DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI SHAH ALAM
DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN
PERBICARAAN JENAYAH NO. 45A-58-2010
_____________________________________
PENDAKWA RAYA
LAWAN
ALIREZA SHAHIDI HOUSHANG
(Warganegara Iran)
PENGHAKIMAN
1.
Alireza Shahidi Houshang (OKT) telah dilepas dan dibebas
di akhir kes Pembelaan.
Pendakwa Raya merayu terhadap
keputusan itu.
2.
Pihak Pendakwaan telah memanggil Sembilan (9) orang saksi.
3.
Keterangan Oliver Tiong (SP1) menyatakan bahawa dia telah
diarahkan oleh SP3 dan SP7 untuk mengambil gambar
berkaitan dengan kes ini. Gambar-gambar yang diambil oleh
SP1 ditandakan sebagai P5 (1-35).
1
4.
Pada 1.2.2010 Mohd. Zamri Shafiee (SP2) bertugas bersamasama Norazmakhairoladhar Abu Hassan (SP3) dan Mohd. AlHakim Mohd. Salleh di Unit Khas Pemeriksaan Penumpang 1
(UKPP), KLIA. Pada jam lebih kurang 11.45 malam, seorang
penumpang yang dicamkan sebagai OKT telah datang dari
Carousel D menuju laluan hijau bersama satu beg pengembara
berwarna merah hitam (P4).
SP2 telah melihat OKT dalam
jarak lebih kurang 10 meter membawa P4. OKT ditahan dan
dia telah diarahkan oleh SP2 pergi ke mesin pengimbas yang
dikendalikan oleh Mohd. Al-Hakim Mohd. Salleh dan juga SP3
untuk imbas bagasi yang dibawanya. Hasil imbasan adalah
mencurigakan.
SP3 mengarahkan OKT mengosongkan P4
dan ia diimbas sekali lagi.
Hasil imbasan P4 yang kosong
tetap mencurigakan. SP3 telah menghubungi Idris bin Ismail
untuk memaklumkan perkara berkenaan.
OKT diarahkan
bersama P4 untuk ke pejabat.
5.
SP3 telah memberi keterangan bahawa semasa pemeriksaan
awal dilakukan di Kaunter Pemeriksaan A, OKT nampak
berpeluh-peluh dan telefon bimbitnya sentiasa berbunyi. OKT
juga pucat semasa pemeriksaan berkenaan.
6.
Apabila pihak Narkotik tiba iaitu SP1, Amaludin Gimin (SP7),
Stanley a/l Simon Joney dan Choo Kim Hon, P4 telah diperiksa
rapi oleh SP3.
SP3
telah memotong kain dalam P4 di
bahagian atas dan kemudian telah mengeluarkan satu
cardboard tebal berwarna putih (P59). SP3 kemudiannya telah
2
memotong cardboard tersebut dan mendapati terdapat satu
kertas
karbon
(P60)
dan
satu
plastik
lutsinar
yang
mengandungi serbuk putih Kristal (P61) yang disyaki dadah.
7.
SP3 telah melabel dan membuat penandaan pada semua
barang kes. Semasa proses melabel dan membuat penandaan
barang kes, OKT berada bersama barang kes.
8.
SP3 telah membuat serahan barang kes kepada SP7 melalui
borang serahan kes (P9).
9.
SP7
telah
memeriksa
barang-barang
milik
OKT
dan
menyediakan senarai sita (P64) di mana kesemua barang yang
disita daripada OKT telah dicamkan.
SP7 telah membuat
pemeriksaan dan menurunkan tandatangannya ke atas semua
barang kes.
10.
Selepas penerimaan barang-barang kes daripada SP3, SP7
telah membawa balik semuanya bersama OKT dan ia
disimpan dalam kabinet besi berpalang di biliknya di mana SP7
seorang sahaja yang memegang kuncinya.
11.
SP7
dalam
keterangannya
mengatakan
P59
telah
dimasukkan dalam sampul (P57) dan telah diseal dengan seal
Kastam dan telah dihantar ke Jabatan Kimia Malaysia.
Sepanjang pergerakan barang-barang kes ini, hanya SP7 yang
mengawalnya sehinggalah ke Jabatan Kimia Malaysia. P57
telah diserahkan kepada Zulkefli bin Mohd. Edin (SP6).
