Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11676
October 17, 1916
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANDRES PABLO, defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
At about noon of the 21st of October, 1915, Andres Pablo, a policeman of the municipality of Balanga,
went by order of his chief to the barrio of Tuyo to raid a jueteng game which, according to the information
lodged, was being conducted in that place; but before the said officer arrived there the players, perhaps
advised of his approach by a spy, left and ran away; however, on his arrival at a vacant lot the defendant
there found Francisco Dato and, at a short distance away, a low table. After a search of the premises he
also found thereon a tambiolo (receptacle) and 37 bolas (balls). Notwithstanding that the officer had seen
the men Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo leave the said lot, yet, as at first he had seen no material
proof that the game was being played, he refrained from arresting them, and on leaving the place only
arrested Francisco Daro, who had remained there.
In reporting to his chief what had occurred, the policeman presented a memorandum containing the
following statement: "In the barrio of Tuyo I raided a jueteng na bilat game, seized a tambiolo and bolas,
and saw the cabecillas Maximo MAlicsi and Antonio Rodrigo and the gambler Francisco Dato. I saw the
two cabecillas escape."
In consequence, chief of police Jose D. Reyes, on October 22, 1915, filed a complaint in the court of
justice of the peace charging the said Rodrigo, Malicsi, and Dato with having gambled at jueteng, in
violation of municipal ordinance No. 5. As a result of this complaint the accused were arrested, but were
afterwards admitted to bail.
At the hearing of the case Francisco Dato pleaded guilty. The other two accused, Maximo Malicsi and
Antonio Rodrigo, pleaded not guilty; therefore, during the trial the chief of police presented the
memorandum exhibited by the policeman Andres Pablo, who testified under oath that on the date
mentioned he and Tomas de Leon went to the said barrio to raid a jueteng game, but that before they
arrived there they saw from afar that some persons started to run toward the hills; that when witness and
his companion arrived at a vacant lot they saw Francisco Dato and a low table there, and the table
caused them to suspect that a jueteng game was being carried on; that in fact they did find on one side of
the lot a tambiolo and 37 bolas, but that they did not see the accused Rodrigo and Malicsi on the said lot,
nor did they see them run; and that only afterwards did the witness learn that these latter were
the cabecillas or ringleaders in the jueteng game, from information given him by an unknown person. In
view of this testimony by the police officer who made the arrest and of the other evidence adduced at the
trial the court acquitted the defendants Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi and sentenced only
Francisco Dato, as a gambler.
Before the case came to trial in the justice of the peace court the policeman Andres Pablo had an
interview and conference with the accused Malicsi and ROdrigo in the house of Valentin Sioson. On this
occasion he was instructed not to testify against Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in fact received through
Gregorio Ganzon the sum of P5.
By reason of the foregoing and after making a preliminary investigation the provincial fiscal, on December
1, 1915, filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Bataan charging Andres Pablo with the crime
of perjury, under the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1697. The following is an extract from the
complaint:
That on or about November 6, 1915, in the municipality of Balanga, Bataan, P.I., and within the
jurisdiction of this court, the said accused, Andres Pablo, during the hearing in the justice of the
peace court of Balanga of the criminal cause No. 787, entitled the United States vs. Antonio
Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi, for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 5 of the municipality of
Balanga, did, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affirm and swear in legal form before the justice
of the peace court as follow: `We did not there overtake the accused Antonio Rodrigo and
Maximo Malicsi, nor did we even see them run,' the said statement being utterly false, as the
accused well knew that it was, and material to the decision of the said criminal cause No.
787, United States vs. Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi. An act committed with violation of
law.
The case came to trial and on December 28, 1915, the court rendered judgment therein sentencing the
defendant to the penalty of two years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P100 and, in case of insolvency, to
the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The defendant was also disqualified
from thereafter holding any public office and from testifying in the courts of the Philippine Islands until the
said disqualification should be removed. From this judgment he appealed.
Francisco Dato, on testifying as a witness, said that when the policemen Andres Pablo and Tomas de
Leon arrived at the place where the jueteng was being played, they found the defendant gamblers,
Malicsi and Rodrigo; that, prior to the hearing of the case in the justice of the peace court, Malicsi and
Rodrigo ordered him to call Andres Pablo, who, together with witness, went to the house of Valentin
Sioson, where they held a conference; that witness pleaded guilty in the justice of the peace court, in
fulfillment of his part of an agreement made between himself and his two coaccused, Malicsi and Rodrigo,
who promised him that they would support his family during the time he might be a prisoner in jail; that
Andres Pablo did not know that they were gamblers, because he did not find them in the place where the
game was in progress, but that when witness was being taken to the municipal building by the policemen
he told them who the gamblers were who had run away and whom Andres Pablo could have seen.
Maximo Malicsi corroborated the foregoing testimony and further stated that, on the arrival of the
policemen who made the arrest and while they were looking for the tambiolo, he succeeded in escaping;
that Andres Pablo had known him for a long time and could have arrested him had he wished to do so;
that prior to the hearing he and his codefendants, ROdrigo and Dato, did in fact meet in the house of
Valentin Sioson, on which occasion they agreed that they would give the policemen Andres Pablo P20,
provided witness and Rodrigo were excluded from the charge; and that only P15 was delivered to the
said Pablo, through Gregorio Ganzon. This statement was corroborated by the latter, though he said
nothing about what amount of money he delivered to the policeman Pablo.
The defendant Andres Pablo testified under oath that, on his being asked by the justice of the peace how
he could have seen Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, he replied that he did not see them at the place
where the game was being conducted nor did he see them run away from there, for he only found the
table, the tambiolo, the bolas, and Francisco Dato; that he did not surprise the game because the players
ran away before he arrived on the lot where, after fifteen minutes' search, he found only the tambiolo and
the bolas; that on arriving at the place where the game was played, they found only Francisco Dato and
some women in the Street, and as Dato had already gone away, witness' companion, the policeman
Tomas de Leon, got on his bicycle and went after him; and that he found the tambiolo at a distance of
about 6 meters from a low table standing on the lot.
From the facts above related, it is concluded that the defendant Andres Pablo, who pleaded not guilty,
falsely testified under oath in the justice of the peace court of Balanga, Bataan, in saying he had not seen
the alleged gamblers Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo in the place where, according to the complaint
filed, the game of jueteng was being played and where the defendant and his companion, the policeman
Tomas de Leon, had found a table, tambiolo and bolas, used in the game of jueteng, while it was proved
at the trial that he did not them and did overtake them while they were still in the place where the game
was being played. But notwithstanding his having seen them there, upon testifying in the cause
prosecuted against these men and another for gambling, he stated that he had not seen them there,
knowing that he was not telling the truth and was false to the oath he had taken, and he did so willfully
and deliberately on account of his agreement with the men, Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in consideration of a
bribe of P15 which he had received in payment for his false testimony he afterwards gave.
Francisco Dato and Gregorio Ganzon corroborated the assertion that the policeman Andres Pablo
undertook to exclude the gamblers, Malicsi and Rodrigo, from the charge and from his testimony in
consideration for P15 which he received through Gregorio Ganzon.
Andres Pablo was charged with the crime of perjury and was afterwards convicted under Act No. 1697,
which (according to the principle laid down by this court in various decisions that are already well-settled
rules of law) repealed the provisions contained in articles 318 to 324 of the Penal Code relative to false
testimony.
By the second paragraph of the final section of the last article of the Administrative Code, or Act No.
2657, there was repealed, among the other statutes therein mentioned, the said Act No. 1697 relating to
perjury, and the repealing clause of the said Administrative Code does not say under what other penal
law in force the crime of false testimony, at least, if not that of perjury, shall be punished.
Under these circumstances, may the crime of perjury or of false testimony go unpunished, and is there no
penal sanction whatever in this country for this crime? May the truth be freely perverted in testimony
given under oath and which, for the very reason that it may save a guilty person from punishment, may
also result in the conviction and punishment of an innocent person? If all this is not possible and is not
right before the law and good morals in a society of even mediocre culture, it must be acknowledged that
it is imperatively necessary to punish the crime of perjury or of false testimony — a crime which can
produce incalculable and far-reaching harm to society and cause infinite disturbance of social order.
The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that by a natural law belongs
to the sovereign power instinctively charged by the common will of the members of society to look after,
guard and defend the interests of the community, the individual and social rights and the liberties of every
citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights.
The power to punish evildoers has never been attacked or challenged, as the necessity for its existence
has been recognized even by the most backward peoples. At times the criticism has been made that
certain penalties are cruel, barbarous, and atrocious; at other, that they are light and inadequate to the
nature and gravity of the offense, but the imposition of punishment is admitted to be just by the whole
human race, and even barbarians and savages themselves, who are ignorant of all civilization, are no
exception.lawphil.net
Notwithstanding that the said Act No. 1697 (which, as interpreted by this court in its decisions, was
deemed to have repealed the aforementioned article of the Penal Code relating to false testimony,
comprised within the term of perjury) did not expressly repeal the said articles of the Penal Code; and as
the said final article of the Administrative Code, in totally repealing Act No. 1697, does not explicitly
provide that the mentioned articles of the Penal Code are also repealed, the will of the legislation not
being expressly and clearly stated with respect to the complete or partial repeal of the said articles of the
Penal Code, in the manner that it has totally repealed the said Act No. 1697 relating its perjury; and,
furthermore, as it is imperative that society punish those of its members who are guilty of perjury or false
testimony, and it cannot be conceived that these crimes should go unpunished or be freely committed
without punishment of any kind, it must be conceded that there must be in this country some prior,
preexistent law that punishes perjury or false testimony.
There certainly are laws which deal with perjury or false testimony, like Law 7 et seq. of Title 2,
third Partida.
However, since the Penal Code went into force, the crime of false testimony has been punished under the
said articles of the said Code, which as we have already said, have not been specifically repealed by the
said Act No. 1697, but since its enactment, have not been applied, by the mere interpretation given to
them by this court in its decisions; yet, from the moment that Act was repealed by the Administrative
Code, the needs of society have made it necessary that the said articles 318 to 324 should be deemed to
be in force, inasmuch as the Administrative Code, in repealing the said Act relating to perjury, has not
explicitly provided that the said articles of the Penal Code have likewise been repealed.
This manner of understanding and construing the statutes applicable to the crime of false testimony or
perjury is in harmony with the provision of Law 11, Title 2, Book 3, of the Novisima Recopilacion which
says::
All the laws of the kingdom, not expressly repealed by other subsequent laws, must be literally
obeyed and the excuse that they are not in use cannot avail; for the Catholic kings and their
successors so ordered in numerous laws, and so also have I ordered on different occasions, and
even though they were repealed, it is seen that they have been revived by the decree which I
issued in conformity with them although they were not expressly designated. The council will be
informed thereof and will take account of the importance of the matter.
It is, then, assumed that the said articles of the Penal Code are in force and are properly applicable to
crimes of false testimony. Therefore, in consideration of the fact that in the case at bar the evidence
shows it to have been duly proven that the defendant, Andres Pablo, in testifying in the cause prosecuted
for gambling at jueteng, perverted the truth, for the purpose of favoring the alleged gamblers, Maximo
Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, with the aggravating circumstance of the crime being committed through
bribery, for it was also proved that the defendant Pablo received P15 in order that he should make no
mention of the said two gamblers in his sworn testimony, whereby he knowingly perverted the truth, we
hold that, in the commission of the crime of false testimony, there concurred the aggravating
circumstance of price or reward, No. 3 of article 10 of the Code, with no mitigating circumstance to offset
the effects of the said aggravating one; wherefore the defendant has incurred the maximum period of the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correccional in its medium degree, and a fine.
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from and sentence Andres Pablo to
the penalty of two years four months and one day of prision correccional, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas,
and, in case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, which shall not exceed
one-third of the principal penalty. He shall also pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Johnson, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., concurs in the result .
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 448
September 20, 1901
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.
Theofilus B. Steele, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
LADD, J.:
The offense charged in the complaint is punishable under the Penal Code now in force by arresto
mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas. (Art. 418.) By Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine
Commission, section 56 (6), Courts of First Instance are given original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in
which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be
imposed." The offense was therefore cognizable by the court below unless the fact that the appellant was
at the time of its alleged commission an employee of the United States military authorities in the
Philippine Islands, and the further fact that the person upon whom it is alleged to have been committed
was a prisoner of war in the custody of such authorities, are sufficient to deprive it of jurisdiction. We must
assume that both these facts are true, as found, either upon sufficient evidence or upon the admissions of
the prosecuting attorney, by the court below.
Setting aside the claim that the appellant was "acting in the line of duty" at the time the alleged offense
was committed, which is not supported by the findings or by any evidence which appears in the record,
the contention that the court was without jurisdiction, as we understand it, is reducible to two propositions:
First, that an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offense
under the Penal Code; and second, that if it is an offense under the Code, nevertheless the military
character sustained by the person charged with the offense at the time of its commission exempts him
from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.
As to the first proposition, it is true, as pointed out by counsel, that an assault of the character charged in
the complaint committed in time of war by a military person upon a prisoner of war is punishable as an
offense under the Spanish Code of Military Justice (art. 232), and it is also true that under the provisions
of the same Code (arts. 4, 5) the military tribunals have, with certain exceptions which it is not material to
state, exclusive cognizance of all offenses, whether of a purely military nature or otherwise, committed by
military persons. But the fact that the acts charged in the complaint would be punishable as an offense
under the Spanish military legislation does not render them any less an offense under the article of the
Penal Code above cited. There is nothing in the language of that article to indicate that it does not apply
to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the law. Under articles 4 and 5 of the Code of Military
Justice above cited a military person could not be brought to trial before a civil tribunal for an assault upon
a prisoner of war, but by the commission of that offense he incurred a criminal responsibility for which he
was amenable only to the military jurisdiction. That criminal responsibility, however, arose from an
infraction of the general penal laws, although the same acts, viewed in another aspect, might also, if
committed in time of war, constitute an infraction of the military code. We are unable to see how these
provisions of the Spanish Military Code, no longer in force here and which indeed never had any
application to the Army of the United States, can in any possible view have the effect claimed for them by
counsel for the appellant.
The second question is, Does the fact that the alleged offense was committed by an employee of the
United States military authorities deprive the court of jurisdiction? We have been cited to no provision in
the legislation of Congress, and to none in the local legislation, which has the effect of limiting, as
respects employees of the United States military establishment, the general jurisdiction conferred upon
the Courts of First Instance by Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission above cited, and
we are not aware of the existence of any such provision. The case is therefore open to the application of
the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special
character of the person brought before them for trial, a principle firmly established in the law of England
and America and which must, we think, prevail under any system of jurisprudence unless controlled by
express legislation to the contrary. (United States vs. Clark, 31 Fed. Rep., 710.) The appellant's claim that
the acts alleged to constitute the offense were performed by him in the execution of the orders of his
military superiors may, if true, be available by way of defense upon the merits in the trial in the court
below, but can not under this principle affect the right of that court to take jurisdiction of the case.
Whether under a similar state of facts to that which appears in this case a court of one of the United
States would have jurisdiction to try the offender against the State laws (see In re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep.,
149), it is not necessary to consider. The present is not a case where the courts of one government are
attempting to exercise jurisdiction over the military agents or employees of another and distinct
government, because the court asserting jurisdiction here derives its existence and powers from the
same Government under the authority of which the acts alleged to constitute the offense are claimed to
have been performed.
It may be proper to add that there is no actual conflict between the two jurisdictions in the present case
nor any claim of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunals. On the contrary it appears from the
findings of the court below that the complaint was entered by order of the commanding general of the
Division of the Philippines, a fact not important, perhaps, as regards the technical question of jurisdiction,
but which relieves the case from any practical embarrassment which might result from a claim on the part
of the military tribunals to exclusive cognizance of the offense.
The order of the court below is affirmed with costs to the appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
COOPER, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of the decision of the court, but am not prepared to assent to all that is said in the
opinion. An offense charged against a military officer, acting under the order of his superior, unless the
illegality of the order is so clearly shown on its face that a man of ordinary sense and understanding
would know when he heard it read or given that the order was illegal, and when the alleged criminal act
was done within the scope of his authority as such officer, in good faith and without malice, and where the
offense is against the military law — that is, such law as relates to the discipline and efficiency of the
Army, or rules and orders promulgated by the Secretary of War to aid military officers in the proper
enforcement of the custody of prisoners — is not within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil
Government. (In re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149.) The civil courts, however, may examine the evidence for
the purpose of determining whether the act alleged to be criminal was done in the performance of duty
under the circumstances above indicated, but should cease to exercise jurisdiction upon such facts
appearing.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179817
June 27, 2008
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I.
CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEÑA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati
City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No.
4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.1 A series of
negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the
militant soldiers that evening.
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes
IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised
Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 03-2784, "People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al."
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention,2 threw his hat in the political arena
and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.3
Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City,
Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and
Related Requests"4 (Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:
(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate (whether at the
Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in session, and to attend the regular and
plenary sessions of the Senate, committee hearings, committee meetings, consultations,
investigations and hearings in aid of legislation, caucuses, staff meetings, etc., which are
normally held at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City
(usually from Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);
(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine
Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop computer and the
appropriate communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line and internet access) in order that
he may be able to work there when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or
when the Senate is not in session. The costs of setting up the said working area and the related
equipment and utility costs can be charged against the budget/allocation of the Office of the
accused from the Senate;
(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his place of
detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at reasonable
times of the day particularly during working days for purposes of meetings, briefings,
consultations and/or coordination, so that the latter may be able to assists (sic) him in the
performance and discharge of his duties as a Senator of the Republic;
(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the
press or the media regarding the important issues affecting the country and the public while at the
Senate or elsewhere in the performance of his duties as Senator to help shape public policy and
in the light of the important role of the Senate in maintaining the system of checks and balance
between the three (3) co-equal branches of Government;
(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be
allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the media who
may wish to interview him and/or to get his comments, reactions and/or opinion at his place of
confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, particularly
when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in
session; and
(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the Senate and
related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July 2007 at the Senate of
the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City.5
By Order of July 25, 2007,6 the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down
to three.7 The trial court just the same denied the motion by Order of September 18, 2007. 8
Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, and
for prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff, resource persons
and guests from meeting with him or transacting business with him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii)
direct respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and guests and permit him
to attend all sessions and official functions of the Senate. Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the
maintenance of the status quo ante of having been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons
and guests9 at the Marine Brig.
Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of Staff, Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navy’s Flag Officer-in-Command, Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag;
Philippine Marines’ Commandant, Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila
Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo Obeña (Obeña).
Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since November 30, 2007,
been in the custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Custodial Center following the foiled take-over
of the Manila Peninsula Hotel10 the day before or on November 29, 2007.
Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as against the above-named
military officers-respondents. The issues raised in relation to them had ceased to present a justiciable
controversy, so that a determination thereof would be without practical value and use. Meanwhile, against
those not made parties to the case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from this Court. 11 Petitioner did not, by
way of substitution, implead the police officers currently exercising custodial responsibility over him; and
he did not satisfactorily show that they have adopted or continued the assailed actions of the former
custodians.12
Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in his Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the trial court:
I.
THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS CLEARLY
INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
A.
UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS ALREADY
CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE INSTANT CASE,
ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED AND, THEREFORE, STILL
ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;
B.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO (2)
COUNTS OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. HEREIN
ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF "COUP D’ETAT", A
CHARGE WHICH IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS A POLITICAL OFFENSE;
C.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO BEING
ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/ PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED TO THE
AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT
OAKWOOD;
II.
GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE BRIG’S
COMMANDING OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE SENATE SESSIONS;
III.
ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR
SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE
REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO WORK
AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;
- AND IV.
MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL TREATMENT OF
DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN THE CASE OF FORMER
PRESIDENT JOSEPH "ERAP" ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR MISUARI.13
The petition is bereft of merit.
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that
former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal,
when he filed a motion similar to petitioner’s Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention
prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of
innocence is still in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two
counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup
d’etat which is regarded as a "political offense."
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate
grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.
In sum, petitioner’s first ground posits that there is a world of difference between his case and that of
Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and other circumstances
which demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos.14
A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement.15
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.16 (Underscoring supplied)
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense,17 or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal action.18
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion
perpetua,19 is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable
penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the
crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied.20 The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in
a hearing of an application for bail21 or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction,22 justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the
proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense23 applies equally to
detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,24 it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners
and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not
forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more
limited than those of the public.
The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:25
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under
the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the
case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.
Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence
can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective
or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention.26 (Underscoring supplied)
These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent that confinement
restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears noting that in Jalosjos, which was
decided en banc one month after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could somehow
accomplish legislative results.27
The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full
enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the presumption of
innocence during the period material to the resolution of their respective motions. The Court
in Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption of innocence no longer operates in favor of the accused
pending the review on appeal of the judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a promulgation of
final conviction is made, the constitutional mandate ofpresumption of innocence prevails. 28
In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither denied nor disputed his
agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media access to him should cease after his
proclamation by the Commission on Elections.29
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk since
he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times he
was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.
Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on November
29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a
posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen
Incident,"30 proves that petitioner’s argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be
neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the
reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of bail.31 In cases involving non-bailable
offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is
established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. 32
Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo33 to buttress his plea for leeway because unlike
petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged with multiple murder
and multiple frustrated murder,34 was able to rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution. Notatu
dignum is this Court’s pronouncement therein that "if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only
on the theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than
face the verdict of the jury."35 At the time Montano was indicted, when only capital offenses were nonbailable where evidence of guilt is strong,36 the Court noted the obvious reason that "one who faces
a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee."37Petitioner’s petition for bail
having earlier been denied, he cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing
him out.
Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial court’s findings, Esperon did not overrule Obeña’s
recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions. Petitioner cites the Comment 38 of Obeña that he
interposed no objection to such request but recommended that he be transported by the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for deeming that
Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to the performance of petitioner’s duties, flatly rejected all his
requests, when what Esperon only disallowed was the setting up of a political office inside a military
installation owing to AFP’s apolitical nature.39
The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid objective that may
justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial detention.40 The officer with custodial
responsibility over a detainee may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure
the safety and prevent the escape of the detainee. 41 Nevertheless, while the comments of the detention
officers provide guidance on security concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the same manner
that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.
Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his mandate,
after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus
Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of proper representation, denying
the people’s will, repudiating the people’s choice, and overruling the mandate of the people.
Petitioner’s contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public official can not be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor."42
The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is no
"prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases,43 the Court categorically held that the doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not
obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters
elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and]
x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison."44
In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument,45 it is opportune to wipe out the lingering
misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful
restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be
harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the
people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.46 (Underscoring supplied)
Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have
also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor
Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of
the more serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged violation of the
equal protection clause.
In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention prisoners, petitioner
expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of being placed under
Senate custody or house arrest,47 yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to
others.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.48 That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner
failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December
2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as
senator-elect, and take his oath of office49 on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the
hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around,50 petitioner largely banks on
these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
Petitioner’s position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone, petitioner’s case fails
to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:
x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for
five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s
status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system.51
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 175888
February 11, 2009
SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; RAUL GONZALEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of Justice; EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary;
RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Government; SERGIO
APOSTOL, in his capacity as Presidential Legal Counsel; and L/CPL. DANIEL SMITH, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176051
February 11, 2009
JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, JOSE DE LA RAMA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, H.
HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., FLORIN HILBAY, and BENJAMIN POZON, Petitioners,
vs.
DANIEL SMITH, SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL SERGIO
APOSTOL, SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, The Special 16th
Division of the COURT OF APPEALS, and all persons acting in their capacity, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176222
February 11, 2009
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), represented by Dr. Carol Araullo; GABRIELA,
represented by Emerenciana de Jesus; BAYAN MUNA, represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo;
GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, represented by Rep. Liza Maza; KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU),
represented by Elmer Labog; KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), represented by
Willy Marbella; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), represented by Vencer Crisostomo; and
THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER, represented by Atty. Rachel Pastores, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as concurrent Defense Secretary,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO
ROMULO, JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, AND INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO,Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
These are petitions for certiorari, etc. as special civil actions and/or for review of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith v. Hon. Benjamin T. Pozon, et al., in CA-G.R. SP No.
97212, dated January 2, 2007.
The facts are not disputed.
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He
was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime on
November 1, 2005, as follows:
The undersigned accused LCpl. Daniel Smith, Ssgt. Chad Brian Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis, Keith
Silkwood and Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr. of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353, upon a complaint under oath filed by Suzette S. Nicolas, which
is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex "A," committed as follows:
"That on or about the First (1st) day of November 2005, inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo
City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused’s (sic), being then
members of the United States Marine Corps, except Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with lewd design and by means of force, threat and
intimidation, with abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of the intoxication of the victim, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sexually abuse and have sexual intercourse with or
carnal knowledge of one Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-year old unmarried woman inside a Starex Van with
Plate No. WKF-162, owned by Starways Travel and Tours, with Office address at 8900 P. Victor St.,
Guadalupe, Makati City, and driven by accused Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., against the will and consent of
the said Suzette S. Nicolas, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW."1
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States, entered into on February 10, 1998, the United States, at its request, was granted custody of
defendant Smith pending the proceedings.
During the trial, which was transferred from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zambales to the RTC of
Makati for security reasons, the United States Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring
defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was required.
On December 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati, following the end of the trial, rendered its Decision, finding
defendant Smith guilty, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence against
accused S/SGT. CHAD BRIAN CARPENTER, L/CPL. KEITH SILKWOOD AND L/CPL. DOMINIC
DUPLANTIS, all of the US Marine Corps assigned at the USS Essex, are hereby ACQUITTED to the
crime charged.
The prosecution having presented sufficient evidence against accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH, also of
the US Marine Corps at the USS Essex, this Court hereby finds him GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime of RAPE defined under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 8353, and, in accordance with Article 266-B, first paragraph thereof, hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalties provided for under
Article 41 of the same Code.
Pursuant to Article V, paragraph No. 10, of the Visiting Forces Agreement entered into by the Philippines
and the United States, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH shall serve his sentence in the facilities that
shall, thereafter, be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. Pending
agreement on such facilities, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is hereby temporarily committed to the
Makati City Jail.
Accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is further sentenced to indemnify complainant SUZETTE S. NICOLAS
in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as compensatory damages plus ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.2
As a result, the Makati court ordered Smith detained at the Makati jail until further orders.
On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of
Philippine law enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government, and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the United States
government, provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and the United States, referred
to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19, 2006 which states:
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America
agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between our two nations, Lance
Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned to U.S. military custody at the U.S.
Embassy in Manila.
(Sgd.) Kristie A. Kenney
Representative of the United States
of America
(Sgd.) Alberto G. Romulo
Representative of the Republic
of the Philippines
DATE: 12-19-06
DATE: December 19, 2006
and the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 which states:
The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines and the Embassy of the United
States of America agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between the two
nations, upon transfer of Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, from the Makati
City Jail, he will be detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S. Embassy Compound in a
room of approximately 10 x 12 square feet. He will be guarded round the clock by U.S. military personnel.
The Philippine police and jail authorities, under the direct supervision of the Philippine Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) will have access to the place of detention to ensure the United
States is in compliance with the terms of the VFA.
The matter was brought before the Court of Appeals which decided on January 2, 2007, as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, we resolved to DISMISS the petition for having become
moot.3
Hence, the present actions.
The petitions were heard on oral arguments on September 19, 2008, after which the parties submitted
their memoranda.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL Smith because, first of
all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional.
This issue had been raised before, and this Court resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the VFA.
This was in Bayan v. Zamora,4 brought by Bayan, one of petitioners in the present cases.
Against the barriers of res judicata vis-à-vis Bayan, and stare decisis vis-à-vis all the parties, the reversal
of the previous ruling is sought on the ground that the issue is of primordial importance, involving the
sovereignty of the Republic, as well as a specific mandate of the Constitution.
The provision of the Constitution is Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which states:
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of
America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
The reason for this provision lies in history and the Philippine experience in regard to the United States
military bases in the country.
It will be recalled that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, which laid the basis for the Philippine
Commonwealth and, eventually, for the recognition of independence, the United States agreed to cede to
the Philippines all the territory it acquired from Spain under the Treaty of Paris, plus a few islands later
added to its realm, except certain naval ports and/or military bases and facilities, which the United States
retained for itself.
This is noteworthy, because what this means is that Clark and Subic and the other places in the
Philippines covered by the RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947 were not Philippine territory, as they
were excluded from the cession and retained by the US.
Accordingly, the Philippines had no jurisdiction over these bases except to the extent allowed by the
United States. Furthermore, the RP-US Military Bases Agreement was never advised for ratification by
the United States Senate, a disparity in treatment, because the Philippines regarded it as a treaty and
had it concurred in by our Senate.
Subsequently, the United States agreed to turn over these bases to the Philippines; and with the
expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the territory covered by these bases were
finally ceded to the Philippines.
To prevent a recurrence of this experience, the provision in question was adopted in the 1987
Constitution.
The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence of foreign military
bases, troops or facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the Philippines and the foreign
sovereign State involved. The idea is to prevent a recurrence of the situation in which the terms and
conditions governing the presence of foreign armed forces in our territory were binding upon us but not
upon the foreign State.
Applying the provision to the situation involved in these cases, the question is whether or not the
presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed "under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate xxx and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State."
This Court finds that it is, for two reasons.
First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora,5 the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been
recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative
of the United States government.
The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not
detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. For this
is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally known practice by the
United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in
nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these policymaking agreements are merely
submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called Case–Zablocki Act, within sixty days from
ratification.6
The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of
August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the
Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.
The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty states:7
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA. Signed at Washington, August 30, 1951.
The Parties of this Treaty
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire
to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the
Pacific area.
Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common
bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side-by-side against imperialist aggression during the last
war.
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend
themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that
either of them stands alone in the Pacific area.
Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and
security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific
area.
Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or interpreted as in any way or sense
altering or diminishing any existing agreements or understandings between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America.
Have agreed as follows:
Article I. The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international
disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relation from the threat or use
of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
Article II. In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly
by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist
armed attack.
Article III. The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to
time regarding the implementation of this Treaty and whenever in the opinion of either of them the
territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external
armed attack in the Pacific.
Article IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties would be
dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in
accordance with its constitutional processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
Article V. For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an
armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its
jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.
Article VI. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and
obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article VII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of the Philippines and the United Nations of
America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when
instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Manila.
Article VIII. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after
notice has been given to the other party.
In withness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.
Done in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August, 1951.
For the Republic of the Philippines:
(Sgd.) Carlos P. Romulo
(Sgd.) Joaquin M. Elizalde
(Sgd.) Vicente J. Francisco
(Sgd.) Diosdado Macapagal
For the United States of America:
(Sgd.) Dean Acheson
(Sgd.) John Foster Dulles
(Sgd.) Tom Connally
(Sgd.) Alexander Wiley8
Clearly, therefore, joint RP-US military exercises for the purpose of developing the capability to resist an
armed attack fall squarely under the provisions of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is
the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing
agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense Treaty. The Preamble of the VFA states:
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire
to strengthen international and regional security in the Pacific area;
Reaffirming their obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951;
Noting that from time to time elements of the United States armed forces may visit the Republic of the
Philippines;
Considering that cooperation between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines promotes
their common security interests;
Recognizing the desirability of defining the treatment of United States personnel visiting the Republic of
the Philippines;
Have agreed as follows:9
Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to
submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress under the
Case–Zablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification. It is for this reason that the US has certified that it
recognizes the VFA as a binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this substantially complies
with the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution.10
The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact that the
presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence "allowed under" the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by both
the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no violation of the Constitutional provision resulting
from such presence.
The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to
abide by its terms and provisions.
The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the members of the US Armed Forces in the
Philippines, the following rules apply:
Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
xxx
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall
immediately reside with United States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the
offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal
notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to those
authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the
person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its position to
the United States Government regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take into full
account. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the United States
shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one year period will not include the time
necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period will not include any time during which scheduled trial
procedures are delayed because United States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine
authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.
Petitioners contend that these undertakings violate another provision of the Constitution, namely, that
providing for the exclusive power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure for all courts in the Philippines
(Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]). They argue that to allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power is
to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused, which also violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1.).
Again, this Court finds no violation of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment
of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused. 11
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one’s territory is immune from
local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign
military units around the world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation of the parties
involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can
exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.12
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is
curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered around the world, the laws
(including rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or apply – except to the extent agreed upon – to
subjects of another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as
visiting foreign armed forces.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some
aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like
Heads of State, diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to
enter another State’s territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).
Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes
to detention as against custody. The moment the accused has to be detained, e.g., after conviction, the
rule that governs is the following provision of the VFA:
Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
xxx
Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be
carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities. United States
personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and
detention after conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this
specific arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on
by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be "by Philippine authorities." Therefore, the
Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of
the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention
is not "by Philippine authorities."
Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives of the United
States towards an agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V,
Sec. 10 of the VFA.
Next, the Court addresses the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas (
552 US ___ No. 06-984, March 25, 2008), which held that treaties entered into by the United States are
not automatically part of their domestic law unless these treaties are self-executing or there is an
implementing legislation to make them enforceable.1avvphi1
On February 3, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution, thus:
"G.R. No. 175888 (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon v. Alberto Romulo, et al.); G.R. No. 176051 (Jovito R.
Salonga, et al. v. Daniel Smith, et al.); and G.R. No. 176222 (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan [BAYAN], et
al. v. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.).
The parties, including the Solicitor General, are required to submit within three (3) days a
Comment/Manifestation on the following points:
1. What is the implication on the RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement of the recent US Supreme
Court decision in Jose Ernesto Medellin v. Texas, dated March 25, 2008, to the effect that treaty
stipulations that are not self-executory can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them
into effect; and that, while treaties may comprise international commitments, they are not
domestic law unless Congress has enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an
intention that it be "self-executory" and is ratified on these terms?
2. Whether the VFA is enforceable in the US as domestic law, either because it is self-executory
or because there exists legislation to implement it.
3. Whether the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951 was concurred in by the US
Senate and, if so, is there proof of the US Senate advice and consent resolution? Peralta, J., no
part."
After deliberation, the Court holds, on these points, as follows:
First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin itself, because the parties
intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the Agreement is intended to carry out
obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has
been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce L/CPL
Smith before the court during the trial.
Secondly, the VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki Act, USC Sec.
112(b), inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements
registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The parties to
these present cases do not question the fact that the VFA has been registered under the Case-Zablocki
Act.1avvphi1
In sum, therefore, the VFA differs from the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Avena
decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), subject matter of the Medellin decision. The
Convention and the ICJ decision are not self-executing and are not registrable under the Case-Zablocki
Act, and thus lack legislative implementing authority.
Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US Senate on March 20,
1952, as reflected in the US Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, Second Session, Vol. 98 – Part 2,
pp. 2594-2595.
The framers of the Constitution were aware that the application of international law in domestic courts
varies from country to country.
As Ward N. Ferdinandusse states in his Treatise, DIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS, some countries require legislation whereas others do not.
It was not the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting Article XVIII, Sec. 25, to
require the other contracting State to convert their system to achieve alignment and parity with ours. It
was simply required that the treaty be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. With that, it
becomes for both parties a binding international obligation and the enforcement of that obligation is left to
the normal recourse and processes under international law.
Furthermore, as held by the US Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Rossi,13 an executive agreement is a
"treaty" within the meaning of that word in international law and constitutes enforceable domestic law visà-vis the United States. Thus, the US Supreme Court in Weinberger enforced the provisions of the
executive agreement granting preferential employment to Filipinos in the US Bases here.
Accordingly, there are three types of treaties in the American system:
1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties – These are advised and consented to by the US Senate in accordance
with Art. II, Sec. 2 of the US Constitution.
2. Executive–Congressional Agreements: These are joint agreements of the President and
Congress and need not be submitted to the Senate.
3. Sole Executive Agreements. – These are agreements entered into by the President. They are
to be submitted to Congress within sixty (60) days of ratification under the provisions of the CaseZablocki Act, after which they are recognized by the Congress and may be implemented.
As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been
given under it and this can only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form
of implementation of its provisions.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED, and the Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 97212 dated January 2, 2007 is MODIFIED. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as
constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in
accordance with the VFA, and respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith
negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on detention facilities
under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which the status quo shall
be maintained until further orders by this Court.
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve without delay the related matters pending therein,
namely, the petition for contempt and the appeal of L/CPL Daniel Smith from the judgment of conviction.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 125865
January 28, 2000
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the
MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the
custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol"
from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding
the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution
dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the
DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to
enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner
elevated the case to this Court viaa petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the
Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in
court.1âwphi1.nêt
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is
covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only
preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu
propio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process
was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the
prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged
utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time. 1 At
any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in
the dropping of the charges.2
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official
capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was done in
"official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within the ambit of
Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it
must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws
do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. 3 The imputation
of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public
official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act
done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. 4 It appears that even
the government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner
and that of the DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is
such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action
relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions.5 As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official
duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that
preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at
bar.6 Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law.7 The rule on the criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.8 Besides the absence of preliminary investigation does
not affect the court's jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective.9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 136149-51
September 19, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL alias "WARPAN," appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested
committed "no other crime." Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal
possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense. Hence, where an
accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14
rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the
separate offense of illegal possession of firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have
aggravated the direct assault.
The Case
Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as "Warpan," appeals before us the September 17, 1998
Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), which found him guilty of
three out of the four charges lodged against him.
Filed against appellant were four Informations,2 all signed by Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Ricardo
G. Cabaron and dated September 25, 1997. The first Information3 was for maintaining a den for the use of
regulated drugs. It reads as follows:
"That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan Ladjaalam being then the owner of a
residential house located at Rio Hondo,4 this City, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding
and assisting x x x his co-accused wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, maintain said house as a den, where regulated drug [was] used
in any form."5
The second Information6 charged appellant with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. We quote
it below:
"That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, mutually
aiding and assisting with one another, without any justifiable reason or purpose other than to use it in the
commission of crime, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in their possession and
under their custody and control, the following weapons, to wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN 1555225 with
magazines and seven (7) rounds of live ammunition; two (2) magazines with twenty (20) and twenty[-one]
(21) rounds of live [ammunition]; one (1) homemade caliber .38 revolver with five (5) live ammunition; one
(1) M-79 (single) rifle with pouch and with five (5) empty shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber .38 with SN311092 with five live ammunition and one empty shell of [a] cal. 38 x x x Smith and Wesson; two (2) .38
Caliber paltik revolver with Serial Number 311092 and one defaced M79 grenade launcher paltik, without
first having obtained the necessary license and or permit therefor from authorities concerned, in flagrant
violation of the aforementioned law."7
The third Information,8 for multiple attempted murder with direct assault, was worded thus:
"That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed with M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16
Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, conspiring and confederating together,
mutually aiding and assisting x x x one another and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to kill SPO1 WILLIAM B. JONES, JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C.
RIVERA[,] SPO1 AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1 RICARDO J. LACASTESANTOS, in the following
manner, to wit: by then and there firing their M-14 x x x Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other
assorted firearms and explosives, aimed and directed at the fatal parts of the bodies of the above-named
police officers, well known to the accused as members of the Philippine National Police, Zamboanga City
Police Office, and as such, agents of a person in authority, who at the time of the attack were engaged in
the performance of their duties, that is, on the occasion when said officers were about to serve the
Search Warrant legally issued by the Regional Trial Court, this City, to the person of the accused thus
commencing the commission of crime of multiple murder directly by overt acts, and if the accused did not
accomplish their unlawful purpose, that is, to kill the above-named Police Officers, it was not by reason of
their own voluntary desistance but rather because of the fact that all the above-named police officers
were able to seek cover during the firing and were not hit by the bullets and explosives fired by the
accused and also by the fact said police officers were able to wrestle with two (2) of the accused namely:
Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were subdued and
subsequently placed under arrest; whereas accused PO2 Nurhakim T. Hadjula was able to make good
his escape and has remained at-large."9
In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs. 10
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini were
dismissed upon motion of the Office of the City Prosecutor, which had conducted a reinvestigation of the
cases as ordered by the lower court. The accused were consequently released from jail.
The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January 6, 1998, during which he
entered a plea of not guilty.11 After pretrial, the assailed Decision was rendered, the dispositive part of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a. ‘WARPAN’ "1. in Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of
Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, as amended, and SENTENCES said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱500,000.00) and to pay the
costs;
"2. In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to
Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended, and ACQUITS him of said crime with costs de oficio;
"3. in Criminal Case No. 14638, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as
amended by Republic Act. No. 8294, and SENTENCES said accused to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision
mayor as maximum and to pay a fine [of] THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) and pay the costs;
"4. in Criminal Case No. 14639, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Direct
Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide and SENTENCES said accused to an indeterminate
penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to SIX
(6) YEARS of prision correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) and to pay the costs." (emphasis in the original)
Hence, this appeal.12
The Facts
Prosecution’s Version
In its Brief,13 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:
"At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the issuance of a
search warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does (Exh. C). After the search warrant was
issued about 2:30 p.m. of the same day, a briefing was conducted inside the office of the AntiVice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga City Police Office in connection with the service of the search
warrant. The briefing was conducted by SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Chief of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit.
During the briefing, PO3 Renato Dela Peña was assigned as presentor of the warrant. SPO1 Ricardo
Lacastesantos and PO3 Enrique Rivera were designated to conduct the search. Other policemen were
assigned as perimeter guards (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 33-36).
"After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police Superintendent Edwin Soledad
proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife at Rio Hondo on board several police vehicles (TSN,
March 4, 1998, p. 32; April 22, 1998, p. 54). Before they could reach appellant’s house, three (3) persons
sitting at a nearby store ran towards the house shouting, ‘[P]olice, raid, raid’ (Ibid., March 3, 1998, pp. 41,
43-44; April 23, 1998, p. 4). When the policemen were about ten (10) meters from the main gate of the
house, they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire coming from the second floor of the house. There was
also gunfire at the back of the house (Ibid., March 5, 1998, pp. 14-16).
"SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Peña who were with the first group of
policemen saw appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them. They all knew appellant. When they were fired
upon, the group, together with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3 Obut and Superintendent Soledad, sought cover at
the concrete fence to observe the movements at the second floor of the house while other policemen
surrounded the house (Ibid., March 4, 1998, pp. 50-51).
"In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence (Ibid., pp. 45-46, 57-59,
73-76). Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and Obut entered the door of the extension
building. Gaganting opened the main (steel) gate of the house. The other members of the team then
entered. Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered the house through the main door and went inside the sala of
the ground floor while other policemen surrounded the house. Two (2) old women were in the sala
together with a young girl and three (3) children. One of the old women took the children to the second
floor while the young girl remained seated at the corner (Ibid., pp. 19-21).
"Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing an M14
rifle at them through the window. While they were going upstairs, appellant noticed their presence. He
went inside the bedroom and, after breaking and removing the jalousies, jumped from the window to the
roof of a neighboring house. Seeing this, Mirasol rushed downstairs and asked help from the other
members of the raiding team to arrest appellant. Lacastesantos went to the second floor and shouted to
the policemen outside not to fire in the direction of the second floor because there were children. Mirasol
and SPO1 Cesar Rabuya arrested appellant at the back of his house after a brief chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23).
"At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on top of the sofa at the
sala on the second floor (Ibid., P. 27). The rifle bore Serial No. 1555225. He removed the magazine from
the rifle and the bullet inside the chamber of the rifle. He counted seventeen (17) live ammunition inside
the magazine. He saw two (2) more M14 rifle magazines on the sofa, one with twenty (20) live
ammunition (Exh. G-3) and another with twenty-one (21) live ammunition (Exh. G-4). He likewise saw
three (3) M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G-2) in a corner at the second floor (TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32,
53-57).
