RODOLFO V. JAO v. CA, GR No. 128314, 2002-05-29
Facts:
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents
He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue.[2] He argued that
the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their
deaths.
The decedent's actual residence was in
Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a bakery
In his opposition,[3] Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfo's house
in Quezon City at the time of their deaths.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the decedents' residence on
the death certificates in good faith and through honest mistake.
The
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position.[6] Both failed to
comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition be archived.
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position.[6] Both failed to
comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition be archived.[7]
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived.[8] After the parties submitted
the names of their respective nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as
special administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and
Andrea Jao.
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,... he Court of Appeals rendered... the
petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
Rodolfo's motion for reconsideration was denied
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,[1
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section 2,[18] on
ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies specifically to settlement
proceedings. He argues that while venue in the former... understandably refers to actual physical
residence for the purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is
significant in Rule 73, Section 1.
Issues:
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga,
where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed
before their demise?
Ruling:
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration
granted in the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar.
It cannot be said that Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical
presence in Quezon City was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioner's
Quezon City residence
Furthermore, the decedents' respective death certificates state that they were both residents of
Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late
mother's death certificate.
To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows... that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased
mother's residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacio's
death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
We agree with the appellate court's observation that since the death certificates were accomplished
even before... petitioner and respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied upon to
reflect the true situation at the time of their parents' death.
the documents presented by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of... death, as required
by the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile
Petitioner's argument fails to persuade.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED
Principles:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,... In Raymond v.
Court of Appeals[19] and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,[20] we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions
and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in
the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person's actual residence or place of
abode, provided... he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
FRANCISCA P. PASCUAL v. JUDGE EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS, AM No. MTJ-02-1429, 2002-1004
Facts:
"Complainant x x x alleges that she filed a complaint for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. 730
against a certain Lorenzo L. Manaois. The complaint was dismissed without prejudice for being
insufficient in some material allegations (Order dated 13 October 1999). On 15
November 1999, she filed a corrected complaint which was docketed as Civil Case No. 740.
"Instead of filing an answer, defendant filed a Motion to Strike Out arguing that the new allegations in
the complaint are false. After the period to answer lapsed and no answer was submitted, complainant
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dated 15 December 1999. Defendant... opposed the motion.
"On 30 May 2000, defendant's motion to strike out was granted by respondent Judge. Complainant
filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order.
The facts in the present case are summarized by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its
January 28, 2002 Memorandum[3] addressed to this Court as follows:
"Complainant x x x alleges that she filed a complaint for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. 730
against a certain Lorenzo L. Manaois. The complaint was dismissed without prejudice for being
insufficient in some material allegations (Order dated 13 October 1999). On 15
November 1999, she filed a corrected complaint which was docketed as Civil Case No. 740.
"Instead of filing an answer, defendant filed a Motion to Strike Out arguing that the new allegations in
the complaint are false. After the period to answer lapsed and no answer was submitted, complainant
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dated 15 December 1999. Defendant... opposed the motion.
"On 30 May 2000, defendant's motion to strike out was granted by respondent Judge. Complainant
filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order.
"Based on the foregoing, complainant accuse[d] respondent Judge of Neglect of Duty anchored on
the following grounds:
'a. Defendant should have filed an answer instead of a Motion to Strike Out. Inspite thereof,
respondent Judge granted the motion 120 days after its filing, thus defeating the summary nature of
the case;
'b. The Order granting the motion to strike out is bereft of any findings of fact because no hearing was
conducted relative thereon;
'c. Respondent Judge exhibited his bias and partiality in favor of the defendant in his Order granting
the motion to strike out when he pointed out 'x x x that the complaint in this case is virtually a rehash
of the complaint in Civil Case No. 730 x x x'. Complainant asserts... that the same is to be expected
because the defects or insufficiency in the first complaint were just being rectified in the later one;
'd. Her Motion for Summary Judgment remains, until the present, unacted upon.'
"Meanwhile, defendant, taking advantage of the lull in the proceedings, started the construction of a
one-storey building on the subject land. To protect her interest, complainant filed an Application for
Preliminary Injunction dated 8 May 2000. Acting thereon, respondent
Judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order dated 9 May 2000 and set the hearing on the
Injunction. On said date, complainant was able to present evidence in support of her application while
defendant chose not to present controverting evidence and to just submit a... memorandum.
"On the last day of the effectivity of the TRO (29 May 2000), complainant filed an Extremely Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion to grant her application for injunction. On 7 June 2000 defendant filed his
memorandum. However, until the present, respondent Judge has not ruled on her... application on
preliminary injunction.
"Instead of obeying the TRO, defendant continued with the construction of the building and even
started with a new one. Hence, a contempt charge was filed by herein complainant on 8 May 2000.
Defendant moved to dismiss the contempt charge on the ground that it was filed in... the same
proceedings ([C]ivil [C]ase No. 740) and the filing fee was not paid. The court, however, motu propio
docketed the complaint for contempt as Civil Case No. 744 while the required docket and other fees
were paid by defendant on 31 May 2000. On same date, the court issued... an Order furnishing anew
the defendants/respondents with a copy of the contempt charge. These, complainant claims, cured
the defect cited by defendants/respondents in their motion to dismiss. However, respondent Judge
still has not resolved the aforesaid motion to the prejudice... of herein complainant."[4]
In his Comment[5] dated September 30, 2000, respondent denied the allegations in the Complaint.