3
12.
SP7 telah menerima semula P57 daripada SP6 dan P57 telah
disimpan
selamat
di dalam kabinet besi berpalang yang
dikawal oleh SP7 seorang.
13.
SP7
dalam
perbandingan
keterangan
pasport
mengatakan
beliau
(P7) dengan E-tiket
membuat
(P63) yang
dirampas daripada OKT dan SP7 mendapati kedua-duanya
mempunyai persamaan pada nama OKT. SP7 juga membuat
perbandingan dengan tag bagasi (P72) yang dirampas pada
beg OKT (P4) dengan “baggage claim tag” yang ada pada OKT
yang dirampas oleh SP3 dan didapati terdapat persamaan
pada nombor tag, iaitu Y9853551.
14.
SP6 (ahli kimia) telah menerima satu sampul bertanda AG
(P57) dari Pegawai Penyiasat (SP7) beserta borang Kimia 14
(P54) pada 8.2.2010.
Selepas menerima P57, SP6 telah
mengeluarkan resit kepada SP7.
Resit ditandakan sebagai
P55. SP7 mendapati di dalam P57 terdapat P59, P60 dan P61
yang mengandungi dadah.
15.
SP6 telah menganalisa bahan serbuk kristal yang disyaki
dadah itu.
SP6 telah menyediakan laporan kimia iaitu P56
yang menyatakan hasil analisa menunjukkan bahawa bahan
berbentuk kristal itu ialah dadah jenis Methamphetamine.
Berat dadah Methamphetamine ini ialah 1795 gram.
4
16.
Setelah
selesai
analisa
dadah
tersebut,
SP6
telah
memasukkan dadah Methamphetamine tersebut ke dalam
peket (P58) yang dibekalkan oleh Jabatan Kimia.
29.4.2010, SP6
Pada
telah menyerahkan semula barang kes
kepada SP7.
17.
Revathi a/p Perumal (SP4) merupakan ahli kimia bagi analisa
DNA.
Pada 17.12.2010 lebih kurang jam 3.00 petang SP4
telah menerima satu kotak bertanda AG-1 (P13) daripada
Meor Ahmad Sazali bin Dol Hadi (SP5). Permintaan adalah
untuk menjalankan
ujian profiling DNA ke atas pakaian-
pakaian (P19-P52) dengan membandingkan sampel darah
yang diambil dari OKT (P18). Hasil ujian DNA berkenaan, SP4
membuat kesimpulan seperti berikut:
(a)
profil DNA lelaki berpadanan dengan P18 (darahOKT)
pada pakaian-pakaian P19, 42, 45;
(b)
profil DNA separa berpadanan dengan P18 (darah OKT)
pada pakaian-pakaian P22, 23, 27, 33, 40, 43, 47;
(c)
profil DNA tidak berpadanan dengan P18 (darah OKT)
pada pakaian P31;
(d)
profil DNA campuran sekurang-kurang 3 orang individu
pada pakaian-pakaian P21, 26, 28, 29, 39, 48, 49;
(e)
profil DNA campuran sekurang-kurangnya 2 individu
pada pakaian P20, 34, 37 (penyumbang major ialah
OKT);
5
18.
(f)
profil DNA lemah pada pakaian P24, 44, 46, 50, 51;
(g)
tiada profil DNA diperolehi daripada pakaian P25, 32, 35,
38, 41, 52A & B;
(h)
tiada DNA dikesan pada pakaian P30, 36.
Mohd. Samsul Shamsuddin (SP8), telah memberi keterangan
bahawa pada 4.2.2010, SP8 telah didatangi oleh SP7 bersama
Md. Fuad Saad dan juga OKT untuk mengambil sampel darah
bagi ujian DNA. SP8 telah mengeluarkan Kad FTA (P18) yang
mengandungi sampel darah OKT dan seal Kad FTA
berkenaan kemudiannya menyerahkannya kepada SP7.
19.
Idris Ismail (SP9) telah memberi keterangan bahawa beliau
mengendalikan CCTV milik Kastam di Lapangan Terbang
Antarabangsa Kuala Lumpur dan telah menerima permintaan
untuk mendapatkan salinan rakaman CCTV di empat lokasi
iaitu di Carousel D, laluan hijau lorong keluar, mesin
pengimbas A serta di kaunter pemeriksaan A.
