JSTOR: A History
Chapter 1
Began w/ discussion before Board of Trustees of Denison University - William G. Bowen:
president of Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, Denison Board of Trustees
Bowen published that service nonprofits are unable to take advantage of technologies
advancements b/c they're mostly reliant on labor (cost disease)
Libraries were running out of room to store print materials & had to keep expanding
(spending)
In the 70's the OCLC (Online Computer Library Center) instituted a cooperative cataloging
program that helped provide interlibrary lending (ILL)
Other proposal called for central lending for periodicals - NPC (National Periodical Center): a
central warehouse to store materials
In 1975 libraries of Columbia, Harvard, Yale, & New York Public Library formed the Research
Libraries Group (RLG) that created an online union catalog - showed holdings of multiple
libraries to avoid unnecessary duplication of research materials
Rising prices of journals led to a spiral of price increases & cancellations
Microfilms were used to compact resources but readers hated them and they eventually
became another waste of space
Bowen believed library resources could be "minimized" - no longer held in physical form
Mellon board commissions Richard Ekman & Quandt to study how technology could help
find efficiencies in scholarly communications
Journals would be easier than books b/c a single negotiation w/ a single publisher could
open the door to hundreds of volumes - offsetting the costs for a database
Harvard already had Periodicals Content Index (PCI) - scanned copies of journal's table of
contents - only available at Harvard (vs. wide scaled)
Chapter 2
What began as space saving began to transform into facilitating access & preserving
backfiles
5 Economics & 5 History (many backfiles owned by nonprofit scholarly societies) of highest
quality journals were on title list, test sites were chosen
JSTOR: acronym for Journal Storage
Wanted to partner w/ UMI (University Microfilms Inc.) b/c they may already have secured
rights necessary to digitize & distribute journals
But, UMI lacked the rights - next met w/ publishers: told them they wouldn't loose revenue &
sought only nonexclusive rights (still follow)
1st publisher agreement (A) didn't have royalties & gave JSTOR a joint copyright on digitized
content that wouldn't expire 3/10 (all societies)
JSTOR-B: limit journal distribution to 50 universities, JSTOR owns copyright on digital 7/10
(university presses + societies)
UMI's software was suboptimal to build the database, JSTOR sought to work w/ Elsevier &
University of Michigan
UMI's scanning proposal was too expensive, JSTOR sought other scanning bureaus
UMI would eventually digitize its content & become ProQuest
Chapter 3
In 1989 Michigan launches DIRECT, became "software looking for a database"
In 1991 Elsevier agreed to participate in what would become TULIP (The University Licensing
Project)
TULIP - experiment where Elsevier & other publishers gave page images + searchable text to
a number of universities
Michigan combines DIRECT & TULIP - huge success
August 1994 - agreement to modify DIRECT for JSTOR project - Mellon gives $700K grant to
Michigan (excluding scanning costs)
Agreement rushed w/o significant consideration regarding intellectual property rights
& management responsibilities
Chapter 4
Bowen believed it would be most efficient to digitize microfilms
UMI claimed their copyright would prohibit this, Bowen & Michigan determined that only the
original copyright from publishers were necessary
Microfilms were examined, & found to be too low of quality for scanning - JSTOR would
digitize straight from print
UMI later worked w/ scanner companies to make new microfilm scanners w/ new tech. &
develop OCR algorithms to create text in 1998
Decided to digitize images at high 600 dpi quality
Digital Imaging & Technologies (DIT) based in Barbados, signs as scanning vendor for much
cheaper than expected
Michigan creates web-based version of DIRECT, including TIFF2GIF, & begins to develop
printing application
For Indexing, Mellon partnered w/ Chadwyck-Healy (owner of PCI)
Elsevier gave Michigan & JSTOR permission to convert the PCI indices into EFFECT so
TULIP would understand it
Chadwyck-Healy was proving to be too expensive, so JSTOR scraped using PCI & planned
to create their own indices from scratch - resulted in huge savings
