Neg
Alliances
I/L
I/L -- Democracy
Alliances among democratic nations can prevent authoritarian action.
Brands 4/3/18 (Hal Brands, the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins
University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and a scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute. Most recently, he is the co-author of "The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World
Order." “NATO’s Next War Is Against Global Tyranny” Bloomerg, 3 April 2019,
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-03/china-and-russia-nato-s-next-war-isagainst-global-tyranny )
Democracies across the world also have growing experience with authoritarian
economic coercion and aggression short of war; they can work together to build resilience and push back against
these tactics. Finally, the more the democracies can join forces to support liberalizing
movements in authoritarian countries, and to pressure democratic governments that are
backsliding into authoritarianism, the better they can preserve a global climate in which
autocracies are isolated and marginalized. The goal is to build, over time, a common
recognition that the world’s democracies truly are in it together, and to develop
patterns of cooperation to beat back the authoritarian threat. There has been some progress already.
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or “Quad”) initiated in 2007 between the U.S., Australia, India and Japan is a
democratic, multilateral group that is gradually doing more to preserve what the Trump
administration calls the “free and open Indo-Pacific.” The U.K. and France have joined America,
Australia, Japan and other Pacific powers in defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
The new trade deal between the EU and Japan is an effort to unite democracies on both
sides of Eurasia against authoritarian mercantilism as well as resurgent American
protectionism. And as NATO focuses more on nonconventional threats such as
cyberattacks and information warfare, there will be opportunities to cooperate with
democracies beyond any official alliance. Of course, these efforts would have greater
impact if the world’s foremost democracy did not seem so ambivalent about leading the
democratic world. The Trump administration deserves credit for re-energizing the Quad and pushing the NATO allies to
take the Chinese threat seriously. Yet the president deserves blame not simply for questioning the defense commitments that hold
U.S. alliances together, but also for denigrating democratic norms and procedures, fawning over powerful autocrats, and often
treating issues of democracy promotion and human rights as mere distractions. The Trump administration calls this “principled
realism.” But it’s no way to catalyze the global democratic response that today’s authoritarian challenge demands.
Alliances among anti-liberal nations overpowered liberal democracies.
Kagen 3/14/19 (Robert Kagen, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a contributing
columnist for The Washington Post. His latest book is “The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our
Imperiled World.” “The Strongmen Strike Back” Washington Post, 15 March. 2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2019/03/14/feature/the-strongmenstrike-back/?utm_term=.2eab7157766e)
During the Cold War, the American left was outnumbered by the broad coalition
of conservatives and anti-communist liberals who, in their own ways and for
their own reasons, joined together to support anti-communist containment and
to make the case for the superiority of liberal democratic capitalism over Soviet
communism. No such coalition has coalesced to oppose international
authoritarianism or to make the case for liberalism today. A broad alliance of
strange bedfellows stretching from the far right to self-described “realists” to the
progressive left wants the United States to abandon resistance to rising
authoritarian power. They would grant Russia and China the spheres of influence
they demand in Europe, Asia and elsewhere. They would acquiesce in the world’s
new ideological “diversity.” And they would consign the democracies living in the
shadow of the authoritarian great powers to their hegemonic control. As the Trump
administration tilts toward anti-liberal forces in Europe and elsewhere, most Americans appear indifferent, at best. In contrast to
their near-obsession with communism during the Cold War, they appear unconcerned by the challenge of authoritarianism. And so,
. Much of the problem is simply intellectual. We look at
the world today and see a multisided struggle among various systems of
governance, all of which have their pluses and minuses, with some more suited
to certain political cultures than others. We have become lost in endless
categorizations, viewing each type of non-liberal government as unique and
unrelated to the others — the illiberal democracy, the “liberal” or “liberalizing”
autocracy, the “competitive” and “hybrid” authoritarianism. These different categories
as the threat mounts, America is disarmed
certainly describe the myriad ways non-liberal societies may be governed. But in the most fundamental way, all of this is beside the
Nations are either liberal, meaning that
there are permanent institutions and unchanging norms that protect the
“unalienable” rights of individuals against all who would infringe on those rights,
whether the state or the majority; or they are not liberal, in which case there is
nothing built into the system and respected by the government and the governed
alike that prevents the state or the majority from violating or taking away
individuals’ rights whenever they choose, in ways both minor and severe.
point. By far, the most significant distinction today is a binary one:
I/L – Climate
Alliances are key to save the environment
VNA 6-19-19 (“International cooperation needed to protect environment,”
https://en.vietnamplus.vn/international-cooperation-needed-to-protectenvironment/154645.vnp, ME)
International collaboration is essential to protect the environment, particularly when economic
development, changes in structure of the society, air and plastic waste pollution are exerting
pressure on Vietnam, an environmental official said. Deputy Director General of the Vietnam
Environment Administration (VEA) Hoang Van Thuc said that the VEA will promote cooperation
with the Society of Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry Asia-Pacific to develop
environmental management policies, and enhance capacity building in setting up a network of
experts and scientists in environmental monitoring. Also, they will work to improve
management capacity in responding and recovering environmental incidents from bauxite
mining. Vietnam will join hands with Japan in the field through concretising cooperative
programmes and projects to boost green growth and technologies to control waste. Both sides
have already set up a joint committee on waste management to share information, support
policy building, and develop effective and sustainable solid waste treatment in Vietnam.
Environment is among four priorities of cooperation between Vietnam and the Republic of
Korea in 2019. The East Asian country will help Vietnam to complete the Law on Environmental
Protection released in 2014, and documents regulating Vietnam’s environmental standards. Due
attention will be paid to human resources training, as well as projects on climate change and
biodiversity conservation, he added. According to the UN Environment Programme, more than
8.3 billion tonnes of plastic has been produced worldwide since the early 1950s. About 60
percent of that plastic has ended up in either a landfill or the natural environment. To date,
more than 99 percent of plastics are produced from chemicals derived from oil, natural gas and
coal — all of which are dirty, non-renewable resources. If current trends continue, by 2050 the
plastic industry could account for 20% of the world’s total oil consumption. Meanwhile, air
pollution is the single biggest environmental health risk, causing roughly 7 million deaths
annually. Short-lived pollutants – which include black carbon, methane, ozone, and airborne
particles produced by industrial operations and the burning of diesel, coal, kerosene or biomass
– are responsible for about one third of deaths from stroke, chronic respiratory disease and lung
cancer and one quarter of deaths from heart attack. These pollutants are also contributing to
global warming, lowering labour productivity, and increasing food insecurity around the world.
Alliances and multilateral processes key to solving climate change
Robinson 17 (Mary Robinson Irish Independent politician who served as the
seventh President of Ireland, “Keynote Speech during the UN Economic and
Social Council” April 5, 2017, https://thecvf.org/new-vision-multilateralcooperation/, Catherine)
Today, more than ever, we are in need of a unifying vision that can bind the international community
together in the face of our world’s greatest collective challenge – overcoming the existential threat
of climate change while enabling sustainable development for all. Our success will be dependent on
our ability to maintain and strengthen a multilateral process that can stimulate inclusive global
responses that work. But we are living through troubled times, where trust between nations is being
eroded, undermining our ability to respond to these complex and interlinked global challenges.
ECOSOC, as the United Nations’ central platform for reflection, debate, and innovative thinking on
sustainable development, has a critical role to play in nurturing a new vision of partnership and
international cooperation based on a shared sense of mutual interdependence. In 2015, world
leaders demonstrated a clear understanding that no one country alone can protect its citizens from
the impacts of climate change. The global transformation – envisioned by the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development and Paris Agreement on Climate Change – sent a clear signal that we must
find a common path forward, based on a shared understanding of both the threats and the
opportunities ahead. But to pioneer new sustainable development pathways, we need to develop an
entirely new paradigm for collaboration. We must remove the silos which have, for too long, divided
government, civil society and the private sector. The success of this global transformation hinges on
our ability to work towards new partnerships based on – as the 2030 Agenda states – “a spirit of
global solidarity, focused in particular on the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable”. A little over
a year on from those historic accords, the collaborative spirit in which the Sustainable Development
Goals and the Paris Agreement were concluded seems to be under attack from rising waves of
populism and myopic decision making. Yet the urgency for collaborative action on the 2030 Agenda
and the Paris Agreement could not be greater. Traditional fossil fuel based development has brought
our global community to the brink of a climate crisis that threatens our very existence, the impacts
of which are already being felt by those least responsible for the emissions which got us here. This is
the injustice of climate change and it can only be remedied through action that is based on
inclusivity, trust and a shared understanding of the opportunities and risks ahead. A new vision for
global partnership must weave together the interlinked challenges of advancing sustainable
development and stabilising the climate system. Climate justice can provide the basis for this
approach, recognizing that taking climate action and ensuring a safer world for future generations is
about a just transition; eliminating fossil fuel emissions while ensuring that people everywhere have
their rights upheld and share the benefits of sustainable development. Agenda 2030 compels
countries to “reach the furthest behind first” in delivering the Sustainable Development Goals and to
leave no one behind. The challenge is greatest in the Least Developed Countries and the Small Island
Developing States where poverty and vulnerability are the immediate priority. Yet these are also the
countries that are giving the most ambitious leadership on climate action. In 2016 the 48 countries of
the Climate Vulnerable Forum commited to playing their part in achieving the 1.5oC goal, peaking
global emissions by 2020 at the latest, and achieving carbon neutrality by the 2050s.
Alliances among more nations will allow for environmental sustainability and
waste elimination.
AEPW 16/1 (Alliance to End Plastic Waste, A wide array of domestic and global news stories;
news topics include politics/government, business, technology, religion, sports/entertainment,
science/nature, and health/lifestyle, 16 Jan 2019, Cision, https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/new-global-alliance-commits-over-1-0-billion-usd-to-help-end-plastic-waste-in-theenvironment-sets-goal-of-investing-1-5-billion-usd-300778996.html, Jewel)
WASHINGTON, Jan. 16, 2019 /PRNewswire/ -- An alliance of global companies
from the plastics and consumer goods value chain today launched a new
organization to advance solutions to eliminate plastic waste in the environment,
especially in the ocean. The cross value chain Alliance to End Plastic Waste
(AEPW), currently made up of nearly thirty member companies, has committed
over $1.0 billion with the goal of investing $1.5 billion over the next five years to
help end plastic waste in the environment. The Alliance will develop and bring to
scale solutions that will minimize and manage plastic waste and promote
solutions for used plastics by helping to enable a circular economy. The Alliance
membership represents global companies and located throughout North and
South America, Europe, Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.
"Everyone agrees that plastic waste does not belong in our oceans or anywhere
in the environment. This is a complex and serious global challenge that calls for
swift action and strong leadership. This new alliance is the most comprehensive
effort to date to end plastic waste in the environment," said David Taylor,
Chairman of the Board, President and CEO of Procter & Gamble, and chairman of
the AEPW. "I urge all companies, big and small and from all regions and sectors,
to join us," he added. "History has shown us that collective action and
partnerships between industry, governments and NGOs can deliver innovative
solutions to a global challenge like this," said Bob Patel, CEO of LyondellBasell,
and a vice chairman of the AEPW. "The issue of plastic waste is seen and felt all
over the world. It must be addressed and we believe the time for action is now."
The Alliance is a not-for-profit organization that includes companies that make,
use, sell, process, collect, and recycle plastics. This includes chemical and plastic
manufacturers, consumer goods companies, retailers, converters, and waste
management companies, also known as the plastics value chain. The Alliance has
been working with the World Business Council for Sustainable Development as a
founding strategic partner. The Alliance today also announced an initial set of
projects and collaborations that reflect a range of solutions to help end plastic
waste: Partnering with cities to design integrated waste management systems in
large urban areas where infrastructure is lacking, especially those along rivers
which transport vast amounts of unmanaged plastic waste from land to the
ocean. This work will include engaging local governments and stakeholders, and
generate economically sustainable and replicable models that can be applied
across multiple cities and regions. The Alliance will pursue partnerships with
cities located in high plastic leakage areas. The Alliance will also be looking to
collaborate with other programs working with cities, such as Project STOP, which
is working in Indonesia. Funding The Incubator Network by Circulate Capital to
develop and promote technologies, business models and entrepreneurs that
prevent ocean plastic waste and improve waste management and recycling, with
the intention of creating a pipeline of projects for investment, with an initial
focus on Southeast Asia. Developing an open source, science-based global
information project to support waste management projects globally with reliable
data collection, metrics, standards, and methodologies to help governments,
companies, and investors focus on and accelerate actions to stop plastic waste
from entering the environment. The Alliance will explore opportunities to
partner with leading academic institutions and other organizations already
involved in similar types of data collection. Creating a capacity building
collaboration with intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations to
conduct joint workshops and trainings for government officials and communitybased leaders to help them identify and pursue the most effective and locallyrelevant solutions in the highest priority areas. Supporting Renew Oceans to aid
localized investment and engagement. The program is designed to capture plastic
waste before it reaches the ocean from the ten major rivers shown to carry the
vast majority of land-based waste to the ocean. The initial work will support the
Renew Ganga project, which has also received support from the National
Geographic Society. In the months ahead, the Alliance will make additional
investments and drive progress in four key areas: Infrastructure development to
collect and manage waste and increase recycling; Innovation to advance and
scale new technologies that make recycling and recovering plastics easier and
create value from all post-use plastics; Education and engagement of
governments, businesses, and communities to mobilize action; and, Clean up of
concentrated areas of plastic waste already in the environment, particularly the
major conduits of waste, like rivers, that carry land-based plastic waste to the
sea. "Success will require collaboration and coordinated efforts across many
sectors – some that create near-term progress and others that require major
investments with longer timelines. Addressing plastic waste in the environment
and developing a circular economy of plastics requires the participation of
everyone across the entire value chain and the long term commitment of
businesses, governments, and communities. No one country, company or
community can solve this on their own," said Veolia CEO Antoine Frérot, a vice
chairman of the AEPW. Research from the Ocean Conservancy shows that nearly
80 percent of plastic waste in the ocean begins as litter on land, the vast majority
of which travels to the sea by rivers. In fact one study estimates that over 90
percent of river borne plastic in the ocean comes from 10 major rivers around the
world – eight in Asia, and two in Africa. Sixty percent of plastic waste in the ocean
can be sourced to five countries in Southeast Asia. "While our effort will be
global, the Alliance can have the greatest impact on the problem by focusing on
the parts of the world where the challenge is greatest; and by sharing solutions
and best practices so that these efforts can be amplified and scaled-up around
the world," said Peter Bakker, President and CEO of World Business Council for
Sustainable Development. The following companies are the founding members of
the Alliance: BASF, Berry Global, Braskem, Chevron Phillips Chemical Company
LLC, Clariant, Covestro, Dow, DSM, ExxonMobil, Formosa Plastics Corporation
USA, Henkel, LyondellBasell, Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings, Mitsui Chemicals,
NOVA Chemicals, OxyChem, PolyOne, Procter & Gamble, Reliance Industries,
SABIC, Sasol, SUEZ, Shell, SCG Chemicals, Sumitomo Chemical, Total, Veolia, and Versalis (Eni).
!
! – Democracy
Democratic governance prevents extinction – shoring up government
legitimacy is key
Kolodziej 17 [Emeritus Research Professor of Political Science @ University of Illinois, UrbanaChampaign, Challenges to the Democratic Project for Governing Globalization,
https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/96620/Kolodziej%20Introduction%205.1
9.17.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y]
The Rise of a Global Society
Let me first sketch the global democratic project for global governance as a point of reference. We must first recognize that
globalization has given rise to a global society for
the first time in the evolution of the human species. We are
each other; seven and half billion people today — nine to ten by 2050: all super
connected and interdependent. In greater or lesser measure, humans are mutually dependent
on each other in the pursuit of their most salient values, interests, needs, and preferences — concerns about personal,
community, and national security, sustainable economic growth, protection of the environment, the equitable
distribution of the globe’s material wealth, human rights, and even the validation of their personal and social
identities by others. Global warming is a metaphor of this morphological social change in the human
condition. All humans are implicated in this looming Anthropogenic-induced disaster — the exhausts of billions of
now stuck with
automobiles, the methane released in fracking for natural gas, outdated U.S. coal-fired power plants and newly constructed ones in
China. Even the poor farmer burning charcoal to warm his dinner is complicit.
Since interdependence
surrounds, ensnares, and binds us as a human society, the dilemma confronting
the world’s diverse and divided populations is evident: the expanding scope as well as the deepening,
accumulating, and thickening interdependencies of globalization urge global government. But
the Kantian ideal of universal governance is beyond the reach of the world’s disparate peoples. They are profoundly
divided by religion, culture, language, tribal, ethnic and national loyalties as well as by class,
social status, race, gender, and sexual orientation. How have the democracies responded to this
dilemma? How have they attempted to reconcile the growing interdependence of the world’s disputing peoples and need for global
governance?
What do we mean by the governance of a human society?
A working, legitimate government of a human society requires simultaneous responses to three
competing imperatives: Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy. While the forms of these OWL imperatives have differed
radically over the course of human societal evolution, these constraints remain predicable of all human societies if
they are to replicate themselves and flourish over time. The OWL imperatives are no less applicable to a global
society.
1. Order refers to a society’s investment of awesome material power in an individual or body to arbitrate and resolve value, interest,
and preference conflicts, which cannot be otherwise resolved by non-violent means — the Hobbesian problematic. 2. The Welfare
imperative refers to the necessity of humans to eat, drink, clothe, and shelter themselves and to pursue the full-range of their
seemingly limitless acquisitive appetites. Responses to the Welfare imperative, like that of Order, constitute a distinct form of
governing power and authority with its own decisional processes and actors principally associated either with the Welfare or the
Order imperative. Hence we have the Marxian-Adam Smith problematic. 3. Legitimacy is no less a form of governing power and
authority, independent of the Order and Welfare imperatives. Either by choice, socialization, or coerced acquiescence, populations
acknowledge a regime’s governing authority and their obligation to submit to its rule. Here arises the Rousseaunian problematic.
The government of a human society emerges then as an evolving, precarious balance and compromise of the ceaseless struggle of
these competing OWL power domains for ascendancy of one of these imperatives over the others. It is against the backdrop of these
OWL imperatives — Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy — that we are brought to the democratic project for global governance. The
Democratic Project For Order, open societies constructed the global democratic state and, in alliance, the democratic global-state
system. Collectively these initiatives led to the creation of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the
World Trade Organization, and the European Union to implement the democratic project’s system of global governance.
The democratic global state assumed all of the functions of the Hobbesian Westphalian security state — but a lot more. The global
state became a Trading, Banking, Market, and Entrepreneurial state. To these functions were added those of the Science,
Technology and the Economic Growth state. How else would we be able to enjoy the
Internet, cell phones and
iPhones, or miracle cures? These are the products of the iron triangle of the global democratic
state, academic and non-profit research centers, and corporations. It is a myth that the Market System did all
this alone. Fueled by increasing material wealth, the democratic global state was afforded the
means to become the Safety Net state, providing education, health, social security, leisure and
recreation for its population. And as the global state’s power expanded across this broad and enlarging spectrum of functions
and roles, the global state was also constrained by the social compacts of the democracies to be bound by popular rule. The ironic
result of the expansion of the global state’s power and social functions and its obligation to accede to popular will was a Security
state and global state-system that vastly outperformed its principal authoritarian rivals in the Cold War. So much briefly is the
democratic project’s response to the Order imperative.
Now let’s look at the democratic project’s response to the Welfare imperative. The democracies institutionalized Adam Smith’s
vision of a global Market System. The Market System trucks and barters, Smith’s understanding of what it means to be human. But it
does a lot more. The Market System facilitates and fosters the free movement of people, goods and services, capital, ideas, values,
scientific discoveries, and best technological practices. Created is a vibrant global civil society oblivious to state boundaries. What we
now experience is De Tocqueville’s Democracy in America on global steroids.
As for the imperative of Legitimacy, the social compacts of the democracies affirmed Rousseau’s conjecture that all humans are free
and therefore equal. Applied to elections each citizen has one vote. Democratic
regimes are also obliged to submit to the
human
rule of law, to conduct free and fair elections, to honor majority rule while protecting minority rights, and to promote
rights at home and abroad.
The Authoritarian Threat to the Democratic Project
The democratic project for global governance is now at risk. Let’s start with the challenges posed by
authoritarian regimes, with Russia and China in the lead. Both Russia and China would rest global governance on
Big Power spheres of influence. Both would assume hegemonic status in their respective regions,
asserting their versions of the Monroe Doctrine. Their regional hegemony would then leverage
their claim to be global Big Powers. Moscow and Beijing would then have an equal say with the United States and the
West in sharing and shaping global governance. The Russo-Chinese global system of Order would ascribe to Russia
and China governing privileges not accorded to the states both aspire to dominate. Moscow and Beijing would enjoy
unconditional recognition of their state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in their domestic
affairs, but they would reserve to themselves the right to intervene in the domestic and foreign affairs of the states and
peoples under their tutelage in pursuit of their hegemonic interests. President Putin has announced that
Russia’s imperialism encompasses the millions of Russians living in the former republics of the Soviet
Union. Russia contends that Ukraine and Belarus also fall under Moscow’s purported claim to historical sovereignty over these
states. Forceful re-absorption of Crimea and control over eastern Ukraine are viewed by President
Putin as Russia’s historical inheritances. Self-determination is not extended to these states or to other states and
peoples of the former Soviet Union. Moscow rejects their right to freely align, say, with the European Union or, god forbid, with
NATO.
In contrast to the democratic project, universal in its reach, the
Russo-Chinese conception of a stable global order rests
on more tenuous and conflict-prone ethno-national foundations. Russia’s proclaimed enemies are the United
States and the European Union. Any means that undermines the unity of these entities is viewed by Moscow as a gain. The
endgame is a poly-anarchical interstate system, potentially as war-prone as the Eurocentric system
before and after World War I, but now populated by states with nuclear weapons.
Global politics becomes a zero-sum game.
Moscow has no compunctions about corrupting the electoral processes of democratic states, conducting threatening military
exercises along NATO’s east border, or violating the more than 30-year old treaty to ban the deployment of Intermediate-Range
missile launchers, capable of firing nuclear weapons. Nothing less than the dissolution of the democratic project is Moscow’s
solution for global Order. China also seeks a revision of the global Order. It declares sovereignty over the South China Sea. Rejected
is The Hague Tribunal’s dismissal of this claim. Beijing continues to build artificial islands as military bases in the region to assert its
control over these troubled waters. If it could have its way, China would decide which states and their naval vessels, notably those of
the United States, would have access to the South China Sea. Where Moscow and Beijing depart sharply are in their contrasting
responses to the Welfare imperative. Moscow has no solution other than to use its oil and gas resources as instruments of coercive
diplomacy and to weaken or dismantle existing Western alliances and international economic institutions. China can ill-afford the
dismantling of the global market system. In his address to the Davos gathering in January of this year, Chinese President Xi asserted
that “any attempt to cut off the flow of capital, technologies, products, industries and people between economies, and channel the
waters in the ocean back into isolated lakes and creeks is simply not possible.” Adam Smith could not have said it better. Both
Moscow and Beijing have been particularly assiduous to legitimate their regimes. President Putin’s case for legitimacy is much
broader and deeper than a pure appeal to Russian nationalism. He stresses the spiritual and cultural unity of Russianspeaking
populations spread across the states of the post-Soviet space. A central core of that unity is the Russian Orthodox Church, a key prop
of the regime. Reviled is Western secularism, portrayed as corrupt and decadent, viewed by Putin as an existential threat to the
Russian World. The Chinese regime, secular and atheistic, can hardly rely on religion to legitimate the regime. Beijing principally
rests its legitimacy on its record of economic development and nationalism. The regime’s success in raising the economic standards
of hundreds of millions of Chinese reinforces its claim to legitimacy in two ways. On the one hand, the Communist Party can rightly
claim to have raised hundreds of millions of Chinese from poverty within a generation. On the other hand, the Communist Party
insists that its model of economic growth, what critics scorn as crony capitalism, is superior to the unfettered, market-driven model
of the West. Hence capitalism with Chinese characteristics is more effective and legitimate than the Western alternative.
Where Moscow
and Beijing do converge is in fashioning their responses to the Legitimacy
imperative. They repudiate Western liberal democracy. Both reject criticisms of their human
rights abuses as interventions into their domestic affairs. Dissidents are harassed, incarcerated, or, in
some instances, assassinated. Journalists are co-opted, selfcensored, silenced, or imprisoned. Social media is state
controlled. Both the Putin regime and the Chinese Communist Party monopolize the public narratives
evaluating governmental policy. Transparency and accountability are hostage to governmental secrecy. Civil society has
few effective avenues to criticize governmental actions. Moscow adds an ironic twist to these controls in manipulating national
elections to produce an elected authoritarian regime.
Whether either of these authoritarian responses to the Legitimacy imperative will survive
remains to be seen. Beijing’s use of economic performance and nationalism to underwrite its legitimacy is a double-edged
sword. If economic performance falters, then legitimacy suffers. Whether top-down nationalism will always control nationalism from
the bottom-up is also problematic. In resting legitimacy on nationalism, dubious historical claims, and crypto-religious beliefs,
Moscow is spared Beijing’s economic performance test. That said, there is room for skepticism that in the long-run Russians will
exchange lower standards of living for corrupt rule in pursuit of an elusive Russian mission antagonistic to the West. The implosion
of the Soviet Union, due in no small part to its retarded economic and technological development, suggests that the patience of the
Russian people has limits. Demonstrations in March 2017 against state corruption in 82 Russian cities, led largely by Russian youth,
reveal these limits. They are an ominous omen for the future of the Putin kleptocracy. Meanwhile, neither Russia nor China offers
much to solve the Legitimacy imperative of global governance.
! – Climate
Global Warming is real and has catastrophic consequences, based on the
consensus of studies---skeptics are wrong, since the upper estimates of climate
impacts are most likely to occur – causes extinction
Bob Ward 15, policy and communications director at the Grantham Research Institute on
Climate Change and the Environment and the ESRC Centre for Climate Change Economics and
Policy at the London School of Economics and Political Science, “Your complete guide to false
propaganda masquerading as serious commentary about climate change,” 12/3/15,
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/news/your-complete-guide-to-false-propagandamasquerading-as-serious-commentary-about-climate-change/
The article by Matt Ridley and Benny Peiser of the Global Warming Policy Foundation, which lobbies against policies to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, recycles a series of ‘sceptic’ talking points, to create a false impression
of the science and economics of climate change.¶ They start with the standard ploy of misrepresenting the scientific
evidence for climate change.¶ First they claim that global mean surface temperature has “gone up only very
slowly”. They add that “the world is barely half a degree Celsius (0.9 degrees Fahrenheit) warmer than it was about 25 years ago”.
In fact, the World Meteorological Organisation has warned that the last five years are the warmest such period
since instrumental records began in the 19th century, and that the average global temperature for
2015 is likely to be about 1 centigrade degree higher than the average during the pre-industrial
era, before the burning of fossil fuels started to dump large volumes of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.¶ Viscount Ridley and
Dr Peiser downplay the significance of this rise in global mean surface temperature, which may seem small compared
to local daily fluctuations. But it should be remembered that the global mean surface temperature during the last Ice
Age was only about 5 centigrade degrees lower than today. During the last major interglacial period (PDF),
which ended about 116,000 years ago, global mean surface temperature was no more than 2 centigrade degrees higher than today,
but the polar land-based ice sheets on West Antarctica and Greenland were much smaller, and global mean sea level was between 5
and 10 metres higher than today. This
shows the profound consequences of what may appear to be
relatively small changes in global mean surface temperature.¶ Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser next seek to
obscure the impacts of the rise in global mean surface temperature that has already occurred, falsely claiming that “on a global
scale, as scientists keep confirming, there has been no increase in frequency or intensity of storms, floods or droughts”. This is
blatantly misleading.¶ The
most authoritative assessment of the scientific evidence, published by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2013, concluded (PDF): “Changes in many extreme weather and
climate events have been observed since about 1950”, including a likely rise in the frequency of heatwaves in
large parts of Europe, Asia and Australia, and an increase in the number or intensity of heavy precipitation events in North America
and Europe.¶ Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser try to hide the true picture on floods and droughts by ignoring the fact that the
impact of climate change varies between regions, which means some parts of the world are becoming drier while
other parts are becoming wetter.¶ Hence the IPCC noted that (PDF) “although the most evident flood trends appear to be in
northern high latitudes, where observed warming trends have been largest, in some regions no evidence of a trend in extreme
flooding has been found”.¶ And on drought, the IPCC found that “it is likely that the frequency and intensity of drought has increased
in the Mediterranean and West Africa and decreased in central North America and north-west Australia since 1950”.¶ Similarly the
data for storms across the world also presents a complex picture, but the IPCC noted that it is “virtually certain” there has been an
“increase in the frequency and intensity of the strongest tropical cyclones since the 1970s” in the North Atlantic basin.¶ Hence, the
attempt by Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser to focus only on global trends is really an obfuscation of the
evidence of regional changes.¶ They also turn a blind eye to the growing number of studies that
have analysed how climate change has increased the probability of different types of extreme
weather. Recent research by scientists around the world found that climate change influenced the probability of the frequency
and severity of many extreme weather events in 2014.¶ While it is true that the world is becoming better at reducing the death toll
from natural disasters, such as extreme weather events, Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser fail to acknowledge that the lives and
livelihoods of millions of people are being exposed to greater risks because of climate change, as the
Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (PDF) pointed out earlier this year.¶ The authors next move on to the hoary old
chestnut of polar sea ice. They state that “Arctic sea ice has recently melted more in summer than it used to in the 1980s”. Again,
this is misleading. In fact, sea
ice extent in the Arctic has been reducing through all seasons. This year,
the peak winter extent was the lowest on record, and the summer extent has been decreasing at
a rate of about 13 per cent per decade, according to the United States National Snow and Ice Data Center. On current
trends, the Arctic could become entirely ice free during summer months over the course of this century.¶
Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser try to muddy the water further by referring to Antarctic sea ice, which has been increasing in extent.
The reasons for this are unclear, although scientists are confident that it does not disprove global warming.¶ They also refer to one
recent study that suggests the land-based ice in East Antarctica and the interior of West Antarctica is increasing, although other
scientists have questioned its significance compared with many other studies that have found strong overall decreases. In addition,
recent research has suggested that parts
of the West Antarctic ice sheet may already have become
destabilised.¶ Next Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser claim that “sea level rise continues its centuries-long slow rise – about a foot a
century- with no sign of recent acceleration”. This is simply wrong. The IPCC concluded (PDF): “The rate of sea level rise
since the mid-19th century has been larger than the mean rate during the previous two
millennia”. Research published in May 2015 found evidence for a further acceleration in global sea level
rise during the last decade. The IPCC’s projections indicate that if atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases continue to rise
at a steep rate, global sea level could be between about 1.5 and 2.5 feet higher by the end of this
century compared with the start, with further big rises over the decades and centuries to follow.¶ Not content with their false
portrayal of the scientific evidence, the authors move on to a misrepresentation of the IPCC’s report
itself, suggesting it projected a potential rise in global mean surface temperature by the end of this century of 1.5
to 4.5 centigrade degrees. This is not true. The IPCC report (PDF) provides four main scenarios.
One shows that global mean surface temperature might be 0.3 to 1.7 centigrade degrees higher by the end
of this century compared with the end of the 20th century, if annual emissions of greenhouse gases are
reduced significantly. However, if annual emissions rise steeply during this century, global mean surface
temperature could be 2.6 to 4.8 centigrade degrees higher after 100 years.¶ Next, the authors draw on the
controversial work of Professor Richard Tol, who, like Viscount Ridley, is a member of the 26-man (and all the members are male)
‘Academic Advisory Council’ of the Global Warming Policy Foundation. This was a brave move as the last time Viscount Ridley cited
Professor Tol’s work, it turned out to contain serious errors that nullified his conclusions.¶ In this case,
Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser refer to a working paper (PDF) by Professor Tol, which also required correction earlier this year after I
pointed out that the first published version contained errors. ¶ But even the corrected version contains serious mistakes. For
instance, it claims that among 11 previous estimates of the worldwide economic impacts of global warming by 2.5 centigrade
degrees, three found net benefits. Yet the data table shows just one positive value. In fact, of
the 26 estimates of the
economic impact of warming collected by Professor Tol, only two are positive, and in both cases
omitted important consequences, such as changes in extreme weather.¶ Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser quote from
Professor Tol’s paper about the likely economic impacts that might be expected during this century: “The welfare change caused by
climate change is equivalent to the welfare change caused by an income change of a few percent”. However, Professor Tol’s
confident conclusion is undermined by the shortcomings and limitations highlighted by the IPCC in its assessment of the economic
impacts (PDF):¶ “Global economic impacts from climate change are difficult to estimate. Economic impact estimates completed over
the past 20 years vary in their coverage of subsets of economic sectors and depend on a large number of assumptions, many of
which are disputable, and many estimates do not account for catastrophic changes, tipping points, and many other factors. With
these recognized limitations, the incomplete estimates of global annual economic losses for additional temperature increases of
~2°C are between 0.2 and 2.0% of income (±1 standard deviation around the mean) (medium evidence, medium agreement). Losses
are more likely than not to be greater, rather than smaller, than this range (limited evidence, high agreement). Additionally, there
are large differences between and within countries. Losses accelerate with greater warming (limited evidence, high agreement), but
few quantitative estimates have been completed for additional warming around 3°C or above.”¶ Indeed, the integrated assessment
models used to estimate the economic impacts of climate change are considered by many researchers to be extremely inadequate,
with Professor Robert Pindyck declaring in a recent paper: “These models have crucial flaws that make them close to useless as tools
for policy analysis”.¶ As a result of these crucial flaws, these estimates of the economic impacts represent a stark contrast to the
scientific evidence of the risks from climate change. For instance, the
IPCC report (PDF) concluded:¶ “Without
additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the
end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread and irreversible
impacts globally (high confidence). In most scenarios without additional mitigation efforts (those with 2100
atmospheric concentrations >1000 ppm CO2-eq), warming is more likely than not to exceed 4°C above preindustrial levels by 2100. The risks associated with temperatures at or above 4°C include
substantial species extinction, global and regional food insecurity, consequential constraints on
common human activities and limited potential for adaptation in some cases (high confidence). Some risks of climate
change, such as risks to unique and threatened systems and risks associated with extreme weather events, are moderate to high at
temperatures 1°C to 2°C above pre-industrial levels.”¶ Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser go on to assert
that upper end of the
IPCC’s estimates of the value of climate
sensitivity, defined as the warming resulting from a doubling of the atmospheric
concentration of carbon dioxide, “is looking even more implausible in theory and practice”.¶ However, the IPCC
report (PDF) noted that the values of equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS), the long-term warming due to a doubling of carbon
dioxide concentration, and the transient climate response (TCR), the short-term warming resulting from a doubling of carbon dioxide
concentration over 70 years, can be estimated using a number of methods, including by being diagnosed from
climate models, constrained by analysis of feedbacks in climate models, patterns of mean climate and variability in models
compared to observations, temperature fluctuations as reconstructed from paleoclimate archives, observed and modelled shortterm perturbations of the energy balance like those caused by volcanic eruptions, and the observed surface and ocean temperature
trends since pre-industrial times. Based
on an assessment of studies using the full range of methods, the
IPCC concluded that there is a 66 per cent probability that the value of the TCR lies in the range 1°C to
2.5°C, and a 66 per cent probability that the ECS value lies between 1.5°C and 4.5°C.¶ But the
authors justify their contrary conclusion by cherry-picking recent studies that support their
assertion that climate sensitivity must have a low value. They refer to a 2013 study by Alexander Otto and coauthors, but this was taken into account by the IPCC report. They also refer to a more recent study by Bjorn Stevens published this
year. But they ignore all of the other recent papers on climate sensitivity, such as studies by Miguel
Martinez-Boti and co-authors, Steven Sherwood and co-authors, and Thomas Frölicher and co-authors. The final report (PDF) of an
international workshop for researchers held in Ringberg, Germany, earlier this year revealed that there
is no consensus
that the value climate sensitivity lies towards the bottom of the IPCC range. So the authors’ assertion
about climate sensitivity is simply not supported by a consideration of the full range of recent research.
Taiwan
! – US heg
I/L
Taiwan alliance is key to US heg
*hostility from China causes draw-in
*heg deters China aggression in the SCS and ECS
Cropsey 18 [Seth, senior fellow at Hudson Institute and director of its Center for American
Seapower, “Taiwan is key to US power in Pacific”; published 8/17/18, accessed 6/24/19;
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/402286-Taiwan-is-key-to-US-power-in-Pacific]
Sixth-century Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu wrote that “to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence;
supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.” Sun Tzu, skeptical about prolonged warfare,
favored swift, decisive action; he preferred deception and psychological warfare to subduing an enemy by force. Contemporary
Chinese rulers sometimes breathe the same strategic air as their distinguished forebear. The Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
has dispatched warships into the Taiwan Strait and conducted live-fire drills. On more than one occasion, its Xian H-6 bombers have
circumnavigated Taiwan; in early summer, a Chinese destroyer and frigate repeated that circumnavigation by sea. And Beijing has
not renounced the use of force to seize Taiwan. A Chinese military analyst and TV personality told one of Beijing’s state-run media
outlets that it is “legitimate” for China “to send strong signals like this,” and that it must be able to deal not only with Taiwan’s
military but potential U.S. and Japanese intervention. This is foolish talk. Taiwan
possesses 1.6 percent of the
mainland’s population; by the most generous estimate, Taiwan’s defense budget is onetwentieth of China’s; the U.S. and Japan would use force against China only if Beijing initiated
hostilities. Like Mikhail Gorbachev, who knew NATO would not invade the former Soviet Union, Xi Jinping understands that
neither Taiwan, nor the U.S. and Japan, nor any combination of these represents a military threat to the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). China’s increasing military exercises are intended to convince the Taiwanese that resisting is useless. Sun Tzu would approve:
China seeks to achieve its objective — the absorption of democratic Taiwan into authoritarian China — by frightening and bullying.
Yet, China also is increasing the amphibious forces needed to put ground troops ashore. Since 2007 it has constructed five
amphibious ships similar in size and capability to the U.S. Navy’s 25,000-ton USS San Antonio-class LPD (landing platform dock); the
Chinese vessels carry up to 800 troops each, along with landing craft and armored vehicles. It is building several larger amphibious
ships (40,000 tons), the first of which is to launch in 2020. China is going about intimidating Taiwan purposefully. The list of
provocative behavior is long: a build-up of armaments that can be used specifically to attack Taiwan; sea and air exercises targeted
at Taiwan; unilaterally expanding its air-defense zone; sustained efforts to isolate Taiwan diplomatically; Xi Jinping’s 2017 statement
to China’s 19th Party Congress that the “Taiwan problem” is part of his plan for “national rejuvenation.” All point to increasing
pressure on Taiwan’s democratic institutions and sovereignty. The
United States has a large interest in helping
Taiwan remain sovereign — not only because of its democratic institutions or its strategic place
in the island chain bracketing China’s east coast. We are committed by the Taiwan Relations Act
of 1979 to provide equipment and services Taiwan needs to defend itself. Deterring China is the
best means to lower tensions and reduce the possibility that Beijing might decide to use force —
but U.S. policy in recent years has alternated between good and dubious. An example of the former is Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo’s July 30 speech restating U.S. commitment to protect sovereignty in the region “from coercion by other countries,” backed
by a pledge of $300 million for Indo-Pacific security. Also on the positive side was last month’s transit of the Taiwan Strait by guided
missile destroyers USS Mustin and USS Benfold, reminding China that the U.S. remains committed to regional stability and Taiwan’s
safety. More such transits are needed — as is overall administration policy as tough-minded about defense as it is about trade. China
is not likely to regard the dispatch of an occasional naval vessel as serious American support for Taiwan and the region. An
American aircraft carrier has not transited the Taiwan Strait since the USS Kitty Hawk, 11 years
ago. China would react with predictable sound and fury if the Trump administration sailed a
carrier through the strait. But the broad midsection of the 110-mile-wide strait is international
waters, and U.S. policy has long insisted on a legal right to sail unrestricted on the high seas.