SP9 telah
mengecamkan SP7 membuat permohonan berkenaan. SP8
memberi keterangan bahawa pada 2.2.2010, beliau telah
menyerahkan kepada SP7satu pen drive bagi rakaman CCTV
di empat tempat berkenaan. SP8 juga memberi keterangan
bahawa pen drive tersebut gagal dikemukakan atas alasan
telah dijangkiti virus dan telah dibuang.
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20.
Di akhir kes Pendakwaan Mahkamah membuat pendapat
bahawa:
(a)
Semasa OKT ditahan dia mempunyai jagaan dan
kawalan P4;
(b)
Pasport OKT (P7) dan E-tiket (P63) menunjukkan
persamaan nama OKT padanya sementara tag bagasi
pada P4 dan “baggage claim tag”(P18) yang dirampas
daripada OKT oleh SP3 mempunyai nombor tag yang
sama iaitu Y 9853551;
(c)
P4 mengandungi dadah methamphetamine seberat 1795
gram disembunyi sulit di tulang belakang P4 terselindung
dengan “cardboard” putih (P59).
21.
Milikan (“possession”) telah diperjelas dalam kes PP v. Abdul
Rahman Akif [2007] 4 CLJ 337 di mana Mahkamah
Persekutuan telah merujuk kepada kes Chan Pean Leon v.
PP [1956] 22 MLJ 237 seperti berikut:
“ In Chan Pean Leon v. Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 LNS 17; [1956]
22 MLJ 237 Thomson J dealt with the issue of possession under
the Common Gaming Houses Ordinance 1953 and at p. 239 he
observed:
“Possession” itself as regards the criminal law is described as
follows in Stephen’s Digest (9th Edition, page 304):
A moveable thing is said to be in the possession of a
person when he is so situated with respect to it that he
has the power to deal with it as owner to the exclusion of
all other persons, and when the circumstances are such
that he may be presumed to intend to do so in case of
need.
7
To put it otherwise, there is a physical element and a mental
element which must both be present before possession is made
out. The accused must not only be so situated that he can deal
with the thing as if it belonged to him, for example have it in his
pocket or have it lying in front of him on a table. It must also be
shewn that he had the intention of dealing with it as if it
belonged to him should he see any occasion to do so, in other
words, that he had some animus possidendi. Intention is a
matter of fact which in the nature of things cannot be proved by
direct evidence. It can only be proved by inference from the
surrounding circumstances.
Whether these surrounding
circumstances make out such intention is a question of fact in
each individual case. If a watch is in my pocket then in the
absence of anything else the inference will be clear that I intend
to deal with it as if it were my own and accordingly I am in
possession of it. On the other hand, if it is lying on a table in a
room in which I am but which is also frequently used by other
people then the mere fact that I am in physical proximity to it
does not give rise to the inference that I intend to deal with it as
if it belonged to me. There must be some evidence that I am
doing or having done something with it that shews such an
intention. Or it must be clear that the circumstances in which it
is found shew such an intention. It may be found in a locked
room to which I hold the key or it may be found in a drawer
mixed up with my own belongings or it may be found, as
occurred in a recent case, in a box under my bed. The possible
circumstances canot be set out exhaustively and it is impossible
to lay down any general rule on the point. But there must be
something in the evidence to satisfy the court that the person
who is physically in a position to deal with the thing as his own
had the intention of doing so.
[15] And further down on the same page he added:
Here again knowledge cannot be proved by direct evidence, it
can only be proved by inference from the surrounding
circumstances. Again the possible variety of circumstances
which will support such an inference is infinite.”.
(Penggarisan oleh saya).
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22.
Beralih kepada faktor “pengetahuan” di pihak OKT dalam hal
keadaan milikan dan kawalan P4 (serta kandungannya) itu,
keadaan mental pengetahuan OKT boleh dilihat dari latar
belakang semua fakta dengan memberi “weight” kepada
kredibiliti saksi-saksi (PP v. Hla Win [1995] 2 SLR 424).
Milikan (“possession”) dalam undang-undang jenayah telah
ditafsirkan dalam Stephen’s Digest (Edisi 9 di muka surat 304)
seperti ditunjukkan di perenggan 22 di atas tadi.
23.