"After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellant’s house, Rivera, Dela Peña, Gregorio and Obut
followed and entered the house. After identifying themselves as members of the PNP Anti-Vice/Narcotics
Unit, Obut presented to the old women a copy of the search warrant. Dela Peña and Rivera then
searched appellant’s room on the ground floor in the presence of Punong Barangay Elhano (TSN, March
3, 1998, pp. 41-43). On top of a table was a pencil case (Exh. J) with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils
inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or ‘shabu’.
"Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different denominations (Exh. W;
TSN, April 28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38 caliber revolver (Exh. B-2) with five (5) live
[ammunition], one (1) M79 single rifle with [a] pouch containing five (5) empty shells of an M79 rifle (Exh.
B-4), and one (1) empty shell of an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-32).
"Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga Police. [O]n
the morning of September 24, 1997, he was instructed by SPO2 Gaganting to go to appellant’s house to
buy ‘shabu.’ Locson knew appellant as a seller of ‘shabu’ (TSN, April 22, 1998, p. 5) and had been to
appellant’s house about fifteen (15) times before. He went to Rio Hondo and arrived at appellant’s house
at 3:20 p.m. He bought P300.00 worth of ‘shabu’ from appellant. The latter got three (3) decks of shabu
from his waist bag. Appellant instructed Locson to go behind the curtain where there was a table. There
were six (6) persons already smoking. There was a lighted kerosene lamp made of a medicine bottle
placed on the table. They asked Locson to smoke ‘shabu’ and Locson obliged. He placed the three (3)
decks of ‘shabu’ he bought on the table (Ibid., pp. 8-15).
"While they were smoking ‘shabu,’ Locson heard gunfire coming from appellant’s house. They all stood
and entered appellant’s compound but were instructed to pass [through] the other side. They met
appellant at the back of his house. Appellant told them to escape ‘because the police are already here.’
They scampered and ‘ran away because there were already shots.’ Locson jumped over the fence and
ran towards the seashore. Upon reaching a place near the Fisheries School, he took a tricycle and went
home (Ibid., pp. 17-19).
"The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed an affidavit (Exh. M)
narrating what transpired at appellant’s house [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997.
"After the search and before returning to the police station, P03 Dela Peña prepared a ‘Receipt for
Property Seized’ (Exh. P & 3) listing the properties seized during the search. The receipt was signed by
Dela Peña as the seizure officer, and by Punong Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano and radio reporter Jun
Cayona as witnesses. A copy of the receipt was given to appellant but he refused to acknowledge the
properties seized (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 11-12).
"An examination conducted by Police Inspector Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service Office 9, on the paraffin casts taken from both hands of appellant yielded positive for
gunpowder nitrates (Exh. A-3), giving rise to the possibility that appellant had fired a gun before the
examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 11). Gunpowder residue examinations conducted on September 26,
1997 showed that the following firearms ‘were fired’ (Exh. B-5): a .38 caliber revolver (homemade) with
Serial No. 311092 (Exh. B-1), another .38 caliber revolver (homemade) without a serial number (Exh. B2), a Cal. 7.62 mm M14 U.S. rifle with Serial No. 1555225 (Exh. B-3), and an M79 rifle without a serial
number (Exh. B-4). They were fired within five (5) days prior to the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp.
16-21).
"With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination conducted by Police Inspector Susan M.
Cayabyab, likewise a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the fifty (50)
pieces of folded aluminum foils each containing white crystalline granules with a total weight of 1.7426
grams (Exh. J-1 to J-50) yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) (Exh. L). However, the examination of one (1) crystalline stone weighing 83.2674 grams (Exh. K)
yielded negative results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. L).
"The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and Explosive Section
show that appellant ‘had not applied/filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition
or x x x been given authority to carry [a] firearm outside of his residence’ (Exh. X)" 14
Defense’s Version
Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts given by the lower court. 15 Hence, we quote the
pertinent parts of the assailed Decision:
"Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. ‘Warpan’, 30 years old, married, gave his occupation as
‘smuggling’ (tsn, p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to go to Labuan in Malaysia and bring cigarettes to the
Philippines without paying taxes (tsn, pp. 40-41, id). He said that his true name [was] Abdul Nasser
Abdurakman and that Warpan or Walpan Ladjaalam [was] only his ‘alias’. However, he admitted that
more people kn[e]w him as Walpan Ladjaalam rather than Abdul Nasser Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-40; 4647, id). He testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, when he was arrested by the police, he
was sleeping in the house of Dandao, a relative of his wife. He was alone. He slept in Dandao’s house
and not in his house because they ha[d] ‘a sort of a conference’ as Dandao’s daughter was leaving for
Saudi Arabia. He noticed the presence of policemen in his neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio Hondo when he
heard shots. He woke up and went out of the house and that was the time that he was arrested. He said
he was arrested ‘xxx [at] the other side of my house; at the other side of the fence where I was sleeping.
xxx. At the back of my house’ (tsn, p. 7, id.). He does not know who arrested him ‘considering that the
one who arrested me does not have nameplate.’ He was arrested by four (4) persons. Not one of those
who arrested him testified in Court. He was handcuffed and placed inside a jeep parked at Rio Hondo
Elementary School. According to him, he did not fire a gun at the policemen from [t]he second floor of his
house. He said the ‘policemen’ [were] ‘the one[s] who fire[d] at us’ (tsn, p. 5, id.). If he fired a gun at the
policemen for sure they [would] die ‘[b]ecause the door is very near x x x the vicinity of my house’. He
does not own the M14 rifle (Exh. ‘B-3’) which according to policemen, he used in firing at them. The gun
does not belong to him. He does not have a gun like that (tsn, p. 15, id.). A policeman also owns an M14
rifle but he does not know the policeman (tsn, pp. 16-17, id). He said that the M79 rifle (Exh. ‘B-4’), the
three (3) empty M16 rifle magazines (Exh. ‘G’; ‘G-1’ to ‘G-2’), the two (2) M14 magazines with live
ammunition (Exh. ‘G-3’; ‘G-4’); the two (2) caliber .38 revolvers (Exhs. ‘B-1’; ‘B-2’), the fifty (50) aluminum
foils each containing shabu (Exhs. ‘J-1’ to ‘J-50’) placed inside a pencil case (Exh. ‘J’, the assorted coins
placed inside a blue bag (Exh. ‘W’) and the white crystalline stone (Exh. ‘K’) all do not belong to him. He
said that the policemen just produced those things as their evidence. The firearms do not belong to him.
They were brought by the policemen (tsn, p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue bag containing
assorted coins, he said: ‘that is not ours, I think this (is) theirs, xxx they just brought that as their evidence’
(tsn, pp. 15-24, id.)
"Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension house. He affirmed
that he owns that house. Four (4) persons were staying in the extension house. He could only recognize
the husband whose name is Momoy. They are from Jolo. They left the place already because they were
afraid when the police raided the place. (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 4, 1998). He does not know prosecution
witness Rino Locson y Bartolome. Although Locson recognized him, in his case he does not know Locson
and he does not recognize him (tsn, p.11, id). He did not sell anything to Locson and did not entertain
him. He is not selling shabu but he knows ‘for a fact that there are plenty of person who are engaged in
selling shabu in that place’, in that area known as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. One of them is Hadji Agbi (tsn,
pp.11-14, id).
"After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the police station where he stayed for one day and
one night before he was transferred to the City jail. While at the police station, he was not able to take a
bath. He smokes two packs of cigarette a day. While he was at the police station, he smoked [a] cigarette
given to him by his younger sister. He lighted the cigarettes with [a] match. From the police station, he
was brought to the PNP Regional Office at R.T. Lim Boulevard where he was subject to paraffin
examination (tsn, pp. 24-26, May 4, 1998).
"During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi, and Jecar (Sikkal)
Usman, the younger brother of his wife were killed. Walpan Ladjaalam said that he saw that ‘it was the
policeman who shot them[,] only I do not know his name." They were killed at the back of his house. He
said that no charges were filed against the one responsible for their death (tsn, pp. 30-33- May 4, 1998).
"Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan Ladjaalam whom he
calls ‘Hadji Id’ at the time the police raided the house. She is the mother of Ahma Sailabbi. She was
together with Babo Dandan, two small children and a helper when ‘soldiers’ entered the house. ‘(W)hen
they arrived, they kept on firing (their guns) even inside the house’ (tsn, p.5, May 5, 1998). They were
armed with short and long firearms. They searched the house and scattered things and got what they
wanted. They entered the room of Walpan Ladjaalam. They tried to open a bag containing jewelry. When
Anilhawa tried to bring the bag outside the room, they grabbed the bag from her and poked a gun at her.
At that time Walpan Ladjaalam was not in the house. Ahamad Sailabbi was also not in the house. A
Search Warrant was shown to Anilhawa after the search was conducted and just before the policemen
left the place. Anilhawa Ahamad said that ‘it was already late in the afternoon[;] before they left that was
the time the Search Warrant (was) given to us by xxx Barangay Captain Hussin Elhano’ (tsn, pp.6-8, May
5, 1998). Barangay Chairman Elhano arrived ‘already late in the afternoon, almost sundown’ (tsn, p. 9,
id). Anilhaw declared that aside from a bag containing jewelry and a bag full of money, she had not seen
anything else that was taken from Walpan Ladjaalam’s house (tsn, pp. 9-12, id).
"Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified that about 4:00 o’clock [o]n the afternoon of
September 24, 1997, ha was standing in front of his house when policemen arrived and immediately
arrested him. He was about to go to the City Proper to buy articles he was intending to bring to Sabah. He
had ‘around P50,000.00’ placed inside a waist bag tied around his waist. The policemen told him to lie
down in prone position and a policeman searched his back. They pulled his waist bag and took his
DiaStar wrist watch. He was shot three times and was hit on the forehead leaving a scar. His injury was
not treated. He was taken to the police station where he was detained for one day and one night. He was
detained at the City Jail for three months and five days after which he was released (tsn, pp. 25-29, May
5, 1998).
"Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was in
the house of her parents lying together with her husband Sikkal Usma. There is only one house between
her parents’ house and the house of Walpan Ladjaalam. Her husband Sikkal Usman is the brother of Nurin Ladjaalam, Walpan’s wife. When Melba heard shots, she went downstairs. A policeman was looking for
her husband. The policeman called her husband. When her husband went down, he was instructed by
the policeman to lie down in prone position. Then the policeman shot her husband. The policeman had
two other companions who also shot her husband while he was lying down in prone position (tsn, pp.2-7,
May 5, 1998).
"Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was
sitting at the door of her house watching her children playing when a motorcyle, driven by a person,
stopped near her house. The driver was Gaganting whom she called a soldier. He went down from his
motorcycle, pulled a gun and poked it at Murkisa. Murkisa stood up and raised her hands. She got her
children and when she was about to enter the room of her house, Gaganting again poked a gun at her
and ‘there was a shot.’ As a result of firing, three persons died, namely, Sikkal Usman, Boy Ladjaalam
and Atip Sapali Sali (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 5, 1998).
"Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old, testified that about 4:00 o ‘clock [o]n the afternoon
of September 24, 1997, he was fetched by two policemen at Catabangan where he was attending a
seminar. Because of traffic along the way, they arrived at the Rio Hondo already late in the afternoon. He
saw policemen were already inside the house. Upon entering the gate, he saw Walpan at the gate
already handcuffed. Walpan called him but the police advised him not to approach Walpan. The search
was already over and things were already taken inside the house. When he went inside the house, he
saw ‘the things that they (policemen) searched, the firearms and the shabu‘ (tsn, p. 17. May 8, 1998). He
did not see the Search Warrant. What was shown to him were the things recovered during the search
which were being listed. They were being counted and placed on a table. ‘Upon seeing the things that
were recovered during the search, I just signed the receipt (Exh. "P"; "P-1") of the things x x x taken
during the search" (tsn, pp. 17-18. May 8, 1998). He saw three dead bodies at the side of the fence when
he went to the other side of the house. The three persons were killed outside the fence of Walpan
Ladjaalam (tsn, p. 18, id)."16
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court observed that the house of appellant was raided on September 24, 1997 by virtue of
Search Warrant No. 20 issued on the same day. However, the lower court nullified the said Warrant
because it had been issued for more than one specific offense,17 in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.18 The court a quo ruled:
"It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No. 20 is totally ‘null and void’ because it was
issued for more than one specific offense x x x contrary to Section 3, Rule 1[2]6 of the Rules of Court
which provides that ‘A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense xxx’. In Tambasan vs. People, 246 SCRA 184 (1995), the Supreme Court ruled that a
search warrant for more than one offense - a ‘scatter shot warrant’ - violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the
[R]evised Rules of Court and is ‘totally null and void.’" 19 (emphasis in the original)
Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellant’s arrest as valid. It emphasized that he had shot at the
officers who were trying to serve the void search warrant. This fact was established by the testimonies of
several police officers,20 who were participants in the raid, and confirmed by the laboratory report on the
paraffin tests conducted on the firearms and appellant. 21 Additionally, the judge noted that Appellant
Ladjaalam, based on his statements in his Counter Affidavit, impliedly contradicted his assertions in open
court that there had been no exchange of gunfire during the raid.22 The trial court concluded that the
testimonies of these officers must prevail over appellant’s narration that he was not in his house when the
raid was conducted.
Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the arrest of appellant, reasoning thus:
"Under the circumstances, the policemen ‘had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan Ladjaalam and
confiscate the firearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to enter his house to effect said arrest
and confiscation of the firearm.’ Under Rule 113, Section 5 (a), of the Rules of Court, ‘A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person xxx (w)hen in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.’ An offense is
committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an
arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. At the time the policemen
entered the house of accused Walpan Ladjaalam after he had fired shots at the policemen who intended
to serve the Search Warrant to him, the accused was engaged in the commission of a crime, and was
pursued and arrested after he committed the crime of shooting at the policemen who were about to serve
the Search Warrant."23
As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the following was also deemed valid: the M14 rifle
(with a magazine containing seventeen live ammunition) 24 used by appellant against the police elements,
two M14 magazines, and three other M16 rifle magazines.25 The trial court observed that these items
were in "plain view" of the pursuing police officers. Moreover, it added that these same items were
"evidence [of] the commission of a crime and/or contraband and therefore, subject to seizure" 26 since
appellant "had not applied for a license to possess firearm and had not been given authority to carry
firearm outside his residence."27
For being incredible and unsupported by evidence, appellant’s claim that the items that were seized by
the police officers had been planted was disbelieved by the trial court. It ruled that if the police officers
wanted to plant evidence to incriminate him, they could have done so during the previous raids or those
conducted after his arrest. To its mind, it was unbelievable that they would choose to plant evidence,
when they were accompanied by the barangay chairman and a radio reporter who might testify against
them. It then dismissed these allegations, saying that frame-up, like alibi, was an inherently weak
defense.28
The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug den. It reasoned as follows:
"The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and SPO1
Amado Mirasol, Jr. clearly established that Walpan Ladjaalam operated and maintained a drug den in his
extension house where shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, was sold, and
where persons or customers bought and used shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride by burning the
said regulated drug and sniffing its smoke with the use of an aluminum foil tooter. A drug den is a lair or
hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its existence [may be]
proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by proof of facts and circumstances,
including evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its general reputation among police officers.
The uncorroborated testimony of accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan’ that he did not maintain an
extension house or a room where drug users who allegedly buy shabu from him inhales or smokes shabu
cannot prevail over the testimonies of Locson, SPO1 Lacastesantos, and SPO1 Mirasol. He admitted that
he is the owner of the extension house but he alleged that there were four (4) occupants who rented that
extension house. He knew the name of only one of the four occupants who are allegedly from Jolo, a
certain Momoy, the husband. Aside from being uncorroborated, Walpan’s testimony was not elaborated
by evidence as to when or for how long was the extension house rented, the amount of rental paid, or by
any other document showing that the extension house was in fact rented. The defense of denial put up by
accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. 'Warpan’ is a weak defense. Denial is the weakest defense and cannot
prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence which deserve
no weight in law and cannot be given evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters. As between the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the
negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence."29
In conclusion, the trial court explained appellant’s liability in this manner:
"x x x. The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were about to enter his house to
serve a search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide[,] not
multiple attempted murder with direct assault[,] considering that no policeman was hit and injured by the
accused and no circumstance was proved to qualify the attempted killing to attempted murder.
"The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ cannot be held liable [for] the crime of Violation of
Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992, as amended, because the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils having
a total weight of 1.7426 grams all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in
his house are inadmissible as evidence against him considering that they were seized after [a] search
conducted by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 which is totally null and void as it was issued for more than
one offense, and were not found in ‘plain view’ of the police officers who seized them. Neither could the
accused be held liable for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition except for the (1) M14 rifle with
Serial Number 1555225 and with magazine containing fifteen (15) live ammunition and two more M14 rifle
magazines with twenty (20) and twenty-one (21) live ammunition respectively considering that the
policemen who recovered or seized the other firearms and ammunition did not testify in court. The blue
bag containing assorted coins cannot be returned to the accused Walpan Ladjaalam
a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ because according to the accused the blue bag and assorted coins do not belong to him[;]
instead the said assorted coins should be turned over to the National Treasury."30
The Issues
In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of Errors:
I
"The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil [had] fired first at the
police officers who went to his house to serve a search warrant upon him which led to an exchange of fire
between Ladjaalam and the police officer.
II
"The trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an ocular inspection of the
scene of the firefight and where the house of the appellant [was] located.
III
"The trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties
[excluded] the claim of the appellant that the firearms and methamphetamine hydrochloride (i.e. shabu)
were planted by the police."31
In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up these issues seriatim: (a) denial of the request for ocular
inspection, (b) credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and (c) the defense of frame-up. In addition, we
shall also discuss the proper crimes and penalties to be imposed on appellant.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue: Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection
Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his request for an ocular inspection of the Ladjaalam
residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would have afforded the lower court "a better perspective
and an idea with respect to the scene of the crime."32 We do not agree.
We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the light of the clear testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses.33 We note in particular that the defense had even requested SPO1 Amado
Mirasol Jr. to sketch the subject premises to give the lower court a fairly good idea of appellant’s
house.34 Viewing the site of the raid would have only delayed the proceedings. 35 Moreover, the question
whether to view the setting of a relevant event has long been recognized to be within the discretion of the
trial judge.36 Here, there is no reason to disturb the exercise of that discretion.37
Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. 38 Suffice it to state that the
trial court’s assessment of their credibility is generally accorded respect, even finality. 39 After carefully
examining the records and finding no material inconsistencies to support appellant’s claim, we cannot
exempt this case from the general rule.40 Quite the contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses positively
showed that appellant had fired upon the approaching police elements, and that he had subsequently
attempted to escape. SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr.41testified thus:
"PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the accused?
A: Yes.
Q: And it’s there where you were met by a volley of fire?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you were met by a volley of fire? ... You said you
were fired upon?
A: More or less, five (5) meters.
xxx
xxx
xxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the gate was opened by your colleague Felipe
Gaganting ... I will reform that question.
Q: Who opened the gate Mr. Witness?
A: SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and Allan Marcos Obut.
Q: And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fence?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went inside the house, right?
A: Yes.
Q: What did you see inside the house?
A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of Walfran [sic]
Ladjaalam at the ground floor. We went inside the sala on the ground floor of his house[;] I saw two old
woman.
xxx
xxx
xxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women?
A: I did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the ground floor. I was
concentrating on the second floor because Ladjaalam was firing towards our group so, I, together with
Ricardo Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second floor of the house.
Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of the house?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened when you were already on the second floor?
A: While we were proceeding to the second floor, Walfan [sic] Ladjaalam, noticed our presence and
immediately went inside the bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went immediately and jumped from the
window of his house x x x leading to the roof of the neighbor’s house.
xxx
xxx
xxx
COURT:
Reform. That is leading
Q: What happened when you entered and he jumped to the roofing of the neighbor’s house?
A: Immediately, I myself, we immediately went downstairs and asked the assistance of the members of
the raiding team to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.
xxx
xxx
xxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Were you able to go down?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened when you were there?
A: We immediately went out and I asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team and the
investigator of the unit especially SPO1 Cesar Rabuya. I was able to manage to arrest Walfan
Ladjaalam."42
What happened thereafter was narrated by Senior Police Officer Ricardo Lacastesantos, 43 as follows:
"Q: What did you notice [o]n the second floor?
A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw [an] M14 rifle and I shouted from the outside, ‘do not fire at
the second floor because there [are] a lot of children here.’
Q: Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14, where did you find this?
A: At the sala set.
Q: This sala set where is this located?
A: Located [on] the second floor of the house.
Q: Is there a sala [o]n the second floor?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you said you recovered from the sale set?
A: Yes.
Q: Why can you identify that?
A: The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I marked it with my initial.
Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell us where is the Serial No. of this?
A: 1555225 and I put my initial, RJL.
FISCAL NUVAL:
This is already marked as our Exhibit ‘B-3’ with magazine, one magazine and seven round [ammunition].
Q: After recovering this, what did you do with this firearm?
A: When I recovered it I removed the bullets inside the chamber[.] I removed the magazine and I turned it
over to the investigator.
Q: Where did you turn it over?
A: At the crime scene.
Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify this?
A: Yes.
Q: Why?
A: I put x x x markings.
xxx
xxx
xxx
COURT:
So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the M14 rifle you found six more magazines?
A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle magazines and three M14.
Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty?
A: Empty.
Q: How about the M14?
A: Found with [ammunition].
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines?
A: In the corner.
Q: What did you do with [these] three magazines of M16?
A: I turned [them] over to the investigator.
Q: Can you identify them?
A: Yes, because of my initials[.]
Q: Where are your initials?
A: On the magazines.
Q: RJL?