He accused Atty. Alejandro V. Peregrino, complainant's counsel in the forcible entry case, of having a
penchant for filing administrative cases against him... instead of appealing decisions before the
proper court. Respondent added that none of the charges had any factual or legal bases. He insisted
that his Decision in Civil Case No. 730 had been rendered with utmost good faith, honesty and sound
discretion.
"Meanwhile, defendant, taking advantage of the lull in the proceedings, started the construction of a
one-storey building on the subject land. To protect her interest, complainant filed an Application for
Preliminary Injunction dated 8 May 2000. Acting thereon, respondent
Judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order dated 9 May 2000 and set the hearing on the
Injunction. On said date, complainant was able to present evidence in support of her application while
defendant chose not to present controverting evidence and to just submit a... memorandum.
"On the last day of the effectivity of the TRO (29 May 2000), complainant filed an Extremely Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion to grant her application for injunction. On 7 June 2000 defendant filed his
memorandum. However, until the present, respondent Judge has not ruled on her... application on
preliminary injunction.
"Instead of obeying the TRO, defendant continued with the construction of the building and even
started with a new one. Hence, a contempt charge was filed by herein complainant on 8 May 2000.
Defendant moved to dismiss the contempt charge on the ground that it was filed in... the same
proceedings ([C]ivil [C]ase No. 740) and the filing fee was not paid. The court, however, motu propio
docketed the complaint for contempt as Civil Case No. 744 while the required docket and other fees
were paid by defendant on 31 May 2000. On same date, the court issued... an Order furnishing anew
the defendants/respondents with a copy of the contempt charge. These, complainant claims, cured
the defect cited by defendants/respondents in their motion to dismiss. However, respondent Judge
still has not resolved the aforesaid motion to the prejudice... of herein complainant."[4]
In his Comment[5] dated September 30, 2000, respondent denied the allegations in the Complaint.
He accused Atty. Alejandro V. Peregrino, complainant's counsel in the forcible entry case, of having a
penchant for filing administrative cases against him... instead of appealing decisions before the
proper court. Respondent added that none of the charges had any factual or legal bases. He insisted
that his Decision in Civil Case No. 730 had been rendered with utmost good faith, honesty and sound
discretion.
Issues:
"Based on the foregoing, complainant accuse[d] respondent Judge of Neglect of Duty anchored on
the following grounds:
'a. Defendant should have filed an answer instead of a Motion to Strike Out. Inspite thereof,
respondent Judge granted the motion 120 days after its filing, thus defeating the summary nature of
the case;
'b. The Order granting the motion to strike out is bereft of any findings of fact because no hearing was
conducted relative thereon;
'c. Respondent Judge exhibited his bias and partiality in favor of the defendant in his Order granting
the motion to strike out when he pointed out 'x x x that the complaint in this case is virtually a rehash
of the complaint in Civil Case No. 730 x x x'. Complainant asserts... that the same is to be expected
because the defects or insufficiency in the first complaint were just being rectified in the later one;
'd. Her Motion for Summary Judgment remains, until the present, unacted upon.'
After investigation of this case, the OCA found that respondent failed to apply the Rule on Summary
Procedure, which he ought to have been very conversant with, because it was a common procedure
in municipal courts. Accordingly, it recommended that respondent "be FINED in the... amount of
P10,000.00 and warned that the commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely
Ruling:
The OCA's Recommendation
After investigation of this case, the OCA found that respondent failed to apply the Rule on Summary
Procedure, which he ought to have been very conversant with, because it was a common procedure
in municipal courts. Accordingly, it recommended that respondent "be FINED in the... amount of
P10,000.00 and warned that the commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely."[7]
This Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings of the OCA, but increase the penalty, taking note that this is respondent's
second infraction.
In this case, it is very clear that respondent lacks awareness of the relevant provisions on
ejectment.[19] He has evidently been remiss in resolving the forcible entry case, pursuant to the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.[20]
Verily, judgment should have been rendered based on the allegations of the Complaint and the
evidence presented therein, inasmuch as the defendant failed to file his answer after the lapse of ten
(10) days from the service of the summons.[21] Section 6 of... the Rule allows the trial court to render
judgment, even motu proprio, upon failure of the defendant to file an answer within the reglementary
period.[22] Moreover, under Section 10 of the Rule, respondent was duty-bound to render his
decision... within thirty (30) days from receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the
expiration of the period for filing them.[23] This notwithstanding, he has not yet ruled on the Motion for
Summary Judgment[24] dated December 15,... 1999, filed in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule
on Summary Procedure.