Another action to underline American support for Taiwan is noted in the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA); it
specifically expresses Congress’s sense that the administration should order Navy ships to call in Taiwanese ports. Congress
understands the geographic centrality of Taiwan in the First Island Chain, along with the large strategic value of a free Taiwan in
preserving America’s position as a great power in the West Pacific. The
2018 NDAA also supports bilateral
exercises with Taiwan’s navy and exchanges of senior military officers; this strengthens the ties
between Washington and Taipei that improve the interoperability of their military forces. If the
Trump administration listens, Congress’s expressed interest and such other measures as regular arms sales to Taiwan —
including substantial assistance to help Taiwan build its own submarines and other equipment needed to defend against China’s
growing arsenal — will
help deter the PRC from precipitous action as well as intimidation. As
demonstrated by the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the Trump administration regards China as a “strategic
competitor.” While the result of tariffs on Chinese goods remains unknown, economic competition between the U.S. and China
is central to their broader contest. And China is challenging the U.S.’s technological edge; for example, its $10 billion investment in a
quantum computing research facility in Hefei dwarfs the approximately $250 million of annual U.S. federal spending on the same
technology, which has extraordinary potential for the security and economy of whichever country holds the whip hand. In this
competitive relationship, Taiwan’s
security remains a large portion of America’s interest in future
stability in the West Pacific. The U.S. will benefit itself and its regional friends by increasing its
tangible commitment to Taiwan and the region, in concert with the Trump administration’s
correct understanding that China is a threat to American and allied interests. Alongside his advice on
using means other than force to achieve a political objective, Sun Tzu noted that “the opportunity of defeating an enemy is provided
by the enemy himself.” China’s willingness to use force demonstrates the enmity it holds for Taiwan. By
increasing the
deterrent value of Taiwan’s defenses and those of our other allies in the region, the U.S. and
Taiwan help deny the PRC the opportunity to accomplish its goal by threat or by force.
AT Heg Decline Inevitable – Trump
Pursuit of hegemony inevitable – Trump cannot destroy liberal international
order
Schmidt 6/13/19 (Brian C. Schmidt, 13 June 2019 Associate Professor of Political
Science at Carleton University, having previously taught at the State University
of New York, New Paltz and the University at Wales, Aberystwyth. He teaches
courses on international relations theory, the causes of war, the United
Nations, and American foreign policy, “The Debate On American Hegemony”,
DOC Research Institute, https://doc-research.org/2019/06/the-debate-onamerican-hegemony/, Jewel)
Instead of simply
emphasising material capabilities, proponents of liberal hegemony accentuate
the leadership and institutionalised components of hegemony. However, like unipolar
optimists, those adhering to liberal versions of hegemonic stability theory argue that
American hegemony is beneficial to both the United States and the world and
should be maintained. The argument is that the United States is better able to
pursue a liberal grand strategy – democracy promotion, free trade,
interdependence, and multilateral institutionalism – when it has unrivalled
capabilities (Ikenberry, 2000). With respect to whether the United States can maintain its unipolar position indefinitely,
liberals are, in Layne’s terminology, unipolar agnostics. The question about the durability of American
hegemony is not just about trends in the relative distribution of power but about
the character of American leadership. According to liberal conceptions of
hegemonic stability theory, US power is not used to dominate others, but rather
to provide the leadership that is necessary for an open, liberal international order
to exist. This is the crux of Ikenberry’s story of how the United States after World War Two built
and maintained a liberal hegemonic order that has produced peace and
prosperity for the world. According to Ikenberry, the United States did not use its
preponderant power after World War Two to dominate the world and create an
empire. Instead, American hegemonic leadership was wisely used to strike a
grand bargain and establish the foundations of a liberal international order. With
the rise of new powers, the growth of right-wing populism, the turn to
authoritarianism, and the election of Donald Trump, the durability of the liberal
international order is being called into question. Yet most liberals remain
confident that the liberal international order will endure. Their basic argument is
that the rules and institutions the United States helped build under Pax
Americana will persist, making it difficult for revisionist states to fundamentally
change the liberal international order. The English School and Social Constructivism move the discussion of
Liberal conceptions of hegemony have much to offer on the debate about US hegemony.
American hegemony and unipolarity away from raw material capabilities to the dynamics of legitimacy. Instead of engaging in the
endless debate about China’s rise and the future of US power they emphasise the role of legitimacy in maintaining any given
hegemonic order. Only time will tell if future US presidents will be able to reclaim a legitimate liberal order or if China is able to
provide the legitimacy necessary either to take over leadership of the liberal international order or offer an alternative vision.
AT Heg Decline – Peer Competitors
No peer competitors – U.S. pursuit of heg inevitable
(Brian C. Schmidt is Associate Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, having
previously taught at the State University of New York, New Paltz and the University at Wales,
Aberystwyth. He teaches courses on international relations theory, the causes of war, the
United Nations, and American foreign policy.
June 13, 2019 “The Debate on American Hegemony” https://doc-research.org/2019/06/thedebate-on-american-hegemony/, Julia/Jack/Arhan/Maddy)
Realists generally define hegemony in terms of first, overwhelming power, and second, the ability to use this power to dominate
others. The predominant tendency among realists, however, is to equate hegemony with overwhelming material power. Realists
typically identify the most powerful state in the international system as the hegemon; a state that possesses vastly superior military
and economic capabilities. Power, according to this view, is synonymous with ‘capabilities’, and the capabilities of a state represent
nothing more than the sum total of several loosely identified national attributes. These may include size of population and territory,
hegemony entails the
concentration of material capabilities in one state is the
related idea this preponderant state is able to dominate all
of the subordinate states. John Mearsheimer, for example, defines a hegemon as a “state that is
so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the
system”. He adds, “no other state has the military wherewithal to
put up a serious fight against it” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.40). This is similar to the view put
economic capacity, and military strength. Closely connected to the idea that that
forth by Robert Gilpin, who considers hegemony to be a particular structure that has periodically characterised the international
system. For Gilpin, a hegemonic structure exists when “a single powerful state controls or dominates the lesser states in the system”
(Gilpin, 1981, p.29). Within the realist literature on hegemony, there is a tendency to conflate hegemony with unipolarity. By
definition, unipolar systems are those with only one predominant state. Those who equate hegemony with unipolarity accentuate
the overwhelming material power dimension of the hegemon and ignore, or discount, the wilful exercise of leadership. According to
this formula, hegemony and unipolarity are essentially synonymous with preponderant material power. The realist variant of
hegemonic stability theory attempts to marry the dual components of preponderant power and the exercise of leadership. The
starting point of hegemonic stability theory is the presence of a single dominant state. In addition to preponderant power,
hegemonic stability theory argues that one of the roles of the hegemon is to ensure international order by
creating international institutions and norms that facilitate
international cooperation. Hegemonic stability theory is basically a realist
prescription of how to achieve international stability in an anarchical international
system. As Gilpin explains, “according to the theory of hegemonic stability as set forth initially by Charles Kindelberger, an open and
world economy requires the existence of a hegemonic
or dominant power” (Gilpin, 1987, p.72). Liberal theories of hegemony emphasise the type of leadership
liberal
that is exercised by the hegemon. Liberal theories do not completely discount the importance of preponderant material power but
argue that this alone is insufficient for understanding the concept of hegemony. Liberal theorists are interested in the mechanisms
and processes through which hegemony is exercised. Liberal hegemony, according to John Ikenberry, “refers to rule and regimebased order created by a leading state.” He continues, “like empire, it is a form of hierarchical order—but in contrast, it is infused
with liberal characteristics” (Ikenberry, 2011, p.70). Ikenberry argues that liberal hegemonic order is based on consensus and is
characterised by a high degree of constitutionalism: “that is, state power is embedded in a system of rules and institutions that
restrain and circumscribe its exercise. States enter international order out of enlightened self-interest, engaging in self-restraint and
binding themselves to agreed-upon rules and institutions. In this way, order is based on consent” (Ikenberry, 2011, p.61). In essence,
a grand bargain is made between the hegemonic state and the secondary states to create a liberal hegemonic order. The latter
willingly agree to participate within the order and the dominant state agrees to place limits on the exercise of its power. For
Ikenberry, the maintenance and legitimacy of a liberal international order are contingent upon the hegemon abiding by the rules
and institutions that it helped to establish. By exercising leadership in this manner, hegemony is established less by domination and
more by consent. Constructivists, Neo-Gramscians, and the English School all embrace the view that hegemony is about more than
just raw material power and domination. For Robert Cox, one of the leading Neo-Gramscians, “dominance by a powerful state may
be a necessary but not a sufficient condition of hegemony.” According to Cox, the concept of hegemony “is based on a coherent
conjunction or fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world order (including certain norms)
and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain semblance of universality” (Cox, 1981, p. 139). Cox combines
material power, ideas, and institutions into a comprehensive theory of hegemony. Drawing directly from the work of Antonio
Gramsci, Cox argues that hegemony incorporates two elements: force and consent. By conceptualising hegemony as a fit between
material power, ideas, and institutions, it is difficult to privilege one set of factors over another. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue
that international institutions and the process of institutionalisation are key components of the neo-Gramscian conception of
hegemony. While international institutions embody the material interests of the hegemon, they also, according to Cox, perform an
ideological function in that they help to legitimate the norms of world order. By emphasising the role of ideas, and recognising that
the social world is composed of both material and ideational forces, social constructivist conceptions of hegemony are not dissimilar
to those put forward by Cox and neo-Gramscians. Constructivists, however, are more inclined to emphasise the ideational aspects of
hegemony over the material. While most constructivists support Cox’s adoption of Gramsci, one of the critiques of Cox is that, in the
end, he did not sufficiently privilege the ideational component of hegemony. According to Ted Hopf, Cox’s account is still too
materialistic in the sense that ideas continue to be a manifestation of the dominant power’s political-economic interests. Yet for
Hopf, the importance of Gramsci’s conception of hegemony is that it helps us understand why the masses go along with and accept
a given order (Hopf, 2013, pp. 317-354). Thus, it is not just the ideology of elites that matter, but also how dominant ideas percolate
downward and become accepted as taken for granted by the broader public. This is what Gramsci meant by ‘common sense’. The
degree to which there is a discursive fit between the ideas propounded by the elites and the common sense of the masses is a key
indicator of the exercise of hegemony. The English School approach to international relations emphasises yet another aspect of
hegemony: social recognition. According to this view, hegemony is not equivalent to predominant material power. Neither is it solely
an attribute of the dominant state itself. Rather it is, as Ian Clark puts it, “a status bestowed by others, and rests on recognition by
them.” Clark defines hegemony as “an institutionalised practice of special rights and responsibilities conferred on a state with the
resources to lead” (Clark, 2009, p. 24). Building on the work of Hedley Bull and others, Clark proposes that we consider hegemony as
an institution of international society. Reasoning by analogy, Clark finds that the institution of hegemony functions in a manner
similar to that of the great powers. Just as special roles, functions, responsibilities, and status are bestowed on the great powers,
Clark reasons that the same is also true of hegemons. This is one of the reasons he argues that social recognition is a key component
of hegemony. The institution of the great powers was not reducible to a set of material assets, but instead rested on a shared
normative framework in which others bestowed status and recognition on those who performed a managerial function in
international society Given the diversity that exists among how the different theories comprehend the concept of hegemony, it is
not surprising that there have been endless debates about the character and durability of US hegemony. From the perspective of
contemporary American foreign policy, two questions about US hegemony have become fundamental today: one, does the
maintenance of hegemony continue to serve American interests; and two, is American hegemony in decline? The answers to these
two questions are actually interrelated. If one believes that hegemony is beneficial for the United States, as proponents of both
primacy and liberalism assert, then every effort should be made to maintain it. Conversely, if one does not believe that hegemony
serves American interests, which is the position of balance-of-power realists and offensive realists, then instead of pursuing policies
to maintain it, the United States should begin adjusting to the reality of inevitable hegemonic decline and the rise of peercompetitors such as China. One of the advantages of the realist conception of hegemony is its focus on the material basis of
hegemony: military and economic strength. Yet even while agreeing that material capabilities are the cornerstone of hegemony,
there are a number of contending views on the relative power position of the United States today. A key point of contention in the
debate about the durability of American hegemony is the degree to which the United States continues to have unrivalled
capabilities. In Layne’s terminology, “unipolar optimists believe that American hegemony will last for a very long time and that it is
beneficial for the United States and for the international system as a whole” (Layne, 2007, p. 134). The best representatives of this
view are William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks. Wohlforth and Brooks dispute the popular view that China’s rise represents a
challenge to US hegemony, insisting that the United States continues to have preponderant material capabilities that are vastly
American
hegemony is beneficial to both the United States and the
world primarily because it greatly reduces security
greater than any other state (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008). According to Brooks and Wohlforth,
competition by rendering the balance of power inoperable
and continues to confer significant benefits to the United
States. For Brooks and Wohlforth, it is of vital importance
that the United States continues to pursue a grand
strategy of primacy or “deep engagement” in order to prevent the return of balance-of-power politics, which they argue is
not possible in a unipolar system (Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, 2013, pp. 7-51). In contrast, ‘unipolar pessimists’ believe that
the United States’ relative power position is declining and view the grand strategy of primacy to be antithetical to American
interests. Most structural realists believe that global hegemony is either impossible to achieve or fleeting. Not only is it difficult to
dominate the entire globe, but structural realists strongly believe in the prevalence of balance-of-power politics. Contrary to
unipolar optimists, structural realists do not believe that balancing has failed to take place since the dawn of the unipolar moment.
Indeed, it is for the very reason that active balancing is taking place especially on the part of China and Russia, that many structural
realists argue that the United States needs to abandon the grand strategy of primacy or deep engagement and adopt a grand
strategy of restraint or offshore balancing (Posen, 2002, pp. 36-42). Liberal conceptions of hegemony have much to offer on the
debate about US hegemony. Instead of simply emphasising material capabilities, proponents of liberal hegemony accentuate the
leadership and institutionalised components of hegemony. However, like unipolar optimists, those adhering to liberal versions of
American hegemony is beneficial to both
the United States and the world and should be
maintained. The argument is that the United States is better able to pursue a liberal grand strategy – democracy
hegemonic stability theory argue that
promotion, free trade, interdependence, and multilateral institutionalism – when it has unrivalled capabilities (Ikenberry, 2000).
With respect to whether the United States can maintain its unipolar position indefinitely, liberals are, in Layne’s terminology,
unipolar agnostics. The question about the durability of American hegemony is not just about trends in the relative distribution of
power but about the character of American leadership. According to liberal conceptions of hegemonic stability theory, US power is
not used to dominate others, but rather to provide the leadership that is necessary for an open, liberal international order to exist.
the United States after World War Two
built and maintained a liberal hegemonic order that has
produced peace and prosperity for the world. According to Ikenberry, the
This is the crux of Ikenberry’s story of how
United States did not use its preponderant power after World War Two to dominate the world and create an empire. Instead,
American hegemonic leadership was wisely used to strike
a grand bargain and establish the foundations of a liberal
international order. With the rise of new powers, the growth of right-wing populism, the turn to
authoritarianism, and the election of Donald Trump, the durability of the liberal international order is being called into question. Yet
most liberals remain confident that
the liberal international order will endure.
Their basic argument is that the rules and institutions the United States helped build under Pax Americana will persist, making it
difficult for revisionist states to fundamentally change the liberal international order. The English School and Social Constructivism
move the discussion of American hegemony and unipolarity away from raw material capabilities to the dynamics of legitimacy.
Instead of engaging in the endless debate about China’s rise and the future of US power they emphasise the role of legitimacy in
maintaining any given hegemonic order. Only time will tell if future US presidents will be able to reclaim a legitimate liberal order or
if China is able to provide the legitimacy necessary either to take over leadership of the liberal international order or offer an
alternative vision (Schweller and Pu, 2011, pp.41-72).
Heg key to contain peer competitors
Andino 6/5 (Carlos Andino, Andino graduated from the University of North
Texas in December 2018, “Defending American Hegemony,” June 5, 2019,
https://loneconservative.com/2019/06/05/defending-american-hegemony/) ct
Throughout various points in human history, the international world order has been held
together by a hegemonic power. A hegemon in international relations is a state actor whose
power is unrivaled by others in the international order. This state actor, through its mere
presence alone, ensures that conflict between major powers is limited. Hundreds of years ago,
the Romans established a Pax Romana, or a Roman Peace. The Roman Empire ruled throughout
much of Europe, across North Africa, and into various parts of what we know today as the
Middle East. From the early 19th century up until the mid-20th century, Britannia really did rule
the waves. The sun never set on the British Empire, as it was the undisputed hegemon of the
international order. The new Pax Britannica was enforced by a navy that was unchallenged by
any other major power of the time. These two empires ruled for hundreds of years each, and
preserved stability among the great powers of their time. Following the Second World War, the
United States inherited hegemonic responsibilities from the British, who were exhausted after
their close involvement in a second European conflict within decades of the last. Today, many
Americans, and especially those in leftist circles, view America’s role as the global hegemon as
imperialistic, unnecessary, and a challenge to international law. This sort of belief is dangerous
when one looks at what the new Pax Americana has been able to achieve. Since the end of
World War II, when this new era began, there hasn’t been a war between major state actors.
Presently, there are various state and non-state actors that would be more than willing to
impose their own rules on the international order if the United States did not exist as the
hegemon. States like China would be emboldened in their efforts to forcibly make Taiwan, what
they consider to be a rogue province, submit to central authority in Beijing. The Chinese
government’s mission to make the South China Sea into its own personal lake by building
artificial islands with military installations would undoubtedly be sped up.In the European
theater, the Russians would gladly move beyond Crimea if the United States did not exist as the
leading member-state of the NATO alliance. Some criticize the American presence in Syria as
illegal and imperialistic, but it is critical to push back against Russian and Iranian interests in the
region. Without Americans acting as a buffer against Iran, Israel would suddenly be faced with
its single greatest adversary right on its border with Syria— an adversary who funds terrorist
groups such as Hezbollah. Americans may wonder why any of these affairs should matter to
them. Why should it be our business? But, when you consider that $5 trillion in international
trade passes through the South China Sea alone, suddenly the world becomes much smaller,
and those trade routes begin to matter.The role of the hegemon is not limited to acting as a
check on the world’s major powers. Many have described the United States as the world’s
policeman, but, in reality, it is best described as the world’s fireman.No other country in the
world possesses a navy that can deploy two state-of-the-art hospital ships to any region on the
planet simply to provide foreign civilians with medical care. After major natural disasters like the
earthquake in Haiti or the tsunami in Thailand strike, you can expect an American military
presence spearheading the recovery efforts. The reason the United States spends more on its
military than any other country in the world by a country mile, is not because of the supposed
military-industrial-complex, but because the United States has a moral obligation as the
indispensable country to ensure that the liberal international order that was built from the
blood and ashes of a world war will survive for future generations to come.
AT Heg Bad Turns
Liberal Hegemony benefits US foreign-policy
Carden 18 (James Carden, contributing editor to The American Conservative
magazine and is a frequent contributor to The National Interest and Russia Direct, “Why
Liberal Hegemony”, The Nation, November 12, 2018,
https://www.thenation.com/article/liberal-hegemony-foreign-policy/, Tanya)
US foreign policy has been oriented around the idea,
known as liberal hegemony, that it is in America’s interest to turn as
many countries as possible into liberal democracies, and to
spread, in the words of Max Boot, “the rule of law, property rights and other
guarantees, at gunpoint if need be.” As Walt portrays it, this establishment,
wedded to the tenets of liberal hegemony, is made up of
members of the government, academy, various left- and rightleaning think tanks, the media, and well-funded foreign lobbies
that reinforce what Walt identifies as an “activist bias” within US
foreign-policy institutions and gives rise to a stifling conformity
when it comes to issues involving US foreign policy. The incentives
for US foreign-policy elites to conform and stay within the
confines of the prevailing consensus are many. As Walt points out, “To be a
respected and well-connected member of the broader foreignpolicy community opens doors, confers status, creates lucrative
opportunities, and feeds one’s ego and sense of self-worth.” One would
And for nearly 30 years,
come away with the impression left by foreign-policy elites in both parties—from Democrats such as former Obama nationalsecurity adviser Susan Rice to former Bush administration officials like Richard Haass—that
has been an unabashed success.
liberal hegemony
Heg Key to Democracy
Decline of US heg will lead to chaos
Kagan 3/28/19 [ Robert Kagan is renowned member of the Brooking Institution. “Robert
Kagan: Authoritarianism Imperiling Liberal International Order.” March 28, 2019.
https://www.ipinst.org/2019/03/kagan-jungle-grows-back#2, Saatvik]
The widening appeal of strongman authoritarian rule is undermining traditional liberal
governance, historian Robert Kagan said, speaking at a March 28th IPI Distinguished Author Series discussion of his new book
The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World. “We see it in Europe, we see it around the world in the rise of
nationalism, in tribalism, and we see it, of course, in the United States,” he said. “And for the first time in American history, an
over the last seven
decades this order had kept the world free of world wars, great power conflicts, and
depressions, and he likened it to a garden, which, if neglected and untended, would revert to
the uncontrollable status of a jungle. “The problem is not that it is growing back because it’s inevitable,” he said. “The
American administration actively sides with opponents of the liberal international order.” He argued that
problem is we are not resisting the jungle as we did before – that we are not gardening in the way we have for 75 years.” Behind his
concern is a conviction that people have taken for granted this period of continuous global economic growth when in fact it has
been aberrantly stable when viewed in the continuum of centuries where the historical norm has been towards chaos. “To me, the
question was never, ‘What is it that’s destroying our liberal world order?’ The question is, ‘What can possibly hold it up because it is
The relative peacefulness of the past 75 years, he theorized, owed to the
American security guarantee, the suppression of nationalism, the spread of democracy, and the
international free trade regime which allowed Europe to prosper. “I’m very worried about the trends in
such a deviation from history.’”
Europe,” he said. “It seems that as Europe renationalizes, all the elements that kept the European miracle are under threat now.
Every single one of these key planks is now at risk, mostly because of the US, but partly because of what is happening in Europe.”
“Europe is in a crisis of liberalism, and America as well, and unfortunately they’re happening at exactly the same time,” he
continued. “What we have seen over the past 15 years is authoritarianism surviving, then getting wind in its sails and now engaging
in a full throated and traditional critique of liberalism. The fact is that Trump and his officials make it clear that they are on the side
of European nationalists and don’t even support center right parties, and the final part of our perfect storm is that Great Britain has
departed the scene as a power of any kind, floating off into the Arctic Ocean.” He noted the significance of the fact that Europeans
drawn to authoritarianism were not doing badly economically. “Instead,” he said, “they’re upset about what they see as an assault
on their culture.” And in the United States, he said, there is a concurrent move back to an earlier American isolationism. “Americans
are increasingly asking and demanding an answer to the question, ‘Could you please remind us why we are out there doing all this
stuff?’” He predicted that this American disengagement would have serious consequences in Asia. “Japan is not going to go quietly
“As soon as they perceive that the US is out of the game in any
fundamental way, they are going to renationalize, rearm, go nuclear, and we are going to be
back to an Asian set of conflicts. And, by the way,” he added, “so will Korea and India. Asia’s
future is Europe’s past, that is where we are heading. That is a recipe for conflict, not for nice
gradual Chinese hegemony.” Asked about the effect of autocratic governance on human rights
protections, he said, “Human rights is the essence of liberalism. The protection of individual
rights is what makes liberalism liberalism.” And, he said, the menace is universal. “Because of changes in technology,
into this good night,” he said.
because of social media, and artificial intelligence data collection, all authoritarian regimes are now a threat to everyone’s freedom.”
it centers around the
establishment after World War II of a European and Asian security order, the transformation of
two autocratic aggressor states, Germany and Japan, into pacific economic democracies.” Asked
by an ambassador in the audience whether he thought the UN was “doing the gardening or is it
creating chaos,” he replied, “My basic view is that the international institutions are like the
scaffolding around the building. The building holds up the scaffolding, the scaffolding does not
hold up the building.”
He said his idea of the liberal world order did not “center around the UN or international law,
Attempts to discount American hegemony are misguided – hegemony enforces
peace
Carla Norrlof, 6-10-2019, "Raison de l’Hégémonie (The Hegemon’s Interest):
Theory of the Costs and Benefits of Hegemony," Taylor & Francis,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2019.1604982,
Mateo)
The nature, durability, and politics of hegemonic order depends crucially on the costs and
benefits to the hegemon of providing security beyond its borders. We have shown that, under
some conditions, raison de l’Hégémonie pays externally. Focusing on the leading state itself and
on the conditions under which protection complements production, the theory developed here
addresses a part of the larger debate on the nature of hegemonic order featured in this special
issue. Yet it is a central one. For, as we have shown, failure to appreciate the potential for raison
de l’Hégémonie explains why so many scholars misdiagnosed the staying power of the US-led
order. A state’s military and economic capability has always been the most fundamental predictor of its ability to realize national objectives, and the optimal balance and feedback between these forms of
material capability varies through time. To understand whether maintaining military capability comes at the expense of thriving economic capability, or whether the material basis for hegemony is mutually
reinforcing, we posited two highly context-dependent sets of interactions. The first concerns the degree to which military strength is necessary for wealth and the degree to which civilian economic productivity is
necessary for military power. The second concerns the global economy’s sensitivity to insecurity and the effect of economic openness on a state’s security. Using these interactions, we unpacked the post–midtwentieth-century setting: a productive civilian economy necessary for generating military power that is useful for other than predatory economic purposes residing within an international economy highly
sensitive to security shocks where states are more secure with economic openness than closure. These circumstances have profound implications for the structure of the international system. They offer few
Only states with a sufficiently productive economy capable of funding
coercive specialization can avoid sharp trade-offs. Even so, possessing a vibrant economy does not necessarily provide incentives to allocate resources to
incentives to specialize in military power for gain.
the military sector over and above what is required in pursuit of safe borders and other strategic interests captured by raison d’état. To specialize in defensive and offensive capability requires a different rationale.
Raison de l’Hégémonie is based on the premise that as the single largest military and economic
power, the hegemon must sustain the capacity to protect the international economy for
pecuniary reasons both in order to continue benefiting from open exchange and to fund military
prowess. Securing the international system represents potential benefits beyond what a mere
economic capability edge can achieve; pursuing raison de l’Hégémonie offers opportunities to
form lasting relationships that produce brokering opportunities and raise a state’s degrees of
freedom. The public-goods dilemma of collective action applies comparatively weakly to the US
security network, which more accurately resembles a system of competing club goods. But even
if we were to consider this joint system of competing club goods as individual components in a
larger public-good effort, the United States has the ability to use preferential access within its
web of security relationships to transform public goods into excludable club goods or impure
public goods by creating some degree of rivalry. Under these circumstances, international
cooperation is no longer a sure drain on the United States either systemically or within specific
alliances. In short, being at the center of a system of defensive alliances offers distinct rewards
in the form of fewer constraints, more opportunities, better bargains, greater influence, and
even deference and attention from those in less favored positions. Security provision bolsters
economic exchange, provides economic leverage, and encourages socialization. The US decline
debates of the 1980s exaggerated the scale, trajectory, and significance of protection costs
largely due to the failure to appreciate shifts in the structural and strategic setting, as well as the
effect of security relationships on economic processes. Scholars therefore missed elements of
stability in the US global position. Significantly, they did not situate the cost-benefit assessment
of US hegemony in a larger structural context specifying potential complementarity between
military power (protection) and economically productive activity (production). In addition, they
failed to consider the social sources of power, which military power can foster and which
accrues over time. Our assessment of the current setting suggests that these omissions still
characterize much declinist thinking and policy prescription. Both will therefore continue to
underestimate the significance of US security provision and of maintaining security alliances for
bolstering the economic order and for US security. The proposed new order is the quickest path
from a world of complementarity to one of clear trade-offs where US decline will be “for real.”
Heg Solves Conflicts
Heg solves global conflagration
Stokes 18 (Doug Stokes, a Professor in International Security and Strategy in the Department of
Politics at the University of Exeter. “Trump, hegemony, and the future of liberal international
order”, January 2018
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/images/ia/INTA94_1_8_238_Stokes.pdf,
Catherine)
The third image, that of the structurally advantaged hegemon, is the one that I argue best
captures the nature of US hegemony. Here, leadership gives the hegemon the capacity to shape
world order in ways that confer upon it advantages that will enable it not only to recover the
costs of supplying public goods, but to accrue other positional advantages. That is, the hegemon
acquires the benefits of cooperation without having to resort to coercion, while reinforcing its
position by extracting resources from the rest of the international community and reinvesting
them in ways that help prolong its hegemony. Moreover, the hegemon can do this as other
states accept the hegemon’s overall international order as legitimate, at least for as long as the
opportunity costs of major systemic revision outweigh the costs of staying with the status quo.
The hegemon is therefore in the position of enjoying resource inflows from the rest of the
international community. In this sense, the United States is thus both a ‘system maker’ and a
‘privilege taker’, and accrues advantages through structuring world order in ways that benefit its
interests while delivering enough benefits to other states to discourage them from seeking to
revise the US-led order What, then, are some of the key positional advantages that the US
enjoys?
U.S. Heg Solves Chinese Heg
US hegemony is key to contain Chinese hegemony – the impact is global
democracy and stability of international order
Thayer 4/14/19 (Bradley A. Thayer, associate professor of political science at the University of
Minnesota-Duluth, “Why America must maintain Ideological Dominance,” The National Interest,
4/14/19, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-america-must-maintain-ideologicaldominance-52082?page=0%2C1”, Ryan)
China is the single most formidable peer competitive threat faced by the United States. It alone
has the potential to replace the United States as the world’s hegemon, an ambition the Soviets
may have possessed but never could have achieved due to their weaknesses, particularly
economically. We can foresee a future where China has the ability to force Washington to yield
and cede its regional and global interests in favor of Beijing’s. China’s greater willingness to use
coercion to advance its interests provides a window into that future, as its territorial expansion
and militarization of the South China Sea illuminate. Whether the United States can remain the
preeminent force for free and open societies in the face of a rising China is the defining element
of international politics in the twenty-first century, and the most immediate U.S. national
security policy interest. An understanding of the future of the Sino-American confrontation
entails an understanding of why both China and the United States are motivated for conflict.
Despite the importance of the issue, the nature and scope of the threat are still not fully grasped
in America. However, there are three ways to understand Sino-American confrontation. First,
there are the causes: the change in the balance of power in China’s favor and the conflicting
ideologies of the two states. Second, the United States leadership and the American people
must understand “Why China Fights.” That is, what the Chinese leadership want, and why they
are willing to fight America. Third, Americans must grasp “Why the U.S. Fights,” to maintain
freedom and other liberal values and to preserve its dominant position, while comprehending
the fundamental advantages Washington possesses. Illuminating the two conceptions of victory
demonstrates the ultimate and irreconcilable gap in the visions for international politics
between Washington and Beijing, and consequently why conflict—certainly cold, and very
possibly hot—is inevitable. The Causes of the Sino-American Conflict: Shifting Balance of Power
and Ideology 10 SECONDS Do You Know What Happened Today In History? Jun 28 2016 A
terrorist attack in Turkey's Istanbul Atatürk Airport kills 42 people and injures more than 230
others. Sovereign power is handed to the interim government of Iraq by the Coalition
Provisional Authority, ending the U.S.-led rule of that nation. From both the Chinese and
American perspectives, two fundamental factors explain the source of the conflict. First, the
Sino-American struggle is material—economic and military power matter, particularly the
shifting balance of relative power from the United States to China. This shift feeds ambition in
China and fear in Washington. Given its strongly nationalistic and ethnocentric beliefs, China as
a rising hegemon would challenge any dominant state—as it did the United States and the
Soviet Union during the Cold War. It is of historical importance that this is the first time in its
long history that China is a rising hegemon. In its past, it was the dominant state in Asia—the
primary world it knew. Even after its defeat in the First Opium War, China maintained the
pretension that it was still dominant until colonization by Europeans, Japanese, and Americans
forced the abandonment of its pretensions. Now, for the first time in its history, China is the
challenger to the dominant state. This is something >truggle is also inherently ideological.
Ideology illuminates what will be gained for the victor—the return of the Middle Kingdom or the
triumph of freedom—and what will be lost for the defeated. It inspires the leadership and
population of both sides. It also provides an understanding of the intensity of passion on the
Chinese side—the hatred for America for hindering China’s return to its rightful position and for
Washington’s arrogance. Beijing and Chinese citizens are also upset with Americans for not
realizing its time is past, and so it must yield gracefully to the new hegemon. Yet so far, a
concomitant level of strategic focus and passion is absent on the U.S. side. That needs to
change. “Why China Fights:” The Return of the Middle Kingdom The Chinese seek confrontation
in order to achieve their conception of victory—the return of the Middle Kingdom’s suzerainty
and the replacement of Washington by Beijing as the dominant power in international politics.
This ambition is a natural one for the Chinese leadership and population, and is caused by their
conception of China’s place in the world. For the Chinese, or more particularly, the majority Han
population, there is the supremacist belief that the Han are the greatest people, the creators of
the most sophisticated polity, and to whom other peoples and states should be deferential. For
Han-supremacists, it is right and proper that China dominates international politics because
China was the most advanced, culturally refined, and humane civilization in history. Hansupremacy is anchored in millennia and is a core component of Chinese political culture.
Consequently, it is a far deeper force than Communism or capitalism. Han culture is viewed as
the epitome of civilized life and contains traditional values of industriousness, discipline,
patriotism, love of the Han and their history. In essence, the Chinese seek a Warren
Hardingesque “return to normalcy,” where they resume their position as the epitome of
civilization and the world’s fountainhead of economic and political power. For its adherents, the
United States is a malevolent force which seeks to prevent the natural and right order of
international politics—Chinese hegemony—from returning. This perspective is not likely to
change. Beijing will fight the United States because it is the single major impediment to China’s
strategic objectives. With America removed, there is no single power, or constellation of
powers such as Australia, Japan, and India, that could prevent Beijing from achieving its aims,
which Xi Jinping transparently and boldly advances in his conception of a hegemonic China by
2049. The United States is the barrier to the realization of China’s ambitions and is its
ideological opponent, and so it is the focus of China’s enmity. “Why the U.S. Fights:”
Preservation of Freedom U.S. leadership seeks to maintain its position because that is best, first,
for U.S. security; second, the security of its allies; and third, for the promotion of its ideology.
America’s ideological push is vital to ensure that freedom and democratic government, open
societies, and free markets are the dominant values of international politics. In sum,
Washington fights for the international order it created after World War II, and which it
expanded after the Cold War. America seeks to maintain the status quo, its position and the
order it has known, and that both Washington and the American people expect to continue.
That expectation was conceived and conditioned in the calm geopolitical seas of the 1990s and
2000s. That time is past. As China has risen, Washington must now battle to maintain its place in
the world and the dominance of its military, economy, ideology, and technological leadership.
Indeed, America is forced to fight to defend its position, allies, and values. But this cannot be
wholly a defensive war, the United States must actively confront China in each realm, and put
China on the back foot in order to ensure the United States and its allies triumph in each aspect
of the competition. While the military and economic components are essential, ideology is their
equal. Ideology is critical for Washington as it motivates the U.S. response to China with a
comprehension, energy, and vigor that material forces cannot. As the U.S. Navy historically
contends: “ships don’t fight, men do.” People fight to defend their country and ideology.
Accordingly, the value of the ideology of the United States is the spine that supports U.S. power.
U.S. ideology unifies and inspires the American people, as well as ideological sympathizers
around the world, and explains why China’s ideology and vision for the world should be resisted.
In explaining “Why We Fight,” the United States must contrast its dynamic, innovative, free, and
open society, with the wealthy and increasingly prosperous, but ethnocentric, racist, and closed
society of the Chinese. The West went through a Civil Rights Movement to create cultures of
anti-racism throughout their societies. In China, the idea of a Civil Rights Movement that would
aid the condition of women and minorities, and so undermine Han-supremacy, is unthinkable.
That stark recognition captures the profound differences between the two societies. Equally
importantly, U.S. ideology may serve to undermine the legitimacy of the authoritarian rule of
the Communist Party of China in the minds of the Chinese people. Ideology also provides
Washington with key advantages. As a free and open society, the United States is a better ally
for states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, than China, whose alliances are frequently
characterized by abuse of its erstwhile ally’s people and resources. In contrast to China, U.S.
decision-making is transparent to allies, it is a dynamic and inclusive society, and has a long
history of protecting the interests of its allies, and treating them as equal partners. America’s
free and open political principles make the United States a more valuable and dependable ally.
Moreover, as U.S. power declines relative to China’s, Washington is likely to depend more on
ideology than economic and military power. Consequently, the United States will have to
depend more on its allies and other cooperative states, in Europe, Asia, and Africa. This situation
plays to the United States’ ideological strength and is a great advantage for Washington. China
seeks resources globally, offering infrastructure development and foreign direct investment to
the many states willing to partner, if not yet align, with it. Thus far, the United States has chosen
not to match China’s ability in these categories, but it does—hands down—far exceed China’s
ability to inspire the people of the world. Furthermore, while the interests of its allies are varied,
U.S. ideology serves as the cement for alignment against China, particularly for states in Africa,
Asia. This is true even in Europe, where economic interest might cause an alliance with China or
neutrality in the face of an intensifying Sino-American conflict. The United States cannot fight
this struggle alone and the good news is that it need not. The ideology of the United States
allows it to maintain relations with Asia-Pacific and European states based on common interests
and political principles. But the struggle does require U.S. leadership. China’s conception of
victory is deeply disturbing, disagreeable, and dangerous for stability: the Middle Kingdom
returned to dominance, with all other states in a subordinate position. “Why China Fights” is for
Han-supremacy. “Why the U.S. Fights” is to preserve a future free and open, and to prevent the
hegemony of a great power governed by a nation-based supremacist ideology. The SinoAmerican conflict will determine whether the security and position of Washington are
maintained, and freedom and open societies remain the dominant ideal in international politics.
Or whether America will lose, and freedom is supplanted by authoritarianism and Hansupremacism.
! – Chinese Heg
I/L -- General
Arms alliances counteract Chinese economic influence – withdraw forces
countries to turn to China for security
Fisher 18 [Max, publisher and analyst of global politics in The Interpreter, “How China is
Challenging American Dominance in Asia”; published 3/9/18, accessed 6/26/19;
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/09/world/asia/china-us-asia-rivalry.html]
Asian leaders know that their economies – and therefore, domestic politics – rely on Beijing, which has shown
it will offer investment to friends and economic punishment to those who displease it. But another metric of great
power influence, arms sales, shows United States’ enduring reach. U.S. arms sales still dominate
Asian markets Arms sales by U.S. China Australia $3,789 million South Korea 3,626 Taiwan 2,953 India
2,782 Singapore 2,420 Japan 1,666 Pakistan 1,005 3,656 Indonesia 447 279 Philippines 261 Thailand 229 131 New
Zealand 136 Bangladesh 1,666 110 Brunei 87 Malaysia 22 Sri Lanka 10 Laos 31 Cambodia 54 Myanmar 1,161 Source: Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute. Figures are SIPRI estimates of total production costs from 2011 to 2016. Countries that
purchase American weapons bind their militaries and their foreign policies to the United States.