Dalam kes Teh Hock Leong v. PP [2008] 4 CLJ 764
Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan bahawa:
“It is true that mens rea possession is an element of the offence of
trafficking. But it is an element like the mental element in other
crimes which cannot be established by direct evidence save in a
case where an accused expressly admits the commission of the
offence. It has, like the mens rea in other offences, to be
established by circumstantial evidence. In other words it is an
ingredient that is to be inferred from the totality of the
circumstances of a particular individual case. We can here do no
better than to quote from the judgment of Lord Diplock in Ong
Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor [1980]1 LNS 181; [1981] 1 MLJ 64,
at p. 69:
‘Proof of the purpose for which an act is done, where such
purpose is a necessary ingredient of the offence with which
an accused is charged, presents a problem with which
criminal courts are very familiar. Generally, in the absence
of an expressed admission by the accused, the purpose with
which he did an act is a matter of inference from what he did.
Thus, in the case of an accused caught in the act of
conveying from one place to another controlled drugs in a
quantity much larger than is likely to be needed for his own
consumption the inference that he was transporting them for
9
the purpose of trafficking in them would, in the absence of
any plausible explanation by him, be irresistible – even if
there were no statutory presumption such as is contained in
section 15 of the Drugs Act.’.
Turning to the facts of the present instance, we agree with the
learned trial judge that the method employed to bring the drugs
in question from Thailand into Malaysia was done in a most
cunning fashion to escape detection by the authorities. The
method employed to convey or transport a drug may sometimes
furnish evidence of knowledge. For example, an attempt to
carefully conceal a drug may indicate an intention to avoid
detection and thereby point to knowledge. Of course it all
depends on the facts of each individual case.”.
(Penggarisan oleh saya).
24.
Dalam kes Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner
[1968] 2 All ER 356 (House of Lords) Lord Morris menyatakan
pengetahuan (”knowledge”) yang perlu bagi membuktikan
milikan (“possession”) adalah seperti berikut:
“If there is assent to the control of a thing, either after having
the means of knowledge of what the thing is or contains or
being unmindful whether there are means of knowledge or not,
then ordinarily there will be possession. If there is some
momentary custody of a thing without any knowledge or means
of knowledge of what the thing is or contains then, ordinarily,
I would suppose that there would not be possession. If,
however, someone deliberately assumes control of some
package or container, then I would think that he is in
possession of it. If he deliberately so assumes control knowing
that it has contents, he would also be in possession of the
contents. I cannot think that it would be rational to hold that
someone who is in possession of a box which he knows to
have things in it is in possession of the box but not in
possession of the things in it. If he had been misinformed or
misled as to the nature of the contents, or if he had made a
10
wrong surmise as to them, it seems to me that he would
nevertheless be in possession of them.”.
25.
Dalam kes Zulfikar bin Mustaffah v. PP [2001] 1 SLR 633
Mahkamah Rayuan Singapura menyatakan di muka surat 639
seperti berikut:
“21. For the element of `possesion’ (within the meaning of
s. 17 of the Misuse of Drugs Act) to be established, it must not
only be shown that the accused had physical control of the
drugs at the relevant time; the prosecution must also prove that
the accused possessed the requisite knowledge as to the
contents of what he was carrying: see Warner v. Metropolitan
Police Commissioner [1969] 2 AC 256; Tan Ah Tee & Anor v.
PP [1978] 1 LNS 193; [1978-1979] SLR 211; [1980] 1 MLJ 49.
In the course of the appeal before us, counsel for the appellant
relied heavily on the fact that the contents of the bundles were
securely wrapped in newspapers and could not be identified.
We were accordingly invited to draw the inference that the
appellant had no knowledge of the contents of the bundles.
22. We were unable to accede to this request. While the fact
that the contents of the bundles were hidden from view may
have been relevant in determining whether the requisite
knowledge was absent, this factor should still not be given too
much weight. Otherwise, drug peddlers could escape liability
simply by ensuring that any drugs coming into their possession
are first securely sealed in opaque wrappings. Rather, the
court must appraise the entire facts of the case to see if the
accused’s claim to ignorance is credible. As Yong Pung How
CJ remarked in PP v. Hla Win [1995] 2 SLR 424 (at p. 438):
In the end, the finding of the mental state of knowledge, or the
rebuttal of it, is an inference to be drawn by a trial judge from
all the facts and circumstances of the particular case, giving
due weight to the credibility of the witnesses.”.