Print journals would be sent from Harvard or Michigan to DIT for Indexing, Scanning, & OCR
(search-able text)
DIT ships 1st datasets in March 1995, were rejected due to low quality, 20 were rejected
before 1st was accepted
Harvard & Michigan backruns were incomplete - had to be hunted down
Chapter 5
By early 1995 it was becoming clear that JSTOR was too be quite large & complex
Libraries needed to pay for the service but the Mellon foundation couldn’t take money
Needed to be a dependent organization - explored University Satellite, Library Cooperative,
Umbrella Organization, For Profit Organization, Nonprofit Organization
A nonprofit structure would best allow navigation between funders, libraries, & publishers
Could grow & develop due to educational priorities vs. financial
Supports archiving mission, assures libraries of commitment
Kevin Guthrie, a member of the Mellon research staff, took lead role for new
JSTOR organization
Bowen becomes founding chairman of JSTOR’s board
In December 1995 Mellon awards JSTOR startup grant of $1.5 million
Chapter 6
Ecological Society of America (ESA) - scholarly society wished to partner with JSTOR
Had 3 journals, were financially stable, leadership was good & familiar
More interested in making current issues widely available vs. archiving old ones
JSTOR intends to become involved in publishing online current issues
Could be a model of the change for new journals online
Elsevier offered print + digital package, but it was 135% the print price - JSTOR could prove
cheaper
Had to put current issues on a campus network or restrict access to inside the library
Putting on a network risked publisher/society revenue by reducing multiple subscriptions per
campus
Muse & Elsevier decided to go with unlimited usage site licensing - JSTOR followed
ESA & JSTOR sign JSTOR-C agreement in Oct. 1995, JSTOR role is to contribute online
production & infrastructure & digitally publishing current issues in addition to archiving
Many societies/publishers didn’t agree to JSTOR's current issues proposal - potential $ risk
Bowen & Guthrie refocused JSTOR to its archival role by mid-1996
JSTOR had signed current issues agreements w/ ESA, AEA, & APSA - though lacked the
technology
Guthrie tried to change publisher agreements to move from “static wall” to “moving wall”
From all content 5 years prior to 1994 (up to 1989) to all content 5 years prior of current year
Some publishers, including Chicago, didn’t fully agree - years later all would
Standard License Terms: downside guarantees (all $ losses will be returned, only occurred
once) & returning any surplus (excess revenues split 50% pub, 25% libraries, 25% JSTOR)
Chapter 7
JSTOR had ambitions to digitize 100 journals, Michigan didn’t have much production
capability
New independent JSTOR wanted to ‘contract' w/ Michigan, Michigan still saw it as a ‘grant’ wanted to call the shots vs. take direction from JSTOR
Michigan still didn’t have QC for scanned items
Spencer Thomas became JSTOR project manager at Michigan & implemented QC, formal
production process
Hired full-time programmers & staff, JSTOR hires Bill Landis to professionalize production
operations
JSTOR UI was designed & made available to the test sites in 1996, would remain same for 5
years
Chapter 8
JSTOR needed to find revenues to pay ongoing archiving costs
Would use archive licensing model - all participants would contribute to archiving costs
Needed to know if online backfiles were of enough value to libraries to buy
Conducted experiment & found that journal backfiles were not used very much
Would be tough to find viable business model leading towards self-sustainment
Strategic & Operating Plan - Guthrie submits in June 1996 - JSTOR’s most important
document
All titles will be marketed under the JSTOR brand to libraries - not as an additional publisher
service
Subscription (unlimited usage) pricing - for a flat fee for permanent rights vs. usage pricing
Pricing - not to exceed marginal costs,
Split Fee (cost based) - upfront Database Dev. Fee (DDF) + ongoing Annual Access Fee
(AAF)
Value based - based on $ saved by shelf space, price based on library size (large,
medium, small);
used Carnegie Classification - based on institution’s research intensity, & FTE
Bundled packages of entire JSTOR coll. for a flat fee for early participants to raise initial
capital
No discounts for consortia
Charter Library Status - institutions joining in 1st 4 months got 25% DDF/AAF reduction
Chapter 9