The imbalance reflects the extent of American military relationships in Asia, which date back to World
War II. Many of the 20 countries caught between Beijing and Washington face an impossible choice between Chinese wealth and
American security. “These countries don’t want to have to choose sides,” said Tanvi Madan, an Asia specialist at the Brookings
Institution. So they’re not. Instead, most are pursuing strategies intended to draw maximum benefit from both powers, minimize
risks of angering either and preserve their independence.
The result will likely be something very different from
Cold War-era Europe, which was divided cleanly between two sides. Instead, the continent will
fracture along many lines at once as countries accept, reject or manage China’s growing
influence. Each strategy involves hard compromises and provides a model for how others in
Asia, and perhaps one day globally, will cope with a Chinese-American world.
I/L -- Taiwan
Taiwan alliance is key to US heg and Chinese containment
Schmitt 4/11 [Gary, Director of the Program on American Citizenship and Resident Scholar
Strategic Studies, Asia, Foreign and Defense Policy, “The Taiwan Relations Act at 40: It’s time to
deepen ties”; published 4/11/19, accessed 6/24/19; http://www.aei.org/publication/thetaiwan-relations-act-at-40-its-time-to-deepen-ties/
Thirty-seven years after the “Assurances,” a completely different geostrategic environment faces the United States in Asia. The Cold
War is long over and so too the justification for using China as a card to be played against the Soviet Union. Also over
is the
hope that somehow economic engagement with China would gradually but inevitably lead China
down the road to political reform and to becoming a “responsible stakeholder” in the international
system. To the contrary, as its economy has grown, China has used these increased resources to
engage in a quarter-of-a-century long military build-up that has led to a worrisome change in
the region’s balance of power and an assertion of power in the South and East China Seas. In this
context Taiwan’s independence and security should be particularly important to Washington. With
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, invasion of Ukraine and Georgia, and China’s destabilizing actions in the South China Sea and
undermining of Hong Kong’s autonomy, Taiwan
will be a key test of U.S. resolve in supporting partners in
the face of great power pressure. Taiwan is also important in its own right as a thriving democracy and major U.S.
trading partner. No less significant, the island is critical in the region’s balance of power, sitting between
two treaty allies (Japan and the Philippines). North and south of the island are the sea gateways to the broader
Pacific and America’s base in Guam. In a crisis, Taiwan could be a key partner in containing the Chinese
military within the first island chain and preventing it from exerting significant reach into the
Western Pacific
Halting arms sales increases Chinese heg and military overmatch
ST 18 [Strait Times, central news agency primarily focused on the Pacific geopolitical theatre,
“China demands halt of US arms sales to Taiwan, as island stresses Central America ties with
navy visit”; published 4/10/18, accessed 6/24/19; https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/eastasia/china-demands-halt-of-us-arms-sales-to-taiwan-as-island-stresses-central-america-ties]
BEIJING/CORINTO, NICARAGUA (REUTERS, AFP) - China said on Monday (Apr 9) that it opposed
the United States selling
weapons to Taiwan, after the Trump administration approved the marketing licence required for American manufacturers to sell technology
to Taiwan that would allow for building submarines. Taiwan's Central News Agency said on Saturday that Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence
confirmed that the US Department of State had agreed to grant the licence needed to sell the technology to Taiwan so the self-ruled island could build
its own submarines. China's Defence Ministry, responding to a journalist's question in an online statement about the issue, demanded that the US "halt
all forms of military links between the United States and Taiwan, as well as all forms of weapon sales to Taiwan". "China's
military has the
ability and determination to defeat all attempts to separate our country, and will adopt all
necessary measures to resolutely defend national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity,"
ministry spokesman Wu Qian said. He did not elaborate. Taiwan is one of China's most sensitive issues. The island is claimed by Beijing as its
sacred territory, part of "one China", and Beijing has never renounced the use of force to bring under Chinese control what it considers to be a
wayward province. The US State Department over the weekend declined to confirm the details of the Taiwan news report. A State Department official
had said the agency continued to review Taiwan's defence needs and referred questions about specific procurement plans to Taiwanese authorities.
China's hostility to Taiwan has grown since Ms Tsai Ing-wen from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party was elected president in 2016.
China fears she wants to push for formal independence, though Ms Tsai says she wants to maintain the status quo and is committed to peace. NAVY
FLOTILLA The opposition from China came as a Taiwanese navy flotilla docked in Nicaragua, in a high-profile visit highlighting ties with Central America
and the Caribbean that are shrinking as China presses countries in the region to drop diplomatic relations. The three vessels - described as being on a
training mission - powered into Corinto, a port town on Nicaragua's Pacific coast, in a visit "to strengthen the ties of friendship", Nicaraguan officials
and Taiwanese diplomats said. Some of the 800 crew members who disembarked put on a Taekwondo martial arts display after an inspection by
Nicaraguan military brass. The warships were Pan Shi, a modern and sleek Fast Combat Support Ship, Pan Chao, an older, US-designed frigate, and Kuen
Wing, a more recent, French-made stealth frigate. They were to stay in port for three days, with the crew of officers, sailors and cadets participating
with the Nicaraguan military in joint training activities, the Taiwanese embassy said. It was the sixth time Taiwan has sent a "friendship flotilla" to
Nicaragua. After Nicaragua, Taiwan's navy ships were to go on to make stops in the Marshall Islands, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and the
Dominican Republic. ASSERTIVE CHINA Taiwan is gradually running out of ports of call as China - which considers Taiwan a renegade province that will
one day be brought back under Beijing's control - presses countries to drop relations with Taipei. Half the countries with which Taiwan has bilateral
diplomatic relations are in Latin America and the Caribbean. And it is slowly losing ground there. In June last year, Panama cut ties with Taiwan to open
relations with China instead. Costa Rica did likewise in 2007. The parts of Latin America that still have ties with Taiwan are the Central American
countries of Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua; the Caribbean states of Haiti, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines,
the Dominican Republic, and Santa Lucia; and the South American nation of Paraguay. Across
the region, China's increased
investment and a more assertive foreign policy are being felt both economically and politically.
That trend has unsettled the US, which views the Chinese interest as encroachment in a region
that it once regarded as its backyard. US President Donald Trump is to attend a summit of leaders across the Americas in Peru on
Friday and Saturday. White House officials said part of his focus would be on pushing back against "external economic aggression", taken to mean
China's growing investment in the region.\
! – Chinese Hegemony – AI
Chinese hegemony leads to AI dominance
Akita 6-14-19 (Hiroyuki, “China is exporting AI-driven authoritarianism,”
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/China-is-exporting-AI-drivenauthoritarianism, ME)
China is building and exporting an Orwellian dystopia, supported by a network of ubiquitous security cameras
and advanced facial recognition technology. Beijing's artificial intelligence-driven dictatorship, which also employs
rigorous internet censorship, poses a fundamental, long-term threat to the liberal postwar world order led by
the U.S. At home, China is working to establish a "social credit system" as a new and powerful tool to control the public. The
system will rate the "trustworthiness" of all Chinese citizens based on a wide range of criteria, including their credit card records,
traffic violations and contributions to the nation. Citizens with low "social credit scores" will be punished in various ways, such as not
being allowed to travel. Alarmed by the Chinese plan to barge into people's private lives, the U.S. government is considering
imposing sanctions on Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology, China's largest manufacturer of video surveillance systems. The
company is believed to be supporting Beijing's "Big Brother" ambitions. Not only is its quest to build a mass-surveillance society
proceeding apace, China
is outmaneuvering the U.S. In addition to developing a vast system to track and control citizens
country is also selling its approach to public security internationally. China's Orwellian vision
of the future has huge implications for how its battle with the U.S. for global hegemony will play out. At
stake is the question of who will lead in building and maintaining order in the Indo-Pacific
region, an area vital to both American strategic interests and to Japan's future. In this war for
hegemony, political power is as important as economic and military power. If other Asian
countries tread the path of democracy, it will be easier for the U.S. to maintain its influence in
the region. If, however, many Asian nations opt for authoritarianism, the foundations of the U.S.-led
liberal order will gradually erode. Seen in this light, the spread of China's AI-powered system of public
surveillance does more than threaten human rights in many parts of the world; it could create
serious geopolitical challenges for those countries that remain committed to the liberal order.
at home, the
According to a report by Freedom House, a U.S. human rights group, at least 18 countries are building AI-based mass-surveillance
systems with China's help, including Zimbabwe and Uzbekistan. The trend is also apparent in Southeast Asia, a region into which
Japan has poured aid for decades in hopes of encouraging reform. According to media reports, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam have
already struck deals with Chinese companies to introduce state-of-the-art public surveillance systems. Myanmar is planning to use
Chinese AI to spot traffic violations. Democracy in all these countries is in a delicate transitional phase. In Thailand, a general
election was held in March, supposedly as a step toward returning to democracy after years of military rule. But former junta leader
Prayuth Chan-ocha returned as prime minister in June. Myanmar's government, whose de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, was the
face of the country's pro-democracy movement, has been roundly criticized by the international community for violent suppression
of the Rohingya, a Muslim minority group. Observers worldwide have raised concerns the country may be backsliding toward
autocracy. In May, Malaysia had its first change in ruling parties since independence, but Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad is
struggling to boost his standing with the public amid ethnic tensions in the country. Vietnam is pushing through economic reforms,
but the Communist Party has maintained its monopoly on power and has made no move toward political reform. Introducing
Chinese AI-powered surveillance systems in these countries will hardly promote democracy in
the region. Although there is money to be made selling hardware and software, money is not the only prize China is after in
exporting its surveillance society model. Some Chinese companies offer to help foreign governments analyze the huge amounts of
facial recognition data collected through their systems. This gives China access to tremendous amounts of data
on facial features, helping boost the accuracy of its facial recognition systems, which compare that information against a database of
known faces to find a match. In
addition to the U.S., democracies in Japan and Europe and elsewhere
worry that China may gain political influence over others by building ports and railway lines in strategically
important areas in the Indo-Pacific region through Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative. To counter what they perceive as a Chinese
campaign to expand its sphere of influence, the U.S. and Australia created a fund last autumn to support the development of
infrastructure in the region. But the spread of China's surveillance technology has more worrying strategic implications than flashy
building projects. Chinese-funded ports and railways will not necessarily undermine democracy in host countries. But
sophisticated systems that let authorities to keep tabs on people could see countries with
immature democratic institutions morph into dictatorships. That is not to say that China's exports of AI
technology are driven solely by evil intent. Such technology could be used to improve air traffic control systems or to better manage
ground transportation, for example. But applying next-generation technology to keep an eye on the citizenry is more likely to foster
totalitarian rule. Another worry is that China is exporting not only hardware for civil surveillance but legal structures that enable
digital dictatorship. China's internet security law, which came into force in June 2017, exemplifies Beijing's legal approach to
monitoring people's activities. The law requires all data collected in China to be stored within the country and bans transfer of data
out of the country without permission from the authorities. It also mandates that web-based businesses cooperate with authorities
investigating matters that may threaten the "safety of the nation." It effectively sets boundaries in cyberspace and cuts China out of
the global internet, while making it easier for the government to find and eliminate information it does not like. Depending on how
the law is enforced, foreign companies operating in China may also be required to disclose information under the pretext of ensuring
public safety, or risk punishment. The law has set
off alarm bells among security policymakers in the U.S.,
Japan, Europe and Australia, but the situation is getting worse. Earlier this year Vietnam enacted a similar
law. If more countries follow suit, the global internet could become seriously snarled. It is vital for Japan, the U.S.,
Europe and Australia to take coordinated action swiftly to stop this trend. China's efforts to
expand its global influence through the power of AI to monitor and control people should not be taken
lightly. Unlike a democracy, China can gather personal data on its 1.3 billion people and develop its AI-based surveillance systems
without concern for human rights. And it can collect personal data on people elsewhere through business contracts with the foreign
governments that adopt its systems. What can the world's democracies do in response? Unfortunately, there is no magic bullet for
countering Beijing's strategy. But there are at least two things they can do. The U.S., Japan and Australia have barred Chinese
telecommunications equipment maker Huawei Technologies from their 5G networks, citing security concerns. These governments
are concerned that China will use Huawei as a tool for espionage. Although Huawei has strenuously denied allegations that it acts on
Beijing's behalf, one diplomat involved in the decision to ban Huawei's from the country's 5G network says the move was based on a
careful analysis of Chinese law, which convinced policymakers that Huawei would not be able to reject a request for information
from the Chinese government. The U.S., Japan and Australia should do more to share their knowledge and concerns about the
Chinese company with other countries to alert them to the risk. Even
authoritarian countries should be worried
about the possibility that China may have easy access to their sensitive information. The second thing
the U.S., Japan, Australia and the European Union should do is work in tandem to quickly draw up international rules for the use of
digital technologies and the internet. The rules should be designed to build a "common digital space" shared by like-minded
countries, one that limits government intervention and monitoring. AI, like any technology, is politically neutral: It can be a tool for
promoting democracy or a means by which dictators suppress people. It all depends on how it is used. The democratic world needs
to work hard to prevent the spread of AI-powered autocracy.
China AI leadership causes oceanic dominance.
Hall ‘18 – (Jonathan, security and political risk analyst with a focus on Eurasian geopolitics,
military affairs, and emerging technologies, M.A. International Relations, Central European
University, Artificial Intelligence in the South China Sea, Global Risk Insights, December 28, 2018,
https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/12/artificial-intelligence-turning-tide-asia-pacific/)
The South China Sea is host to a number of countries vying for control in the area. Attempting to
develop new tactics and technologies to swing the balance in its favor, China may have found its key
advantage – artificial intelligence (AI). Described as an “enabling” technology, in the same way as the combustion
engine or electricity, applications range from deep-sea exploration and international investment, to
cybersecurity and combat operations. Deep-Sea Operations Chinese scientists are currently developing
plans for the first-ever AI-run colony on Earth. Designed for unmanned submarine science and
defense operations, the project started at the Chinese Academy of Sciences following a visit from President Xi Jinping in April
to the deep-sea research institute in Sanya, Hainan province. Costing taxpayers roughly $160 million, a location under review is the
Manila Trench, the only place in the South China Sea with a depth exceeding 5,000 meters. Located
near the
Scarborough Shoal, where China and the Philippines nearly sparked conflict two years ago, the
base provides China with a humanitarian pretext for placing strategically useful assets in the
region. Resting along the meeting point between the Eurasian and Pacific continental plates, the trench is a prime target for
recording seismic activity. In one of the largest quake zones in the world, China can likely push their agenda under the guise of a
“win-win” scenario. The
ability to monitor potential earthquakes and tsunamis would be to the benefit of
country. However, China’s ability to launch antagonistic operations and
track foreign vessels – would not. Maritime Drones Following the president’s April visit, in July the Chinese Academy
of Sciences began pursuing plans for a fleet of unmanned autonomous underwater submarines, or
“Extra Large Underwater Unmanned Vehicles (XLUUVs).” With an available mission profile from whale tracking to anti-carrier
operations, this will all happen thanks to artificial intelligence. Able to traverse thousands of nautical miles, depending on
the size of the fleet China could attain near ubiquity in the region. Roving the ocean floor, they are going to
provide a wide spectrum of capabilities ranging from electronic to mine warfare, and varying
offensive payload capacities – and geopolitical analysts should take note of serious security
implications. As AI technology remains in its infancy, the possibility of a “rogue” submarine is not out of the question,
unexpectedly firing on a naval ship or civilian tanker. This leads to additional concerns that China, provided with plausible
deniability, could initiate a small-scale attack on foreign vessels claiming the incident occurred due
to a “technological mishap.” The developments in autonomous submarine drone systems are subsumed
within China’s overarching “Underwater Great Wall.” The initiative involves a network of submarine detectors for
national security in the South China Sea. The main strategic benefit provided by such a project, placing subsurface
sensors throughout the region, would be to detect U.S. and Russian submarines – eliminating the current
advantage these states have in that realm of naval competition. Dual-Use Technology According to the China State
emergency planners in each
Shipbuilding Corporation, in charge of the project, an additional objective is to provide customers with “a package solution in terms
of underwater environment monitoring and collection, real-time location tracing of surface and underwater targets, warning of
seaquakes, tsunamis, and other disasters as well as marine scientific research”. Things beneficial to all parties involved, an
unspoken reality, however, is the decisive advantage this would provide the Chinese maritime
forces. With real-time monitoring systems throughout the South China Sea, the tactical
potential is nearly endless. One key factor in predicting the precipitous rise of AI technology is ease of cross-over between
private and military application. Should the algorithms developed in the civilian sector be easily adaptable for military usage, then
the full force of China’s emerging AI start-up community may assist in developing security applications of AI technology. An example
of this, drawing from the previous mention of autonomous submarines, would be an AI algorithm used to direct the subs as they
search for resources and other useful scientific data. Directing themselves in conjunction with one another, the algorithm can easily
find a further use in swarming techniques – allowing the drones to maneuvre in synchronisation, easily adapting to changes in the
combat environment. Such algorithms already exist in the private sector, the military only needs to adapt them for full use in naval
operations. AI-Assisted Policymaking An additional example of dual-purpose AI technology is China’s advancements within the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A prototype underway is providing decision-makers with an AI-enabled diplomatic system, currently
being used to lighten the load for policymakers undertaking China’s Belt and Road Initiative. With over 70 countries and roughly 65%
of the world’s population involved, there are a lot of moving parts to consider when making decisions. With AI technology available
to synthesize this data and provide recommendation, the ministry could enjoy a huge boon to efficiency and accuracy of judgement.
In addition to usefulness for foreign investment, the
military has made use of the system for wargaming
activities. Liu Yu, an associate researcher at the Institute of Automation at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, involved in the
development of this AI wargame system for the People’s Liberation Army said that “human diplomats would have
difficulty winning a strategic game against AI”.
That makes conflict over Taiwan and the SCS likely---US naval access is the key
stabilizer.
Wong ‘18 – (Edward Wong, diplomatic and international correspondent for The New York
Times who reports on foreign policy from Washington, "Military Competition in Pacific Endures
as Biggest Flash Point Between U.S. and China," New York Times, 11-14-2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/world/asia/usa-china-tradepacific.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FUnited%20States%20Politics%20and%20Governm
ent&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics®ion=stream&module=stream_
unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=31&pgtype=collection)
WASHINGTON — Trade
disputes have for months been the focus of souring relations between the United
States and China. But intractable problems in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait underscore
that competition for dominance of the Pacific Ocean remains the most volatile source of
conflict between the two nations — and the tensions are rising. That became clear in barbed comments during a
meeting in Washington last week in which Mike Pompeo, the secretary of state, and Jim Mattis, the defense secretary,
negotiated with their Chinese counterparts. And it is evident as Vice President Mike Pence is in Asia this week to
talk to East Asian and Southeast Asian leaders to shore up support for American efforts to
counterbalance China. Mr. Pence’s trip includes stops at two Asia-Pacific summit meetings, where he plans to speak about
checking China’s influence and power projection. Since his broad speech last month on American competition with China, Mr.
Pence has become the face of the administration’s aggressive approach to Beijing. Some Asia analysts
say, though, that President Trump’s absence sends a signal that the United States is not committed to the region: President Xi
Jinping of China and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia are each attending at least one of the gatherings. Strategy
for the
region, in Washington and Beijing, revolves around how each country can assert military
dominance in the Pacific. For now, the most powerful military in the region is still that of the United
States, which relies on the ability to have unfettered naval access to the South China Sea and the support of
the self-governing island of Taiwan to bolster its standing. But China has become more aggressive in trying to
assert dominance over both. And its state-owned companies are making inroads in the islands of Oceania — from
Saipan to Vanuatu — with infrastructure projects. American officials say those could eventually become
beachheads for the People’s Liberation Army, which would pose a challenge to the United States Navy’s operational
command in the far island chains. Australia is also watching closely because the South Pacific has traditionally been its sphere of
influence. Closer to home, China
has continued to place military equipment and installations on rocks
and reefs in the South China Sea, over which it claims sovereignty. And it is persuading some nations
to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan while forcing foreign companies, including hotels and airlines, to drop any
mention of Taiwan. There is a consensus in Washington that American officials need to find ways of
pushing back. In the South China Sea, that has mainly taken the form of what are called freedom-ofnavigation operations by the Navy, in which ships sail near the islands or features claimed by Beijing to establish that
the waters are international — and not Chinese territory. On Sept. 30, American and Chinese warships nearly collided, coming within
45 yards of each other. On Tuesday, Mr. Pence’s plane flew over the South China Sea to Singapore, where he attended the annual
summit meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Mr. Pence
told a Washington Post columnist on the plane
that the flight, which passed within 50 miles of the contested Spratly Islands, was a type of freedom-of-navigation operation. “We
will not be intimidated,” he said. “We will not stand down. We will continue to exercise freedom
of navigation.” Graham Allison, a Harvard Kennedy School professor who wrote a book on the potential for war between the
United States and China, said most people in the region had thought it was “game over” on the South China Sea — too late to roll
back China’s presence from rocks and reefs, as well as islands it created by dredging sand. But “the
Trump administration
now means to fight back vigorously on all fronts, including on the South China Sea — and perhaps
even on Taiwan,” Mr. Allison said. Last Friday, at the close of the Washington meeting with their Chinese counterparts, Mr.
Pompeo and Mr. Mattis made sharp comments on Pacific issues. “Regarding our strong ties with a democratic Taiwan, I reiterated
the U.S. policy has not changed and that we are concerned about China’s increasing efforts to coerce others, constraining Taiwan’s
international space,” Mr. Pompeo said, notably, in opening remarks to journalists. Later, Gen. Wei Fenghe,
the Chinese
defense minister, made his own assertive comments on Taiwan, referencing the American Civil War and the
United States Pledge of Allegiance. “To achieve reunification is a mission for our party and our country,” General
Wei said. “In the Pledge of Allegiance to the U.S., there is this sentence saying this is a nation under God, indivisible. So it is the same
with Taiwan. It is an inalienable part of China.” If
“this territorial integrity is under threat,” he said, China
would move to maintain it “at any cost,” just as the United States had to do “in the Civil War.” Analysts in
Washington took note of the remarks. “I believe it’s rare that the U.S. side raises Taiwan in a news conference with the Chinese in an
opening statement,” said Bonnie S. Glaser, a senior adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Pompeo
referred to ‘democratic Taiwan.’ That will surely rankle the Chinese. I expect China’s remarks in private regarding Taiwan were even
sharper.” The United States has been more aggressive in defending Taiwanese interests since John R. Bolton became national
security adviser in April. Last
month, the Pentagon sailed two warships through the Taiwan Strait,
which underscored the potential for conflict. The White House had initially considered sending an aircraft carrier
through the strait — something the United States has not done since 2007. That most likely would have ignited a furious response
from China. Instead, the Pentagon sent a cruiser and a destroyer. Defense Department officials had argued that the carrier would be
too provocative at a time when Washington
and Beijing are already at loggerheads over trade and other
issues. That includes Communist Party repression of ethnic Uighur Muslims, which Mr. Pompeo regularly
denounces. On Wednesday, American legislators introduced bills calling on the Trump administration to take action to defend the
Uighurs. Mr. Mattis and Mr. Wei have tried to lower the temperature on tensions in the Pacific. Before the Washington talks, the
two met in Singapore last month on the sidelines of a conclave of Southeast Asian defense ministers. But one Defense Department
official said that cordial talks were the limits of what the two nations could achieve for now.
Both countries have dug into
seemingly nonnegotiable positions on China’s militarization of disputed land features in the
South China Sea — the issue that most bedevils the military relationship. The Chinese do not describe their
actions as militarization; they accuse the United States of militarizing the sea with its freedom-of-navigation ship operations and
overflights. Now, officials from Britain and France say their navies are also taking part in the operations, even though Southeast
Asian nations contesting China’s claims have not publicly committed to participating. Yang Jiechi,
the senior Chinese
foreign policy official who attended the Washington meeting, said China was building what he
described as civilian facilities and necessary defense facilities “on its own territory.” “The
Chinese side made it clear to the United States that it should stop sending its vessels and
military aircraft close to Chinese islands and reefs, and stop actions that undermine China’s
sovereignty and security interest,” Mr. Yang said. Michael Pillsbury, an author on the Chinese military cited by Mr. Trump
and Mr. Pence, said the Chinese would no doubt continue to see the actions in a hostile light. They
are, he said, “interpreting these freedom-of-navigation exercises, even when they’re innocent
passage, as something more — provocations, or a declining hegemon trying to maintain its power.”
Both go nuclear
Lemon ‘18 – Jason Lemon, a contributor to The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, U.S.-CHINA
NUCLEAR WAR THREAT IS GREATER THAN MOST PEOPLE REALIZE, EXPERT WARNS, 10/17/18,
https://www.newsweek.com/us-china-nuclear-war-threat-greater-most-people-realize-expertwarns-1175610
It is more likely than in the past that China and the U.S. could enter into a military conflict, and
the possibility of such a battle going nuclear is higher than many analysts believe, a security expert from
Georgetown University has warned. Caitlin Talmadge, who is an associate professor of security studies at the Walsh School of
Foreign Service, laid out a grim picture of how military
escalation could play out between Washington and
Beijing in an article for Foreign Affairs’ November-December issue. “The odds of such a confrontation going
nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think,” she wrote. However, she also pointed out
that “a war between the two countries remains unlikely, but...no longer seems as implausible as it once did.” According to
Talmadge, most U.S. and Chinese analysts have generally dismissed the possibility of a nuclear
confrontation altogether. However, looking at the Pentagon’s preferred war tactics in recent conflicts, the
professor pointed out that typical U.S. strategy involves punching “deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the
opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost.” “The Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq,
Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power,” Talmadge wrote. In China, nuclear and other more conventional military
weapons are closely intertwined, meaning the U.S. would
likely purposefully or inadvertently target Beijing’s
nuclear capabilities early on. Recognizing this possibility, the Chinese may consider using their nuclear
arsenal before it could be taken out. Talmadge suggested that such a scenario could arise if Beijing
were to move to invade Taiwan. A conflict could also erupt over territorial rights in the South China Sea,
where Beijing has staked claim to what much of the world sees as international waters. Tensions have remained high
between U.S. and Chinese naval patrols within the region. Although Talmadge maintains that such military scenarios
are not highly likely, the risk has increased as tensions between China and the U.S. have escalated.
“This sobering reality should encourage leaders on both sides to find ways of resolving political, economic and military disputes
without resorting to a war that could rapidly turn catastrophic for the region and the world,” she concluded her article.
Independently, AI dominance emboldens China and other adversaries to attack
US infrastructure
Gertz ‘19 – (Bill, national security columnist for The Washington Times, journalist and author
who has spent decades covering defense and national security affairs at the Washington Post,
senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon, China developing battlefield AI for hightechnology warfare, The Washington Times, January 30, 2019,
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jan/30/chinas-military-outlines-artificialintelligence-p/)
A Chinese
military newspaper has outlined how the People’s Liberation Army plans to deploy artificial intelligence (AI)
for its forces in future high-technology warfare. The PLA Daily reported Jan. 19 that warfare is shifting from
conventional destruction to artificial-intelligence-powered high-speed and extreme destruction
operations. Li Minghai of the PLA’s National Defense University wrote that AI will be a key “war-winning mechanism” for
China. “Through gunpowder smoke in war, we can perceive that today, war fighting has evolved from bloody struggle for
storming castles and capturing territories in the uncivilized and barbaric age into information-driven precision
decapitation operations and intense contests in the domain of high intelligence,” Mr. Li stated. The
military expert said China plans to win wars by shifting the emphasis in war fighting from “systems confrontation” to “algorithms
competition” and that achieving superiority in algorithms ultimately will produce “war-fighting superiority.” “In future warfare, the
force that enjoys algorithm superiority will be able to rapidly and accurately predict the development of the battlefield situation,
thus coming up with the best combat-fighting methods and achieving the war objective of ‘prevailing before battle starts,’” Mr. Li
said. A second requirement is the use of large data sets that can be rapidly converted through algorithms to war-fighting
intelligence. “Thus, the force with algorithm superiority will be able to disperse ‘battlefield fog’ emerging because data cannot be
processed in a timely way, and can gain more profound insights into the battlefield situation,” he wrote. Additionally, when applied
to quantum computing, AI
will produce exponential acceleration effects that will allow the PLA to
create “decision-making superiority” in conflicts. AI-powered forces will permit unmanned, AI-driven aircraft to
rapidly defeat all advanced fighter aircraft. The report said Russian forces in Syria conducted an operation in late 2015 using six
unmanned tracked combat vehicles, four unmanned wheeled combat vehicles and one unmanned aerial vehicle to assault an Islamic
State target. The battle killed 70 terrorists in what the report called the first case of the use of mainly robot forces. AI war fighting in
the future will utilize a combination of autonomous weaponry and forces with traditional manned forces. According to Mr. Li, the
PLA is developing “extreme operations” that break through the boundaries of traditional warfare. “Victories in AI warfare will be
scored through bringing forward the time of issuing early warnings, shortening the period of decision-making and extending
operational actions, thus producing the effects of making pre-emptive deployments and launching pre-emptive attacks,” he stated,
while producing “a higher level of surprise” among enemy forces. One system discussed in the report is the use of stealth drones the
size of a beetle that can be used to scan a soldier’s face. “Through data analysis and judgment, it can directly hit the target’s head,
and can even pierce the human brain by carrying a payload,” the report said. Using a large number of robots in clustered operations
“may produce extremely huge power that exceeds a nuclear weapon’s explosion,” Mr. Li said. DNI: CYBERTHREATS TO ‘MINDS AND
MACHINES’ Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats revealed this week that cyberthreats — both current espionage and
future attacks — are
one of the most significant security challenges posed by China, Russia, Iran and North
Korea. “Our adversaries and strategic competitors will increasingly use cyber capabilities — including
cyber espionage, attack and influence — to seek political, economic and military advantage over
the United States and its allies and partners,” according to the report prepared for the annual threat briefing Tuesday before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and signed by Mr. Coats. “China, Russia, Iran and North Korea increasingly use cyber
operations to threaten both minds and machines in an expanding number of ways — to steal information, to influence our
citizens, or to disrupt critical infrastructure.” Of the four adversaries, China and Russia pose the greatest threats, U.S.
intelligence analysts say. The report for the first time included non-technical influence operations, such as those used by Russia and
China to affect U.S. policies and elections. In the past, intelligence leaders did not include adversary information-warfare capabilities
in analyzing cyberthreats. Another significant disclosure is that adversaries have penetrated critical infrastructure
such as electrical grids and communications networks for what the intelligence threat report said were
plans to “hold [them] at risk” in a future crisis or conflict. It was the first time the intelligence
community has publicly stated that China and Russia, in particular, have conducted cyberforays inside
computer networks that are used to control critical infrastructure. The report also warned that foreign
adversaries are becoming more skilled at using social media and other means to influence American opinion. The growing
integration of electronic systems with internet connectivity will bring new dangers. The report said,
“As we connect and integrate billions of new digital devices into our lives and business processes, adversaries and strategic
competitors almost certainly will gain greater insight into and access to our protected information.” China
ranks as the
most serious cyberthreat after years of intelligence-gathering against both U.S. government
and private-sector networks. China “is improving its cyber attack capabilities and altering information
online, shaping Chinese views and potentially the views of U.S. citizens,” the report said. “China has the ability to launch
cyber attacks that cause localized, temporary disruptive effects on critical infrastructure — such
as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks — in the United States,” the report said. Russian
cybercapabilities also pose a significant threat, with the intelligence community describing Moscow as “a highly capable and
effective adversary, integrating cyber espionage, attack and influence operations to achieve its political and military objectives.”
“Moscow is now staging cyber attack assets to allow it to disrupt or damage U.S. civilian and military infrastructure during a crisis
and poses a significant cyber influence threat,” the report added. Russia
could temporarily disrupt the U.S.
electrical distribution network, as shown in cyberattacks against Ukraine in 2015 and 2016, the report
said. “Moscow is mapping our critical infrastructure with the long-term goal of being able to cause
substantial damage,” the report said. Iran is working on cyberattack capabilities against critical U.S.
infrastructure. Tehran is also using social media to target American and allied audiences in influence operations. Iranian
cyberattacks could cause localized, temporary disruptions of corporate computer networks,
similar to the cyberattacks carried out against Saudi Arabia in 2016 and 2017, U.S. analysts warned. North
Korean cyberthreats are targeting financial institutions and are described in the DNI report as “significant.” “Pyongyang’s cybercrime
operations include attempts to steal more than $1.1 billion from financial institutions across the world — including a successful
cyber heist of an estimated $81 million from the New York Federal Reserve account of Bangladesh’s central bank,” the report said.
The report concluded that cyberattacks
are increasing and growing more sophisticated. “The growing
availability and use of publicly and commercially available cyber tools is increasing the overall
volume of unattributed cyber activity around the world,” the report said. “The use of these tools
increases the risk of misattributions and misdirected responses by both governments and the
private sector.”
Grid collapse causes extinction.
Friedemann ‘16 – (Alice Friedemann, Transportation expert, founder of EnergySkeptic.com
and author of “When Trucks Stop Running, Energy and the Future of Transportation,” worked at
American Presidential Lines for 22 years, where she developed computer systems to coordinate
the transit of cargo between ships, rail, trucks, and consumers. 01-24-16. “Electromagnetic
pulse threat to infrastructure (U.S. House hearings).” Energy Skeptic.
http://energyskeptic.com/2016/the-scariest-u-s-house-session-ever-electromagnetic-pulse-andthe-fall-of-civilization/)
Modern civilization cannot exist for a protracted period without electricity. Within days of a blackout
across the U.S., a blackout that could encompass the entire planet, emergency generators would
run out of fuel, telecommunications would cease as would transportation due to gridlock, and
eventually no fuel. Cities would have no running water and soon, within a few days, exhaust their food
supplies. Police, Fire, Emergency Services and hospitals cannot long operate in a blackout. Government
and Industry also need electricity in order to operate. The EMP Commission warns that a natural or nuclear EMP event, given
current unpreparedness, would likely result in societal collapse.
AND nuclear lashout.
Tilford ‘12 – (Robert Tilford, Writer for The Examiner. 07-27-12. “Cyber Attackers Could Easily
Shut Down the Electric Grid for the Entire East Coast.” Examiner.
http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shut-down-the-electric-grid-forthe-entire-east-coa) Accessed via archive.org/web, this snapshot is from October 18, 2014
“Cyber
attackers could all too easily shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast, the
west coast, and the middle part of our country”, said Senator Grassley on July 26, 2012. “Any one
attack could leave dozens of major cities and tens of millions of Americans without power. We
know, because we were shown in a room here in the Capitol, how an attack could take place and what damage it would do, so we
know this is not just make believe”, he said. So what would a cyber attack look like anyway? The Senator explained: “Without
ATMs or debit card readers, commerce would immediately grind to a halt. My daughter, who lives here in the
DC area, lost power when the storm hit. They waited for a number of hours, and then they took all the food out of their freezer, they
gave away what they could, and they threw the rest away. And that was the way it was all over. Their power was out for about a
week, and it made it very difficult. They are fortunate enough to have a basement, and the heat wasn’t oppressive down there.
Without refrigeration, food would rot on the shelves, the freezers would have to be emptied,
and people could actually go hungry. Without gas pumps, transportation arteries would clog
with abandoned vehicles. Without cell phones or computers, whole regions of the country would
be cut off from communication and families would be unable to reach each other. Without air
conditioning and without lifesaving technology and the service of hospitals and nursing homes,
the elderly and sick would become much sicker and die. Most major hospitals have backup
power, but it is only for a limited amount of time. It depends on how much fuel they can store, and that is very limited”,
Senator Grassley said. The devastation that the Senator describes is truly unimaginable. To make matters worse a cyber attack
that can take out a civilian power grid, for example could also cripple harm the U.S. military. The
senator notes that is that the same power grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations,
cell towers and heart monitors also power “every military base in our country.” “Although bases
would be prepared to weather a short power outage with backup diesel generators, within hours, not days,
fuel supplies would run out”, he said. Which means military command and control centers could
go dark. Radar systems that detect air threats to our country would shut Down completely.
“Communication between commanders and their troops would also go silent. And many weapons systems would be left without
either fuel or electric power”, said Senator Grassley. “So in
a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in
the world would be left scrambling to maintain base functions”, he said. We contacted the Pentagon
and officials confirmed the threat of a cyber attack is something very real. Top national security
officials—including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security
Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director— have said, “preventing a cyber attack
and improving the nation’s electric grids is among the most urgent priorities of our country” (source:
Congressional Record). So how serious is the Pentagon taking all this? Enough to start, or end a war
over it, for sure (see video: Pentagon declares war on cyber attacks
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_kVQrp_D0kY&feature=relmfu ). A
cyber attack today against the US could very well be
seen as an “Act of War” and could be met with a “full scale” US military response. That could
include the use of “nuclear weapons”, if authorized by the President.
Infrastructure disruptions ripple---extinction.