11
26.
Dalam kes Teh Hock Leong v. PP [2010] 1 MLJ 741,
Mahkamah
Persekutuan,
antara
lainnya,
membuat
pemerhatian tentang pengetahuan dari sudut perlakuan
(“conduct”) seperti berikut:
“First, he contended that the High Court and the Court of
Appeal had failed to consider the contemporaneous conduct of
the appellant in not trying to escape or putting up a struggle
with the police when confronted by PW5 and his men or
attempting to disassociate or discard the backpack containing
the dangerous drugs. Such conduct, if considered by the
courts below, could infer that the appellant had no knowledge
of the said drugs in the backpack.
It is our view that in order to draw a favourable inference from
the appellant’s contemporaneous conduct, his action or
inaction must be examined in the light of the situation at the
material time….
And, if the appellant were to attempt to throw away or
disassociate himself with the backpack during this entire
duration described it would evidently be noticeable. Of
course, since the drugs were so cunningly concealed, there
could be no necessity to take such drastic actions which may
attract instant suspicion. So against these circumstances, the
appellant’s docile conduct throughout the period described
could not have inferred an absence of knowledge of the said
drugs.”.
(Penggarisan oleh saya).
27.
Beralih pula kepada faktor pembuktian pengedaran, seksyen 2
Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 mentafsirkan seperti berikut:
“trafficking” includes the doing of any of the following acts, that
is to say, manufacturing, importing, exporting, keeping,
concealing, buying, selling, giving, receiving, storing,
administering, transporting, carrying, sending, delivering,
procuring, supplying or distributing any dangerous drug
12
otherwise than under the authority of this Act or the
regulations made under the Act.”.
Dalam hal keadaan fakta perbuatan OKT membawa masuk ke
negara ini dadah methamphetamine (1795 gram) yang tersorok
rapi dalam P4 memanglah perbuatan yang boleh memberi satu
inferen yang ia dilakukan bagi tujuan mengedar dan tentu
sekali bukan untuk kegunaan sendiri.
Mahkamah Rayuan
dalam kes Mohamad Yazri Minhat v. PP [2003] 2 CLJ 65
menerimapakai
prinsip
dalam kes Ong Ah Chuan v. P.P
[1981] 1 MLJ 64, di muka surat 69, yang menyatakan:
“Proof of the purpose for which an act is done, where such
purpose is a necessary ingredient of the offence with which
an accused is charged, presents a problem with which
criminal courts are very familiar. Generally, in the absence
of an express admission by the accused, the purpose with
which he did an act is a matter of inference from what he did.
Thus, in the case of an accused caught in the act of
conveying from one place to another controlled drugs in a
quantity much larger than is likely to be needed for his own
consumption the inference that he was transporting them for
the purpose of trafficking in them would, in the absence of
any plausible explanation by him, be irresistible, even if there
were no statutory presumption such as is contained in
section 15 of the Drugs Act”.
As a matter of common sense the larger the quantity of
drugs involved the stronger the inference that they were not
intended for the personal consumption of the person carrying
them, and the more convincing the evidence needed to rebut
it.”.
(Penggarisan oleh saya).
13
28.
Seterusnya, dalam kes Wjchai Onprom v. PP [2006] 3 CLJ
724, Y.A. Gopal Sri Ram telah berkata:
“Here the appellant was caught conveying a very large
quantity of cannabis from Thailand to Malaysia. In view of
the amount involved, it is safe to infer that the drug was
intended for a third person or persons known or unknown.
That other person or persons may, to borrow Lord Diplock’s
words, be “the actual consumer or a distributor or another
dealer”.
So this is not a case of mere passive
possession.
There were overt acts done by the appellant, namely the
active concealment of the drug on his person followed by its
conveyance from Thailand into Malaysia which reasonably
supports the existence of criminal purpose proscribed by the
Act. We may add that the very same facts also give rise to a
strong inference that the appellant was aware of his
possession, knew the nature of the drug possessed and had
the power of disposal over it. So much for the prima facie
proof of actual trafficking.”.
(Penggarisan oleh saya).
29.
