Teodosio
Valenton, the president thereof; Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class
to which the deceased belonged; and Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of
the deceased.
- At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship,
but lately, it was duly incorporated.
- the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code.
- The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other defendantsofficials of the Manila Technical Institute, in this wise:
“In the opinion of the Court, this article(art.2180) of the Code is not applicable
to the case at bar, since this contemplates the situation where the control or
influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the
conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents...The
clause "so long as they remain in their custody" contemplated a situation
where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control or
influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents...There is no evidence
that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other
defendant officials of the school.”
ISSUE
WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors with
Daffon.
HELD
a. YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute, Valenton and
Quibulue, respectively)
Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the
tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their
custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students,
in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over
the conduct of the child." In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the
protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily
substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as
well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students'
activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect
the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would
reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves
may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.
Reasoning
- The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum
in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so
long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the
pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influence. It is true that under the law abovequoted, teachers or directors of
prof. casis
arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only applies
to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational
institution"
- phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their
custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and
its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as
they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing
in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who
commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously
held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied, must now
be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.
- At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such
liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by
"(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's
decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability.
b. NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors and the
school) itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been properly
impleaded as party defendant
- the school had been incorporated since and therefore the school itself, as
thus incorporated, should have been brought in as party defendant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows: .
1. Sentencing the Daffon, Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay
plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the
death of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory
expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of
earning power and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this
action in both instances; 2. absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from the
complaint; and 3. dismissing defendants' counterclaims. .
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:
-I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect
that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180
should be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord with the plain text
of the law.
- Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed
therein is limited to illegal acts during minority, the article expressly so
provides, as in the case of the parents and of the guardians. It is natural to
expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of
the other categories of persons enumerated in the article, it would have
expressly so stated. The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that
the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age. Further, it is
not without significance that
- finally, that while in the case of parents and guardians, their authority and
supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching
majority age, the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist
regardless of the age of the latter.
MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:
- I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in
Mercado v. Court of Appeals. I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to
unjust results, considering the size of the enrollment in many of our
educational institutions, academic and non-academic, as well as the temper,
torts & damages
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attitudes and often destructive activism of the students, to hold their teachers
and/or the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts
committed by them.
- It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority, rendering
teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their
power to control.
- one other factor constrains me to dissent. The opinion of the majority states:
"Here, the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved,
since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident." Note that
for parental responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in
their company...it stands to reason that (1) the clause "so long as they remain
in their custody" as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be
equated with the phrase "who live in their company" as used in reference to
parents; and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused
by their children who are no longer minors, so should teachers and school
heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the
same age category.
AMADORA VS CA
RECOLLETOS)
160 SCRA 315
CRUZ; April 15, 1988
(COLLEGIO
DE
SAN
JOSE-
Facts:
It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletes. Alfredo went to the school to submit his “Report in
Physic”. While they were in the auditorium of their school, hewas shot to
death by his classmate Pablito Daffon.
ISSUE:
WON Art 2180 is applicable.
Held:
Yes. Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools, academic or non-academic.
Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is
technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head
thereof shall be answerable.
“There is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic
and non-academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are
concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student
under their control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where
he is teaching”. “x x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present. x x x “
The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under
the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the
semester has not ended, or has ended or has not yet begun. The term
“custody” signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the
school authorities. The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean,
principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the
pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are
assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher is
physically present and in a position to prevent it.
prof. casis
- 69 -
Thus, for injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shall
be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the
school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or
the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior, but it
may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence
of a bonus paterfamilias. Such defense they had taken necessary
precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from
liability imposed by Art 2180.
Basis of teacher’s vicarious liability is, as such, they acting in Loco Parentis
(in place of parents). However teachers are not expected to have the same
measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over
the child is not equal in degree. x x x The parent can instill more lasting
discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be
held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort
committed by the child.
As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised
in the discharged of their duties, they were exonerated of liability.
(Note – the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence
resulting to injuries, in or out of the school premises – J. Guttierez, Jr
concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the
bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment
and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected. It
seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of
negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly
speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship.
The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose.
The court cannot make law, it can only apply the law with its imperfections.
However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or
repealed.
PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY)
160 SCRA 785
PARAS; April 25, 1988
NATURE
Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered
setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the
respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of
dismissal.
FACTS
- A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and
mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias
“Teng”. Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring
him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery.
- Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University
based on Art 2190 CC
- Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to
vocational schools and not to academic institutions. They also claim that the
civil liability in this case arose from a crime, which they did not commit. Since
it was a civil case, respondent school claims that a demand should have
been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for
damages against respondent school. MTD was granted by the CA.
- Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal. Motion was denied
due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling.
ISSUE
WON the Art 2180 CC13 applies to academic institutions
HELD
It is unnecessary to answer the issue. What the petitioner wants to know is
WON the school or the university itself is liable. The answer is no since the
provision speaks of “teachers or heads”
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
YLARDE
vs.
GANCAYCO; 1988 July 29
AQUINO
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon
Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher
therein. At that time, the school was littered with several concrete blocks
which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War
II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren,
another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by
himself.
Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered
eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven. Being their teacher-in-charge,
he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a
hole wherein the stone can be buried. The work was left unfinished. The
following day, also after classes, private respondent Aquino called four of the
original eighteen pupils to continue the digging. These four pupils ---Reynaldo Alonso, Fransico Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, dug
until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep. At this point,
private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained
inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the
digging.
When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block,
private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. Then, said
private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open
hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. Private
respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom
where he could get some rope. Before leaving, private respondent Aquino
allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone."
"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody."
13
torts & damages
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A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left, three of the four kids,
Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any
warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block
causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able
to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde, the
concrete block caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in
a standing position. As a result thereof, Ylarde sustained injuries and died
three (3) days later.
Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages against both
private respondents Aquino and Soriano. The lower court dismissed the
complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is
in line with their course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that the demise of Ylarde
was due to his own reckless imprudence.
ISSUE
WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
both private respondents can be held liable for damages.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."
On the other hand, the applicable provision of Article 2180 states:
"Art. 2180. . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody."
HELD
Only Aquino, the teacher, is liable.
Ratio: As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made responsible
for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school
and not a school of arts and trades.
Reasoning:
This is in line with the Court’s ruling in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals,
wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic
school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. This
Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of
the school who can be held liable.
Ratio: Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in
his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to
prevent any injury on their persons.
Reasoning:
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(1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead
utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton
concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task;
(2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished
digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily
pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous
area;
(3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so
apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling;
(4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's
safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive
nuisance.
(6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is evident that the lower
court did not consider his age and maturity. This should not be the case. The
degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the
person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the
same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according
to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. The standard
of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree
of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion,
knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances.
Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless
imprudence.
DISPOSITION
Granted.
SALVOSA v. IAC (CASTRO)
166 SCRA 274
PADILLA, J.: October 5, 1988
FACTS
Jimmy Abon, a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and
a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was
convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro, a student of
the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking
space of BCF. BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the
ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading
Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa
(President and Chairman of the Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive
Vice President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of
Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges
Foundation Inc. as party defendants.
After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1) sentencing defendants
Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc.,
jointly and severally, to pay private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro;
(2) absolving the other defendants; and (3) dismissing the defendants'
counterclaim
for
lack
of
merit.
ISSUE
WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the
tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
prof. casis
HELD
NO. Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the
school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically,
therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held
solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
Ratio:
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains
in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco
parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the [student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in
[Art. 2180 — 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time."
Reasoning:
a. The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA. According to the
CA, while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at
the time of the shooting incident, which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening;
but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property
custodian of the BCF ROTC unit, he must have been attending night classes
and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him
or soon thereafter. The time interval is safely within the "recess time" that the
trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case, supra. In line with the
case of Palisoc, 17 a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in
"recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at
attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment
of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor
and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which
the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include
dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises
of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in
the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the
law.
b. Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite
instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot
Napoleon Castro.
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(Castillo/Cadiz)
194 SCRA 340
Paras, J.: Feb. 25, 1991
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the CA
FACTS
-Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student at St. Francis HS wanted to join
a school picnic at Talaan Beach, Quezon. His parents didn’t allow him to go
due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic
and go straight home. However, he was persuaded by his teachers to go and
later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher.
-his parents filed a complaint against St. Francis HS, represented by its
principal, Illumin, and several teachers for damages incurred from the death
torts & damages
of their son, contending that it occurred due to petitioners’ failure to exercise
proper diligence of a good father of the family. The TC found against the
teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in
which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim. Also, the male teachers who
were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off
drinking. The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher
Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school
sanctioned, and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was
not actually invited.
-Both parties appealed to the CA. On the issue of the liability of St. Francis
HS and the Illumin, the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken
together with the 1st, 4th, and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180. They cannot
escape liability simply because it wasn’t an “extra-curricular activity of the
HS”. From the evidence, it was shown that the principal had known of the
picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the
event. As such, under Article 2180, both are jointly and severally liable w/ the
teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees
(teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the
owner/manager (St. Francis and the principal). Petitioners contend that the
victim’s parents failed to prove by evidence that they didn’t give their son
consent to join the picnic. The Court finds this immaterial to the determination
of the existence of their liability. Also, 2 of the teachers who arrived after the
drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their
lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence
attributed to the other teachers. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
(1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants
(2) WON Art. 2180, in relation to 2176 is applicable
(3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper
HELD
(1) NO. Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the
negligence of people under them. At the outset, it should be noted that the
victim’s parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental
and physical cross examination.
-Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show
acquiescence or consent to it. If the CA’s findings are to be upheld,
employers will be forever exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to
Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if
such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance
of their duties.
-No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is
overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the
family. In fact, 2 P.E. teachers were invited as they were scout masters and
had knowledge in First Aid and swimming. Life savers were brought in the
event of such an accident. The records also show that the 2 P.E. teachers did
all that was humanly possible to save the victim.
(2) NO. The CA erred in applying Art. 2180, particularly par 4. For an
employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or
omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an
employee was in the performance of his assigned task. In the case at bar, the
teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a
purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity.
A2010
- 71 -
(3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence
required of them, no moral or exemplary damages under Art. 2177 may be
awarded in favor of respondent spouses.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is SET ASIDE
PSBA v CA (BENITEZ/BAUTISTA)
205 SCRA 729
Padilla, J.: Feb. 4, 1992
FACTS
-Carlitos Bautista, enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of PSBA, was
stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were from outside the
school’s academic community. This prompted his parents to file suit with the
RTC of Manila w/ Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against
PSBA and its corporate officers, alleging negligence, recklessness and lack
of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the
attack of the victim.
-PSBA sought to dismiss the case, alleging that since they were presumably
sued under Art 2180, there was no cause of action since academic
institutions are not subject to the said provision.
-A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC, yielding
the same results upon appeal with the CA. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
(1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180
HELD
(1) NO. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual
relation between the parties, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern;
but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even
when there is a contract.
-Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroad:”… the mere fact that a person is bound
to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to
such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break
the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a
breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extracontractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties”
-Using the test in Cangco, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to
PSBA’s liability; hence, any finding of negligence would generally give rise to
a breach of contractual obligation only.
-When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment, a contract is
established between them, resulting in a bilateral obligation. The school is
obliged to provide the student with an education, along with a safe
atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge. In turn,
the student abides by the school’s academic requirements and observes its
rules and regulations. However, a school cannot be an insurer for its students
against all risks; one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the
circumstances of persons, time and place.
- In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was
breached due to PSBA’s negligence in providing proper security measures.
At this stage, the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the
private respondent’s complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts
which only the TC can determine.
prof. casis
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of origin is hereby
ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the
Court. Costs against the petitioners.
SOLIMAN, JR. V JUDGE TUAZON
209 SCAR 47
FELICIANO, J; May 18, 1992
NATURE
Civil complaint for damages
FACTS
- On August 13, 1982, while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman, Jr., a student of
the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC), was in the campus premises
thereof, the defendant, Jimmy Solomon, who was then in the premises of
said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of
defendant R.L. Security Agency, Inc., without any provocation, shot the
plaintiff on the abdomen. The plaintiff was confined in a hospital, and as per
doctor's opinion, he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will
be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from
three to four months. Petitioner, represented by his guardian, filed a civil
complaint for damages against RCC, RL Security Agency and Solomon,
- RCC filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the complaint stated no
cause of action against it. It argued that it is free from any liability for the
injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the
employer of the security guard Solomon, and hence was not responsible for
any wrongful act of Solomon. It further argued that Article 2180, 7th
paragraph, of the Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds
teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, while security guard
Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the school.
- Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCC’s motion to dismiss.
Petitioner’s MFR was denied, Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180, as well as those of
Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code
2. WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law, for the injury
sustained by petitioner
HELD
1. NO
- Under Art. 2180, the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one
against another by fault or negligence exists not only for one's own act or
omission, but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law
responsible. Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or
omissions of another person are the following:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helper, acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils, their students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
- The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for
the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon
Soliman, Jr. RCC was not the employer of Solomon. The employer of
torts & damages
Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the school was the client of
the latter. It is settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires
and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the
employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts
committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not
to the clients of such agency. There being no employer-employee
relationship between RCC and Solomon, petitioner cannot impose vicarious
liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon.
- Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an
apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the R.L. Security
Agency Inc., the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts
of Solomon.
- The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by
petitioner are as follows:
Art. 349. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(2) Teachers and professors;
xxx
xxx
xxx
(4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices;
xxx
xxx
xxx
Art. 350.
The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student
are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution. In
no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. The teacher or
professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the
pupil or student."
- In Palisoc v. Brillantes, the Court held the owner and president of a school
of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in
damages for the death of Palisoc, a student of that Institute, which resulted
from fist blows delivered by Daffon, another student of the Institute. It will be
seen that the facts of Palisoc v. Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th
paragraph of Article 2180, quoted above; but those facts are entirely different
from the facts existing in the instant case.
- Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for
damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such
substitute parental authority. In the instant case, Solomon who committed
allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner, was not a pupil, student
or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school had no substitute
parental authority over Solomon.
2. YES
- In the case of PSBA v CA, the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code
was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an
outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or
control or supervision. At the same time, however, the court stressed that an
implied contract may be held to be established between a school which
accepts students for enrollment, on the one hand, and the students who are
enrolled, on the other hand, which contract results in obligations for both
parties. It held: When an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably
suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide
A2010
- 72 -
by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or 'built-in'
obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or
assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly,
no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or
explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school
premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must
ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the
campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
- It was also pointed out in said case that: "In the circumstances obtaining in
the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract
between school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence
in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give
rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of
Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a
contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the
contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a
contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The
negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless
the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the
Civil Code.
- In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss
the complaint against it, and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial
court's order. In the case at bar, the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss
filed by RCC, upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of action was
based, and could have been based, only on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. As
PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in
character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other
legal obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he
supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based
on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have
granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of justice,
allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex
contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC.
Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition, to treat the comment of
respondent Colleges as its answer, and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
Order granting the motion to dismiss the case.This case is REMANDED to
the court a quo for further proceedings.
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS
PARDO, February 6, 2002
NATURE
Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR
FACTS
(this case was already assigned in PFR)
-Sherwin Carpitanos, together with James Daniel II (then 15, driving the jeep)
and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep, Grandson
of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on
their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle
turned turtle. It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached.
prof. casis
Carpitanos sued the school, James Daniel II, his parents, and Vivencio
Villanueva.
-TC: absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II, held parents and school liable
-CA: school liable under A218 and 219, FC, finding that school was negligent
in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them.
ISSUE (regarding liability of St. Mary’s Academy)
WON St. Mary’s Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin
Carpitanos, and therefore, liable for damages
HELD
NO. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote
cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there
intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Ratio. For the school to be liable, it must be shown that the ‘injury for which
recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done;
the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and
natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.
Reasoning. The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school
was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
-The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but
the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva.
-Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause
of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless
driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded.
-There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James
Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched
Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep, and was in fact the
one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep.
-Liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor
driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep,
must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner
St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the
remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s
parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an
event over which petitioner St. Mary’s Academy had no control, and which
was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for
the death resulting from such accident.
- It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court.[19] The Court
remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of
defendants, excluding petitioner St. Mary’s Academy, Dipolog City. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS
63 SCRA 231
AQUINO; March 25, 1975
NATURE
Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision
torts & damages
FACTS
- PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint
for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against
PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, Inc., its manager BALINGIT and the
driver, PINEDA.
- It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK, owned by PhilAm, along the nat’l highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped
the BUS driven by Pangalangan, owned by Phil Rabbit. Pangalangan
suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79
days. This deprived the company of earnings of about P8,600.
- Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not
Pineda's employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be
dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no
cause of action against him.
- CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was
not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art.2180 CC.
- In the appeal, the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a
business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value
of P41,200, Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T. This implied that the
veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and
his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality. But this was
not alleged in their complaint.*
ISSUE
WON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment
or enterprise" used in Art. 2180 NCC (Art.1903 OCC) embrace the manager
of a corporation owning a truck
(this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue!)
HELD
NO
Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments: Art.2180
uses the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) to mean
"employer.”
- Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual
liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be
regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc.
* This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow
them to do so now. The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings
filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality
separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses.
Dispositive Lower court’s order of dismissal is AFFIRMED.
PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA)
273 SCRA 562
DAVIDE; June 17, 1997
A2010
-Civil Case No. 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages
instituted by the heirs of Ramon A. Acuesta
-Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross
negligence, recklessness, violation of traffic rules and regulations,
abandonment of victim, and attempt to escape from a crime
Private Respondents’ Version
-In the early morning of March 24, 1990, about 6:00 o’clock, the victim
Ramon A. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez
Street
-On the Magsaysay Blvd., defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc.
(Philtranco for brevity) Bus No. 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being
pushed by some persons in order to start its engine.
-The Magsaysay Blvd. runs perpendicular to Gomez St. and the said
Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez
Street.
-As the bus was pushed, its engine started thereby the bus continued on its
running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A. Acuesta who was
still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus.
-As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly, its
running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine, thereby
the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A. Acuesta who, as a result
thereof fell and, thereafter, was run over by the said bus.
Petitioner’s Version
-Manilhig, in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City, warmed up the
engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog.
-While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street, the
victim, who was biking towards the same direction as the bus, suddenly
overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road.
-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the
brakes and blew the bus horn, the victim was bumped from behind and run
over by the bus.
-Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, including petitioner
Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of
rigid training before he was hired.
-Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in
overtaking two tricycles, without taking precautions such as seeing first that
the road was clear, which caused the death of the victim
**Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents
-Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, and denied MFR
-Hence, this appeal
ISSUE
WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages
HELD
Yes.
-Civil Case No. 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under
Article 217614 and 218015 of the Civil Code against petitioner Manilhig and his
employer, petitioner Philtranco, respectively.
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA

FACTS
14Art.
prof. casis
- 73 -
(limited to that involved in the outline)
2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter
-We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a
public service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising
from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and
several or solidary with the driver. As to solidarity, Article 2194
expressly provides: the responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
-Since the employer's liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse
if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid
from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to
the action based on quasi-delict. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may
recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the
claim.
Disposition
Appealed decision is affirmed. (with regard to this issue)
CASTILEX V. VASQUEZ
Dec. 21, 1999. Davide
Facts: At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was
driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was
traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but
without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a
Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad
[was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered
owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On the same
date and time, Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but
instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against
[the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to
Belvic St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of
Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad
stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital
and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's
Hospital. It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible
Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills,
professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.
After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the
accident, a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was
subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the present action for
damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez,
parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad
15Art.
2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxxxxxxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
xxxxxxxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
xxxxxxxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage
torts & damages
and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same action, Cebu Doctor's
Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given
to Romeo So Vasquez.
Issue: WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death
resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a
company-issued vehicle.
Held: Castilez is absolved from any liability. The negligence of ABAD is not
an issue at this instance. Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but
claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death
caused by ABAD.
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in
business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing
and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the
fourth paragraph should apply.
Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth
paragraph is not accurate. The phrase "even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be
interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in
any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who
is acting within the scope of his assigned task.
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to
determine what is applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth
paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and
the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of
employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion
of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of
employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an
expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included.
Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a
business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the
scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of
the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly,
employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are
beyond their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within
the call of duty.This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the
employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and
banks. The Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted in applying the said
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case. Under the fifth
paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or
industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the
scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employeremployee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the
employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his
assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that
the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence
in the selection and supervision of the employee.
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of
petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he was
acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which the
court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality
at times. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as when the
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- 74 -
conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures. Such
exception obtain in the present case to warrant review by this Court of the
finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner's
vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager.
On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently
established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks,
ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of
the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle, registered under the
name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some
snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for
the petitioner. No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will
furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an
employee is engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor
vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employee's
action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each state of facts. The
court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a
manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned
tasks regardless of the time and circumstances. The SC does not agree. The
mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious
incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the
negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating
the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. It used the
principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries
inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor
vehicle:
I.
Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to or
from Meals
It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's
vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in
returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his
employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to
the employer. Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from
meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more
time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee
is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle.
II.
Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to or from
Work
In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is
ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of
his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit
to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at
the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of
his employment even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle. 14 cda
The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some
special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employer's
vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work
earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his actual duties. Where the
employee's duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed
place or hours of work, or to go to and from his home to various outside
places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his
work, the courts have frequently applied what has been called the "special
errand" or "roving commission" rule, under which it can be found that the
employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches
home. However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the
scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employer's vehicle,
the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident,
the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is
pursuing a personal errand of his own.
III.
Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working
Hours
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the
latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable
for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of
permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly
assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as
business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even
where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been
accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the
vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his
employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent
operation of the vehicle during the return trip.
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our
jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not on the
principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of
the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or
jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of
negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the
employee was acting in his employer's business or within the scope of his
assigned task. ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a
personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a
vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m., way beyond the normal
working hours. ABAD's working day had ended; his overtime work had
already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was
known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had
no connection to petitioner's business; neither had it any relation to his duties
as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes
was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.
FILAMER V IAC
212 SCRA 637
GUTIERREZ SR; August 17, 1992
NATURE
Motion for Reconsideration
FACTS
- Funtecha is a scholar of FCI. He is also employed as a janitor. The
president of FCI is Agustin Masa. Agustin has a son, Allan, who is the school
bus (bus na jeepney) driver. Allan lives with his dad. Funtecha also lives in
the president’s house free of charge while a student at FCI.
- It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home,
then go back to the school, then go home in the school jeep. He is allowed to
bring home the jeep because in the morning he’s supposed to fetch the kids
and bring them to school.
- One night, Funtecha wanted to drive home. He has a student license. After
a dangerous curb, and seeing that the road was clear, Allan let Funtecha
drive. Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring
lights. Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan. Kapunan was
walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung
tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians). The jeep had only one functioning
headlight that night.
torts & damages
- TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan. SC reversed, saying that FCI is not
liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was
not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and
primarily answerable.
ISSUE
WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable
HELD
YES
- Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both
Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the
petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive home the school jeep
so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day.
- It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had
knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose.
Moreover, it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge
of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license and his desire to
undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms.
- In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of
Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not, having a joy ride Funtecha was
not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but
ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the
petitioner school. The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was
one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitionerschool cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the
scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned
tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer,
includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the
employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the
injury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived
some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the
employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the
servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of
his master's business.
- Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI. He need not have an official
appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held
responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of
driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence,
the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the
scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of
rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part
either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over
him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the
required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha
and Allan. There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the
school jeep by persons other than the driver. There was thus no supervision
on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep.
- The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from
the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the absence of
evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the
vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. The liability of the
employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer
shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages
are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
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- 75 397 SCRA 75
NPC v CA (PHESCO INC.)
294 CRA 209
ROMERO; August 14, 1998
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National
Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City.
Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of the trucks driven by Gavino
Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident
resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well
as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers.
- The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and
PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC with the main duty
of supplying workers and technicians for the latter's projects, but in this case
it was alleged that they own the dump trucks).
- The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability. PHESCO
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's judgment
absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages.
ISSUE
WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba, driver of the dump truck, which should
be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims
HELD
YES
- In the provisions of the "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into by
PHESCO and NPC, we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in "labor
only" contracting. In a "labor only" contract, the person acting as contractor is
considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is
responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if
they had been directly employed by him. Finding that a contractor was a
"labor-only" contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee
relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the "laboronly" contractor, including the latter's workers.
- Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides:
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry."
- In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO
and the driver. Of course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it,
shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the
negligence which gave rise to the action.
DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed.
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN
vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR
NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY
VITUG, J/February 6, 2003
NATURE: APPEAL from CA’s DECISION
- 14 Oct 1993, about 730pm, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA
LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare).
- While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito
Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad.
- A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued
that led to a fist fight.
- No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who,
between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT
tracks.
- At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner
Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and
he was killed instantaneously.
- Marjorie Navidad (Nicanor’s widow), along with their children, filed a
complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA,
the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the
death of her husband.
- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim
against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and
averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of
its security guards.
- The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin,
instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had
failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task.
- TC: Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security
and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiffs the following:
"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00; 2) Compensatory damages of
P443,520.00; 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of
P50,000.00; b) Moral damages of P50,000.00; c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000;
d) Costs of suit.
- TC: dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for
lack of merit.
-Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals.
- CA: exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad
and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the
following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages; b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages; c)
P50,000.00 as moral damages; d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
the deceased; and e) P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.
-CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded
the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the
victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying
the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent
from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security
agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that
Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely
established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by
the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by
Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present
expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes
could not have stopped the train.
- CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10
October 2000.
torts & damages
ISSUES:
WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF
NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN
EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD
LRTA’s CLAIMS:
-Escartin’s assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks,
was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented.
- NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because
Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of
the LRTA.
Navidads Contention:
- A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid
the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling
Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation, and that
the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of
Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a
common carrier.
HELD:
1. NO. The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its
obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by
reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common
carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers,
a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services
of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case,
the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of
carriage.
- PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the provisions of
Article 217612 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,13 of the
Civil Code. (But there wasn’t any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the
death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise, however, for the employer’s
liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee.
- Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the
basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees.
The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not
been shown.
- A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or
omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in
culpa aquiliana, Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply.
- In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes
a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasidelictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can
be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to
apply.
2. YES.
There is no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act
or omission, he must also be absolved from liability as Prudent is. Needless
to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a
juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made
liable only for his own fault or negligence.
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REASONING:
- Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature
of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of
exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.
- The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or
injury to its passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or
injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of
their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof
that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the
exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or
stopped the act or omission."
-The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances.
- Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so
obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the
passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance
to the contract of carriage
- The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury
to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b)
on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if
the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could
have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
- In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault
or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of
the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its
employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is
due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of
satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which
LRTA and Roman, according to the CA, have failed to show, the presumption
would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that
negligence must be proved.
DISPOSITION: CA’S DECISION AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in
that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner
Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.
______________
12 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
prof. casis
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
13 Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task
done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be
applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.
14 Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi-delict is solidary.
MCKEE V IAC (TAYAG & MANALO)
221 SCRA 517
Davide, Jr.; July 16, 1992
NATURE
- Petition to review the resolution of the CA
FACTS
- On January 8, 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway,
Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo
truck, Loadstar, owned by private respondents, Jaime Tayag and Rosalina
Manalo, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose
Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim McKee and Loida
Bondoc, and physical injuries to George McKee, Christopher McKee and
Araceli McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
- Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with
200 cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from
Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The
Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San
Fernando. When the northbound car was about 10 meters away from the
southern approach of the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side
of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and
forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back.
Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of
the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes
and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car
torts & damages
collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which
was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
- Please see first Mckee digest for details on the collision.
- Civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a result of a
vehicular accident.
ISSUE
WON the owners of the cargo truck (Tayag and Manalo) are liable for the
resulting damages
HELD
YES
- The Court rules that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert
ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of
the collision. As employers of the truck driver, Manalo and Tayag are, under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting
damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence
of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et
de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Article 2180 reads as
follows:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.
The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection
and supervision of employees.
- The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478
did not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.
VALENZUELA v CA (LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL,
INC.)
253 SCRA 303
KAPUNAN; February 7, 1996
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving when she realized she had a flat tire.
She parked along the sidewalk of Aurora Blvd., put on her emergency lights,
alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was
standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man
who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven
by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander
Commercial, Inc.
- Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car
of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was
pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the
middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of
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the body. She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was
eventually fitted with an artificial leg. She filed a claim for damages against
defendant.
- Li’s alibi was that he was driving at 55kph when he was suddenly confronted
with a speeding car coming from the opposite direction. He instinctively
swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped
plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with
no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted.
Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was the one
who was reckless or negligent.
-RTC found Li and Alexander solidarily liable. CA absolved Alexander.
ISSUE
1. WON Li was grossly negligent in driving the company issued car
2. WON Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence
3. WON Alexander Commercial is liable as Li’s employer
HELD
1. YES
- The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying
the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall,
the visibility of the street, and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan
thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to react to
the changing conditions of the road if he were alert as every driver should be
to those conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses.
Physiological "fight or flight" mechanisms are at work, provided such
mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.
Li's failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could
therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he
was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by one of the witneses; and 2)
that he was under the influence of alcohol. Either factor working
independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions,
since normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela's
car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes.
- Li was, therefore, negligent in driving his company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer
2. NO
- Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Under
the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an
individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required
to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution,
unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.
- While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought
or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the
conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not
exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates
thoroughful care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman
driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be
faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and
which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire
boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where
she would likely find no one to help her.
- Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an
undue risk of harm to others. It is the failure to observe that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.
3. YES
- Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours
in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the
unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and
goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the
individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company
sales agent. As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or
for the purpose of furthering the company's image, a company owes a
responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees
to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to
use the company issue capably and responsibly.
- In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our
satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the
family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to
whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or
ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the
burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its
company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater
familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries
sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
DISPOSITION Judgment of RTC reinstated.
MERRITT v GOVERNMENT
34 Phil 311
TRENT; March 31, 1916
NATURE
Appeal from decision of the CFI
FACTS
- E. Merritt, riding on a motorcycle, was hit by the General Hospital
ambulance, which turned suddenly and unexpectedly to Taft Avenue without
sounding any whistle or horn, in contravention of an ordinance and the Motor
Vehicle Act.
- Plaintiff was so severely injured. His leg showed a contraction of an inch
and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the
point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable
readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The patient apparently
was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental
condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to
do any difficult mental labor, especially when he attempted to use his money
for mathematical calculations.
- Witnesses testified that plaintiff’s physical and mental condition before the
accident was excellent. He was one of the best contractors of wooden
buildings. He could not now earn even a half of the income that he had
secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. He had
to dissolve a partnership that he had with an engineer and give up a contract
for the construction of a building.
torts & damages
- Trial court held that the collision was due solely on the negligence of the
chauffeur and awarded the plaintiff the sum of P14, 741.
- Act No. 2457 was enacted. It states that “E. Merritt is hereby authorized to
bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the
Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the
collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital,
and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is
entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the
Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on
the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant said Government
at the same.”
ISSUES
WON the government is liable for the damages resulting from a tort
committed by an agent or employee of the government
HELD
NO
Ratio The State is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers and
employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph
5 of article 1903.
Reasoning
- In the United States the rule is that the state is not liable for the torts
committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly
made so by legislative enactment. The Government does not undertake to
guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs,
since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.
- As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the
state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is
stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It
does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of
action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability
and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.
- Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
- The obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to
another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law
3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or
negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the
damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of
law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence
can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of
public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must
presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each
branch of service serves the general weal an that of private persons
interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no
relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a
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case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and
contracting obligations.
- The Civil Code in chap 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which
arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the first article thereof. No.
1902, where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an
act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence, shall
be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or
omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the
following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation
upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the
authors of the damage, because the law presumes that in consequence of
such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to
them. This legal presumption gives way to proof, however, because, as held
in the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons
ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage, and among
these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner,
are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians
and owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but not
always, except when it acts through the agency of a special agent, doubtless
because and only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original
basis of this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
- Although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle
set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to
private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made
by branches of the central administration acting in the name and
representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its
sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet said article is not
applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the
petitioners by an executive official, acting in the exercise of his powers, in
proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the
owner of the property which they hold in sublease.
- The responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein
it acts through a special agent (one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an
agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not
apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration
and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent
in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the
regulations.
- The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a
special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform
some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim,
and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public
official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held
to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility.
- The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an
agent within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903
On the computation of damages
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in
question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for permanent
injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during
the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find
nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the
first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the
plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court,
however, limited the time to 2months and 21 days, which the plaintiff was
actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error, because it
was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period
of 6 months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only 2 months
and 21 days while the remainder of the 6 months was spent in his home,
would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find that the
amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is
P18,075.
Dispositive Judgment appealed from reversed. Whether the Government
intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set
forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one
of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient
funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely
with the Legislature and not with the courts.
ROSETE v AUDITOR GENERAL
81 Phil 453
FERIA; August 31, 1948
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor
FACTS
- Jose Panlilio ignited his lighter near a drum into which gasoline was being
drained causing fire in the warehouse of Emergency Control Administration
(ECA, a government agency).
- The fire destroyed the building owned by the petitioner, thereby giving rise
to this claim for damages against Panlilio for his negligence and the officers
of ECA for storing gasoline in said warehouse contrary to the provisions of
ordinances of the City of Manila (ordinance requires a license for storing
flammable substances, which ECA didn’t have).
- Insular Auditor dismissed the claim hence this appeal.
ISSUE
WON the government is liable for the damages
HELD
NO
- Art. 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
“Art. 1903. The obligation imposed in the preceding article is
enforceable not only for personal acts and omission but also for
those persons for whom another is responsible.
xx
“The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special
agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by
the official to whom it properly pertained to do the act performed,
in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be
applicable.”
- In the case of Merritt v. Government, the court held the following:
torts & damages
“ ’… The state is not responsible for the damage
suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed
by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to
their office… n relations of a private nature governed by the civil
law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a juridical
person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations.’
A2010
-
xx
“ ‘That the responsibility of the state is limited by
article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent
(and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are
employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order by the
commission, foreign to the exercise of duties of his office if he is
a special official) so that in representation of the state and being
bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided
to him.
- There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the
ECA or its officers, was done by a special agent, because the officers of the
ECA did not act as special agents of the government within the above defined
meaning of that wod in Article 1903 of the Civil Code in storing gasoline in the
warehouse of ECA, the government is not responsible for damages caused
through such negligence.
- Although there is an act (Act No. 327) authorizing the filing of claims against
the government with the Insular Auditor, and appeal by private persons or
entities from the latter’s decision to the Supreme Court, it does not make any
and all claims against the government allowable, and the latter responsible
for all claims.
DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is affirmed.
MENDOZA V. DE LEON
FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINSITRATION
194 SCRA 486
PARAS; February 27, 1991
NATURE
Resolution
FACTS
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains that it does not
perform solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency of
the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore
not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia, who was not its
special agent.
o
NIA believes this bases this on:

PD 552 – amended some provisions
of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA)

The case of Angat River Irrigation
System v. Angat River Workers’ Union
Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that the Angat
System, like the NIA, exercised a governmental function because the
-
- 79 -
nature of its powers and functions does not show that it was intended
to “bring to the Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary
profit”, a strong dissenting opinion held that Angat River system is a
government entity exercising proprietary functions.
The Angat dissenting opinion:
Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He
argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would
terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services were necessary and
desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment
had lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of regular
employee and could not be removed except for valid cause.
The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor Code
of the Philippines had not yet been promulgated, which came into
effect some 3 years after the perfection of the contract.
ISSUE
WON the NIR is a government agency with a juridical personality separate
and distinct from the government, thereby opening it up to the possibility that
it may be held liable for the damages caused by its driver, who was not its
special agent
HELD YES
Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into
governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former
involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter
connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as
optional.
The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local
government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service
agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public
welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a
"government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of
"constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national
irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump
irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are
largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are
only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of
lands.
NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate
and distinct from the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3601 provides:
Sec. 1. Name and Domicile — A body corporate is hereby created which
shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration. . . . which shall be
organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal
seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all
provinces, for the proper conduct of its business. (Emphasis for emphasis).
Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that:
(b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation
systems constructed by or under its administration, such fees or
administration charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of operation,
maintenance and insurance, and to recover the cost of construction within a
reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with government policy; to
recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction and/or
rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a
special fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof;
prof. casis
Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first,
upon the land benefited, and then on the crops raised thereon, which liens
shall have preference over all other liens except for taxes on the land, and
such preferred liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration
charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the National
Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . .
The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court.
It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be
exercised by a Board of Directors. Section 2, subsection (f):
(f) . . . and to transact such business, as are directly or indirectly necessary,
incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above powers and objectives,
including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries, and in general, to
exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar
as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
DISPOSITION
We conclude that the National Irrigation Administration is a
government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the
government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body
performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the
damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special
agent.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26, 1990 is
DENIED WITH FINALITY. The decision of this Court in G.R. No. 55963 and
G.R. No. 61045 dated December 1, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED.
DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say that NIA has opened itself to suit is one
thing; to say that it is liable for damages arising from tort committed by its
employees, is still another thing.
The state or a government agency performing governmental functions may
be held liable for tort committed by its employees only when it acts through a
special agent.
CITY OF MANILA V TEOTICA
22 SCRA 267
CONCEPCION; January 29, 1968
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- Genaro N. Teotico, an accountant, was at the corner of the Old Luneta and
P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, waiting for a jeep. After waiting 5 mins, he hailed
a jeep that came to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the
jeep, and took a few steps, he fell inside a manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.
Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses
and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed
therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to his assistance and
pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine
General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken
home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico
suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the
upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These
injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections
administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a
private practitioner.
- Teotico filed with CFI Manila, a complaint which was, subsequently,
amended for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer,
torts & damages
city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police.
- Defense pointed out that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then
prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant; that the Office of
the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron
covers; that in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has changed
the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by constructing them under
the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and openings on the side of the
gutter; and that these changes had been undertaken by the city from time to
time whenever funds were available.
- CFI Manila sustained the theory of the defendants and dismissed the
amended complaint, without costs.
- This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as
the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages
in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. Hence, this appeal by the City of
Manila.
- The first issue raised by the Manila is whether the present case is governed
by Section 4 of RA 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or
property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any
other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other
officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions
of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision.
- Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter,
because RA 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila,
whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
ISSUES
WON City of Manila should be held liable for the damages suffered by
Teotica.
HELD
YES.
Ratio RA 409,sec.4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general,
regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189, CC governs liability
due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based
upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive
thereon.
Reasoning The assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national
highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil
Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the
defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from
which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province,
city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or
road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this
circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision"
by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409.
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under
the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty
of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said road, which were
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decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the
findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review.
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila.
Voting Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
ARANETA v JOYA
57 SCRA 59
CASTRO J.: May 24, 1974
FACTS:
-An employee of the Ace ADVERTISING Company was sent to the States to
pursue studies in television. When asked about the expenses of the trip,
respondent answered that these were not shouldered by the company and
instead by other parties
-while abroad, he continued to receive his salaries in the form of vouchers
ordered and signed by respondent Joya. The petitioner signed three of these
checks. The others were signed by either the respondent, or Vicente Araneta
(company treasurer) who put up part of the bill connected with Taylor's trip
and also handed him letters for delivery in the United States. The Ace
Advertising disbursed P5,043.20, all told, on account of Taylor's travel and
studies
-the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court of first instance of Manila
against the respondent for recovery of the total sum disbursed to Taylor,
alleging that the trip was made without its knowledge, authority or ratification.
The respondent, in his answer, denied the charge and claimed that the trip
was nonetheless ratified by the company's board of directors, and that in any
event under the by-laws he had the discretion, as general manager, to
authorize the trip which was for the company's benefit
-Joya also filed a 3rd party complaint against the two Aranetas proving that
they were involved in sending Taylor abroad
-trial court rendered judgment ordering the respondent to pay the Ace
Advertising "the sum of P5,043.20 with interest at the legal rate from August
23, 1954 until full payment. 3rd party complaint dismissed
-CA affirmed however dismissal of 3rd party complaint was reversed stating
that Taylor's trip had been neither authorized nor ratified by the company
-CA noted that based on the facts, both petitioners knew and through their
acts showed that they approved of the trip. “…were also privy to the
unauthorized disbursement of the corporate moneys jointly with the appellant;
what had happened was in truth and in fact a venture by them given their
stamp of approval; and as it was an unauthorized act of expenditure of
corporate funds, and it was these three without whose acts the same could
not have happened, the juridical situation was a simple quasi-delict by them
committed upon the corporation, for which solidary liability should have been
imposed upon all in the first place”
ISSUE:
WON petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict
HELD: Yes
- The petitioner's assertion that he signed the questioned payroll checks in
good faith has not been substantiated, he in particular not having testified or
offered testimony to prove such claim. Upon the contrary, in spite of his being
a vice-president and director of the Ace Advertising, the petitioner remained
passive, throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad, concerning the
unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds for the latter. This plus the
fact that he even approved thrice payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's
salary, demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner neglected to perform his
duties properly, to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer.
-The fact that he was occupying a contractual position at the Ace Advertising
is of no moment. The existence of a contract between the parties, as has
been repeatedly held by this Court, constitutes no bar to the commission of a
tort by one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages
TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT
CIVIL ACTION
LIM v DE LEON
G.R. No. L-22554
MARTIN; August 29, 1975
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the CFI
FACTS
- Plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor
launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9, 1962 Alberto
Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor
launch from him.
- After conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de
Leon, in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery
with Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha.
- June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that
the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander
of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander in Balabac
to impound and take custody of the motor launch.
- Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to
impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party,
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of
the same. Upon order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee
Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the
motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and
impounded it.
- Plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando Maddela to return the
motor launch but the latter refused. Likewise, Jikil Taha through his counsel
made representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the seized
property to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on
the ground that the same was the subject of a criminal offense.
ISSUES
1. WON defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order
the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and
seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime
torts & damages
2. WON defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for
damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor
launch was unlawful
HELD
1. NO
- Defendant-appellees admitted that when Orlando Maddela entered the
premises of Delfin Lim and impounded the motor launch he was not armed
with a search warrant; that he effected the seizure of the motor launch in the
absence of and without the consent of Delfin Lim. There can be no question
that without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter
the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and
seizure. And since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the
motor launch without a warrant, they have violated the constitutional right of
plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure.
2. YES
- Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim for damages on Articles 32 and 2219
of the New Civil Code which provide in part as follows:
"ART. 32.Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or
in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages.
xxx
"(9)The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
xxx
"The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary
damages may also be adjudicated."
"ART. 2219.Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases:
xxx
"(6)Illegal search;
xxx
"(1)Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34 and 36."
- Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights
have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from
the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary
damages may also be awarded.
DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one
entered declaring the seizure illegal and ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal
Francisco Ponce de Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim the sum of
P3,000.00 as actual damages, plus P1,000.00 moral damages, and, in
addition, P750.00 for attorney's fees.
ABERCA V VER
G.R. No. L-69866
YAP; April 15, 1988
NATURE: Petition for certiorari
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FACTS
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other
violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM)
ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against
known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing
reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila,"
Plaintiffs’ allegations: That complying with said order of Ver, elements of
the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued
judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the
raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to
plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the
courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of
relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their
rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them
employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to
obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them;
that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and
deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements
from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being
previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages of P39,030; moral damages
of at least P150K each or a total of P3M; exemplary damages of at least
P150K each or a total of P3M; and attorney's fees not less than P200K.
Respondents’ contentions: A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants,
through their counsel, then Sol-Gen. Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1)
plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their
detention in the guise of a damage suit because the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the
present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of
action against the defendants.
ISSUES
1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a
civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel
and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution.
2. WON a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be
answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the
person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated.
3. WON trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to (dome
of the) plaintiffs on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file MFR
of the court's resolution granting the respondent's motion to dismiss
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio: The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest
and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The
suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention.
What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from
detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining
his liberty.
Reasoning: [a] The purpose Art. 32 CC is to provide a sanction to the deeply
cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is
clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times
of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is
strongest to yield to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is
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necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are
immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious
demands of the ruling power. [b] The invocation of the doctrine of state
immunity from suit totally misplaced. It cannot be construed as a blanket
license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to
disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen
enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the
supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military,
owe obedience and allegiance at all times. [c] Art. 32 of CC which renders
any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for
violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another does not exempt the
respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under
the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation
of the RPC or other penal statute. [d] Even assuming that the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action
for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend
their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents'
confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain
silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman
treatment.
2. NO
Ratio: Although the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case,
as contended by respondents, the decisive factor in this case is the language
of Art. 32 CC. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or
"indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and
liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly
responsible) who must answer for damages under Art. 32; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to
the aggrieved party
Reasoning: [a] The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally
limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e.
employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between
superior officers of the military and their subordinates. But in this case, Art. 32
governs. [b] By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials
under the Constitution acquires added meaning and acquires a larger
dimension. A superior have to answer for the transgressions of his
subordinates against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the
citizen. Hence, Art. 32 of CC makes the persons who are directly, as well as
indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. [c] To determine
the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint,
and no others, should be considered. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss
must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. [d]
So, under the above principles, it is difficult to justify the TC’s dismissal for
lack of cause of action the complaint against all the defendants, except
Maj.Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba. The complaint contained allegations
against all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be
sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under
Art. 32 of CC.
3. NO.
The body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on
behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this must have been also the understanding of
defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the motion, he
furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to
all the lawyers of plaintiffs In filing the motion to set aside the resolution, the
signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. They needed no specific
torts & damages
authority to do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of
a party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse
party or the party concerned, which was never done in this case.
DISPOSITION: Petition granted. Case remanded to the respondent court for
further proceedings.
SEPARATE OPINION:
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
- The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be they public
officers or employees, or members of the military or police force or private
individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner
impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person,
stand liable and may be sued in court for damages as provided in Art. 32 of
CC.
- The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for
damages filed in the court below by petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches
conducted by military personnel and other violations of their constitutional
rights and liberties. At the same time it rejects the automatic application of the
principle of respondent superior or command responsibility that would hold a
superior officer jointly and severally accountable for damages, including
moral and exemplary, with his subordinates who committed such
transgressions. However, the judgment gives the caveat that a superior
officer must not abdicate his duty to properly supervise his subordinates for
he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of being
held under the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily
accountable with the tortfeasor.
MHP GARMENTS, INC. vs. CA
PUNO; 22 September 1994
Nature
- Petition for Certiorari
Facts
-MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the
exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms,
supplies, badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, petitioner
corporation was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken
the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other
scouting supplies."