Furthermore, respondent failed to apply these very basic rules when he granted the defendant's
Motion to Strike Out which was in reality a motion to dismiss, a prohibited pleading.[25] In his
Order[26] dated May 30, 2000, he ruled... that the Complaint in Civil Case No. 740 was a mere
rehash of the dismissed Complaint in Civil Case No. 730. He cited Section 12[27] of Rule 8 of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure as basis for this ruling. In doing so, he committed an obvious
mistake... showing gross ignorance of the law. This is because the civil case assigned to him is for
forcible entry, which is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.[28] In fact, all cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer are governed by this
Rule
In the present case, the heavy caseload in respondent's sala, though unfortunate, cannot excuse him
from due observance of the rules. We reiterate that judges, when burdened by heavy caseloads that
prevent them from deciding cases within the reglementary period, may ask for... additional time from
this Court. Indubitably, respondent has failed to do so.[37] He ought to know that the speedy
resolution of forcible entry cases is a matter of public policy. His inaction for almost three years on
complainants' Motion for Summary
Judgment practically rendered nugatory the whole purpose of summary proceedings -- to promote a
more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.[38] By tarrying too long in deciding this
forcible entry case, he failed to live up to the mandate of... the Code of Judicial Conduct to "maintain
professional competence."[39] Judges are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in
the performance of their judicial functions and duties
We agree with the findings of the OCA, but increase the penalty, taking note that this is respondent's
second infraction.
Administrative Liability
Judges are the visible representations of law and justice.[8] They ought to be embodiments of
competence, integrity and independence.[9] In particular, municipal judges are frontline officers in the
administration of... justice.[10] It is therefore essential that they live up to the high standards
demanded by the Code of Judicial Conduct.[11] To be able to render substantial justice and to
maintain public confidence in the legal system, they are... expected to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. They are likewise expected to keep abreast of all
laws and prevailing jurisprudence.[12] Judicial competence requires no less.[13]
Moreover, judges are bound to dispose of the court's business promptly and to decide cases within
the required period.[14] For it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied.
Procrastination among members of the judiciary in rendering... decisions and in acting upon cases
before them not only causes great injustice to the parties involved, but also invites suspicion of
ulterior motives on their part.[15]
It must be emphasized that rules of procedure have been formulated and promulgated by this Court
to ensure the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules
undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the rule of... law.[16] The Rule on
Summary Procedure was promulgated precisely to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases. Failure to observe the period within which to render a judgment subjects the
defaulting judge to administrative... sanctions.[17] For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and
expressly prohibits, altogether, the filing of motions for extension.[18]
In this case, it is very clear that respondent lacks awareness of the relevant provisions on
ejectment.[19] He has evidently been remiss in resolving the forcible entry case, pursuant to the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.[20]
Verily, judgment should have been rendered based on the allegations of the Complaint and the
evidence presented therein, inasmuch as the defendant failed to file his answer after the lapse of ten
(10) days from the service of the summons.[21] Section 6 of... the Rule allows the trial court to render
judgment, even motu proprio, upon failure of the defendant to file an answer within the reglementary
period.[22] Moreover, under Section 10 of the Rule, respondent was duty-bound to render his
decision... within thirty (30) days from receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the
expiration of the period for filing them.[23] This notwithstanding, he has not yet ruled on the Motion for
Summary Judgment[24] dated December 15,... 1999, filed in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule
on Summary Procedure.
Furthermore, respondent failed to apply these very basic rules when he granted the defendant's
Motion to Strike Out which was in reality a motion to dismiss, a prohibited pleading.[25] In his
Order[26] dated May 30, 2000, he ruled... that the Complaint in Civil Case No. 740 was a mere
rehash of the dismissed Complaint in Civil Case No. 730. He cited Section 12[27] of Rule 8 of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure as basis for this ruling. In doing so, he committed an obvious
mistake... showing gross ignorance of the law. This is because the civil case assigned to him is for
forcible entry, which is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.[28] In fact, all cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer are governed by this
Rule.[29]
It must likewise be underscored that respondent dismissed Civil Case No. 730 without prejudice, on
the theory that the date of the dispossession had not been initially indicated in the Complaint. Thus, it
would reasonably be expected that the allegations in that civil case... would be reiterated in Civil Case
No. 740. Needless to state, what also contributed to the delay in the resolution of the main case was
the grant of the Motion to Strike Out based on misplaced reasoning.[30]
Lack of knowledge of the Rules on Summary Procedure reflects a serious degree of
incompetence.[31] When the law is so elementary, as in this case, not to be aware of it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.[32] A member of the... bench must be constantly abreast of legal and
jurisprudential developments, bearing in mind that this learning process never ceases. It is
indispensable to the correct dispensation of justice.[33]
Delay
Respondent claimed that if there was any delay on his part in resolving the incidents, it was not
intentional but merely brought about by pressure from work.[34]
We are not convinced. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Canons on Judicial Ethics mandates that a judge
should dispose of the court's business promptly and decide each case within the period prescribed
therefor.[35] We have held in numerous cases that failure... to decide within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.[36]
In the present case, the heavy caseload in respondent's sala, though unfortunate, cannot excuse him
from due observance of the rules. We reiterate that judges, when burdened by heavy caseloads that
prevent them from deciding cases within the reglementary period, may ask for... additional time from
this Court. Indubitably, respondent has failed to do so.[37] He ought to know that the speedy
resolution of forcible entry cases is a matter of public policy. His inaction for almost three years on
complainants' Motion for Summary
Judgment practically rendered nugatory the whole purpose of summary proceedings -- to promote a
more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.[38] By tarrying too long in deciding this
forcible entry case, he failed to live up to the mandate of... the Code of Judicial Conduct to "maintain
professional competence."[39] Judges are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in
the performance of their judicial functions and duties.[40]
In determining his administrative liability, we note that this is not the first infraction of respondent.[41]
In Espiritu v. Jovellanos,[42] he was found guilty of gross misconduct for his partiality to one of the
parties,... for which he was fined P20,000.