Tambahan pula, dalam kes PP v. Lim Hock Boon [2009]
3 CLJ 457, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa:
“There is another matter that needs to be considered by this
court. The Court of Appeal had ruled that the alternative
ground advanced by the learded trial judge that the
respondent was guilty of trafficking because his case came
within one or more of the acts set out under the definition of
the word “trafficking” in s. 2 of the Act is against both
authority and principle. On perusal, there is nothing in Teh
Geok Hock to suggest that the prosecution could not rely on
s. 2 establish trafficking. Thus, the reliance placed by the
Court of Appeal on Chow Kok Keong, supra, to hold that the
definition section under s. 2 of the Act could never be
invoked to impose criminal liability, was, with respect,
misplaced.
A good example where the definition of
trafficking in s. 2 of the Act was invoked is in the case of
14
Public Prosecutor v. Abdul Manaf Muhamad Hassan [2006]
2 CLJ 129.
There the Federal Court, in order to avoid
contravening the bar against the use of double presumptions
following the case of Muhammed Hassan v. Public
Prosecutor [1998] 2 CLJ 170, substituted the presumption of
trafficking under s. 37 (da) of the Act relied on by the trial
court, to find trafficking in the dangerous drugs by carrying
under s. 2 of the Act.”.
(Penggarisan oleh saya).
30.
Berdasarkan kepada apa yang diperjelaskan di perengganperenggan di atas tadi, Mahkamah ini berpendapat di sisi
keterangan dan undang-undang, bahawa di peringkat akhir kes
pendakwaan ini, terdapat satu kes prima facie yang telah
dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan dan pihak OKT diperintah
untuk membela diri. OKT diterangkan tiga alternatif iaitu sama
ada untuk memberi keterangan bersumpah di mana dia boleh
diperiksa-balas atau untuk memberi pernyataan dari kandang
pesalah di mana dia tidak boleh diperiksa-balas atau untuk
berdiam diri. OKT membuat pilihan alternatif pertama tadi.
31.
Dalam pembelaan OKT dia mengatakan telah pergi bersama
ibunya, Shahla Shakoi (DW2) dan seorang sahabat ayahnya
telah ke Lapangan Terbang Teheran di mana dia (OKT)
berlepas untuk ke Malaysia melalui Kish dan Dubai.
berkata
OKT
di lapangan terbang itu dia diberi satu bagasi (P4)
oleh Reza Sultani untuk disampaikan kepada Behnam (muka
surat 73 Nota Keterangan). P4 telah dibuka olehnya dan OKT
mendapati di dalamnya ada tuala, seluar dan pakaian lain dan
15
buku-buku (muka surat 74 Nota Keterangan).
Selain yang
diperkatakan itu oleh OKT dalam pemeriksaan awal, dia turut
menyatakan yang sama dalam pemeriksaan balas oleh
Timbalan Pendakwa Raya, iaitu P4 diberi oleh Reza dan
terdapat tuala dan pakaian dalam P4 itu (muka surat 78 Nota
Keterangan). DW2 (ibu OKT) turut memberi keterangan dalam
pemeriksaan awal bahawa dia telah periksa kandungan P4
yang Reza telah beri kepada OKT dan mendapati dalamnya
tuala,
pakaian
dan
buku-buku
(muka
surat
80
Nota
Keterangan).
32.
Apa yang ketara lagi kekal “impact” keterangan ini ialah
terdapat keterangan sokongan bersesama OKT (DW1) dan
DW2 bahawa P4 diberi oleh Reza Sultani kepada OKT yang
berisi tuala, pakaian dan buku-buku. Keterangan OKT tentang
hal ini tidak dicabar langsung dalam pemeriksaan balas oleh
Timbalan Pendakwa Raya. Usaha Timbalan Pendakwa Raya
jelas nampak “inadequate” dan “meager” dengan tidak
mempedulikan
detail
yang
mendalam
untuk
mencungkil
“incredidulity” keterangan OKT yang menggambarkan bahawa
dia adalah seorang “innocent carrier”.
Timbalan Pendakwa
Raya lesu dalam aspek ini dan tiada apa-apa penyangkalan ke
atas keterangan OKT dan DW2 itu.
Tambahan pula OKT
berkata (di muka surat 78 Nota Keterangan) bahawa bukan
sahaja P4 ada barang-barang dalamnya untuk dihantar kepada
Behnam tetapi juga P4 akan diguna kembali untuk membawa
pulang ke Iran baju-baju lelaki.
16
33.