-Sometime in October 1983, MHP received information that private
respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales
were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. De
Guzman, an employee of petitioner corporation, was tasked to undertake the
necessary surveillance and to make a report of the Philippine Constabulary
(PC). De Guzman, Peñafiel, and two (2) other constabulary men of the
Reaction Force Battalion went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina
Public Market. Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts
pants, dresses, and suits on display at respondents' stalls. The seizure
caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. The items were
then turned over by Captain Peñafiel to petitioner corporation for
safekeeping. A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed
against private respondents. After a preliminary investigation, the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents.
He also ordered the return of the seized items which was not immediately
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returned despite demands. Private respondents had to go personally to
petitioners' place of business to recover their goods. Even then, not all the
seized items were turned. The other items returned were of inferior quality.
Private respondent then filed a Civil Case against the petitioners for sums of
money and damages. The trial court ruled for the private respondents. The
decision was appealed to the respondent court. It affirmed the decision with
modification
MHP filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.
Issue/s and Held
WON the search and seizure was legal
No. The evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private
respondents' goods. Petitioner corporation received information that private
respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in
October 1983. The specific date and time are not established in the evidence
adduced by the parties. De Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of
private respondents. They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on
October 25, 1983, the raid was made on the stores of private respondents
and the supposed illicit goods were seized. The progression of time between
the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private respondents
shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to
apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply
for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they
took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to
violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and
seizure. The search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable
cause for the seizure. Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched."
These facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners
to justify their warrantless search and seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary
investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair
competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods.
WON MHP Garments is liable
Yes. The omission will not exculpate petitioners. The respondent court
correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly
involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against
unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to
their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution
in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. The raid was conducted
with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman who did not
lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by
and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the
officers themselves. So with the petitioner corporation which even received
for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and
de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the
dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition. Secondly, Letter of
Instruction No. 1299 already directs all law enforcement agencies of the
Republic of the Philippines, to apprehend immediately unauthorized
manufacturers and distributors of Scout paraphernalia, upon proper
application by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the
Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law; and to impound the
said paraphernalia to be used as evidence in court or other appropriate
administrative body it orders the immediate and strict compliance with the
Instructions which the petitioners miserably failed to do. And thirdly, they
should have filed a third-party complaint against the raiding team for
contribution or any other relief, in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery
of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did not.
WON an award for moral damages should be awarded
Yes. It is consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize
the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have
suffered. Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, op. cit.,
moral damages can be awarded in the case at bench. There can be no doubt
that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and
wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners. Private
respondents' avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure of
their merchandise were supported by their testimonies.
The wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of exemplary
damages. It will also serve as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the
constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile
reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. The all encompassing protection
extends against intrusions directly done both by government and indirectly by
private entities.
Disposition
IN VIEW WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. We impose a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9,
1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) for the unreturned
twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%)
interest, in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%), on the said amount upon finality of
this Decision until the payment thereof. Costs against petitioners.
MARCIA V CA (PAJE)
205 PHIL 147
RELOVA; January 27, 1983
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- Paje is a driver of a Victory Liner Bus
- His bus collided with the jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, causing
the latter’s death and physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar
Marcia and Renato Yap
- Paje was charged with homicide and serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence. A civil case was also instituted against him by
herein petitioners for reckless imprudence and negligence in driving
the passenger bus.
- He was convicted in the criminal case in the RTC. However, he
was acquitted in the CA. The CA ruled that criminal negligence is
wanting and that Paje was not even guilty of civil negligence, for the
case was of pure accident.
- The defendants presented the copy of said criminal case to the
court handling the civil case against them. The civil case was
dismissed.
torts & damages
ISSUES
WON the acquittal in the criminal case would result to a dismissal in
the civil case
HELD
YES
- The acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not
necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in
the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist.
- Petitioner also relies on Art 33 CC. However, the said article
speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries
suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of
criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no
independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection
therewith. Otherwise stated, unless the act from which the civil
liability arises is declared to be non-existent in the final judgment, the
extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of
the civil liability
DISPOSITIVE
Decision affirmed
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HELD
1. YES. Ratio Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article
33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. The two enactments are
quoted hereinbelow:
"Sec, 2. Independent civil action. - … an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved
as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. "
- "Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence."
Obiter - There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which
are worth noting, namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto.
This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal
action" and "criminal prosecution."
Tolentino says: "While the State is the complainant in the criminal case, the
injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who has
suffered directly. He should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong
which peculiarly affects him."
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only
physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.
MADEJA V CARO
ABAD SANTOS, J.: December 21, 1983
Dispositive
Petition is GRANTED; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is SET ASIDE
NATURE
Petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting
the defendant's motion to dismiss
ARAFILES v PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC
CARPIO MORALES, J., March 25, 2004
FACTS
- Dr. Eva A. Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for
the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness
is the widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that:
"The offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate
civil action for damages."
- The criminal case still pending, Madeja sued Dr. Japzon for damages in the
same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross
negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss which invoked Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court which reads: "Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. - In all
cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be
observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the
civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action.". . .
NATURE
Petition for review of CA Deci
ISSUES
1. WON an independent civil action may be filed during the pendency of the
criminal case
FACTS
(Consti II Case)
-Respondent Morales wrote an article for People’s Journal Tonight based on
the sworn statement in the police blotter and interview of Emelita Despuig
where Despuig alleged that Arafiles raped her the month before then
attempted to rape her the night she filed a complaint. Morales attempted to
contact Arafiles but since the latter’s office was still closed at that time (past
12mn – he works for NIAS-PAGASA), he was not able to do so.
-About a year following the published article, Arafiles filed action for damages
based on the alleged “grossly malicious and overly sensationalized” report by
Morales which cast aspersions on his character, being the object of public
contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial
rapist.
-RTC: in favor of Arafiles
-CA: in favor of Morales, et. al. based on doctrine of fair comment
ISSUE
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WON the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not
attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages
HELD
NO. Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and
reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the
circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of
the press.
Ratio. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to
enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in
our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors]
usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and
reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.
Reasoning. First discussed applicable provisions (A33, 19, 21 NCC): Article
33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely
unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel
under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and
proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely
independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal action
because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the
Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil
liability arising therefrom.
-then discussed how to determine if a published work is libelous: In actions
for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to
contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole.
-then discussed the petitioner’s allegation that the news item as a “malicious
sensationalization” failed: even though the police blotter only shows 1 count
of abduction and rape, respondent was present when Emelita executed her
sworn-statement where she reported an abduction with rape and an
abduction incident (where no rape occurred, but was about to happen) – so
respondent’s article was not maliciously sensationalized. The presentation of
the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a
sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal. Respondents could of course
have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first
seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director
of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The
succeeding paragraphs (in which petitioner and complainant Emelita were
eventually identified) sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the
narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the
police headquarters.
-then mentioned doctrine: The newspapers should be given such leeway and
tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their
important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters
and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with
good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point
of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED
MVRS V ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL
G.R. No. 135306
BELLOSILLO; January 28, 2003
NATURE
Petition to review decision of CA
torts & damages
FACTS
- The ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHIL (IDCP), a local federation
of more than 70 Muslim religious orgs, and some individual Muslims filed in
the RTC Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class
suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS
PUBLICATIONS, et.al.
- Complaint alleged that what was published in BULGAR was insulting and
damaging to the Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the God of
the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to
hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam; that on
account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the
Phil but the entire Muslim world, esp. every Muslim individual in non-Muslim
countries.
- MVRS claimed it was merely an expression of belief/opinion and was
published without malice. Also, it did not mention respondents as object of
the article, hence, were not entitled to damages.
RTC dismissed: plaintiffs failed to establish their cause of action since the
persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified.
CA reversed: it was "clear from the disputed article that the defamation was
directed to all adherents of Islamic faith.”
ISSUE
1. WON elements of libel exist
2. WON the cause of action should rise from an intentional tortuous act
causing mental distress
HELD
1. NO.
Reasoning Defamation means the offense of injuring a person's character,
fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. Words which are
merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words
of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether
written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the
absence of an allegation for special damages.
2. NO.
The cause of action is libel.
Ratio Action arising from an intentional tortuous act causing mental distress
cannot be sustained in this case, for such action is personal in nature, and
since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article, such cause
of action cannot be sustained.
Torts with independent civil action: DEFAMATION An "emotional distress"
tort action is personal in nature; it is a civil action filed by an individual to
assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his
character.
- The purported damage caused by the published article falls under principle
of relational harm - which includes harm to social relationships in the
community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of
reactive harm - which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the
form of an infliction of emotional distress. The present case falls within the
application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for defamation.
- To recover for this the plaintiff must show that: (a) conduct of the defendant
was intentional or in reckless disregard of plaintiff; (b) conduct was extreme
and outrageous; (c) causal connection between defendant's conduct and
the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) the plaintiff's mental distress was
extreme and severe.
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- Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere
worry, anxiety, embarrassment, or anger. (AmJur)
Disposition Petition granted. Decision reversed.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG [concur]
- The present controversy stems from a civil action for damages and not from
a criminal complaint. CC recognizes the possibility of such a civil action either
pursuant to Art 26, par. 4, to the effect that although it may not constitute a
criminal offense, “vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious
beliefs xxx” can give rise to a cause of action for damages, or to Art. 33
which provides that in case of defamation, a civil complaint for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal case, may be brought by the
injured party.
- In the present case, the article relates to the entire Muslim population and
not just to the IDCP or to any of the individual respondents. There is no direct
reference or allusion to the federation or any of its members, or to any of the
individual complainants. Respondents scarcely can claim having been
singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages.
CARPIO [dissent]
- I dissent not because the newspaper article in question is libelous, but
because it constitutes an intentional tortious act causing mental distress to
those whom private respondent IDCP represents.
- Both RTC and CA found the article insulting and humiliating to Muslims,
causing wounded feelings and mental anguish to believers of Islam. This
finding of fact establishes that petitioners have inflicted on private
respondents an intentional wrongful act - humiliating persons because of their
religious beliefs.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ [dissent]
- Focal point of claim for damages: insult caused by the article that the
Muslims worship the pig as their God which is absolutely contrary to their
basic belief as Muslims that there is only one God, and, that the greatest sin
in Islam is to worship things or persons other than Allah.
- The article is not only an imputation of irreligious conduct but also a
downright misrepresentation of the religious beliefs of Muslims. Liability for
libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer, but on the fact of
defamation.
SALTA V DE VEYRA
202 Phil 527
DE CASTRO; September 30, 1982
FACTS
- Two cases involving the same issue disposed of by two judges in a manner
directly in opposition of each other. For a uniform ruling that would
authoritatively settle this regrettable conflict of opinion, the two cases have
been consolidated for a single decision.
- Salta was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos'
branch. His duty was to grant loans, or only to recommend the granting of
loans, depending on the amount of the loan applied for.
prof. casis
- In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and policies of the respondent
bank, Salta indiscriminately granted certain loans mentioned in the
complaints filed by PNB, in manner characterized by negligence, fraud and
manifest partiality, and upon securities not commensurate with the amount of
the loans.
- PNB filed two civil actions to recover losses the bank suffered (Civil Case
No. 79583, Civil Case No. 88343). With this the bank filed a criminal action
against Salta, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
- Salta was acquitted in the criminal case, and filed Motions to Dismiss in
each of the two civil cases. It is in the resolution of the motions to dismiss that
Judges de Veyra and Purisima of the CFI of Manila took diametrically
opposing views, the former denying the motion, the latter granting it.
ISSUE
WON a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates to dismiss a separate
civil action filed on the basis of the same facts as alleged in the criminal case
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
HELD
NO.
Ratio The civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of
the result of the latter." Acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle
for the civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a
finding that even civilly, the accused would not be liable.
Reasoning
ART 33.
In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action
for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
- The filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is
fully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. The
criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main element of which is
fraud, one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. Based
on the same acts for which the criminal action was filed, the civil actions very
clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of
action averred in the complaints.
- The offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other
offenses not mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a separate civil
action because of the distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or
basis of action. This is clearly illustrated in the case of swindling, a specie of
an offense committed by means of fraud, where the civil case may be filed
separately and proceed independently of the criminal case, regardless of the
result of the latter.
- That there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting the aforesaid
loans which rendered him liable for his acts, which fraud is positively and
easily identifiable in the manner and scheme aforementioned.
- JUSTICE JBL REYES: “…in the case of an independent civil actions under
the Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction,
would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action. This seems to be the spirit of
the law when it decided to make these actions `entirely separate and distinct'
from the criminal action. Hence in these cases, I think Rule 107 Sec. 1(d)
does not apply.”
torts & damages
- It is significant to note that under Article 31 [11] of the New Civil Code, it is
made clear that the civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from
the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
"regardless of the result of the latter."
DISPOSITION
The decision of Justice De Veyra is affirmed.
PRUDENTIAL BANK V IAC (Philippine Rayon Mills &
Anacleto Chi)
216 SCRA 257
DAVIDE, JR.; G.R. No. 74886 December 8, 1992
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of IAC, which affirmed in toto
the decision of CFI Quezon City in a civil action instituted by the
petitioner for the recovery of a sum of money representing the
amount paid by it to the Nissho Company Ltd. of Japan for
textile machinery imported by the Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc.,
represented by co-defendant Anacleto R. Chi.
FACTS
-August 8, 1962: Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. entered into a
contract with Nissho Co., Ltd. of Japan for the importation of
textile machineries under a five-year deferred payment plan. To
effect payment for said machineries, Phil. Rayon applied for
and was granted a commercial letter of credit with the
Prudential Bank and Trust Company in favor of Nissho. Against
this letter of credit, drafts were drawn and issued by Nissho,
which were all paid by the Prudential Bank through its
correspondent in Japan, the Bank of Tokyo, Ltd. As indicated
on their faces, two of these drafts were accepted by the Phil
Rayon through its president, Anacleto R. Chi, while the others
were not.
-Upon arrival of the machineries, the Prudential Bank indorsed
the shipping documents to the Phil Rayon which accepted
delivery of the same. To enable the Phil Rayon to take delivery
of the machineries, it executed, by prior arrangement with the
Prudential Bank, a trust receipt which was signed by Anacleto
R. Chi in his capacity as president of Phil Rayon.
-At the back of the trust receipt is a printed form to be
accomplished by two sureties who, by the very terms and
conditions thereof, were to be jointly and severally liable to the
Prudential Bank should the Phil Rayon fail to pay the total
amount or any portion of the drafts issued by Nissho and paid
for by Prudential Bank. The Phil Rayon was able to take
delivery of the textile machineries and installed the same at its
factory site at 69 Obudan Street, Quezon City.
-Sometime in 1967, the Phil Rayon ceased business operation.
On December 29, 1969, Phil Rayon's factory was leased by
Yupangco Cotton Mills for an annual rental of P200,000.00.
The lease was renewed on January 3, 1973. On January 5,
1974, all the textile machineries in the Phil Rayon's factory
were sold to AIC Development Corporation for P300,000.00.
A2010
- 85 -
-The obligation of the Phil Rayon arising from the letter of credit
and the trust receipt remained unpaid and unliquidated.
Repeated formal demands for the payment of the said trust
receipt yielded no result Hence, the present action for the
collection of the principal amount of P956,384.95 was filed on
October 3, 1974 against the Phil Rayon and Anacleto R. Chi.
Defendant’s Defenses lack of cause of action; prescription;
laches
Lower Court’s Ruling Both the CFI and the IAC ruled that
Philippine Rayon could be held liable for the two (2) drafts
because only these appear to have been accepted by the latter
after due presentment. The liability for the remaining ten (10)
drafts did not arise because the same were not presented for
acceptance. In short, both courts concluded that acceptance of
the drafts by Philippine Rayon was indispensable to make the
latter liable thereon.
ISSUES:
1. Whether presentment for acceptance of the drafts was
indispensable to make Philippine Rayon liable thereon;
2. Whether Philippine Rayon is liable on the basis of the trust
receipt;
3. Whether private respondent Chi is jointly and severally liable
with Philippine Rayon for the obligation sought to be enforced
3a. If not, WON he may be considered a guarantor
3b. If he is a guarantor, WON the case should have been
dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action as there was
no prior exhaustion of Philippine Rayon's properties.
HELD:
1. NO. Presentment for acceptance is necessary only in the
cases expressly provided for in Section 143 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law (NIL). The parties herein agree, and the trial
court explicitly ruled, that the subject, drafts are sight drafts
which do not require presentment for acceptance. They are,
pursuant to Section 7 of the NIL, payable on demand. And even
if these were not sight drafts, thereby necessitating acceptance,
it would be the petitioner — and not Philippine Rayon — which
had to accept the same for the latter was not the drawee.
2. YES.
-And although it is true that the petitioner commenced a
criminal action for the violation of the Trust Receipts Law, no
legal obstacle prevented it from enforcing the civil liability
arising out of the trust, receipt in a separate civil action. Under
Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law, the failure of an
entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods,
documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the
extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appear in the
trust receipt or to return said goods, documents or instruments
if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the
terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa,
punishable under the provisions of Art.315, par. 1(b) of the
RPC.
-Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party in cases of
prof. casis
defamation, fraud and physical injuries. Estafa falls under
fraud.
3. NO. Private respondent Chi's signature in the dorsal portion
of the trust receipt did not bind him solidarily with Philippine
Rayon.
3a. YES. SC’s own reading of the questioned solidary guaranty
clause yields the conclusion that the obligation of Chi is only
that of a guarantor.
Reasoning Last sentence of the clause speaks of waiver of
exhaustion, which, nevertheless, is ineffective in this case
because the space therein for the party whose property may
not be exhausted was not filled up.
-The clause "we jointly and severally agree and undertake"
refers to the undertaking of the two (2) parties who are to sign it
or to the liability existing between themselves. It does not refer
to the undertaking between either one or both of them on the
one hand and the petitioner on the other with respect to the
liability described under the trust receipt. Elsewise stated, their
liability is not divisible as between them, i.e., it can be enforced
to its full extent against any one of them.
-Any doubt as to the import, or true intent of the solidary
guaranty clause should be resolved against the petitioner since
the trust receipt, together with the questioned solidary guaranty
clause, is a contract of adhesion which must be strictly
construed against the party responsible for its preparation.
-By his signing, Chi became the sole guarantor. The attestation
by witnesses and the acknowledgement before a notary public
are not required by law to make a party liable on the
instrument. Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they
may have been entered into, provided all the essential
requisites for their validity are present; however, when the law
requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be
valid or enforceable, or that it be proved in a certain way, that
requirement is absolute and indispensable. With respect to a
guaranty, which is a promise to answer for the debt or default of
another, the law merely requires that it, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing. Otherwise, it would be
unenforceable unless ratified. While the acknowledgement of a
surety before a notary public is required to make the same a
public document, under Article 1358 of the Civil Code, a
contract of guaranty does not have to appear in a public
document.
-Reading Section 13 of PD No. 115: It is clear that if the
violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership,
association or other juridical entities, the penalty of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the directors, officers,
employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for
the offense. However, it is these corporations, partnerships,
associations, etc, which are made liable for the civil liability
arising from the criminal offense.
-Since that violation of a trust receipt constitutes fraud
under Article 33 of the Civil Code, petitioner was acting
well within its rights in filing an independent civil action to
enforce the civil liability arising therefrom against
Philippine Rayon.
torts & damages
3b. NO. Excussion is not a condition sine qua non for the
institution of an action against a guarantor. There was nothing
procedurally objectionable in impleading private respondent Chi
as a co-defendant in the civil case for the collection of a sum of
money. As a matter of fact, Section 6, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court on permissive joinder of parties explicitly allows it.
-This is the equity rule relating to multifariousness. It is based
on trial convenience and is designed to permit the joinder of
plaintiffs or defendants whenever there is a common question
of law or fact. It will save the parties unnecessary work, trouble
and expense.
-However, Chi's liability is limited to the principal obligation in
the trust receipt plus all the accessories thereof including
judicial costs; with respect to the latter, he shall only be liable
for those costs incurred after being judicially required to pay.
Interest and damages, being accessories of the principal
obligation, should also be paid; these, however, shall run only
from the date of the filing of the complaint. Attorney's fees may
even be allowed in appropriate cases.
Disposition Petition granted. Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc.
declared liable on the 12 drafts in question and on the trust
receipt. Private respondent Anacleto R. Chi declared
secondarily liable on the trust receipt.
CAPUNO V PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES
MAKALINTAL; April 30, 1965
FACTS
- The case arose from a vehicular collision.
- Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private
car driven by Capuno.
- The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers, the
spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras.
- Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the
CFI of Pampanga. The information was subsequently amended to include
claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims.
- While the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan
spouses and their heirs filed a civil action, also for damages, in the CFI of
Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon
Elordi.
- Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2,623.00
allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
-In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of were
represented by their respective counsel as private prosecutors: Attorney
Ricardo Y. Navarro and Attorneys Jose W. Diokno and Augusto M. Ilagan.
- In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strike
out the appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case.
Grounds for the motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were concerned,
they no longer had any interest to protect in the criminal case since they had
already claimed and received compensation for the death of their decedent;
and (2) that on the part of the Estate of Buan its right to intervene in said case
had been abated by the civil action.
A2010
prof. casis
- 86 -
-The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan was
disallowed by the Court and that of Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an
amending order. No appeal was taken from either of the two orders.
- The parties in the civil case entered into a "Compromise and Settlement."
For P290,000.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages, including
the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2,623.00 previously paid to the
heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act."
- The Court approved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case.
- At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was rendered
wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. Prior
thereto, herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi.
- This is the action which, upon appellees' motion, was dismissed by the
Court a quo in its order of February 29, 1960, from which order the present
appeal has been taken.
- The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and
which the Court found to be "well taken" were; (1) that the action had already
prescribed; and (2) that appellees had been released from appellants' claim
for damages by virtue of the payment to the latter of the sum of P2,623.00 by
the Buan Estate under the Workmen's Compensation Act, which sum, in turn,
was sought to be recovered by the said Estate from appellees in Civil Case
No. 838 but finally settled by them in their compromise.
ISSUE
WON the action had already prescribed.
RULING
YES.
- There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of
damages based on a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted within four
(4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code).
- Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim ex-delicto, that is, under
the provisions of the Penal Code, when they intervened in the criminal case
against Jon Elordi. The information therein, it may be recalled, was amended
precisely to include an allegation concerning damages suffered by the heirs
of the victims of the accident for which Elordi was being prosecuted.
- But appellants' intervention was subsequently disallowed and they did not
appeal from the Court's order to the effect.
- And when they commenced the civil action on September 26, 1958 the
criminal case was still pending, showing that appellants then chose to pursue
the remedy afforded by the Civil Code, for otherwise that action would have
been premature and in any event would have been concluded by the
subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case.
- In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly considered it as
entirely independent of the criminal action, pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of
the Civil Code, which read:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless
of the result of the latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
- The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing
death. In other words, the civil action for damages could have been
commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent,
Cipriano Capuno, and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of
the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. But the
complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or after the lapse of
more than five years.
- The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the fouryear period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of the
criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived the
civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Such reservation
was not then necessary; without having made it they could file — as in fact
they did — a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal
case; and consequently, as held in Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the institution
of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a
civil action based on a quasi-delict."
- As to whether or not Rule 111, Section 2, of the Revised Rules of Court
which requires the reservation of the right to institute a separate and
independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34,
and 2177 of the Civil Code affects the question of prescription, the said rule
does not apply in the present case.