Pamlin and Armstrong ‘15 – (Dennis Pamlin, Executive Project Manager Global Risks,
Global Challenges Foundation, and Stuart Armstrong, James Martin Research Fellow, Future of
Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford. February 2015. “Global
Challenges: 12 Risks that threaten human civilization: The case for a new risk category,” Global
Challenges Foundation, https://api.globalchallenges.org/static/wp-content/uploads/12-Riskswith-infinite-impact.pdf)
Global Challenges – Twelve risks
that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 89 3.1
Current risks System Collapse 3.1.5 Global Global system collapse is defined here as either an economic or societal collapse on
the global scale. There is no precise definition of a system collapse. The term has been used to describe a broad range of bad
economic conditions, ranging from a severe, prolonged depression with high bankruptcy rates and high unemployment, to a
breakdown in normal commerce caused by hyperinflation, or even an economically-caused sharp increase in the death rate and
perhaps even a decline in population. 310 Often economic collapse is accompanied by social chaos, civil unrest and sometimes a
breakdown of law and order. Societal
collapse usually refers to the fall or disintegration of human
societies, often along with their life support systems. It broadly includes both quite abrupt
societal failures typified by collapses, and more extended gradual declines of superpowers. Here
only the former is included. 3.1.5.1 Expected impact The world economic and political system is made up of many actors
with many objectives and many links between them. Such intricate, interconnected systems are subject to unexpected system-wide
failures due to the structure of the network311 – even if each component of the network is reliable. This gives rise to systemic risk:
systemic risk occurs when parts that individually may function well become vulnerable when
connected as a system to a self-reinforcing joint risk that can spread from part to part
(contagion), potentially affecting the entire system and possibly spilling over to related outside
systems.312 Such effects have been observed in such diverse areas as ecology,313 finance314 and critical
infrastructure315 (such as power grids). They are characterised by the possibility that a small
internal or external disruption could cause a highly non-linear effect,316 including a cascading failure
that infects the whole system,317 as in the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The possibility of collapse becomes more
acute when several independent networks depend on each other, as is increasingly the case
(water supply, transport, fuel and power stations are strongly coupled, for instance).318 This
dependence links social and technological systems as well.319 This trend is likely to be intensified
by continuing globalisation,320 while global governance and regulatory mechanisms seem
inadequate to address the issue.321 This is possibly because the tension between resilience and efficiency322 can even
exacerbate the problem.323 Many triggers could start such a failure cascade, such as the infrastructure damage wrought
by a coronal mass ejection,324 an ongoing cyber conflict, or a milder form of some of the risks presented in the rest of the
paper. Indeed the main risk factor with global systems collapse is as something which may exacerbate some of the
other risks in this paper, or as a trigger. But a simple global systems collapse still poses risks on
its own. The productivity of modern societies is largely dependent on the careful matching of different
types of capital325 (social, technological, natural...) with each other. If this matching is disrupted,
this could trigger a “social collapse” far out of proportion to the initial disruption.326 States and
institutions have collapsed in the past for seemingly minor systemic reasons.327 And institutional collapses can create
knock-on effects, such as the descent of formerly prosperous states to much more
impoverished and destabilising entities.328 Such processes could trigger damage on a large scale
if they weaken global political and economic systems to such an extent that secondary effects
(such as conflict or starvation) could cause great death and suffering. 3.1.5.2 Probability disaggregation
Five important factors in estimating the probabilities of various impacts: 1. Whether global system collapse will trigger subsequent
collapses or fragility in other areas. 2. What the true trade-off is between efficiency and resilience. 3. Whether effective regulation
and resilience can be developed. 4. Whether an external disruption will trigger a collapse. 5. Whether an internal event will trigger a
collapse. 1. Increased
global coordination and cooperation may allow effective regulatory
responses, but it also causes the integration of many different aspects of today’s world, likely
increasing systemic risk. 2. Systemic risk is only gradually becoming understood, and further research is needed, especially
when it comes to actually reducing systemic risk. 3. Since systemic risk is risk in the entire system, rather than in any individual
component of it, only institutions with overall views and effects can tackle it. But regulating systemic risk is a new and uncertain
task. 4. Building
resilience – the ability of system components to survive shocks – should reduce
systemic risk. 5. Fragile systems are often built because they are more efficient than robust systems, and hence more
profitable. 6. General mitigation efforts should involve features that are disconnected from the standard system, and thus should
remain able to continue being of use if the main system collapses 7. A
system collapse could spread to other areas,
infecting previously untouched systems (as the subprime mortgage crisis affected the world
financial system, economy, and ultimately its political system). 8. The system collapse may lead to increased
fragility in areas that it does not directly damage, making them vulnerable to subsequent shocks. 9. A collapse that spread
to government institutions would undermine the possibilities of combating the collapse. 10. A
natural ecosystem collapse could be a cause or consequence of a collapse in humanity’s
institutions. 11. Economic collapse is an obvious and visible way in which system collapse could cause a lot of damage. 12. In
order to cause mass casualties, a system collapse would need to cause major disruptions to the world’s political and economic
system. 13. If
the current world system collapses, there is a risk of casualties through loss of trade,
poverty, wars and increased fragility. 14. It is not obvious that the world’s institutions and
systems can be put together again after a collapse; they may be stuck in a suboptimal
equilibrium. 15. Power grids are often analysed as possible candidates for system collapse, and they are becoming more
integrated. 16. The world’s financial systems have already caused a system collapse, and they are still growing more integrated. 17.
The world’s economies are also getting integrated, spreading recessions across national boundaries. 18. The world’s political and
legal systems are becoming more closely integrated as well. Any risk has not been extensively researched yet, and there remain
strong obstacles (mainly at the nation state level) slowing down this form of integration. 19. The politics of the post-system collapse
world will be important in formulating an effective response instead of an indifferent or counterproductive one. 20. System
collapses can be triggered internally by very small events, without an apparent cause. 21. External disruptions can trigger the
collapse of an already fragile system. 22. The trade-off between efficiency and resilience is a key source of fragility in a world
economy built around maximising efficiency. 23. Climate change, mass
movements of animals and
agricultural mono-cultures are interlinking ecosystems with each other and with human
institutions. 24. There is a lot of uncertainty about systemic risk, especially in the interactions between different fragilities that
would not be sufficient to cause a collapse on their own.
! – Impact – Proxy Wars
Chinese hegemony causes Sino-U.S. proxy wars
Sharma 6-3-19 (Shubham, “Is China a new alternative to US hegemony?”
https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/06/opinion/is-china-a-new-alternative-tous-hegemony/, ME)
The world is experiencing a paradigm shift from unipolarity to a bipolar power struggle between
China and the well-established superpower the United States. In order to achieve its ambitions,
the Chinese regime launched the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, which has become
recognized as a “New Silk Road,” in 2013 to counter the presence of the US in Asia as well as
across the globe. The huge influx of investment under the BRI has opened the door for many
countries that had been desperate for direct foreign investments. Despite the slowdown in the
world’s economy, China pledged to invest more than US$1 trillion within a decade. In fact, US
investment bank Morgan Stanley has predicted that total investment under the BRI could reach
$1.3 trillion by 2027. The total money flowing from China toward the world for its Silk Road is
equivalent to nearly half of the total economy of the United Kingdom. China’s investment
initiative has so far grabbed the attention of more than 60 countries including key allies of the
US. With this project, China is using its financial clout to persuade beneficiary countries to take
its side in many significant issues. According to a report by Rhodium Group, a US research firm,
China has invested $120.75 billion in Europe in the past three years. Apart from pumping billions
of dollars into Western countries, the Chinese are also using hawkish diplomacy to break
Western unanimity. In a major ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitrations, Hungary and
Greece prevented the European Union from joining the US and Japan in siding with the
Philippines in a dispute with China over maritime borders in the South China Sea. This was not
the first time Western countries lacked unanimity against China. Thus investment under the BRI
is coming at a cost to some countries’ foreign policy. Also, in 2017, the EU for the first time did
not offer any statement on Chinese human rights violations in Xinjiang at the UN Human Rights
Council after it was blocked by Greece. The Americans are failing to persuade their allies to
spurn the BRI. Italy delivered what is seen by some observers as a slap in the face to Uncle Sam
when it became the first NATO and G7 country to join the BRI. The United States had issued
numerous warnings but they were not enough to dissuade the Italian government, which was
desperately seeking billions of dollars in foreign direct investment. One possible cause behind
the rise of the “dragon” is the failure of Uncle Sam to fulfill the needs not only of the developing
world but also of Western countries. China is giving plenty of cash to developing countries to
bolster their struggling economies. But in return, China is seeking political and diplomatic gains
in the international arena. Nayan Chanda, the former editor of the Far Eastern Economic
Review, called the BRI an “overt expression of China’s power ambitious in the 21st century.”
However, the BRI is a Chinese response to a renewed US focus on Asia initiated by the Barack
Obama administration in 2011. Many Chinese economic experts claim that the country’s leaders
are determined to restructure the economy to avoid the so-called middle-income trap. To
accomplish this, and project itself as a new alternative to the US, the Chinese are working on a
three-point “LDC” formula – language, diplomacy and currency. China is determined to maintain
the liquidity of its currency by investing in yuan and to challenge the international dollar system.
They are also focusing on increasing the number of Chinese speakers in the world. Moreover, all
the roads and maritime projects related to the BRI offer information mainly in the Chinese
language. Thus the hawkish diplomacy of the regime has already shown its colors in
international forums. Most recently, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman supported
China’s crackdown on Uighur Muslims just to bolster his kingdom’s ties with Beijing. This is a
glaring example of Chinese diplomacy and the country’s growing presence in the MENA (the
Middle East and North Africa) region. Saudi Arabia, a key ally of the US, has 30% more exports to
China than to the US, according to International Monetary Fund (IMF) data. Major oil and gas
producers are highly dependent on China for a big chunk of their revenues. According to IMF
Direction of Trade Statistics data, in some cases, key US allies such as the United Arab Emirates
export nearly three times as much to China as to the US. But even worse situations for the US
are indicated by the statistics on China’s trade with Kuwait, Qatar and Oman, which is nearly
eight, nine and 29 times, respectively, as much as their trade with America. China makes the
MENA region its battlefield against Uncle Sam and it has an edge over the US. The American
Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker has claimed that China has invested more
than $86 billion in this region since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative. The unimpeded
flow of yuan around the world has resulted in many countries that rely on China choosing to
stand by its side. But beyond Africa, Eurasia and the MENA region, the Chinese have also
invested a lot in America’s backyard. Before 2010, China had only invested $5 billion into Latin
America and the Caribbean (LAC). But now, the US lags behind China in terms of investment in
this region as well. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean,
the US is responsible for only 28% of the investment, whereas with 42% of the total investment,
China leads the way. The American Enterprise Institute believes China has invested more than
$182 billion in Latin America since the launch of the BRI. Also, Chinese investments are running
ahead in Australia with a total investment of $54.95 billion from 2013 to 2018. Moreover, the
US has attracted more than $138 billion in Chinese investment in the past five years. China’s
defiant posture toward US hegemony is most probably due to its grand economy, billions of
dollars in hand, hawkish diplomacy and its ability to sell its advanced technology at the lowest
price. The Chinese government has so far invested more than $125.5 billion on developing
infrastructure to connect the world with China under its New Silk Road project. Apart from
investing money in different countries, China is doing everything it can to eliminate America’s
technological edge. It is, for example, investing billions of dollars in Shenzhen for the promotion
of new technological developments. According to Bloomberg, nearly 50% of the mobile phones
sold in the first quarter of 2019 were manufactured by Chinese companies, 25% were made by
South Korea’s Samsung, and the remaining 25% were made in other countries. Moreover, it’s
annual spending on research and development has increased by 71% in the last five years, and it
has also tripled its military budget to bolster its muscular power in the region. Because of the
failure of the US to fulfill the needs of its allies and other major countries, the world is now
looking for new options, which makes the presence of China more prominent. China is giving all
possible assistance to countries that once had doubts about China’s ambitions and investments.
In every scenario, the Chinese want to establish hegemony over the United States. With the new
developments in the regions, it is becoming clear that China is creating a new alternative to the
United States and it might be possible that in the future the world will have two superpowers
engaging in a proxy war, as we saw during the Cold War.
Israel
Top Shelf – Middle East Stability
U.S.-Israel alliance key to overall foreign policy objectives in the Middle East
Zeidman chairman of the Council for a Secure America 5-15-19 (Fred, “Israel
needs bipartisan support,” https://thehill.com/opinion/international/443798israel-needs-bipartisan-support, ME)
The Middle East grows more and more volatile each day. Israel emerged from a contentious election, Hamas
launched rockets against Israel and the Israeli army responded with lethal force, President Trump ordered a carrier group to the
Persian Gulf, and Iran announced it would not comply with the nuclear agreement that contained its capacity to make bombs. All of
these events happened in May, and the month is only half over. The latest agitation was a statement over the weekend by
Democratic Representative Rashida Tlaib of Michigan. “There is kind of a calming feeling I always tell folks when I think of the
Holocaust,” she said before claiming that Palestinians suffered “in the name of trying to create a safe haven for Jews.” This is a
repugnantly tone deaf and woefully contorted version of history. It is also a grave disservice to the vast majority of Republicans and
Democrats in Congress who profoundly disagree. One of us is a conservative Republican fundraiser and a Bush appointee, and the
other was chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. While we disagree on many issues, we are in complete
and total agreement about continuing support for the relationship with Israel, which is
a vital tenet of United States
foreign policy in an increasingly unstable world. While we may have disagreements with various facets of Israeli
policy, now is not the time to allow this critical alliance to erode. Geopolitics in and near the Middle East is as
stable as a river rapid. Turkey was once a dependable ally, but has turned against our interests and fundamental
democratic norms. Syria is increasingly becoming a platform for the Russian military. Iran funds and
supports terrorism in the region. As the Middle East has been evolving through a multitude of leaders and movements
from Pan Arabism to the Arab Spring, the support that Israel has for the United States has remained steadfast. That is not to say the
relationship has always been in perfect harmony. There was the clash over settlements in the 1990s between President George H.W.
Bush and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir that resulted in the United States placing billions of dollars in loan guarantees on hold. The
address by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Congress four years ago bypassed President Obama and rankled many
Democrats. The seeming drift from a two state solution further strains our alliance. Despite these disagreements with some
elements of Israeli policy, one ideal that has remained paramount is that the
alliance with Israel is vital to protecting
American interests. This is why we need to occasionally step back and remind ourselves of the basics. A strong ally in
the war on terror, intelligence cooperation with Israel is unparalleled. The only democracy in the region,
Israel has an exemplary record of human rights that celebrates due process. Its judicial system has investigated,
prosecuted, and jailed its own leaders. While Israel proudly identifies as a Jewish state, it is not a theocracy and the Knesset remains
a vibrant and often chaotic example of the diverse Israeli parliamentary system. Arab party members, left wing supporters, and right
wing settlers all sit in the same Knesset chamber. Israel is torn by the same social upheaval as other nations, but remains a
flourishing democracy that promotes civil and religious liberties for all of its citizens. Women have served in major leadership roles,
including prime minister, foreign minister, and Supreme Court chief, among other senior roles in government. While its neighbors
have actively persecuted and threatened death to its homosexual citizens, Israel still remains the only LGBTQ friendly country in the
Middle East. In fact, one would be hard pressed to find a more LGBTQ friendly environment than Tel Aviv, where the annual Gay
Pride Parade rivals that of Dupont Circle or New York City. Presidents and prime ministers come and go. Disagreements flare and
subside. But today, global
affairs spin with centrifugal force, uprooting long established norms and assumptions.
Certain things must center us. The alliance between the United States and Israel is one. On this issue,
there is no disagreement between this Republican and this Democrat.
Links
Foreign Sales are Israeli Blackmail – the plan removes the stick that keeps
Israeli nuclear ambiguity
Smith ’19 (Grant, “U.S. Foreign Aid and the Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program,”
May, Middle East Affairs, May 2019, pp. 26-30, available online at
https://www.wrmea.org/2019-may/u.s.-foreign-aid-and-the-israeli-nuclearweapons-program.html ME)
Grant F. Smith: I haven’t had a chance to introduce the Institute for Research: Middle Eastern Policy, co-organizer of this conference.
We’re an organization that began doing Middle East policy research in 2002. As part of that research, we did keep running into the
Israel lobby and its multiple policies and programs. So the Institute for Research has three core programs, many of which focus on
the lobby. The first one of those programs is Freedom of Information Act [FOIA] requests. The Freedom of Information Act is in a
period right now where any real bona fide effort is going to require a lawsuit to complete. We have multiple lawsuits going on at any
single time, but the purpose of Freedom of Information Act lawsuits is really to ferret out information that the government has kept
secret about Middle East policymaking that Americans should know. So our second major program, as Delinda mentioned at the top
of the hour, is our effort to do public opinion polling that asks, in many cases, questions that the mainstream pollsters, whether
Gallup or Pew or Rasmussen, do not ask about U.S. Middle East policy. There’s a huge wide range of questions that they will never
ask about U.S. foreign aid, about what they think about Middle East nuclear proliferation. So what we’ve done with our polling is—
using the Google surveys platform, which is a representative polling process that costs money—attempt to ask questions and track
Gallup, in particular, which has, even within the polling world, many polls about the Middle East that are extreme outliers with even
other pollsters like Pew Research, but certainly with our polling. Finally, we put together research reports and the data we’ve
gathered through FOIA and polling results and other sources to publish policy research. It often appears online at Antiwar.com. It’s
published by the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. And we think that this research that we’ve been performing has
potential to reduce a lot of the enormous waste and misdirected efforts and huge opportunity costs that we’ve been paying as a
nation. So today, I’d like to talk about the Israeli nuclear weapons program. It’s a topic that is of interest because, back
in the 1960s, as Professor Hixson mentioned this morning, the United States correctly opposed the Israelis going nuclear.
Nevertheless, the U.S. effort to make non-proliferation a key policy goal was undermined—I call it
supplanted. So we’re going to go through a few details about that, because everybody in this room, everybody watching this in one
way or another, has paid a price as U.S. obligations under treaty and our own Arms Export Control Act have been systematically
undermined for 50 years. And so, what we need to understand is that the
root cause of this undermining leads
directly to the Israel lobby. They want you to pay. They want you to continue paying. But they would prefer that
you do not know what is going on, so it can continue indefinitely. I’m going to basically base a lot of the
points I’m making on three concurrent lawsuits that are happening right now in DC District Court. One of them is about obtaining
the entire black budget from U.S. foreign aid to Israel which is very large, but never disclosed. The other is to expose a new gag order
that came out in 2012 which bans all U.S. federal workers and contractors from discussing the Israeli nuclear weapons program.
Finally, a newly unearthed part of nuclear
ambiguity policy, which are secret letters signed by presidents
promising, in effect, to violate NPT and our arms export control regime. Professor Hixson already mentioned
this this morning: This era in the 1960s, at the end of it, where the policy goals of the entire U.S. policymaking community for the
Israeli nuclear weapons program were to compel Israel to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to uphold U.S. obligations under
that treaty, withhold the sale of nuclear delivery-capable Phantom jets from Israel that they wanted to buy, and compel the Israelis
to dismantle their Dimona nuclear weapons facility. Their consensus, as stated in a memo compiled by National Security Adviser
Henry Kissinger, was to avert a disaster in terms of the peace process. They felt that nuclear
weapons would “sharply
reduce the chances for any peace settlement in the future”—and, boy, were they ever right. Israeli policy
goals were to buy those nuclear-capable jet fighters, to maintain their Dimona facility, and to get the United States to enter
into an Israeli-contrived policy of forever being ambiguous about whether they did or did not
have a nuclear weapons program. And so, these two policy objectives were fundamentally opposed, and the United
States decision factors really rotated around the Nixon assessment of the Israel lobby’s ability to mount pressure upon them. Henry
Kissinger noted that if they made public the fact that they were going to base sales of these jets on the nuclear program, that an
enormous pressure would be mounted on them by the lobby. Previous presidents, as Professor Hixson had alluded to, had already
collapsed under this very same pressure, that they couldn’t pressure the Israelis without immediately having U.S.-based groups
come to them and say, “you can’t do this.” So, there was another consideration within the policy compilation which they all
considered. This is something most Americans don’t know about, but there was concern because they knew that the Israelis had in
fact stolen weapons-grade uranium from the United States beginning in about 1965 from a plant in Apollo, Pennsylvania. As
Kissinger said, this is one program on which the Israelis have persistently deceived us, and may even have stolen from us.
Subsequent document releases from the CIA and FBI leave no doubt about that. But what happened ultimately was that, with all
these policy considerations out on the table, the Nixon administration nevertheless adopted an Israeli policy of nuclear ambiguity
and sold the jets in a meeting with Golda Meir on Sept. 26, 1969. Ever since, United States presidents
have, while in office,
by a policy of never confirming, denying, or talking about the Israeli nuclear
weapons programs, just as most Israeli prime ministers do not. But there were two senators who were not satisfied, and
mostly abided
made some trouble for the CIA and the National Security Council. These were Sens. Stuart Symington and John Glenn. Although in
numerous meetings with the Central Intelligence Agency they couldn’t compel any action on their part, or on the part of the NSC or
anybody else, to do anything about the diversion, they did pass an amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act, which is now part
of the Arms Export Control Act, which provides conditions that the U.S. has to follow if it ever wants to transfer foreign aid to a
nuclear weapon state that has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nevertheless, the United States has never followed
its own law. So, from our standpoint as Freedom of Information Act users, we hit a wall every time we move to attempt to make the
Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department or any other agency release information about the Israeli nuclear weapons
program. The CIA has released things before: in 1974, they released a special national security estimate which leaves no doubt that
they know the Israelis have nuclear weapons. The Department of Defense, after fighting us in court for half a year, released a very
lengthy 1987 analysis of the Israeli nuclear development program, which included hydrogen bomb developments, which included
using U.S. resources provided under Atoms for Peace for making nuclear weapons designs. So, the U.S. government can fight these
things, but they’re [faced] with 50 years of history, 50 years of slip-ups and releasing information. There’s plenty of compelling
evidence that we’ve been able to use to convince judges that, at this point, the only possible reason that they’re still maintaining a
lot of this information under classification is that they don’t want anybody to come after them and challenge them on the laws and
the treaty that they’re breaking. So, nuclear
ambiguity has been around for so long that it requires heavy
maintenance in this day and age to maintain. New Yorker reporter Adam Entous wrote a stunning piece in June of 2018 in
which he talked about a series of letters that the Israelis have been making presidents sign since Bill Clinton in 1993
until Donald Trump more recently, in which they promise in a letter, a secret letter, that they will not compel the
Israelis to sign the NPT. They will not talk about Israel’s nuclear weapons in public. And, of course, the National Archives and
Records Administration will and is fighting not to even confirm the existence of these letters. But it is clear that they are part of
ambiguity maintenance. This ambiguity maintenance has even taken another form, in which the Obama administration, after being
very positive in talking about nuclear non-proliferation, in talking about a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East, finally
buckled to pressure and not only signed the letter, but also passed a new classification guideline which says, essentially, that any
government employee, any government contractor, that even so much as references information about the Israeli nuclear weapons
program from the public domain will be fired, prosecuted, lose their security clearance or possibly much worse. And this has already
happened to one Department of Energy employee by the name of James Doyle, who used to work at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory. James Doyle made the mistake of writing a single article called, “Why eliminate nuclear weapons?” in a magazine called
Survival, the February/March edition from 2013. James Doyle wrote the following: “Nuclear weapons did not deter Egypt and Syria
from attacking Israel in 1973, Argentina from attacking the British in the Falklands War or Iraq from attacking Israel in the 1991 Gulf
War.” Clear reference to Israel’s nukes not being a great conventional deterrent, but a congressional staffer noticed that he had
written this. That representative’s office contacted the Department of Energy, hugely dependent on Congress’ good graces for
funding. They looked at the article, which they had already reviewed for classified information. Then they retroactively classified it,
raided Doyle’s home, fired him, pulled his security clearances—and that’s how it works. So, if we look at some of the
costs of
nuclear ambiguity policy, one way to do that is to look at all of the foreign aid that’s been given since
Symington and Glenn first managed to pass their restrictions of foreign aid to non-NPT states. If you look at the aid figures—
which are never given in inflation-adjusted terms—that foreign aid since 1949 has now surpassed $260.9 billion—and again, this
does not include any of the black budget aid, which we still haven’t been able to release. That’s far
more than the United
States spent rebuilding Europe under the Marshall Plan. It’s far more aid than given to any other
foreign country. It’s interesting, then, to take a data cut of that aid and see that 85 percent of that foreign aid has been given
to Israel since the Symington and Glenn amendments became law in 1976. So by law, none of that almost quarter-billion dollars
should have been allowed absent some Arms Export Control Act compliance and absent some Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
compliance. If you look at how much aid has been given since President Clinton, President George W. Bush, President Obama,
President Trump, acquiesced to signing new pledges to Israel to promise to ignore their weapons, to promise to ignore the NPT and
U.S. law, the amount is $99.9 billion. Let’s round it up to a hundred. Israel’s demands have another component. This, again, goes
back to the concerns expressed in the report about adopting nuclear ambiguity in the first place. That is, the cleanup of the toxic
waste site left by the plant that Henry Kissinger referred to. The Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation [NUMEC] was, as the
CIA once said, an Israeli operation from the beginning. Yet because the NUMEC diversion information gathered by the CIA, gathered
by the FBI, gathered by other parties, has never fully been released, the cleanup cost and the blame for this toxic waste left by this
underfunded plant have been shifted on to other parties. The FBI has documents indicating that they know that underfunding and
shoddy treatment of protocols on waste handling contributed to the toxic pollution in Apollo, Pennsylvania, because they had
wiretaps on the plant owners talking about the results of the toxic spill in which they were sending unprotected workers to go make
cleanups—but the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is estimating this $500 million toxic cleanup will have to be paid by U.S. taxpayers.
So, I think the story of nuclear
ambiguity, the cost that it transfers to U.S. taxpayers, the pretty much
illegitimate discussion that comes around nuclear non-proliferation in policy-making circles, can be traced
back to this particular nuclear ambiguity policy. But what’s interesting about it is that it’s not unique. If you look
at other policies, you can see a cycle at work: supplant, silence, and exploit. Supplanting: devise an original or supplant a policy of
the United States that benefits the United States with one that broadly benefits Israel is the supplantation stage. Silence: figure out a
way to gag or prevent stakeholders or government employees, officials, contractors, from effectively communicating about the
supplanted interest. And then exploit: compel the U.S. taxpayers, voters, businesses, others, to provide resources for Israel and the
lobby rather than the common good. So, this is taking place and has taken place in other arenas. Ali Abunimah mentioned that there
was an organization back in the 1960s called the American Zionist Council which was, in fact, ordered to register as an Israeli foreign
agent because it received funding from Israel to start up and conduct public relations. But that same organization—along with
pressure on the Justice Department—managed to supplant the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act and their desire to have open
information on the money coming in and the policies being enacted, and silenced the Justice Department through pure internal
pressure into not even releasing the registration that was finally compelled in 1962. The Justice Department held on to it until 2010.
But there’s a clear set of documents that shows that AIPAC was originally ordered, when it was operating as an unincorporated
organization inside the AZC, to comply with the FARA order and it never did. The Justice Department never did anything about it,
and they won’t even talk about it. So that exploitation is that foreign agent activities immediately resumed for the Israeli
government when AIPAC incorporated itself in 1963, just six weeks after that order. AZC’s gone, AIPAC’s been with us ever since. The
First Amendment—and this is something that we’ll be talking about more this afternoon, supplanting and conditioning the First
Amendment where it pertains to people wanting to boycott Israel over its human rights issues. The silence part of the cycle is free
speech activities, seeking peaceful change through nonviolent protests. People are now being asked to sign waivers and pledges that
they will not engage in that speech activity. The exploitation basically is that if you don’t sign as a government employee or
contractor in many states, now, a pledge saying that you won’t boycott Israel, then all those revenues and opportunities are going to
go to others more willing to prioritize Israel’s policy objectives. This has happened in weapons smuggling. Telogy is a recent example
of Tektronix oscilloscopes being shipped to Israel for their nuclear weapons program. They were able to simply get a slap on the
wrist for an export violation. But it’s been going on since the very first Neutrality Act violations in the 1940s, where there was a
major Israeli weapon smuggling ring in the United State. Some people called it the Haganah smuggling ring, others call it other
things, but it was able to move a large number of conventional weapons out of this country to Israel with almost no criminal
prosecutions. What I’m hoping our friends from the Virginia Coalition for Human Rights will talk about this afternoon is another case
of supplant, silence, and exploit called the replacing textbook histories in the K-12 education system with what’s essentially the
Israeli government line on territory, settlements and other things, in order to spread a line of government propaganda, basically
through the textbooks. So I’m not going into that. But I can express some hope in the sense that Americans are increasingly, if you
ask them the right question, increasingly interested in seeing more proper regulation and governance in questions like this. A poll we
conducted in August of 2018 asked Americans whether—given the fact that Arms Export Control Act laws that govern foreign aid to
countries with nuclear weapons programs that haven’t signed the NPT, and the fact that Israel has not signed the NPT—should those
laws be enforced, 54.8 percent said yes. So this is material, raw material. Someone just asked me before this, how do we contact
these people? Well, that’s the work at hand, but raw material for building more representative rule of law governance in this
country. People are clearly out there who are willing to and eager to see some of these things enforced. So signs of hope are
certainly that Americans are becoming better informed about some of the things the lobby has been doing. Hopefully, they can
grasp, if they have the spectacles of supplant, silence, and exploit, they might be able to see something going on in their states or
community. Courts are beginning to play a slightly more aggressive and productive role in allowing people to question these things
using our legal system, and Martin McMahon and Saqib Ali will talk about that. Some members of Congress are obviously
demonstrating that they’d like to see more popular action. Most importantly, the institutionalization of groups who know something
about what’s been going on and are willing to take some action is my biggest hope. My biggest hope is seeing some of the groups,
particularly that come to this conference year after year, and hearing about their work attacking the silence, which is the weakest
point of the cycle and the one that we have the best chance of prevailing against as organizations, activists, and people willing to
take more of a leadership role in confronting these abuses. Thank you. Questions & Answers Dale Sprusansky: Thank you very much.
We have a couple of minutes for questions here. So if you have any questions out there, please feel free to give them to someone
collecting them so they can send them up to me. We have a couple of questions on the relationship between South Africa—
apartheid South Africa—and Israel, and so the question is: What was the collaboration between Israel and apartheid South Africa to
develop nuclear weapons? Grant Smith: Right, so someone noticed I skipped a couple of slides in this presentation. What the 1974
CIA special report talking about Israel’s nuclear weapons most feared was collaboration with South Africa and Taiwan. The Israelis
did in fact sign a contract with [South African Prime Minister] P.W. Botha to sell them nuclear-tipped missiles, Jericho missiles. Sasha
Polakow-Suransky wrote an entire book about that after he obtained the documents from the post-apartheid government. Most
people who are doing credible work on nuclear non-proliferation believe that the so-called Vela flash in the Indian Ocean in 1979
was an Israeli nuclear test with South Africa. So, yes, we can do an entire day-long conference, and I hope someday we can, about
the Israeli nuclear weapons program and just how much information there is out there about it. But the U.S. ignores, it will not
accept officially, that the Vela flash was an Israeli nuclear test. They don’t accept the authenticity of the South African government
document release that there was an attempted sale of turnkey weapons systems to the apartheid regime. So just another example
of your government at work under a supplanted policy of nuclear ambiguity. Dale Sprusansky: Very good. Another question here:
What can you say about President Carter’s divulgence of Israel’s nuclear weapons in 2008 and the aftermath? Grant Smith: Yeah, I
can say something about that. A judge won’t accept that. A judge will say, well, Carter wasn’t in office, so that’s not really an
authoritative official statement. We’re sorry, IRmep, nice try, but we’re not going to release information based on the premise that
it’s already official that presidents have acknowledged a nuclear weapons program. Is Sam Husseini in the audience? Well, Sam
Husseini is a reporter for the Institute for Public Accuracy who has done videos of major political figures in power—Condoleezza
Rice, Dick Cheney—all running away from him and his camera crew when asked “Excuse me, sir, does Israel have nuclear weapons?”
You would not believe the circumlocutions that you see these people go through when Sam Husseini traps them with his camera. So
it doesn’t matter, unfortunately. Dale Sprusansky: We have someone wondering what
leverage does Israel use to
compel U.S. presidents to sign the letters that you discussed? Grant Smith: Right. According to the story, these
nuclear ambiguity maintenance letters come at the worst possible moment. For President Trump, it was as he was
facing the ouster of a general and dealing with all sorts of startup conflicts, and suddenly Dan Meridor of the [Israeli] Embassy shows
up with a letter, saying, well, you have to sign this, Mr. President, because every other president three times before you signed them
and you have to do it. You have to give us this guarantee that you will not be as spontaneous with us as you are in a lot of things. So
he signed it. Apparently, they were angered by it within the administration. They felt undue pressure. They felt like this was out of
line. But they signed it.
Arms sales key to the alliance
Mandell ’17 (Ariane, “US approves possible $440 million arms sale to Israel,”
April 29, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/USapproves-possible-440-million-arms-sale-to-Israel-489299, ME)
The State Department approved a “Possible Foreign Military Sale” to Israel, according to a Defense Security Cooperation Agency
press release published on Friday. The agency said that the Israeli government requested to purchase 13 76-mm. naval guns, as well
as a variety of naval maintenance materials and tools, technical, logistics and support services, operations and maintenance training
and other related supplies and services. The estimated cost of such a deal is $440 million. “The
United States is committed
to the security of Israel,” said the press release. “And it is vital to US national interests to assist Israel to develop and
maintain a strong and ready self-defense capability... This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign
policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a strategic regional partner that has been, and
continues to be, an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.” In terms of specifics, the agency
said the equipment “will
improve Israel’s capability to meet current and future threats in the defense of
its borders and territorial waters. The naval guns will be installed on Israeli Navy Sa’ar-4.5 and Sa’ar-6 missile patrol
boats. One gun will be located at an Israeli naval training center to be used for training maintenance personnel.” In September,
Israel and the US signed a defense agreement worth $38 billion over 10 years, the largest such pledge in American history, which
was hailed by both countries as a cornerstone of their alliance. The deal incorporates several budget lines
that have previously been negotiated and approved by Congress each year, and requires Israel to abide by these terms over the
course of the next decade, through 2029, without further lobbying of the US legislature for additional funds. Israel will receive $3.1b.
in foreign military financing this fiscal year, followed by $3.3b. in subsequent years, plus $500 million designated to missile defense.
Israel will return any money Congress may allocate in its 2017-2018 budget for Israel beyond the $3.1b., acting National Security
Adviser Ya’acov Nagel, who negotiated the deal on Israel’s behalf, said. At the time of the signing, then-US president Barack Obama
praised the agreement as an example of his “unshakable” commitment to the Jewish state. “For as long
as the State of Israel has existed, the United States has been Israel’s greatest friend and partner, a fact underscored again today,” he
said.
Internal Link – Samson Option
Arms Sales key to prevent the Samson Option
Sagir ’18 (Dan, “From Nixon to Trump, America Has Always Backed a Nuclear
Israel. This Is Why,” July 8, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-eastnews/.premium-from-nixon-to-trump-america-has-backed-a-nuclear-israelthis-is-why-1.6247109, ME)
Since the early 1990s, Israel has been asking incoming American presidents, including President Donald Trump, to sign off on
letters continuing their predecessors’ policy regarding Israel's nuclear status, as the New Yorker recently revealed. The secret letters
state that
the U.S. will not press Israel to give up its nuclear weapons so long as it faces existential
threats in the Middle East These secret understandings were a major enabling factor behind Israel’s unique nuclear
strategy. Behind the thin veneer of nuclear ambiguity, Israel, with American support, became, according to foreign
sources, regional nuclear power. Israel’s practice of seeking presidential letters on its nuclear capacities is anachronistic and
ludicrous, as Avner Cohen has argued ("Time for Israel to Drop Nuclear Ambiguity"): "...Almost 50 years after the original
understandings, Israel’s nuclear capability – declared or not – is a solid fact recognized by all...[Israel no longer needs] a presidential
piece of paper to confirm this...The time has come for post-ambiguity." I agree with Cohen's conclusion, but for entirely different
reasons. For many years now ambiguity
has not been the most important issue in Israel-U.S. nuclear
relations. Israel’s nuclear ambiguity was originally a compromise offered to then-U.S. President Richard Nixon and his national
security adviser Henry Kissinger, in order to end clashes with Washington over Israel’s nuclear program. Paradoxically, however,
ambiguity evolved into a diplomatic fiction that also proved to be a top Israeli strategic asset.
Israel became a nuclear state, but without having to pay the heavy political price. It's worth reviewing
the milestones over the past half-century that attest to America's full commitment to Israel on the nuclear issue and how Israel's
nuclear status has bolstered its relationship with America – a commitment that obviates the need for these official letters of
confirmation. In the late 1960's, Israel’s nuclear status allowed it to abandon its pursuit of an official alliance with the U.S.: Israel’s
leadership felt that the country had been left to its fate during the 1967 crisis. The Johnson administration did not meet the 1957
commitment by U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower to ensure that the Straits of Tiran would remain open for shipping, which was a
causus belli for Israel. Against this background, Israeli decision-makers set their sights on strategic depth and nuclear capability;
official American security guarantees were perceived as a poor substitute. The
consent Israel received from the Nixon
an alleged undeclared nuclear state effectively obviated the need for
official American guarantees for Israel’s survival. In the early 1970's, Israel's nuclear status triggered
the U.S. to supply it advanced conventional weapons: Israel’s alleged nuclear capabilities
became, paradoxically, a kind of "incentive" for the U.S. government to supply Israel with state-ofthe-art conventional arms, in order to prevent a weakened Israel from being forced to communicate
nuclear threats or abandon its ambiguity. The connection between the American conventional
weapons supply and Israel’s alleged nuclear capability came to the fore during and after the Yom Kippur War
administration in 1969 for its status as
in 1973. In the 1990-91 Iraq war, Israel's nuclear status was leverage for the U.S. against Iraq: The U.S.-Iraq crisis that followed Iraq’s
1990 invasion of Kuwait had far-reaching consequences in terms of the U.S. approach to Israel’s nuclear status. Responding to
Saddam Hussein’s threat to launch chemical warheads at Israel – even though Israel was not part of the U.S.-led anti-Iraq coalition –
Israel and the U.S. conveyed harsh deterrence signals to Baghdad during the 1990-1991 crisis and war. The most significant incident
was a wartime CNN interview given by then-Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, in which Cheney warned Iraq that Israel might
respond with unconventional weapons should Iraq fire chemical weapons at it. Cheney’s statement was
a quantum leap in
terms of the U.S. government’s attitude toward Israel’s nuclear posture. For the first time in the history of
the two nations, the U.S. transmitted an obvious deterrence signal to Iraq based on Israel’s nuclear capability. The U.S. has backed
Israel's alleged Mideast nuclear monopoly: Israel’s efforts to ensure that no Arab or Muslim country in the region obtains nuclear
weapons, referred to as the Begin Doctrine, were at first supported silently by the U.S., and later largely became joint policy. The
Reagan administration, surprised by Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, confined itself to half-hearted protests and
a minor delay in supplying arms. Following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the U.S. led an effort to divest Iraq of its weapons of mass
destruction, ultimately toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime. Another example was the discovery of a nuclear facility in eastern Syria in
2007. Israel shared this surprising and disturbing information with the American government and proposed a military strike. For
domestic political reasons the White House preferred that Israel carry out the strike, and it did, as then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
revealed this year. In the 1980s, the U.S. backed Israel against campaigns for a denuclearized Mideast: The international effort led by
Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone posed a thorny dilemma for the
U.S. and Israel. The campaign, which centered around the demand that Israel sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), peaked during the 1995 NPT Review Conference. The initiative was consistent with U.S. policy favoring nuclear nonproliferation, yet it would mean dismantling Israel’s nuclear arsenal. The
U.S., under Clinton, helped Israel withstand
pressure to sign the NPT. Against this background Israel began to request letters of commitment from all
incoming U.S. presidents to help it maintain its nuclear status. The campaign to halt Iran’s nuclear program: A
variety of efforts to halt the Iranian nuclear program have been underway for the past two decades. Intelligence, securityoperational, and political coordination between Israel and the U.S. on the Iranian issue have been maintained at very high levels. It is
clearly in Israel’s interest that the U.S. lead the campaign against Tehran, but under the Obama administration there was fierce
disagreement between Israeli and American leaders regarding the policy and strategy by which Iran’s nuclear program should be
stopped. The most striking reflection of the depth of American support for Israel’s nuclear capability was the fact that, even during
the bitter discord over the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, neither the Obama nor any administration spokespeople resorted to
mentioning longtime U.S. support for Israel’s exclusive nuclear capability. The only ones who publicly called attention to Israeli
"hypocrisy" or American double standards were the Iranians. Israeli nuclear concerns currently revolve around the latter two issues.