Apa yang lebih memeranjatkan, pihak Pendakwaan tidak
menunjukkan
sekurang-kurangnya
cadangan
sinis
yang
keterangan OKT adalah pembohongan memandangkan ia
bertentangan dengan percakapan beramaran OKT (D88) yang
menunjukkan P4 diterima daripada orang suruhan Reza
(soalan/jawapan 46 dan 50 dalam D88 masing-masingnya di
muka surat 6 dan 7) dan bukan daripada Reza sendiri, seperti
yang dikatakan dalam keterangan di Mahkamah.
Tidak
hairanlah Timbalan Pendakwa Raya sendiri tidak pula inginkan
(atau tidak mengetahui) peluang untuk mencabar (“impeach”)
OKT atas percanggahan dua keterangan tersebut yang jelas
itu. Bukan sahaja itu, tetapi Timbalan Pendakwa Raya juga
lalai untuk mencabar OKT atas dua lagi percanggahan bila
OKT
berkata
dalam
keterangannya
bahawa
P4
yang
diterimanya di Teheran berisi kandungan tersebut di atas tadi
(muka surat 74 dan 78 Nota Keterangan) sementara dalam
pernyataan beramarannya, OKT berkata P4 adalah kosong
(soalan/jawapan 56 dalam D88) dan juga diperkatakan pula
oleh OKT dalam keterangannya dia tidak lihat dalam P4 barang
“Sang” (dalam bahasa Parsi bererti “batu”) walhal dalam D88
OKT berkata “Sang” yang dia disuruh-hantar dan yang dibawa
ke Malaysia (soalan/jawapan 64 dalam D88).
17
34.
Kelesuan pihak Pendakwaan terus terlihat dan diulangi bila
mana DW2 tidak diperiksa-balas pun, setelah DW2 memberi
keterangan yang menyokong keterangan (OKT) DW1 yang
lebih memihak kepadanya iaitu beg P4 diberi oleh Reza Sultani
dan ia mengandungi buku-buku, tuala dan pakaian.
35.
Mahkamah memahami dan menyedari beberapa autoriti yang
menerangkan
tanggungjawab
pihak-pihak
Mahkamah,
Pendakwaan dan Pembelaan dalam sesuatu kes jenayah.
Dalam kes PP v. Chia Leong Foo [2000] 4 CLJ 649, Hakim
Augustine Paul berkata di muka surat 676:
“Thus where the Prosecution has made out a prima facie
case and the Accused, in his defence, offers an explanation,
the burden of the proof to establish the offence beyond
reasonable doubt is still on the Prosection and if, upon a
review of the evidence of both sides, there is a reasonable
doubt, the Accused must be acquitted.”.
dan di muka surat 683:
“It is trite law that the explanation of an accused has to be
considered together with the rest of the evidence in the case
and that he will be entitled to an acquittal if, as a result of
such explanation the existence of a material fact on which
the prosecution relied is no longer so probable as to make a
prudent man act upon the supposition that fact exists.”.
18
36.
Kes Mohamad Radhi bin Yaakob v. PP [1991] 1 CLJ 311
menyatakan:
“It is a well-established principle of Malaysian criminal law
that the general burden of proof lies throughout the trial on
the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt
of the accused for the offence with which he is charged.
There is no similar burden placed on the accused to prove
his innocence. He is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
To earn an acquittal, his duty is merely to cast a reasonable
doubt in the prosecution case.
In the course of the
prosecution case, the prosecution may of course rely on
available statutory presumptions to prove one or more of the
essential ingredients of the charge. When that occurs, the
particular burden of proof as opposed to the general burden
shifts to the defence to rebut such presumptions on the
balance of probabilities which from the defence point of view
is heavier than the burden of casting a reasonable doubt, but
it is certainly lighter that the burden of the prosecution to
prove beyong reasonable doubt …. if defence is called, the
duty of the accused is only to cast a reasonable doubt in the
prosecution case. He is not required to prove his innocence
beyond reasonable doubt.
To earn an acquittal, the court may not be convinced of the
truth of the defence story or version. Raising a reasonable
doubt in the guilt of the accused will suffice.