A: RJL."44
These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests conducted on appellant and on the weapons
seized during the raid. Both of his hands as well as the weapons, particularly the M-14 which he had
used, were positive for gunpowder nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes Delfin-Diestro explained in open
court:
"Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination, Madam Witness?
A: The result of the examination [was] that both hands of the subject person, ha[d] presence of gun
powder nitrates.
Q: What do you mean Madam Witness, what does that indicate?
A: It indicates there is presence of powder nitrates.
Q: Can we conclude that he fired a gun?
A: I cannot conclude that he fired a gun because there are so many circumstances [why] a person [would
be] positive on his hands for gun powder nitrates.
Q: But, most likely, he fired a gun?
A: Yes.
xxx
xxx
xxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit ‘B-3’, which is the M14 rifle. What did you do with this?
A: SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the barrel wherein I observed there [were] black
and traces of brown residue on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel.
Q: And, that indicates Madam Witness...?
A: It indicates that the gun was fired.
Q: Recently?
A: Because of the traces of brown residue, it could be possible that the gun was fired before the incident x
x x.
COURT:
Q: There is also black residue?
A: Yes.
Q: What does it indicate?
A: It indicates that the firearm was recently fired.
Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing of this Exhibit?
A: This one.
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit ‘B-3-A’.
COURT:
Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired, during the incident?
A: Yes.
Q: And also before the incident it was fired because of the brown residue?
A: Yes, Your Honor."45 (emphasis supplied)
Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements46 of the crime of illegal possession of firearms.
Undoubtedly, the established fact that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon the approaching police
officers clearly showed the existence of the firearm or weapon and his possession thereof. Sufficing to
satisfy the second element was the prosecution’s Certification47 stating that he had not filed any
application for license to possess a firearm, and that he had not been given authority to carry any outside
his residence.48 Further, it should be pointed out that his possession and use of an M-14 rifle were
obviously unauthorized because this weapon could not be licensed in favor of, or carried by, a private
individual.49
Third Issue: Defense of Frame-up
From the convoluted arguments strewn before us by appellant, we gather that the main defense he raises
is frame-up. He claims that the items seized from his house were "planted," and that the entire
Zamboanga police force was out to get him at all cost.
This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up is inherently weak, since it is easy to
fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove.50 Absent any showing of an improper motive on the part of the
police officers,51 coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty, such defense
cannot be given much credence.52Indeed, after examining the records of this case, we conclude that
appellant has failed to substantiate his claim. On the contrary, his statements in his Counter Affidavit are
inconsistent with his testimony during the trial.53 He testified thus:
"Q Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed an Affidavit/ a Counter-Affidavit?
A I could not remember.
Q I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was signed before this representation on the 8th day of
December 1997[;] tell us whose signature is this appearing above the typewritten name
FISCAL NUVAL:
Q . . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this?
(Showing)
A Yes, Sir. This is mine.
Q Now, in paragraph[s] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8; you stated in this Counter-Affidavit which I quote: ‘that I was
resting and sleeping when I heard the gunshots and I noticed that the shots were directed towards our
house.. and I inspected and x x x we were attacked by armed persons.. and I was apprehended by the
persons who attacked x x x our house’; [the] house you are referring to [in] this paragraph, whose house
[are you] referring to, is this [what] you are referring to [as] your house or the house of your neighbors
[from] which you said you heard gunshots?
A Our house.
Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated and I quote: ‘that [o]n that afternoon of
September 24, 1997, I was at home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim, my companions
in my house [were] the two old women and my children, is this correct?
A They were not there.
Q Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said that you were at home in [your] house at Aplaya,
Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim[;] which is which now, you were in your house or you were in your
neighbors[‘] house at that time when you heard gunshots?
A I was in the house near my house.
Q So, your statement particularly paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit that you were at home in [your]
house at Aplaya Riohondo Bo. Campo Muslim, is x x x not correct?
A Yes, Sir. This is not correct."54
Crime and Punishment
The trial court convicted appellant of three crimes: (1) maintenance of a drug den, (2) direct assault with
attempted homicide, and (3) illegal possession of firearms. We will discuss each of these.
Maintenance of a Drug Den
We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an offense for which
he was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly established by the testimony of
Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself had used the extension house of appellant as
a drug den on several occasions, including the time of the raid. The former’s testimony was corroborated
by all the raiding police officers who testified before the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of
the house and its extension lent credence to the prosecution’s story.
Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide
The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of direct assault55 with multiple counts of attempted
homicide. It found that "[t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle [at] the policemen[,] who were about
to enter his house to serve a search warrant x x x" constituted such complex crime. 56
We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the penalty of prision
correccional.57 Hence, for the present complex crime, the penalty for direct assault, which constitutes the
"most serious crime," should be imposed and applied in its maximum period. 58
Illegal Possession of Firearms
Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court
convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended
by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the trial court should not have
applied the new law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the applicable law should have been PD
1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294.
The trial court’s ruling and the OSG’s submission exemplify the legal community’s difficulty in grappling
with the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are opposing views on how to
interpret Section 1 of the new law, which provides as follows:
"SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read
as follows:
"Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. -- The penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos
(₱15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose,
or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar
firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000) shall
be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in
diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered
firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other
firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no
other crime was committed by the person arrested.
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an
element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible
officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow
any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or
persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow
any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their
residence in the course of their employment.
"The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm
outside his residence without legal authority therefor."
Citing People v. Jayson,59 the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does not cover the specific facts
of this case. Since another crime -- direct assault with multiple unlawful homicide -- was committed,
appellant cannot be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under the second paragraph of the
aforecited provision. Furthermore, since there was no killing in this case, illegal possession cannot be
deemed as an aggravating circumstance under the third paragraph of the provision. Based on these
premises, the OSG concludes that the applicable law is not RA 8294, but PD 1866 which, as worded prior
the new law, penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms even if another crime is committed at the
same time.60
Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be convicted of illegal
possession of firearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. It did not explain its
ruling, however. Considering that it could not have been ignorant of the proviso61 in the second
paragraph, it seemed to have construed "no other crime" as referring only to homicide and murder, in
both of which illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a crime
other than murder or homicide is committed, a person may still be convicted of illegal possession of
firearms. In this case, the other crime committed was direct assault with multiple attempted homicide;
hence, the trial court found appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of the statute. A
simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there
can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the "other crime" is murder
or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate
offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can
no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.62 In this case, the plain meaning of
RA 8294’s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is
justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the
accused.63 Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of
firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct
assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating
circumstance.
We reject the OSG’s contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294, should be
applied in this case.1âwphi1 When the crime was committed on September 24, 1997, the original
language of PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took effect on July 6,
1997.64 In other words, no longer in existence was the earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified a
conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate from any other crime. It was replaced by RA 8294
which, among other amendments to PD 1866, contained the specific proviso that "no other crime was
committed."
Furthermore, the OSG’s reliance on People v. Jayson65 is misplaced. True, this Court sustained the
conviction of appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had also committed homicide. We
explained, however, that "the criminal case for homicide [was] not before us for consideration."
Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for limiting
the proviso in the second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be
convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that "no other crime was committed by the
person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and
murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle,
an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the
first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade
conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter
offense,66 like alarm and scandal67 or slight physical injuries,68 both of which are punishable by arresto
menor.69 This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is
not subject to the Court’s review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be
addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached
from the manifest intendment and language of the legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to
applying the law and jurisprudence70 to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is
found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a
weapon, for which he is sentenced to 2 years and 4 months to 6 years of prision correccional; and (2)
maintaining a drug den, for which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua.
Costs against appellant.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a possible review, at its sound
discretion, of RA 8294.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 195064
January 15, 2014
NARI K. GIDWANI, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before us is a Petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision2 and the subsequent
Resolution3of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32642 dated 17 September 2010 and 6
January 2011, respectively.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner is the president of G.G. Sportswear Manufacturing Corporation GSMC), which is engaged in
the export of ready-to-wear clothes. GSMC secured the embroidery services of El Grande Industrial
Corporation El Grande) and issued on various dates from June 1997 to December 1997 a total of 10
Banco de Oro (BDO) checks as payment for the latter’s services worth an aggregate total of
₱1,626,707.62.
Upon presentment, these checks were dishonored by the drawee bank for having been drawn against a
closed account.
Thus, El Grande, through counsel, sent three demand letters regarding 8 of the 10 issued checks:4
Date of letter
BDO Check No.
Date of Check
Amount
24 September 1997 0000063646
4 September 1997
24 September 1997 0000059552
12 June 1997
412,000.00
0000063643
24 July 1997
138,859.69
0000063644
7 August 1997
138,859.69
0000063650
7 August 1997
144,457.56
0000063645
28 August 1997
138,859.68
0000063647
25 September 1997
130,000.00
0000063648
2 October 1997
130,000.00
8 October
P 130,000.00
On 15 October 1997,5 petitioner wrote to El Grande’s counsel acknowledging receipt of the 8 October
demand letter6 and informing the latter that, on 29 August 1997, GSMC had filed a Petition with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It was a Petition for the Declaration of a State of
Suspension of Payments, for the Approval of a Rehabilitation Plan and Appointment of a Management
Committee.7 Acting on the Petition, the SEC issued an Order8 on 3 September 1997 ordering the
suspension of all actions, claims, and proceedings against GSMC until further order from the SEC
Hearing Panel. Petitioner attached this SEC Order to the 15 October 1997 letter. In short, GSMC did not
pay El Grande.
Despite its receipt on 16 October 1997 of GSMC’s letter and explanation, El Grande still presented to the
drawee bank for payment BDO Check Nos. 0000063652 and 0000063653 dated November and
December 1997, respectively.
Thereafter, sometime in November 1997, El Grande filed a Complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila charging petitioner with eight counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P.
22) for the checks covering June to October 1997. El Grande likewise filed a similar Complaint in
December 1997, covering the checks issued in November and December 1997. Corresponding
Informations for the Complaints were subsequently filed on 1 October 2001.
For his part, petitioner raised the following defenses: (1) the SEC Order of Suspension of Payment legally
prevented him from honoring the checks; (2) there was no consideration for the issuance of the checks,
because the embroidery services of El Grande were of poor quality and, hence, were rejected; and (3) he
did not receive a notice of dishonor of the checks.
On 24 March 2008, after trial on the merits, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila found petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten counts of violation of B.P. 22. It ordered him to pay the face value
of the checks amounting to ₱1,626,707.60 with interest at the legal rate per annum from the filing of the
case and to pay a fine of ₱200,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.9 The MTC held
that the Petition for voluntary insolvency or a SEC Order for the suspension of payment of all claims are
not defenses under the law regarding violations of B.P. 22, since an order suspending payments involves
only the obligations of the corporation and does not affect criminal proceedings.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the findings of the MTC and likewise denied the
Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.10
Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 42.
In its Decision dated 17 September 2010, the CA found that the prosecution was able to establish that
petitioner had received only the 8 October 1997 Notice of Dishonor and not the others. The CA further
held that the prosecution failed to establish that the account was closed prior to or at the time the checks
were issued, thus proving knowledge of the insufficiency of funds.
Thus, the CA partly granted the appeal and acquitted petitioner of eight counts of violation of B.P. 22,
while sustaining his conviction for the two remaining counts and ordering him to pay the total civil liability
due to El Grande. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the assailed RTC
Decision dated January 29, 2009 and its Order dated June 5, 2009 are AFFIRMED with modifications: (a)
sustaining accused-appellant’s conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 301888 and 301889; (b) acquitting him in
Criminal Case Nos. 371112-13, 301883-87 and 301890; and (c) ordering him to pay private complainant,
El Grande Industrial Corporation, the aggregate amount of ₱1,626,707.62 representing the value of the
ten (10) BDO checks with interest at 12% per annum reckoned from the date of the filing of the
Information until finality of this Decision, and thereafter, the total amount due, inclusive of interest, shall
be subject to 12% annual interest until fully paid.
The rest of the Decision stands.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner filed his Motion for Partial Reconsideration on 11 October 2010,12 raising the following as his
defenses: (1) there was no clear evidence showing that he acknowledged the Notice of Dishonor of the
two remaining checks; (2) the suspension Order of the SEC was a valid reason for stopping the payment
of the checks; and, (3) as a corporate officer, he could only be held civilly liable.
On 6 January 2011, the CA denied the motion through its assailed Resolution.13
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner raises these two issues in the present Petition:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ORDER FOR THE
SUSPENSION OF PAYMENT ISSUED BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
IS NOT A VALID REASON TO STOP PAYMENT OF A CHECK EVEN IF SUCH ORDER WAS
ISSUED PRIOR TO THE PRESENTMENT OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS FOR PAYMENT;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING A CORPORATE OFFICER PERSONALLY
LIABLE FOR THE CIVIL OBLIGATION OF THE CORPORATION.14
We find the appeal to be meritorious.
The elements of a violation of B.P. 22 are the following:15
1) making, drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for value;
2) knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment;
and
3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or
dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment.
In convicting petitioner of two counts of violation of B.P. 22, the CA applied Tiong v. Co, 16 in which we
said:
The purpose of suspending the proceedings under P.D. No. 902-A is to prevent a creditor from obtaining
an advantage or preference over another and to protect and preserve the rights of party litigants as well
as the interest of the investing public or creditors. It is intended to give enough breathing space for the
management committee or rehabilitation receiver to make the business viable again, without having to
divert attention and resources to litigations in various fora. The suspension would enable the
management committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any
judicial or extrajudicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the "rescue" of the debtor
company. To allow such other action to continue would only add to the burden of the management
committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources would be wasted in defending
claims against the corporation instead of being directed toward its restructuring and rehabilitation.
Whereas, the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is designed to
prevent damage to trade, commerce, and banking caused by worthless checks. In Lozano v. Martinez,
this Court declared that it is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of
penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from
society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. Hence, the criminal
prosecution is designed to promote the public welfare by punishing offenders and deterring others.
Consequently, the filing of the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is not a "claim" that can be enjoined within
the purview of P.D. No. 902-A. True, although conviction of the accused for the alleged crime could result
in the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he
sustained by reason of the felonious act of the accused, nevertheless, prosecution for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 is a criminal action. (Emphasis supplied.) The CA furthermore cited Tiong in this wise: 17
Hence, accused-appellant cannot be deemed excused from honoring his duly issued checks by the mere
filing of the petition for suspension of payments before the SEC. Otherwise, an absurdity will result such
that " one who has engaged in criminal conduct could escape punishment by the mere filing of a petition
for rehabilitation by the corporation of which he is an officer." (Emphasis supplied.)
However, what the CA failed to consider was that the facts of Tiong were not on all fours with those of the
present case and must be put in the proper context. In Tiong, the presentment for payment and the
dishonor of the checks took place before the Petition for Suspension of Payments for Rehabilitation
Purposes was filed with the SEC. There was already an obligation to pay the amount covered by the
checks. The criminal action for the violations of B.P. 22 was filed for failure to meet this obligation. The
criminal proceedings were already underway when the SEC issued an Omnibus Order creating a
Management Committee and consequently suspending all actions for claims against the debtor therein.
Thus, in Tiong, this Court took pains to differentiate the criminal action, the civil liability and the
administrative proceedings involved.
In contrast, it is clear that prior to the presentment for payment and the subsequent demand letters to
petitioner, there was already a lawful Order from the SEC suspending all payments of claims. It was
incumbent on him to follow that SEC Order. He was able to sufficiently establish that the accounts were
closed pursuant to the Order, without which a different set of circumstances might have dictated his
liability for those checks.
Considering that there was a lawful Order from the SEC, the contract is deemed suspended. When a
contract is suspended, it temporarily ceases to be operative; and it again becomes operative when a
condition occurs – or a situation arises – warranting the termination of the suspension of the contract.18
In other words, the SEC Order also created a suspensive condition. When a contract is subject to a
suspensive condition, its birth takes place or its effectivity commences only if and when the event that
constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled. 19 Thus, at the time private respondent presented the
September and October 1997 checks for encashment, it had no right to do so, as there was yet no
obligation due from petitioner.
Moreover, it is a basic principle in criminal law that any ambiguity in the interpretation or application of the
law must be made in favor of the accused. Surely, our laws should not be interpreted in such a way that
the interpretation would result in the disobedience of a lawful order of an authority vested by law with the
jurisdiction to issue the order.
Consequently, because there was a suspension of GSMC s obligations, petitioner may not be held liable
for the civil obligations of the corporation covered by the bank checks at the time this case arose.
However, it must be emphasized that her non-liability should not prejudice the right of El Grande to
pursue its claim through remedies available to it, subject to the SEC proceedings regarding the
application for corporate rehabilitation.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 7
September 2010 and the Resolution dated 6 January 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32642 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. 301888 and 301889 are DISMISSED,
without prejudice to the right of El Grande Industrial Corporation to file the proper civil action against G.G.
Sportswear Manufacturing Corporation for the value of the ten (10) checks.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE C. MENDOZA*
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 150785
September 15, 2006
EMMA P. NUGUID, petitioner,
vs.
CLARITA S. NICDAO,1 respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Emma P. Nuguid assails the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. No. 23054:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED and the Assailed Decision dated
May 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court [RTC], Branch 5, Bataan, affirming the Decision dated
January 11, 1999 of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The petitioner CLARITA S. NICDAO is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner seeks a review of the decision with respect to the alleged lack of civil liability of respondent
Clarita S. Nicdao. Stemming from two cases of violation of BP 22,3 this petition involves the following
facts:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of Violation of BP 22 in
fourteen (14) counts. The criminal complaints allege that sometime in 1996, from April to August
thereof, [respondent] and her husband [,] of Vignette Superstore [,] approached [petitioner] and
asked her if they [could] borrow money to settle some obligations. Having been convinced by
them and because of the close relationship of [respondent] to [petitioner], the latter lent the former
her money. Thus, every month, she was persuaded to release P100,000.00 to the accused until
the total amount reached P1,150,000.00.
As security for the P1,150,000.00, [respondent] gave [petitioner] the following open dated
Hermosa Savings Bank (HSLB) (sic) with the assurance that if the entire amount is not paid
within one (1) year, [petitioner] can deposit the check:
Check No.
7277
7348
12118
8812
12102
7255
2286
8128
7254
7278
4540
4523
12103
7294
Amount
P100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
150,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
P1,150,000.00
In June 1997, [petitioner] together with Samson Ching demanded payment of the sums [abovementioned], but [respondent] refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Thus, on October 6,
1977, [petitioner] deposited all aforementioned checks in the bank of Samson Ching totaling
P1,150,000.00 since all the money given by her to [respondent] came from Samson Ching. The
checks were all returned for having been drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).
A verbal and written demand was made upon [respondent] to pay the amount represented by the
bounced checks, but [to] no avail. Hence, a complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed against the
[respondent]. 4(Citation omitted)
After petitioner instituted 14 criminal cases5 (docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9458-9471) for violation of
BP 22 involving the sum of P1,150,000, corresponding warrants of arrest were issued against
respondent. On November 12, 1997, respondent was arraigned. She pleaded not guilty and trial ensued.
In a decision dated January 11, 1999, Judge Manuel M. Tan of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Dinalupihan, Bataan found respondent guilty of the charges against her. Respondent was sentenced to
pay P1,150,000, plus interest, and to suffer imprisonment equivalent to one year for each violation of BP
22, or a total of 14 years of imprisonment.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan.
Respondent elevated the case to the CA. On October 30, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the lower
courts and acquitted respondent. According to the CA, certain substantial facts were overlooked by the
trial court. These circumstances, if properly considered, justified a different conclusion on the case. 6
Petitioner now comes to us, raising this main issue: whether respondent remains civilly liable to her for
the sum of P1,150,000. In this connection, she asserts that respondent obtained loans from her in the
aggregate amount of P1,150,000 and that these loans have not been paid.
From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against the State
because of the disturbance of the social order and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by
the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others (wherein no
civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or
there is no private person injured by the crime7). What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation
of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission,
whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. 8
Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist.9
On one hand, as regards the criminal aspect of a violation of BP 22, suffice it to say that:
[t]he gravamen of BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment [and] the accused failed to satisfy the amount of
the check or make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor.
The act is
malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a goal
intended to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check was
issued is irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance
of the checks are also irrelevant.10
On the other hand, the basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable is also
civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil Code.11 A person acquitted
of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in
criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability
(mere preponderance of evidence12). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a person's acquittal
must be based on the fact that he did not commit the offense.13 If the acquittal is based merely on
reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit
the act complained of.14 It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged.15
Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where the court declared the
accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where the civil liability does not arise from
or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.16
In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As found by the CA, her
supposed civil liability had already been fully satisfied and extinguished by payment. The statements of
the appellate court leave no doubt that respondent, who was acquitted from the charges against her, had
already been completely relieved of civil liability:
[Petitioner] does not dispute the fact that payments have already been made by petitioner in [the
stated] amounts but argues that the Demand Draft represented payment of a previous
obligation. However, no evidence of whatever nature was presented by the prosecution to
substantiate their claim that there was indeed a previous obligation involving the same
amount for which the demand draft was given. Except for this bare allegation, which is
self-serving, no documentary evidence was ever adduced that there were previous
transactions involving the subject amount.
Likewise, [petitioner] admitted having received the cash payments from petitioner on a daily basis
but argues that the same were applied to interest payments only. It however appears that
[petitioner] was charging [respondent] with an exorbitant rate of interest…on a daily basis. xxx In
any event, the cash payments [made] were recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by
[petitioner] in her own handwriting as testified to by [respondent] and her employees,
Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. Indeed, the daily cash payments marked in
evidence as Exhibits 7 to 15 reveal that [respondent] had already paid her obligation to
[petitioner] in the amount of P5,780,000.00 as of July 21, 1997 and that she stopped
making further payments when she realized that she had already paid such amount.
From the foregoing, it would appear that [respondent] made a total payment of
P6,980,000.00, inclusive of the P1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which is definitely much more
than P1,150,000.00, the amount she actually borrowed from [petitioner]. These facts were
never rebutted by [petitioner].