Israel fears a nuclear Iran, the creation of a regional balance of terror vis-a-vis Tehran, and its regional political ramifications. Israel
also harbors concerns about pressure to dismantle its alleged nuclear capability as part of a wider call for Mideast nuclear
disarmament. Israeli decision-makers consider these two issues intertwined. So long as the danger of Iran becoming a nuclear state
still exists, it is easy for Israel to reject the idea of a Mideast nuclear weapon-free zone, with support from the U.S., Europe, and even
from the Sunni Arab nations. Given the close Israel-U.S. alignment on Israel’s nuclear status, Israel’s request for a secret letter of
commitment from President Trump indeed seems anachronistic and redundant. Today’s Israel
is a responsible Western
long as no
nation like France and the U.K., who have an independent nuclear deterrence to safeguard their existence. So
change occurs in the nuclear world order that would cause first-generation and second-generation nuclear states – the latter
of which according to foreign sources includes Israel - to gradually dismantle their nuclear arsenals, it is hard to imagine
Israel doing so in response to international pressure. And that includes pressure from the U.S. itself.
! – Turkey
U.S.-Israeli arms cooperation key to contain Iran and Turkey
Shufutinsky Master’s in International Peace and Conflict Resolution 4-30-19
(Dmitri, “US and Israel Should Help Craft Regional Policy to Contain Turkey’s
Erdogan,” https://www.algemeiner.com/2019/04/30/us-and-israel-shouldhelp-craft-regional-policy-to-contain-turkeys-erdogan/, ME)
Turkey poses a long-term threat to the security of the Middle East. Containing neo-Ottomanism
requires a defensive policy that integrates Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and the Kurds into a regional alliance. A new
era has dawned in the northern Levant. The Republic of Turkey has left behind its Kemalist, secular foundations in pursuit of Islamist,
authoritarian governance. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), headed by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has alienated the
US, Israel, and the EU, and abandoned the country’s pro-Western and NATO credentials. The AKP has adopted a neo-Ottoman policy
of imperialism, seeking to usurp the position of “leader of the Muslim World” from Saudi Arabia. In colonial language reminiscent of
Mussolini’s fascist Italy, Erdogan
has threatened to conquer the Greek Isles, Cyprus, and the Levant. And
he has taken concrete steps towards advancing this vision, despite alienating European and Arab allies. Some
analysts have called for maintaining ties with Turkey in the hope that the AKP government will fall and relations with a more
moderate leader can resume. But this is wishful thinking. Despite poor showings in local elections and a recent poor economic
performance, ultra-nationalist and neo-fascist organizations like the Grey Wolves have been emboldened since the AKP’s rise. The
AKP has also sought to Islamize the still-secular North Cyprus, turning the conflict from an ethno-national one into a religious one.
Ankara has hopes of changing the peace process in Cyprus from one of reunion with equal rights, to a two-state solution. This would
be the pretext for an eventual annexation of the island (or at least its northern portion). Given
Ankara’s increasing
interference in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean, it is necessary to build and strengthen a
multilateral mechanism among the region’s most affected states and “statelets” to contain it. The US is already providing
major support to both the Kurds in Syria and the burgeoning “Axis of Antiquity” of Greece, Israel, and the Republic of Cyprus. The
Kurds and the eastern Mediterranean coalition have a common interest in challenging Erdogan’s
hegemonic ambitions and protecting their sovereignty. These actors — perhaps with guidance from
Washington — must iron out a cohesive plan to make it happen. Turkey’s decision to buy the S-400 missile
defense system from Russia at the expense of Washington’s F-35s has angered the US, to the point of threatening sanctions. Last
summer, the US damaged Ankara’s economy with tariffs and threatened sanctions if it attacked the Kurds in Syria. The Syrian Kurds
are floating the idea of diplomacy with Turkey if it stops occupying the enclave of Afrin — but without it, they say, there
will be
war. Meanwhile, Athens has expressed interest in acquiring F-35 fighter jets. Greece’s military is inferior to that of Turkey, and F35s would provide a valuable deterrent to prevent further violations of airspace. With that said, Greece would have to make the
purchase at a relatively low price, given its economic situation. Washington should consider a Greek F-35 sale at a discount, on
condition that they also be used to protect Cypriot airspace in the event of Turkish military provocation on the island. Greece
already has Patriot missiles. To further deter Turkey, the US should consider stationing THAAD missiles in
Crete, where the US maintains a military base. It should also seriously consider pressing Britain to allow Patriot and THAAD missile
defense systems to be placed at its Akrotiri and Dhekelia military bases in Cyprus. Greece is building a
joint radar system on
Crete with the Israelis, that is possibly aimed at monitoring Turkish aggression. Israel should consider placing
Arrow, Iron Dome, and David’s Sling systems near the Crete radar installation to ensure its protection, and consider selling the
systems to Nicosia as well to prevent a Turkish attack. These systems would be extremely valuable in view of Turkish
aggression aimed at gas exploration in Cyprus. The Cyprus gas project is critical to Israel’s economic and diplomatic interests in the
coming decades, and must be protected at all costs. The defensive nature of these
weapons systems should nullify
any possible Turkish diplomatic criticism of “militarization” of the northern Levant. Meanwhile, as the
Kurds increasingly consolidate their power in northern Syria, the US and Israel should look to mediate a possible
peace agreement or cooperation mechanism between Iraqi Kurdistan and Rojava (Kurdish Syria).
While the primary goal of the Kurdish fighters is aimed at counterinsurgency against the remnants of jihadists, these forces will also
need the capability to deter Turkey and Iran’s “axis of resistance” should diplomacy fail. The
US and Israel should
consider deploying Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, THAAD, and Patriot missile systems in the
broader Kurdish region, under the full control of Washington and Jerusalem. These systems
would protect the Kurds from missile attacks, such as those previously launched by Iran. They would
also protect Israel, regional Arab allies, and US military bases in the region, which may be more
vulnerable to attack after the US’ designation of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a
terror group. More can be done to integrate the Kurds and Israelis into the greater energy scheme in the eastern
Mediterranean. Israel has oil in the Negev, the Meged oil field, and the Golan. Jerusalem could easily replace Tehran when it comes
to supplying oil to Greece and Italy, both of which secured waivers from Washington when sanctions on Iran were resumed last year.
This would further tighten Israel’s alliance with Athens and the new right-wing government in Rome. Kurds in the
northern portions of Syria and Iraq also control vast oil sources and are selling it to stimulate the local economy. Adding Kurdish and
Israeli oil — even if only temporarily — to the energy pipelines being built from the Mediterranean to southern Europe would enrich
Israel, stabilize Kurdistan, and give the Kurds and Israelis more regional clout. Doing so would also undermine European excuses that
they must continue buying oil from Iran or Arab dictatorships in the Gulf. A
coalition of this kind in the eastern
Mediterranean and northern Levant would allow for greater US involvement in the region, which would
help to ensure a successful outcome while shoring up the regional economy. This would
contribute toward regional stability, wean Europe off “autocratic oil,” and contain Ankara’s neoOttoman aspirations in the region through purely defensive means. It would also foster “local multilateralism”
without resorting to the bloated and ineffective approach of the EU, UN, and Arab League.
! – Iran
Israel-Iran conflict escalates – timeframe is quick
David Wainer, Donna Abu-Nasr , and Henry Meyer, 5-2-18, Bloomberg staff writers, “Israel
and Iran on Path to War as Mideast Tinderbox Awaits Spark”
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-03/israel-sees-iran-war-looming-asmideast-tinderbox-awaits-a-spark
There have been coups and revolutions, external invasions and proxy conflicts, but the Middle
East hasn’t seen a head-tohead war between major regional powers since the 1980s. There’s a growing risk that one is about
to break out in Syria, pitting Israel against Iran. The Islamic Republic’s forces are entrenching there, after joining
the fight to prop up President Bashar al-Assad. The Jewish state, perceiving a direct threat on its border, is subjecting them to an
escalating barrage of airstrikes. Nobody expects those strikes to go unanswered. The
path to escalation is clear, and
the rhetoric is apocalyptic. “We will demolish every site where we see an Iranian attempt to position itself,’’ Israel’s Defense
Minister Avigdor Liberman told the London-based Saudi newspaper Elaph, adding that the Iranian regime is “living its final days.’’ In
Tehran, Hossein Salami, deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards, said that “100,000 missiles are ready to fly’’ in Israel’s
direction, and warned they could bring about its “annihilation and collapse.’’ Light a Match Iran
and Israel have been
exchanging threats for decades. What’s different now is that Syria’s civil war, which sucked in
both countries, provides a potential battlespace -- one that’s much closer to Jerusalem than to
Tehran. Israeli officials say there are 80,000 fighters in Syria who take orders from Iran. As they help Assad
recapture territory, militiamen from Hezbollah have deployed within a few kilometers of the Golan Heights on
Israel’s border. Iran has vowed to avenge its citizens killed by the Israeli airstrikes, and it has plenty of
options for doing so. It’s a tinderbox, says Ofer Shelach, a member of the foreign affairs and defense committee in Israel’s
parliament. “I’m worried about the possibility that a match ignited in the Golan will light up a war going all the way to the sea.’’ Even
more troubling is the absence of firefighters. Israelis lament that Washington has become a bit-part player, unable to impose a
Syrian settlement that would guarantee its ally’s security. Absent that, “we can only represent our interests through force,’’ Shelach
says. Asked about Israel-Iran tensions at a press briefing on Thursday, Pentagon spokeswoman Dana White said the U.S. is
concerned by Iranian
actions that “destabilize the region,” including through its proxy Hezbollah.
“Wherever Iran is, chaos follows,” she said. Able or Willing Far from tamping down tensions, President Donald Trump -–
egged on by Israel –- has been ramping them up. By threatening to withdraw next week from the international agreement to curb
Iran’s nuclear program, he’s added another volatile element to the regional mix. The only power with channels open to both sides,
and the clout to play mediator, is Russia. President Vladimir Putin’s intervention in 2015 to shore up Assad has left Russia as the
strongest actor in Syria. Putin is seeking to impose a peace that would lock in his political gains, so he has every interest in averting
any spread of the war. But that doesn’t mean he’s able or willing to rein in Iran. While
Russia has cordial ties with Israel,
they’re likely outweighed by the confluence of interests with the Islamic Republic, whose ground forces
were crucial to the success of Putin’s Syrian gambit. Repeatedly threatened with attack or regime-change by its
enemies, Iran sees the sympathetic governments in Damascus and Beirut as providing strategic depth. ‘Unstable, Unmanaged’ Now,
the Iranians in Syria have graduated from helping Assad to “building their strategic presence against Israel,’’ said Paul Salem, senior
vice president at the Middle East Institute in Washington. “It
appears that neither the Russians nor the Assad
regime are in control or can limit these things,’’ he said. “The situation is highly unstable and highly
unmanaged.’’ One test of Russia’s ability to manage it may come in southern Syria, where Islamic State and other jihadists and
rebels still hold territory near Israel’s border -- enclaves that are among the likely next targets for Assad’s advancing army. “Before
they do that, the Russians need to have an arrangement with the Israelis,’’ said Yuri Barmin, a Middle East expert at the Russian
International Affairs Council, which advises the Kremlin. Russia is “willing to negotiate on the issue of Iran and Iran’s presence’’ in
those regions, he said. ‘It’s Shortsighted’ That may not be enough to meet Israeli concerns, which extend far beyond the border.
Earlier in the Syrian conflict, Israel’s airstrikes typically aimed to destroy weapons convoys bound for Hezbollah in Lebanon. There’s
been a significant change. Two strikes in the past month -– widely attributed to Israel, though the Jewish state doesn’t comment on
such matters –- targeted permanent infrastructure used by Iran’s forces. Both took place deep inside Syrian territory. “It’s
shortsighted to look at it in terms of how many kilometers from the border Iran is sitting,’’ said Amos Gilad, who recently stepped
down as director of political-military affairs at Israel’s Defense Ministry. “Iran
cannot be allowed to base themselves
militarily in Syria. And Israel is fully determined to prevent that.’’ To be sure, the goal could be achieved
without a full-blown war. Salem, at the Middle East Institute, says the likeliest outcome is that Israel and Iran will avoid a conflict
that neither really wants -- though he says the risk that they’ll end up fighting is higher than at any time since the Israel-Hezbollah
war in 2006. And although hostilities have effectively begun with the airstrikes, many analysts say that they can be contained to
Syria -– where Israel and Iran can square off without their allies necessarily being drawn into the fight. ‘Never!’ “Never!’’ said
Liberman, when asked if clashes with Iran could lead to clashes with Russia. “There will be no confrontation with them.’’ In Beirut,
Sami Nader of the Levant Institute for Strategic Studies said that Russia may not oppose an Israeli attack on Iranian positions in Syria,
provided it doesn’t threaten to topple the Assad regime that is “the Russians’ main card at the negotiating table.” Barmin, the
Kremlin adviser, said there’s plenty of daylight between the “diverging interests” of Russia and Iran. So
far, Russia’s
response to Israeli airstrikes has been muted. But after the U.S. bombed Syrian targets last month, to punish
Assad for an alleged chemical attack, Russian officials said they may deliver state-of-the-art S-300 missile
defense systems to Syria. That would pose new risks for the Israeli air force -– and increase the
chance of a flashpoint. Israel’s parliament this week passed a law empowering the prime minister and defense to declare
war without wider Cabinet approval in “extreme circumstances.” Half a century ago, Israel launched a surprise attack against its Arab
enemies. A few years later, in 1973, the tables were turned. In both cases, one of the combatants consciously opted for war. But
that’s not how Israel’s more recent conflicts have started, says Shelach. “It always happened because the situation escalated,
deteriorated, without any of the sides making a decision.’’ And that’s the
risk he sees now, with no obvious off-
ramp.
War with Iran goes global and nuclear.
Avery 13 – (11/6, John Scales, Lektor Emeritus, Associate Professor, at the Department of
Chemistry, University of Copenhagen, Contact Person in Denmark for Pugwash Conferences on
Science and World Affairs and received the Nobel Peace Prize for his work, Member of the
Danish Peace Commission of 1998, former Technical Advisor, World Health Organization,
Regional Office for Europe , former Chairman of the Danish Peace Academy, PhD in Theoretical
Chemistry and MSc in Theoretical Physics, “An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global
Nuclear War,” http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm)
As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal
disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a
danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that
is already deep in problems.
Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus
introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also
be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause
The unstable government of
the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy.
nuclear weapons would be used, either
intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making
large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage
global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions
would result.
In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that
Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and
much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.
AT: No Impact – Miscalc
Miscalculation will definitely lead to war
Goldenberg 6/4 (Goldenberg, previously served as Iran Team Chief in the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy., June 4, 2019. “What a War With Iran Would Look Like.”
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2019-06-04/what-war-iran-would-look)
Tensions between Iran and the United States are at their highest point in years. The 2015 Iran
nuclear agreement is teetering. The Trump administration is using sanctions to strangle the Iranian economy and in May
deployed an aircraft carrier, a missile defense battery, and four bombers to the Middle East. Washington has evacuated nonessential
personnel from its embassy in Baghdad, citing intelligence
suggesting that Iran is increasingly willing to hit
U.S. targets through its military proxies abroad. The United States also stated that Iran almost certainly
perpetrated the recent damage to oil tankers flagged by Saudi Arabia, Norway, and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) and claimed that Iran had temporarily loaded missiles onto small boats in the Persian Gulf. In early May,
U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton publicly threatened a response to any Iranian attacks,
“whether by proxy, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards [sic] Corps or regular Iranian forces. “The good news is that the situation
is not as bad as it appears. None of the players—with the possible exception of Bolton—seem to really want a war.
Iran’s military strategy is to keep tensions at a low boil and avoid a direct confrontation with the United States. Washington struck a
tough public posture with its recent troop deployment, but the move was neither consequential nor terribly unusual. If the United
States were truly preparing for a war, the flow of military assets into the region would be much more dramatic. The bad
news is
that a war could still happen. Even if neither side wants to fight, miscalculation, missed signals, and the
logic of escalation could conspire to turn even a minor clash into a regional conflagration—with
devastating effects for Iran, the United States, and the Middle East.
AT: US military capacity would prevent war
Frisch 6/5 (Lappin, professor of political studies and Middle East studies at Bar-Ilan
Universityand a senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center. June 5,2019.”
https://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/1192-Iran-Is-Too-Smart-to-Go-to-WarFrisch-final.pdf, Saatvik)
There has been much belligerent rhetoric and saber-rattling between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the US of late–for example,
the announced arrival of a USAF aircraft carrier to the Gulf area. Many analysts are speculating what will happen if war breaks out
between the two. Not so fast. If
the Iranians have their way, they will make sure that tensions fall far
short of war. The leaders of Iran are certainly belligerent toward their neighbors–they clearly harbor ambitions to dominate
areas far beyond their borders, including Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen–but they are not reckless. Preying on their minds
when they contemplate the cost of war with the US, the leading military power in the world by
far, is Operation Praying Mantis, which the US Navy undertook against the navy of the Islamic Republic during the Iran-Iraq War in
April 1988. Retaliating against Iranian attacks intended to disrupt Gulf oil shipping, the US Navy –in a single day of battle –sank an
Iranian frigate, damaged another, and sank a gunboat, three speedboats, and two moving platforms at a cost of 55 Iranian lives. The
US Navy’s losses totaled two crew members of a helicopter that malfunctioned on a reconnaissance mission and crashed into the
sea. Even more nightmarish for the Iranian leaders is what transpired in 2003 with the allied conquest (led overwhelmingly by US
forces) of Iraq. The subsequent difficulties involved in staying in Iraq to rebuild the state have overshadowed one of the greatest
The US military, with minor help from allies, conquered a state
the size of Poland in less time than the German blitzkrieg of that country, at a cost of 157 lives (122 of them US
military personnel).Thousands of losses had been envisioned. The mullahs know only too well that their
military successes in the history of warfare.
forces, by
contrast, engaged the Iraqis in warfare for eight years without achieving any decisive
results. It does not require complex reasoning to deduce the likely outcome of a war with the
US. They are also fully aware that because Iran as a state is so vulnerable, the US will scarcely
need any forces on the ground to bring it to its knees. Not only is Iran dependent on one type of export to foot
government bills –oil and gas exports account for 40-60%of government revenue (depending on the
fluctuating price of energy) –but over 80%of those energy exports are shipped out of a single island
port, Khark, on the Iranian side of the Arab Gulf. It is reasonable to assume that the US is aiming cruise missiles at this threesquare mile complex. How effective will those missiles be? The answer lies in the devastating effect left by 59 missiles launched from
the USS Ross and USS Porter in the Mediterranean at the Shayrat military base in central Syria in April 2017 in retaliation for the
regime's use of chemical weapons. Should
single or successive attacks on Khark fail, the US can always
strike at Iran’s second vulnerable nodal point: Bandar Abbas, the country’s biggest port on its
southern coast. To strike at Khark is to strike at Iran’s financial lifeline; to strike at Bandar Abbas is to
strike at its imports. Nearly four-fifths of container imports of the country run through this port. These products are finished
goods –cars, trucks, apparel, electronics. These imports make the difference between living in the 21st
century and living in the 19th.And again, there would be little chance of missing the target. Damage
would be massive, if not total. Perhaps Iran’s greatest weakness is its vulnerability relative to that of the
US. While the US can devastate Iran, Iran can only punish the US’s allies, not the US itself. The few
thousand US military personnel in Qatar and Bahrain are protected by Patriot missiles, and, one can assume, underground shelters.
Given the US’s bounty in terms of shale oil and gas, the ayatollahs do not hold the oil card, as the Shah once did. And the
current
US president, at least for a period of time, would likely be relatively insensitive to European
concerns about rising energy prices. This is perhaps to be expected, as the European states were
insensitive to Trump’s concerns about Iran. In theory, Tehran could order Hezbollah to launch its massive arsenal
against Israel. Once again, from the US’s perspective, the risk would be to Israeli and not American lives. But giving Hezbollah
the green light would not be wise. Ever since the war with Hezbollah in 2006, the Israeli establishment and
(even more so) its military brass have been highly reluctant to engage in a full-scale ground
offensive in Lebanon and possibly Syria. This reluctance would dissipate in an instant, however, in a scenario involving Iranian
belligerence against both the US and Israel. Israel would feel compelled to demonstrate its allegiance with and loyalty to its
American ally. In such a situation, Israelis across the entire political spectrum would be willing to pay the human and economic price
of a full-scale offensive against Hezbollah. The likely consequence would be the destruction of Iran’s staunchest non-state ally. The
mullahs are not foolish. They will avoid war at all costs, sticking instead to the proven strategy of acting through proxies to
undermine Arab state order. This strategy will take time. Hopefully, the massive
economic hardship caused by US
sanctions will deny the regime the time it needs to achieve its goals.
Iran-US war will definitely go nuclear
Afrasiabi & Entessar 19 (Afrasiabi taught political science at the University of Tehran,
Boston University, and Bentley University and was a visiting scholar at Harvard University.
Entessar, professor and chair of the department of political science and criminal justice at the
University of South Alabama, June 4, 2019. “What a War With Iran Would Look Like.”
https://thebulletin.org/2019/06/a-nuclear-war-in-the-persian-gulf/, Saatvik)
Tensions between the United States and Iran are spiraling toward a military confrontation that
carries a real possibility that the United States will use nuclear weapons. Iran’s assortment of
asymmetrical capabilities—all constructed to be effective against the United States—nearly assures such a confrontation. The
current US nuclear posture leaves the Trump administration at least open to the use of tactical
nuclear weapons in conventional theaters. Some in the current administration may well think it
to be in the best interest of the United States to seek a quick and decisive victory in the oil hub of the
Persian Gulf—and to do so by using its nuclear arsenal. We believe there is a heightened possibility of a
US-Iran war triggering a US nuclear strike for the following reasons: The sanction regime set
against the Iranian economy is so brutal that it is likely to force Iran to take an action that will
require a US military response. Unless the United States backs down from its present self-declared “economic warfare”
against Iran, this will likely escalate to an open warfare between the two countries. In response to a White House request to draw up
an Iran war plan, the Pentagon proposed sending 120,000 soldiers to the Persian Gulf. This force would augment the several
thousands of troops already stationed in Iran’s vicinity. President Trump has also hinted that if need be, he will be sending “a lot
more” troops. Defeating Iran through conventional military means would likely require a half million US forces and US preparedness
for many casualties. The
US nuclear posture review is worded in such a way that the use of tactical
nuclear weapons in conventional theaters is envisaged, foreshadowing the concern that in a
showdown with a menacing foe like Iran, the nuclear option is on the table. The United States
could once again justify using nuclear force for the sake of a decisive victory and casualtyprevention, the logic used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Trump’s cavalier attitude toward nuclear
weapons, trigger-happy penchant, and utter disdain for Iran, show that he would likely have no
moral qualm about issuing an order to launch a limited nuclear strike, especially in a US-Iran showdown,
one in which the oil transit from the Gulf would be imperiled, impacting the global economy and necessitating a speedy end to such
a war. If the United States were to commit a limited nuclear strike against Iran, it would minimize risks to its forces in the region,
defang the Iranian military, divest the latter of preeminence in the Strait of Hormuz, and thus reassert US power in the oil hub of the
Persian Gulf. Oil flowing through the Strait of Hormuz is critical to a rising China. US control over this merchant waterway would
grant the United States significant leverage in negotiations. A limited US nuclear strike could cause a ‘regime change’ among Iranian
leadership, representing a strategic setback for Russia, in light of their recent foray in the Middle East with Iranian backing.
Undoubtedly, there are several significant negative consequences to a US use of nuclear weapons, opening the way for other
nuclear-armed states to emulate US behavior, and for many other non-nuclear weapons states to seek their own nuclear deterrent
shields. There would also be a huge outcry in the international community causing the US global image to suffer. Will such
anticipated consequences represent sufficient obstacles to prevent a limited U.S. nuclear strike on Iran? With
President
Trump, who counts on “bomb Iran” billionaire Sheldon Adelson as one of his main campaign
contributors, the threshold for using nukes certainly seems to have been lowered.
South Korea
UQ/Brink
The alliance is fragile but stable now
Freidman 5/23 [“The alliance between S.K. and the U.S. is weak, and any disturbance will
break it.” “If the United States believes that it doesn’t need an alliance with the Republic of
Korea, I would say it’s okay. If the United States doesn’t want the alliance, we don’t have to beg
for it.” It was a stunning statement to hear in Seoul from one of South Korea’s highest-ranking
officials, considering it was in regard to a nearly 70-year partnership forged by American and
Korean soldiers who fought and died together during the Korean War. And it was a sign that well
beyond South Korea, the United States’ system of alliances is buckling under pressure from
President Donald Trump’s campaign to renegotiate the terms of America’s involvement with the
world—to turn what used to be a basic tenet of U.S. grand strategy into a blunt question of
financial grand totals. Seated in his ornate chambers in April, the speaker of the National
Assembly, Moon Hee-sang, was answering my question about Trump’s demand for South Korea
to shell out more money to keep American troops in the country, and his threats to impose
tariffs on South Korean goods. The motto for the U.S.–South Korea alliance isn’t “We go
together, if I get enough money as reimbursement,” one analyst observed. The disparity
between the liberal government in Seoul and the Republican administration in Washington has
led many to predict that U.S.-South Korea relations are heading south and likely to stay there.
The last time a liberal South Korean president was paired with a conservative U.S. counterpart,
the two allies witnessed a significant rollback in relations, including a wave of angry anti-U.S.
protests in Seoul following a tragic accident in which two Korean schoolgirls were run over by a
U.S. Army personnel carrier, a gradual reduction in the size of U.S. forces on the peninsula (from
37,000 to less than 24,000), and a decision to plan the removal of U.S. Forces Korea/8th Army
headquarters from Yongsan Garrison in Seoul. Early in his term, Moon drew rebukes in U.S.
conservative circles for his suggestion that the United States could not launch a preemptive
attack against North Korea without the South’s permission. www.crs.gov, 5/2o A once strong
alliance based on the mutual strategies of defeating S.K. is now weak under the Trump
administration, so it is inevitable. South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea, or ROK) isone of
the United States’ most important strategic andeconomic partners in Asia. The U.S.-ROK Mutual
Defense Treaty, signed in 1953 at the end of the Korean War, commits the United States to help
South Korea defend itself, particularly from North Korea (officially theDemocratic People’s
Republic of Korea, or DPRK). Approximately 28,500 U.S. troops are based in the ROK,which is
included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella.” TheU.S.-ROK economic relationship is bolstered by
the U.S.- South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). SouthKorea is the United States’
seventh-largest trading partner,and the United States is South Korea’s second-largest trading
partner, behind China. After several years of close coordination, notably on North Korea,
collaboration between the United States and South Korea has become more inconsistent and
unpredictable under the administrations of Donald Trump and Moon Jae- in. Moon, a
progressive, was elected in May 2017 after a decade of conservative rule in South Korea. (See
Figure 1for more on ROK politics.) Moon and Trump have aligned aspects of their approaches
toward North Korea, with both pursuing a rapprochement with Pyongyang. Moon brokered a
summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Trump in June 2018. Kim and Trump met
again in Hanoi in February 2019, though the negotiations collapsed, dealing amajor blow to
Moon’s agenda of developing closer ties tothe North. U.S.-DPRK and ROK-DPRK diplomacy have
stalled since the Hanoi summit. With the recent election and tensions of Nor The alliance
between the United States and South Korea has, for the past six decades, been a core pillar of
the U.S.-led security architecture in Northeast Asia—but in recent months, the bilateral
relationship has been facing something of a crisis of confidence. Though the alliance is broadly
integral to maintaining a balance of power favorable to the region’s democracies, functionally,
its nearly singular focus on managing the North Korea challenge bears fundamental risks. In
2018, the breakneck pace of inter-Korean rapprochement and the failure to reach a timely
agreement on the United States and South Korea’s military cost-sharing framework, the Special
Measures Agreement, nudged the alliance toward a new inflection point. These developments
have caused alarm in some quarters about Seoul going its own way, balancing between great
powers, as portended in President Moon Jae-in’s August 2018 Liberation Day Speech. But they
should also be seen as an opportunity to inject new vitality into the bilateral relationship. U.S.
officials have urgent cause to work with their South Korean counterparts toward an elevated
vision of the alliance—one that transcends exclusive orientation around North Korea and a
transactional, cost-driven view of burden-sharing. As Seoul adopts more globally oriented
policies, the United States should parlay these efforts into a more concrete effort. eeffrole for
South Korea in the United States’ Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.
Internal Link – SoKo Escalation
Escalation likely – multiple reasons
*Historical Tensions
*Rally Around the Flag
*Naval Ship Incidents
Roblin M.A. in conflict resolution from Georgetown University 1-5-19
(Sebastien, “Forget North Korea: Is the Next Showdown in Asia Japan vs. South
Korea?” https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/forget-north-korea-nextshowdown-asia-japan-vs-south-korea-40692, ME)
On December 20, an advanced P-1 maritime patrol plane of the Japanese Self Defense Force was patrolling international waters
between the Korean peninsula and the Japanese archipelago when its radar warning system abruptly began chiming. The antisubmarine jet had apparently detected the fire-control radar of the South Korean destroyer Gwanggaeto the Great, cruising 110
miles west of the Liancourt Rocks. The 3,300-ton Gwanggaeto is the lead ship in her class and is armed with medium-range Sea
Sparrow missiles for air defense out to ranges of twelve miles. South Korean defense officials claim the destroyer’s higher-resolution
three-dimensional STIR-180 fire-control radar—usually used to target missiles—was supplementing its surface-search radar while
attempting to assist a North Korean fishing boat which had issued a distress call after running adrift. According to South Korean
account, the STIR-180 was scanning in a 360-degree arc and was not focused onto the P-1. The P-1 patrol plane broadcast a message
in English to the South Korean vessel: “Korean naval ship, Hull number 971. We observe that your FC [fire control] antenna is
directed to us. What is the purpose of your act? Over?” Receiving no response, the P-1’s pilot repeated the inquiry five more times
over the following six minutes. During that time, the jet circled the destroyer at altitudes as low as 150 meters. Three days later, the
Japanese government released a recording by the P-1 here, including the chatter by the crew, and demanded an apology. Then on
Friday, December 4, 2019, the South Korean government released its own video suggesting the Japanese messages were
unintelligible and that the P-1 had circled provocatively low over the destroyer. At the very least, it seems unlikely the P-1 crew
would have continued orbiting the destroyer if it thought it was under genuine risk of attack. Focusing on the exact technical
systems at play or the precise motivations of the crews on the destroyer and patrol plane, however, is missing the forest for the
trees. Neither
South Korea or Japan is seeking an armed conflict. However, militaries cohabiting
international waters are capable of downplaying or covering up faux pas when they wish to do so, particularly
when they are allied in a common cause such as defense against nuclear-armed ballistic missiles from North
Korea. Several retired military officials have informally indicated the incident shouldn’t be made out to be such a big deal.
Instead, first Japan and then South Korea have chosen to escalate the diplomatic conflict while using
accusatory language and issuing demands for apologies. This is due to a combination of unresolved historical
tensions related to Japanese colonial occupation of Korea, nationalistic theater designed for
domestic consumption, and genuine divergences in foreign policy. Japan effectively turned Korea into a
Japanese colony between 1876 and 1910. After the Japanese defeat in World War II, the nation was split into its present divided
status. During the war, Koreans had been forced to labor in factories and serve as sex slaves (“Comfort Women”) in support of the
Japanese war effort. Though Tokyo has at times apologized for various atrocities its forces undertook in the first half of the
twentieth century, these acts have been undermined by a consistent drive by Japanese nationalists, including Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe, to redefine events such as biological weapons testing on civilians, the mass rape and murder of Chinese civilians in Nanjing, or
the forced recruitment of sex workers under conditions that killed thousands of them, as ordinary wartime acts no different than
those undertaken by the Allies in World War II. For example, in article on October 2018, the Japan Times, apparently due to political
pressure, announced it would stop using “potentially misleading” terms such as “slave or forced labor” or “Comfort women,” instead
using “wartime labor” and “women who worked in wartime brothels”—arguing this was justified because in some cases the labor
was voluntary. South Korean president Moon Jae-in recently terminated cooperation with a Japanese foundation intended to
support surviving comfort women over continued disputes on how such wartime acts are portrayed, underscoring how contentions
over the narrative itself may be important than material compensation alone. The Abe government, meanwhile, may have
an
incentive to escalate tensions with South Korea to shore up his credentials from his party’s right wing
after loosening of labor-migration laws implemented to address a shrinking labor force. Despite the historical headwinds, Japan and
South Korea should have highly practical reasons to cooperate. Both are wealthy democracies that are potential targets of North
Korean nuclear missiles, both host U.S. military bases that contribute to each other’s security, and both are wary of pressure from
Beijing’s growing economic and military might. However, Tokyo
and Seoul also espouse sharply divergent
strategies regarding North Korea. The left-wing Moon administration seeks a new peace with North Korea buttered over
with generous economic assistance, while tacitly overlooking the North’s retention of nuclear weapons capability. Meanwhile, the
right-wing Abe administration has
advocated greater military and economic pressure on Pyongyang to
denuclearize and has sought a rapid buildup of Japanese military capabilities, including stealth jets and
aircraft carriers. After escalating tensions with North Korea for a year and a half, the Trump administration declared victory after a
symbolic summit in Singapore in 2018 and has remained largely disengaged from the two Koreas ever since. Washington’s
disinterest suits Moon’s peace agenda, but not Abe’s desire for more sanctions and military buildup. The United States’ political
disarray and relative absence from northeast Asian politics have also removed a typical stabilizing force on relations between the
two countries. It’s worth noting that the islands, known as Takeshima by the Japanese and the Dokdo by Koreans, are also subject of
a dispute between Seoul and Tokyo, but remain under South Korean control. In August 2018, Japanese textbooks formally described
the South Korean presence as an “illegal occupation,” triggering yet another a diplomatic spat. The lingering
between the two nations highlight
international interests.
tensions
how heavily historical scars can affect the ostensibly dispassionate pursuit of
! – North Korea
War with North Korea causes extinction – kills 300,000 without nukes
Jacobson 18 [Oren. Masters in IR @ University of Chicago, Masters in Economics @ DePaul.
10/8. "Diplomacy, not military, is key to solution in North Korea."
https://www.dailyherald.com/discuss/20181008/diplomacy-not-military-is-key-to-solution-innorth-korea]
Negotiations between Pyongyang and Washington have struggled for months, including over points such as the exact definition of
denuclearization. While Pyongyang wants to see these confidence building measures first, the United States insists that North Korea
must surrender all of its nuclear weapons before further steps can be taken; a breakthrough on who goes first has yet to be seen. As
these negotiations continue to limp forward -- largely thanks to the hard work of South Korean diplomats -- it is crucial that
diplomacy stays the course. After all, the
costs of war with North Korea will be staggeringly high.
For one, there is the risk of a truly catastrophic number of casualties from any conflict. The Congressional Research Service, a
nonpartisan bureau that provides hard data to members of the House and Senate, estimates that within the
first few
days of a conflict, between 30,000 and 300,000 people could die -- and that is with only conventional
weaponry, before nuclear weapons come into play. Plus, some 35,000 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea
alone, with another 40,000 in Japan; in other words, our men and women in uniform would be on the front lines of this war.
There is also the possible effect on our economy. A new report out from the Economist's Intelligence Unit
estimates that an outbreak of conflict on the Korean Peninsula would slash U.S. economic growth
down to one percent -- roughly as bad as things were at the onset of the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
Specific American industries would be put at risk, including the automotive and agricultural
sectors, which have already suffered as a result of the uncertainty of other economic policy upheavals during this administration.
And finally,
the United States has multiple treaty-obligated allies in the immediate neighborhood, such as South
very likely get involved in the conflict and consequently escalate the war
very quickly. Within North Korea's missile range is also our territory, the island of Guam, where more than 150,000 U.S. troops
and citizens live. And lastly, nuclear-armed China would obviously step into any fighting on their
border, and Russia might be right behind them as well. In short, there is no way that any "preemptive" or "limited" strike on Pyongyang, as advocated by National Security Advisor John Bolton, would not
result in a much larger-scale battle in the region.
Korea and Japan, that would
Overall, these facts establish that diplomacy
is to be our first, best option for resolving the North Korean nuclear
problem. We know that tough, principled, and American-led diplomacy is what really gets us
lasting results. Though the process will be long, negotiations must persist and cannot be rushed or left
half-complete for the sake of a purely cosmetic and political victory. Ultimately, the agreement
with North Korea must include verifiable steps toward denuclearization, so we can see that it is working
along the way -- and this can only be truly accomplished via diplomatic channels.
The catastrophic risks of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula are undeniable -- which is more reason
than ever to stay engaged on the issue and push the Trump Administration to maintain
diplomatic efforts, rather than militaristic ones.
Goes nuclear --- causes extinction
Chol 11 Kim Myong Chol is author of a number of books and papers in Korean, Japanese and
English on North Korea, including Kim Jong-il's Strategy for Reunification. He has a PhD from the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Academy of Social Sciences "Dangerous games" Aug 20
www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MH20Dg01.html
The divided and heavily armed Korean Peninsula remains the most inflammable global
flashpoint, with any conflict sparked there likely to become a full-blown thermonuclear war
involving the world's fourth-most powerful nuclear weapons state and its most powerful. Any incident in Korea by
design, accident, or miscalculation could erupt into a devastating DPRK-US war, with the
Metropolitan US serving as a main war theater. Rodong Sinmun warned on August 16: "The Korean Peninsula
is faced with the worst crisis ever. An all-out war can be triggered by any accident." Recent incidents illustrate the
real danger of miscalculation leading to a total shooting war, given the volatile situation on
the Land of Morning Calm. 1. The most recent case in point is the August 10 shelling of North
Korea by the South. Frightened South Korea marines on Yeonpyeong Island mistook three
noises from a North Korean construction site across the narrow channel for artillery rounds, taking an hour to respond with
three to five artillery rounds. The episode serves as a potent reminder to the world that the slightest
incident can lead to war. A reportedly malfunctioning firefinder counter-artillery radar system seems to partly account
for the panicky South Korean reaction. South Korean conservative newspaper the Joong Ang Daily reported August 17: "A
military source said that radar installed to detect hostile fire did not work last week when North Korea fired five shots toward
the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the disputed maritime border, on Aug 10. "'We must confirm the location of the source of the
firing through the ARTHUR (Artillery Hunting Radar) and HALO (hostile artillery location) systems, but ARTHUR failed to operate,
resulting in a failure to determine the source of the fire,' said the source." BBC reported on November 25 last year the
aggressive nature of troops on the South Korea-held five islands in North Korean waters. "Seen in this sense, they (five islands
including Yeonpyeong Island) could provide staging bases for flanking amphibious attacks into North Korea if South Korea ever
takes the offensive." 2. An almost catastrophic incident took place at dawn on June 17 near Inchon.