DISPOSTIION The order appealed from was affirmed, without costs.
CORPUS V PAJE
28 SCRA 1062
CAPISTRANO; July 31, 1969
NATURE
Direct appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
FACTS
- December 23, 1956 – Felardo Paje was driving a Victory Liner bus. It
collided with a jeepney driven by Clemente Marcia in Lubao, Pampanga. As
a result of the collision, Marcia died while two other people were physically
injured.
- An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence was filed against Paje. Marcia’s heirs reserved their
right to institute a separate civil action against Paje. Paje was later found
guilty on November 7, 1960.
- November 21, 1961 – Pending Paje’s appeal, the window and children of
Marcia instituted the separate civil action for damages arising from the
accident against Paje and Victory Liner, praying that the defendants be jointly
and severally liable.
- November 9, 1962 – Paje was acquitted by the appellate court, saying that
the collision was purely an accident.
- December 29, 1962 – Paje filed a motion to dismiss the civil action on the
ground that his acquittal barred the said action but the motion was denied.
Petitioners’ Claim
> The petitioners claim that the Lower Court erred in acquitting Paje and that
his acquittal was a bar to the civil action. Quoting Chantangco vs. Abaroai: “It
is true that one of the plaintiffs in the present case reserved whatever right he
may have had to bring a civil action. This was obviously of no avail, inasmuch
as there resulted a judgment for the defendant, and the plain inference from
torts & damages
A2010
- 87 -
the foregoing is that a verdict of acquittal must carry with it exemption from
civil responsibility.”
Respondents’ Comments:
> At the pre-trial of the civil case, the defendants asked the court to rule on
their special defense that plaintiffs' cause of action based upon a quasi-delict
had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought four years and
eleven months after the collision and that according to Article 1144 of the
Civil Code an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four
years. The lower court ruled that the action had already prescribed.
- The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon
for damages, alleging that her husband died because of the gross negligence
of Dr. Japzon.
- The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the respondent judge
granted on the basis of Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court16
ISSUE
WON the civil action against Paje can still prosper despite his acquittal
HELD
YES
- Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil
Code is the applicable provision. A
- Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31,
32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent
civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal
case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding
section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111,
Rules of Court.)
- Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code,)
Obiter
- There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth
noting, namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto.
This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal
action" and "criminal prosecution."
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the
crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It
includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide.
- The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical
injuries.' Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because
there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms
as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation
and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning
in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this in mind, it is
evident that the terms 'physical injuries' could not have been used in its
specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult
to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same
article-some in their general and another in its technical sense.
- In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean
bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with
the latter are general terms.
HELD
NO
Ratio Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not one of the
three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the
institution of an independent civil action, that is, of an entirely separate and
distinct civil action for damages, which shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of
evidence. Thearticle mentions only the crimes of defamation, fraud, (estafa)
and physical injuries.
Reasoning
- Although in the case of Dyogi vs. Yatco this Court held that the term
"physical injuries" used in Article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide, it is
to be borne in mind that the charge against Felardo Paje was for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, and not for homicide and physical injuries.
- In People vs. Buan, the Court ruled that the “offense of criminal negligence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as
a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof.”
- Homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under
the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a
bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that
the injured party reserved.
- With regard to the issue of prescription, the Court ruled that the action had
indeed prescribed because the prescription period was pegged at 4 years
(A1146, CC) and began to run on the day the quasi-delict was committed.
Disposition PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed from is
affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs.
MADEJA V CARO
211 PHIL 469
ABAD SANTOS; December 21, 1983
NATURE
Petition seeking to set aside the order of the CFI dismissing the civil case
against Japzon
FACTS
- DR. EVA A. JAPZON was accused of homicide through reckless
imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy.
- In the information, the offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserved her right
to file a separate civil action for damages
ISSUE
WON a civil action for damages may be instituted pending the resolution of a
criminal case
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the preceding section
the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may
be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be
instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. ...
16
prof. casis
- In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil action for
physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in
American Law, and this recommendation must hove been accepted by the
Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent
has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the
complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code
Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed
is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or
even death" **(end of obiter)
- Corpus vs. Paje, which states that reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not
authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and
four of them merely concurred in the result.
Disposition Petition is granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is
hereby set aside.
DULAY V CA (SAFEGUARD, SUPERGUARD)
243 SCRA 220
BIDIN; April 3, 1995
FACTS
- Benigno Torzuela, , a security guard on duty at the "Big Bang sa Alabang,"
and Atty. Napoleon Dulay had an altercation. Torzuela shot and killed Atty.
Dulay.
- Maria Benita Dulay, widow of Dulay, filed an action for damages against
Torzuela and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (SAFEGUARD)
and/or Superguard Security Corp. (SUPERGUARD), alleged employers of
defendant Torzuela.
Respondent:
> that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties,
and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed w/ deliberate intent
(dolo), the civil liability is governed by Art 100 of the RPC.
> that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Art 2176 (the one
filed by petitioners) cannot lie, since the civil liability under Art 2176 applies
only to quasi-offenses under Art 365 of the RPC.
> that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the
conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the
employer's subsidiary liability.
> that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed (Marcia v CA)
Petitioner
> the incident resulting in the death of Dulay was due to the concurring
negligence of the defendants. Torzuela's wanton and reckless discharge of
the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD
was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence of
defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed
to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and
control of its employee to avoid the injury.
> that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their
liability under Article 2180
> that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts
that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC. Thus, Torzuela's act
of shooting Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Art 2176
torts & damages
> that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Art 3317
and Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court18
ISSUE
WON civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action
HELD
YES
- Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
"Sec 1.
Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the
accused."
- It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the
prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a
compliance with the requirement of an express reservation. This is precisely
what the petitioners opted to do in this case.
- The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to
include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co;
Carandang v. Santiago). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also
consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro).
- Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil action
may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal
negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case
at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the
defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in
this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
INTENTIONAL TORTS
VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS
100 PHIL 186
FELIX; October 31, 1956
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila
FACTS
- Since the start of Commercial Air Line, Inc’s (CALI) operations, its fuel
needs were all supplied by Shell Company of the P.I., Ltd, (Shell). Desmond
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence
18 Rule 111.Sec. 3.
When civil action may proceed independently - In the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil-action which has
been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal
action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
17
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Fitzgerald, Shell’s Credit Manager was in charge of collecting payment. Any
extensions of term of payment, however, had to be decided by Stephen
Crawford and later by Wildred Wooding
- As of August 1948, Shell’s books showed a balance of P170,162.58 in its
favor for goods it sold and delivered to CALI. Shell had reasons to believe
that the financial condition of Shell was far from being satisfactory.
Alfonso Sycip, CALI”s President of Board of Directors, offered to Fitzgerald
CALI’s Douglas C-54 plane, which was then in California. The offer was
declined by Crawford.
- Aug 6, 1948, management of CALI informally convened its principal
creditors in a luncheon, and informed them that CALI was in a state of
insolvency and had to stop operation. Alexander Sycip, Secretary of the
Board of Directors of CALI, explained the memorandum agreement executed
by CALI with Phil Air Lines Inc on Aug 4, regarding the proposed sale to PAL
of the aviation equipment of CALI. Alfredo Velayo, Auditor of CALI, discussed
the balance sheets of CALI. The balance sheet made mention of the Douglas
C-54 plane.
- There was a general understanding among all creditors present on the
desirability of consummating the sale in favor of PAL. Then followed a
discussion on the payment of claims of creditors and the preferences claimed
for the accounts due to employees, the Government, and the National
Airports Corp. The other creditors disputed such contention of preference. No
understanding was reached on the matter of preference of payment and it
was then generally agreed that the matter be further studied by a working
committee to be formed. Mr. Fitzgerald of Shell, Atty. Agcaoili of National
Airports Corp., and Atty. Alexander Sycip were appointed to the working
committee.
- Those present in the meeting were of the unanimous opinion that it would
be advantageous not to present suits against CALI but to strive for a fair prorata division of its assets. The management of CALI announced that in case
of non-agreement of the creditors, it would file insolvency proceedings.
- Aug 9, 1948, working committee discussed methods of achieving
objectives, which were to preserve the assets of CALI and to study the way of
making a fair division of all the assets among the creditors. However,
negotiation on the division of assets was left pending.
- On the same day (Aug 9), Shell effected a telegraphic transfer of all its
credit against CALI to the American Corporation Shell Oil Co., Inc., assigning
its credit amounting to $79,440. This was followed on Aug 10 by a deed of
assignment of credit amounting to $85,081.29.
- Aug 12, 1948 American Shell Oil Co filed a complaint against CALI in the
Superior Court of the State of California, USA, for the collection of assigned
credit of $79,440, and a writ of attachment was applied for and issued against
a C-54 plane. Sept 17, 1948 an amended complaint was filed to recover
assigned credit of $85,081.29 and a supplemental attachment for a higher
sum against the C-54 plane, plus miscellaneous personal properties.
- Unaware of Shell’s assignment of credit, CALI on Aug 12, 1948 approved
the memorandum agreement of sale to PAL, and noted that “the Board had
been trying to reach an agreement with creditors… to prevent insolvency
proceedings, but so far no definite agreement had been reached.”
- First week of Sept 1948, National Airports Corp learned of Shell’s action in
the US and hastened to file its own complaint with attachment against CALI in
the CFI of Manila.
- Oct 7, 1948 CALI filed a petition for voluntary insolvency. An order of
insolvency was issued by the court on the same day. Mr. Alfredo Velayo was
appointed Assignee in the proceedings.
prof. casis
- Velayo instituted case against Shell for the purpose of securing writ of
injunction restraining Shell from prosecuting against CALI, and as an
alternative, that Shell be ordered to pay damages double the value of the
plane if the case in the US will defeat the procurement of CALI of its plane.
- Dec 22, 1948, Court denied petition because whether the conveyance of
Shell’s credit was fraudulent or not, the Phil court would not be in a position to
enforce its orders as against the American corporation Shell Oil Co., Inc.,
which is outside the jurisdiction of the Phils.
- Plaintiff confined his action to the recovery of damages against Shell. Lower
court dismissed the case.
Defendant’s Comments
> Assignment of credit in favor of American Shell was for valuable
consideration and made in accordance with established commercial practices
> It has no interest in the case instituted by American Shell, as they are
separate and distinct corporations.
> Fitzgerald was merely invited to the luncheon-meeting, without knowing the
purpose for which it was called. Fitzgerald could not have officially
represented Shell because authority resides on Crawford.
ISSUES
1. WON Shell Co., of the P.I. Ltd, taking advantage of its knowledge of the
existence of CALI’s airplane C-54 at California, USA, acted in bad faith and
betrayed the confidence and trust of other creditors of CALI present in said
meeting by affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer of its credit to the American
corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc., thus defeating the purpose of the
informal meetings of CALI’s principal creditors and depriving the plaintiff of
the means of obtaining the plane, or its value, to the detriment and prejudice
of other CALI creditors who were consequently deprived of their share in the
distribution of said value
2. WON by reason of said betrayal of confidence and trust, Shell may be
made to answer for the damages, and if so, the amount of such damages
HELD
1. YES, Shell acted in bad faith.
- It is evident that Shell, upon learning the precarious economic situation of
CALI and that will all probability, it could not get much of its outstanding credit
because of the preferred claims of other creditors, entirely disregarded all
moral inhibitory tenets.
- The telegraphic transfer made without knowledge and at the back of other
creditors of CALI may be a shrewd and surprise move that enabled Shell to
collect almost all if not the entire amount of its credit, but the Court of Justice
(SC) cannot countenance such attitude at all, and much less from a foreign
corporation to the detriment of Philippine Government and local business.
- Shell’s transfer of credit would have been justified only if Fitzgerald had
declined to take part in the working committee and frankly and honestly
informed the other creditors present that he had no authority to bind his
principal and that the latter was to be left free to collect its credit from CALI by
whatever means his principal deemed wise and were available to it. But then,
such information would have dissolved all attempts to come to an amicable
conciliation and would have precipitated the filing of CALI’s voluntary
insolvency proceedings and nullified the intended transfer of Shell’s credit to
American Shell.
2. YES, Shell must answer for damages.
- Section 37 of the Insolvency Law states
torts & damages
Sec 37. If any person, before the assignment is made, having notice of the
commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, or having reason to
believe that insolvency proceedings are about to be commenced,
embezzles or disposes of ay money, goods, chattels, or effects of the
insolvent, he is chargeable therewith, and liable to an action by the
assignee for double the value of the property sought to be embezzled or
disposed of, to be received for the benefit of the insolvent estate.
- There are doubts, however, as to the applicability of this provision, as it is
contented that what Shell really disposed of was its own credit and not CALI’s
property, although this was practically the effect and result of the scheme.
The same result, however, may be achieved in applying the provisions of the
Civil Code.
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides
Art 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.
- While Art 19 contains a mere declaration of principles, such declaration is
implemented by Article 21 of the Civil Code, which states
Art 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
- Code Commission on Article 21: (it) would vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. (It) is a prudent
earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of enumerating, one by one,
all wrongs which cause damage.
- If Article 23 of Civil Code goes as far as to provide that “Even if an act or
event causing damage to another’s property was not due to the fault or
negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through
the act or event he was benefited.”, with much more reason that Shell should
be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of
confidence.
- Anent the argument that Civil Code provisions cannot be applicable as they
came into effect only on Aug 30, 1950, Art 2252 of Civil Code provides by
implication that when new provisions of the Code does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation, they may be
given retroactive effect. Shell did not have any vested or acquired right to
betray confidence of CALI or of its creditors. Moreover, according to Art 2254
of Civil Code, “no vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions
which are against the law or which infringe upon the right of others.”
Disposition Shell is liable to pay plaintiff, for the benefit of CALI and its
creditors, compensatory damages a sum equivalent to the value of the plane
at the time Shell assigned its credit to American Shell, and another equal sum
as exemplary damages.
VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS
RESOLUTION
100 PHIL 207
FELIX; July 30, 1957
Defendant-appellee’s contentions
- It is not guilty of bad faith, it having done nothing but to protect legitimately
its own interest or credit against the bad faith of its debtor, the insolvent CALI,
under the control of the latter’s president Alfonso Sycip
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- The transfer of credit to its sister corporation in the US did not prejudice the
Government, because its claims were fully paid, not caused any loss or injury
to other creditors, except the entities and groups controlled by Alfonso Sycip.
It is not liable for exemplary damages because the provisions of the new Civil
Code on the matter are not applicable to this case
- Plaintiff-appellant has no cause of action against it and is not the real party
in interest
- Plaintiff’s right of action was based and prosecuted in the lower court under
the provisions of the Insolvency Law and consequently he is stopped from
pursuing another theory and is not entitled to damages under the provisions
of the new Civil Code.
HELD
- The facts on which Court based its conclusion that Shell acted in bad faith
are not and cannot be denied or contradicted by defendant.
- There is no sensible reason for disturbing the finding that Shell is liable for
exemplary damages. The amount of the award, however, may be modified.
- According to the Civil Code, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed
by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages, and that the amount of the
exemplary damages need not be proved, for it is left to the sound discretion
of the Court.
- Majority of the Court is of the opinion that the value of the C-54 plane might
result too high, and that exemplary damages should not be left to speculation
but properly determined by a certain and fixed amount. The amount of
exemplary damages is thus modified, and fixed at P25,000.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V CA (MORADA)
297 SCRA 469
QUISUMBING; October 8, 1998
NATURE
Petition for certiorari to annul and set aside CA resolution and decision
FACTS
- Private respondent Milagros Morada was a flight attendant of Petitioner
Company. During a stop-over in Jakarta, she went to a disco with 2 of her
fellow crew members Thamer and Allah (both surnamed Al-Gazzawi) and
had breakfast in their hotel room. While there, Allah left and Thamer
attempted to rape her. She was saved by hotel security personnel who heard
her cries for help. She later filed a case against them. The two were arrested
and detained by Jakarta police. When Morada returned to Jeddah (the base
of operations of petitioner), she was asked to go to Jakarta to arrange for the
release of the two men. She proceeded to Jakarta but she refused to
cooperate. She was eventually allowed to return to Jeddah but barred from
Jakarta flights. The Indonesian authorities eventually deported the 2 men,
through the intercession of the Saudi govt., after 2 weeks of detention. They
were put back in service while respondent Morada was transferred to Manila.
- 2 years later, she was asked by her superiors to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief
Legal Officer of Saudia, in Jeddah. When they met, he brought her to the
police station where her passport was taken and she was questioned about
the Jakarta incident. Miniewy merely stood as the police put pressure on her
to drop the case against the two men. Not until she agreed to do so did the
police return her passport and allowed her to catch a later flight out of
Jeddah.
prof. casis
- A year and a half later, she was again asked to go to Jeddah to see
Miniewy. When she did, a certain Khalid of Saudia brought her to a Saudi
court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. She was
told that it was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it
turned out, she signed a document to appear before the court a week later.
When the date of appearance came, she complied but only after being
assured by Saudia’s Manila manager that the investigation was routinary and
posed no danger to her. She was brought before the court and was
interrogated by a Saudi judge and let go, however, just as she was about to
board a plane home, she was told that she had been forbidden to take flight.
She was later told to remain in Jeddah and her passport was again
confiscated. A few days later, she was again brought before the same court
where the Saudi judge, to her astonishment and shock, sentenced her to 5
months imprisonment and 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the
Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah for what happened
in Jakarta. The court found her guilty of adultery; going to a disco, dancing
and listening to music in violation of Islamic laws; and socializing with the
male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
- Facing conviction, she sought help from her employer, petitioner Saudia but
she was denied assistance of any kind. She asked the Phil. Embassy to help
her. Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed
the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before
her return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by Saudia without
being informed of the cause.
- She then filed a complaint for damages against Saudia and Mr. Al-Balawi,
its country manager. Saudia filed a motion to dismiss raising the issues of
lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The RTC denied the motion to
dismiss by Saudia, as well as the subsequent MFR. Saudia then filed petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction and/or TRO with the CA. The CA issued a TRO prohibiting
respondent judge from conducting any proceeding unless otherwise directed.
The CA, however, in another resolution, denied Saudia’s prayer for issuance
of writ of preliminary injunction. Saudia then filed to the SC this instant
petition. However, during the pendency of this petition, respondent CA
rendered a decision that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering
that the Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Art.21 CC,
thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court.
ISSUES
1. WON Morada had a cause of action
2. Which law should govern (Phil. Law or Saudi Law)
HELD
1. YES
- She aptly predicated her cause of action on Art.19 and Art.21 of the CC. As
held in PNB v CA, “the aforecited provisions on human relations were
intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold no. of moral wrongs which is impossible
for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.” Although Art.19
merely declares a principle of law, Art.21 gives flesh to its provisions.
Reasoning
- After a careful study of the pleadings, We are convinced that there is
reasonable basis for private respondent’s assertion that although she was
already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense
that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made
against the two crew members for the attack on her person. As it turned out,
torts & damages
she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including
adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.
- There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that in “handing over”
or “turning over” the person of private respondent to Jeddah officials,
petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioner’s
purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused
additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner
thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution of private
respondent under the guise of petitioner’s authority as employer, taking
advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As
purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and
imprisonment of Morada was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm
allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner could
be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs
done, once duly proven.
2. Philippine Law
Ratio Choice of law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as
property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact,
such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Reasoning
- Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the
“connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or places where
the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle
in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the
tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because
it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent,
a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly
believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the
performance of its duties, “act with justice, give her due and observe honesty
and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That
certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of
no moment. For in our view, what is important here is the place where the
over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person,
reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had
lodged according to the private respondent. All told, it is not without basis to
identify the Phil. as the situs of the alleged tort.
- In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, We find here an
occasion to apply the “State of the most significant relationship” rule, which
should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of the case. In
applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and
evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue: (A) the place where the injury occurred; (B) the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred; (C) the domicile, residence, nationality,
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and; (D) the place
where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
- As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that the over-all injury
occurred and lodged in the Phils. There is likewise no question that private
respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident
foreign corporation engaged in international air carriage business here. Thus,
the “relationship” between the parties was centered here.
Disposition petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. Civil case entitled “Milagros
Morada v Saudi Arabia Airlines” REMANDED to RTC
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GLOBE MACKAY V CA
176 SCRA 778
CORTES; August 25, 1989
NATURE
An appeal from the decision of CA
FACTS
- Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe
Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation as a purchasing agent and
administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager.
- GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the
anomalies and reported them to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren
and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive VP and
General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
- one day after Tobias made the report, Hendry confronted him by stating that
he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced
leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open,
and to leave the office keys.
- when Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, Hendry went up to him
and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a
lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his
handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators
to determine his complicity in the anomalies.
- the Manila police investigators cleared Tobias of participation in the
anomalies.
- Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator
who submitted a report finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly
stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.
- Nevertheless, Hendry issued a memo suspending Tobias from work
preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.
- the Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents
pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second
laboratory crime report reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings,
signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved
in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests
conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.
- Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the
anomalies petitioners filed a complaint for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents, later amended to just estafa.
- Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four
of which were for estafa while the fifth was for of Art.290 of' RPC (Discovering
Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence).
- All of the 6 criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal.
- In the meantime, Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his
employment has been terminated. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal.
- Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling,
reinstated the labor arbiter's decision and dismissed the complaint. Tobias
appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President.
- Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone
Company. However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO,
prof. casis
wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE
MACKAY due to dishonesty.
- Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful,
malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners.
- Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings.
- The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by ordering petitioners to
pay him P80,000.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, and
costs.
- CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
ISSUE
WON petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent
HELD
YES
Ratio Art.19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle
of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and
to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become
the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible.
Reasoning
- One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the
codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order."
Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which
provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
- But while Art.19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article
20 or Article 21 would be proper.
- Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides
that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
- However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any
provision of law since they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss
private respondent. This does not, however, leave private respondent with no
relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
- In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be
invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. The question of whether
or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages
torts & damages
under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on
the circumstances of each case.
- the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that
they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter
must now be indemnified.
- An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed
dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering
an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and
the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer.
But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly
uncalled for.
- The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during
the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right
of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the
manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the
dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the
employee.
- Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias
after the latter's termination from work: Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations
by telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more
cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos
cannot be trusted."
- The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken
against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well
as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler"
are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity
- The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to
RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been
dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Tobias remained
unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by
Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with
Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
- Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal
complaints against Tobias. While sound principles of justice and public policy
dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs
and vindication of their rights, the right to institute criminal prosecutions can
not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith. Considering the haste in which
the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the
pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by
Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police
reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed
against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases,
the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated
by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias.
- It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing
several actionable tortious acts. Considering the extent of the damage
wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioners' contention,
the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the
circumstances.
- Petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the
principle of damnum absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable
actual damage that private respondent could have suffered was a direct
result of his having been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid
and legal act of the defendants-appellants. According to the principle of
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damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation
of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. This principle
finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that
petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive
manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for
which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by
Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was
dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts
committed by petitioners.
- Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court
has already ruled that moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.
- Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. The
nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners
against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the
latter.
Disposition petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the CA is
AFFIRMED.
ALBENSON V CA
BIDIN; January 11, 1993
NATURE
Petition assailing the decision of respondent CA which modified the judgment
of the RTC and ordered petitioner to pay private respondent moral damages
and attorney's fees.
FACTS
- Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed
Industries, Inc. the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As part payment
thereof, Albenson was given a check in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn
against the account of E.L. Woodworks. When presented for payment, the
check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed."