Moreover, we find no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that there was a
stipulation in writing that interest will be paid by [respondent] on her loan obligations [as required
under Article 1956 of the Civil Code].
xxx
xxx
xxx
By and large, the obligation of [respondent] has already been extinguished long before the
encashment of the subject checks. A check is said to apply for account only when there is still a
pre-existing obligation. In the case at bench, the pre-existing obligation was extinguished after full
payment was made by [respondent]. We therefore find the clear and convincing documentary
evidence of payment presented by [respondent] worthy of credence. 17 (emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The October 30, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 23054 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, J.J., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181409
February 11, 2010
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG, represented by
MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. – No criminal, but only civil liability shall result from the
commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the
following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse
before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the
commission of the crime. (emphasis supplied)
For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created between the husband
and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives of her husband)
dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such relationship by
affinity? Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru falsification?
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix 1 of petitioner intestate
estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit2 for
estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaint-affidavit read:
I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single, and resident of Unit 1111,
Prince Gregory Condominium, 105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after being duly sworn, depose
and state that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,] Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104, being one (1) of her surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters of Administration dated
June 22, 1995 is hereto attached as Annex "A" to form an integral part hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the properties of the Intestate
Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds and/or properties as
property belonging to the estate but are presently in the possession or control of other parties.
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of the children of my
sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our mother Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzales, having died in Japan in 1991.
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato, age[d] 27 and 24
respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the death of my mother Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992, their father William Sato, through
fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature and thumbmark of my mother on
a Special Power of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty
(20) years old, was made her attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land
in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "A" of the
Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my mother because William
Sato told her that the documents she was being made to sign involved her taxes. At that time, my
mother was completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years prior to November, 1992.
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the presence of Wendy,
my other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor Josephine Ramirez
who later became the second wife of my sister’s widower William Sato.
6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the document in the belief that
they were in connection with her taxes, not knowing, since she was blind, that the same was in
fact a Special Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found buyers for the
property and made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of absolute sale in favor
of (a) Anita Ng (Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B.
Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc. No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary
Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series
of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D. Labid). x x x
8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations appearing on the deeds of
absolute sale were not the true and actual considerations received by her father William Sato
from the buyers of her grandmother’s properties. She attests that Anita Ng actually paid
₱7,000,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3148 and ₱7,034,000.00 for the property
covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid proceeds were turned over to William Sato who
undertook to make the proper accounting thereof to my mother, Manolita Carungcong Gonzale[s].
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid ₱8,000,000.00 for the
property covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735, and the proceeds thereof were likewise
turned over to William Sato.
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato
has actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since she
was the signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose or to refuse
her father’s orders.
12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the power of attorney
fraudulently secured from my mother, which total ₱22,034,000.00, William Sato failed to account
for the same and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the
latter died on June 8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to deliver the
proceeds of the sales to me as Administratrix of my mother’s estate, but he refused and failed,
and continues to refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the estate of the
deceased Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which include his six (6) children
with my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato. x x x3
Wendy Mitsuko Sato’s supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly issued by the
deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were attached to the complaintaffidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaint. 4 On
appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution dated March 25, 1997
and directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of Article
315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code.5 Thus, the following Information was filed against Sato in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87:6
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, by means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit: the said accused
induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong[,] who was already then blind and 79 years old[,] to
sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C.
Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe that said document involved only her taxes, accused
knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign,
transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay City, as
follows:
1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more or less and covered
by T.C.T. No. 3147;
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3148 with
Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106;
3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3149 with
Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax Declaration No. GR016-1735, Cadastral Lot No. 7062;
registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in the possession of the
said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato
sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148 for
₱250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for ₱250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for ₱650,000.00 and
once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in 1994.
Contrary to law.7
Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase the amount
of damages from ₱1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds of sale, to ₱22,034,000, the actual
amount received by Sato.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code,
his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law,
was an exempting circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Sato’s motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006,8 the trial court granted Sato’s motion and ordered the dismissal of the
criminal case:
The Trial Prosecutor’s contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed the relationship of
affinity between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of protection provided to the
accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining.
A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code convinces this Court of
the correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true that the death of Zenaida CarungcongSato has extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it does not erase the fact that accused and
Zenaida’s mother, herein complainant, are still son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[-inlaw] and mother-in-law even beyond the death of Zenaida.
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. "No criminal, but only civil
liability[,] shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1) spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by
affinity in the same line."
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code, preserves family
harmony and obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and malicious mischief, where the crime is
committed by a stepfather against his stepson, by a grandson against his grandfather, by a son against
his mother, no criminal liability is incurred by the accused only civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame,
CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).
Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the same is GRANTED and,
as prayed for, case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.9 (underlining supplied in the original)
The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration10 was denied in an order dated June 2, 2006.11
Dissatisfied with the trial court’s rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals12 which, however, in a decision13 dated August 9, 2007,
dismissed it. It ruled:
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by
affinity between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does not bar the
application of the exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of
private respondent Sato.
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)] that nothing in the law
and/or existing jurisprudence supports the argument of petitioner that the fact of death of Zenaida
dissolved the relationship by affinity between Manolita and private respondent Sato, and thus removed
the protective mantle of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and that
notwithstanding the death of Zenaida, private respondent Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita,
and a brother-in-law of petitioner administratrix. As further pointed out by the OSG, the filing of the
criminal case for estafa against private respondent Sato already created havoc among members of the
Carungcong and Sato families as private respondent’s daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause with
her aunt [Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2) other children of private respondent, William
Francis and Belinda Sato, took the side of their father.
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the provision of Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, from the plain language of the law, it is clear that the exemption from
criminal liability for the crime of swindling (estafa) under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code applies to
private respondent Sato, as son-in-law of Manolita, they being "relatives by affinity in the same line" under
Article 332(1) of the same Code. We cannot draw the distinction that following the death of Zenaida in
1991, private respondent Sato is no longer the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to exclude the former from
the exempting circumstance provided for in Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where
the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the
application of law where none is indicated. The courts could only distinguish where there are facts or
circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts
would merely give effect to the lawgiver’s intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and
apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.
Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are strictly construed
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of
the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code’s simple
language is most favorable to Sato.14
The appellate court denied reconsideration.15 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the trial court. It cites the
commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law that the rationale of Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code exempting the persons mentioned therein from criminal liability is that the law
recognizes the presumed co-ownership of the property between the offender and the offended
party. Here, the properties subject of the estafa case were owned by Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida
Carungcong-Sato (Sato’s wife), died on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner
because, under the law, her right to the three parcels of land could have arisen only after her
mother’s death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came about and
the mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of
death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while the death of Zenaida
extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship
between Sato and Zenaida’s mother, Manolita.
For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption from criminal liability
provided under Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports petitioner’s claim that
Zenaida’s death dissolved the relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the criminal
case against Sato created havoc among the members of the Carungcong and Sato families, a situation
sought to be particularly avoided by Article 332’s provision exempting a family member committing theft,
estafa or malicious mischief from criminal liability and reducing his/her liability to the civil aspect only.
The petition has merit.
The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. In
particular, it calls for the determination of the following: (1) the effect of death on the relationship by
affinity created between a surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse and (2) the
extent of the coverage of Article 332.
Effect of Death on Relationship By Affinity as Absolutory Cause
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause16in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious
mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him from criminal liability by
virtue of his relationship to the offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that included in the
exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.17 By virtue thereof, no criminal liability
is incurred by the stepfather who commits malicious mischief against his stepson; 18 by the stepmother
who commits theft against her stepson;19 by the stepfather who steals something from his stepson;20 by
the grandson who steals from his grandfather;21 by the accused who swindles his sister-in-law living with
him;22 and by the son who steals a ring from his mother.23
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. It is a relationship by
marriage or
a familial relation resulting from marriage.24 It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection
with the institution of marriage and family relations.
If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of one’s spouse, does the
extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us in this case. That is
why the trial and appellate courts acknowledged the "dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries" on
the matter. In contrast, in the American legal system, there are two views on the subject. As one Filipino
author observed:
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are conflicting views. There
are some who believe that relationship by affinity is not terminated whether there are children or not in the
marriage (Carman vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better view supported by most judicial
authorities in other jurisdictions is that, if the spouses have no living issues or children and one of the
spouses dies, the relationship by affinity is dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases
with the dissolution of the marriage which produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec. 288).
On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is continued despite the death of one of the spouses where
there are living issues or children of the marriage "in whose veins the blood of the parties are
commingled, since the relationship of affinity was continued through the medium of the issue of the
marriage" (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333).25
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the
dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity
between the parties.26 Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent
with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the
marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a
spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouse’s blood
relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death of one
spouse when there is a surviving issue.27 The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of
the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled. 28
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving
spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse,
regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not. 29 Under this view, the relationship by affinity
endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the
parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit
step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to
be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.30
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that the second
view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification and
incest.31 On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the interpretation of
laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in
Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the
said provision, the continuing affinity view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the same line" is
couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction between the spouse of
one’s living child and the surviving spouse of one’s deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or
daughter-in-law with respect to his or her parents-in-law)32 can be drawn from Article 332(1) of
the Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a basic
autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the State to
strengthen the solidarity of the family.33 Congress has also affirmed as a State and national policy
that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family.34 In this connection, the spirit of Article 332
is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.35The view that relationship by affinity is not
affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with
family solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all
doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.36 This is in
consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent
unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.37
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The rule applies when the court is
faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and
another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient
to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic purpose
of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by providing an absolutory cause.
Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application or
interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing
affinity view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship by affinity
created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death
of either party to the marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying
circumstance of defense of one’s relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense committed against one’s relatives under Article
13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20
also of the same Code.)
Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility
of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its
right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to
hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain,
categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple
crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned
under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through
falsification.39
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is
determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the offense.40 What controls
is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the
Information.41 In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the
nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the Information.42 It is the
exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is or what it is named. 43 The determination by the
prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is merely an opinion which is not binding on
the court.44
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with simple estafa
but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. In particular, the
Information states that Sato, by means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time) and induced her
to sign and thumbmark the same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her taxes when it
was in fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor daughter Wendy to sell,
assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of Manolita’s properties in Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Sato’s inducement and representation, Manolita signed and thumbmarked the SPA
in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither delivered the
proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the same and
(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds, to the damage and
prejudice of the estate of Manolita.
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by attributing to Manolita
(who participated in the execution of the document) statements other than those in fact made by her.
Manolita’s acts of signing the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that document were the very expression
of her specific intention that something be done about her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark were the
affirmation of her statement on such intention as she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document
which she could not have read) because of Sato’s representation that the document pertained to her
taxes. In signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed that she believed and adopted the
representations of Sato as to what the document was all about, i.e., that it involved her taxes. Her
signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her conformity to Sato’s proposal that she execute a
document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita granted his daughter
Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise
disposing of Manolita’s Tagaytay properties when the fact was that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the
document presented by Sato in the belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the
SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign the
SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents,
[Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale" and
(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused,
misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit" raise
the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document and the one who benefited
therefrom, was the author thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as
to increase the amount of damages from ₱1,150,000 to ₱22,034,000. This was granted by the trial court
and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on certiorari. This meant that the amended Information would
now state that, while the total amount of consideration stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only
₱1,150,000, Sato actually received the total amount of ₱22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of Manolita’s
properties.45 This also meant that the deeds of sale (which were public documents) were also falsified by
making untruthful statements as to the amounts of consideration stated in the deeds.
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not simple estafa. Sato
resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the special power of attorney and the deeds of
sale) as a necessary means to commit the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause
provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.
Effect of Absolutory Cause Under Article 332 on Criminal Liability For The Complex Crime of
Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of
the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, should he not be absolved also from
criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents? No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document
is required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document.
That is the ruling in Gonzaludo v. People.46 It means that the prosecution must establish that the accused
resorted to the falsification of a public document as a necessary means to commit the crime of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code
and of the nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from criminal liability for the complex crime
of estafa through falsification of public documents, simply because the accused may not be held
criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property, namely, the
simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or
complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory
cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a complex crime
for the purpose of negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article
332. In other words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the
component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment as separate charges
of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a single charge for the single (complex) crime of
estafa through falsification of public document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender criminally
liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers the violation of the
juridical right to property committed by the offender against certain family members as a private matter
and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to
property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in
the integrity and presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is
involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a paramount public interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. 47 Thus, the action provided
under the said provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties as family members and is
limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed through
falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes
beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively, when the
offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public documents as a means to
violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed from the protective mantle of the absolutory
cause under Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents, it would be wrong to consider the component crimes separately from each other. While there
may be two component crimes (estafa and falsification of documents), both felonies are animated by and
result from one and the same criminal intent for which there is only one criminal liability.48 That is the
concept of a complex crime. In other words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one,
subject to a single criminal liability.
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated (e.g., homicide which
violates the right to life, theft which violates the right to property),49 a complex crime constitutes a violation
of diverse juridical rights or interests by means of diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime in
itself.50 Since only a single criminal intent underlies the diverse acts, however, the component crimes are
considered as elements of a single crime, the complex crime. This is the correct interpretation of a
complex crime as treated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes where the same
criminal intent results in two or more component crimes constituting a complex crime for which there is
only one criminal liability.51 (The complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document falls
under this category.) This is different from a material (or real) plurality of crimes where different criminal
intents result in two or more crimes, for each of which the accused incurs criminal liability. 52 The latter
category is covered neither by the concept of complex crimes nor by Article 48.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes (concursus delictuorum or
concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and requires the imposition of a single penalty:
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is only one crime in law on
which a single penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes constituting the same are more
conveniently termed as component crimes.53 (emphasis supplied)
—∞——∞——∞—
In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime
in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The offender has only one criminal
intent. Even in the case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the evil intent of
the offender is only one.54
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document requires that the
elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the criminal liability for estafa may be
determined and considered independently of that for falsification. The two crimes of estafa and
falsification of public documents are not separate crimes but component crimes of the single complex
crime of estafa and falsification of public documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public document, the liability for estafa should be considered separately from the
liability for falsification of public document. Such approach would disregard the nature of a complex crime
and contradict the letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would wrongly disregard the
distinction between formal plurality and material plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document as a mere material plurality where the
felonies are considered as separate crimes to be punished individually.
Falsification of Public Documents May Be a Necessary Means for Committing Estafa Even Under
Article 315 (3[a])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised Penal Code are as
follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;
(3) the offended party personally signed the document and
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require that the
document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the falsification of the
document cannot be considered as a necessary means to commit the estafa under that provision.
The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did, then the offense as a
"necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would be an
ingredient thereof.55 In People v. Salvilla,56 the phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime
is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other.57 In this case, the crime of falsification of
public document, the SPA, was such a "necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and
carry out more effectively his evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to
sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or
malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code.58 The falsification
of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa because, before the
falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a
public, official or commercial document.59 In other words, the crime of falsification was committed prior to
the consummation of the crime of estafa.60 Actually utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial
document to defraud another is estafa.61 The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa,
not by the falsification of the document.621avvphi1
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show that the falsification of
public document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the
same as a statement of her intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification was
consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato
later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the
proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as
no damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign the
document) but by the subsequent use of the said document. That is why the falsification of the public
document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the commission of the
estafa.
The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had made Manolita sign a
deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor of third parties. In that case, the damage would
have been caused by, and at exactly the same time as, the execution of the document, not prior thereto.
Therefore, the crime committed would only have been the simple crime of estafa. 63 On the other hand,
absent any inducement (such as if Manolita herself had been the one who asked that a document
pertaining to her taxes be prepared for her signature, but what was presented to her for her signature was
an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple crime of falsification. 64
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007 and the resolution
dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-69668 October 2, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HUMBERTO TEMPONGKO, JR., defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Adriano Pagarigan for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:p
The appellant is before us to challenge his conviction of the crime of rape. He claims it was not he who
erred but the trial court. The usual plea is made: that there was a misappropriation of the evidence,
resulting in the sentence of reclusion perpetua that he now faces. He prays for a reversal.
At the time of the commission of the alleged offense, the complainant, Lolita Dacoycoy, was an 18-year
old senior student at the Manuel L. Quezon High School and undergoing citizen army training (CAT)
under the command of the appellant. 1 The appellant was 43 years old, married, with five children, and
commandant of the said course, besides being the owner of a tailoring shop. 2
These are the facts as the trial court saw them.
On November 9, 1981, the complainant and her friend, Rosalita Quinto, went to the appellant's tailoring
shop in accordance with the appointment made by them the day before. This was about 7 o'clock in the
evening. Their purpose was to solicit a contribution for their high school annual. Upon arrival one hour
later, the appellant offered them beer, which they drank. Lolita became dizzy and the appellant suggested
that the two girls stay for the night. The appellant then left, at about 11:30 o'clock. Lolita slept on the sofa
while Rosalita slept on the floor about two arms length from her. It was at dawn when Lolita felt the weight
of a person on her whom she immediately recognized as the appellant. She pleaded, "Huwag mong
gawin sa akin iyan, sir." The appellant kissed her and bit her lower lip. Lolita boxed him in the back and
he boxed her in the stomach, rendering her unconscious. She did not scream or call for help because it
all happened so fast. When she woke up, the deed was done and she was bleeding. The appellant was
seated on the sofa totally naked. She moaned presumably in anguish and pain, and Rosalita woke up.
Rosalita embraced and consoled Lolita. She turned on the light and upbraided the appellant who at that
time was already putting on his trousers. The appellant soon left without saying a word, looking very
nervous. As Lolita's jogging pants were bleed, Rosalita left to get her some clothes. Lolita stayed until
past noon and when Rosalita did not return decided to leave the office. She proceeded to the house of
another friend, a certain Cecile, where she stayed for five days until she was fetched by her stepfather,
Delfin Dalisay. This was Lolita Dacoycoy's testimony. 3
Continuing the story, Delfin Dalisay related that on November 10, Rosalita and her mother informed him
of Lolita's rape. He blamed Rosalita for Lolita's misfortune, and Rosalita and her mother left in a huff. Five
days later, Cecile's sister informed them at their market stall that Lolita was in their house. He fetched
Lolita from there and later, upon advice of the lawyer to whom they had earlier been referred by a friend,
he and her mother took Lolita to the National Bureau of Investigation, where she underwent a medical
examination. 4 Part of this narration was contributed by Clarita Dacoycoy, Lolita's mother, who also
testified on the civil damages suffered by the complainant. 5
According to the medical report as explained by Dr. Orlando Salvador of the NBI in layman's terms, the
complainant was deflowered on or about the date of the alleged rape. This witness also testified that the
claimed blow inflicted on the complainant's stomach would not necessarily leave any external sign or
mark. 6
Testifying for himself, the appellant denied the charge, saying he was at home with his family when the
rape was supposedly committed. He did not deny that he offered the two girls beer and allowed them to
sleep in his office in the night of November 9, 1981. He declared, however, that having left his office at
about 11:30 p.m. of that date, he returned thereto at about 9 o'clock in the morning of the following day
and not earlier. In fact, he saw the complainant having breakfast at that time. 7
The appellant presented two witnesses to corroborate his testimony, but it seems they did him more harm
than good. We shall go to that later.
The medical report suggests that the complainant was a virgin at the time of the supposed intercourse,
but it would seem that her conduct in the night of November 9, 1981, was hardly maidenly or at least
discreet. First, she went to the office of a man she did not know very well at 7 o'clock on a Sunday
evening. Then she accepted beer instead of a soft drink, which would have been the proper refreshment
for her and her companion, considering their age and sex. Not only that, instead of taking a few sips just
to be polite, what she did was drink about three-fourths of the glass, as a result of which she felt dizzy.
Then, instead of going home with her companion, she decided to stay and sleep in the strange office of
this person who, to repeat, was by her own narration not close to her.
There is no evidence that her friend Rosalita was also dizzy and could not have taken her home that
night. In fact, Lolita herself testified that Rosalita did not complain of being dizzy. 8 The appellant's office
on C.M. Recto was not far from the complainant's house on Vicente G. Cruz, which could have been
reached by one jeep ride. Alternatively, she had a telephone at her house and could have called one of
her relatives to fetch her if she and Rosalita could not leave by themselves. 9 It is incredible that she did
not even trouble to tell her parents of her whereabouts. One might expect such thoughtless conduct of an
experienced girl of loose discipline but not of the virtuous and virginal girl the complainant was supposed
to be.
The other parts of her testimony also raise some perplexing questions. By her own account, she was
raped on the sofa while her friend Rosalita was sleeping on the floor only two arms length away and in
the same room. 10 The implication is that the appellant was reckless not only of resistance from Lolita but
also of discovery by Rosalita. The complainant testified that he immediately recognized the appellant
although she had just awakened and that when she recovered consciousness after having been boxed in
the stomach, she had already been ravished. Strangely, the appellant was then still seated on the sofa
and apparently taking his time about dressing. 11 She also said she was desperate for clothing because
her jogging pants were bloody. 12 Yet it did not occur to her to get other attire, which must have been
available in abundance in the place where she was then, which was a tailoring shop. In fact, the shop was
a contractor for the supplying of, precisely, CAT uniforms. 13
Instead of going straight home, which would have been the normal reaction of a young woman subjected
to her traumatic experience, what she did was stay with a friend, the mysterious Cecile. 14 She stayed
there for five days and did not communicate with her mother even once. Neither did her friend Cecile. In
fact, it was only on the fifth day that Cecile's sister saw fit to tell the complainant's family where Lolita was
notwithstanding Lolita's alleged condition at the time. If, according to Delfin Dalisay, the complainant was
"tulala" when he saw her, it would have been the natural thing for Cecile to inform Lolita's family of her
state of shock as soon as possible.