South Korean marines stationed on Gyodong Island near Inchon Airport fired rifles at a civilian South Korean jetliner Airbus A320
with 119 people aboard as it was descending to land, after mistaking it for a North Korean military aircraft. The Asiana Airlines
flight was carrying 119 people from the Chinese city of Chengdu. About 600 civilian aircraft fly near the island every day,
including those flying across the NLL, but they face a perennial risk of being misidentified as a hostile warplane. It is nothing
short of a miracle that the Airbus A320 was not hit and nobody harmed. 3. On March 26, 2010, the high-tech South Korean
corvette Sokcho fired 130 rounds at flocks of birds, mistaking them for a hostile flying object. The innocent birds looked like a
North Korean warplane just at a time when an alleged North Korean midget submarine had managed to escape with impunity
after torpedoing the hapless Cheonan deep inside security-tight South Korean waters. The South Korean military's habit of firing
at the wrong target increases the risk of an incident running out of control. CNN aired a story December 16, headlined:
"General: South Korea Drill Could Cause Chain Reaction." F/A-18 pilot-turned Marine Corp General James Cartwright told the
press in the Pentagon, "What we worry about, obviously, is if that it [the drill] is misunderstood or if it's taken advantage of as
an opportunity. "If
North Korea were to react to that in a negative way and fire back at those
firing positions on the islands, that would start potentially a chain reaction of firing and
counter-firing. "What you don't want to have happen out of that is ... for us to lose control of
the escalation. That's the concern." Agence France-Presse on December 11 quoted former chief of US
intelligence retired admiral Dennis Blair as saying that South Korea "will be taking military action against North
Korea". New Korean war differs from other wars Obama and the Americans seem to be incapable of
realizing that North Korea is the wrong enemy, much less that a new Korean War would be
fundamentally different from all other wars including the two world wars. Two things will
distinguish a likely American Conflict or DPRK-US War from previous wars. The first essential
difference is that the US mainland will become the main theater of war for the first time since the US
Civil War (1861-1865), giving the Americans an opportunity to know what it is like to have war fought on their own land, not on faraway soil. The US previously prospered by waging aggressive wars on
other countries. Thus far, the Americans could afford to feel safe and comfortable while watching TV footage of war scenes from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Libya as if they were fires raging across the
river. The utmost collateral damage has been that some American veterans were killed or returned home as amputees, with post traumatic stress disorder, only to be left unemployed and homeless.
However, this will no longer be the case. At long last, it is Americans' turn to have see their homeland ravaged. An young North Korea in 1950-53 was unable to carry the war all the way across the Pacific
Ocean to strike back, but the present-day North Korea stands out as a fortress nuclear weapons state that can withstand massive American ICBM (Intercontinental ballistic missile) attacks and launch direct
The second essential difference is that the next war in Korea, that
is, the American Conflict or the DPRK-USA War would be the first actual full-fledged nuclear,
thermonuclear war that mankind has ever seen, in no way similar to the type of nuclear
retaliatory transpacific strikes on the Metropolitan USA.
warfare described in science fiction novels or films. North Korea is unique among the nuclear powers in two
respects: One is that the Far Eastern country, founded by legendary peerless hero Kim Il-sung, is
the first country to engage and badly maul the world's only superpower in three years of
modern warfare when it was most powerful, after vanquishing Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.
The other is that North Korea is fully ready to go the length of fighting [hu]mankind's [the]
first and last nuclear exchange with the US.
The DPRK led by two Kim Il-sungs - the ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant commander Kim
Jong-il and his heir designate Kim Jong-eun - is different from Russia under Nikita Khrushchev which backed down in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Khrushchev and his company never fought the Americans
However, it is no
exaggeration to say that the two North Korean leaders are just one click away from ordering
a retaliatory nuclear strike on the US military forces in Guam, Hawaii and metropolitan
centers on the US mainland. On behalf of Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-eun will fire highly destructive weapons of like
in war. As a rule, most countries are afraid to engage the Americans. As the case is with them, North Korea is the last to favor war with the Americans.
Americans have never heard of or imagined to evaporate the US. The North Koreans are too proud of being descendents of the ancient
civilizations of Koguryo 2,000 years ago and Dankun Korea 5,000 years ago, to leave the Land of morning Calm divided forever with the southern
half under the control of the trigger-happy, predatory US. The North Koreans prefer to fight and die in honor rather than kowtow to the arrogant
Americans. At
the expense of comforts of a better life, North Koreans have devoted more than
half a century to preparing for nuclear war with the Americans. All available resources have
been used to convert the whole country into a fortress, including arming the entire population and
indigenously turning out all types of nuclear thermonuclear weapons, and developing long-range delivery capabilities and digital
warfare assets. An
apocalyptic Day After Tommorow-like scenario will unfold throughout the US,
with the skyscrapers of major cities consumed in a sea of thermonuclear conflagration. The nuclear exchange will
begin with retaliatory North Korean ICBMs detonating hydrogen bombs in outer space far
above the US mainland, leaving most of the country powerless. New York, Washington, Chicago, San Francisco
and major cities should be torched by ICBMs streaking from North Korea with scores of
nuclear power stations exploding, each spewing as much radioactive fallout as 150-180 H-bombs.
Aff
Alliances
Alt Cause – Trumpism
The Trump administration has weakened democratic values among allies which
has allowed the rise of authoritarianism to occur.
Beavers 2/26/19 (Oilivia Beavers, Bachelor of Arts Foreign Affairs, Energy Resource Bureau
Intern for the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Chief of Staff and Office of
Communications Intern at The White House, wrote content for CNN politics, Congressional
reporter at the Hill. “National security experts warn of rise in authoritarianism” The Hill, 26 Feb
2019, https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/431646-national-security-experts-warn-ofrise-in-authoritarianism-efforts)
A group of national security experts testified Tuesday on Capitol Hill about the
rise of authoritarianism, warning lawmakers that countries such as China and
Russia are seeking to gain power by undermining democratic systems. In a
hearing before the House Intelligence Committee, former Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, former NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen, Open
Constitution Initiative co-founder Teng Biao and Center for a New American
Security’s transatlantic security expert Andrea Kendall-Taylor said there are
indicators popping up worldwide that suggest a growing return to dictators and
despots. “Warning signs abound across the globe: the discarding of mainstream
politicians, the emergence of leaders who seek to divide rather than unite, the purist
of political victory at all costs and the invocation of national greatness by people who identify greatness only with themselves,”
Albright told the committee in her opening remarks. “Tyranny is once again awakening from its slumber,” Rasmussen said in his
The experts warned that authoritarianism is beginning to
replace democracy, in countries such as Turkey, the Philippines, Hungary, Poland,
Brazil and Egypt — as well as in China and Russia. “This is the most trying time for
democracy since the 1930s when fascism spread across much of Europe,” said
Kendall-Taylor. “If current trends persist, authoritarianism will soon become the
most common way that democracies crumble and autocracies emerge,” she
added. Albright also suggested some of President Trump’s actions may be
weakening U.S. efforts to promote democratic values overseas. “For almost as
long as I have been alive the world has been able to count on the United States to
serve as the rock against which the forces of despots run aground and break
apart. What concerns me is that we may no longer be able to make that claim. In
opening remarks, echoing Albright.
my travels abroad, I hear the same questions all the time: If America has a leader who says the press always lies, how can Vladimir
Putin be faulted for making the same claim,” said Albright, who served in the Clinton administration. “If America has a leader who
insists that judges are biased and how calls the American criminal system a ‘laughingstock,’ what is to stop a repressive leader in
Hungary of Southeast Asia from discrediting this own judiciary,” she continued. Her remarks came after the top Republican on the
warned the experts at the beginning of the hearing for
them to not to draw “scurrilous” comparisons between authoritarian
governments and democracies, stating that this would trivialize the decree of
suffering and violence individuals endure under authoritarian regimes.
committee, Rep. Devin Nunes (Calif.),
Nevertheless, Albright still used the hearing to subtly rebuke certain foreign
policies carried out by the Trump administration. When asked by a Democratic lawmaker whether
the administration’s decision to lift sanctions on three companies linked to a prominent Russian oligarch — who is close with Putin
— was a “mistake,” Albright replied “yes.” Experts also highlighted the efforts of authoritarian countries to both control the internet
at home and to use it to interfere in Democratic processes abroad. Rasmussen, who warned Russia is carrying out hybrid warfare,
said his foundation, the Alliance of Democracies, has detected foreign interference in at least 10 elections on both sides of the
Atlantic.
Because Trump has weakened US democratic alliances, Russia has been able to
make new alliances and strengthen powers, as well as tale resources the US
needs, like oil.
Shuster 4/4/19 (Simon Shuster, reporter, covered the news out of Russia and the
former Soviet Union for TIME Magazine, Reuters, The Associated Press, The Moscow
Times and has contributed stories to Foreign Policy.)
Even in the worst of times, Russia had been a reliable friend to the Sudan of Omar alBashir. It continued selling him weapons during the atrocities his regime carried out
in the Darfur region from 2003 to 2007. And when the International Criminal Court indicted al-Bashir in 2009 for genocide,
war crimes and crimes against humanity, issuing a warrant for his arrest, Russia
went its own way. Instead of detaining al-Bashir when the Sudanese leader landed in Sochi in 2017, Russian President
Vladimir Putin received him at his official residence and put the meeting on state television. As it turned out, Russia’s enduring
friendship was about to pay off. The outlaw President had arrived with an offer: “Sudan,” he told Putin, “can be Russia’s key to
Africa.” What he wanted in return was “protection from aggressive U.S. actions” in the region, said al-Bashir. The evidence shows
Putin took him up on it. The leaders’ talks opened the gates to a flood of Russian ventures in Sudan, from political consulting to
mining and military aid, according to documents obtained by TIME. As Russian geologists began drilling for gold near the banks of
the Nile River last year, the Russian armed forces drafted plans to use Sudan’s ports and air bases as military outposts. Sudan is just
Over the past few years, the Kremlin has once again been scouring the
world in search of influence. In troubled countries overlooked since the Cold War,
Russia has been forging new alliances, rekindling old ones and, wherever
possible, filling the void left by an inward-looking West. Across Africa, the
Middle East and Latin America, TIME tracked the Kremlin effort through months of interviews with local officials,
the start.
Russian operatives and other players, as well as by vetting documents provided by the Dossier Center, a private investigative unit
The Russian campaign reaches
from major conflict zones such as Venezuela, Libya and Syria to the more obscure
corners of Africa and, as al-Bashir hoped, to Sudan. What comes through is a
newfound Russian willingness, even an eagerness, to involve itself in wars and
cultivate regimes anywhere Moscow sees a chance to assert itself. But unlike the
Cold War, when the communist East competed with the capitalist West as equals, the new contest is being waged in an altered
world. Trump’s America no longer projects interest in foreign affairs, democratic
ideals or even alliances. And China, with an economy eight times the size of Russia’s, has replaced it as the major
alternative to the West. Yet Putin has managed to keep Russia in the global picture–punching far above its
weight through a combination of opportunism, bluster and common cause with
isolated despots to whom Moscow offers weapons, protection and respect. “We are
funded by Mikhail Khodorvsky, an exiled Russian businessman and critic of Putin.
not out to rule the world or impose some ideology on other countries, be it communism or capitalism,” says Senator Andrei Klimov,
a fixture in Moscow’s foreign policy circles. “We are merely out to defend our interests. And we will do that wherever they arise.”
Russian troops and military cargo
landed in Venezuela to shore up the embattled dictator Nicolás Maduro. The
deployment was meant as a challenge to the U.S., which recognizes the
legitimacy of Maduro’s rival Juan Guaidó. It got Trump’s attention. “Russia has to
get out,” he told reporters in the Oval Office four days later, adding that “all options are open” for ensuring a
Russian withdrawal. But Maduro has survived U.S. sanctions thanks in part to Russian cash and political cover. In Syria,
Russia rescued the dictatorship of Bashar Assad with a military campaign that
forced the U.S. to abandon its hopes of ousting him–while boosting Assad’s only
other friend in the world, Iran. And in the complex war for control of Libya,
various factions have sought the Kremlin’s support, often in exchange for access
to oil fields and other resources that the U.S. also covets
That became clear as recently as March 23, when two planeloads of
AT Environment Impact
Tech solves—reject their alarmist impact claims
Gertner 6-7-19 (Jon, “Maybe We’re Not Doomed After All,”
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/07/opinion/climate-change-hopesolutions.html?emc=rss&partner=rss, ME)
As the effects of a warming climate intensify and a sense of impending catastrophe grows stronger, it’s becoming easier to give in to
environmental despair. Having spent the past five years studying the Arctic and traveling around Greenland, I feel the pull as well.
Glaciers and sea ice are melting at an alarming rate; temperatures are rising at a steady clip. To make matters worse, the Trump
administration’s recent efforts to ignore a fact-based, scientific approach — rejecting, for instance, the use of computer projections
to assess how a warming world might look after 2040 — leads me to worry that climate denialism is moving from the scientific
fringes to the institutional center. Still, it’s worth considering that things
may not be as bad as they appear. I say this
with a full understanding that most indicators are pointing in the wrong direction. Yet I also feel we’re in danger of losing sight
of two crucial and encouraging aspects of our predicament. The first is the extraordinary value of the
climate knowledge we’ve amassed over the past 100 years — a vast archive of data and wisdom that gives us
a fine-grained understanding of how the planet is warming and how we can change the
trajectory we’re on. The second is the emergence of potential solutions, the products of a half-century of
technological innovation, which may help us avert the worst impacts of the carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases we continue to release into the atmosphere. (Last year carbon dioxide emissions
were the highest ever recorded.) Almost certainly, these tools, if used wisely, could keep global average
temperatures from rising 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit, or 2 degrees Celsius, from a preindustrial
baseline. Even lesser levels of warming are probably hazardous, but that temperature is the point beyond which many scientists
believe the planet will suffer irreversible impacts from extreme and dangerous warming. Recently, the entrepreneur and
technologist Saul Griffith undertook a study of energy consumption for the Department of Energy and concluded that, using the
United States as an example, “decarbonization is
not an unattainable ideal.” In fact, he surmised it would
be far easier than one might think, given our wealth and technological know-how. We don’t
need to assume an attitude of fear and dread. Our scientific progress is a story of technological
optimism, defined by an extraordinary sense of capability. It shows what might be built and gained in the coming
decades, and not merely what could be lost. First, let’s consider this: For all the terror and gloom that global warming portends, its
discovery is one of the greatest achievements of modern science. Technology can now tell us everything from how
many tons of ice were shed by the glaciers in Greenland over the past few years to how many millimeters the oceans rose. Indeed,
almost every fact or idea that informs the climate debate, from the number of endangered species to the dangers of melting
permafrost, results
from countless scientists and engineers, working in the field and in laboratories, over the
course of a century. This knowledge derives not only from heroic human expeditions to tropics, oceans, icecaps
and deserts, but also from exquisite orbiting satellites that constantly scrutinize natural systems and
human impacts on those systems. We know how much we have to fix on this planet, because we’ve figured out how to
measure just about everything. In the past few years, some commentators have warned that modern society’s faith in
technology has led to a mistaken belief that it will save the world. They embrace solutions that encourage
widespread behavioral changes, like consuming less, traveling infrequently and adopting a plant-based diet. We’re likely
to need both technological and personal transformations. But in the end, it’s technology that will save us, not only
because it can but also because it will have to. In many respects, technology is saving us already: by identifying the
magnitude of the threat, providing the extraordinary computing power required to run climate models to predict the
future, and enabling architects and engineers to design for resilience against tempestuous storms
and encroaching seas. Technology has made possible clean and efficient energy systems that
wouldn’t have been achievable a few decades ago, including cheap solar panels, LED lighting and batteries for electric cars. We now
have green buildings that reduce energy usage and an emerging class of solar cells known as perovskites that may greatly lower the
costs of renewable energy, and we are developing techniques to produce concrete that absorbs carbon dioxide rather than emitting
it. There is even room for techno-skeptics. A movement for “natural climate solutions,” like planting vast forests and using
agricultural methods that sequester carbon in the soil, will become increasingly important as technology in the form of “integrated
assessment” computer models tells us how much this approach can mitigate warming trends. In the coming years, moreover, our
ability to improve technology will determine the viability of carbon capture techniques to
reduce atmospheric carbon dioxide and the value (or danger) of injecting aerosols into the atmosphere to shade the
sun, cool the earth and provide more time for a clean-energy transition. The range of hypothetical geoengineering ideas for
the Arctic is equally audacious. One is to use wind power in winter to pump water from the depths of the Arctic Ocean to the
surface to thicken sea ice so that it is more resistant to melting. Sea ice is critical to cooling the planet, because it reflects sunlight
that would otherwise be absorbed by the ocean, heating it. (The downside of this idea, which underscores the scope of the problem,
is that 10 million windmills would be needed.)
Acroecology solves – it makes the environment resilient
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy 6-20-19 (“Agroecology: Key to
Agricultural Resilience and Ecosystem Recovery,”
https://www.resilience.org/stories/2019-06-20/agroecology-key-toagricultural-resilience-and-ecosystem-recovery/, ME)
The IPCC gives us 12 years to limit global warming to 1.5˚C. The IPBES Global Assessment has revealed that nearly a million species
are on the verge of disappearance at an unprecedented rate of extinction. Climate change has become a primary cause of
biodiversity loss, while land use change is a key factor in both the climate and biodiversity crises. Both
the IPCC and IPBES
call for “transformative” change that can still reverse these catastrophic trends. Agroecology is a
transformative approach that can galvanize a just transition away from a destructive
conventional agriculture and food system to one that builds agricultural resilience, rebuilds
ecosystems, supports localized, fair food systems and strengthens local communities. It is an
innovative process that seeks to produce significant amounts of food by maintaining and
enhancing biological and ecological processes through practices that minimize the use of external inputs, recycle
nutrients, build healthy, fertile soils and conserve moisture in the agroecosystem. Agroecology puts more power in
local farmers’ hands, in contexts where they have long been disempowered. It is built on traditional knowledge
and cultural practices, enhanced by scientific advances, and spread through farmer-to-farmer exchanges.
The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) defines agroecology as a scientific discipline, a set of practices and a movement. It
is a dynamic concept that has evolved over decades to expand its scope from a focus on
agroecosystems—understanding field-level farming practices that rely on high agrobiodiversity—to include not only
ecological, but also socioeconomic, nutrition and even equity aspects of agriculture and food
systems. While there are many techniques intended to improve environmental sustainability and yields, agroecology is an
integrated approach to the entire agroecosystem (rather than individual plants, animals, humans or soil
organisms). Agroecologists recognize that technological advances are essential, but that they occur in specific socioeconomic
contexts that can either reinforce or challenge inequality and environmental sustainability. Key agroecological principles, based on
experiential learning from social movements and networks of small-scale farmers, landless farmers and farmworkers, include:
Building on indigenous practices and knowledge generation, as well as empowering local farmers Recognizing women’s central roles
as seed keepers, cultivators and workers Developing
new techniques through experimentation and sharing
among farmers and workers Respecting food sovereignty—the right of peoples to define their own food and agriculture
systems, allowing producers to play a lead role in innovation and placing those who produce,
distribute and consume food at the center of decisions on food systems and policies Despite
agroecology’s successes at withstanding droughts—and hurricanes—there is a lack of awareness among decision-makers of the
significant potential of agroecology to tackle challenges related to the climate and biodiversity crises. As governments at the
UNFCCC engage in the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture (KJWA) on adaptation, soils, nutrient use, manure management and
livestock systems (see points: 2.c, d, and e), it is critical that they take note of progress being made on agroecology in key U.N.
bodies and at national and sub-national levels to inform their discussions leading to an agriculture decision at COP 26 and integrate
them in KJWA. In addition, these developments
in agroecology should also be a central component in
enhancing mitigation and adaptation within NDCs. Agroecology has been gaining ground in many
U.N. processes, especially those centered at the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). A recent decision by the FAO’s
Committee on Agriculture (FAO 2018 COAG/2018/5) to support agroecology as a key approach to promote sustainable agriculture
and food systems has given rise to FAO’s Scaling up Agroecology Initiative (SAI 2018), which aims to support national agroecology
transition processes through policy and technical capacity that builds synergies between countries. SAI endorses the 10 elements of
agroecology that are based on seminal scientific literature and inputs over a three year process of FAO regional and international
multi-stakeholder symposiums (2015-2018). The
Initiative will develop, implement and continuously
improve tools, instruments and guidance documents for leading national agroecological transitions through alliance
building, co-creation of knowledge and knowledge sharing. (See also five principles of agroecology and five levels of agroecological
transitions.) In addition, the U.N. Committee on World Food Security (CFS) (the foremost inclusive intergovernmental and
international mechanism on food security and nutrition) requested its High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) in 2017 to elaborate on
agroecological approaches and other innovations for building sustainable food systems that enhance food and nutrition security.
This HLPE #14 report will be released in Rome in July 2019, and its recommendations will be taken up for consideration in October
2019 during the CFS annual meeting. A set of CFS decisions are expected in 2020. Decisions from the CFS would not only guide
national policies on food and agriculture and contribute to informed national debates on food sovereignty and the right to food, but
also help guide the three Rome-based U.N. food agencies in their regional and country level program development. The KJWA
process should in no way undermine the progress being made in these other fora on agroecology and should seek to incorporate the
benefits of agroecology in both international and national level climate policy on agriculture.
A review of scientific
literature examining social and economic indicators in 42 studies showed that adopting
agroecological practices increased yields (in 60% of comparisons), labor productivity (100% of comparisons)
and farm profitability (56% of comparisons), and decreased labor demand (75% of comparisons, likely resulting
from an increase in yield and labor productivity). Because of its emphasis on minimal external inputs, instead
recycling nutrients through a reliance on biological processes and agrobiodiversity,
agroecological practices can be labor intensive but not necessarily cash intensive. This is an area for
further research as the social and economic performance of agroecology and its indicators are not as well-documented as its impacts
on farming communities and other practitioners. Agroecology
increases production in ways that enhance
biodiversity and nutritional diversity due to a reliance on integrated cropping systems rather
than unsustainable and intensive monocrop production. This diversified approach also reduces
vulnerability to biotic and abiotic stress from weather and disease. The advantages of this
approach were conclusively demonstrated in the 2008 International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science
and Technology for Development (IAASTD), a multi-year study involving hundreds of experts and several U.N. agencies. The findings
were re-substantiated in a report submitted in 2010 to the U.N. Human Rights Council by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the right to
food, Olivier De Schutter. It showed the additional value of agroecology, not only for fast progress in the realization of the right to
food for vulnerable groups in various environments, but also for economic development. The report called for appropriate public
policies to create an enabling environment. The KJWA should build upon these and other international
processes that
are well underway. A number of national and regional governments are also moving forward with
policy and funding support to institutionalize and operationalize agroecology. Parties participating in
the KJWA should take the time to understand what their own governments are doing with regards to research and support for the
expansion, operationalization and implementation of agroecology. They can learn from and build upon current international,
national and subnational processes. At a minimum, the discussions and any actions taken through the KJWA must not undermine
the enormous potential of agroecology to meet international climate and food security goals.
Climate Change reports are exaggerated – actual science proves there’s no
substantial change
H. Sterling Burnett, 12-17-2018, H. Sterling Burnett, Ph.D. is a Heartland senior fellow on
environmental policy and the managing editor of Environment & Climate News.
"National Climate Assessment Criticized as Badly Flawed," Heartland Institute,
https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/news/national-climate-assessment-criticizedas-badly-flawed, Mateo
The final version of the Fourth National Climate Assessment (NCA4), reflecting the work of the 13 different federal agencies that make up the U.S. Global Climate Change Research program (USGCCR), was released
on Friday, November 23. The 1990 Global Climate Research Act required the president to establish the USGCCR, charged with issuing a report describing the state of the climate and the economic, environmental,
health, and safety consequences of climate change, every four years. Predicting Extreme Harm Upon NCA4’s release, USGCCR spokespersons stressed extreme estimates of harm included in the 1,600-page report.
“The impacts and costs of climate change are already being felt in the United States, and changes in the likelihood or severity of some recent extreme weather events can now be attributed with increasingly
higher confidence to human-caused warming,” NCA4 says. NCA4’s worst-case scenario assumes the world’s human population will grow to 12 billion by 2100, the rate of technological change will stagnate,
economic growth will slow, and fossil fuel use will be 300 percent greater than today. As a result, NCA4 estimates atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations will reach 950 parts per million (ppm), up from 405
ppm at present, resulting in the global average temperature rising by 10 to 15 degrees Fahrenheit by 2100. Among the myriad harms NCA4 claims will occur by 2100 based on these assumptions are U.S. GDP will
be 10 percent lower than it otherwise would be; crop losses and damage from extreme weather will top $500 billion per year; and the United States will experience $141 billion in annual economic losses from
thousands of premature deaths from heat, plus billions of dollars in losses from premature deaths and damage from extreme flood, wildfire, and weather events the study predicts will happen more regularly.
President Rejects Findings When asked on November 26 his thoughts on NCA4, President Donald Trump was unperturbed, maintaining his previous skepticism about the dangers of anthropogenic climate change.
“I’ve seen it. I’ve read some of it,” said Trump. “I don’t believe it.” This is a purely political report that Trump is right to reject, says Tim Huelskamp, Ph.D., president of The Heartland Institute, which publishes
“This latest climate report is just more of the
same—except for even greater exaggeration, worse science, and added interference in the
political process by unelected, self-serving bureaucrats,” said Huelskamp. “This report from the
climate alarmist Deep State in our government is even more hysterical than some United
Nations reports. “The idea global temperatures could rise as much as 12 degrees in the next 80
years is absurd, and not a shred of actual data and observation supports that,” Huelskamp said.
“As noted in the Nongovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s report Climate Change
Reconsidered, global temperatures have stayed largely the same for much of the last 20 years,
and sea levels have not been rising at an accelerated rate. President Trump was required by law
to release this report, but he is not required to take it seriously—and he surely will not.” ‘Blatantly
Absurd Conclusions’ NCA4 is extremely inaccurate because it is based on flawed computer models, says Jay Lehr, Ph.D., science director at The Heartland Institute. “I have
never seen such blatantly absurd conclusions drawn entirely from mathematical models that use
only a limited number of variables,” said Lehr. “The physical evidence conclusively shows the
frequency and strength of hurricanes, floods, and wildfires has been declining for years, not
increasing. “Of course, this shoddy science by Obama-era appointees serves its real purpose: producing a preordained political outcome that puts more power and
Environment & Climate News and produced its own detailed critique of a draft version of NCA4 in early 2018.
money in the hands of the United Nations,” Lehr said. The government agencies involved in the report are putting politics above the pursuit of truth, says University of Delaware
climatology professor David Legates, Ph.D. “The Obama administration demanded the use of the extreme scenarios so the predicted impact on the populace would be
substantial,” Legates said. “This isn’t about the science. If it were, there would be discussions about the other scenarios and about the uncertainties in the climate system and in
the models that drive these scenarios. “They have taken the worst possible scenarios and packaged them as if they were the expected norm,” said Legates. “Climate science has
all but died in this country.” ‘Completely Unbelievable’ NCA4 was written to incite drastic action to fight climate change, says Tom Harris, executive director of the International
Climate Science Coalition. “The Fourth National Climate Assessment, released just over a week before the 24th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, seems designed to provide ammunition to those who want drastic action on climate change,” Harris said. “The problem is NCA4’s conclusions
are so extreme as to be completely unbelievable and easily dismissed by any thinking person.” The cost estimates of the harm from future climate changes are built on
assumptions about carbon dioxide emissions well outside mainstream analyses, says Patrick J. Michaels, Ph.D., director of the Center for the Study of Science at the Cato
Institute.
“The ‘social cost’ of carbon dioxide emissions is highly dependent upon the assumptions made in its calculation,” said Michaels. “For example, using the historical 7 percent
discount rate and more modest equilibrium climate sensitivities calculated by John Christy and Nic Lewis, the cost actually becomes negative, meaning there is a net benefit of a
few dollars per emitted ton.
“By using lower discount rates and high emissions scenarios and sensitivities, holdovers from the Obama administration were able to calculate costs in excess of $50 per ton,”
Michaels said.
Any rise in temperature was not caused by CO2, and rise in CO2 is not harmful,
in fat in can be beneficial
Keith and Craig Idso, ‘98, Dr. Idso is the founder, former president, and currently chairman of
the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change. Keith E. Idso is a botanist and
vice president of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change. "CO2 Science,"
C02Science, http://www.co2science.org/about/position/globalwarming.php, Mateo There is little doubt
the air's CO2 concentration has risen significantly since the inception of the Industrial Revolution; and there are few who do not attribute the CO2 increase to the increase in
but there is no compelling reason to
believe that the rise in temperature was caused by the rise in CO2. Furthermore, it is highly
unlikely that future increases in the air's CO2 content will produce any global warming; for there are
humanity's use of fossil fuels. There is also little doubt the earth has warmed slightly over the same period;
numerous problems with the popular hypothesis that links the two phenomena. A weak short-term correlation between CO2 and temperature proves nothing about
causation. Proponents of the notion that increases in the air's CO2 content lead to global warming point to the past century's weak correlation between atmospheric CO2
that correlation does not imply
causation, and that a hundred years is not enough time to establish the validity of such a
relationship when it comes to earth's temperature history. The observation that two things have risen together for a period of
concentration and global air temperature as proof of their contention. However, they typically gloss over the fact
time says nothing about one trend being the cause of the other. To establish a causal relationship it must be demonstrated that the presumed cause precedes the presumed
effect. Furthermore, this relationship should be demonstrable over several cycles of increases and decreases in both parameters. And even when these criteria are met, as in the
case of solar/climate relationships, many people are unwilling to acknowledge that variations in the presumed cause truly produced the observed analogous variations in the
we
note that increases and decreases in atmospheric CO2concentration not only did not precede
the changes in air temperature, they followed them, and by hundreds to thousands of years! There
presumed effect. In thus considering the seven greatest temperature transitions of the past half-million years - three glacial terminations and four glacial inceptions -
were also long periods of time when atmospheric CO2 remained unchanged, while air temperature dropped, as well as times when the air's CO2 content dropped, while air
no evidence to suggest
that the ongoing rise in the air's CO2 concentration will lead to significant global warming. Strong
temperature remained unchanged or actually rose. Hence, the climate history of the past half-million years provides absolutely
negative climatic feedbacks prohibit catastrophic warming. Strong negative feedbacks play major roles in earth's climate system. If they did not, no life would exist on the
planet, for some perturbation would long ago have sent the world careening into a state of cosmic cold or horrendous heat; and we know from the fossil record that neither of
these extremes has ever occurred, even over billions of years, and in spite of a large increase in the luminosity of the sun throughout geologic time. Consider, in this regard, the
water vapor that would be added to the atmosphere by enhanced evaporation in a warmer world. The extra moisture would likely lead to the production of more and higherwater-content clouds, both of which consequences would tend to cool the planet by reflecting more solar radiation back to space. A warmer world would also mean a warmer
ocean, which would likely lead to an increase in the productivity of marine algae or phytoplankton. This phenomenon, in turn, would enhance the biotic production of certain
sulfur-based substances that diffuse into the air, where they are oxidized and converted into particles that function as cloud condensation nuclei. The resulting increase in the
number of cloud-forming particles would thus produce more and smaller cloud droplets, which are more reflective of incoming solar radiation; and this phenomenon would also
tend to cool the planet. All of these warming-induced cloud-related cooling effects are very powerful. It has been shown, for example, that the warming predicted to result from
a doubling of the air's CO2 content may be totally countered by: (1) a mere 1% increase in the reflectivity of the planet, or (2) a 10% increase in the amount of the world's lowlevel clouds, or (3) a 15 to 20% reduction in the mean droplet radius of earth's boundary-layer clouds, or (4) a 20 to 25% increase in cloud liquid water content. In addition, it has
been demonstrated that the warming-induced production of high-level clouds over the equatorial oceans almost totally nullifies that region's powerful water vapor greenhouse
effect, which supplies much of the temperature increase in the CO2-induced global warming scenario. Most of these important negative feedbacks are not adequately
represented in state-of-the-art climate models. What is more, many related (and totally ignored!) phenomena are set in motion when the land surfaces of the globe warm. In
response to the increase in temperature between 25°N latitude and the equator, for example, the soil-to-air flux of various sulfur gases rises by a factor of 25, as a consequence
of warmth-induced increases in soil microbial activity; and this phenomenon can lead to the production of more cloud condensation nuclei just as biological processes over the
sea do. Clearly, therefore, any number of combinations of these several negative feedbacks could easily thwart the impetus for warming provided by future increases in the air's
Carbon dioxide is a powerful aerial fertilizer, directly
enhancing the growth of almost all terrestrial plants and many aquatic plants as its atmospheric
concentration rises. And just as increased algal productivity at sea increases the emission of sulfur gases to the atmosphere, ultimately leading to more and
CO2 content. Growth-enhancing effects of CO2 create an impetus for cooling.
brighter clouds over the world's oceans, so too do CO2-induced increases in terrestrial plant productivity lead to enhanced emissions of various sulfur gases over land, where
they likewise ultimately cool the planet. In addition, many non-sulfur-based biogenic materials of the terrestrial environment play major roles as water- and ice-nucleating
incorporation of this
multifaceted CO2-induced cooling effect into the suite of equations that comprise the current
generation of global climate models might actually tip the climatic scales in favor of global
cooling in the face of continued growth of anthropogenic CO2 emissions. There is no evidence for warming-induced increases in extreme weather. Proponents of the
aerosols; and the airborne presence of these materials should also be enhanced by rising levels of atmospheric CO2. Hence, it is possible that
CO2-induced global warming hypothesis often predict that extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, and hurricanes will become more numerous and/or extreme in a
that the numbers and intensities of
extreme weather events have remained relatively constant over the last century of modest
global warming or have actually declined. Costs of damages from these phenomena, however, have risen dramatically; but this phenomenon
warmer world; however, there is no evidence to support this claim. In fact, many studies have revealed
has been demonstrated to be the result of evolving societal, demographic and economic factors. Elevated levels of atmospheric CO2 are a boon to the biosphere. In lieu of
the biospheric
benefits that come from the aerial fertilization effect of atmospheric CO2 enrichment: enhanced
plant growth, increased plant water use efficiency, greater food production for both people and
animals, plus a host of other biological benefits too numerous to describe in this short
statement. And these benefits are not mere predictions. They are real. Already, in fact, they are evident in long-term tree-ring
global warming, a little of which would in all probability be good for the planet, where do the above considerations leave us? Simply with
records, which reveal a history of increasing forest growth rates that have closely paralleled the progression of the Industrial Revolution. They can also be seen in the slow but
inexorable spreading of woody plants into areas where only grasses grew before. In fact, the atmosphere itself bears witness to the increasing prowess of the entire biosphere in
the yearly expanding amplitude of the its seasonal CO2 cycle. This oscillatory "breath of the biosphere" - its inhalation of CO2, produced by spring and summer terrestrial plant
growth, and its exhalation of CO2, produced by fall and winter biomass decomposition - has been documented to be growing greater and greater each year in response to the
ever-increasing growth stimulation provided by the ongoing rise in the air's CO2 content. Atmospheric CO2 enrichment brings growth and prosperity to man and nature alike.
This, then, is what we truly believe will be the result of the ongoing rise in the air's CO2 content: a reinvigorated biosphere characteristic of those prior periods of earth's history
when the air's CO2 concentration was much higher than it is today, coupled with a climate not much different from that of the present. Are we right? Only time will tell. But one
thing is certain now: there is much more real-world evidence for the encouraging scenario we paint here than for the doom-and-gloom predictions of apocalypse that are
preached by those who blindly follow the manifestly less-than-adequate prognostications of imperfect climate models. Our policy prescription relative to anthropogenic CO2
emissions is thus to leave well enough alone and let nature and humanity take their inextricably intertwined course. All indications are that both will be well served by the
ongoing rise in atmospheric CO2.
Carbon dioxide isn’t a pollutant and has no impact
Craig Idso, ‘17, Dr. Idso is the founder, former president, and currently chairman of the Center for the Study of
Carbon Dioxide and Global Change.. "PRESS RELEASE: HEARTLAND INSTITUTE EXPERTS REACT TO EPA SCRAPPING THE
CLEAN POWER PLAN," Heartland Institute, https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/news/press-release-heartlandinstitute-experts-react-to-epa-scrapping-the-clean-power-plan, Mateo Today’s action by Pruitt is a wake-up call for those who
continue to falsely claim carbon dioxide is a pollutant. It isn’t, so get over it! Carbon dioxide is a
colorless, odorless, and tasteless gas that is essential for life on Earth. It will never cause the
dangerous global warming that climate alarmists and their failed models predict. Future legal
challenges to reverse Pruitt’s action are welcomed, as they will only fail in the end.
AT Democracy Impact
Democratic institutions are resilient
Elahi 6-20-19 (Mahmood, “US democracy remains resilient,”
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2019/06/162_270790.html, ME)
American political leaders seems to be engaged in a rhetorical war of words with violent
undertones. Referring to the calls for the impeachment of President Donald Trump, Democratic
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said: "I think Donald Trump should be in prison, not impeached."
This reminds us of Trump's declaration during the 2016 campaign that Hillary Clinton should be
locked up for using a private server for official business. Trump has escalated his attack on
Special Counsel Robert Mueller for indulging in what he calls "a witch hunt" for his investigation
over alleged collusion by Trump's election team with Russia. Although Mueller "absolved"
Trump of any collusion with Russia, he didn't exonerate Trump from obstruction of justice. So,
Trump continues to blast Mueller for "presidential persecution" and being in league with
Democrats to undermine his presidency. House Democrats, on their part, have increased their
pressure to impeach Trump for obstruction of justice and for lying to the American people. As
pressure mounts on House Democrats to impeach Trump, Republicans are seeming to rally
behind him, and a showdown between the Republican-controlled Senate and Democratcontrolled House of Representatives may be on the horizon if impeachment goes ahead.
President Trump, on his part, responded with increased attacks on Democrats, calling House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi a "nasty" person. He called off any cooperation with Democrats; and the
two sides are now completely polarized. Trump has also become increasingly autocratic, using
his executive privilege, acting without any consultation with Congress. He has unilaterally
imposed tariffs on China, Canada and Mexico among others. His latest 5 percent tariffs on
Mexican products unless Mexico takes steps to stem Guatemalan asylum seekers from entering
the United States through its border is another example of Trump's autocratic decision-making.
Even many Republicans are opposed to it. Although Trump suspended the tariffs after Mexico
agreed to take appropriate measures to stem the flow of asylum seekers, he continues to
threaten to re-impose them if he is not satisfied. These autocratic tendencies and disarray in
Washington have led many analysts to think that America might be moving toward what CNN
commentator Fareed Zakaria calls an "illiberal democracy." He sees that in many parts of the
world an emerging trend is the rise of the elected autocrat. Such autocrats are elected by the
people. But they tend to take their electoral victories as a license to rule as they like. But before
we conclude that Trump is an elected autocrat, we must take into consideration America's
extensive democratic institutions that provide checks and balances against the
monopolization of decision-making by any autocratic leader. First, the U.S. Constitution is a
living document, articulating all major issues relating to democratic governing. Second, the
separation of powers is the most important feature of the Constitution. It separates executive
and legislatives bodies, allowing each to provide checks on the other. Although this separation
of powers can be compromised if the same party controls all branches of the government. This
happened in 2016 when Donald Trump was elected president with both the Senate and the
House of Representatives under the control of his Republican Party. However, this is rare and
both Houses have shown their willingness to exert their own powers. Third, although Supreme
Court Judges are appointed by the president, they are appointed for life and this gives them an
independence not available to other appointees. And most partisan judges have shown their
independence time and again. Fourth, a free press, whose independence has been enshrined in
the First Amendment, provides a check on the government. Although Trump calls the critical
press the "enemy of the people," he cannot suppress it, violating the Constitution. These and
other democratic institutions remain resilient to any design by any careerist to turn America
into an illiberal democracy. Despite Trump and his autocratic tendencies, America will always
remain a shining example of democracy in the real sense and to quote President Abraham
Lincoln's immortal declaration that "government by the people, of the people and for the
people will not perish from the earth."