Indeed, it seems that he has remained undeterred in disregarding the law and the Code which he has
pledged to uphold.[43] He appears to be unfazed by the previous penalties and warnings meted out
to him.[44] Since this is his second... infraction, he deserves a sanction heavier than that
recommended by the OCA.
WHEREFORE, Judge Eduardo Jovellanos is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and
is FINED in the amount of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000). He is further warned that a repetition of
this or similar offenses will be dealt with even more... severely.
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, Judge Eduardo Jovellanos is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and
is FINED in the amount of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000). He is further warned that a repetition of
this or similar offenses will be dealt with even more... severely.
SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN: BERNARDO S. SABANPAN, RENE S. SABANPAN, DANILO S. SABANPAN
and THELMA S. CHU; HEIRS OF ADOLFO SAEZ: MA. LUISA SAEZ TAPIZ, MA. VICTORIA SAEZ LAPITAN, MA. BELEN
SAEZ and EMMANUEL SAEZ; and HEIRS OF CRISTINA SAEZ GUTIERREZ: ROY SAEZ GUTIERREZ and LUIS SAEZ JR.
vs.
ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA, HERDIN C. COMORPOSA, OFELIA C. ARIEGO, REMEDIOS COMORPOSA, VIRGILIO A.
LARIEGO, BELINDA M. COMORPOSA and ISABELITA H. COMORPOSA
G.R. No. 152807; August 12, 2003; PANGANIBAN, J.
--- The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative value. Just because a piece of
evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact in dispute.
FACTS:
A Complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by [petitioners] against [respondents] before the
MTC Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur, whereby it was alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor
of Lot No. 845, Land 275 located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur with an area of 1.2 hectares. In 1960, he
died leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren.
In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was terminated from his job. The
termination of his employment caused a problem in relocating his house. Being a close family friend of
Marcos Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the late Marcos Saez’s son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband of
Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Adolfo allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos Saez.
Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his neighbors and transferred to a portion of the land subject matter of this
case. Francisco Comorposa occupied a the said portion of Marcos Saez’ property without paying any rental,
and later when he left for Hawaii, USA, he was succeeded in his possession by the respondents who likewise
did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises through petitioners’ tolerance.
On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises but the latter
refused to vacate the same and claimed that they were the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful
possessors of the premises. A complaint was filed with the barangay office of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, but the
parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.
Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the complaint and alleged that they entered
and occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid and lawful claimants, possessors and owners of the
said lot way back in 1960 and up to the present time; that they have acquired just and valid ownership and
possession of the premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription, and that the Regional Director of the
DENR, Region XI had ruled that they were the rightful claimants and possessors, and therefore entitled to the
issuance of a title.
The MTC ruled in favor of petitioners, but the RTC, on appeal, reversed the MTC Decision. The CA affirmed the
RTC decision, and upheld the right of respondents as claimants and possessors. The appellate court held that - although not yet final -- the Order issued by the regional executive director of the DENR remained in full
force and effect, unless declared null and void. The CA added that the Certification issued by the DENR’s
community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was proof that when the cadastral survey was
conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person. Thus, respondents had the
better right to possess the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, because they have suffiently
proven their actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof
since 1960. The appellate court deemed as self-serving, and therefore incredible, the Affidavits executed by
Gloria Leano Saez, Noel Oboza and Paulina Paran.
ISSUES:
1) WON the CA erred in giving credence to the Order issued by the regional executive director
2) WON the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s ruling giving weight to the CENR Officer’s Certification, which only
bears the facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda, and it is a new matter raised for the
first time on appeal?
3) WON the CA erred in reaffirming the RTC when it did not give importance to the affidavits by Gloria Leano
Saez, Noel [Oboza], and Paulina Paran for allegedly being self serving
4) WON petitioners are correct in their contention that prescription cannot apply in the present case because
respondents’ possession of the land in question was allegedly only by tolerance
HELD:
1) NO. Under the Public Land Act, the management and the disposition of public land is under the primary
control of the director of lands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau or LMB), subject to review
by the DENR secretary. As a rule, then, courts have no jurisdiction to intrude upon matters properly falling
within the powers of the LMB.
The powers given to the LMB and the DENR to alienate and dispose of public land does not, however, divest
regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants to protect their
respective possessions and occupations. The power to determine who has actual physical possession or
occupation of public land and who has the better right of possession over it remains with the courts. But once
the DENR has decided, particularly through the grant of a homestead patent and the issuance of a certificate
of title, its decision on these points will normally prevail.
Therefore, while the issue as to who among the parties are entitled to a piece of public land remains pending
with the DENR, the question of recovery of possession of the disputed property is a matter that may be
addressed to the courts.
2) NO. Petitioners cite Garvida v. Sales Jr. and argue that the Certification is a new matter being raised by
respondents for the first time on appeal. We are not persuaded. In Garvida, the Court held:
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they are not
admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic.
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer
Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one
mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means
but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.
Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director has
acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998. If the Certification were a sham as
petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he
would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter was
under the former’s direct control and supervision.
Petitioners’ claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect. As early as the
pretrial conference at the MTC, the CENR Certification had already been marked as evidence for respondents
as stated in the Pre-trial Order. The Certification was not formally offered, however, because respondents had
not been able to file their position paper.
Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of evidence that has not been
formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases
covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.