’97 - JSTOR needed to sign 100 titles by ’99 to complete Arts & Sciences I collection
Hired Sarah Sully as general counsel & pub relations director & already had defined
agreements
Wanted to concentrate tiltes in selected fields vs. large fields with few titles
Interdisciplinary work (statistics) & titles w/ the most subscription overlap were targeted
Arts & Sciences I has 100 titles signed in Oct. 1998, is completed in Apr. 1999 w/ 117 titles
Later, Elsevier, despite earlier claims against digitizing backfiles, began to do so w/
ScienceDirect
In agreements, the moving wall was up to 5yrs, & JSTOR hasn’t pushed much to change it
since
Create “mirror sites” - other physical sites in case of server failure & possible international
capability
Princeton chosen as 1st mirror site - low levels of downtime once JSTOR released publicly in
1/97
Andrews-Landis process redesign greatly improved speed + quality of journal production
Michigan still saw JSTOR as more of a R&D grant vs. an independent organization
Was proposing to use JSTOR software to mount Elsevier journals on a server for other
libraries
Interim agreement in ’97 to change the IP of software developed by Michigan for JSTOR to
JSTOR
JSTOR’s Michigan operations were consolidated in 1 off-campus building w/ full time staff
Chapter 10
January 1997 - JSTOR goes public w/ 17 titles in Arts & Sciences I (A&S1)
Librarians did not want licenses to impair fair use provisions of the copyright code
JSTOR consults own librarians & a publisher to create a library license that works for both
parties
License was campus wide & unlimited usage w/ a fail safe archive plan & even an ILL
provision
JSTOR wanted to be perceived differently in the market
Had no sales force, no advertising, open “about” page on the web w/ exact pricing
“Demo" database with one journal’s early issues available on the web
190 libraries joined JSTOR during 4 month charter period - exceeded expectations
Board member Richard DeGennaro, emeritus director of HU libraries helped Guthrie reach
out
2 main types of consortia - decentralized buying co-op & centralized service providers (CSP)
CSP had possible savings - OhioLINK could work but agreement fell through
Ended up not signing special deals for consortia - wouldn’t work w/ JSTOR’s cost-based
pricing
Mellon grants $2M to Southern Ed. F. - SEF (HBCUs) & App. Col. A. - ACA for resources &
JSTOR
20 SEF & 25 ACA schools sign up for JSTOR, all would agree to pay after 12/2000 expiration
JSTOR dep. on bandwidth - Lexis-Nexis only text based (2KB), JSTOR was image based
(50KB)
Many countries lacked bandwidth, not UK - JISC-JSTOR mirror site agreement in 1998
JSTOR had an authorization db for parts. & internet addresses; dev. Usage statistics program
Finished 1st year w/ less medium libraries than expected & $5.1M (-40%) revenue $3.1M
(13%) costs
Chapter 11
Near end of charter period, 25% of A&S1 released, JSTOR began planning for content
expansion
Wanted to reconnect w/ AAAS to explore adding Science (signed) & Nature (didn’t sign) titles
Needed to increase production - Princeton mirror site chosen as 2nd production site (for
Science)
JSTOR would redeploy existing content in disciplinary clusters bundled w/ new content
Would allow new & old participants to get additional titles w/o threatening original
business plan
JSTOR would digitize further titles & fields - Michigan office expanded
Digitization project for Ecology & Botany for 700K pages - funded by ESA thru Mellon $1.5M
grant
ESA identified initial titles of interest & outreach to publishers, JSTOR negotiated final
agreements
Again, most commercial pubs. that didn’t sign for A&S1 didn’t sign up like the UP’s, & SS’s
General Science Collection - Science, PNAS, Royal Society + other titles thru Mellon & other
grants
Chapter 12
1998 - JSTOR needs more participants to reach 750 libraries by end of 1999 (S&O Plan)
Hired Gerard Aurigemma - introduced refined financial reporting & formal invoicing system
Thought best to grow (new staff) content vs. software development, user services, & library
relations
Used usage statistics to re-class libraries into more groups - lowered prices for all but very
large
A&S1 closed 1999 a little short of the S&O goal - no problem though, numbers were rising
Access to 2 year colleges - one-time $1000 installation fee to cover marginal costs
No more mirror sites - JSTOR could offer access from the U.S. servers
Set standard pricing classes similar to U.S. ones - parts. skyrocket in 1999 w/ 111 int.