Backsliding inevitable – democracy is dead
Feffer director of Foreign Policy In Focus 6-12-19 (John, “Democracy
Desperately Needs a Reboot,” https://fpif.org/democracy-desperately-needs-areboot/, ME)
If you’re a supporter of Donald Trump — or Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil or Matteo Salvini in Italy —
you probably think that democracy has never been in better health. Recent elections in these
countries didn’t just serve to rotate the elite from the conventional parties. Voters went to the
polls and elected outsiders who promised to transform their political systems. That
demonstrates that the system, that democracy itself, is not rigged in favor of the “deep state” or
the Bilderberg global elite — or the plain vanilla leaders of the center left and center right.
Moreover, from the perspective of this populist voter, these outsiders have continued to play by
the democratic rules. They are pushing for specific pieces of legislation. They are making all
manner of political and judicial appointments. They are trying to nudge the economy one way or
another. They are standing up to outside forces who threaten to undermine sovereignty, the
bedrock of any democratic system. Sure, these outsiders might make intemperate statements.
They might lie. They might indulge in a bit of demagoguery. But politicians have always sinned in
this way. Democracy carries on regardless. You don’t have to be a supporter of right-wing
populists to believe that democracy is in fine fettle. The European Union just held elections to
the European Parliament. The turnout was over 50 percent, the highest in two decades. True,
right-wing populists increased their share from one-fifth to one-fourth of the chamber, with
Marine Le Pen’s party coming out on top in France, Salvini’s Liga taking first place in Italy, and
Nigel Farage’s Brexit party winning in the UK. But on the other side of the spectrum, the Greens
came in second in Germany and expanded their stake of the European parliament from 7 to 9
percent. And for the first time, two pan-European parties ran candidates. The multi-issue
progressive Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM 25) received more than 1.4 million
votes (but failed to win any seats). Or maybe you’re an activist fighting for democracy in an
authoritarian state. In some countries, you have reason to celebrate. You just succeeded in
forcing out the long-serving leader of long-suffering Sudan. You just booted the old, sick, corrupt
head of Algeria. You’ve seen some important steps forward in terms of greater political
pluralism in Ethiopia, in Malaysia, in Mexico. You can cherry-pick such examples and
perspectives to build a case that the world is continuing to march, albeit two steps forward and
one step back, towards a more democratic future. But you’d be wrong. Democracy faces a
global crisis. And this crisis couldn’t be coming at a worse time. Democracy’s Fourth Wave In
1991, political scientist Samuel Huntington published his much-cited book, The Third Wave.
After a first wave of democratization in the nineteenth century and a second wave after World
War II, Huntington argued, a third wave began to sweep through the world with the overthrow
of dictatorship in Portugal in 1974 and leading all the way up to the collapse of communism in
Eastern Europe and the fall of apartheid in South Africa. It was at this time, too, that Francis
Fukuyama and others were talking about the inevitable spread of democracy — hand in hand
with the market — to every corner of the globe. Democratic politics appeared to be an
indispensable element of modernity. As countries hit a certain economic, social, and
technological threshold, a more educated and economically successful population demands
greater political participation as a matter of course. Of course, democracy doesn’t just arrive like
a prize when a country achieves a certain level of GDP. Movements of civil society, often
assisted by reformers in government, push for free and fair elections, greater government
transparency, equal rights for minorities, and so on. Sometimes, too, outside actors play a role
— providing trainings or financing for those movements of civil society. Sometimes democratic
nations sanction undemocratic governments for their violations of human rights. Sometimes
more aggressive actors, like U.S. neoconservatives in the 2000s, push for military intervention in
support of a regime change (ostensibly to democracy), as was the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Libya. However, the modernization thesis generates too many exceptions to remain credible.
Both China and Saudi Arabia function at a high economic level without democracy. Russia and
Turkey, both modern countries, have backslid into illiberal states. Of the countries that
experienced Arab Spring revolutions in 2011, only Tunisia has managed to maintain a democracy
— as civil war overtook Libya, a military coup displaced a democratically elected government in
Egypt, Bashar al-Assad beat back various challenges in Syria, and the Gulf States repressed one
mass demonstration after another. More recently, backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the
military in Sudan is using violence to resist the demands of democracy activists to turn over
government to civilian hands. In Algeria, the military hasn’t resorted to violence, but it also
hasn’t stepped out of the way. Move back a few steps to get the bigger picture and the retreat
of democracy looks like a global rout. Here, for instance, is Nic Cheeseman’s and Jeffrey Smith’s
take on Africa in Foreign Affairs: In Tanzania, President John Magufuli has clamped down on the
opposition and censored the media. His Zambian counterpart, President Edgar Lungu, recently
arrested the main opposition leader on trumped-up charges of treason and is seeking to extend
his stay in power to a third term. This reflects a broader trend. According to Freedom House, a
think tank, just 11 percent of the continent is politically “free,” and the average level of
democracy, understood as respect for political rights and civil liberties, fell in each of the last 14
years. Or let’s take a look at Southeast Asia, courtesy of Josh Kurlantzick: Cambodia’s
government transformed from an autocratic regime where there was still some (minimal) space
for opposition parties into a fully one-party regime. Thailand’s junta continued to repress the
population, attempting to control the run-up to elections still planned in February 2019. The
Myanmar government continued to stonewall a real investigation into the alleged crimes
against humanity in Rakhine State, despite significant international pressure to allow an
investigation. And even in Indonesia, one of the freest states in the region, the Jokowi
government has given off worrying signs of increasingly authoritarian tendencies. Or how about
this assessment of Latin America from The Washington Post last year (before the Brazilian
election): Brazil is not the only Latin American country with troubled politics. Democracy has
collapsed in Nicaragua and Venezuela and is in serious trouble in countries such as Bolivia and
Honduras. In El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, just as in Brazil, criminal
organizations rule the poorer parts of many cities, weakening democracy and undermining the
rule of law. Waves, of course, go both ways. And the fourth democratic tide definitely seems to
be going in the wrong direction. The 2019 Freedom House report, entitled “Democracy in
Retreat,” chronicles 13 years of decline. The V-Dem Institute in Sweden, in its 2019 report on
the state of global democracy, identifies a “third wave of autocratization” affecting 24 countries
(including the United States). The Economist Intelligence Unit is somewhat more optimistic,
arguing that “the retreat of global democracy ended in 2018.” But all the threats itemized in the
Unit’s actual report are a reminder that this optimism stems from the fact that the terrible state
of democracy didn’t get demonstrably worse last year. And, the report concludes, the decline
must just have paused last year before continuing on its dismal trajectory. Democracy’s Dial-Up
Dilemma I’ve written extensively about how Donald Trump has undermined U.S. democracy
with his rhetoric, his appointments, his attacks on the press, his executive actions, his selfserving financial decisions, and so on. I’ve connected the attacks on democracy in the United
States to trends toward autocracy in East-Central Europe from the 1990s onward. I’ve compared
Trump’s politics to the majoritarian aspirations of Narendra Modi in India, Benjamin Netanyahu
in Israel, Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia, and Vladimir Putin in Russia. Maybe it’s a
positive sign that an outsider won the 2016 elections (putting aside Russian interference for the
moment). If Donald Trump can do it, so perhaps can Bernie Sanders or the Green Party. Another
politics is indeed possible. But everything else about Trump is profoundly anti-democratic.
Worse, he’s part of a more general trend. Democracy’s troubles do not simply result from
generals seizing power (as in Thailand or Egypt), undemocratic rulers consolidating power (like
Xi Jinping in China), or illiberal leaders weakening the institutions of democratic governance (like
Victor Orban in Hungary, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, or
Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines). In other words, democracy’s discontents are not solely
external to democracy itself. There’s a deeper vein of popular dissatisfaction. According to Pew
research from 2018, a majority of people (out of 27 at least formally democratic countries
polled) are dissatisfied with democracy. And for good reason. They are disgusted with the
corruption of elected leaders. They are unhappy with economic policies that continue to widen
the gap between rich and poor. They are fed up with politicians for not responding with
sufficient urgency to global problems like climate change or refugees. Here’s an equally
disturbing possibility. Even in the so-called advanced democracies, the political software has
become outdated, full of bugs, susceptible to hacking. Put simply, democracy requires a
thorough update to deal with the tasks at hand. So, for instance, democratic institutions have
failed to get a handle on the flow of capital, licit and illicit, that forms the circulatory system of
the global economy. The corruption outlined in the Panama Papers, the Russian laundromat,
and the Odebrecht scandal, among others, reveal just how weak the checks and balances of
democracy have been. Watchdog institutions — media, inter-governmental authorities — have
been playing catch up as the financial world devises new instruments to “create” wealth and
criminals come up with new scams to steal wealth. The Internet and social media have been
hailed as great opportunities for democracy. States can use electronic referenda to encourage
greater civic participation. Democracy activists can use Twitter to organize protests at the drop
of a hashtag. But the speed of new technologies also establishes certain expectations in the
electorate. Citizens expect lightning fast responses from their email, texts, web searches, and
streaming services. But government seems stuck in the dial-up age. It takes forever to get
legislation passed. The lines at social service centers are long and frustrating. In some cases, the
slowness of government response is more than just irritating. The last IPCC report suggests that
the world has only a dozen years to deal with climate change before it’s too late. All of the
patient diplomacy of states leading up to the Paris climate deal, which itself was an insufficient
response to the crisis, was then undone by the results of… American democracy. It’s no surprise,
then, that voters have gravitated toward right-wing politicians who promise fast results and
easy solutions, however illusory those might be. In other words, these leaders have the opposite
appeal of democracy, which is so often slow and messy. Right-wing populists are disruptive
technologies that destroy existing structures. That’s why I’ve called populist leaders “disruptors
in chief.” There are no instruction manuals on how to fix hardware and software simultaneously,
on how to address climate change at the same time as fixing the political systems that have
hitherto failed to tackle the problem. But democracy definitely needs a reboot. Right-wing
populists have offered their illiberal fix. Despite the hype, those “solutions” aren’t working, not
on climate change, not on refugees, not on trade, not on international disputes with Iran, North
Korea, or Venezuela. So, now it’s time for the rest of us to roll up our sleeves and get our hands
dirty.
AT Arms Sales Key to Econ
The benefits of arms sales are greatly exaggerated.
Thrall and Dorminy 18 (Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey. senior fellow
for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Department and policy
analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. CATO
Institute. Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in US Forign Policy.
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-rolearms-sales-us-foreign-policy https://www.cato.org/publications/policyanalysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy, Maddy)
Though the president trumpets each deal as a victory for the United States, an analysis of American arms sales since 2002 reveals
the arms trade is a risky business. The United States has repeatedly sold
weapons to nations engaged in deadly conflicts, and to those with
horrendous human rights records, under conditions in which it has been
impossible to predict where the weapons would end up or how they would
be used. On repeated occasions, American troops have fought opponents armed with American weapons. Advocates argue
that
that arms sales bolster American security by enhancing the military capabilities of allies, providing leverage over the behavior and
that
the economic benefits of arms sales are dubious and that their strategic
utility is far more uncertain and limited than most realize. Arms sales also create a host of
policies of client nations, and boosting the American economy while strengthening the defense industrial base. We argue
negative, unintended consequences for the United States, for those buying the weapons, and for the regions into which American
weapons flow.
Washington’s historical faith in arms sales is seriously misplaced. The
United States should revise its arms sales policy to improve the risk assessment process, to ban sales to countries where the risk of
negative consequences is too high, and to limit sales to cases in which they will directly enhance American security.
Trade war thumps – most realistic scenario for recession
Wang 6/13 [Orange, economic journalist for the South China Morning Post, “Trade war could
cause global recession, Beijing official warns, as US investment growth in China sinks”; published
6/13/19, accessed 6/26/19; https://www.scmp.com/economy/chinaeconomy/article/3014407/trade-war-could-cause-global-recession-beijing-official-warns]
May’s escalation
in trade tensions led to a sharp drop in the growth of American investment in
China, according to data released on Thursday which highlighted the chilling effect the trade war is having on investor confidence.
The data release from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce showed that US investment in China grew 7.5 per cent between January
and May, year on year, a much slower pace than the 24.3 per cent recorded between January and April. The
rate also was
significantly lower than the 16.3 per cent growth posted for the first five months of 2018. The US
fell to sixth largest foreign investor in China in April from third largest in March, according to the data. No figure was available for US
investment in China for May. Chinese
Ministry of Commerce spokesman Gao Feng told a Beijing press
conference on Thursday that “there will be no winner in the trade war, which could cause a
recession in the United States and global economies.” The ministry did not disclose US investment growth in
China for the month of May alone, but the plunge seems to have coincided with the collapse of trade talks between Beijing and
Washington. This development led to the US’ more than doubling tariffs on US$200 billion of Chinese goods, from 10 per cent to 25
per cent. Washington
also set the ball rolling on a threat to roll out further 25 per cent tariffs on
the remaining untaxed Chinese items, valued by the US government at US$300 billion. China has retaliated by
slapping higher tariffs on US$60 billion of US goods. The trade war has caused US exports to
China in dollar terms for the January to May period to fall by 29.6 per cent from a year earlier.
China’s overall foreign direct investment (FDI) growth accelerated slightly to US$54.61 billion over the first five months of the year,
up 3.7 per cent from the same period last year. But the rate was slower than the growth rate for the January to April period. In May,
total FDI into China grew by 4.6 per cent to US$9.47 billion, a larger rise than the 2.8 per cent increase posted in April. Investment in
China’s hi-tech service sector, meanwhile, saw the most significant growth over the first five months of this year, with foreign capital
inflows surging 68.9 per cent, according to ministry data. In contrast to inbound FDI, China’s outbound direct investment (ODI)
decreased by 1 per cent to US$44.54 billion in the January to May period. China saw no new ODI in the fields of property or sports
and entertainment, year-to-date, as these areas had been put on a list of banned overseas investments by the government to
prevent capital flight. The
data comes one day after the United Nations warned that global FDI is on
the wane, partly as a result of rising trade tensions. In the World Investment Report 2019, the UN Conference on
Trade and Development (Unctad) found that global FDI flows slid by 13 per cent last year, to US$1.3 trillion from US$1.5 trillion the
previous year – the third consecutive annual decline. “FDI continues to be trapped, confined to post-crisis lows. This
does not
bode well for the international community’s promise to tackle urgent global challenges, such as
abject poverty and the climate crisis,” Unctad secretary general Mukhisa Kituyi said. “Geopolitics and trade
tensions risk continuing to weigh on FDI in 2019 and beyond.”
Israel
Impact Turn – Samson Option Good
Samson Option is key to solve Middle East instability, Iran war, and nuke terror
Beres Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue ’18 (Louis
Rene, “Israel Must Reevaluate Its Policy of Nuclear Ambiguity,” December 2,
https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/israel-nuclear-ambiguity/, ME)
In view of growing Middle Eastern turmoil since the Arab upheavals of 2011, the time has come
for Israel to review the efficacy of its traditional policy of deliberate nuclear ambiguity. Given
the upheavals cascading throughout the Middle East since 2011, Israel now faces a unique
dilemma. Notwithstanding the logical underpinnings and coherence of its own unilateral foreign
policies, whatever Jerusalem should decide to do or not do about the “big picture,” a vision that
could include the advent of a nuclear Iran as a regional hegemon and heightened Shiite-Sunni
infighting, this ever-volatile region could slip irretrievably into a still deeper level of chaos. If
Israel is to remain secure in such an environment, it will have to re-evaluate its policy of
deliberate nuclear ambiguity. To date, the “bomb-in-the-basement” policy has made good sense
for Israel. Both friends and foes recognize that it possesses significant nuclear capabilities that
are both survivable and capable of penetrating enemy defenses. Indeed, for adversaries not to
acknowledge these capabilities would require a self-imposed intellectual deficit. But what
should Israel do about its nuclear posture going forward? How should this ambiguous stance be
adapted to the convergent and inter-penetrating threats of still-impending Middle
Eastern/North African revolutions, a nuclear Iran, and Israel’s more or less constant concern
about negotiating agreements with state and sub-state (terrorist) organizations? Conventional
wisdom assumes that credible nuclear deterrence is somehow an automatic consequence of
merely holding nuclear weapons. By this argument, removing Israel’s nuclear bomb from the
“basement” would elicit new waves of global condemnation without offering any
commensurate benefits. But conventional wisdom is not always wise. The pertinent strategic
issues for Israel are not simple or straightforward. In the arcane world of Israeli nuclear
deterrence, it can never be adequate that enemy states simply acknowledge the existence of
the Jewish State’s nuclear arsenal. Rather, these states must believe that Israel holds usable
nuclear weapons, and that Jerusalem would be willing to employ them in certain circumstances.
The Middle East’s endemic instabilities create good reason to doubt that Israel would benefit
from a continuation of the policy of deliberate nuclear ambiguity. It would seem, moreover,
from certain developments within Israel’s defense and intelligence communities, that the
country’s senior leadership fully understands such informed skepticism. To best augment such
an understanding, Israel’s nuclear strategists should proceed interrogatively – in effect, creating
a continuously self-refined “strategic dialectic” from which suitable answers and policies could
then be incrementally extracted or systematically deduced. A basic point now warrants
reiteration. Israel is imperiled by existential threats that fully justify its possession of nuclear
weapons and that require a correspondingly purposeful strategic doctrine. Without such
weapons and doctrine, Israel cannot survive over time, especially if neighboring regimes
become more adversarial, more jihadist, and/or less risk-averse. Nuclear weapons and a
correspondingly purposeful nuclear doctrine could prove vital to those more-or-less predictable
scenarios requiring preemptive action and/or retaliation. Generically, military doctrine
describes how a country’s national forces would fight in plausible combat operations. But the
full importance of doctrine lies not only in the ways it can animate and unify military forces, but
also in the particular fashion with which it can transmit messages. In other words, doctrine can
serve a state (especially an endemically beleaguered state) as a critical form of communication
with both friends and foes. Israel can benefit from such a broadened understanding of doctrine.
The principal risks facing Israel are specific, not generic. This is because its adversaries in the
region can be joined by: 1) the prospective new Arab state of “Palestine;” and 2) a newly nuclear
Iran. In the worst case, such inauspicious “joinings” would take place at the same time. For
Israel, merely possessing nuclear weapons, even when fully recognized by enemy states, can
never automatically ensure successful deterrence. Though possibly counter-intuitive, a
selective and nuanced end to deliberate ambiguity could substantially improve the overall
credibility of Israel’s nuclear deterrent. With this in mind, the injurious potential of enemy
attacks in the future could be reduced by making selectively available additional information
concerning the security of Israel’s nuclear weapon response capabilities. This information,
limited yet explicit, would center on major and inter-penetrating issues of Israeli nuclear
capability and decisional willingness. Skeptics will likely disagree. It does, after all, appear
reasonable to assert that nuclear ambiguity has worked so far. Arguably, while Israel’s current
nuclear policy has done little to deter multiple conventional terrorist attacks, it has succeeded in
keeping the country’s enemies, whether singly or in collaboration, from mounting any
authentically existential aggressions. But as nineteenth-century Prussian strategic theorist Karl
von Clausewitz observed in his classic essay On War, there comes a military tipping point when
“mass counts.” Israel is very small. Its enemies have always had a huge advantage in terms of
“mass.” Perhaps more than any other imperiled state on earth, Israel needs to steer clear of
such a tipping point. An integral part of Israel’s multi-layered security system lies in effective
ballistic missile defenses, primarily the Arrow. Yet even the well-regarded and successfully
tested Arrow, augmented by the newer, shorter-range and systematically integrated operations
of Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and related active defenses, could never achieve a sufficiently high
probability of intercept to protect Israeli civilians. No system of missile defense can ever be
entirely “leak-proof,” and even a single incoming nuclear missile that somehow managed to
penetrate Arrow or its corollary defenses could conceivably kill tens or perhaps hundreds of
thousands of Israelis. Leaving aside a jihadist takeover of nuclear Pakistan, the most obviously
unacceptable “leakage” threat would come from an eventually nuclear Iran. To be effectively
deterred, a nuclear Iran would need to be convinced that Israel’s atomic weapons were both
invulnerable and penetration-capable. Any Iranian judgments about Israel’s capability and
willingness to retaliate with nuclear weapons would depend largely upon prior knowledge of
these weapons, including their degree of protection from surprise attack as well as their
capacity to punch through Iranian active and passive defenses. A nuclear weapons-capable Iran
may already be a fait accompli. For whatever reasons, neither the international community in
general nor Israel in particular has managed to create sufficient credibility concerning timely
preemptive action. Such a critical defensive action would require complex operational
capabilities, and could generate Iranian counter actions that could have a very significant impact
on the entire Middle East. It is likely that Israel has already undertaken major steps in cyberdefense and cyber-war, but even the most strenuous efforts in this direction would not be
enough to stop Iran altogether. The sanctions leveled at Tehran over the years have had an
economic impact, but have had no determinable effect in terms of halting Iranian nuclearization
or Tehran’s enhancements of intercontinental ballistic missile testing. A nuclear Iran could
decide to share some of its nuclear components and materials with Hezbollah or with other
terrorist groups. To prevent this, Jerusalem would need to convince Iran, inter alia, that it
possesses a range of usable nuclear options. Jerusalem should now be calculating (vis-à-vis a
prospectively nuclear Iran) the degree of subtlety with which it should consider communicating
key portions of its nuclear status. Certain general details could be released about the availability
and survivability of lower-yield weapons. Naturally, Israel should never reveal any specific
information about its nuclear strategy, hardening, or yield-related capabilities. It is important to
bear in mind that an Israeli move from ambiguity to disclosure would not necessarily help in the
case of an irrational nuclear enemy. It is possible that certain elements of the Iranian leadership
might subscribe to certain end-times visions of a Shiite apocalypse. By definition, such an enemy
would not value its own continued national survival more highly than any other preference or
combination of preferences. Were its leaders to be or to become non-rational, Iran could
effectively become a nuclear suicide-bomber in macrocosm. Such a destabilizing prospect is
improbable, perhaps even at the very outer fringes of plausibility, but it is not inconceivable. A
more-or-less similar prospect exists in already nuclear and distinctly coup-vulnerable Pakistan.
To protect itself against military strikes from irrational enemies, particularly attacks that could
carry existential costs, Israel will need to reconsider virtually every aspect and function of its
nuclear arsenal and doctrine. Removing the bomb from Israel’s “basement” could enhance
Israel’s strategic deterrence to the extent that it would heighten enemy perceptions of the
severity of the risks involved. This would also bring to mind the so-called Samson Option, which
could allow enemy decision-makers to grasp that Israel is prepared to do whatever is needed to
survive. Irrespective of its preferred level of ambiguity, Israel’s nuclear strategy must always
remain oriented towards deterrence, not war-fighting. The Samson Option refers to a policy that
would be based in part upon some implicit threat of massive nuclear retaliation for certain
specific enemy aggressions. Israel’s small size means, among other things, that any nuclear
attack would threaten Israel’s very existence and therefore could not be tolerated. A Samson
Option would make sense only in last-resort or near last-resort scenarios. If it is to be part of a
credible deterrent, a corresponding end to Israel’s deliberate ambiguity is essential. The really
tough part of this transformational process will be determining the proper timing for any such
action vis-à-vis Israel’s core security requirements, and also the expectations of the international
community. In any event, the Samson Option should never be confused with Israel’s overriding
security objective: to seek stable deterrence at the lowest possible levels of military conflict. In
the often counter-intuitive strategic world, it can sometimes be rational to pretend irrationality.
The nuclear deterrence benefits of pretended irrationality would depend, at least in part, upon
an enemy state’s awareness of Israel’s intention to apply counter-value targeting when
responding to a nuclear attack. But, once again, Israeli decision-makers would need to be wary
of releasing too much specific information. Also worrisome, of course, is that the American
president could be perceived as more-or-less genuinely irrational, prodding “anticipatory
preemptions” against the US directly or (depending on particulars) against close allies such as
Israel. None of this is meant to suggest that an Israeli movement away from deliberate nuclear
ambiguity would be helpful only on matters specifically involving nuclear threats. The credibility
and cost-effectiveness of any Israeli nuclear retaliatory threat would be greatest where the
expected aggression was similarly nuclear. Still, there are circumstances in which a determined
enemy or coalition of enemies might contemplate launching “only” a devastating conventional
first strike against Israel, and conclude that such a move would be sensible because it would not
elicit Israeli nuclear retaliation. If, however, the aggressors were aware that Israel was in
possession of a wide array of capable and secure nuclear retaliatory forces, both in terms of
range and yield, these enemies would be more likely to be successfully deterred. In this
scenario, as a consequence of incremental and nuanced disclosures, Jerusalem would have
signaled its adversaries that it can and will cross the nuclear retaliatory threshold in order to
punish the inflicting of any potentially existential national harm. In more narrowly military
parlance, Israel’s actions would be designed to better ensure “escalation dominance.” The
nuclear deterrence advantages to Israel of taking certain steps away from nuclear ambiguity
would lie in the signal it sends: that Israel will not need to retaliate with massive and
disproportionate nuclear force. It will have other (more believable) retaliatory options. Such
advantages could extend beyond the enhancement of credible threats of Israeli nuclear
retaliation to supporting credible threats of Israeli nuclear counter-retaliation. If, for example,
Israel should initiate a non-nuclear defensive first strike against Iran before that state becomes
nuclear capable (not an “aggression,” but an act of “anticipatory self-defense” under
international law), the likelihood of massive Iranian conventional retaliation could be
diminished if there had already been open Israeli threats of nuclear counter-retaliation. In
essence, by following an incremental path away from deliberate nuclear ambiguity, Israel would
be less likely to replicate America’s much earlier nuclear posture vis-à-vis the then Soviet Union:
a posture of threatening only “massive retaliation.” In the final analysis, specific and valuable
security benefits would likely accrue to Israel as a result of a selective and incremental end to
deliberate nuclear ambiguity. The optimal time to begin such an “end” may not yet have come,
but it will have arrived the moment Iran or any other obvious foe verifiably crosses the nuclear
threshold. If and when that moment arrives, Israel should have already configured 1) its optimal
allocation of nuclear assets; and 2) the precise extent to which that configuration should be
disclosed. Such preparation could meaningfully enhance the credibility of its nuclear
deterrence posture. A fully recognizable second-strike nuclear force should then be revealed. Of
necessity, such a robust strategic force – hardened, multiplied, and dispersed – would be
fashioned to inflict a decisive retaliatory blow against major enemy cities. Iran or another
prospective nuclear adversary, so long as it is led by rational decision-makers, should be made
to understand that the costs of any planned aggression against Israel would always exceed any
conceivable gains. To more comprehensively protect itself against potentially irrational nuclear
adversaries, Israel still has no logical alternative to developing a conventional preemption
option. Operationally, there can be no reasonable assurance of success against multiple
hardened and dispersed targets. Regarding deterrence, however, “irrational” is not the same as
“crazy.” Even an irrational enemy leadership can still maintain national preference orderings or
hierarchies that are both consistent and transitive. For example, an irrational leadership can be
subject to threats of deterrence that credibly threaten deeply held religious as well as public
values. The principal difficulty for Israel is in ascertaining the precise nature of those core enemy
values. Should it be determined that an Iranian leadership were genuinely “crazy;” that is,
without any decipherable or predictable ordering of preferences, usual deterrence bets could
necessarily give way to preemption. By definition, such determinations are strategic rather than
jurisprudential. From the discrete standpoint of international law, perhaps in view of Iran’s
genocidal threats against Israel, a preemption option could still represent a permissible
expression of anticipatory self-defense. Again, this purely legal judgment would be entirely
separate from any parallel or coincident assessments of operational success. For now, at least,
these assessments all point overwhelmingly to the avoidance of exercising any residual
preemption option. In the final analysis, whether or not a prompt or incremental shift from
deliberate nuclear ambiguity to express nuclear disclosure is indicated will depend upon several
complex and interdependent factors. They include the specific types of nuclear weapons
involved; the presumed reciprocal calculations of designated enemy leaders (state and substate); the expected effects on rational decision-making processes by these enemy leaders; and
the expected effects on both Israeli and adversarial command/control/communication
processes. Correspondingly, if bringing Israel’s bomb out of the “basement” were ever expected
to produce selected enemy pre-delegations of nuclear launch authority and/or new and
seemingly less stable launch-on-warning procedures, the likelihood of unauthorized or
accidental nuclear wars could be increased. It follows that Israel must prepare to continuously
upgrade its national military nuclear strategy – in particular its longstanding policy of deliberate
nuclear ambiguity.
Impact D – Israel War
No Israel strike---Iran abides by the deal and no interest
Shimon Stein and Shlomo Brom, Senior Fellow at the INSS and a former deputy director general
of Israel's Foreign Ministry and ambassador to Germany, 3-18-19 Neither Israel nor Iran Trust
Russia. But Only Putin Can Prevent War Between Them https://www.haaretz.com/middle-eastnews/.premium-neither-israel-nor-iran-trust-russia-but-only-putin-can-prevent-war-betweenthem-1.7025237
The 1979 revolution that transformed Iran into an Islamic republic wasalso a turning point in Iran’s foreign policy - and in particular, its approach to the
State of Israel. Its hostility
towards Israel has manifested itself over the years in repeated declarations by
Iranian leaders that Israel should be destroyed, as well as anti-Semitic assertions and Holocaust denial, leading to an
escalatory cycle of Israeli reactions and Iranian counter-reactions. Iran has avoided direct
military confrontation with Israel, but at the same time provided substantial military, financial and political support to Hezbollah and
Palestinian terror groups for their operations against Israel and Jews, on the basis that they serve Iran’s interests. Iran’s nuclear program,
perceived by many in Israel as an existential threat, raised for the first time the possibility of a direct military confrontation between the two
states. That would likely be the consequence of an Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure to prevent Tehran achieving a
military nuclear capability. That Israeli strike scenario is still off the table thanks to the Iran nuclear deal.
Even though President Donald Trump pulled the U.S. out of the deal, a move the Israeli government celebrated, Iran
continues to abide by the terms it agreed with the U.S., Russia, China, France, the UK and Germany and as long as it lasts, and the
limitations on Iran's nuclear program hold, Israel has no interest in initiating a strike.
No War – Israel is decades ahead
Council on Foreign Relations ‘6 (“Israel’s Nuclear Program and Middle East
Peace,” February 10, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/israels-nuclearprogram-and-middle-east-peace, ME)
What is the likelihood of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East? According to recent workshops
by the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies Institute, if Iran’s nuclear program were left unchecked, this
could encourage Tehran’s Arab neighbors and Turkey either to seek nuclear capabilities of their
own (i.e. Israel) or to import nuclear technologies (i.e. Saudi Arabia). Ferguson says this could set
off a "lukewarm arms race," but adds it would take Iran—or any state in the region—decades to
match Israel’s level of nuclear warheads. Instead, Ferguson predicts that, in response to a
nuclear-weapons-capable Iran, some Arab states and Turkey might "try to use the NPT as a
cover to acquire at least the capability to break out into nuclear weapons development."
Impact D – Iran
No Iran impact
Hayden J. Smith 18. School of Politics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs, Washington State
University. 02/07/2018. “Threats Won’t Work.” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, pp. 1–11.
Discussion Western
politicians and the media often portray Iran and Khamenei as uncooperative
and threatening, by interpreting his rhetoric and actions from the black boxed perspective of
offensive realism (Mearsheimer, 2001), with the fundamental assumption that Khamenei’s intentions
are inherently aggressive. Rather than analyzing Iran from one perspective and set of assumptions, I have assessed what
motivates Iran’s key decision-maker. Foreign policy is more nuanced and may be characterized as
offensive realism or defensive realism (Rose, 1998). Through at-a-distance profiling, I find that
Khamenei generally has a positive worldview and prefers cooperation to conflict, but will not
cooperate in the face of threats, whether they be directed at hard resources, culture, or
morality, and believes in a strong Iran that can defend itself. This suggests he will behave more
as a defensive realist and is not inherently aggressive and expansionistic, providing more concrete
evidence and support for Waltz’s (2012) assertion that the Iranian regime is not a belligerent rogue actor.
Cooperation was demonstrated by the regime aiding the USA with intelligence in the war in
Afghanistan, as well as offering assistance with the 2003 invasion of Iraq (BBC, 2009). Instead of
accepting the assistance with Iraq, George W. Bush added Iran to the “axis of evil.” Hymans (2006)
asserts that fear leads to increased defensive aggression and national pride encourages a unilateral
bolstering of power, and can lead to the desire to “go nuclear,” particularly when combined with
nationalism. Khamenei is clearly nationalistic and threats, particularly from the West, conjure the
image of western imperialism. Both appear to be in play at this time. The implication for policy is simple. If
you want cooperation from Iran, don’t make threats. Rather, encourage positive relations and
mutual cooperation. If not threatened, and fear is reduced, Khamenei may be less likely to desire the
completion of a bomb. If he does acquire a bomb, it is likely to bolster leverage in negotiations
with world leaders, thus defensive in nature. This is supported by his Degenerate/Imperialist Image of USA, in which
he perceives more of a cultural than physical threat. If this analysis is correct, it may be beneficial to all nations, for Iran to acquire a
nuclear bomb and enhance mutual cooperation between the West and the Middle East
South Korea
UQ – Alliance Stable
The US-South Korea alliance is strong despite recent pressure
Byrne 12/20/18 [Thomas J. Byrne is president of the New York-based Korea Society.. “The
U.S.-South Korea alliance can withstand the current diplomatic pressures” December 20, 2018.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/20/us-south-korea-alliance-canwithstand-current-diplomatic-pressures/?utm_term=.4800ac4002cd/]
North Korea on Thursday renewed threats not to denuclearize until the United States eliminates its own nuclear capabilities in the
region, even as the possibility looms of a historic first visit by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to South Korea, which would add to
the dramatic advances in inter-Korean diplomacy over the past year. A question has taken on fresh urgency:
Is the U.S.South Korean alliance fraying? South Korean President Moon Jae-in is eager to engage North Korea to try to decrease
tension and build ties. The Trump administration wants to compel North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons through stringent
sanctions — including the Treasury Department’s Dec. 10 targeting of three senior North Korean officials, enraging Pyongyang. This
appears to put the two allies at odds, or at least on different timelines. But the
alliance — based on a six-decade commitment
to democracy, security and shared prosperity — is strong enough and flexible enough to withstand this period
of diplomatic ferment. It is no impediment to inter-Korean engagement. Moon is in a relative rush to engage North Korea because
he seems to sense a rare opportunity for a breakthrough in establishing permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. Kim’s newfound
interest in engagement with Seoul and with the United States may signal a weariness with international isolation and economic
deprivation — and an ultimate willingness to denuclearize. Carrots as well as sticks are needed to achieve that end. South Korea’s
inter-Korean efforts of late include establishing a liaison office in the shuttered Kaesong Industrial Complex in September and
launching a joint survey of railway lines in North Korea in November, despite Washington’s initial misgivings. Further engagement, as
Moon seems to envisage it, starts with peace that would lead to prosperity, or at least economic gains, for North Korea. And beyond
the foreseeable horizon lies reunification, not in the form of absorption by South Korea, but rather a merger facilitated by North
Korea’s entering the ranks of “normal” countries through internal economic and — implicitly — political reforms. The window for
successful diplomacy, however, might not be wide. Moon was elected last year and is limited to a single five-year term. Trump’s
reelection in 2020 is hardly assured, yet he has placed a large bet on being able to resolve tensions over the future of the Korean
Peninsula and has indicated that another summit with Kim is possible next year. In the past, diplomatic overtures foundered because
North Korea was not ready to embrace reform that entailed an opening up of its autarkic economy. Pyongyang prioritized a songun,
or military-first doctrine. But this time may be different. Though any pronouncement by Kim must be viewed with skepticism, in
April he did declare that, having succeeded in making North Korea a nuclear power, he had made economic development his top
priority. South Korea is not contemplating sacrificing the alliance for engagement. As Moon told Vice President Pence last month:
“It
is entirely the power of the strong Korea-U.S. alliance that drew North Korea into
dialoguae and made the current situation possible.” But what could strain the alliance, potentially crippling a coordinated
diplomacy of engagement? Of immediate concern is the failed negotiations on the Special Measures Agreements that govern
burden-sharing for the 28,000 U.S. troops based in South Korea. The agreements, which are renegotiated annually, saw Seoul’s
contribution increase by nearly 500 percent in dollar terms, from $150 million in 1991, when the agreement began, to $860 million
in 2016. In diplomatic circles it is understood that the United States wants South Korea to significantly increase its share beyond the
roughly 50 percent it currently pays. Indeed, a South Korean lawmaker says the Trump administration wants Seoul to raise its
contribution from $860 million to $1.3 billion. Negotiations have proved difficult — 10 rounds of talks produced no deal — and the
two sides will not meet again before year end, raising the risk of a funding gap. Playing hardball with South Korea on the payments is
puzzling at this historic moment, given the troops’ larger strategic purpose. Korea also
needs the U.S. alliance to
provide geopolitical balance in East Asia. Korea, whether divided or unified, will always be much smaller than regional
neighbors China, Russia and Japan. Given that disproportion, the U.S.-South Korean alliance should go on serving Korea, much as
NATO serves midsize European countries. Stability in East Asia is critical for U.S. economic prosperity, in turn, as global supply chains
are concentrated in this region. Instability and disruption would have global economic consequences. Moreover, the 20th century
teaches us that when America signaled its abandonment of Korea in 1950, war broke out, at a cost of 1.6 million civilian deaths and
more than 36,000 U.S. military deaths. The
U.S.-South Korean alliance got us to this point of
potentially historic engagement. It functions as the ballast that makes summit diplomacy possible. An alliance
that can continue to adapt to changing conditions, amid the crosscurrents of denuclearization, is essential
for moving the process forward.
No Link
Arm sales won’t have an impact because South Korea in the squo is already
covering an increasing number of their own arms and the alliance is still strong
Monaghan ‘18 (Patrick Monaghan is a former U.S. Navy intelligence officer, who served as
indications and warning officer at the Combined Forces Command in Seoul from 1999-2000. He
is now a practicing attorney, corporate Board member and technology investor, residing in
Seoul. " Is the US-South Korea Alliance in Trouble?", 4/21/18,
https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/is-the-us-south-korea-alliance-in-trouble//)
With North Korea rapidly expanding its nuclear and missile capabilities, maintaining a robust U.S. –South Korean alliance is vital. Unfortunately, there is a
ticking time-bomb that threatens to throw the alliance in a tailspin.
This time-bomb is the upcoming renegotiation of the burden sharing agreement known as the Special Measures Agreement (SMA). The current five-year
SMA, negotiated in 2014, will expire in 2018, meaning negotiations will need to begin soon. Financial matters between allies can always be touchy, and the
combination of Donald Trump’s “America First” foreign policy and Moon Jae-in’s Korean nationalism could make this round particularly toxic. If handled
correctly, however, Trump and Moon can revitalize the alliance and put it on a more sustainable footing for years to come.
Under the current SMA, South Korea covers approximately 50 percent of nonpersonnel costs (about $821 million in 2016) and contributes $9 billion
towards the relocation of U.S. bases in South Korea. Negotiations of the 2014 agreement were tense, with anti-American protests and some South Korean
lawmakers calling the talks “humiliating.” During the process, Seoul’s primary concern was a lack of transparency and control over how South Korean
contributions were used. These concerns were addressed in the 2014 SMA by requiring the United States to report to the Republ ic of Korea (ROK) on how
the funds are used. Nonetheless, they are certain to reappear in the new negotiations, especially with Moon ’s party now in control.