3) NO. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to
the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to
the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the
rules of evidence.
While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses’ respective testimonies, the failure of
the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still
bear the burden of proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.
4) NO. For the Court to uphold the contention of petitioners, they have first to prove that the possession of
respondents was by mere tolerance. The only pieces of evidence submitted by the former to support their
claim were a technical description and a vicinity map drawn in accordance with the survey dated May 22,
1936. Both of these were discredited by the CENR Certification, which indicated that the contested lot had not
yet been allocated to any person when the survey was conducted. The testimony of petitioners’ witnesses
alone cannot prevail over respondents’ continued and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot for a
considerable length of time. Furthermore, this is an issue of fact that cannot, as a rule, be raised in a petition
for review under Rule 45.
CELEDONIO MOLDES, vs. TIBURCIO VILLANUEVA,
FACTS: The spouses Juan Mollet and Silvina Del Monte were the owners of three parcels of land. Their
daughter, Josefa, died intestate on November 24, 1918 at the age of 25. Juan Mollet died intestate on January
30, 1934 and his widow died also, intestate, on March 22, 1948. They were survived by their daughter Romana
Mollet, who married Andres Gelardo.3 Romana and Andres were blessed with five children, namely, Flaviana,
Brigida, Maria, Isaac and Leonila, all surnamed Gelardo.4 Flaviana married Manuel Villanueva, and their
marriage produced four offsprings, namely, Apolinario, Tiburcio, Manuel and Juanita (now deceased), all
surnamed Villanueva.5 Juanita married Cornelio Maritana. The couple begot five children, namely, Luis,
Orlando, Normita, Diego, and Julieta, all surnamed Maritima.
Brigida married Mariano Dullavin and they had two children, Rolando and Teodora, both surnamed
Dullavin.6 Maria married Primo Tolentino and the couple had two children, Hermino and Carolyn.7 Leonila
married Delfin Malacca and they had two sons, Gelardo and Marcial.8 Isaac died a bachelor and without any
issue.9
A document denominated as Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Quitclaim10 covering Lot Nos. 589, 590 and
591 were executed by Maria and Leonila, surnamed Gelardo, Mariano Dullavin, Manuel, Juanita, Tiburcio and
Apolonio, all surnamed Villanueva, and Emeterio, Celedonio, Domingo, Rosita and Carolina, all surnamed
Moldes.
Manuel Villanueva and his children, namely, Tiburio and Apolonio, and Mariano Dullavin and his children,
namely, Rolando and Teodora, filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati against
Celedonio, Rosita and Carolina Cedia, all surnamed Moldes, to annul the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Quitclaim.
RTC: rendered a decision declaring that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Quitclaim was void. The
RTC held that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Quitclaim was a sham. Through deceit and
machinations, the plaintiffs, being illiterate at that, were “mislead, duped, railroaded and bamboozled” by the
defendants in signing the deed and waiving their respective shares.
REPORT THIS AD
CA: affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC.
RULING: The Court grants the petition on the sole ground that the respondents, who were the plaintiffs in the
trial court, failed to implead indispensable parties.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties-in-interest without whom no final determination
can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
In Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo v. Herbert Markus Emil Scheer,27 the Court held that the joinder of
indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the
court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. The
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, with no authority to
act not only as to the absent party but also as to those present. The responsibility of impleading all the
indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff.
In this case, the respondents herein, who were the plaintiffs in the court a quo, alleged in their complaint that, as
heirs of the spouses Mollet, they were co-owners of the subject property together with the heirs of Maria and
Leonila, namely, Primo Tolentino and their children, Hermino and Carolyn, and Delfin Malacca and their sons
Gelardo and Marcial. With the death of the respondent’s sister Juanita Maritana, her heirs, (Cornelio Maritana
and their children Luis, Orlando, Normita, Diego, and Julieta) retained their right to inherit despite her
death.23 However, the respondents failed to implead the aforementioned heirs as parties-plaintiffs. The
respondents also failed to implead the other signatories of the deed, namely, Emeterio and Domingo, surnamed
Moldes, who, under the deed, were deeded shares in the property.
This is fatal to the complaint. All heirs of the deceased are indispensable parties to the respondents’ action to
nullify the deed and the partition of the subject property among the signatories therein.24 All the parties to the
deed are, likewise, indispensable parties.
Living @ Sense vs. Malayan Insurance
FACTS
Petitioner Living @ Sense, Inc. sub-contracted to Dou Mac, Inc. (DMI) its underground
open-trench work for the Network Project of Globe Telecom in Mindanao. As required,
DMI gave surety and performance bonds which it secured from respondent Malayan
Insurance Company, Inc. (Malayan) which bound itself jointly and severally liable with
DMI. The bonds will answer for the loss and damage to petitioner if DMI fails to perform
its obligations under the subcontract.
The excavation and restoration works by DMI was later stopped by the government after
it found DMI's work unsatisfactory. Eventually, petitioner terminated the subcontract and
demanded from respondent insurance company indemnification in the amount of P1.04
million. Respondent Malayan denied petitioner's claim arguing that the liability of its
principal, DMI, should first be determined before Malayan can be held liable. Thus,
petitioner sued Malayan for specific performance and breach of contract.