One also wonders why Rosalita Quinto, the complainant's companion on the night of the alleged rape,
and who was supposed to be in the room when the complainant claimed she was ravished, was not
presented as a witness by the prosecution It is not often that the prosecution has the good fortune of an
actual eyewitness in cases like this, and yet neither the fiscal nor the private prosecutor saw fit to ask
Rosalita to corroborate the testimony of Lolita. Instead, they presented only the parents of Lolita who
testified on what happened after, and not before and during, the alleged rape.
For its part, the defense was none-too-convincing either and, in the view of the trial court, fatally flawed.
The appellant relied on alibi, an inherently feeble excuse that cannot prevail as against the positive
Identification of the accused. Moreover, the appellant was living in Sisa, in Sampaloc, only two kilometers
or so from his office, 15 where the rape was allegedly committed. It could have been reached from his
house in a matter of minutes, as the trial court observed, considering the light traffic at 5 o'clock in the
morning or thereabouts.
The appellant's first witness, Remy Oriola, testified that Lolita and Rosalita slept in the appellant's office in
the morning of November 8, 1981, and that the appellant returned thereto the following morning of
November 9, 1981. 16 By contrast, the appellant's testimony was that the two girls slept in his office on
November 9, 1981, and that he returned thereto the following morning of November 10, 1981. 17 And
whereas the appellant testified that the complainant came to his office with a paper bag containing
clothes, 18 the witness said Lolita was carrying only a handbag. 19
The testimony of the other defense witness, Rolando Hermilo, was not only practically useless but in fact
prejudicial to the appellant. In the first place, he testified only up to the time he left the appellant's office at
about 11 o'clock in the night of November 9, 1981, and not on what happened later to the girls who were
left behind. 20 But what makes his testimony suspect was his admission that he learned of the charge
against the appellant, and was asked to testify for him, only on the date itself of the hearing, in the very
morning when he was presented as witness, 21 and this was more than two years after the alleged rape.
On top of this, he was by his own admission reading the transcript of the appellant's testimony before he
was actually called to the witness stand. 22
The defendant argues that Lolita should have shouted for help but did not; that he would not have
attempted the rape in such a cramped place and with another person in the very room where the crime
was supposedly committed; and that there were no signs of the alleged stomach blow on the
complainant's stomach.
On the other hand, he could not explain why he offered the two girls beer when soft drinks would have
been more appropriate, and also why he allowed them to sleep in his office when they were just trainees
under his command and had no special ties with him. His claim was that they had left home because
Lolita had been scolded by her mother was belied by his own testimony that he heard Lolita calling her
mother on the telephone to say she was sleeping with a friend. 23
It is unfortunate that the trial court did little to analyze the evidence of the parties and virtually limited itself
to the defense of alibi, which it declared to be untenable. There should have been a more careful analysis
of the other evidence to get to the truth of this unfortunate mess where there is more than meets the eye.
This is not a pat case, so to speak. There are many unanswered questions. The conduct of both the
complainant and the defendant, as narrated by the requires not a little explaining. The trial judge should
have probed deeper instead of simply relying on the question of alibi, which is only part of the intriguing
mosaic.
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The
accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it
fails utterly, even if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no defense at all. The defendant faces
the full panoply of state authority with all "The People of the Philippines" arrayed against him. In a manner
of speaking, he goes to bat with all the bases loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It is important,
therefore, to equalize the positions of the prosecution and the defense by presuming the innocence of the
accused until the state is able to refute the presumption by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant does not deny that he asked the two girls to see him at his office in the evening of
November 9, 1981; that he there offered them beer, which they drank; and that he permitted them to
sleep there that night.
The proper thing to do was to receive these girls at his office at the MLQ where he was working as
commandant of the CAT, and during school hours. Soft drinks would have been a more appropriate
refreshment for the young ladies, especially since such beverages were easily available. And if it is true,
as he says, that the complainant asked to sleep in his office because she had been scolded by her
mother, the appellant, exercising as he did some moral influence over her as her commandant, should
have counseled her to go home. Failing that, he should have at least caged up the complainant's mother
to tell her that Lolita was in his office.
But all these improprieties and omissions come under the heading of indiscretions and not crimes.
Serving beer instead of soft drinks and snowing the use of one's office for sleeping purposes are not
indictable offenses. Moral irresponsibility and thoughtlessness are also not prohibited under our criminal
laws. More importantly, all these indiscretion do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the appellant
raped the complainant in the morning of November 10, 1981, in his office. The connection is too farfetched.
The only fact conclusively established by the prosecution is that the complainant was deflowered on or
about the time of the alleged rape, but that is all. The rest of its case is based on the improbable
testimony of the complainant, whose conduct, even before the alleged rape, was hardly befitting a proper
young lady, to say the least.
The almost indifferent reaction of her family is implausible too, if we go by the recorded testimony. After
being informed of Lolita's rape, they did not immediately look for her; and when they did, their efforts were
hardly energetic. The mother testified that they later searched for her but did not elaborate beyond saying
that they asked her friends. They did not inquire from her classmates in MLQ They did not talk to the
alleged rapist, whom Rosalita had Identified. In fact, when she and her mother informed Delfin Dalisay
that Lolita had been raped, he did not ask where she was — a most natural and logical question to ask at
that time. All he did, by his own account, was blame Rosalita for the incident.
It was only five days later that they teamed of her whereabouts, and this because Cecile's sister came to
see them and informed them. As for Cecile, in whose house the complainant supposedly stayed for five
days, she was not even presented as witness to corroborate Lolita's testimony. It is significant that
although she and Rosalita Quinto played key roles as it were in this case, they were strangely silent and
absent at the trial.
The trouble with the appellant, according to the trial court, is that he could not prove his defense of alibi.
But then how could he? He said he was sleeping in his house with his family. At five o'clock in the
morning, where else could he have been? How could he have produced third parties as witnesses to
testify that he was fast asleep in his own house? His presence in his own bedroom at that time was not
incredible or even improbable but perfectly believable.
What does strain the imagination is the complainant's own implausible story: of a virgin who visited a
casual acquaintance of the opposite sex in his own office on a Sunday evening; accepted and drank beer
with him; asked to sleep in his office; was awakened by the weight of a person on top of her whom she
immediately recognized notwithstanding that her eyes were not yet accustomed to the dark; suffered a
blow in her stomach and recovered consciousness to discover she had been raped by the appellant who
was still seated on the sofa totally naked; could not leave because her jogging pants were bloodied
notwithstanding that she was in a tailoring shop where clothes were available in abundance; finally went
to a friend's house instead of straight to her mother from whom she normally would have sought solace.
Most significantly, the alleged rape was committed within two arms length of her companion, Rosalita
Quinto, who was sleeping with her in the same room, and could have awakened any time and in fact did
so, according to Lolita, when she moaned after her ravishment.
The theory of the prosecution has too many loose ends that it has failed to tie up to the satisfaction of this
Court. The guilt of the appellant has not been established beyond doubt and so cannot be affirmed in this
appellant The defense is weak, to be sure, but for all the persuasive arguments of the Solicitor General
and the private prosecutor, this Court remains unconvinced that the appellant raped the complainant. The
appellant may have been lying, and there is evidence of this, but we are not prepared to accept, to the
point of moral certainty, that the complainant was telling the truth. The ambiguous evidence of the
prosecution cannot justify our condemning the appellant to prison for the rest of his life where there are
whispers of doubt that he is guilty.
WHEREFORE, the decision' of the lower court is REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED, without
any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 167011
April 30, 2008
SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners Spouses Carlos S. Romualdez
and Erlinda R. Romualdez seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions, dated 11 June 2004 1 and 27
January 20052 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in E.O. Case No. 2000-36. In the Resolution
of 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Bancdirected the Law Department to file the appropriate Information
with the proper court against petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for violation of
Section 10(g) and (j)3 in relation to Section 45(j)4 of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as The
Voter’s Registration Act of 1996.5 Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration thereon was denied.
The factual antecedents leading to the instant Petition are presented hereunder:
On 12 July 2000, private respondent Dennis Garay, along with Angelino Apostol6 filed a ComplaintAffidavit7 with the COMELEC thru the Office of the Election Officer in Burauen, Leyte, charging petitioners
with violation of Section 261(y)(2)8 and Section 261(y)(5)9 of the Omnibus Election Code, similarly
referred to as Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and Section 1210 of Republic Act No. 8189.
Private respondent deposed, inter alia, that: petitioners are of legal ages and residents of 113 Mariposa
Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City; on 9 May 2000 and 11 May 2000,
petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez, applied for registration as new voters with
the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos.
42454095 and 07902952, respectively; in their sworn applications, petitioners made false and untruthful
representations in violation of Section 10 11 of Republic Act Nos. 8189, by indicating therein that they are
residents of 935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are
residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City, and
registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A,
as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823; and that petitioners, knowing
fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in said applications
corresponding to the length of time which they have resided in Burauen, Leyte. In fine, private respondent
charged petitioners, to wit:
Respondent-spouses, Carlos Sison Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez committed and
consummated election offenses in violation of our election laws, specifically, Sec. 261, paragraph
(y), subparagraph (2), for knowingly making any false or untruthful statements relative to any data
or information required in the application for registration, and of Sec. 261, paragraph (y),
subparagraph (5), committed by any person who, being a registered voter, registers anew without
filing an application for cancellation of his previous registration, both of the Omnibus Election
Code (BP Blg. 881), and of Sec. 12, RA 8189 (Voter Registration Act) for failure to apply for
transfer of registration records due to change of residence to another city or municipality." 12
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the
COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.
Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss13 dated 2 April 2001. They contended
therein that they did not make any false or untruthful statements in their application for registration. They
avowed that they intended to reside in Burauen, Leyte, since the year 1989. On 9 May 2000, they took
actual residence in Burauen, Leyte, by leasing for five (5) years, the house of Juanito and Fe Renomeron
at No. 935, San Jose Street in Burauen, Leyte. On even date, the Barangay District III Council of Burauen
passed a Resolution of Welcome, expressing therein its gratitude and appreciation to petitioner Carlos S.
Romualdez for choosing the Barangay as his official residence.14
On 28 November 2003, Atty. Maria Norina S. Tangaro-Casingal, COMELEC Investigating Officer, issued
a Resolution, recommending to the COMELEC Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division),
the filing of the appropriate Information against petitioners, disposing, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division),
RECOMMENDS to file the necessary information against Carlos Sison Romualdez before the
proper Regional Trial Court for violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of
Republic Act 8189 and to authorize the Director IV of the Law Department to designate a
Comelec Prosecutor to handle the prosecution of the case with the duty to submit periodic report
after every hearing of the case.15
On 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc found no reason to depart from the recommendatory
Resolution of 28 November 2003, and ordered, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Law Department is hereby directed to file the
appropriate information with the proper court against respondents CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ
AND ERLINDA ROMUALDEZ for violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of
the Republic Act No. 8189.16
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon.
Acting on the Motion, the COMELEC found no cogent reason to disturb the assailed En Banc Resolution
of 11 June 2004,17 rationalizing, thus:
However, perusal of the records reveal (sic) that the arguments and issues raised in the Motion
for Reconsideration are merely a rehash of the arguments advanced by the Respondents in
[their] Memorandum received by the Law Department on 17 April 2001, the same [w]as already
considered by the Investigating Officer and was discussed in her recommendation which
eventually was made as the basis for the En Banc’s resolution.
As aptly observed by the Investigating Officer, the filing of request for the cancellation and
transfer of Voting Registration Record does not automatically cancel the registration records. The
fact remains that at the time of application for registration as new voter of the herein Respondents
on May 9 and 11, 2001 in the Office of Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte their registration in
Barangay 4419-A, Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame Quezon City was still valid and
subsisting.18
On 12 January 2006, Alioden D. Dalaig, Director IV, Law Department of the COMELEC filed with the
RTC, Burauen, Leyte, separate Informations against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez19 for violation of
Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, and against petitioner Erlinda R.
Romualdez20 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189,
subsequently docketed as Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4185 and Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4183,
respectively. Moreover, separate Informations for violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189 were filed against petitioners.21
Hence, petitioners come to us via the instant Petition, submitting the following arguments:
I
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION; and
II
COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PREMISED ITS RESOLUTION ON
A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND FAILED TO CONSIDER CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS
THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.22
On 4 May 2006, petitioners filed a Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and to Cite for Indirect Contempt,23 alleging that two separate Informations, both dated 12 January 2006,
were filed with the RTC by the COMELEC against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for violation of Section
10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9184; and for
violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No. BN06-03-9185. Similarly, the Motion alleged that the COMELEC filed with the RTC, two separate
Informations, both dated 12 January 2006, against petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez, charging her with the
same offenses as those charged against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez, and thereafter, docketed as
Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9182, and No. BN-06-03-9183.
On 20 June 2006, this Court issued a Resolution24 denying for lack of merit petitioners’ Motion Reiterating
Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt.
We shall now resolve, in seriatim, the arguments raised by petitioners.
Petitioners contend that the election offenses for which they are charged by private respondent are
entirely different from those which they stand to be accused of before the RTC by the COMELEC.
According to petitioners, private respondent’s complaint charged them for allegedly violating, to wit: 1)
Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code, and 2) Section 12 of the Voter’s
Registration Act; however, the COMELEC En Bancdirected in the assailed Resolutions, that they be
charged for violations of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of the Voter’s Registration Act.
Essentially, petitioners are of the view that they were not accorded due process of law. Specifically, their
right to refute or submit documentary evidence against the new charges which COMELEC ordered to be
filed against them. Moreover, petitioners insist that Section 45(j) of the Voter’s Registration Act is vague
as it does not refer to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election
offense; hence, it runs contrary to Section 14(1)25 and Section 14(2),26 Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
We are not persuaded.
First. The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched in a language
which embraces the allegations necessary to support the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in
relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189.
A reading of the relevant laws is in order, thus:
Section 10(g) and Section 10(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, provide as follows:
SEC. 10 – Registration of Voters. - A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of
voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election.
To register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for registration as
prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any date during
office hours after having acquired the qualifications of a voter.
The application shall contain the following data:
xxxx
(g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;
xxxx
(j) A statement that the application is not a registered voter of any precinct;
The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of the applicant, clear
and legible rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints, with four identification size copies of his
latest photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at the expense of the Commission.
Before the applicant accomplishes his application for registration, the Election Officer shall inform
him of the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by law for a voter, and thereafter, see to
it that the accomplished application contains all the data therein required and that the applicant’s
specimen signatures, fingerprints, and photographs are properly affixed in all copies of the voter’s
application.
Moreover, Section 45(j) of the same Act, recites, thus:
SEC. 45. Election Offense. – The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act:
xxxx
(j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.
Significantly, the allegations in the Complaint-Affidavit which was filed with the Law Department of the
COMELEC, support the charge directed by the COMELEC En Banc to be filed against petitioners with the
RTC. Even a mere perusal of the Complaint-Affidavit would readily show that Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 8189 was specifically mentioned therein. On the matter of the acts covered by Section 10(g) and (j),
the Complaint-Affidavit, spells out the following allegations, to wit:
5. Respondent-spouses made false and untruthful representations in their applications (Annexes
"B" and "C") in violation of the requirements of Section 10, RA 8189 (The Voter’s Registration
Act):
5.1 Respondent-spouses, in their sworn applications (Annexes "B" and "C", claimed to be
residents of 935 San Jose [S]treet, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were
and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa [S]treet, Bagong Lipunan ng
Crame, Quezon City and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, a copy of the Certification issued by Hon.
Emmanuel V. Gozon, Punong Barangay, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City is
hereto attached and made an integral part hereof, as Annex "D";
5.2 Respondent-spouses knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill
the blank spaces in their applications (Annexes "B" and "C") corresponding to the length
of time they have resided in Burauen, Leyte;
6. Respondent-spouses, in (sic) all intents and purposes, were and still are residents and
registered voters of Quezon City, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and
26195823, respectively; photocopies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "E" and "F"[.]
Likewise, attached is a "Certification" (Annex "G") of Ms. Evelyn B. Bautista, Officer-in-Charge of
the Office of the Election Officer, Fourth District, Quezon City, dated May 31, 2000, together with
a certified copy of the computer print-out of the list of voters of Precinct No. 4419-A (Annex "G-1"
) containing the names of voters Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez. The
Certification reads as follows:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that as per office record MR. CARLOS ROMUALDEZ and MS.
ERLINDA REYES ROMUALDEZ are registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng
Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct Number 4419A with voters affidavit serial nos.
26195824 and 26195823, respectively.
This certification is issued for whatever legal purpose it may serve."
7. Respondent-spouses, registered as new voters of the Municipality of Burauen, Leyte, [in spite
of] the fact that they were and still are, registered voters of Quezon City as early as June 22,
1997;
7.1 That, Double Registration is an election offense.
A person qualified as a voter is only allowed to register once.
If a person registers anew as a voter in spite of a subsisting registration, the new
application for registration will be disapproved. The registrant is also liable not only for an
election offense of double registration, but also for another election offense of knowingly
making any false or untruthful statement relative to any data or information required in the
application for registration.
In fact, when a person applies for registration as a voter, he or she fills up a Voter
Registration Record form in his or her own handwriting, which contains a Certification
which reads:
"I do solemnly swear that the above statements regarding my person are true and
correct; that I possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a voter;
that the thumbprints, specimen signatures and photographs appearing herein are mine;
and that I am not registered as a voter in any other precinct."27
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election offenses
charged against them by private respondent are entirely different from those for which they stand to be
accused of before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no
incongruity between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before
the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to be covered
by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC against petitioners, and which
were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private
respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.
Petitioners buttress their claim of lack of due process by relying on the case of Lacson v. Executive
Secretary.28Citing Lacson, petitioners argue that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined by
the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information; and that the object of such written accusations
was to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him, as will enable him to make
his defense. Let it be said that, in Lacson, this court resolved the issue of whether under the allegations in
the subject Informations therein, it is the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction
over the multiple murder case against therein petitioner and intervenors. In Lacson, we underscored the
elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the Complaint or
Information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. 29 Indeed, in Lacson, we
articulated that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of
the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information.30
Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due process because, as
we have said, the charges contained in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as
directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the
criminal charges in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges contained in the
Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that,
petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or submit documentary evidence against the
charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due process because they were
granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April
2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to
Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum before the said
body. Finding that due process was not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we
agree with the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably apprised of
the nature and description of the charges against them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary
investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for their
defense. In all these stages, petitioners actively participated.
The instant case calls to our minds Orquinaza v. People,31 wherein the concerned police officer therein
designated the offense charged as sexual harassment; but, the prosecutor found that there was no
transgression of the anti-sexual harassment law, and instead, filed an Information charging therein
petitioner with acts of lasciviousness. On a claim that there was deprivation of due process, therein
petitioner argued that the Information for acts of lasciviousness was void as the preliminary investigation
conducted was for sexual harassment. The court held that the designation by the police officer of the
offense is not conclusive as it is within the competence of the prosecutor to assess the evidence
submitted and determine therefrom the appropriate offense to be charged.
Accordingly, the court pronounced that the complaint contained all the allegations to support the charge
of acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code; hence, the conduct of another preliminary
investigation for the offense of acts of lasciviousness would be a futile exercise because the complainant
would only be presenting the same facts and evidence which have already been studied by the
prosecutor.32 The court frowns upon such superfluity which only serves to delay the prosecution and
disposition of the criminal complaint.33
Second. Petitioners would have this court declare Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 vague, on the
ground that it contravenes the fair notice requirement of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, Section 14(1)
and Section 14(2), Article III of thereof. Petitioners submit that Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189
makes no reference to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election
offense.
We are not convinced.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.34 However, this Court has imposed
certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This
Court has declared that facial invalidation35 or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not
appropriate.36 We have so enunciated in no uncertain terms in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 37 thus:
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed
for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law,
First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal
statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might
also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment
context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found
vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant.'" (underscoring supplied)
"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of
ambiguity." While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-vagueness concept has yet
to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was
found unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause, not because it was
vague. Adiong v. Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute.
Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of
undue delegation of legislative powers, not because of vagueness.
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of
parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would
constitute a departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and
permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness.
In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:
"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction
of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for
the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of
the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that
is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be
decided."
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described
as a "manifestly strong medicine" to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In
determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly
been violated must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has
been charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring to the
fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a
facial challenge. An appropriate "as applied" challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to
Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189—the provisions upon which
petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law covering provisions which are alien to
petitioners’ case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for judicial review to be exercised, there must
be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, and not conjectural or
anticipatory.
We further quote the relevant ruling in David v. Arroyo on the proscription anent a facial challenge:38
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
"harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, it was held:
It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on its
face and when such summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at
the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules
of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise
unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward
conduct and that conduct even if expressive falls within the scope of otherwise valid
criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls
over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that
are sought to be applied to protected conduct." Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP
1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used
"sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;" The reason for this is
obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle
that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground
that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not
before the Court. A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to
some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims
that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts
carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper
applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to
raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth
analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties;
and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the
overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more
narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the
concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not
courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression."
An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third
parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine
PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners,
but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the
Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.
Xxx xxx xxx
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the
assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation
exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is
unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law
is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application." It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth
doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it
is vague in all its possible applications.
Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice.39 This Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude.40
As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under the same
Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its specification that a violation of any of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged
provision renders itself to no other interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision involves no
guesswork. We do not see herein an uncertainty that makes the same vague.
Notably, herein petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged provision, the import or meaning of which
they do not understand. This is in stark contrast to the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan42 where therein
petitioner sought for statutory definition of particular words in the challenged statute. Even then, the Court
in Estrada rejected the argument.
This Court reasoned:
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and
void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of
terms without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides,
there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define
each and every word in an enactment.Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its
will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be
gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law."
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is
evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.
The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to
use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.