It is not,
however, wrong for the court to be convinced that the
defence version is true, in which case the court must order
an acquittal. In appropriate cases it is also not wrong for the
court to conclude that the defence story is false or not
19
convincing, but in that instance, the court must not convict
intil it asks a further question, that even if the court does no
accept or believe
the defence explanation, does it
nevertheless raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt? It is
for this reason that in dealing with the defence story or
explanation, the majority of judges rightly prefer to adopt
straightaway the legally established ‘reasonable doubt’ test,
rather than to delve in the ‘believable and convincing’ test
before applying the ‘resonable doubt’ test.”
The leading case on this point is Woolmington v. DPP Lord Sankey
said:
“Throughout the web of English Criminal Law, one golden
thread is always to be seen, that is the duty of the
prosecution to prove the person’s guilt. If at the end of and
on the whole of the case, there is reasonable doubt, created
by the evidence given either by the prosecution or the
prisoner as to whether the offence was committed by him,
the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner
is entitled to an acquittal.”.
37.
Kes klasik Mat v. PP [1963] 1 MLJ 263 memperkatakan:
“ The correct law for Magistrates to apply is as follows. If
you accept the explanation given by or on behalf of the
accused, you must of course acquit.
But this does not
entitled you to convict if you do not believe that explanation,
for he is still entitle to an acquittal if it raises in your mind a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt, as the onus of proving his
guilt lies throught on the prosecution.
20
If upon the whole
evidence you are left in a real state of doubt, the prosecution
has failed to satisfy the onus of proof which lies upon it.”
The position may be conveniently stated as follows:
1. If you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the
accused’s guilt … Convict.
2. If you accept of believe the accused’ explanation …
Acquit.
3. If you do not accept or believe the accused’s explanation
… Do not convict but consider the next step below.
4. If you do not accept or believe the accused’s explanation
and the explanation does not raise in your mind a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt … Convict.
5. If you do not accept or believe the accused’s explanation
but nevertheless it raises in your mind a reasonable
doubt as to his guilt … Acquit.”.
38.
Mahkamah membuat pendapat bahawa kes yang di hadapanya
sekarang ini tergolong dalam hal keadaan cabang no. 5, kes
Mat v. PP itu, di mana walaupun Mahkamah tidak menerima
atau mempercayai keterangan OKT tetapi ia membangkitkan
pada pemikirannya suatu keraguan munasabah ke atas
kebersalahannya,
maka
ia
membebaskan OKT.
21
hendaklah
melepas
dan
39.
Dengan yang demikian Mahkamah ini dengan penuh yakin
mendapati bahawa pihak Pembelaan telah membangkitkan
satu keraguan yang munasabah ke atas kes Pendakwaan dan
dalam yang sama juga pihak Pendakwaan telah gagal
membuktikan
kesnya
melampaui
keraguan
munasabah.
Mahkamah memerintahkan OKT dilepas dan dibebaskan
daripada pertuduhan ke atasnya.
DATO’ ABDUL ALIM ABDULLAH
Hakim
Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya
Shah Alam.
29 November 2011.
Pihak-pihak:
1.
Puan Nurul Ezwaney Husin bagi pihak Pendakwa Raya.
Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Kastam Diraja Malaysia.
2.
Encik Mohd. Irwan Mohamad. Mubarak dan Encik Zamri Idrus
bagi pihak OKT.
Tetuan Mohd. Irwan Mohd. Mubarak.
22
Rujukan:
1.
PP v. Abdul Rahman Akif [2007] 4 CLJ 337.
2.
Chan Pean Leon v. PP [1956] 22 MLJ 237.
3.
PP v. Hla Win [1995] 2 SLR 424.
4.
Teh Hock Leong v. PP [2008] 4 CLJ 764.
5.
Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] 2 All
ER 356.
6.
Zulfikar bin Mustaffah v. PP [2001] 1 SLR 633.
7.
Teh Hock Leong v. PP [2010] 1 MLJ 741.
8.
Mohamad Yazri Minhat v. PP [2003] 2 CLJ 65.
9.
Ong Ah Chuan v. PP [1981] 1 MLJ 64.
10.
Wjchai Onprom v. PP [2006] 3 CLJ 724.
11.
PP v. Lim Hock Boon [2009] 3 CLJ 457.
12.
PP v. Chia Leong Foo [2000] 4 CLJ 649.
13.
Mohamad Radhi bin Yaakob v. PP [1991] 1 CLJ 311.
14.
Mat v. PP [1963] 1 MLJ 263.
23