libraries
Individual Access - pubs. could buy & offer their JSTOR archive for a fee to their subscribers
Chapter 13
Summer 1998: JSTOR looked to future collections - Business & Arts & Sciences II
They knew that new collections required +1yr to secure funds, select titles, pub. agreements,
etc.
Would avoid basic sciences & make use of discipline-specific bundles when appropriate
Board endorses enhancing A&S1 to include classics, archaeology, area studies interdisciplinary
Mellon awards grant to MLA (like ESA deal) to expand indexing & secure journals for JSTOR
JSTOR adds Languages & Literature & Art History collections to list of priorities
Titles would be signed for A&SII & specific collections concurrently, prioritize collections later
Resulted in few titles being signed for Business by end of 1999 but solid overall growth plan
Chapter 14
By 2000 some publishers in professional fields were intent on digitizing their own content
EBSCO & ProQuest paid royalties to pubs; they didn’t digitize full back runs - had current
issues
JSTOR emphasized non-royalty benefits of having a digitized archive at no cost
Revenue-sharing would be introduced in 2002
2nd scanning vendor - Apex Data Services Inc. - added to increase production beginning w/
GenSci
OCR technology improved & JSTOR was able to do “in-house” at Princeton - lowered labor
costs
Took till 7/2000 to consistently match production capacity w/ acquisitions (too slow)
Participation greatly increased though 1999 750 goal wasn’t met till 5/2001 w/ international
participants it was over 1000. By end of 2001 it was 1200 total
85-90% added JSTOR not b/c of space saving but for collection building & easy access
Faculty found JSTOR by peer word of mouth
General Science & Ecology & Botany released in 2000
New pricing in 2001 to account for reduced costs in having multiple collections
Users couldn’t tell which collections their library had, just the # of journals
Whenever users emailed JSTOR to ask why something wasn’t in the collection, JSTOR would
forward to library contact - many times the librarians would then add another collection
2000 - Bruce Heterick joins JSTOR to oversee the library-relations group
Was careful w/ horizontal linking to JSTOR FT images - MathSciNet experiment showed high
usage
Created 2 types of links: 1) stable URLs users could use to link to the article
2) footnote reference linking to JSTOR by major bibliographic linkers (EIS) by offering
automated tools to create links to articles at no cost
JSTOR plans to use linking the back files with current journals - ESA pilot allows TOC current
issues linking
Conclusion
Commercial pubs., UPs, & indexing services (EIS & ProQuest) had their own isolated
proprietary interfaces - the "dark web"
Largely agnostic to discipline - however, JSTOR cut across pubs. to create a curated
collection
JSTOR also has fail safe guarantees to preserve the archives in case of company failure
JSTOR has become self-sustaining financially
JSTOR sold access but delivered archiving by refusing to offer one w/o the other so all
libraries contribute to archiving
Non-archiving working libraries were no longer free-riders of the big archiving libraries via ILL
Access & collection building were the main reason libraries signed vs. space savings
Still, Guthrie's vision is for colleges to view JSTOR as a cost savings, rather than an expense