Perforce, this Court has underlined that an act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been
more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the
act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. 43
The evident intent of the legislature in including in the catena of election offenses the violation of any of
the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, is to subsume as punishable, not only the commission of
proscribed acts, but also the omission of acts enjoined to be observed. On this score, the declared policy
of Republic Act No. 8189 is illuminating. The law articulates the policy of the State to systematize the
present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of
voters. A reading of Section 45 (j) conjointly with the provisions upon which petitioners are charged, i.e.,
Sections 10 (g) and (j) would reveal that the matters that are required to be set forth under the aforesaid
sections are crucial to the achievement of a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters. The
factual information required by the law is sought not for mere embellishment.
There is a definitive governmental purpose when the law requires that such facts should be set forth in
the application. The periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration delve into the
matter of residency, a requisite which a voter must satisfy to be deemed a qualified voter and registered
in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides. Of even
rationality exists in the case of the requirement in Section 10 (j), mandating that the applicant should state
that he/she is not a registered voter of any precinct. Multiple voting by so-called flying voters are glaring
anomalies which this country strives to defeat. The requirement that such facts as required by Section 10
(g) and Section 10 (j) be stated in the voter’s application form for registration is directly relevant to the
right of suffrage, which the State has the right to regulate.
It is the opportune time to allude to the case of People v. Gatchalian44 where the therein assailed law
contains a similar provision as herein assailed before us. Republic Act No. 602 also penalizes any person
who willfully violates any of the provisions of the Act. The Court dismissed the challenged, and declared
the provision constitutional. The Court in Gatchalian read the challenged provision, "any of the provisions
of this [A]ct" conjointly with Section 3 thereof which was the pertinent portion of the law upon which
therein accused was prosecuted. Gatchalian considered the terms as all-embracing; hence, the same
must include what is enjoined in Section 3 thereof which embodies the very fundamental purpose for
which the law has been adopted. This Court ruled that the law by legislative fiat intends to punish not only
those expressly declared unlawful but even those not so declared but are clearly enjoined to be observed
to carry out the fundamental purpose of the law.45 Gatchalian remains good law, and stands
unchallenged.
It also does not escape the mind of this Court that the phraseology in Section 45(j) is employed by
Congress in a number of our laws.46 These provisions have not been declared unconstitutional.
Moreover, every statute has in its favor the presumption of validity.47 To justify its nullification, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or
argumentative.48 We hold that petitioners failed to overcome the heavy presumption in favor of the law. Its
constitutionality must be upheld in the absence of substantial grounds for overthrowing the same.
A salient point. Courts will refrain from touching upon the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota. In the case at bar, the lis mota is the alleged grave abuse of
discretion of the COMELEC in finding probable cause for the filing of criminal charges against petitioners.
Third. Petitioners maintain that the COMELEC En Banc, premised its finding on a misapprehension of
facts, and committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of Informations against them with the
RTC.
We are once again unimpressed.
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the COMELEC finds statutory expression under Section
26549 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.50 The task of the
COMELEC whenever any election offense charge is filed before it is to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the case, and make a determination of probable cause. Under Section 8(b), Rule 34 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the investigating officer makes a determination of whether there is a
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed.51 In Baytan v. COMELEC,52 this Court,
sufficiently elucidated on the matter of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses, viz:
It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses
rests in the COMELEC's sound discretion. The COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority
to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including
acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offense and malpractices. Generally, the Court will
not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELEC's exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the
same, except as may otherwise be provided by law.53
It is succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of probable cause by the COMELEC in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.54
According to the COMELEC En Banc, the investigating officer, in the case at bar, held that there was
sufficient cause for the filing of criminal charges against petitioners, and found no reason to depart
therefrom. Without question, on May 9 and 11 of 2001, petitioners applied for registration as new voters
with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of petitioners’
registration records as registered voters of Precinct No. 4419-A of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
District IV, Quezon City. The directive by the COMELEC which affirmed the Resolution 55 of 28 November
2000 of Investigating Officer Atty. Tangaro-Casingal does not appear to be wanting in factual basis, such
that a reasonably prudent man would conclude that there exists probable cause to hold petitioners for
trial. Thus, in the aforesaid Resolution, the Investigating Officer, found:
A violation therefore of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense.
In the instant case, when respondents Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez filed their
respective applications for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of
Burauen, Leyte on May 9 and 11, 2001, respectively, they stated under oath that they are not
registered voters in other precinct (VRR Nos. 42454095 and 07902941). However, contrary to
their statements, records show they are still registered voters of Precinct No. 4419-A, barangay
Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, as per VRR Nos. 26195825 and 26195823.
In other words, respondents’ registration records in Quezon City is (sic) still in existence.
While it may be true that respondents had written the City Election Officer of District IV, Quezon
City for cancellation of their voter’s registration record as voter’s (sic) therein, they cannot
presume that the same will be favorably acted upon. Besides, RA 8189 provides for the
procedure in cases of transfer of residence to another city/municipality which must be complied
with, to wit:
"Section 12. Change of Residence to Another City or Municipality. – Any registered voter who has
transferred residence to another city or municipality may apply with the Election Officer of his new
residence for the transfer of his registration records.
The application for transfer of registration shall be subject to the requirements of notice and
hearing and the approval of the Election Registration Board, in accordance with this Act. Upon
approval, of the application for transfer, and after notice of such approval to the Election Officer of
their former residence of the voter, said Election Officer shall transmit by registered mail the
voter’s registration record to the Election Officer of the voter’s new residence."
They cannot claim ignorance of the abovestated provision on the procedure for transfer of
registration records by reason of transferred new residence to another municipality. Based on the
affidavit executed by one Eufemia S. Cotoner, she alleged that the refusal of the Assistant
Election Officer Ms. Estrella Perez to accept the letter of respondents was due to improper
procedure because respondents should have filed the required request for transfer with the
Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte. Despite this knowledge, however, they proceeded to register
as new voters of Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of their previous registrations in
Quezon City.
In their subsequent affidavit of Transfer of Voters Registration under Section 12 of Republic Act
8189, respondents admitted that they erroneously filed an application as a new voter (sic) with
the office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, by reason of an honest mistake, which they
now desire to correct. (underscoring ours).
Respondents lose sight of the fact that a statutory offense, such as violation of election law, is
mala prohibita. Proof of criminal intent is not necessary. Good faith, ignorance or lack of malice is
beside the point. Commission of the act is sufficient. It is the act itself that is punished.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, the Law Department respectfully submits that there is probable cause to
hold respondents Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for trial in violation of Section 10(g)
and (j) in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189. There is no doubt that they applied for
registration as new voters of Burauen, Leyte consciously, freely and voluntarily.56
We take occasion to reiterate that the Constitution grants to the COMELEC the power to prosecute cases
or violations of election laws. Article IX (C), Section 2 (6) of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and where appropriate, prosecute cases or violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
This power to prosecute necessarily involves the power to determine who shall be prosecuted, and the
corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute.57 Evidently, must this power to prosecute also include the
right to determine under which laws prosecution will be pursued. The courts cannot dictate the
prosecution nor usurp its discretionary powers. As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor’s
discretion and control of the criminal prosecution.58Its rationale cannot be doubted. For the business of a
court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure of the
prosecution to prosecute.59 Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies,
but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of
the defense.60
Fourth. In People v. Delgado,61 this Court said that when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law
officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a
probable cause, files the Information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the
case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the
court. The records show that Informations charging petitioners with violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in
relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 had been filed with the RTC. The case must, thus, be
allowed to take its due course.
It may be recalled that petitioners prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before this Court to restrain the COMELEC from executing its Resolutions of 11
June 2004 and 27 January 2005. In a Resolution dated 20 June 2006, this Court En Banc denied for lack
of merit petitioners’ Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for
Indirect Contempt. Logically, the normal course of trial is expected to have continued in the proceedings a
quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions, dated 11 June 2004 and 27 January
2005 of the COMELEC En Banc are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Dissenting Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
*RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
Dissenting Opinion
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180016
April 29, 2014
LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated
November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City
sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino
players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him
on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis.
Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an
18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with
an aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that
petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period
of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces
of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he
will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having received from one Danilo
Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth ₱45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k,
worth ₱25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth ₱12,000.00, or in the total amount of
Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part
of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said
accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse
of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the
aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused
failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos
(₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the
aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the
other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the
financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a
commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a
blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence
against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary the penalty
imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of
an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of
Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8)
MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant
Danilo Tangcoy the amount of ₱98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the
decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of
San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison
term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each
additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the present petition
stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND
APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS,
WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING
THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH
THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE IN THAT 1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT
[PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO
BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE
ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING
THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE
PROCEEDS, IF SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE – WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING
THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH 1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE
INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD
AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS
CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the following counterarguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of the offense
and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when
said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of
support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court.
He now comes to this Court raising both procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in evidence a
receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was merely a
photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner never
objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in
court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an
objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed
the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to
evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. 5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information filed
against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry
were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one
testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the
Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and
substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of
the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner 6 and that the time of occurrence is
not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the
occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA
ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense
and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides
that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows
compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or
about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that
Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material
ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an
essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date
does not render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date
within which accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of
jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accusedappellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges
proferred against him.7
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1
(b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property; x x x
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other personal
property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation
or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand
made by the offended party on the offender.8
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on the
offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant narrated how he
was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and
asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have been finished on
5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline came?
a I went looking for him, sir.
q For whom?
a Lito Corpuz, sir.
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
a I looked for him for a week, sir.
q Did you know his residence?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go there?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you find him?
a No, sir.
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
a I talked to him, sir.
q How many times?
a Two times, sir.
q What did you talk (sic) to him?
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items are and he
promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?
a No, sir.9
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. 10 Demand need not even be formal;
it may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed been
made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this
case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of estafa need
not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of
demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the law
would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to
include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as
evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the
accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of
embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust,
is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other proof,
such as that introduced in the case at bar.14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all
the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on
commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same
within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds
of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within
or after the agreed period despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the same is
unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great
respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which
merely rely on the records of the case.15 The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding
if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence,
especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is established not by the number of witnesses,
but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the
witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the question of the
continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came up. The legislature
apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the
Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since
the issues are of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration
and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic
opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean
Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty.
Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue
to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the
value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties
because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the
penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would
be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the
whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by
the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may
deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall
report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which is not
punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and
thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same
act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is
not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need
to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except
for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by
the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of
the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to
be non-commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive,
this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in Article 5,
the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment
or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that there
can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to prohibit its
perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the ground
that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that
the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. 20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and
retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the
above-cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must be
tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the
penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of
particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are questions as to which commentators on
the law may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases
unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel
and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the current
inflation rate or at the ratio of ₱1.00 is equal to ₱100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as this would
result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that
the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be
adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the
framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, it included the
earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the present legislature has not
made any moves to amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we
know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the further commission of those
punishable acts which have increased tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the
legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the
crime of Plunder, from its original minimum amount of ₱100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature
lowered it to ₱50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon which
the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from ₱1,000,000.00 to ₱500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to be
excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions
state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing
stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed
in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection
with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the
thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of
the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the
circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing
stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the
five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the
thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger,
poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the above-provision states that the penalty is
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto
mayor in its medium period to prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months). It would seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same as the
penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law,
the minimum penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its
medium period to maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for
pardon or parole after serving the said minimum period and may even apply for probation. Moreover,
under the proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor
in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the
minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed under the
law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa. 23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the crime of Theft
and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the maximum
amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the
penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to the act committed and the value of the thing
stolen or the damage caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the penalties are not
changed:
1. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00 will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punished by prision
mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).
2. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punished by prision
correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years).24
3. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by prision
correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).
4. ₱50.00 to ₱200.00 will become ₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
5. ₱5.00 to ₱50.00 will become ₱500.00 to ₱5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and
1 day to 6 months).
6. ₱5.00 will become ₱500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto mayor medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but the penalties
are not changed, as follows:
1st. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00, will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punishable by
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8
years).25
2nd. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punishable by prision
correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).26
3rd. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
4th. ₱200.00 will become ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1
day to 6 months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that the
incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according to a valid
classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, 27 which
has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial distinctions as
₱10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which violates the first requisite;
the IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier
penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a person who steals ₱142,000.00 would receive
the same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; and,
the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the
law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental penalty in
Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what then is the penalty that should
be applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime exceeds ₱22,000.00? It seems that
the proposition poses more questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the
appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to
legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the remedy is to
go to Congress. Thus:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as unconstitutional
because it is absurd.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than Twenty-Two
Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule
unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, my presen ... (interrupted)
JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(₱22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you right?
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But if we de ... (interrupted)
DEAN DIOKNO:
....then....
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix the amount
...
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00)
Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The Court cannot do that.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Could not be.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The only remedy is to go to Congress...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(₱22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you.
x x x x29
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme Court
has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things
must be done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the
nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed
on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes are subject to the same
penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in Solem what
respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota after it took
into account the latter’s recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering a "no account" check.
Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime would have been five years imprisonment and a
$5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole under South Dakota’s recidivist statute because of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the
factual antecedents of Solem are different from the present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable penalty for the offense
is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is the
fact that in the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence
reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the
household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of the employer’s loved
ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of
imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on the subject
matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious implications. For example, in
the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money malversed by the
public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who,
by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the
same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit
any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of
the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved
in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is
more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand
pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved
is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount
exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due to the unlawful
acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed is ₱200.00 (under the existing
law), the amount now becomes ₱20,000.00 and the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the
act of embezzlement of ₱20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by public officials punishable by a
special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section
3,31 wherein the injury caused to the government is not generally defined by any monetary amount, the
penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should
not be the case, because in the crime of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public
position to embezzle the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or
uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the bases of
the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is
dependent on the cost of the damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of the thing
unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value of the
thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force employed in entering the premises. It may
likewise cause an inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and
this kind of robbery because the former is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding ₱1,000.00 (₱100,000.00 now if
the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the main
justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a
penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of
Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the
unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that can be imposed is
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the
damage caused exceeds ₱1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the damage will now become
₱100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the
value of the damaged property does not exceed ₱200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not
less than the value of the damage caused and not more than ₱200.00, if the amount involved does not
exceed ₱200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, ₱200.00 will now become ₱20,000.00,
which simply means that the fine of ₱200.00 under the existing law will now become ₱20,000.00. The
amount of Fine under this situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that
the offense is categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the
RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the penalty of
Fine, but changing the same through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and
constitutionally feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be affected by the
proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of the
damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum),
Article 312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering
boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article
318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or
damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also
be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215
(Prohibited Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of accountable
officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before
leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes which are
punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705, as amended.34The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or
other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified
theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and
31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the penalty imposable for the offense is, again,
based on the value of the timber or forest products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said
proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the
penalty is concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer
is in the negative because the soundness of this particular law is not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and Special Laws, and
other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough study is needed to determine
its effectivity and necessity. There may be some provisions of the law that should be amended;
nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised
Penal Code by merely making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times.
Such is not within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to conduct
public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide
whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even create a new legislation
which will adopt to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code. During the
oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now
pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code,37 each one proposing much needed
change and updates to archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago when the political, socioeconomic, and cultural settings were far different from today’s conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp
legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it
should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend,
distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. 38 The
Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the
law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching
upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an
inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it can be
increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding
five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which
in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person
dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to
pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the
victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis
in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of
civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of
the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount
for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the
minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity
can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral
damages under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be
awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the
private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so
long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount to cruel
punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are
excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative
of the courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation
than that which is plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio’s opinions is that the incremental
penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the courts should only impose the penalty
corresponding to the amount of ₱22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds
₱22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes
of Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of
criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties
different from the proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law
has no legal basis and directly runs counter to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal justice by the
Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in December 1993. The said law has been
questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still,
from the time the death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No.
9346,41 the Court did not impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel
punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1),42 Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was through
an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the death penalty that led to its non-imposition and not
via the intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the
law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative
of due process, considering that the State and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to
comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked
collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally, 43 more so in the
present controversy wherein the issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at
the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and
applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those
inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling,
and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not
make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the
punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community."45
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our
modern time.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned monetary
values to the present value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There are other factors and
variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said
values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the
accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in
order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly,
the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and
sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function
clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso you have to
take into consideration several factors.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Per capita income.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Consumer price index.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Inflation ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of those
economic terms.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, but ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value to One
Hundred (₱100.00) Pesos to ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... One (₱1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That is legislative in nature.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the adjustment that is
a power that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.46
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that the role
of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order
to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged
eighty three years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation.
Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant
changes in circumstances" in its decisions.
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of the substance of a
statute. The issue is no different from the Court’s adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons,
which the Court had previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of People v.
Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my Colleagues, all the
proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as extensively
discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power
belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil
indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a
kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on
penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the value of money, but on several
other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only
pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can
be adjusted in light of current conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of the RTC. The
RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its
medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus
one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People48 is highly
instructive, thus:
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if
the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case, Article
65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of
time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the
latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days 49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be
deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the amount
involved is ₱98,000.00, which exceeds ₱22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be
within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 also
states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every additional ₱10,000.00 defrauded
in excess of ₱22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of ₱98,000.00 is ₱76,000.00 more than the ₱22,000.00 ceiling set by law,
then, adding one year for each additional ₱10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the maximum of the
prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate
penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge
against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower
would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of lawmaking. The
Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws. While it
may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the
Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is
hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5,
2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision
correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the President of
the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
See Dissenting Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
See: Concurring Opinion
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
I take no part due to prior action in the CA
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*
Associate Justice
I join the Dissent of J. Abad
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
See Dissenting Opinion
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
BVIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
No Part
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17958
February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain
Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like Blackbeard
flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a
tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity,
so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men,
women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7
o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East
Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros
first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the
men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons
on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were
made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days
of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch
possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At
Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There
they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A
demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense
charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine
Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine
Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered
finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to
return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the
thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees,
and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a process of
elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery
or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit
and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done in
this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes
humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be
punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may
be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so
may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile
limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong
[1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is
whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Article
153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not
at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena
perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it
shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding
article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes
referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena
perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical
injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in
paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in
Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when Spain
is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according
to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of a
transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the former
sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution,
the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force.
As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order
and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of
the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn
[1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the Instructions of
President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the Army of
Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate
upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such
as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are
considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until
they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and practice they are not usually
abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals,
substantially as they were before the occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible,
to be adhered to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p.
1. See also General Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to
include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of
the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but
to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil law,
and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to
statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so,
considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and
the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. (U.S.
Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary
legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of
nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S.
Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution
and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception
under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not
inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of
articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever
"Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are
mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of
the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith
([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which
would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the
Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished with
a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United
States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154,
to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154. There
are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena
perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary
for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this
connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and
compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11,
as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating
circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by
causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength,
and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be
taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to
impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not
unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance
with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the
defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who
is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and
place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two
appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly
and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the
costs of both instances. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5270
January 15, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J.:
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to this court,
where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not state facts
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was without
jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain
provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the facts of this case; and (4)
that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
The information alleges:
That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull was then
and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard, which vessel was
then and there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a
foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said accused H. N. Bull, while master
of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of December, 1908, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard
said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of
cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit,
so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals, in this, to wit, that the said
H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then and there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in
transit and suitable means for trying and securing said animals in a proper manner, and did then
and there cause some of said animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses,
and allow and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel
without being tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid
neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in
transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were
tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that —
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep,
swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign
port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels carrying
such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable sustenance of such
animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of shipment to
the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage and
fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that the animals are embarked
to the time of their final debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section 1 thereof the
following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep,
swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port
to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing such animals
while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals, and suitable
and proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon
which they are transported, without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful
to load or unload cattle upon or from vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes
or chains attached to the thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that —
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly and willfully fails to
comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty
of not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred dollars, United States money, for
each offense. Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any Court of First Instance or any
provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked.
1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state that the court was sitting at
a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a vessel
registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance or any provost
court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked, and there is nothing
inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for the organization of the courts of the
Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses
committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the waters of the
Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine
Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be
exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which such ship or water upon which the
offense or crime was committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had this offense been
committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of
the court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well recognized and
established public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not
registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the question
whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character, committed on board a foreign ship by
the master thereof, when the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense continued during the
time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States. No court of the Philippine Islands had
jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any
other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the
entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable.
(Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer
Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject
through the proper political agency. This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line
which determines these waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to
anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the jurisdiction
of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel was
on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a
continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the
territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court therefore
had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the objection to the
jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of
the ship. Every. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to
strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power without permission, but it
is now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are considered as open to the public ship
of all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction while within such waters was
not established until within comparatively recent times. In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796
Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions to the effect that "the laws of nations invest the commander of a
foreign ship of war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the country into which he comes." (1, Op.
U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to
the British Government as late as 1820. In the leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7
Cranch (U.S.), 116, 144), Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under which such vessels
enter a friendly port may reasonably be construed as "containing exemption from the jurisdiction of the
sovereign within whose territory she claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was accepted by the
Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that "the priviledge of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of
war has been admitted in the law of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded
on the principle of courtesy and mutual deference between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip
de la Mer, 2. C.X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely. Local official exercise
but little control over their actions, and offenses committed by their crew are justiciable by their own
officers acting under the laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general
principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds its justification
in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to respect local laws and
regulation which are essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port. But comity and convenience
does not require the extension of the same degree of exemption to merchant vessels. There are two welldefined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to the French theory
and practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity of the
port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to which the vessel
belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French
merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le Droit Int.
(quat. ed.), secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p.
292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great Britain
as a right, although she has frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1,
231; British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory
have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says that
—
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of merchant vessels that so
soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state they become subject to the local jurisdiction on
all points in which the interests of the country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port
it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of
acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op.
Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol.
II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said that —
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be obviously in convinient and
dangerous to society and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the government to
degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were
not amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of one country
visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern the
ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by
treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article 13 of the treaty of
commerce and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827, which
concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each country "The right to sit as judges and
arbitrators in such differences as may arise between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to
the nation whose interests are committed to their charge, without the interference of the local authorities,
unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb the order or tranquillity of the country."
(Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception applies to controversies between the members
of the ship's company, and particularly to disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p.
318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order and tranquillity of the country are affected by many
events which do not amount to a riot or general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of
the crew upon another, committed upon the ship, of which the public may have no knowledge whatever,
is not by this treaty withdrawn from the cognizance of the local authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on board the vessel
in the port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of the peace, but the United
States district attorney was instructed by the Government to take the necessary steps to have the
proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with the view to "guard against
a repetition of similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian
charged, May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel" was of such a nature
as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879 the mate for the Norwegian bark
Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an assault and battery committed on
board the ship while lying in the port of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the treaty which
deprived the local courts of jurisdiction. (Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.)
Representations were made through diplomatic channels to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880,
Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister, as
follows:
I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration in connection with the
views and suggestion of your note and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827
between the United States and Sweden and Norway. The stipulations contained in the last clause
of that article . . . are those under which it is contended by you that jurisdiction is conferred on the
consular officers, not only in regard to such differences of a civil nature growing out of the
contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of controversies resulting from
personal violence involving offense for which the party may be held amenable under the local
criminal law.
This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of such broad interpretation.
The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to their right to sit as judges
or abitrators in such differences as may arise between captains and crews of the vessels, where
such differences do not involve on the part of the captain or crew a disturbance of the order or
tranquillity of the country. When, however, a complaint is made to a local magistrate, either by the
captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel, involving the disturbance of the order or
tranquillity of the country, it is competent for such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in
furtherance of the local laws, and under such circumstances in the United States it becomes a
public duty which the judge or magistrate is not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it
must necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities whether the procedure shall take place in
the United States or in Sweden to determine if in fact there had been such disturbance of the
local order and tranquillity, and if the complaint is supported by such proof as results in the
conviction of the party accused, to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be defined
against the offense by the municipal law of the place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses committed on board a
merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another which amount to a disturbance of the order
or tranquillity of the country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the language requires un to hold
that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or traquillity of the country. The offense with which
the appellant is charged had nothing to so with any difference between the captain and the crew. It was a
violation by the master of the criminal law of the country into whose port he came. We thus find that
neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of the offense, or the
prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law, are the court of the Philippine Islands deprived
of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that the animals were
disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the
court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this issue would be to construe the language of
the complaint very strictly against the Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in
order to constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of the statute
confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are then
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far
as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted a
constitutional element in the offense, but it does not.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege that the
defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable means for securing said animals while in
transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the complaint that the act was
committed willfully includes the allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in Woodhouse vs. Rio
Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used in connection with
an act forbidden by law, that the act must be done knowingly or intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will
consented to, designed, and directed the act." So in Wong vs. City of Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was
said: "The first one is that the complaint did not show, in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant
'knowingly' did the act complained of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the respondent's counsel
— that the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies that
it was done by design — done for a certain purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was
'knowingly' done." To the same effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all
fours with the present case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his defense rests upon
the assertion that "according to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in
the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven
that what was done was done knowingly and intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only necessary to
state the act or omission complained of as constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary and concise
language, without repitition. It need not necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it must be in such
form as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and the court to
pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint which complies with this requirement is good.
(U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)
The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a vessel the duty to "provide
suitable means for securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to the animals." The allegation of the complaint as it reads in English is that the defendant
willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the cattle "without providing suitable means for securing said
animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this . . .
that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing
said animals were cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of
said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and killed."
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge him with
failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes" and
"medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and that the
word "suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente," according to the
context and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of the fact
that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure to
provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."
2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the amendment thereto
seems to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of the constitutional law of these Islands. The
statute penalizes acts and ommissions incidental to the transportation of live stock between foreign ports
and ports of the Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute regulating commerce with its ports been
enacted by the legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have been in violation of
Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S.,
1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is controlled by constitutional
principles different from those which apply to States of the Union. The importance of the question thus
presented requires a statement of the principles which govern those relations, and consideration of the
nature and extent of the legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the Legislature of the
Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity of opinion certain applicable constitutional
doctrines are established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war and treaties, and it has
the power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired
belongs to the United States, and to guard against the possibility of the power of Congress to provide for
its government being questioned, the framers of the Constitution provided in express terms that Congress
should have the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting territory and
other property belonging to the United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the territory
by the United States, and until it is formally incorporated into the Union, the duty of providing a
government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may govern the territory by its direct acts, or it may
create a local government, and delegate thereto the ordinary powers required for local government.
(Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual procedure. Congress has provided such
governments for territories which were within the Union, and for newly acquired territory not yet
incorporated therein. It has been customary to organize a government with the ordinary separation of
powers into executive, legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act certain general
conditions in accordance with which the local government should act. The organic act thus became the
constitution of the government of the territory which had not been formally incorporated into the Union,
and the validity of legislation enacted by the local legislature was determined by its conformity with the
requirements of such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.) To the legislative
body of the local government Congress has delegated that portion of legislative power which in its
wisdom it deemed necessary for the government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the
action of the local legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has been exercised
during the entire period of the history of the United States. The right of Congress to delegate such
legislative power can no longer be seriously questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U.
S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370, 385.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within such territory, although the
liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into contiguous territory tended to create an
impression upon the minds of many people that it went there by its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182
U. S., 289.) In legislating with reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited only by those
prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of its power to act at all, irrespective of time or
place. In all other respects it is plenary. (De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S.,
244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U.
S., 516.)
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the United States, and
legislation founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the acquisition of the present Insular
possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides that "The Constitution and all laws of
the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the
organized territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United States."
When Congress organized a civil government for the Philippines, it expressly provided that this section of
the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of 1902.)
In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United States as a result of the
war with Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have consistently proceeded in conformity with
the principles above state. The city of Manila was surrendered to the United States on August 13, 1898,
and the military commander was directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a
peace which should determine the control, disposition, and government of the Islands. The duty then
devolved upon the American authorities to preserve peace and protect person and property within the
occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders, and on August 26 General Merritt
assumed the duties of military governor. The treaty of peace was signed December 10, 1898. On the 22d
of December, 1898, the President announced that the destruction of the Spanish fleet and the surrender
of the city had practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of the
Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of peace the future control, disposition, and
government of the Islands had been ceded to the United States. During the periods of strict military
occupation, before the treaty of peace was ratified, and the interim thereafter, until Congress acted
(Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory was governed under the military authority of the
President as commander in chief. Long before Congress took any action, the President organized a civil
government which, however, had its legal justification, like the purely military government which it
gradually superseded, in the war power. The military power of the President embraced legislative,
executive personally, or through such military or civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by Secretary
Root in his report for 1901 —
The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation includes executive,
legislative, and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single order of a military
commander can be found the exercise of all three of these different powers — the exercise of the
legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power by determination of
right; and the executive power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed and the rights
determined.
President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly as conditions would
permit. After full investigation, the organization of civil government was initiated by the appointment of a
commission to which civil authority was to be gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the authority
to exercise, subject to the approval of the President. "that part of the military power of the President in the
Philippine Islands which is legislative in its character" was transferred from the military government to the
Commission, to be exercised under such rules and regulations as should be prescribed by the Secretary
of War, until such time as complete civil government should be established, or congress otherwise
provided. The legislative power thus conferred upon the Commission was declared to include "the making
of rules and orders having the effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs duties, and
imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public funds of the Islands; the establishment of an
educational system to secure an efficient civil service; the organization and establishment of courts; the
organization and establishment of municipal and departmental government, and all other matters of a civil
nature which the military governor is now competent to provide by rules or orders of a legislative
character." This grant of legislative power to the Commission was to be exercised in conformity with
certain declared general principles, and subject to certain specific restrictions for the protection of
individual rights. The Commission were to bear in mind that the government to be instituted was "not for
our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity
of the people of the Philippine Island, and the measures adopted should be made to conforms to their
customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment
of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government." The specific restrictions upon legislative
power were found in the declarations that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that
in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense; that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist
except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to
peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances; that no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be
allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the Spooner amendment to
the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that "all military, civil, and judicial powers
necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise provided by Congress be vested in
such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States
shall direct, for the establishment of civil government, and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants
of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901,
the authority, which had been exercised previously by the military governor, was transferred to that
official. The government thus created by virtue of the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy continued to administer the affairs of the Islands under the direction of the President
until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed control of the situation by the enactment of a law
which, in connection with the instructions of April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine
Islands.
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of government which the President had
erected. Congress adopted the system which was in operation, and approved the action of the President
in organizing the government. Substantially all the limitations which had been imposed on the legislative
power by the President's instructions were included in the law, Congress thus extending to the Islands by
legislative act nor the Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the rights and privileges of
individuals which were appropriate under the conditions. The action of the President in creating the
Commission with designated powers of government, in creating the office of the Governor-General and
Vice-Governor-General, and through the Commission establishing certain executive departments, was
expressly approved and ratified. Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a tariff before and
after the ratification of the treaty of peace was also ratified and approved by Congress. (Act of March 8,
1902; Act of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until
otherwise provided by law the Islands were to continue to be governed "as thereby and herein provided."
In the future the enacting clause of all statutes should read "By authority of the United States" instead of
"By the authority of the President." In the course of time the legislative authority of the Commission in all
parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a legislature
consisting of two houses — the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The government of
the Islands was thus assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired territory not
incorporated into the United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and organization
somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which unites the States
and Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is derived from the
Constitution of the United States, which, however, operates on the President and Congress, and not
directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States, acting through the President
and Congress, both deriving power from the same source, but from different parts thereof. For its powers
and the limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looked to the orders of the President before
Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the
formally and legally expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign
constituency which lies upon any subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it
exercise such power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment
of a constitution in the United States.
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete governmental organism
with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly assigned to such
departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in most governments. In neither Federal nor
State governments is this separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. For
instance, in the Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to some
extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a State the veto power enables him to exercise
much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the executive department in the
Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but as executive he has no veto
power. The President and Congress framed the government on the model with which Americans are
familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the
protection of individual rights and priviliges.
In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt the general constitutional
doctrined which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the Legislature must enact laws subject to the
limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must act under the national Constitution, and the States
under the national and state constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are constitutionally
enacted. The judiciary, as in all governments operating under written constitutions, must determine the
validity of legislative enactments, as well as the legality of all private and official acts. In performing these
functions it acts with the same independence as the Federal and State judiciaries in the United States.
Under no other constitutional theory could there be that government of laws and not of men which is
essential for the protection of rights under a free and orderly government.
Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine Islands, it is apparent that the
courts must consider the question of the validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the State legislature. The Federal Government exercises
such powers only as are expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the United States, while
the States exercise all powers which have not been granted to the central government. The former
operates under grants, the latter subject to restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress depends upon
whether the Constitution of the United States contains a grant of express or implied authority to enact it.
An act of a State legislature is valid unless the Federal or State constitution expressly or impliedly
prohibits its enaction. An Act of the legislative authority of the Philippines Government which has not been
expressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by congressional
legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the organic laws.
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms subject to specific
limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the
legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that specific authority is conferred upon the
Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated
upon certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein
Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local
legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by the Government of the
Philippine tends strongly to confirm the view that for purposes of construction the Government of the
Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead of enumerated legislative powers. The situation
was unusual. The new government was to operate far from the source of its authority. To relieve
Congress from the necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to grant general
legislative power to the new government, subject to broad and easily understood prohibitions, and
reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if they met with disapproval. It was therefore provided
"that all laws passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be reported to Congress, which
hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.)
This provision does not suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines until approved by Congress,
or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make them the laws of Congress. They are valid acts
of the Government of the Philippine Islands until annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the Legislature has been
expressly or implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States
operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no application to the Government of the Philippine
Islands. The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to
govern the territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce with such territory. It
may do this directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created by it, to which its power in this respect
if delegate. Congress has by direct legislation determined the duties which shall be paid upon goods
imported into the Philippines, and it has expressly authorized the Government of the Philippines to
provide for the needs of commerce by improving harbors and navigable waters. A few other specific
provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its general regulation
is left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to the reserved power of Congress to annul such
legislation as does not meet with its approval. The express limitations upon the power of the Commission
and Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with respect to the regulation of commerce with
foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over the control of the Islands, and this
act was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The
military government, and the civil government instituted by the President, had the power, whether it be
called legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign nations and the ports of the
territory. (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This
Act has remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other action by Congress, and must
be presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied that the Commission had, and the
Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation of commerce between
foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275,
is valid.
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the Act can not be left to
the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be determined by the court from the
evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and city of
Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means
for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said
animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275.
The trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by the evidence:
That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian steamer known as
the Standard, for a period of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December, 1908,
was engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines and Japanese ports to and
into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and captain as aforesaid,
brought into the city of Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle, which ship was
anchored, under the directions of the said defendant, behind the breakwaters in front of the city of
Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court; and that fifteen of said cattle then
and there had broken legs and three others of said cattle were dead, having broken legs; and
also that said cattle were transported and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the defendant,
upon the deck and in the hold of said ship, without suitable precaution and care for the
transportation of said animals, and to avoid danger and risk to their lives and security; and further
that said cattle were so transported abroad said ship by the defendant and brought into the said
bay, and into the city of Manila, without any provisions being made whatever upon said decks of
said ship and in the hold thereof to maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for
such transportation.
That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle abroad steamship coming into
Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls for such cattle,
providing partitions between the cattle and supports at the front sides, and rear thereof, and
cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and are transported, of that in case of storms,
which are common in this community at sea, such cattle may be able to stand without slipping
and pitching and falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the production of panics and
hazard to the animals on account or cattle were transported in this case. Captain Summerville of
the steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced seaman, has testified, as a witness in
behalf of the Government, and stated positively that since the introduction in the ships with which
he is acquainted of the stall system for the transportation of animals and cattle he has suffered no
loss whatever during the last year. The defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf,
that according to his experience the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the
hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals, but this theory of the
case is not maintainable, either by the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with logic
that, for instance, three hundred cattle supports for the feet and without stalls or any other
protection for them individually can safely and suitably carried in times of storm upon the decks
and in the holds of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling or
pitching, if he is untied or unprotected, might produce a serious panic and the wounding of half
the animals upon the ship if transported in the manner found in this case.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is
affirmed. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
ARELLANO, C. J.:
The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, stated that he
"carried, kept, possessed and had in his possession and control, 96 kilogrammes of opium," and that "he
had been surprised in the act of selling 1,000 pesos worth prepared opium."
The defense presented a demurrer based on two grounds, the second of which was the more than one
crime was charged in the complaint. The demurrer was sustained, as the court found that the complaint
contained two charges, one, for the unlawful possession of opium, and the other, for the unlawful sale of
opium, and, consequence of that ruling, it ordered that the fiscal should separated one charge from the
other and file a complaint for each violation; this, the fiscal did, and this cause concerns only the unlawful
possession of opium. It is registered as No. 375, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and as No. 5887
on the general docket of this court.
The facts of the case are contained in the following finding of the trial court:
The evidence, it says, shows that between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. on the present month (stated
as August 19, 1909), several persons, among them Messrs. Jacks and Milliron, chief of the
department of the port of Cebu and internal-revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went abroad the
steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found, first in a cabin near the saloon, one
sack (Exhibit A) and afterwards in the hold, another sack (Exhibit B). The sack referred to as
Exhibit A contained 49 cans of opium, and the other, Exhibit B, the larger sack, also contained
several cans of the same substance. The hold, in which the sack mentioned in Exhibit B was
found, was under the defendant's control, who moreover, freely and of his own will and accord
admitted that this sack, as well as the other referred to in Exhibit B and found in the cabin,
belonged to him. The said defendant also stated, freely and voluntarily, that he had bought these
sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera
Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been searched several times for opium, he ordered two
other Chinamen to keep the sack. Exhibit A.
It is to be taken into account that the two sacks of opium, designated as Exhibits A and B, properly
constitute the corpus delicti. Moreover, another lot of four cans of opium, marked, as Exhibit C, was the
subject matter of investigation at the trial, and with respect to which the chief of the department of the port
of Cebu testified that they were found in the part of the ship where the firemen habitually sleep, and that
they were delivered to the first officer of the ship to be returned to the said firemen after the vessel should
have left the Philippines, because the firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the instructions he
had from the Manila custom-house, were permitted to retain certain amounts of opium, always provided it
should not be taken shore.
And, finally, another can of opium, marked "Exhibit D," is also corpus delicti and important as evidence in
this cause. With regard to this the internal-revenue agent testified as follows:itc-alf
FISCAL. What is it?
WITNESS. It is a can opium which was bought from the defendant by a secret-service agent and
taken to the office of the governor to prove that the accused had opium in his possession to sell.
On motion by the defense, the court ruled that this answer might be stricken out "because it refers to a
sale." But, with respect to this answer, the chief of the department of customs had already given this
testimony, to wit:
FISCAL. Who asked you to search the vessel?
WITNESS. The internal-revenue agent came to my office and said that a party brought him a
sample of opium and that the same party knew that there was more opium on board the steamer,
and the agent asked that the vessel be searched.
The defense moved that this testimony be rejected, on the ground of its being hearsay evidence, and the
court only ordered that the part thereof "that there was more opium, on board the vessel" be stricken out.
The defense, to abbreviate proceedings, admitted that the receptacles mentioned as Exhibits A, B, and C,
contained opium and were found on board the steamship Erroll, a vessel of English nationality, and that it
was true that the defendant stated that these sacks of opium were his and that he had them in his
possession.
According to the testimony of the internal-revenue agent, the defendant stated to him, in the presence of
the provincial fiscal, of a Chinese interpreter (who afterwards was not needed, because the defendant
spoke English), the warden of the jail, and four guards, that the opium seized in the vessel had been
bought by him in Hongkong, at three pesos for each round can and five pesos for each one of the others,
for the purpose of selling it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz; that on the 15th the
vessel arrived at Cebu, and on the same day he sold opium; that he had tried to sell opium for P16 a can;
that he had a contract to sell an amount of the value of about P500; that the opium found in the room of
the other two Chinamen prosecuted in another cause, was his, and that he had left it in their stateroom to
avoid its being found in his room, which had already been searched many times; and that, according to
the defendant, the contents of the large sack was 80 cans of opium, and of the small one, 49, and the
total number, 129.
It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came from Hongkong, and
that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu.
The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to try the
same and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal, at the conclusion of his
argument, asked that the maximum penalty of the law be imposed upon the defendant, in view of the
considerable amount of opium seized. The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the
crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu.
The court sentenced the defendant to five years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000, with additional
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, though not to exceed one third of the principal penalty,
and to the payment of the costs. It further ordered the confiscation, in favor of the Insular Government, of
the exhibits presented in the case, and that, in the event of an appeal being taken or a bond given, or
when the sentenced should have been served, the defendant be not released from custody, but turned
over to the customs authorities for the purpose of the fulfillment of the existing laws on immigration.
From this judgment, the defendant appealed to this court.lawphi1.net
The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations made therein by the parties, it is found: That,
although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in
transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this
country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule
does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case
a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the
laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the
commission of the crime, only the court established in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in
the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
It is also found: That, even admitting that the quantity of the drug seized, the subject matter of the present
case, was considerable, it does not appear that, on such account, the two penalties fixed by the law on
the subject, should be imposed in the maximum degree.
Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000, respectively, we
affirm in all other respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18924
October 19, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case and
in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles
from the shores of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and dismissed the
case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous or not; and it
will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein
involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit, the
French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be
prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless
their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the
territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such
circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of
this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and
jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a
territory of the United States.
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], 116), Chief Justice
Marshall said:
. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient
and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government
to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and
were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . .
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on the
high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within three
miles of a line drawn from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was
within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International
Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch.
1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject
to such limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper political
agency. . . .
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of
the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:
. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb only the peace of
the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the
ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders
punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to
determine which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will
undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede
that felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are
proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has no right to interfere to prevent it.
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by
the courts of the Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of its own nationality,
the same rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is
landed from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the
land is committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of
the commission of the crime, no court other than that established in the said place has jurisdiction
of the offense, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction
or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship
where the crime in question was committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.,"
volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:
There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the territories of His
Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries,
respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all
such places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted
to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the said territories,
respectively; also to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their
commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the
most complete protection and security for their commerce, but subject always to the laws and
statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court
not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of
the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such
a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our
statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the
public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a
breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects
within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the
aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the port
of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is
simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive
that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to
smoke opium on board.
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
SEC. 58. Extra-Territorial Application of this Act. - Subject to the provision of an existing treaty of
which the Philippines is a signatory and to any contrary provision of any law of preferential application,
the provisions of this Act shall apply: (1) to individual persons who commit any of the crimes defined and
punished in this Act within the terrestrial domain, interior waters, maritime zone, and airspace of the
Philippines; (2) to individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the
Philippines, commit, conspire or plot to commit any of the crimes defined and punished in this Act inside
the territorial limits of the Philippines; (3) to individual persons who, although physically outside the
territorial limits of the Philippines, commit any of the said crimes on board Philippine ship or Philippine
airship; (4) to individual persons who commit any of said crimes within any embassy, consulate, or
diplomatic premises belonging to or occupied by the Philippine government in an official capacity; (5) to
individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said
crimes against Philippine citizens or persons of Philippines descent, where their citizenship or ethnicity
was a factor in the commission of the crime; and (6) to individual persons who, although physically
outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes directly against the Philippine
government.