For the United States, the biggest concern is getting Seoul to
contribute more to its own defense . This concern long predated the current
U.S. administration, but it will be especially important to President Trump. As a presidential
candidate, Trump
went so far as to suggest that if Seoul did not
cover “100 percent” of alliance costs the United States should be
“prepared to walk,” leaving South Koreans to “defend
themselves.” As president, Trump has made increased alliance contributions a
cornerstone of his foreign policy, meaning he is unlikely to back down in SMA
talks.
Interestingly, however, the U.S. president might find his South Korean counterpart to be an
ideal partner. While Trump
and Moon have widely divergent views on how to deal
with the North Korean threat, both agree that South Korea should have
more responsibility for its own defense. Despite widely being thought of as
a dove, Moon is calling for a 7 percent increase in defense
spending in 2018. He has also pushed the United States to loosen restrictions on South Korea’s missile
capabilities and is seeking nuclear submarines.
Moon’s interest in strengthening South Korea’s military capabilities is part of his desire to regain wartime operational control (OPCON) over ROK forces.
The United States first gained OPCON over ROK forces during the Korean War and has made the transfer of wartime OPCON conditi onal on increased
South Korean military capabilities. President Moon and much of his South Korean left-wing base are Korean nationalists who consider OPCON a pressing
sovereignty issue.
It is easy to imagine how the two nationalist presidents could butt heads in the upcoming burden sharing negotiation. President Trump is widely
unpopular in South Korea and could easily make undiplomatic comments that could inflame latent ROK anti-Americanism. President Moon’s left-wing
allies are already distrustful of the United States and will likely press him to drive a hard bargain. Perceptions of bad faith on either side flamed by public
comments or protests in Seoul could easily poison alliance relations.
However, the combination of Trump and Moon offers some promising possibilities. President Moon’s push for more defense spending could help offset
U.S. basing and personnel costs. This is entirely appropriate for a wealthy country like South Korea, especially when one con siders that other countries,
like Japan, pay a higher portion of U.S. alliance costs. One mutually beneficial way to increase burden sharing is to count a portion of U.S. arms sales to
South Korea as part of Seoul’s contributions to the alliance. This would appeal to President Trump, who has touted increased arms exports as a way to
bolster the American economy. Purchasing high-tech American military systems would be in line with President Moon’s desire to strengthen South Korea’s
military and regain wartime OPCON.
At the same time, America’s willingness to sell South Korea more advanced weaponry and transfer wartime command to ROK forces must be not be
unconditional. In particular, just as President Moon has said America cannot conduct military operations against North Korea without Seoul ’s approval, the
United States must retain a share of military decision-making as long as it has troops on the peninsula. That way, U.S. forces will not be dragged into a war
by risky unilateral actions by South Korea, such as preventive or decapitation strike s on North Korea.
In sum, the governments in Seoul and Washington must ensure that the upcoming SMA negotiations don ’t disrupt the alliance at a time when they must
be laser-focused on dealing with the North Korean threat. Beyond that, however, they should look for opportunities to modernize the alliance to secure its
longevity into the future.
I/L – Alliance Fails
US-South Korea alliance will inevitably fail but not because of arm sale – other
factors will destroy the alliance. SK is becoming more focused on China than
alliances with the US.
Monaghan ‘18 (Patrick Monaghan is a former U.S. Navy intelligence officer, who served as
indications and warning officer at the Combined Forces Command in Seoul from 1999-2000. He
is now a practicing attorney, corporate Board member and technology investor, residing in
Seoul. " Is the US-South Korea Alliance in Trouble?", 4/21/18,
https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/is-the-us-south-korea-alliance-in-trouble//)
Recent trends suggest that U.S.-South Korea relations are increasingly strained. While the
resplendent beauty of cherry blossoms returned to Seoul this spring, the hordes of curious and free-spending Chinese tourists, upon which the local Korean
economy has become dependent, did not. In the wake of an as-yet unresolved spat between South Korea and neighboring China over the former’s agreement to
host the U.S.-supplied Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system in 2016, the flow of visitors, inbound investment and trade
from mainland China to South Korea shifted from a deluge to a trickle. Key export-driven sectors like entertainment, cosmetics, automobiles, electronics, and
tourism were hit hard by the virtual Chinese boycott. Many Koreans have openly wondered whether crossing Beijing to maintain favor with an erratic Washington
was wise and in the nation’s long-term interest. In light of South Korea’s rising economic codependence with and historical affinity for China, the rise of a
progressive government historically given to wariness toward the United States., and younger Koreans’ increasing skepticism toward Washington’s geopolitical
motives on the peninsula, it is fair to ask whether the best days of this security alliance, and the sometimes uneasy friendship that accompanied it, are over. China
is now Korea’s largest trading partner by a large margin; the Middle Kingdom was the destination for more than $90 billion in South Korean exports in 2017. This
figure has grown more than 82 percent over the last five years, and was nearly double the value of goods and services sold to the United States (just over $46
billion), where bilateral trade volumes have grown far more sluggishly, at about 7 percent over the same period. But China’s concomitant emergence as a tech and
industrial power in its own right means that South Korea cannot simply rely on its neighbor as a captive consumer market for wildly popular South Korean music,
movies, and beauty products. China is also a source of technology, research and development, and even competition in South Korea’s other leading industries.
Chinese rivals have continued to capture significant market share from South Korean shipbuilding, chemical, and consumer electronics companies. As bilateral
economic ties grow and evolve, good relations with China will become more important to Seoul. As the complexity of the trade and cultural relationship has grown
amidst China’s emergence as an economic superpower, so too have Beijing’s assertiveness and confidence in perceiving that it can, at a minimum, give Seoul major
pause in simply going along with the demands of its long-time U.S. ally. The de facto trade sanctions imposed by China may already have borne fruit: despite
Seoul’s acceptance of the THAAD shipments, some reports indicate that the South Korean government hasn’t decided when or where to deploy additional
batteries. This hesitation may reflect an apparent (if implicit) bowing to Beijing’s pressure campaign. Recent strong-arming of South Korean counterparts by the
Trump administration to renegotiate portions of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, which Trump has repeatedly criticized since his 2016 presidential campaign,
may also trigger resentment in South Korean diplomatic circles, while bringing little substantive economic change: U.S. exporters were unable to even reach the
original export quotas, suggesting that the raising of these levels will make no practical difference in the volume of trade The election of President Moon Jae-in last
year, South Korea’s first liberal president since 2007, following two staunchly pro-American administrations, ushered in a new era with predictable consequences.
The disparity between the liberal government in Seoul and the Republican administration in Washington has led many to predict that U.S.-South Korea relations
are heading south and likely to stay there. The last time a liberal South Korean president was paired with a conservative U.S. counterpart, the two allies witnessed
a significant rollback in relations, including a wave of angry anti-U.S. protests in Seoul following a tragic accident in which two Korean schoolgirls were run over by a
U.S. Army personnel carrier, a gradual reduction in the size of U.S. forces on the peninsula (from 37,000 to less than 24,000), and a decision to plan the removal of
U.S. Forces Korea/8th Army headquarters from Yongsan Garrison in Seoul. Early in his term, Moon drew rebukes in U.S. conservative circles for his suggestion that
the United States could not launch a preemptive attack against North Korea without the South’s permission. U.S. hawks are concerned that Seoul’s eagerness to
defuse tensions and compassion for its brothers to the North will make the achievement of conservatives’ strategic goals, which include the maintenance of a U.S.
military foothold on the Asian continent, problematic. Moon has been reluctant to publicly advance the perception of any rift with Washington. But his sky-high 71
percent approval rating among the South Korean public and his party’s condemnation of its now-disgraced conservative predecessors’ obsequiousness toward the
U.S. make it likely a more formal and transactional, if not estranged, relationship with Washington will continue to emerge over the remaining four-plus years of
Moon’s term. Ironically, a move toward a permanent peace, as much as a move toward war, between the U.S. and North Korea may produce the same effect:
without the need for Washington’s military muscle, South Koreans may see their future along a more culturally comfortable Asian axis than a trans-Pacific one. But
perhaps the biggest long-term threat to Washington’s influence over Korean security and strategy is demographic: the younger voters in South Korea, culturally
A well-publicized
recent survey of incoming South Korean military cadets identified the United States, not
North Korea or even Korea’s colonial occupier Japan, as the nation’s leading security threat. Far
influential and a critical part of Moon’s political base, are openly skeptical, if not hostile, toward Washington’s intentions.
too young to share their grandparents’ nostalgia for the arrival of U.S.-led UN forces in the dramatic Incheon landing,
younger Koreans have watched the United States wage wars of choice and topple regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and fear the massive death and destruction that could follow a similar action launched against its North Korean
neighbors. Younger South Koreans feel that their nation’s burgeoning success as a cultural, sporting, and geopolitical
power deserves greater respect and attention, and have found more receptive and appreciative audiences in
neighboring Asian countries, China in particular, than they have in the United States. Young Koreans
are
turning their attention to China; more now study on the Chinese mainland than in the United
States. For U.S. voters, the planned summit with North Korea later this spring should force a reckoning of the future prospects of
the South Korean alliance. In the event of a war between nuclear powers, are U.S. citizens really willing to trade San Francisco for
Seoul? The risks of a nuclear attack against the U.S. homeland created by a seemingly outdated security arrangement designed to
contain the spread of communism may be too great for many to accept, and even a moment’s hesitation in affirming their
commitment may cause many suspicious Koreans to conclude that their trust in a U.S. security umbrella has been misplaced and
naive. Conversely, if Trump and Kim Jong-un can strike a deal which eliminates the North’s nuclear arsenal and joins the two Koreas
together peacefully, how can America justify the costs, in blood, treasure and goodwill, of maintaining its robust presence on the
it is
conceivable that South Korea’s economic maturity and changing political priorities,
coupled with Washington’s reassessment of its security needs and priorities, may soon
drive these once unshakable allies widely and perhaps irrevocably apart.
peninsula, itself the raison d’etre of the bilateral alliance? While the events of the coming months will surely tell us more,
I/L Turn – Korean Peninsula
The only way to make peace with No Ko is to abandon the alliance with South
Korea
Kelly 5/30/19 (Robert E. Kelly is a professor of international relations in the Department of
Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University, 5-30-2019, " The Real Reason
Negotiations Between America and North Korea Are Stuck"
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/real-reason-negotiations-between-america-andnorth-korea-are-stuck-60167, Jack)
the North simply will not surrender them—even some of them—without very serious
counter-concessions from the Americans. Such concessions would include ending
the U.S. alliance with South Korea; removing U.S. forces from South Korea;
removing U.S. air and/or naval power from the South; sanctions relief and a huge
aid package; full normalization with South Korea, the United States, and Japan;
shrinking the size and/capabilities of the South Korean military; and so on. All of
these are large, politically painful concessions from the U.S.-South Korean side, which
no one wants to make.
American policymakers just keep demanding CVID over and
As such,
So Washington does not debate such possible concessions; instead,
over again—and the North keeps saying no. At best, America is willing to append some vague talk about North Korean
But the North Koreans are not stupid. They will not
surrender something as valuable as nukes without something really valuable and
directly tangible in return.
modernization or U.S. security guarantees.
Impact D -- Inevitable
The impact is inevitable – reducing arms sales doesn’t solve
Waldman associate editor of World Politics Review 1-11-19 (Elliot, “Trump’s
Transactional Worldview Is Imperiling the U.S.-South Korea Alliance,”
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/27171/trump-stransactional-worldview-is-imperiling-the-u-s-south-korea-alliance, ME)
Amid the ongoing U.S. government shutdown, soon to be the longest in American history, another recent lapse in funding has
received far less attention but could be just as consequential. On Jan. 1, an
important cost-sharing defense
agreement, dictating how much money the South Korean government pays to support
the U.S. military presence in the country, expired. No replacement text has been agreed to and
negotiations are reportedly deadlocked due to President Donald Trump’s demands that Seoul shoulder a much larger
portion of the stationing costs. The situation casts uncertainty on the future of the 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea, who play an
important deterrent role, not only against North Korean aggression but also against an increasingly assertive Chinese military. The
dispute also puts a strain on U.S.-South Korea relations as the two allies seek to reboot stalled nuclear
talks with North Korea. At issue is the so-called Special Measures Agreement, or SMA, which
establishes the South Korean government’s financial contribution to offset the non-personnel cost
of maintaining the U.S. military presence on the peninsula. In 2018, Seoul paid roughly $860 million, almost half of total stationing
costs. But Trump
is asking for a 50 to 100 percent increase, an unprecedented demand that
would be difficult, if not impossible, for the South Koreans to swallow. To be sure, negotiations over
burden-sharing for U.S. military installations overseas are always contentious. The previous round of SMA talks also stretched past
the deadline, but successfully concluded in January 2014 when South Korea agreed to a 6 percent increase in its share of base
funding. A reprise of that scenario this year is unlikely, however, as Trump has never subscribed to the view that U.S. forces overseas
serve valuable American security interests. Rather, he sees troops stationed abroad as protecting the host country—a service that
those governments should pay full freight for, or else do it themselves. “We are substantially subsidizing the Militaries of many VERY
rich countries all over the world, while at the same time these countries take total advantage of the U.S., and our TAXPAYERS, on
Trade,” he wrote on Twitter last month, in a likely reference to South Korea. That crude, transactional
view of
alliances is also behind Trump’s repeated demands that NATO members increase their military budgets.
But while NATO’s overreliance on the U.S. for its collective defense has long been widely acknowledged on both sides of the Atlantic,
South Korea’s defense spending has never been an issue. As of 2017, it spends 2.4 percent of GDP on defense, more than any nonU.S. NATO country, and President Moon Jae-in has set a goal of raising that to 2.9 percent by the end of his term. South Korea also
covered nearly the entire cost—almost $11 billion—of expanding Camp Humphreys, a massive military base just south of Seoul that
the U.S. Army calls “the largest power projection platform in the Pacific.” As the Korea Economic Institute’s Kyle Ferrier recently
pointed out, the South Korean government also provides indirect financial support for U.S. forces in a variety of ways that
Washington often fails to account for, such as exemptions from paying rent, taxes and base relocation expenses. All of that means it
is actually cheaper to station troops in South Korea than on American soil. But as evinced by his border wall brinkmanship, Trump
has never been one to let facts stand in the way of a self-made crisis. And much like the current U.S. government shutdown,
innocent workers are the collateral damage. South Koreans who provide important administrative, logistical and support functions
on U.S. military installations were reportedly told late last year to go on unpaid leave if the SMA lapses, as their salaries are paid
from South Korea’s share. The
longer the impasse over stationing costs drags on, the greater the
chances that Trump will make good on his stated desire to bring American troops home from South
Korea. Friction over the dispute also threatens to spill over into U.S.-South Korea
coordination on their approach to Pyongyang ahead of a likely second summit between Trump and North Korea’s leader, Kim
Jong Un. That could magnify recent disagreements between the two allies over how much pressure to
maintain on Kim as Washington seeks an end to North Korea’s nuclear program. David Maxwell, a 30-year U.S. Army veteran with
extensive experience in South Korea, says a recently established strategic working group led by U.S. Special Representative for North
Korea Stephen Biegun and his South Korean counterpart, Lee Do-hoon, is helping to ensure more effective consultation and
coordination between the two sides—not only on military matters but also on sanctions policy and potential pathways for
humanitarian aid to North Korea. But there’s still fundamental tension between Moon’s eagerness to move forward on inter-Korean
engagement and the “clear breakdown” in nuclear talks with Pyongyang, according to Brad Glosserman, a visiting professor and
deputy director of the Center for Rulemaking Strategies at Tama University in Tokyo. The longer the impasse drags on, the greater
the chances that Trump will disregard the advice of his aides—like he did on the sudden decision last month to withdraw from
Syria—and make good on his stated desire to bring American troops home from South Korea. In anticipation of such a move,
Congress last year restricted Trump from reducing troop levels on the peninsula below 22,000, unless his secretary of defense
certified that it was in the interest of U.S. national security to do so and that regional allies had been properly consulted. But even
a 20 percent drawdown could have powerful and unpredictable ripple effects. A total
withdrawal, should Trump find a secretary of defense willing to do his bidding, would dramatically alter the regional security
landscape. “It would weaken our position in Northeast Asia, it would scare the living hell out of the Japanese, it would absolutely
delight and embolden the Chinese, and probably the Russians, too,” Glosserman says in an interview. Such
also roil
a move would
South Korean politics. Many progressive politicians in Seoul, including some of Moon’s senior advisers, see U.S.
troops as an obstacle to warmer North-South relations and would welcome a military drawdown. But Glosserman fears that
opposition conservatives, already furious with Trump and Moon for what they see as an excessively soft stance toward North Korea,
might react to a withdrawal of U.S. forces with street protests and agitation. At the same time, Glosserman is quick to note that
Moon would likely try to prevent Trump from following through on his repeated threats to pull out. “There’s a really considerable
conservative institutional bias toward the security status quo” in South Korea, he says, so “that is a far-fetched scenario, but it’s not
unimaginable.” Given the wide gap between the two sides in the SMA talks, some creative
accounting may be
required to resolve the spat. Leaders of South Korea’s five major political parties have reportedly signaled to Moon
that the National Assembly cannot absorb a spending increase, so if Trump is unwilling to yield on his desire to extract more rents
from Seoul, the money will have to come from somewhere else. A
potential way out, Maxwell says, is for the Moon
administration to reallocate money that would otherwise have been spent on purchases of
U.S. military equipment. South Korea is a major customer of American defense contractors, spending a total of $22.5
billion in military acquisitions between 2008 and 2016. If planned purchases could be quietly reduced by $800 million,
that might allow Trump to claim a rare negotiating victory. Managers of the alliance could then re-focus
their attention on more important matters. Even that kind of solution, though, would not
address the true threat to the U.S.-South Korea alliance, which is Trump’s exceedingly coarse
and transactional worldview. “The president’s vision of American power is fundamentally stunted and warped,” Glosserman says.
“There’s no understanding that American power really rests on values, and if you don’t understand the complexities of power, then
you’re never going to grasp the multiple dimensions of an alliance.” Regardless of how much Moon opts to pay to station American
troops in South Korea, a disproportionate burden of preserving the alliance will continue to fall on his shoulders.
The U.S.-South Korea relationship is on the verge of collapse
Kim 19 (Hyung-Jin Kim is a reporter for AP news, based in seaul. “Concerns about U.S.-South korea relations ahead of North
Korea summit” Febuary 2019, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/concerns-about-u-s-south-korea-relations-grow-ahead-ofnorth-korea-summit, Jack)
Trump’s repeated assertions that the U.S. military
deployment in South Korea is too costly, and to his surprise
suspension of some U.S. military exercises with South Korea —
including a major summertime drill — as a concession to Kim after
their first summit in Singapore last year. Added to this concern are
policies by South Korea’s liberal President Moon Jae-in that critics
say favor engagement with North Korea at the expense of the
alliance with Washington. The broader U.S.-South Korean alliance, sealed during the bloodshed of the 1950-53
Much of this worry is linked to
Korean War, won’t be on the negotiating table during the summit in Hanoi on Feb. 27-28. But some observers say its long-term future could be in doubt
Trump may eventually withdraw some of the 28,500 U.S.
troops deployed in South Korea. “The Korea-U.S. alliance is
seriously ill now,” Kim Taewoo, the former head of the
government-funded Korea Institute for National Unification in
South Korea, said in a recent speech.
and that
Young South Koreans are identifying the u.s. as the main threat against south
korea-strains relations
Monaghan ’18 (Patrick Monaghan, 4-21-2018, "Is the U.S.-South Korean Alliance in trouble?"
https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/is-the-us-south-korea-alliance-in-trouble/, Jack)
South Korea’s first liberal president since 2007,
following two staunchly pro-American administrations, ushered in a new era with predictable consequences. The disparity
between the liberal government in Seoul and the Republican administration in
Washington has led many to predict that U.S.-South Korea relations are heading
south and likely to stay there. The last time a liberal South Korean president was
paired with a conservative U.S. counterpart, the two allies witnessed a significant
rollback in relations, including a wave of angry anti-U.S. protests in Seoul
following a tragic accident in which two Korean schoolgirls were run over by a
U.S. Army personnel carrier, a gradual reduction in the size of U.S. forces on the
peninsula (from 37,000 to less than 24,000), and a decision to plan the removal of U.S. Forces Korea/8th Army headquarters
from Yongsan Garrison in Seoul. Early in his term, Moon drew rebukes in U.S. conservative
circles for his suggestion that the United States could not launch a preemptive
attack against North Korea without the South’s permission. U.S. hawks are concerned that
The election of President Moon Jae-in last year,
Seoul’s eagerness to defuse tensions and compassion for its brothers to the North will make the achievement of conservatives’
strategic goals, which include the maintenance of a U.S. military foothold on the Asian continent, problematic. Moon has been
But his sky-high 71 percent approval
rating among the South Korean public and his party’s condemnation of its nowdisgraced conservative predecessors’ obsequiousness toward the U.S. make it
likely a more formal and transactional, if not estranged, relationship with
Washington will continue to emerge over the remaining four-plus years of
Moon’s term. Ironically, a move toward a permanent peace, as much as a move
toward war, between the U.S. and North Korea may produce the same effect:
without the need for Washington’s military muscle, South Koreans may see their
future along a more culturally comfortable Asian axis than a trans-Pacific one. But
perhaps the biggest long-term threat to Washington’s influence over Korean security and strategy is demographic: the
reluctant to publicly advance the perception of any rift with Washington.
younger voters in South Korea, culturally influential and a critical part of Moon’s
political base, are openly skeptical, if not hostile, toward Washington’s
intentions. A well-publicized recent survey of incoming South Korean military
cadets identified the United States, not North Korea or even Korea’s colonial
occupier Japan, as the nation’s leading security threat. Far too young to share their grandparents’
nostalgia for the arrival of U.S.-led UN forces in the dramatic Incheon landing,
younger Koreans have watched the United States wage wars of choice and topple
regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, and fear the massive death and destruction that
could follow a similar action launched against its North Korean neighbors. Younger
South Koreans feel that their nation’s burgeoning success as a cultural, sporting, and geopolitical power deserves greater respect
and attention, and have found more receptive and appreciative audiences in neighboring Asian countries, China in particular, than
Young Koreans are turning their attention to China; more now
study on the Chinese mainland than in the United States.
they have in the United States.
Taiwan
I/L D – Posturing
Tensions over Taiwan are posturing – political consequence, lack of resources
mean it stays limited at worst
Apps 1/7 [Peter, journalist for Reuters, “Commentary: Will China go to War Over Taiwan?”;
published 1/7/19, accessed 6/25/19; https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apps-taiwancommentary/commentary-will-china-go-to-war-over-taiwan-idUSKCN1P11IT]
China’s rulers have long regarded the island as a rogue province, with regaining control a point of honor for the ruling Communist
Party and military alike. In a major speech on Wednesday, Xi
warned the “problem” could not be held over for
another generation. While he talked primarily of “peaceful unification,” he said Beijing reserves
the right to use force if necessary. The speech brought a sharp rebuke from Taiwan, where residents remain strongly
opposed to rejoining China, even under a Hong Kong-style “one country, two systems” deal. Nothing in Xi’s speech
suggested China sees conflict as imminent. However, Xi’s comments about support for peaceful “reunification”
included a warning that “we do not promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option to use all necessary measures” to
prevent Taiwan’s independence. Ultimately, if Beijing truly wishes to reassert control over the island, military force may be its
only option. That would
be a risky step for a government that has not fought a war against a foreign
state since a brief and unsuccessful conflict with Vietnam in 1979. It would also put Beijing on a
collision course with Washington, which does not support Taiwan’s independence but has what the U.S. State
Department describes as “a robust unofficial relationship” with Taipei. To invade the island successfully, most military analysts argue
that Beijing
would either have to deter the United States from intervening or defeat nearby U.S.
forces and prevent others from entering the region. China may not yet be strong enough to do this, but its
military enlargement means that may not always be the case. Certainly, Chinese military thinking increasingly revolves around just
this kind of potential war, in which Beijing would want to grab territory while keeping U.S. forces back. Much of China’s
military buildup has been based around ships, aircraft, and arms systems that appear suited for the type of conflict needed to
take Taiwan. As well as landing ships to carry assault troops, that includes a focus on missiles designed to destroy U.S. aircraft
carriers – or prompting Washington to keep out of range of the conflict. How well those weapons would work is another question,
but they would be central to any conflict over Taiwan or disputed islands elsewhere in the South China Sea. To an extent, much of
is grandstanding geopolitical ballet. Beijing has been unable to stop Taiwan from acting as a
de facto country over the last half century, but remains desperate to prevent the island from making an outright
this
declaration of independence. To an extent, this posturing – like Beijing’s increasing military assertiveness with warships and jets
around Taiwan – is about reminding those in power in Taipei that any vote on independence might bring war. But there’s more to it
than that. As China asserts itself as a global power, Beijing wants to show the world that it is strong enough to take Taiwan at any
point it wants. Domestic Taiwanese politics also remain a factor. In the run-up to Taiwan’s November elections, Taiwanese officials
accused China of a Russia-style messaging campaign to undermine support for President Tsai Ing-wen’s pro-independence
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Those elections saw a serious setback for the DPP and a strong performance by the pro-Chinese
Kuomintang opposition, but Xi’s comments last week suggest Beijing still sees military posturing as the best way of pressuring the
island. Taking Taiwan militarily would not be a simple operation. Chinese forces would face sophisticated
Taiwanese missile, mine, submarine and air attack if they tried to cross the 110-mile (180 km) Taiwan Strait. The island’s highly
populated cities and densely forested mountains would prove a guerrilla fighter’s paradise.
A botched Taiwan invasion,
potentially with tens of thousands of casualties, could prove an international humiliation as well
as kickstarting a domestic political crisis for Xi. Taiwan, for its part, clearly wishes to persuade China that it is not an
easy target. Taipei intends to spend $11 billion on defense this year, a six percent increase from 2018. Much of that will be spent on
cutting-edge U.S. and Taiwan-made equipment – on Jan. 2, Taipei unveiled its latest domestically-built anti-ship missile, capable of
inflicting serious casualties on any Chinese invasion force. For Washington and Beijing alike, most of the military
posturing
for now is likely to remain limited to the Taiwan Strait. Last year, the U.S. Navy sent several ships through the
Strait in what a U.S. Pacific Fleet statement described as a demonstration of the U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. In
1996, President Bill Clinton sent two U.S. aircraft carriers – a much more potent force – through the same route during a crisis with
China; some argue Washington should again take similar action. That would outrage Beijing – no U.S. carrier has sailed through in
more than a decade, although China’s aircraft carrier has sailed the same waters in its own show of force.
Impact D – Latin America Thumps
Latin America ventures thump
Scott 6/11 [Senator Rick Scott (R-FL), sitting senator on the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, former governor of Florida, “China’s growing influence in Latin
America is a threat to our way of life”; published 6/11/19, accessed 6/26/19;
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/11/sen-rick-scott-chinas-growing-influence-in-latin-america-isa-threat-to-us.html]
Last month I traveled to Panama, Colombia and Argentina. The purpose of my trip was to get an update on the fight for freedom and
liberty in Venezuela, to highlight the important economic relationships between Latin America and my state of Florida and to
continue building on the progress made to stop narco-trafficking. On all of those fronts we made important progress and had great
conversations about the future. I came away with another impression that I, quite honestly, hadn’t expected. But it’s one that is
stark and unmistakable. All
across Latin America, we’re seeing the creeping influence of China in our
hemisphere. We know that China is a bad actor. China is not our friend. China sees the United States as its global
adversary and is taking the steps necessary to “win” the great power conflict of the 21st
Century. We know they’ve been stealing our technology and our intellectual property. We know they manipulate their currency.
We know they’ve been developing bases in the South China Sea. We know they’ve flooded the United States with dangerous
fentanyl. We know their state sponsored technology companies like ZTE and Huawei have been accused of fraud, violating the Iran
sanctions and stealing intellectual property. We know China consistently violates human rights. We know that China suppresses
freedom of speech. We know what China is. And yet, how
many Americans realize that in countries just a few
thousand miles (and in some cases a few hundred miles) away, China is taking every opportunity
it can to gain influence and exert control. Latin America is the new battleground in the greatest
geopolitical conflict of our time. In Panama, the Chinese government is building its own port in Colon to exert more
control over international trade between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres and drive out competition. Street restaurants in
Panama have menus in English, Spanish and – you guessed it – Chinese. Meanwhile, Colombia is experiencing a mass-influx of
refugees from Venezuela. Venezuela’s president Nicolás Maduro’s policies are not only causing the deaths of thousands of his own
people, he’s also created a refugee crisis with millions of Venezuelans fleeing his brutal regime. Most have gone to Colombia, which
is struggling to keep up with the migration. China’s president Xi Jinping knows what Maduro is doing to his own people. He knows
that he’s intentionally starving them, that he’s using Cuban security forces to harass dissidents and beat children in the streets. Xi
doesn’t care. China is a willing participant in Maduro’s genocide. If we take a stand against China now, American businesses and
American consumers will come out on top. Our manufacturing sector will be stronger. America will export more products. Our trade
secrets will be protected. The average American consumer will benefit. China continues to prop up the Maduro regime, along with
Cuba, Russia and Iran. Why? It’s pretty simple. Venezuela, before the tyranny of Hugo Chavez and Maduro, was an economic hub
with huge reserves of oil and other natural resources. It can become that again and China wants in on the ground floor. Even after
the revelations of their dubious dealings, Maduro announced that Venezuela would make major investments in Huawei and ZTE
despite not being able to even feed his own people. China’s support for Maduro is already paying off for them. Almost 3,000 miles
due south of Bogota, in Argentina, China is set to build a nuclear facility after signing an agreement with President Mauricio Macri.
The deal includes a $10 billion loan from China. Make no mistake. This is not by accident. Everything
China does is on
purpose. And right now, under our very noses, its purpose is to gain a foothold in Latin America
by any means necessary, even if it means propping up ruthless dictators.
Impact D – OBOR Thumps
OBOR thumps
Mahato 18 [Rubeena, Nepali writer for the South China Morning Post covering global and
regional politics, “India and the West are concerned about China’s growing influence in South
Asia – South Asians should be, too”; published 10/18/18, accessed 6/26/19;
https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/asia/article/2169108/india-and-west-areconcerned-about-chinas-growing]
A new geopolitics is shaping up in South Asia: China is fast replacing India and the West,
commanding greater say among small South Asian states which have felt bogged down by Indian
and Western machinations.
Despite India’s opposition and warnings about debt entrapment and environmental crises, most
South Asian states have joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, apart from concerns
about what the initiative means for the West and India, there has been little discussion of how
small South Asian states will be affected by the belt and road strategy and how they will seek to
influence the terms of engagement.
To be sure, the project has faced setbacks: there have been delays and concerns about financial
viability and political sovereignty, and critics have argued that the whole endeavour could be a
massive waste. Still, the initiative is taking shape.
The inability of the West to imagine, let alone build, such a project has allowed China an
enviable entry point to shape and influence global politics. Having lost hope of reducing poverty
with the Western development model, developing countries have opted to try the Chinese
approach of investing in large infrastructure projects.
It remains to be seen if the Chinese model will rescue countries from underdevelopment or push
them deeper into economic troubles. But economic impacts aside, there are other lessdiscussed consequences of the belt and road strategy and increased engagement with China
that South Asian countries should carefully consider.
The first is geopolitical, particularly new alliance formation in South Asia and its effect on the
domestic politics of small states. Western attempts at rebalancing relations, including a
European Union proposal about building an alternative to the belt and road scheme, can be
seen in this light.
The tri-polar competition of India, China and the West in the region has often led to frequent
regime changes, political instability and, consequently, erosion of democratic rules and values in
small South Asian states. Thanks to the belt and road scheme, the geopolitical rivalry will
accelerate further.
At times, geopolitical competition has enabled South Asian states to wield bargaining power,
but has more frequently locked them in survival mode, unable to focus on the more demanding
jobs of state-building and economic development.
Additionally, there have been cases where bigger powers have bypassed smaller countries to
reach an understanding on issues of tri-lateral disputes. This happened most recently in Doklam,
in Bhutan’s case, and previously in Kalapani, in Nepal’s case. In both instances, India and China
forged an agreement without involving the countries concerned. The belt and road would bring
another level of complexity to the tri-lateral interactions in the region.
India intervened on Bhutan’s behalf in a border dispute with China that lasted for more than
two months in mid-2017, an incident which left some Bhutanese convinced that they need to
assert their own sovereignty in negotiating with China, without India’s help. Photo: AFP
India intervened on Bhutan’s behalf in a border dispute with China that lasted for more than
two months in mid-2017, an incident which left some Bhutanese convinced that they need to
assert their own sovereignty in negotiating with China, without India’s help. Photo: AFP
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The second impact will be in terms of how close engagement with China through projects such
as the belt and road transforms political culture and public opinion in the small states. A
consequence of democratic decline in the West is that, increasingly, people in transitional
countries may see China’s political model as more attractive.
Third will be the ecological impact of the belt and road scheme and the implications for climate
security. Most South Asian states already feel the effects of climate change, which they had very
little role in causing. Participating countries must understand how an infrastructure race in one
of the most ecologically fragile regions will affect regional and global climate systems.
Is China serious about curbing pollution along the belt and road?
The belt and road project will bring to the fore pertinent questions about environmental
degradation, climate-change-induced conflict and displacement, and the potential for state
failure. These challenges cannot be addressed at the state level but would need collective
deliberations.
As of now, there is no mechanism or effective structure in place where such deliberations can
take place. Forums like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation are ineffective and
small states embroiled in their own battles have been unable to think together on issues of
shared importance.
Consequently, the conversation on the belt and road has focused on how the West should
position itself to protect its interests in South Asia, given the waning power of the Indo-West
alliance in the region and how small states will no longer provide a buffer space.
Investment in infrastructure requires cooperation not competition
The West’s immediate interests with regards to the belt and road involve maintaining trade
competitiveness and security leverage. One could argue that, as a major development partner,
Western interests in South Asia also extend to support on environmental sustainability, social
and economic development, governance reform and democracy building.
Impact D – Chinese Heg
No impact to Chinese heg – not hostile
Paul Heer 19. Served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia in the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence from 2007 to 2015, since served as Robert E. Wilhelm Research Fellow
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies and as Adjunct
Professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. 1-8-2019.
"Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia." National Interest.
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-40972
But this policy
mantra has two fundamental problems: it mischaracterizes China’s strategic intentions in the
based on a U.S. strategic objective that is probably no longer achievable. First, China
is pursuing hegemony in East Asia, but not an exclusive hostile hegemony. It is not trying to
extrude the United States from the region or deny American access there. The Chinese have long
recognized the utility—and the benefits to China itself—of U.S. engagement with the region, and they
have indicated receptivity to peaceful coexistence and overlapping spheres of influence with
the United States there. Moreover, China is not trying to impose its political or economic system
on its neighbors, and it does not seek to obstruct commercial freedom of navigation in the
region (because no country is more dependent on freedom of the seas than China itself). In short,
Beijing wants to extend its power and influence within East Asia, but not as part of a “winnertake-all” contest. China does have unsettled and vexing sovereignty claims over Taiwan, most of the
islands and other features in the East and South China Seas, and their adjacent waters. Although Beijing has
demonstrated a willingness to use force in defense or pursuit of these claims, it is not looking
for excuses to do so. Whether these disputes can be managed or resolved in a way that is
mutually acceptable to the relevant parties and consistent with U.S. interests in the region is an open, longterm question. But that possibility should not be ruled out on the basis of—or made more difficult by—
false assumptions of irreconcilable interests. On the contrary, it should be pursued on the basis
of a recognition that all the parties want to avoid conflict—and that the sovereignty disputes in the region
region, and it is
ultimately are not military problems requiring military solutions. And since Washington has never been opposed in principle to
reunification between China and Taiwan as long as it is peaceful, and similarly takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the
other disputed features, their long-term disposition need not be the litmus test of either U.S. or Chinese hegemony in the region. Of
course, China would prefer not to have forward-deployed U.S. military forces in the Western Pacific
that could be used against it, but Beijing has long tolerated and arguably could indefinitely tolerate an
American military presence in the region—unless that presence is clearly and exclusively aimed at
coercing or containing China. It is also true that Beijing disagrees with American principles of military freedom of navigation in
the region; and this constitutes a significant challenge in waters where China claims territorial jurisdiction in violation of the UN
Commission on the Law of the Sea. But this should not be conflated with a Chinese desire or intention to exclusively “control” all the
waters within the first island chain in the Western Pacific. The Chinese almost certainly recognize that exclusive control or
“domination” of the neighborhood is not achievable at any reasonable cost, and that pursuing it would be counterproductive by
inviting pushback and challenges that would negate the objective. So what would Chinese
“hegemony” in East Asia
like American primacy in the Western
Hemisphere: a model in which China is generally recognized and acknowledged as the de facto
central or primary power in the region, but has little need or incentive for militarily adventurism
because the mutual benefits of economic interdependence prevail and the neighbors have no reason—and
mean or look like? Beijing probably thinks in terms of something much
inherent disincentives—to challenge China’s vital interests or security. And as a parallel to China’s economic and diplomatic
engagement in Latin America, Beijing would neither exclude nor be hostile to continued U.S. engagement in East Asia. A
standard counterargument to this relatively benign scenario is that Beijing would not be content with it for
long because China’s strategic ambitions will expand as its capabilities grow. This
is a valid hypothesis, but it usually
overlooks the greater possibility that China’s external ambitions will expand not because its
inherent capabilities have grown, but because Beijing sees the need to be more assertive in
response to external challenges to Chinese interests or security. Indeed, much of China’s
“assertiveness” within East Asia over the past decade—when Beijing probably would prefer to focus on
domestic priorities—has been a reaction to such perceived challenges. Accordingly, Beijing’s willingness to settle for
a narrowly-defined, peaceable version of regional preeminence will depend heavily on whether it perceives other countries—
especially the United States—as trying to deny China this option and instead obstruct Chinese interests or security in the region.
Impact D – US Heg
Heg is ineffective ---no causal relationship with peace
Fettweis, 17 – Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University (Christopher,
“Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace,” Security Studies, 26:3, 423-451, 5-8-2017,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394)
Conflict and Hegemony by Region
Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all
corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most
important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have
contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the
latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the
hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially
between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible
explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy,
democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is
certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned
world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity
has generally been much
better, but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear. Overall US interest in the affairs
of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all
regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in
the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US
interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 Regional peace and stability exist where there is
US active intervention, as well as where there is not. No direct relationship seems to exist across
regions. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional
picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not
been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the
moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant,
where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. US
intervention is imperfectly correlated with
stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the
security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse. In recent years, substantial hard power
investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on
diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible
that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to
make the case that the US presence has improved matters. In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony
has failed to bring peace. In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any
particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s
intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more
blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of
peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century
conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highlevel US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors
(Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of
the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made
repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67
The war ended in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The
Horn of
Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious
US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably
affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is
minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the
presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It
seems hard to make the case that the relative
peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative
leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.