Respondent Malayan claimed that the suit should be dismissed because petitioner failed
to implead DMI as an indispensable party. Petitioner, on the other hand, argued that
respondent is a surety who is directly and primarily liable to indemnify petitioner, and
that the bond is "callable on demand" in the event of breach of obligation. The Regional
Trial Court ruled for the respondent, and the case was elevated to the Supreme Court
on a pure question of law.
ISSUE
Is DMI an indispensable party in this case?
RULING
No, DMI is not an indispensable party in this case. Article 1216 of the Civil Code on
solidary obligations allows petitioner, as creditor, to proceed against any of the solidary
debtors. Since respondent Malayan bound itself "jointly and severally" with DMI under
the surety and performance bonds, it is considered a solidary debtor and is therefore not
an indispensable party. This is because petitioner can claim indemnity directly from
respondent insurance company who has bound itself solidarily with DMI for the
obligations under the bonds.
An indispensable party is defined as "a party-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or
defendant." Without it, the court cannot act on the case not only as to the absent party
but also as to those present.
Even if assuming that DMI was indeed an indispensable party, the Regional Trial Court
should not have dismissed the case but should have ordered the petitioner to implead
the indispensable party, which can be done on motion of the party or on the court's own
initiative at any stage of the action.
Polytrade Corp vs. Blanco
30 SCRA 187
Facts:
Polytrade wants to recover the purchase price of rawhide which it delivered to Blanco, thus it instituted a suit
against Blanco in the CFI of Bulacan. Polytrade’s principal office is in Makati, Rizal. Blanco is a resident of
Bulacan. Blanco filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. He alleges that the suit can only be
instituted in the courts of Manila since they had an agreement stating that “the parties agree to sue and be sued in
the courts of Manila.” Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
Issue: WON the denial of the motion to dismiss is proper.
Held:
Yes.
The stipulation that “the parties agree to sue and be sued in the courts of Manila,” does not preclude the filing of
suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties merely consented to be sued
in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are
totally absent therefrom. For, that agreement did not change or transfer venue. It simply is permissive. The parties
solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may resort. They did not waive their right to
pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
——————————
The provisions of the Rules of Court on venue of personal actions provides that “actions may be commenced and
tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.” “By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may
be changed or transferred from one province to another.”
CASE DIGEST: HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR. v. JUANA GONZALES
FACTS: Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina Aguilar (Capitolina) with whom
he had seven children. When Capitolina died in March 1994. Dr. Favis married Juana Gonzalez
(Juana), his common-law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis (Mariano), he
executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano is married to
Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four children.
Dr. Favis died intestate on July 29, 1995. On October 16, 1994, prior his death, he allegedly executed a
Deed of Donation transferring and conveying properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana.
Claiming the said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with Capitolina, petitioners
herein, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation, inventory, liquidation, liquidation and
partition of property before the RTC against Juana, Sps. Mariano and Larcelita and their
grandchildren as respondents.
RTC nullified the Deed of Donation. The trial court found that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued
with illnesses, could not have had full control of his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of
Donation.
The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners nullification case. The CA motu
proprioproprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners to make an averment
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family
Court.
ISSUE: May the appellate court dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for
failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made?
HELD: The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint.
The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. The appellate courts
decision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code, Art.151.No suit between members of the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no
such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
The appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides: Section 1. Grounds. - Within the time for but before filing the answer to
the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
The appellate courts reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the grounds for a motion
to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9
which specifically deals with dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may
motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis
pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action.
It was in Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas cited in P.L. Uy Realty Corporation v. ALS
Management and Development Corporation where we noted that the second sentence of Section 1 of
Rule 9 does not only supply exceptions to the rule that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases motu proprio on
any of the enumerated grounds. The tenor of the second sentence of the Rule is that the allowance of a
motu propio dismissal can proceed only from the exemption from the rule on waiver; which is but
logical because there can be no ruling on a waived ground.
A failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members of the
same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action.
In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The complaint of
petitioners was answered by respondents without a prior motion to dismiss having been filed. The
decision in favor of the petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of the alleged error in
the ruling on the merits, no mention having been made about any defect in the statement of a cause of
action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with a
condition precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the
appeal that respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly
applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not, after filing
their answer to petitioners complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on
earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or
basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioners complaint.
The correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of Appeals. The respondents opted to rely
only on what the appellate court considered, erroneously though, was a procedural infirmity. The trial
court's factual finding, therefore, stands unreversed; and respondents did not provide us with any
argument to have it reversed.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and the Judgment of the Regional Trial
Court is AFFIRMED. GRANTED.
Nation Petroleum Gas VS RCBC
FACTS:
Respondent filed against petitioner a Complaint5 for civil damages arising from estafa in relation to violations
of the Trust Receipts Law. after an ex parte hearing was conducted, respondent’s prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment was granted and the corresponding writ was issued.6 Thereafter, Sheriff Leodel N.
Roxas served upon petitioners a copy of the summons, complaint, application for attachment, respondent’s
affidavit and bond, and the order and writ of attachment.
Petitioners filed through counsel a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss8 on November 15, 2006. They
asserted that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the corporation since the summons was improperly
served upon Claudia Abante (Abante), who is a mere liaison officer and not one of the corporate officers
specifically enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules. the RTC denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and
ruled that there was valid service of summons. CA affirmed RTC decision.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF
THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON ITS MERE EMPLOYEE.