- From the records of the SEC, Albenson discovered that the president of
Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio
S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry, Albenson was informed by the Ministry of
Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a single proprietorship business,
was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon
verification with the drawee bank, Albenson was advised that the signature
appearing on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao." After
obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson made an extrajudicial demand
upon private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao to replace and/or make good the
dishonored check. However, private respondent has a namesake, his son
Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business establishment, E.L. Woodworks,
with the very same business address as Guaranteed.
- Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S.
Baltao for Violation of BP 22. In filing said information, Fiscal Sumaway
claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit
controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and therefore, was
deemed to have waived his right. Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint
against him, immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for
reinvestigation. Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the
finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. He found that
the signature on the check is not the signature of Eugenio S. Baltao.
- Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him,
respondent Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against
herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin
Mendiona, its employee. In its decision, the lower court observed that "the
check is drawn against the account of "E.L. Woodworks," not of Guaranteed
Industries of which plaintiff used to be President. Guaranteed Industries had
been inactive and had ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975. . . The
possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III, a son of
plaintiff, that the defendants may have been dealing with . . ."
ISSUE
WON private respondent's cause of action is not one based on malicious
prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the CC
HELD
NO
Ratio The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has
been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other
applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. The
elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a
legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for
all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own
sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of
his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim
for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores,
and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which
is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is
done with intent to injure. There is a common element under Articles 19 and
21, and that is, the act must be intentional.
Reasoning
- Petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right.
What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of BP 22 against
private respondent was their failure to collect the amountdue on a bounced
check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private
respondent. Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of
mistaken identity at first hand. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or
of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse
result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the
actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose
a penalty on the right to litigate. Considering that Guaranteed, which received
the goods in payment of which the bouncing check was issued is owned by
respondent, petitioner acted in good faith and probable cause in filing the
complaint before the provincial fiscal. The presence of probable cause
signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice.
Disposition petition is GRANTED and the decision of the CA is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
AMONOY V GUTIERREZ
351 SCRA 731
PANGANIBAN; 2001
FACTS
torts & damages
- Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos,
Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. He won the case for them and
charged P27600 as attorney’s fees. As they were not able to pay, his clients
executed real estate mortgages on their lands and the house thereon.
Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passed
away on 2 July 1969. Among the heirs of the latter was his daughter,
plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez.
- Because his attorney’s fees thus secured by the two lots were not paid, on
21 January 1970 Amonoy filed for their foreclosure before the CFI of Pasig,
Rizal. The heirs opposed, contending that the attorney’s fees charged were
unconscionable and that the agreed sum was only P11,695.92. But on 28
September 1972 judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the
heirs to pay within 90 days the P27,600.00 secured by the mortgage,
P11,880.00 as value of the harvests, and P9,645.00 as another round of
attorney’s fees. Failing in that, the two (2) lots would be sold at public
auction.
- They failed to pay. On 6 February 1973, the said lots were foreclosed.
Amonoy was the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale. The heirs sought the
annulment of the auction sale. The case was dismissed by the CFI on 7
November 1977, and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 22 July
1981. Thereafter, the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession and
pursuant to which a notice to vacate was made on 26 August 1985. On
Amonoy’s motion of 24 April 1986, the Orders of 25 April 1986 and 6
May 1986 were issued for the demolition of structures in the said lots,
including the house of the Gutierrez spouses.
- The Gutierrez spouses sought a restraining order from the Supreme Court,
which was granted by the same. Upon a judgment on merits later on,
Amonoy was ordered to return said properties to the rightful owners. But by
the time the Supreme Court promulgated the above-mentioned Decision,
respondents’ house had already been destroyed, supposedly in accordance
with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court.
- Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their
house was filed by respondents against petitioner before the RTC on
December 15, 1989. In its January 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC dismissed
respondents’ suit. On appeal, the CA set aside the lower court’s ruling and
ordered petitioner to pay respondents P250,000 as actual damages.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was also denied.
Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE
WON Amonoy may properly invoke damnum absque injuria in this case since
at the time of the demolition he had color of authority over said properties
HELD
NO
Ratio Damnum absque injuria may not be invoked by a person who claims
to exercise a right but does so in an abusive manner violative of Article 19 of
the Civil Code. Indeed, in the availment of one’s rights, one must
Reasoning
- Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the
demolition of respondents’ house. He maintains that he was merely acting in
accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.
- We reject this submission. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to
this case.True, petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents’ house
on May 30, 1986 under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the
RTC. But the records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
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enjoining the demolition of respondents’ house, was issued by the Supreme
Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based on the Certificate of
Service of the Supreme Court process server, that a copy of the TRO was
served on petitioner himself on June 4, 1986.
- Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We agree with the
CA that he unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents’ house well until
the middle of 1987. Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally
justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO
amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were
tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition,
respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before
the RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an
invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received the
TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then, he was no longer entitled to
proceed with the demolition.
- A commentator on this topic explains:
“The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears
when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a
right without the spirit of justice which gives it life, is repugnant to the
modern concept of social law. It cannot be said that a person exercises a
right when he unnecessarily prejudices another x x x. Over and above the
specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice x x x;
and he who violates them violates the law. For this reason, it is not
permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.”
- Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and
to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the
primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself
legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible”
UE V JADER
325 SCRA 804
YNARES-SANTIAGO; February 17, 2000
FACTS
- Jader was enrolled in the UE College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. He
failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he
was given an incomplete grade .He enrolled for the second semester as
fourth year law student .He filed an application for the removal of the
incomplete grade but got a grade of five (5).
- In the mean time, his name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for
graduation with an annotation regarding his deficiencies. His name also
appeared in the invitation for the graduation as one of the candidates for
graduation. At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there
appeared however an annotation saying that it was a tentative list and that
degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily complete
requirements as stated in the University Bulletin . Jader attended the
graduation and brought his family with him. He thereafter prepared himself for
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the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without pay from his job and
enrolled at the pre-bar review class. Jader later learned of the deficiency and
he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination.
Consequently, he sued UE for damages.
- UE denied liability arguing that it never led respondent to believe that he
completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name
was included in the tentative list of graduating students.
- TC rendered judgment in favor of the Jader and ordered UE to pay Jader
P35,470.00
- CA Affirmed and added an award of P50,000.00 for moral damages
- UE elevated the case to this Court on a petition for review arguing that it has
no liability to respondent Romeo A. Jader, considering that the proximate and
immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by the latter arose out of
his own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of
his removal exam.
ISSUE
WON an educational institution may be held liable for damages for
misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the
requirements for graduation when such is not the case
HELD
YES
- UE had a contractual obligation to inform his students as to whether or not
they have met all the requirements for the conferment of a degree. Thus, UE
in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination,
particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar
exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith
must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the
aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil
Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue
advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law,
together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render
the transaction unconscientious.
- Considering that the institution of learning involved herein is a university
which is engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it
inculcates in its students, more specifically the principle of good dealings
enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
- Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.
- In civilized society, men must be able to assume that others will do them no
intended injury – that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them;
that their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so with due care
which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts
and that those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in
good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance
under conditions of civilized society. Schools and professors cannot just take
students for granted and be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the
former are useless.
torts & damages
- Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their
academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The
conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the
person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a
claim for damages. Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil
obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally
calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. Petitioner
ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its
obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that
respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely
the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act
seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student’s grades at any time
because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme
Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner’s
liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an
examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all
requirements for the course.
- Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own
negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to respondent. When
one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss
occurred must bear it. The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for
damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not
illicit. If mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for
damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad
faith make him liable. A person should be protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in
good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
GARCIANO V CA
212 SCRA 436
GRIÑO-AQUINO; August 10, 1992
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
complaint for damages filed by the petitioner against the private respondents.
FACTS
- The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the
Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes. On January 13,
1982, or before the school year ended, she applied for an indefinite leave of
absence because her daughter was taking her to Austria where her daughter
was employed. The application was recommended for approval by the school
principal, Emerito O. Labajo, and approved by the President of the school's
Board of Directors.
- On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner
through her husband, Sotero Garciano (for she was still abroad), informing
her of the decision of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the school's founder, concurred in by
the president of the Parent-Teachers Association and the school faculty, to
terminate her services as a member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the
absence of any written contract of employment between her and the school
due to her refusal to sign one; and (2) the difficulty of getting a substitute for
her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position without a
written contract. Upon her return from Austria in the later part of June, 1982,
she received the letter informing her that her services at the Immaculate
Concepcion Institute had been terminated. She made inquiries from the
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school about the matter and, on July 7, 1982, the members of the Board of
Directors of the school, with the exception of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, signed a
letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to report and do your usual duties
as Classroom Teacher . . . effective July 5, 1982," and that "any letter or
notice of termination received by you before this date has no sanction or
authority by the Board of Directors of this Institution, therefore it is declared
null and void."
- On July 9, 1982, the president, vice president, secretary, and three
members of the Board of Directors, out of a membership of nine (9), resigned
their positions from the Board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty, has reacted
acidly to the Board's deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs. Esteria F.
Garciano, thereby questioning the integrity of the Board's decision".
- On September 3, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the
Regional Trial Court, Cebu, Branch XI, against Fr. Wiertz, Emerito Labajo,
and some members of the faculty of the school for discrimination and unjust
and illegal dismissal.
ISSUE
WON the defendants prevented the petitioner from reporting to the school
and thus making them liable for damages
HELD
NO
- The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's discontinuance
from teaching was her own choice. While the respondents admittedly wanted
her service terminated, they actually did nothing to physically prevent her
from reassuming her post, as ordered by the school's Board of Directors.
That the school principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision
to retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse,
even if true, did not make them liable to her for damages. They were simply
exercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent from the
Board's decision. Their acts were not contrary to law, morals, good customs
or public policy. They did not "illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to
retain her prevailed. She was ordered to report for work on July 5, 1982, but
she did not comply with that order. Consequently, whatever loss she may
have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit
injuria.
Ratio Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
arises only from unlawful, willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law, or
morals, good customs or public policy.
BARONS MARKETING V CA (PHELPS DODGE PHILS)
286 SCRA 96
KAPUNAN; February 9, 1998
NATURE
Petition for review decision of CA
FACTS
- Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as one of its dealers of electrical
wires and cables. As such dealer, Barons was given 60 days credit for its
purchases of Phelp’s products.
- From Dec1986 to Aug1987, Barons purchased on credit wires and cables
worth P4.1m, which it in turn supplied to MERALCO. In the sales invoice, it
prof. casis
was stipulated that an interest of 12% would be imposed, plus 25% for atty’s
fees and collection. On Sept1987, Barons paid P300k (thereby leaving an
unpaid account of P3.8m). Phelps sent several demands, but Barons still did
not pay. It instead wrote Phelps requesting if it could pay the outstanding
account in monthly installments of P500k plus 1% interest.
- Phelps, instead of responding to the request of Barons, filed a complaint for
recovery of the P3.8m plus interest, and prayed for atty’s fees of 25% of the
amt, and exemplary damages amounting to P100k.
- Barons admitted the purchase of the wires and cables, but disputed the amt
claimed by Phelps. The RTC rendered decision in favor of Phelps, ordering
Barons to pay the debt and interest of 12% and awarding 25% as atty’s fees.
CA affirmed (with modification, reducing atty’s fees to 5%) Barons now assail
the CA decision, alleging that Phelps should have been held guilty of
“creditor’s abuse of rights”, and Barons should not be liable for atty’s fees.
*note: Barons contends that Phelps abused its rights when it rejected Barons’
offer to settle the debt in installments
**right involved: right of a creditor to refuse partial fulfillment of a prestation
due to him
ISSUES
1. WON there was creditors’ abuse of rights in this case
2. WON Barons should be liable for interest and atty’s fees
HELD
1. NO
Ratio there is no abuse of rights when there is no bad faith nor intent to
prejudice another. Also, the mere exercise of a right cannot be said to be an
abuse of right.
Reasoning
- the law prescribes a "primordial limitation on all rights" by setting certain
standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof. Thus, the inclusion
of Art.19 in the CC: Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
- To constitute abuse of rights, there must be bad faith or intent to prejudice
the plaintiff. Citing Tolentino: There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it
is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. When the
objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed under
the guise of exercising a right. xxx The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.
- In this case, bad faith on the part of Phelps was not proved. More
importantly, Phelps was driven by legitimate reasons for rejecting Barons
offer. It merely wanted to avoid a situation wherein its cash position would be
compromised, making it harder for them to pay its own obligations.
“Clearly, this (the request of Barons) would be inimical to the interests of
any enterprise, especially a profit-oriented one like Phelps. It is plain to
see that what we have here is a mere exercise of rights, not an abuse
thereof.”
2. YES
Ratio the penal clause included in the contract should be complied with in
the event of breach.
Reasoning
- the contract expressly provided for the imposition of the 12% interest plus
25% for attorney’s fees and collection, by way of penal clause. Thus, Barons
is bound to pay the said amounts.
torts & damages
- However, since 25% if P4.1m is almost P2m, this should be reduced to 10%
for being manifestly exorbitant. Thus, atty’s fees should be reduced to 10%
Disposition CA decision modified WRT atty’s fees but AFFIRMED in other
respects
BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION V CA (MARASIGAN)
296 SCRA 260
KAPUNAN; September 25, 1998
FACTS
- December 8, 1989 - Atty. Ricardo J. Marasigan’s credit card was
dishonored, the bill amounting to P735.32, by Café Adriatico when the he
entertained some guests. One of his guests, Mary Ellen Ringler, paid the bill
by using her own credit card a Unibankard
- MARASIGAN was a complimentary member of BECC from February 1988
to February 1989 and was issued Credit Card with a credit limit of P3,000.00
and with a monthly billing every 27th of the month His membership was
renewed for another year or until February 1990 and the credit limit was
increased to P5,000.00.
- MARASIGAN oftentimes exceeded his credit limits but this was never taken
against him by BPI and even his mode of paying his monthly bills in check
was tolerated.
- October 1989 – statement amounting to P8,987.84 was not paid in due
time. MARASIGAN admitted having failed to pay his account because he
was in Quezon attending to some professional and personal commitments.
He was informed that bpi was demanding immediate payment of his
outstanding account, was requiring him to issue a check for P15,000.00
which would include his future bills, and was threatening to suspend his credit
card.
- MARASIGAN issued Far East Bank Check of P15,000.00, postdated
December 15, 1989 which was received on November 23, 1989 by Tess
Lorenzo, an employee of the defendant who in turn gave to Jeng Angeles, a
co-employee who handles the account of the plaintiff. The check remained in
the custody of Jeng Angeles. Mr. Roberto Maniquiz, head of the collection
department of defendant was formally informed of the postdated check about
a week later.
- November 28, 2989 - BPI served MARASIGAN a letter by ordinary mail
informing him of the temporary suspension of the privileges of his credit card
and the inclusion of his account number in their Caution List. He was also told
to refrain from further use of his credit card to avoid any
inconvenience/embarrassment and that unless he settles his outstanding
account with the defendant within 5 days from receipt of the letter, his
membership will be permanently cancelled
- There is no showing that the plaintiff received this letter before December 8,
1989.
- December 12, 1989 – MARASIGAN requested that he be sent the exact
billing due him as of December 15, 1989, to withhold the deposit of his
postdated check and that said check be returned to him because he had
already instructed his bank to stop the payment because BPI violated their
agreement that when MARASIGAN issued the check to cover his account
amounting to only P8,987.84 on the condition that BPI will not suspend the
effectivity of the card
- December 16, 1989 – MARASIGAN sent letter to the manager of FEBTC
requesting the bank to stop the payment of the check
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- March 12, 1990 – MARASIGAN sent another letter reminding the manager
of FEBTC that he had long rescinded and cancelled whatever arrangement
he entered into with BPI and requesting for his correct billing, less the
improper charges and penalties, and for an explanation within five (5) days
from receipt thereof why his card was dishonored on December 8, 1989
despite assurance to the contrary by defendant's personnel-in-charge,
otherwise the necessary court action shall be filed to hold defendant
responsible for the humiliation and embarrassment suffered by him
- March 21, 1990 - final demand by BPI requiring him to pay in full his
overdue account, including stipulated fees and charges, within 5 days from
receipt thereof or face court action and also to replace the postdated check
with cash within the same period or face criminal suit for violation of Bouncing
Check Law
- April 5, 1990 – MARASIGAN demanded BPI compliance with his request in
his first letter dated March 12, 1990 within three (3) days from receipt,
otherwise the plaintiff will file a case against them
- May 7, 1990 - MARASIGAN filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner before the RTC Makati
- TC: ruled for MARASIGAN finding that BPI abused its right in contravention
of A19 CC ordering BPI to pay P 100,000.00 as moral damages; P 50,000.00
as exemplary damages; and P 20,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
- CA: AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION P50,000.00 as moral damages:
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P10,000.00 by way of attorney's
fees.
ISSUES
1. WON BPI abused its right to suspend the credit card
2. WON MARASIGAN can recover moral damages arising from the
cancellation of his credit card by BPI
HELD
1. NO
Ratio The agreement was for the immediate payment of the outstanding
account. A check is not considered as cash especially when it is postdated
sent to BPI. Thus, the issuance of the postdated check was not effective
payment. BPI was therefore justified in suspending his credit card. BPI did
not capriciously and arbitrarily canceled the use of the card.
Reasoning
- Under the terms and conditions of the credit card, signed by MARASIGAN,
any card with outstanding balances after thirty (30) days from original
billing/statement shall automatically be suspended,
Any CARD with outstanding balances unpaid after thirty (30) days from
original billing/statement date shall automatically be suspended and those
with accounts unpaid after sixty (60) days from said original
billing/statement date shall automatically be cancelled without prejudice to
BECC's right to suspend or cancel any CARD any time and for whatever
reason.
- By his own admission MARASIGAN made no payment within 30 days for
his billing/statement dated 27 September 1989. Neither did he make payment
for his original billing/statement dated 27 October 1989. Consequently as
early as 28 October 1989 thirty days from the non-payment of his billing
dated 27 September 1989, BPI could automatically suspend his credit card.
Ratio To find the existence of an abuse of right A19 the following elements
must be present (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Reasoning
- Good faith is presumed and the burden of proving bad faith is on the party
alleging it. As early as 28 October 1989, BPI could have suspended
MARASIGAN’S card outright. Instead, BPI allowed him to use his card for
several weeks.
Ratio The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that
an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a
breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the
proximate cause of the injury.
Reasoning
- Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm
which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the results
of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne
by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting
from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These
situations
are
often
called
damnum
absque
injuria
- It was petitioner's failure to settle his obligation which caused the
suspension of his credit card and subsequent dishonor at Café Adriatico. He
can not now pass the blame to the petitioner for not notifying him of the
suspension of his card. As quoted earlier, the application contained the
stipulation that the petitioner could automatically suspend a card whose
billing has not been paid for more than thirty days. Nowhere is it stated in the
terms and conditions of the application that there is a need of notice before
suspension may be affected as private respondent claims.
2. NO
- MARASIGAN’S own negligence was the proximate cause of his
embarrassing and humiliating experience in not reading the letter of notice of
cancellation. The award of damages by the CA is clearly unjustified.
RUIZ V SECRETARY
PAREDES; 1966
NATURE
Appeal from an order of the Manila CFI
FACTS
- Enrique Ruiz and Jose Herrera, both shareholders of Allied Technilogists,
Inc. filed an action against the Secretary of National Defense and also
against their own company (together with Pablo Panlilio who is also a
shareholder of the company) in connection with the 15% retention fund
withheld by the DND relating to the construction of the Veterans Hospital. It
turned out that said retention was already released by the DND to the
Company. The Court then proceeded with the other cause of action which
was deemed to be the controversy between Ruiz and Panlilio over the said
15%.
- As it turned out, the real issue was the credit as to the architects of the
building were. Under the contract and all other documents relating to the
construction of the Veterans Hospital, the named architect was only Panlilio.
Ruiz and Herrera want to be recognized as architects of the building also
citing Article 21 of the Civil Code as their base for he cause of action.
torts & damages
- The amended complaint of appellants claimed that the non inclusion of their
names as architects resulted in their professional prestige and standing being
seriously impaired. Hence, they claim that even if the retention fund was in
act released, their pleas for recognition as architects should have been heard
by the lower court.
ISSUE
WON the lower court erred in dismissing the case
HELD
NO
- The sole object of the appellants was to secure for themselves recognition
that they were co-architects of the Veterans Hospital, together with Panlilio,
so as to enhance their standing and prestige. If this is so, there is no need or
necessity for a judicial declaration. Prestige and recognition are bestowed on
the deserving even if there is no judicial declaration. On the other hand no
amount of declaration will help an incompetent person achieve prestige and
recognition. Article 21, which was used as basis of the action, states;
“Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the
latter for damages.”
- While the word “injury” may also refer to honor or credit, the article envisions
a situation where a person has a legal right which was violated by another in
a manner contrary to morals, good custom, or public policy. Hence it
presupposes losses or injuries which are suffered as a result of said violation.
The pleadings in this case do not show damages were ever asked or alleged.
- And under the facts and circumstances obtaining, one cannot sustain the
contention that the failure or refusal to extend recognition was an act contrary
to morals, good custom, or public policy.
Disposition Petition denied. Order appealed from is affirmed. he modified
award of attorney’s fees.
ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO)
217 SCRA 16
BIDIN; January 11, 1993
NATURE
Appeal from decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- Albenson Enterprises Corp. delivered to Guaranteed Industries Inc. the mild
steel plates which the latter ordered. As part payment, Albenson was given a
check drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks.
- Check was dishonored for the reason “Account closed.”
- Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed was one Eugenio S.
Baltao and that E.L. Woodworks was registered in the name Eugenio Baltao.
The signature on the subject check belonged to Eugenio Baltao.
- Albenson made an extrajudicial demand but Balbao denied issuing the
check. Thus, Albenson filed a complaint against Eugenio S. Baltao for
violation of BP 22.
- Asst. Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S.
Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
- Baltao filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation. It
appears that private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III,
who manages E.L. Woodworks.
A2010
prof. casis
- 95 -
- Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal
Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao.
- Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Albenson
Enterprises, its owner, and one employee.
- Trial court granted Baltao’s claim for actual or compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs.
- CA modified by reducing the moral damages and the attorney's fees
awarded.
ISSUES
WON Baltao should be awarded damages (based on malicious prosecution)
HELD
NO
- A party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later on
absolved, may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of
abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution. In order that such a case can
prosper, however, the following three (3) elements must be present, to wit: (1)
The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself
the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2)
That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3)
The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice
- To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person,
and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his
charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a
case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was prompted
by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and
preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages
- Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted.
- An award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action
was filed in good faith. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal
rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
- Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of
pecuniary loss — in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation
— and the same must be proved, otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and
unsubstantiated, no damages will be given
- In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral
damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does
not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of
damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right
to litigate
- Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton,
fraudulent or reckless, or oppressive manner, neither may exemplary
damages be awarded
Disposition Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside
WASSMER V VELEZ
12 SCRA 648
BENGZON; December 24, 1964
FACTS
- Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise
of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On
September 2, Velez left a note for Wassmer saying that he has to postpone
the wedding because his mother opposes it.
- But the next day, he sent a telegram assuring Wassmer that nothing has
changed and he will return soon. But Velez did not appear nor was he heard
from again.
- Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in
default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner
Judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000 as actual
damages; P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500 as attorney's
fees; and the costs.
ISSUE
WON Velez is liable for the cost of wedding preparations spent by Wassmer
HELD
YES
- While mere breach of contract is not an actionable wrong, Article 21 of the
Civil Code says that when the person willfully causes loss or injury contrary to
good custom, he shall compensate the latter for damages. It is the abuse of
right which can be a cause for moral and material damages.
- The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied
for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued. Their
wedding was set. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends
and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other
apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of
honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories,
was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received.