RULING: YES.
Service of summons on Domestic Corporation, partnership or other juridical entity is governed by Section 11,
Rule 14 of the Rules, which states:
SECTION 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a corporation, partnership
or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on
the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
In this case, Abante proceeded to receive the summons and accompanying documents only after receiving
instructions to do so from Melinda Ang, an individual petitioner herein and the petitioner corporation’s
corporate secretary. It is clear, therefore, that Abante, in so receiving the summons, did so in representation of
Ang who, as corporate secretary, is one of the officers competent under the Rules of Court to receive summons
on behalf of a private juridical person. Thus, while it may be true that there was no direct, physical handing of
the summons to Ang, the latter could at least be charged with having constructively received the same, which in
Our view, amounts to a valid service of summons.
City of Dumaguete vs PPA
FACTS: Petitioner, through Mayor Remollo filed before the RTC an Application for Original Registration of
Title over a parcel of land with improvements under the Property Registration Decree. The Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, and respondent, represented by the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel, filed separate Oppositions 6 to the application for registration of petitioner. Both the
Republic and respondent averred that petitioner may not register the subject property in its name since petitioner
had never been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said property for at least 30
years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and the subject property remains to be a portion of the
public domain which belongs to the Republic.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case. the RTC issued an Order12 granting the Motion to Dismiss to the respondent. In its Motion for
Reconsideration15 and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner contended that the dismissal of its
application was premature and tantamount to a denial of its right to due process. It has yet to present evidence to
prove factual matters in support of its application, such as the subject property already being alienable and
disposable at the time it was occupied and possessed by petitioner.
Respondent opposed the MR. Respondent based its Opposition on technical and substantive grounds. According
to respondent, the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner violated Sections 4 (Hearing of motion), 5 (Notice
of hearing), and 6 (Proof of service necessary), Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner did not set its Motion
for Reconsideration for hearing even when the said Motion could not be considered as non-litigable. The RTC
could not hear the motion for reconsideration ex parte as they are prejudicial to the rights of respondent.
Petitioner also failed to comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court when it did not attach to the
Motion for Reconsideration a written explanation why it did not resort to personal service of the said Motion.
Thus, respondent averred that the Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioner should be treated as a mere scrap
of paper with no legal effect.
RTC: Initially agreed with respondent that the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner violated Sections 4, 5,
and 6, Rule 15 and Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. However, after taking into consideration the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioner, the RTC issued another Order setting aside its Order
in the interest of justice and resolving to have a full-blown proceeding to determine factual issues in LRC Case
No. N-201.
CA: Set aside the orders of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in setting aside the orders promulgated by the RTC.
RULING: YES.
Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule,
and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is
practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory.
Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be
accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable, to begin with. In
adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter
of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for
violation of Section 11.
In this case, counsel for petitioner holds office in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, in the Visayas; while
counsel for respondent holds office in Quezon City, Metro Manila, in Luzon. Given the considerable distance
between the offices of these two counsels, personal service of pleadings and motions by one upon the other was
clearly not practicable and a written explanation as to why personal service was not done would only be
superfluous.43 In addition, we refer once more to the merits of the Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000, filed by petitioner, which
justify the liberal interpretation of Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court in this case.
Moreover, records reveal that the notices in the Motion were addressed to the respective counsels of the private
respondents and they were duly furnished with copies of the same as shown by the receipts signed by their staff
or agents. Consequently, the Court finds that the petitioner substantially complied with the pertinent provisions
of the Rules of Court and existing jurisprudence on the requirements of motions and pleadings.
G.R. No. 205428
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS (DPWH) vs
SPOUSES SENANDO SALVADOR and JOSEFINA SALVADOR
Del Castillo, J.
(Remedial Law: Motion for Reconsideration timely filing; Taxation Law: Capital Gains Tax;
Civil Law: Damages)
Summary:


If a pleading is filed by registered mail, the date of mailing shall be considered as the date of
filing. It does not matter when the court actually receives the mailed pleading
Capital gains tax on the transfer of the expropriated property cannot be considered as
consequential damages that may be awarded to the sellers of the property.
FACTS
Spouses Salvador are the registered owners of a parcel of land. The Republic filed a complaint for
expropriation. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) directed petitioner Republic to pay the spouses
consequential damages equivalent to the value of the capital gains tax and other taxes necessary for
the transfer of the expropriated property in the Republic’s name.
The Republic moved for partial reconsideration, specifically on the issue relating to the payment of
the capital gains tax, but the RTC denied the motion in its Order for having been belatedly filed. The
Republic filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration before the RTC via registered mail on September
28, 2012 and the trial court received the Republic’s motion only on October 5, 2012.
ISSUES
1. Whether the RTC correctly denied the Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration for having
been filed out of time; and
2. Whether the capital gains tax on the transfer of the expropriated property can be considered as
consequential damages that may be awarded to respondents.
RULING
1 . No, the RTC did not correctly deny the Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration for having
been filed out of time.
“Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that if a pleading is filed by registered mail, x x x
the date of mailing shall be considered as the date of filing. It does not matter when the court actually
receives the mailed pleading.”
In this case, the records show that the Republic filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration before the
RTC via registered mail on September 28, 2012. Although the trial court received the Republic’s
motion only on October 5, 2012, it should have considered the pleading to have been filed on
September 28, 2012, the date of its mailing, which is clearly within the reglementary period of 15 days
to file said motion, counted from September 13, 2012, or the date of the Republic’s receipt of the
assailed Decision.
2. No, the capital gains tax on the transfer of the expropriated property cannot be considered as
consequential damages that may be awarded to the respondents.
Consequential damages are only awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of
the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value.
In this case, no evidence was submitted to prove any impairment or decrease in value of the subject
property as a result of the expropriation. More significantly, given that the payment of capital gains tax
on the transfer· of the subject property has no effect on the increase or decrease in value of the
remaining property, it can hardly be considered as consequential damages that may be awarded to
respondents.
Case Digest: BANCO DE ORO UNIVERSAL BANK v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
Having failed to comply with the Credit Line Agreement (CLA) obligation, Banco de Oro Universal
Bank filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC) an application for an extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties against Gabriel and Ma. Geraldine Locsin. Subsequently, the
Locsins filed a complaint against BDO, the RTC Clerk of Court and Ex-Oficio Sheriff of Quezon City,
and Sheriff VI Marino V. Cahero, for Specific Performance, Tort and Damages with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The RTC
denied the issuance of a TRO.
A Supplemental Complaint was filed by the Locsins. They repleaded in toto the allegations in their
Complaint and additionally alleged that BDO proceeded with the public auction of the properties
covered by the mortgage in the CLA “contrary to law.”BDO admitted that the public auction took place
but it denied that it was contrary to law
More than eight months after the Locsins filed their Supplemental Complaint, BDO filed a
complaint against them before the Mandaluyong RTC for Collection of Sum of Money. To such, the
Locsins filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it should have been raised as compulsory
counterclaim in their complaint and by failing to raise it as such, it is now “barred by the rules.” The
RTC denied the same.
The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the Mandaluyong
RTC finding that BDO‘s complaint was a compulsory counterclaim which should have been raised in its
Answer to the Locsins‘ complaint, and having failed to do so, it is now barred.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BDO‘s complaint is barred for failure to raise it as a compulsory counterclaim in its
Answer to the Locsins‘ complaint
HELD:
The Court held that until after the Locsins allegedly refused and failed to settle the alleged deficiency
amount of their outstanding obligation, despite BDO‘s letter of demand sent to the Locsins, BDO‘s
cause of action had not arisen. BDO could not, therefore, have set its claim assuming arguendo that it
is a compulsory counterclaim.
The counterclaim must be existing at the time of the filing of the answer, though not at
the commencement of action-a premature counterclaim cannot be set in the answer. The party who
fails to interpose a counterclaim although arising out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction
or occurrence of the plaintiff‘s suit but which did not exist or mature at the time said party files his
answer is not thereby barred from interposing such claim in a future litigation.
The setting up of such “after-acquired counterclaim,” is merely permissive, not compulsory. At all
events, even if the claim of BDO is a compulsory counterclaim which should have been set up in its
Answer to the Locsins‘ Supplemental Complaint, technicality should give way to justice and equity to
enable BDO to pursue its “after-acquired” claim against the Locsins.
G.R. No. L-48610
SOLEDAD PROVIDO, plaintiff-appellant vs. OCTAVIO ACENAS etc , defendant-appellee
FACTS:
Plaintiff- appellant Soledad Provido was granted a homestead patent over a parcel of land consisting
of 79,986 sqm and located at Silway 7, Polomolok, South Cotabato on October 1, 1954. Said land was
sold to Acenas on October 15, 1963 who in turn sold it to the National Development Company (NDC)
in 1966. NDC then leased said land to Dole Philippines under a Grower Agreement.
On September 19, 1968, Provido filed an action seeking exercise her right to repurchase under Sec.
119 of CA 141 against Acenas. Acenas filed an answer stating that the plaintiff's complaint states no
cause of action and thta he no longer owns or holds the property concerned as same was sold to NDC.
Provido files her answer to the counterclaim on December 24, 1968, a motion for leave to amend
complaint in order to implead NDC and Dole. Defendants, both NDC and Dole filed motions to
dismiss on the grounds that the claim therein set forth had already been extinguished or was bound
by the Statute of LImitations and that the complaint did not state any cause of action.
CFI dismissed the case in so far as Dole and NDC were concerned. Provido filed a motion for
reconsideration which was also denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUEs:
1. Whether or not the plaintiff's right to repurchase has prescribed?
2. Whether or not Provido's complaint states a cause of action against Acenas?
RULING:
Assailed orders , SET ASIDE. Remanded for trial on the merits.
The original complaint clearly states a cause of action against Acenas namely the right given by law to
Provido to repurchase the property from the buyer within 5 years from the date of the sale. The
allegation in the answer that the NDC had already purchased the same from Acenas is of no
consequence, for it is not the allegation in the answer but those in the complaint which determine
whether or not the complaint itself states a cause of action.
The fact is if an original complaint already states a cause of action in favor of a plaintiff, the
subsequent filing of an amended complaint makes the filing retroact to the time the original
complaint was filed. (Pangasinan Transportation Co. vs. Philippine Farming Co. Ltd., 81 Phil 273)
Thus in so far as NDC and Dole is concerned, the filing of the amended complaint against them was
legally effectuated upon the filing of the original complaint (therefoe within the prescribed period of 5
years), they having immediately stepped into Acenas shoes.