- This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. To formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21
aforesaid.
- Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral
damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.
As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be
adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the
condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit
as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly
acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." P15,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
TANJANCO V SANTOS
REYES; December 17, 1966
NATURE
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals revoking an order of the CFI
dismissing appellant's action for support and damages.
FACTS
torts & damages
- Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that he
expressed and professed his undying love and affection for her who also in
due time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of his
promise of marriage Araceli consented and acceded to Tanjanco’s pleas for
carnal knowledge. Regularly until December 1959, through his protestations
of love and promises of marriage, Tanjanco succeeded in having carnal
access to Araceli, as a result of which she conceived a child. Due to her
pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, Araceli
had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc. She became
unable to support herself and her baby and duer to Tanjanco's refusal to
marry her as promised, she suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a
decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff
was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her support and
that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus
P10,000.00 attorney's fees. CFI dismissed the complaint. The Court of
Appeals, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court
of origin to proceed with the case.
ISSUE
WON CS erred in reversing the CFI decision
HELD
YES
- In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under
Article 21, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the
memorandum submitted by the Code Commission where it stated, “but the
Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has
deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed
Civil Code the following rule: ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." They gave an
example  "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of
marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes
pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above
eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of
marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been
committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered incalculable
moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But
under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of
action. The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set
forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor
who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law it is
more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse
of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. To
constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction. She must be induced to depart
from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and
wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result
A2010
- 96 -
in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her
seducer.
- And in American Jurisprudence: On the other hand, in an action by the
woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury;
and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual
desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the
needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized
that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of
the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit.
- Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. Over and
above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year,
from 1958 to 1959, Araceli Santos, a woman of adult age, maintained
intimate sexual relations with Tanjanco, with repeated acts of intercourse.
Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had Araceli been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of
the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less
for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of
marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no
case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action
being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint.
Disposition the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the
Court of First Instance is affirmed..
BAKSH V CA
219 SCRA 115
DAVIDE JR; February 19, 1993
NATURE
Appeal by certioriari to review and set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals
FACTS
- Private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the
alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said
complaint that: she is 22 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good
moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner,
on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments,
Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at
the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987,
the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the
condition that they would get married; they therefore argued to get married
after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year;
petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August
1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she
was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated
and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained
injuries, during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain
prof. casis
of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the
petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her
damages, reimbursement for actual expenses, attorney's fees and costs, and
granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable.
- In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner admitted only the personal
circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest
of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as
his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never
proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he
neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live
in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to
his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his
money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a
representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the
complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was
unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has
suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award
for miscellaneous expenses and moral damages.
- After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil
Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private
respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and
attorney's fees.
- The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that
(a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is
not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to
sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, (d) because of his
persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by
him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her
parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some
preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987
by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting
sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such
acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine
hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and
traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to
come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and
ridicule if her claim was false.
- Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of
Appeals. Respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision affirming in
toto the trial court's ruling. Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the
instant petition; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21
of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.
- It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had
not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or
public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact
that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs,
traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic
and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to
marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable
torts & damages
because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which
purportedly allows a Muslim to take four wives and concludes that on the
basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not possess good
moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law wife" is now his
legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the
Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent,
petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the livein relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to
an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be
assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent
and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in
view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is
not actionable.
ISSUE
WON Art. 21 is applicable to the case at bar
HELD
YES
- The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the
New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. This
notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books.
- In light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, The Court is of the
opinion, and so holds, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause
of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation
which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live
with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise,
and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to
their supposed marriage."
Disposition Petition denied
BUNAG V CA (CIRILO)
211 SCRA 441
REGALADO; July 10, 1992
NATURE
Petition for review from the decision of CA
A2010
prof. casis
- 97 -
FACTS
- Conrado Bunag, Jr brought Zenaida Cirilo to a hotel where they had sex.
Later that evening, Bunag brough her to his grandmother’s house in Las
Pinas where they liver together as husband and wife for 21 days. During that
time, Bunag, Jr. and Cirilo applied for their respective Marriage Licenses, but
after leaving, Bunag Jr withdrew his application. Cirilo contends that she was
abducted by Bunag Jr along with unidentified man and brought her to the
motel where she was raped. The Court a quo adopted her evidence.
- The Court found that Cirilo and Bunag Jr were sweethearts but for 2eeks
before the alleged rape, they had a quarrel. On the day of the said rape,
Bunag jr invited her for merienda to talk things over. Bunag Jr came riding in
a car with an unidentified man. Cirilo rode in the passenger’s seat while
Bunag Jr was driving. When she noticed they were going the wrong way,
Cirilo protested but Bunag threatened her that he would bump the car against
the post if she made any noise. They never got to the restaurant where they
were supposed to eat.
- She was then dragged by the 2 men in the hotel where Bunag Jr deflowered
her against her will and consent.
- Bunag initially allowed her to go home but later refused to consent and
stated that he would only let her go after they were married, so much so that
she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him. they proceeded to
Bunag’s grandmother’s house. That night, Bunag Sr arrived and assured
them that they would apply for the ML the next day.
- After filing for the ML, they lived as husband and wife for 21 days. Bunag
then left and never returned. Cirilo was ashamed when she went home and
could not sleep and eat because of the deception done against her by Bunag,
Jr.
- A complaint fro breach of promise to marry was filed against Bunag Sr and
Bunag Jr. The RTC upon finding that she was forcibly abducted and raped
Bunag Jr was ordered to pay for P80K for moral damages, P20K for
exemplary damage, P20K by way of temperate damage, and P10K for atty’s
fees. Bunag Sr was absolved from liability.
- Cirilo appealed on the disculpation of Bunag Sr’s liability. While the Bunag’s
assigned several errors in the TC decision. CA dismissed the petitions and
affirmed judgment of RTC in toto.
- Bunag filed for the petition for review claiming that CA failed to consider vital
exhibits and testimonies and error in the proper application of the law.
ISSUE
WON lower courts erred in granting damages for the breach of promise to
marry
HELD
Ratio A breach of promise to marry is not actionable per se, except where
the plaintiff incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents
therrof. However, the award for moral damages is allowed in cases specified
and analogous to those provided in Art 2219 CC. Under Art 21 CC, in relation
to Art 2219, par10, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damages.
Reasoning
- The court is constrained with the factual findings of the lower courts.
- A breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the
right to recover for money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith
of such promise.
- Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the petitioner’s promising to
marry Cirilo to evade criminal liability constitutes acts contrary to morals and
good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions
which warrant and justify the award of moral and exemplary damages,
pursuant to Art 21 in relation to par 3 and 10, Art 2219, and Art 2229 and
2234 CC.
- Although TC granted damages on the basis of the forcible abduction and
rape even after the criminal complaint’s dismissal, the extinction of the
criminal liability does not extinguish civil liability unless there is a declaration
of a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case may arise did not
exist. In the case, only the fiscal made such dismissal of the criminal
complaint.
Disposition petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the
assailedjudgment and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.
CONSTANTINO V MENDEZ
BIDIN; May 14, 1992
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment, support
and damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez.
- In her complaint, Amelita Constantino alleges that she met Ivan Mendez at
Tony's Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, where she worked as a
waitress; that the day following their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine
with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; that while dining, Ivan
professed his love and courted Amelita; that Amelita asked for time to think
about Ivan's proposal; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Amelita
asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed, that on the pretext of
getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a
promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter;
that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married
man; that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and
November, 1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a result of which Amelita got
pregnant; that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears; that Amelita
had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the father of
the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint; that because
of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress; that
Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with a monthly income of
P5,000 to P8,000.00. As relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the
unborn child, the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees plus costs.
ISSUE
WON Amelita can claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4
of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she
surrendered her virginity
HELD
NO
Ratio Mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages
could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness
and mutual desire.
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Reasoning
- Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood.
Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage, she
could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was
informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he
was a married man. Repeated sexual intercourse only indicates that passion
and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her
submit herself to Ivan.
QUIMIGUING V ICAO
34 SCRA 132
REYES; July 31, 1970
NATURE
Appeal on points of law from an order of the CFI
FACTS
- Appellant, Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued her neighbor Icao with
whom she had close and confidential relations. The latter, although married,
succeeded in having sex with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation
and without her consent. She became pregnant and despite efforts and drugs
(abortion pills?) supplied by defendant, she had to stop studying. Hence, she
claimed support of P120/mo.
- Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action as the complaint did not
allege the child had been born—the motion was sustained. Plaintiff amended
the complaint but the TC ruled such was not allowable as the original
complaint averred no cause of action.
ISSUES
1. WON Quimiguing had a right to the support of the child
2. WON Quimiguing is entitled to damages
HELD
1. YES
- A conceived, unborn child is given a provisional personality by law and
therefore has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly Icao (Art. 40)
and may receive donations (Art. 742). Its being ignored by the parent in his
testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution
of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of
the testator (Art. 854)
2. YES
- For a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as
averred in the original complaint) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of
his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damages caused. As
stated in Art. 21, “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damage.” This is furthered by Art. 2219 which
provides compensation in cases of seduction, abduction, rape or other
lascivious acts.
- Hence, independent of the right to support of the child, plaintiff herself had a
cause of action for damages; thus the order dismissing it for failure to state a
cause of action was doubly in error.
Disposition the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside
PE V PE
prof. casis
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5 SCRA 200
1962
FACTS
- Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita PE, an unmarried
woman 24 years of age. Defendant, a married man, frequently visited Lolita’s
house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. They
fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the parents learned
about this, they prohibited defendant from going to their house. The affair
continued just the same. On april 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from her
brother’s house where she was living. A note in the handwriting of the
defendant was found inside Lolita’s aparador. The present action was
instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court dismissed the
action. Hence, this appeal by the plaintiffs
ISSUE
WON the defendant can be held liable under Article 21
HELD
YES
- The circumstances under which the defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection
cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, through an
ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her
fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the
house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the
rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter’s family who
allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered
as a member of the family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and
conducted clandestine love affairs. Defendant continued his love affairs with
Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other
conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that the defendant not
only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the
affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The
wrong he had caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering
the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to
Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy
as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
QUE V IAC (NICOLAS)
169 SCRA 137
CRUZ; January 13, 1989
NATURE
Petition for review
FACTS
- Magtanggol Que is a dealer of canvass strollers while Antonio Nicolas
orders from him. The two had an amicable business relation until 1975, when
Nicolas ordered strollers from Que, which were delivered, and then issued 5
postdated checks in favor of Que. The checks were dishonored, in
accordance with Nicolas’ order to stop payment. After making demands for
payment, which Nicolas allegedly ignored. Que filed an estafa case against
Nicolas. The case was dismissed for lack of merit.
- Nicolas then filed a case against Que for malicious prosecution. He
allegedly ordered that payment be stopped because the goods delivered to
him by Que were defective and that Que allegedly refused to replace them.
Que on his part alleged that the said defective products were only returned
after he filed an estafa case. TC ruled in favor of Que, IAC reversed.
ISSUE
WON Que had instituted a malicious prosecution of the private respondent
(WON the reversal made by IAC was correct)
HELD
NO
- It is evident that the petitioner was not motivated by ill feeling but only by an
anxiety to protect his his rights when he filed the criminal complaint for estafa
with the fiscal's office.
Ratio. One cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a
prosecution where he acted with probable cause.
Reasoning
-. 'Under the Spanish Law, the element of probable cause was not treated
separately from that of malice, as under the American Law. When a
complaint was laid and there was probable cause to believe that the person
charged had committed the acts complained of, although, as a matter of fact,
he had not, the complainant was fully protected, but not so much on the
theory of probable cause as on the ground that, under such circumstances,
there was no intent to accuse falsely. If the charge, although false, was made
with an honest belief in its truth and justice, and there were reasonable
grounds on which such a belief could be founded, the accusation could not
be held to have been false in the legal sense.
- To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person
that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges
were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to
the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution (Manila Gas Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602)
- Nicolas issued 5 checks which Que cannot encash, inspite of demands by
the latter. Also, the goods which were allegedly defective were not yet
returned to Que before the filing of the estafa case. Instead, Nicolas kept the
goods, did not demand for its repair. He just stopped payment, without Que
knowing that there were defects in the goods he delivered. Therefore, from
Que’s point of view, the circumstances presented the possibility that Nicolas
might cheat him.
Disposition decision of the respondent court dated March 12, 1984, is SET
ASIDE and the amended decision of the trial court dated February 21, 1979,
is REINSTATED as above modified. This decision is immediately executory.
DRILON V CA (ADAZA)
270 SCRA 211
HERMOSISIMA JR; March 20, 1997
NATURE
Petition to reverse CA’s Resolutions
FACTS
- Gen Renato DE VILLA, Chief of Staff of the AFP, requested the DOJ
(headed by Sec Franklin DRILON) to order the investigation of several
individuals, including private respondent ADAZA for their alleged participation
in the failed Dec 1989 coup d’etat.
torts & damages
- This was then referred for preliminary inquiry to the Special Composite
Team of Prosecutors who issued a subpoena to the said individuals after
finding sufficient basis to continue the inquiry. The panel assigned to conduct
prelim investigation found that there was probable cause to hold them for trial
for the crime of REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER.
Information was filed before RTC QC, with no recommendation as to bail.
- Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these proceedings against him,
ADAZA filed a complaint for damages and charged petitioners with engaging
in a deliberate, willful and malicious experimentation by filing against him a
charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder when
petitioners were fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the statute
books.
- Petitioners filed MD since there was no valid cause of action for this
complaint for damages.
- RTC denied MD. MFR for Order of Denial was also denied.
- CA also dismissed petition for certiorari and ordered RTC judge to proceed
with the trial of civil case filed by ADAZA.
(In Adaza’s latest Comment, he maintained that his claim before the trial
court was merely a suit for damages based on tort and NOT a suit for
malicious prosecution.)
ISSUES
1. WON complaint was a suit for damages for malicious prosecution
2. WON petitioners are liable for malicious prosecution
HELD
1. YES
Definition of Malicious Prosecution:
- In American jurisdiction, it has been defined as“One begun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be
sustained. Instituted with intention of injuring defendant and without probable
cause, and which terminates in favor of the person prosecuted. For this
injury an action on the case lies, called the action of malicious prosecution.”
- In Philippine jurisdiction, it has been defined as“An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution,
civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without
probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other
proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the
putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or
injury.”
Reasoning
- Nowhere in his complaint filed with the trial court did respondent Adaza
allege that his action is one based on tort. (Sec 3e of RA 3019) An
examination of the records would show that this latest posture as to the
nature of his cause of action is only being raised for the first time on appeal.
Such a change of theory cannot be allowed.
2. NO
Ratio In order for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must
prove these elements:
(a) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was
himself the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal;
(b) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause;
and
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(c) That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by
improper or sinister motive.
- The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution
are found in the provisions of the NCC [Art 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35,
2217 and 2219 (8)].
Reasoning
- Judging from the face of the complaint itself filed by Adaza, NONE of these
requisites have been alleged, thus rendering the complaint dismissible on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action.
(a) Insofar as Adaza’s Criminal Case is concerned, what appears clear from
the records only is that respondent has been discharged on a writ of habeas
corpus and granted bail. This is not considered the termination of the action
contemplated under Philippine jurisdiction to warrant the institution of a
malicious prosecution suit against those responsible for the filing of the
information against him.
(b) It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a
prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. The petitioners were
of the honest conviction that there was probable cause to hold Adaza for trial.
(c) Suffice it to state that the presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal
consequence, the absence of malice.
Disposition Petition is GRANTED. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to take
no further action on civil case except to DISMISS it.
GLOBE MACKAY V CA
CORTES; August 25, 1989
NATURE
Certiorari
FACTS
- Globe Mackay found out an anomaly that has been causing them to lose
money, to which Tobias was the number one suspect though he claimed he
was the one who reported it.
- The results of the investigations said that the handwritings, signatures, and
initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the
fraudulent transactions were not those of -Tobias. The lie detector tests
conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.
- Despite being cleared, complaints for estafa were filed against Tobias. All of
the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal and MRs of Globe
were denied too.
- Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal upon receiving the notice of his
termination.
- LA: dismissed the complaint; NLRC- reversed; the Secretary of Labor:
reinstated the LA's decision which Tobias appealed to the Office of the
President.
- During the pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and private
respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the
latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.
- Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone
Company (RETELCO).
- However, Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to
the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to
dishonesty.
- This led Tobias to file a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful,
malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners.
- RTC: rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by ordering petitioners to pay
him P80,000.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs.
- Both parties appealed. CA: affirmed the RTC decision in toto, denied
Globe’s MR.
ISSUE
WON there was malicious prosecution
HELD
YES
- Petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. There was
malicious intent manifested through the filing of the criminal cases as the
case for illegal dismissal was pending; Hendry’s threat of more suits against
Tobias; The filing of the cases despite the police reports exculpating Tobias;
and the eventual dismissal of the cases. SC anchored its findings on TC’s
finding (re bad faith of Globe Mackay in filing the criminal complaints against
Tobias).
Reasoning
- Although Globe claims that they must not be penalized for exercising their
right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints against
an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries
and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of
substantial sums of money, “the right to institute criminal prosecutions can
not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith” [Ventura v. Bernabe, 38 SCRA
5871.]
- Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co.,[ 2 SCRA 337]: the Court held that the right to
file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged
debtor to pay an indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the
function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice.
- Hawpia CA,[20 SCRA 536]: the Court upheld the judgment against the
petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees after making a
finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints
against respondent, all of which were dismissed.
*Findings of bad faith (as per the TC):
> After the dismissal of the 4 cases and denial of the MR by the Ministry of
Justice, 2 cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office of
the AFP to railroad Tobias’ arrest and detention in the military stockade,
but this was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring criminal cases
involving civilians to the civil courts.
> Despite the clearing Tobias of participation or involvement in the
fraudulent transactions complained of, despite the negative results of the
lie detector tests which Globe Mackay compelled him to undergo, and
although the police investigation was "still under follow-up and a
supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been
gathered," Globe Mackay hastily filed 6 criminal cases with the city Fiscal's
Office of Manila, 5 for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and
1 for violation of A290 of the RPC (all of which were dismissed), with one
of the investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one case
that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this case was investigated is evident.
Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case against
torts & damages
respondent Tobias," there can be no mistaking that defendants would not
but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and
cause damage to plaintiff.
Ratio To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that
it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were
false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, 100 SCRA 602].
Concededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person liable for
malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, 122 SCRA 576]. The mere
dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award
of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to
show that the complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, 1 SCRA 60].
Disposition CA’s decision AFFIRMED.
ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO)
BIDIN; January 11, 1993
NATURE
Appeal from CA judgment modifying RTC’s decision as regards amount to be
paid
FACTS
- Albenson Enterprises delivered mild steel plates to 3267 V. Mapa Street,
Sta. Mesa, Manila. The delivery was received by Guaranteed Industries, of
which Eugeneio Baltao was president; a check in the amount of P2,575 was
given as payment. Said check was signed by a Eugenio Baltao, drawn
against the account of E.L. Woodworks.
- The check bounced. Albenson extrajudicially demanded payment from
Baltao. Baltao denied that it was his signature on the check. Albenson filed
case for violation of BP22. Investigating fiscal found probable cause and filed
info with the RTC. Baltao appealed to the Provincial Prosecutor. The
provincial prosecutor found out that something was amiss during the
investigation and upon reinvestigation, found no probable cause. He told the
trial fiscal to move for dismissal.
- After the criminal case was dismissed, Baltao filed a complaint for damages
against Albenson because the latter had unjustly filed a criminal case against
him.
- IT TURNS OUT that E.L. Woodworks’ business address was the same as
Guaranteed Industries. ELW was owned by Baltao’s son, who is his
namesake.
- RTC granted actual (P133k), moral (P1M) and exemplary damages
(P200k), and atty’s fees (P100k). CA modified by awarding only half of
original moral damages and atty’s fees.
ISSUE
WON Baltao is entitled to damages
HELD
NO
- An award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action
was filed in good faith. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal
rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
- ABUSE OF RIGHTS
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in
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the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and
to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the
primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become
the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the requirements of each
provision is different, these three articles are all related to each other.
"With this article (Article 21), combined with articles 19 and 20, the scope
of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened; it has become
much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It
is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which
could not be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino, 1
Civil Code of the Philippines 72).
- There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question
of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting
in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law,
depends on the circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay Cable and
Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 [1989]).
- The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following:
(1) There is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
- ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES
Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following
elements:
1) There is an act which is legal;
2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy;
3) and it is done with intent to injure.
- Thus, under any of these three provisions of law, an act which causes injury
to another may be made the basis for an award of damages.
- There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act
must be intentional. However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be
done either "willfully", or "negligently". The trial court as well as the
respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped these three articles together,
and cited the same as the bases for the award of damages.
- Albenson did not abuse its rights. The second and third elements are not
present. All they wanted was to collect what is owed them. They believed
Baltao was really the one who issued the check because it was his company
who ordered and received the delivery. They wrote to him. He replied by
denying and telling them to check the veracity of their claim. He didn’t tell
them that his son was his namesake and that the latter operated a business
in the same building. Albenson acted in good faith and had probable cause in
filing their complaint against Baltao.
- There was no malicious prosecution. To constitute malicious prosecution,
there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to
vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the
defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. The presence
of probable cause means the absence of malice.
Disposition Petition granted. CA reversed and set aside.
MANILA GAS CORPORATION V CA (ONGSIP)
prof. casis
MAKASIAR; October 30, 1980
NATURE
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA (treated as a special
civil action)
FACTS
- On May 20, 1964, respondent Ongsip applied for gas service connection
with petitioner Manila Gas Corporation.
- A burner gas was installed by petitioner's employees in respondent's kitchen
at his residence.
- On July 27, 1965, respondent Ongsip requested petitioner to install
additional appliances as well as additional gas service connections in his 46door Reyno Apartment: petitioner installed two 20-gallon capacity water
storage heaters and two heavy-duty gas burners and replaced the original
gas meter with a bigger 50-light capacity gas meter.
- The installations and connections were all done solely by petitioner's
employees.
- There was no significant change in the meter reading despite additional
installations, and on May and June 1966, no gas consumption was registered
in the meter, prompting petitioner to issue a 'meter order' with instructions to
change the gas meter in respondent's residence.
- On August 17, 1966, petitioner's employees went to Ongsip's place.
- Without notifying or informing respondent Ongsip, they changed the gas
meter and installed new tube connections. Private respondent was then
taking a nap, but he was informed afterwards of what had taken place by his
houseboy.
- On that same afternoon, petitioner's employees returned with a
photographer who took pictures of the premises. Ongsip inquired from
Coronel why they were taking pictures but the latter simply gave him a calling
card with instructions to go to his office. There, he was informed about the
existence of a by-pass valve or "jumper" in the gas connection and that
unless he gave P3,000.00, he would be deported.
- Respondent Ongsip refused to give the money
- By the end of August, a reading was made on the new meter and
expectedly, it registered a sudden increase in gas consumption.
-Thereafter, in October, 1966, a complaint for qualified theft was filed by
petitioner against respondent Ongsip
- On February, 1967, pending investigation of the criminal complaint,
petitioner disconnected respondent's gas service for alleged failure
and/or refusal to pay his gas consumptions from July, 1965 to January,
1967.
- Subsequently, the complaint was dismissed
- On July 14, 1967, following the dismissal by the investigating fiscal of
the complaint for qualified theft and the disconnection by petitioner of
his gas service, respondent Ongsip filed a complaint for moral and
exemplary damages against petitioner Manila Gas Corporation based
on two causes of action, firstly: the malicious, oppressive and
malevolent filing of the criminal complaint; and, secondly: the illegal
closure of respondent Ongsip's gas service connection without court
order and without notice of warning.
- Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied
- On May 2, 1972, the trial court rendered its decision ordering defendant to
pay plaintiff:(1) P50,000.00 as moral damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF
ACTION; (2) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF
ACTION; (3) P30,000.00 as moral damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF
torts & damages
ACTION; (4) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION; (5) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (6) the costs of the suit.
- Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
- CA affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto, hence, this petition
ISSUE
WON the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded by the trial court
and affirmed by the Court of appeals is excessive
HELD
YES
- Article 2217 of the Civil Code states that "moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission." On
the other hand, Article 2229 provides that "exemplary or corrective damages
are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition,
to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."
- The first cause of action, for which respondent Ongsip was awarded moral
and exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and P10,000.00,
respectively, is predicated on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which states that
"moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: .. .
(8) malicious prosecution; .. .
- To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person
that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges
were false and groundless.
- Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for
prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.
- In the instant case, however, there is reason to believe that there was
malicious intent in the filing of the complaint for qualified theft.
- As correctly observed by the trial court in its decision—A significant fact
brought about by the testimony of Coronel himself is the total absence of
immediate accusation against Plaintiff right at the very moment when the bypass valve was allegedly discovered. Right then and there Coronel should
have told Plaintiff that he was using a by-pass valve and in effect stealing gas
from Defendant. The circumstance was familiar to that of catching a thief in
flagrante delicto. But the truth is that when Coronel and his men entered
Plaintiff's compound and made changes therein, Plaintiff was sleeping. When
Plaintiff woke up at four o'clock in the afternoon, Coronel and his men had
already made the changes and had already gone. They returned however at
five o'clock, this time with a photographer. This was the time when Plaintiff
met Coronel. Here was then the opportunity for Coronel to confront Plaintiff
with the allegedly discovered 'by-pass valve' and bluntly, even brutally, tell
him that there was thievery of gas. This, Coronel did not do. .. .. ."
- It bears noting that when he was informed as to the existence of a 'jumper'
in his gas connection, respondent Ongsip did not show any sign of fear or
remorse and did not yield to the threatening demand of Coronel—this is the
attitude of someone who knows how to take a firm stand where his principles
and rights are concerned. To prove his innocence, he was even willing to
have his place excavated but petitioner would not dare take the
consequences. Besides, Delfin Custodio, petitioner's own mechanical
engineer, testified that the second gas meter was replaced as being defective
because "some of its parts were worn out and that it was not properly
registering."
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- Evidently, petitioner Manila Gas Corporation, in failing to recover its lost
revenue caused by the gas meter's incorrect recording, sought to vindicate its
financial loss by filing the complaint for qualified theft against respondent
Ongsip knowing it to be false. It was actually intended to vex and humiliate
private respondent and to blacken his reputation not only as a businessman
but also as a person. Qualified theft is a serious offense indicating moral
depravity in an individual. To be accused of such crime without basis is
shocking and libelous. It stigmatized private respondent causing him
emotional depression and social degradation. The fact that the complaint for
qualified theft was dismissed by the Pasay City fiscal is no consolation. The
damage had been done. Necessarily, indemnification had to be made.
- The Court gives due consideration to respondent Ongsip's social and
financial status as a businessman and the mental anguish he suffered as a
result of the false imputation. However, petitioner's financial capability must
also be considered. Petitioner is a public utility corporation whose primary
concern is service to the people, the profit motive being merely secondary.
Under the circumstances, the award of moral and exemplary damages should
be reduced to P25,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively.
- Petitioner's act in disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without
prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an independent tort.
The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause additional
mental and moral suffering to private respondent. This is a clear violation of
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
- The award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides
that "willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith"
- Respondent Ongsip's default in payment cannot be utilized by petitioner to
defeat or nullify the claim for damages. At most, this circumstance can be
considered as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of damages to
which respondent Ongsip is entitled. In consequence thereof, We reduce the
amount of moral damages to P15,000.00 The award of P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages, on the other hand, is sustained, being similarly
warranted by Article 2234 of the Civil Code as complemented by Article 2220.
Disposition Decision of CA modified as regards the amount of damages.
PATRICIO V LEVISTE
PADILLA; April 26, 1989
FACTS
- Rafael Patricio, an ordained Catholic priest, and actively engaged in social
and civic affairs in Pilar, Capiz, where he is residing, was appointed Director
General of the 1976 Religious and Municipal Town Fiesta of Pilar, Capiz.
While a benefit dance was on-going in connection with the celebration of the
town fiesta, petitioner together with two (2) policemen were posted near the
gate of the public auditorium to check on the assigned watchers of the gate.
Private respondent Bienvenido Bacalocos, President of the Association of
Barangay Captains of Pilar, Capiz and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan,
who was in a state of drunkenness and standing near the same gate together
with his companions, struck a bottle of beer on the table causing an injury on
his hand which started to bleed. Then, he approached petitioner in a hostile
manner and asked the latter if he had seen his wounded hand, and before
petitioner could respond, private respondent, without provocation, hit
petitioner's face with his bloodied hand. As a consequence, a commotion
prof. casis
ensued and private respondent was brought by the policemen to the
municipal building. As a result, Patricio filed a complaint for Slander by Deed.
the court ruled in favor of herein petitioner (as complainant), holding private
respondent liable to the former for moral damages as a result of the physical
suffering, moral shock and social humiliation caused by private respondent's
act of hitting petitioner on the face in public.
ISSUE
WON Patricio is entitled to damages for the humiliation he experienced
during the town fiesta
HELD
YES
- As to moral damages, An award of moral damages is allowed in cases
specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, to
wit:
"ART. 2219.
Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases:
(1)
A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2)
Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3)
Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts.
(4)
Adultery or concubinage;
(5)
Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6)
Illegal search;
(7)
Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8)
Malicious prosecution;
(9)
Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10)
Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 32,
34, and 35.
- Private respondent's contention that there was no bad faith on his part in
slapping petitioner on the face and that the incident was merely accidental is
not tenable. It was established before the court a quo that there was an
existing feud between the families of both petitioner and private respondent
and that private respondent slapped the petitioner without provocation in the
presence of several persons.
- The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on the face is contrary to
morals and good customs and caused the petitioner mental anguish, moral
shock, wounded feelings and social humiliation. Pursuant to Art. 21 of the
Civil Code in relation to par. (10) of Art. 2219 of the same Code, "any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."
- In addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or corrective
damages may be imposed upon herein private respondent by way of
example or correction for the public good. The amount of exemplary
damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled to
either moral, temperate or compensatory damages
Disposition Decision in favor of Patricio.
GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET INC V ESPINO
GUERRERO; December 28, 1979
NATURE
Certiorari from CA’s decision to grant P75k, P25k and P5k to Espino for
moral damages, exemplary damages and atty’s fees.
torts & damages
FACTS
- Espino is a graduate Mechanical Engineer from U.P. Class 1950, employed
as an executive of Proctor & Gamble Phils., Inc., a corporate manager
incharge of motoring and warehousing therein; honorably discharged from
the Philippine Army in 1946; a Philippine government pensionado of the
United States for six months; member of the Philippine Veterans Legion;
author of articles published in the Manila Sunday Times and Philippines Free
Press; member of the Knights of Columbus, Council No. 3713; son of the late
Jose Maria Espino, retired Minister, Department of Foreign Affairs at the
Philippine Embassy, Washington.
- One morning in 1970, he and his wife and their two daughters went to shop
at South Supermarket (owned by Grand Union) in Makati. While his wife was
shopping for groceries, he went around the store and found a cylindrical “rattail” file that he had wanted to buy for his hobby. Because it was small, he
didn’t put it in the grocery cart because it might fall and get lost. He instead
held it in his hand. While still shopping, he and his wife ran into his aunt’s
maid. While they were talking he stuck the file in his breast pocket, with a
good part of the merchandise exposed.
- He paid for the items in his wife’s cart; but he forgot about the file in his
pocket. On their way out, the guard stopped him and told him he hadn’t paid
for the file. He apologized and said he had forgotten. He started towards the
cashier to pay; but the guard stopped him and said they were to go to the
back of the supermarket. There, a report was made, where Espino said that
he just forgot that he placed it in his pocket while talking to the maid and his
wife. He was then brought to the front of the grocery, near the cashiers to a
Mrs. Fandino. It was around 9am and the many people were at the store.
- Fandino read the report and remarked: “Ano,nakaw na naman ito.” Espino
said he was going to pay for it. Fandino replied: “That is all they say, the
people whom we cause not paying for the goods say . . . They all intended to
pay for the things that are found to them.” Espino objected, saying he was a
regular customer of the supermarket. Espino took out a P5 bill to pay for the
P3.85 file. Fandino reached over and took the P5 bill and said it was a fine.
Espino and wife objected and said that he was not a common criminal.
Fandino said it was a reward for guards who apprehend pilferers. People
started milling around and stared at Espino. He was directed to get in line at
the cashier to pay for the file. All the time the people were staring at him. He
was totally embarrassed.
- After paying he and his wife walked out quickly. He thought about going
back that night to throw stones at the supermarket; but decided to file a case.
The CFI dismissed. CA awarded him damages.
ISSUE
WON Espino is entitled to damages for the humiliation he experienced at the
supermarket
HELD
YES
- The false accusation charged against the private respondent after detaining
and interrogating him by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner in
which he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon him a fine,
threatening to call the police and in the presence and hearing of many people
at the Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and
embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the petitioners liable for damages under
Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Petitioners
wilfully caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner that was
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prof. casis
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contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. It is against morals, good
customs and public policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity of
a person. Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace
of mind of his neighbors and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code). And one
must act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith (Article 19, Civil Code).
- While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal,
temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated, the
assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion
of the court, according to the circumstances of each case (Art. 2216, New
Civil Code). The whole incident that befell respondent had arisen in such a
manner that was created unwittingly by his own act of forgetting to pay for the
file. It was his forgetfulness in checking out the item and paying for it that
started the chain of events which led to his embarrassment and humiliation,
thereby causing him mental anguish, wounded feelings and serious anxiety.
Yet, private respondent's act of omission contributed to the occurrence of his
injury or loss and such contributory negligence is a factor which may reduce
the damages that private respondent may recover (Art. 2214, New Civil
Code). Moreover, that many people were present and they saw and heard
the ensuing interrogation and altercation appears to be simply a matter of
coincidence in a supermarket which is a public place and the crowd of
onlookers, hearers or bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by
management to witness private respondent's predicament. The Court does
not believe that private respondent was intentionally paraded in order to
humiliate or embarrass him because petitioner's business depended for its
success and patronage the good will of the buying public which can only be
preserved and promoted by good public relations.
Disposition Petition denied. CA modified: moral damages = P5k; atty’s fees
= P2k. no exemplary damages.
CARPIO V VALMONTE
438 SCRA 38
TINGA; September 9, 2004
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- Respondent Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Del Rosario and Sierra
engaged her services for their church wedding on 10 October 1996. At about
4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the bride and
her family were billeted. When she arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons
were already there including the bride, the bride's parents and relatives, the
make-up artist and his assistant, the official photographers, and the fashion
designer. Among those present was petitioner Carpio, an aunt of the bride
who was preparing to dress up for the occasion.
- After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the
items needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors.
She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be
held. She paid the suppliers, gave the meal allowance to the band, and went
back to the suite. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed the people
staring at her. It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the
following words to Valmonte: “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang
dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw
ang kumuha.” Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmonte's
bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties,
petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the
comfort room in a paper bag were lost. The hotel security was called in to
help in the search. The bags and personal belongings of all the people inside
the room were searched. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched,
interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the evening. Later,
police officers arrived and interviewed all persons who had access to the
suite and fingerprinted them including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte
was being interrogated by the police officers, petitioner kept on saying the
words “Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto.” Valmonte's car which was parked
at the hotel premises was also searched but the search yielded nothing.
- A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte
demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the
newlyweds' relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a
result of petitioner's imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to the
letter. Thus, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against her before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 268. In her complaint,
Valmonte prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay actual, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
- Responding to the complaint, petitioner denied having uttered words or
done any act to confront or single out Valmonte during the investigation and
claimed that everything that transpired after the theft incident was purely a
police matter in which she had no participation. Petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint and for the court to adjudge Valmonte liable on her
counterclaim.
- The trial court rendered its Decision dismissing Valmonte's complaint for
damages. It ruled that when petitioner sought investigation for the loss of her
jewelry, she was merely exercising her right and if damage results from a
person exercising his legal right, it is damnum absque injuria. It added that no
proof was presented by Valmonte to show that petitioner acted maliciously
and in bad faith in pointing to her as the culprit. The court said that Valmonte
failed to show that she suffered serious anxiety, moral shock, social
humiliation, or that her reputation was besmirched due to petitioner's wrongful
act.
- Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court
erred in finding that petitioner did not slander her good name and reputation
and in disregarding the evidence she presented. The Court of Appeals ruled
differently. It opined that Valmonte has clearly established that she was
singled out by petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry.
The appellate court held that Valmonte's claim for damages is not predicated
on the fact that she was subjected to body search and interrogation by the
police but rather petitioner's act of publicly accusing her of taking the missing
jewelry. It categorized petitioner's utterance defamatory considering that it
imputed upon Valmonte the crime of theft. The court concluded that
petitioner's verbal assault upon Valmonte was done with malice and in bad
faith since it was made in the presence of many people without any solid
proof except petitioner's suspicion. Such unfounded accusation entitles
Valmonte to an award of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 for
she was publicly humiliated, deeply insulted, and embarrassed. However, the
court found no sufficient evidence to justify the award of actual damages.
- Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the appellate court's conclusion
that she publicly humiliated respondent does not conform to the evidence
presented. She adds that even on the assumption that she uttered the words
complained of, it was not shown that she did so with malice and in bad faith.
ISSUE
torts & damages
WON petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner that is
contrary to morals and good customs
HELD
YES
- Petitioner's verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for
considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind
and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no
right to attack respondent with her innuendos which were not merely
inquisitive but outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the
only person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the
presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately
bodily searched, petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. True,
petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to
malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually
stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle of law is
impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a
manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. Her firmness and
resolve to find her missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward respondent.
She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other
purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner
transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she
should be held accountable. A person should be protected only when he acts
in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and
good faith; but not when he acts with negligence and abuse.
- Respondent is clearly entitled to an award of moral damages. Moral
damages may be awarded whenever the defendant's wrongful act or
omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury in the cases specified or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Though no
proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be
adjudicated, courts are mandated to take into account all the circumstances
obtaining in the case and assess damages according to their discretion.
Worthy of note is that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the
defendant, or to enrich a complainant, but to enable the latter to obtain
means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone, by reason of defendant's culpable action. In any
case, award of moral damages must be proportionate to the sufferings
inflicted. Considering respondent's social standing, and the fact that her
profession is based primarily on trust reposed in her by her clients, the
seriousness of the imputations made by petitioner has greatly tarnished her
reputation and will in one way or the other, affect her future dealings with her
clients, the award of P100,000.00 as moral damages appears to be a fair and
reasonable assessment of respondent's damages.
Disposition Petition denied
QUISABA V STA. INES
CASTRO; August 30, 1974
NATURE
Special civil action for certiorari
FACTS
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- Quisaba avers in his complaint that for 18 yrs prior to his dismissal, he was
in the employ of the defendant corporation.
- That Robert Hyde instructed him to purchase logs for the company's plant to
which he refused on the ground that the work of purchasing logs is
inconsistent with his position as internal auditor
- That on the following day Hyde informed him of his temporary relief as
internal auditor so that he could carry out immediately the instructions thus
given, and he was warned that his failure to comply would be considered a
ground for his dismissal
- He pleaded for fairness but was instead demoted from a position of dignity
to a servile and menial job; that the defendants did not reconsider their
"clever and subterfugial dismissal" of him which for all purposes constituted a
"constructive discharge;" and that because of the said acts of the defendants,
he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock and social humiliate on. The complaint does not pray
for reinstatement or payment of backwages.
- Sta Ines et al moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the Davao CFI, asserting that the proper forum is the NLRC
established by Presidential Decree No. 21.
- Quisaba opposed the motion;the NLRC's authorized representative in
Davao City opined that the NLRC no power to award damages
- CFI granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint basically
involves an employee-employer relationship.
ISSUE
WON a complaint for moral damages, exemplary damages, termination pay
and attorney's fees, arising from an employer's constructive dismissal of an
employee, is exclusively cognizable by the regular courts of justice or by the
NLRC
HELD
NO
- The case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil (not a labor) dispute. It
has to do with an alleged violation of Quisaba's rights as a member of society,
and does not involve an existing EE-ER relation within the meaning of section
2(1) of LC. The complaint is thus properly and exclusively cognizable by the
regular courts of justice, not by the National Labor Relations Commission.
Reasoning
-The jurisdiction of the NLRC is defined by section 2 of PD No. 21(AKA LC)
which reads:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the following.
(1) All matters involving employee employer relations including all disputes
and grievances which may otherwise lead to strikes and lockouts under
Republic Act No. 875;
(2) All strikes overtaken by Proclamation No. 1081; and
(3) All pending cases in the Bureau of Labor Relations.
- Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute "matters
involving employee-employer relations" as Quisaba's dismissal was the
severance of a pre-existing employee-employer relation, his complaint is
grounded not on his dismissal per se as in fact he does not ask for
reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismissal and the
consequent effects of such dismissal.
prof. casis
- Civil law consists of that "mass of precepts that determine or regulate the
relations ... that exist between members of a society for the protection of
private interests. 3
- The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused
with the manner in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing
therefrom.
- If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively, as the complaint
alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 of the Civil Code which
prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and
article 21, which makes a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy, the sanction for which, by way of moral damages, is provided in
article 2219, no. 10.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cages:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, ....
Disposition CASE REMANDED to the CFI for further proceedings in
accordance with law.
MEDINA V CASTRO-BARTOLOME
ABAD SANTOS; September 11, 1982
FACTS
- This is a civil case filed by Medina and Ong against Cosme de Aboitiz and
Pepsi-cola Bottling. Medina was the former Plant General Manager and Ong
was the former Plant Comptroller. De Aboitiz is President and CEO of Pepsicola Bottling.
- Without provocation, De Aboitiz shouted at plaintiffs in the presence of the
plaintiffs’ subordinates, “GOD DAMN IT. YOU FUCKED ME UP. YOU SHUT
UP! FUCK YOU! YOU ARE BOTH SHIT TO ME! YOU ARE FIRED!
(Medina) YOU TOO ARE FIRED! (Ong)”
- Plaintiffs filed joint criminal complaint for oral defamation. But after
preliminary investigation, complaint was dismissed allegedly because the
expression was not intended to slander but to express anger. Deputy
Minister of Justice issued resolution sustaining complaint, reversing the
resolution of the Provincial Fiscal.
- It was alleged that the defendants dismissed the plaintiffs because of an
alleged delay in the use of promotional crowns when such delay was true
with respect to the other plants.
- The dismissal was effected on the very day that plaintiffs were awarded
rings of loyalty to the Company, five days before Christmas and on the day
when the employees' Christmas party was held in the Muntinlupa Plant, when
plaintiffs went home that day and found their wives and children already
dressed up for the party, they didn't know what to do and so they cried.
- Motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was
filed by the defendants. The trial court denied the motion because civil
damage complaint is not based on employer-employee relationship but on
torts & damages
manner of dismissal. PD 1367 provides that Regional Directors shall not
indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms
of damages, now under courts’ jurisdiction.
- Defendants filed second motion to dismiss because of amendments to the
Labor Code and PD No 1691. They said the case arose from such employeremployee relationship, which under PD No 1691, is under exclusive original
jurisdiction of labor arbiter. The ruling with respect to defendants' first motion
to dismiss, therefore, no longer holds.
- Motion to reconsider was filed but was denied.
ISSUE
WON Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs
HELD
NO
- Plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple
action for damages for tortuous acts allegedly committed by defendants.
Governing statute is Civil Code and not Labor Code.
SEPARATE OPINION
AQUINO [dissent]
- In my opinion the dismissal of the civil action for damages is correct
because the claims of Medina and Ong were within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
- Medina and Ong should not split their cause of action against Aboitiz and
Pepsi-Cola.
OTHER TORTS
AMARO V SUMANGUIT
G.R. No. L-14986
MAKALINTAL; July 31, 1962
NATURE
Appeal from decision of CFI
FACTS
- October 5, 1958: Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot at near the city
government building of Silay
- The following day he, together with his father and his witnesses, "went to
the office of the defendant but instead of obtaining assistance to their
complaint they were harassed and terrorized"
-In view thereof, they "gave up and renounced their right and interest in the
prosecution of the crime "
- Upon advice of the City Mayor an investigation was conducted and as a
result the city attorney of Silay was about to file or had already filed an
information for illegal discharge of firearm against the assailant
- Having finished the investigation of the crime complained of, the defendant
chief of police is now harassing the plaintiffs in their daily work, ordering them
thru his police to appear in his office when he is absent, and he is about to
order the arrest of the plaintiffs to take their signatures in prepared affidavits
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- 104 -
exempting the police from any dereliction of duty in their case against the
perpetrator of the crime."
- Appellants filed suit for damages in the CFI of Negros Occidental against
the chief of police of the City of Silay. Although not specifically alleged in the
complaint, it is admitted by both parties, as shown in their respective briefs,
that the action is predicated on Articles 21 and/or 27 of the Civil Code.The
complaint was dismissed upon appellee's motion in the court below on the
ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
ISSUE
WON the case should have been dismissed
HELD
NO
Ratio An action should not be dismissed upon mere ambiguity, indefiniteness
or uncertainty, for these are not grounds for a motion to dismiss, under Rule
8, but rather for a bill of particulars according to Rule 16.
Reasoning
- The facts set out constitute an actionable dereliction on appellee's part in
the light of Article 27 of the Civil Code, which states that
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public
servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his
official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against he
latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may
be taken.
- That appellants were "harrased and terrorized" may be a conclusion of law
and hence improperly pleaded. Their claim for relief, however, is not based
on the fact of harassment and terrorization but on appellee's refusal to give
them assistance, which it was his duty to do as an officer of the law. The
requirement under the aforesaid provision that such refusal must be "without
just cause" is implicit in the context of the allegation. The statement of
appellee's dereliction is repeated in a subsequent paragraph of the complaint,
where it is alleged that "he is about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs" to
make them sign affidavits of exculpation in favor of the policemen.
- All that the Rules require is that there be a showing by a statement of
ultimate facts, that the plaintiff has a right and that such right has been
violated by the defendant.
- Moran: The real test of good pleading under the new rules is whether the
information given is sufficient to enable the party to plead and prepare for
trial. A legal conclusion may serve the purpose of pleading as well as
anything else if it gives the proper information. If the party wants more he
may ask for more details in regard to the particular matter that is stated too
generally
Disposition THE ORDER APPEALED from is set aside and the case is
remanded to the Court of origin for further proceedings. Costs against
appellee.
ST. LOUIS REALTY V ARAMIL
AQUINO; November 14, 1984
FACTS
- St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S.
Arcadio (but without permission of Doctor Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday
Times of December 15, 1968 an advertisement with the heading "WHERE
THE HEART IS". Below that heading was the photograph of the residence of
prof. casis
Doctor Aramil and the Arcadio family and then below the photograph was the
following write-up:
"Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR. AND MRS. ARCADIO
S. ARCADIO and their family have been captured by BROOKSIDE HELLS
[note: that’s not MY typo ha]. They used to rent a small 2-bedroom house
in a cramped neighborhood, sadly inadequate and unwholesome for the
needs of a large family. They dream(ed) of a more pleasant place free
from the din and dust of city life yet near all facilities. Plans took shape
when they heard of BROOKSIDE HELLS [again, not MY typo]. With thrift
and determination, they bought a lot and built their dream house . . . for
P31,000. The Arcadios are now part of the friendly, thriving community of
BROOKSIDE HILLS [whew, there you are, no typo at last]... a beautiful
first-class subdivision planned for wholesome family living."
- The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated January 5,
1969. Doctor Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of the
U.E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, noticed the mistake. On that
same date, he wrote St. Louis Realty a letter of protest.
- The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in
charge of advertising. He stopped publication of the advertisement. He
contacted Doctor Aramil and offered his apologies. However, no rectification
or apology was published.
- On February 20, 1969, Aramil's counsel demanded from St. Louis Realty
actual, moral and exemplary damages of P110,000. St. Louis Realty claimed
that there was an honest mistake and that if Aramil so desired, rectification
would be published in the Manila Times. It published in the issue of the
Manila Times of March 18, 1969 a new advertisement with the Arcadio family
and their real house. But it did not publish any apology to Doctor Aramil and
an explanation of the error.
- On March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages. St. Louis Realty
published in the issue of the Manila Times of April 15,1969 the following
"NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION" in a space 4 by 3 inches:
"This will serve as a notice that our print ad 'Where the Heart is' which
appeared in the Manila Times issue of March 18, 1969 is a rectification of
the same ad that appeared in the Manila Times issues of December 15,
1968 and January 5, 1969 wherein a photo of the house of another
Brookside Homeowner (Dr. Aramil-private respondent) was mistakenly
used as a background for the featured homeowners the Arcadio family.
The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the Arcadio family with their real house
in the background, as was intended all along."
- Judge Jose Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty should have
immediately published a rectification and apology. He found that as a result of
St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor
Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was reduced by about P1,000
to P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy
(Art. 26, Civil Code). The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual
damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as allomey's fees. St.
Louis Realty appealed. The CA affirmed. The CA reasoned that St. Louis
Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under Articles 21 and 26 of the
Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house
which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was
annoyed by that.
ISSUE
WON the CA erred by ignoring certain facts and resorting to surmises and
conjectures hence its decision is contrary to law and the rulings of the SC
torts & damages
HELD
1. NO.
Reasoning
- St. Louis Realty argues that the case is not covered by Article 26 which
provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons". "Prying into the privacy of
another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another" and "similar acts, " "though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief."
- The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208
and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and
actions mentioned in Article 26. [NOTE: see Art 2219 for the list of cases
where moral damages may be granted.] The acts and omissions of the firm
fall under Article 26.
- St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil
and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday
Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation
of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification." Persons,
who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted,
lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that
Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly
and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental
anguish.
Disposition Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.
CONCEPCION V CA
DAMAGES
PEOPLE V BALLESTEROS
285 SCRA 438
ROMERO; January 29, 1998
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as
charged under Article 248 of the RPC.
FACTS
- The information alleged that the accused with the use of firearms caused
the death of Eduardo Tolentino Sr. and Jerry Agliam and inflicted gunshot
wounds to Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel
Tolentino.
- The Supreme Court upheld the RTC’s decision as to the guilt of the three
accused, FELIPE BALLESTEROS, CESAR GALO and ALVIN BULUSAN.
This digest will focus on the RTC’s award of damages which is relevant to our
recitation.
- As to damages, the RTC further sentenced them to pay jointly and solidarily:
A2010
- 105 -
1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of
P50,000, moral damages in the amount of P20,000, and actual damages in
the amount of P35,755, with interest;
2. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr., compensatory damages in
the amount of P50,000, moral damages in the amount of P20,000, and actual
damages in the total amount of P61,785, with interest;
3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of P2,003.40, and moral
damages in the amount of P10,000, with interest;
4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, moral damages in
the amount of P5,000 each, with interest.
5. The costs.
ISSUE
WON the trial court erred in the award of damages to the victims’ heirs
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation,
recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise
expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the
breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Actual or compensatory
damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or
injury sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked when the
complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical
suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these
were the proximate result of the offender's wrongful act or omission.
Reasoning
- In granting actual or compensatory damages, the party making a claim for
such must present the best evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and
the like, as corroborated by his testimony. Here, the claim for actual damages
by the heirs of the victims is not controverted, the same having been fully
substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the court.
Therefore, the award of actual damages is proper.
- However, the order granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry
Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be amended. Consistent with the
policy of this Court, the amount of P50,000 is given to the heirs of the victims
by way of indemnity, and not as compensatory damages.
- As regards moral damages, the amount of psychological pain, damage and
injury caused to the heirs of the victims, although inestimable, may be
determined by the trial court in its discretion. Hence, we see no reason to
disturb its findings as to this matter.
Disposition Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. No pronouncement as to cost.
CUSTODIO V CA
ALGARRA V SANDEJAS
27 Phil 284
TRENT; March 24, 1914
NATURE
Civil action for personal injuries received from a collision with the defendant’s
automobile due to the negligence of the defendant, who was driving the car.
prof. casis
The negligence is not questioned and this case involves only the amount of
damages which should be allowed.
FACTS
- The accident occurred on July 9, 1912.
- Because of injuries, plaintiff spent 10 days in the hospital. The first 4-5
days he couldn’t leave his bed. After being discharged, he received medical
attention from a private practitioner for several days.
- Plaintiff testified that he had down no work since the accident, that his
earning capacity was P50/month
- He described himself as being well at the end of July; the trial took place
September 19
- Plaintiff sold distillery products and had about 20 regular customers who
purchased in small quantities, necessitating regular, frequent deliveries
- It took him about 4 years to build up the business he had at the time of the
accident, and since the accident, he only kept 4 of his regular customers.
- The lower court refused to allow him any compensation for injury to his
business due to his enforced absence therefrom.
ISSUE
How to determine the amount of damages to award plaintiff
HELD
Reasoning
- Actions for damages such as the case at bar are based upon article 1902 of
the Civil Code: "A person who, by act or omission, causes damage to another
where there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so
done." Of this article, the supreme court of Spain, in considering the
indemnity imposed by it, said: "It is undisputed that said reparation, to be
efficacious and substantial, must rationally include the generic idea of
complete indemnity, such as is defined and explained in article 1106 of the
said (Civil) Code."
- Art 1106. Indemnity for losses and damages includes not only the amount of
the loss which may have been suffered, but also that of the profit which the
creditor may have failed to realize, reserving the provisions contained in the
following articles.
- Art 1107. The losses and damages for which a debtor in good faith is liable,
are those foreseen or which may have been foreseen, at the time of
constituting the obligation, and which may be a necessary consequence of its
nonfulfillment.
- The rules for the measure of damages, once that liability is determined: The
Civil Code requires that the defendant repair the damage caused by his fault
or negligence. No distinction is made therein between damage caused
maliciously and intentionally and damages caused through mere negligence
in so far as the civil liability of the wrongdoer in concerned. Nor is the
defendant required to do more than repair the damage done, or, in other
words, to put the plaintiff in the same position, so far as pecuniary
compensation can do so, that he would have been in had the damage not
been inflicted. In this respect there is a notable difference between the two
systems. Under the Anglo-SAxon law, when malicious or willful intention to
cause the damage is an element of the defendant's act, it is quite generally
regarded as an aggravating circumstance for which the plaintiff is entitled to
more than mere compensation for the injury inflicted. These are called
exemplary or punitive damages, and no provision is made for them in article
1902 of the Civil Code.
torts & damages
- article 1902 of the Civil Code requires that the defendant repair the damage
done. There is, however, a world of difficulty in carrying out the legislative will
in this particular. The measure of damages is an ultimate fact, to be
determined from the evidence submitted to the court. The complexity of
human affairs is such that two cases are seldom exactly alike, a thorough
discussion of each case may permit of their more or less definite
classification, and develop leading principles which will be of great assistance
to a court in determining the question, not only of damages, but of the prior
one of negligence. As the Code is so indefinite (even though from necessity)
on the subject of damages arising from fault or negligence, the bench and bar
should have access to and avail themselves of those great, underlying
principles which have been gradually and conservatively developed and
thoroughly tested in Anglo-Saxon courts. A careful and intelligent application
of these principles should have a tendency to prevent mistakes in the rulings
of the court on the evidence offered, and should assist in determining
damages, generally, with some degree of uniformity
- The case at bar involves actual incapacity of the plaintiff for two months,
and loss of the greater portion of his business. As to the damages resulting
from the actual incapacity of the plaintiff to attend to his business there is no
question. They are, of course, to be allowed on the basis of his earning
capacity, which in this case, is P50 per month. the difficult question in the
present case is to determine the damage which has results to his business
through his enforced absence. In Sanz vs. Lavin Bros. (6 Phil. Rep., 299),
this court, citing numerous decisions of the supreme court of Spain, held that
evidence of damages "must rest upon satisfactory proof of the existence in
reality of the damages alleged to have been suffered." But, while certainty is
an essential element of an award of damages, it need not be a mathematical
certainty. That this is true is adduced not only from the personal injury cases
from the supreme court of Spain which we have discussed above, but by
many cases decided by this court, reference to which has already been
made. As stated in Joyce on Damages, section 75, "But to deny the injured
party the right to recover any actual damages in cases f torts because they
are of such a nature a cannot be thus certainly measured, would be to enable
parties to profit by and speculate upon their own wrongs; such is not the law."
- As to the elements to be considered in estimating the damage done to
plaintiff's business by reason of his accident, this same author, citing
numerous authorities, has the following to say: It is proper to consider the
business the plaintiff is engaged in, the nature and extent of such business,
the importance of his personal oversight and superintendence in conducting
it, and the consequent loss arising from his inability to prosecure it.
- The business of the present plaintiff required his immediate supervision. All
the profits derived therefrom were wholly due to his own exertions. Nor are
his damages confined to the actual time during which he was physically
incapacitated for work, as is the case of a person working for a stipulated
daily or monthly or yearly salary. As to persons whose labor is thus
compensated and who completely recover from their injuries, the rule may be
said to be that their damages are confined to the duration of their enforced
absence from their occupation. But the present plaintiff could not resume his
work at the same profit he was making when the accident occurred. He had
built up an establishing business which included some twenty regular
customers. These customers represented to him a regular income. In addition
to this he made sales to other people who were not so regular in their
purchases. - But he could figure on making at least some sales each month
to others besides his regular customers. Taken as a whole his average
monthly income from his business was about P50. As a result of the accident,
he lost all but four of his regular customers and his receipts dwindled down to
A2010
prof. casis
- 106 -
practically nothing. Other agents had invaded his territory, and upon
becoming physically able to attend to his business, he found that would be
necessary to start with practically no regular trade, and either win back his old
customers from his competitors or else secure others. During this process of
reestablishing his patronage his income would necessarily be less than he
was making at the time of the accident and would continue to be so for some
time. Of course, if it could be mathematically determined how much less he
will earn during this rebuilding process than he would have earned if the
accident had not occurred, that would be the amount he would be entitled to
in this action. But manifestly this ideal compensation cannot be ascertained.
The question therefore resolves itself into whether this damage to his
business can be so nearly ascertained as to justify a court in awarding any
amount whatever.
- When it is shown that a plaintiff's business is a going concern with a fairly
steady average profit on the investment, it may be assumed that had the
interruption to the business through defendant's wrongful act not occurred, it
would have continued producing this average income "so long as is usual
with things of that nature." When in addition to the previous average income
of the business it is further shown what the reduced receipts of the business
are immediately after the cause of the interruption has been removed, there
can be no manner of doubt that a loss of profits has resulted from the
wrongful act of the defendant. In the present case, we not only have the value
of plaintiff's business to him just prior to the accident, but we also have its
value to him after the accident. At the trial, he testified that his wife had
earned about fifteen pesos during the two months that he was disabled. That
this almost total destruction of his business was directly chargeable to
defendant's wrongful act, there can be no manner of doubt; and the mere fact
that the loss can not be ascertained with absolute accuracy, is no reason for
denying plaintiff's claim altogether. As stated in one case, it would be a
reproach to the law if he could not recover damages at all. (Baldwin vs.
Marquez, 91 Ga., 404)
- We are of the opinion that the lower court had before it sufficient evidence of
the damage to plaintiff's business in the way of prospective loss of profits to
justify it in calculating his damages as to his item. That evidence has been
properly elevated to this court of review. Under section 496 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, we are authorized to enter final judgment or direct a new
trial, as may best subserve the ends of justice. We are of the opinion that the
evidence presented as to the damage done to plaintiff's business is credible
and that it is sufficient and clear enough upon which to base a judgment for
damages. Plaintiff having had four years' experience in selling goods on
commission, it must be presumed that he will be able to rebuild his business
to its former proportions; so that at some time in the future his commissions
will equal those he was receiving when the accident occurred. Aided by his
experience, he should be able to rebuild this business to its former
proportions in much less time than it took to establish it as it stood just prior to
the accident. One year should be sufficient time in which to do this. The
profits which plaintiff will receive from the business in the course of its
reconstruction will gradually increase. The injury to plaintiff's business begins
where these profits leave off, and, as a corollary, there is where defendant's
liability begins. Upon this basis, we fix the damages to plaintiff's business at
P250.
Disposition The judgment of the lower court is set aside, and the plaintiff is
awarded the following damages; ten pesos for medical expenses; one
hundred pesos for the two months of his enforced absence from his business;
and two hundred and fifty pesos for the damage done to his business in the
way of loss of profits, or a total of three hundred and sixty pesos. No costs
will be allowed in this instance.
PNOC V CA (MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION)
297 SCRA 402
ROMERO; October 8, 1998
NATURE
Petition for certiorari on a decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
- In the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia XV,
owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was
navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way
to Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided with the vessel Petroparcel which
at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC) but then
subsequently transferred to PNOC, causing the former to sink.
- Private respondent averred that M/V Maria Efigenia XV had an actual value
of P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the insurance payment of
P200,000.00, the amount of P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed. The
amended complaint also alleged that inflation resulting from the devaluation
of the Philippine peso had affected the replacement value of the hull of the
vessel, its equipment and its lost cargoes, such that there should be a
reasonable determination thereof. Furthermore, on account of the sinking of
the vessel, private respondent supposedly incurred unrealized profits and lost
business opportunities that would thereafter be proven.
- Lower court, on November 18, 1989 disposing of Civil Case No. C-9457,
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant PNOC
Shipping & Transport Corporation, to pay the plaintiff:
a. The sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing boat with
interest from the date of the filing of the complaint at the rate of 6% per
annum;
b. The sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
c. The costs of suit.
- The lower court concluded:
Evidently, the quotation of prices submitted by the plaintiff relative to the
replacement value of the fishing boat and its equipments in the tune of
P6,438,048.00 which were lost due to the recklessness and imprudence of
the herein defendants were not rebutted by the latter with sufficient
evidence. The defendants through their sole witness Lorenzo Lazaro
relied heavily on said witness' bare claim that the amount afore-said is
excessive or bloated, but they did not bother at all to present any
documentary evidence to substantiate such claim. Evidence to be
believed must not only proceed from the mouth of the credible witness, but
it must be credible in itself.
- Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the same in toto on
October 14, 1992. On petitioner's assertion that the award of P6,438,048.00
was not convincingly proved by competent and admissible evidence, the
Court of Appeals ruled that it was not necessary to qualify Del Rosario as an
expert witness because as the owner of the lost vessel, "it was well within his
knowledge and competency to identify and determine the equipment installed
and the cargoes loaded" on the vessel.
ISSUE
torts & damages
WON respondent court’s award for damages is appropriate
HELD
NO
Ratio A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary
loss actually suffered and duly proved. Indeed, basic is the rule that to
recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of
proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual
amount thereof. The claimant is duty-bound to point out specific facts that
afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne. A
court cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the
fact and amount of damages as well as hearsay or uncorroborated testimony
whose truth is suspect.
Reasoning
- Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are
those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to
repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted
and not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual
damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. There are two kinds of actual or compensatory
damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses (daño
emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that
which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante).
- Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the plaintiff
is entitled to their value at the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of
money which he would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially
similar goods, plus in a proper case damages for the loss of use during the
period before replacement. In other words, in the case of profit-earning
chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a
going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in
the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending
engagements,
- If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case virtually
certain of profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that value in
respect of charters actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to
compensate the plaintiff twice over. On the other hand, if the ship is valued
without reference to its actual future engagements and only in the light of its
profit-earning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the value thus
assessed the anticipated profit on a charter or other engagement which it was
unable to fulfill
- What the court has to ascertain in each case is the "capitalised value of
the vessel as a profit-earning machine not in the abstract but in view of
the actual circumstances," without, of course, taking into account
considerations which were too remote at the time of the loss.
- Del Rosario's claim that private respondent incurred losses in the total
amount of P6,438,048.00 should be admitted with extreme caution
considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by
independent evidence. Moreover, because he was the owner of private
respondent corporation whatever testimony he would give with regard to the
value of the lost vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed in the
light of his self-interest therein. Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages
may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.
- Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not mean that it
totally deprives private respondent of any redress for the loss of its vessel.
A2010
- 107 -
- Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law,
contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasidelicts, or in every case where property right has been invaded. Under Article
2223 of the Civil Code, "(t)he adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude
further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as
between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns."
- Actually, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact.
Where these are allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong
inflicted but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.
However, the amount to be awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at
least commensurate to the injury sustained by private respondent considering
the concept and purpose of such damages. The amount of nominal damages
to be awarded may also depend on certain special reasons extant in the
case.
- Applying now such principles to the instant case, we have on record the fact
that petitioner's vessel Petroparcel was at fault as well as private
respondent's complaint claiming the amount of P692,680.00 representing the
fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes that sunk with the M/V Maria
Efigenia XV. In its amended complaint, private respondent alleged that the
vessel had an actual value of P800,000.00 but it had been paid insurance in
the amount of P200,000.00 and, therefore, it claimed only the amount of
P600,000.00. Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments should diminish
the total value of the vessel quoted by private respondent in his complaint
considering that such payment is causally related to the loss for which it
claimed compensation. This Court believes that such allegations in the
original and amended complaints can be the basis for determination of a fair
amount of nominal damages inasmuch as a complaint alleges the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. Private respondent should be
bound by its allegations on the amount of its claims.
Disposition the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
14, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26680 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is hereby MODIFIED insofar as it awarded
actual damages to private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation in
the amount of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases therefor.
Considering the fact, however, that: (1) technically petitioner sustained injury
but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, and (2)
this case has dragged on for almost two decades, we believe that an award
of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) in favor of private respondent as and for
nominal damages is in order.
INTEGRATED PACKING V CA
DBP V CA (CUBA)
DAVIDE JR; January 5, 1998
FACTS
- Plaintiff Lydia Cuba is a grantee of a Fishpond Lease Agreement. She
obtained loans from DBP. As security for said loans, plaintiff Lydia P. Cuba
executed two Deeds of Assignment of her Leasehold Rights.
- Plaintiff failed to pay her loan. Without foreclosure proceedings, DBP
appropriated the leasehold Rights of Cuba over the fishpond in question.
After which defendant DBP, in turn, executed a Deed of Conditional Sale of
the Leasehold Rights in favor of plaintiff Lydia Cuba over the same fishpond.
prof. casis
- In the negotiation for repurchase, plaintiff Lydia Cuba addressed two letters
to the Manager DBP, Dagupan City thereafter accepted the offer to
repurchase in a letter addressed to CUBA.
- After the Deed of Conditional Sale was executed in favor of Cuba, a new
Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and
Food .
- Cuba failed to pay the amortizations stipulated in the Deed of Conditional
Sale. After which she entered with the DBP a temporary arrangement
whereby in consideration for the deferment of the Notarial Rescission of Deed
of Conditional Sale, plaintiff Lydia Cuba promised to make certain payments
as stated in temporary Arrangement.
- DBP thereafter sent a Notice of Rescission thru Notarial Act and which was
received by Cuba. After the Notice of Rescission, DBP took possession of the
Leasehold Rights of the fishpond in question;
- That after defendant DBP took possession of the Leasehold Rights over the
fishpond in question, DBP thereafter executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in
favor of defendant Agripina Caperal.
- Thereafter, defendant Caperal was awarded Fishpond Lease Agreement by
the Ministry of Agriculture and Food.
- CUBA filed complaint questioning the act of DBP in appropriating to itself
CUBA's leasehold rights over the fishpond in question without foreclosure
proceedings. TC ruled in favor of petitioner and granted actual damages in
the amount of P1,067,500 representing lost equipment and dead fish due to
DBP’s forecloseure of fishpond and ejectment of laborers.
- CA regarding damages granted ruled that CUBA was not entitled to loss of
profits for lack of evidence, but agreed with the trial court as to the actual
damages of P1,067,500. It, however, deleted the amount of exemplary
damages and reduced the award of moral damages from P100,000 to
P50,000 and attorney's fees, from P100.00 to P50,000
ISSUE
WON the damages granted to CUBA are valid
HELD
NO
- Article 2199 provides:
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
damages
- Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proved
with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations,
conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must
depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered by the injured
party and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof.
- In the present case, the trial court awarded in favor of CUBA P1,067,500 as
actual damages consisting of P550,000 which represented the value of the
alleged lost articles of CUBA and P517,500 which represented the value of
the 230,000 pieces of bangus allegedly stocked in 1979 when DBP first
ejected CUBA from the fishpond and the adjoining house.
- We find that the alleged loss of personal belongings and equipment was not
proved by clear evidence. Other than the testimony of CUBA and her
caretaker, there was no proof as to the existence of those items before DBP
took over the fishpond in question. As pointed out by DBP, there was no
"inventory of the alleged lost items before the loss which is normal in a project
torts & damages
which sometimes, if not most often, is left to the care of other persons."
Neither was a single receipt or record of acquisition presented.
- in her complaint dated 17 May 1985, CUBA included "losses of property" as
among the damages resulting from DBP's take-over of the fishpond. Yet, it
was only in September 1985 when she came to know of the alleged loss of
several articles. Such claim for "losses of property," having been made before
knowledge of the alleged actual loss, was therefore speculative. The alleged
loss could have been a mere afterthought or subterfuge to justify her claim for
actual damages.
- With regard to the award of P517,000 representing the value of the alleged
230,000 pieces of bangus which died when DBP took possession of the
fishpond in March 1979, the same was not called for. Such loss was not duly
proved; besides, the claim therefor was delayed unreasonably. From 1979
until after the filing of her complaint in court in May 1985, CUBA did not bring
to the attention of DBP the alleged loss
- The award of actual damages should, therefore, be struck down for lack of
sufficient basis.
- In view however, of DBP's act of appropriating CUBA's leasehold rights
which was contrary to law and public policy, as well as its false representation
to the then Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources that it had
"foreclosed the mortgage," an award of moral damages in the amount of
P50,000
- Exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of P25,000 should likewise
be awarded by way of example or correction for the public good. 20 There
being an award of exemplary damages, attorney's fees are also recoverable
FUENTES V CA
323 PHIL 508
BELLOSILLO; February 9, 1996
FACTS
- 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina was at a benefit dance at Dump Site,
Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his
right arm on the shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a long
hair but now you have a short hair. Suddenly petitioner stabbed Malaspina in
the abdomen with a hunting knife. After muttering that Fuentes stabbed him,
he died.
- Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr.,
alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina. He said that his cousin directly told him
that he stabbed the victim out of grudge.
- The Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, found petitioner
guilty of murder qualified by treachery and imposed on him an indeterminate
prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion tempora