Continued Relevance of Ground Based Air Defence Weapons

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Continued Relevance of Ground Based Air
Defence Weapons
Mandeep Singh
Air Power made its advent in the First World War and over the past hundred years has
become a credible means of projection of power, at time being called the dominant means
of projection of national power. Though the claim of it being the dominant means may be
debatable, it can be said with certainty that it is indeed a favored means of power projection
and can greatly influence the conduct of ground operations.
Even in an age of multi-dimensional air power, while Air Forces can deliver results and
carry out a number of functions, it cannot do everything and has certain limitations.
Providing effective air defence with aerial platforms alone one such limitation, for which
Ground Based Air Defence Weapons continue to be required.
Countering the emerging threats is one such limitation. With tactical ballistic missiles
becoming the weapon of choice across the globe, it is only the GBADWS that can effectively
counter them. Air Force is capable of taking out the TBM launchers but even then it has
difficulty in locating and taking out the TBM launchers. Air Forces are not capable of
interception of TBM during flight that can only be carried out by GBADWS. Even the Air
Force’s capability to destroy the missile launchers has been disputed. US Air Force (USAF)
during the 1991 Gulf War had claimed that ‘within three days of the start of the air war, as
many as ‘30 fixed sites’ and ‘as many as 16 mobile launchers’ of an estimated 20 that Iraq
possessed, had been destroyed’. As per one report, based on 11 separate inspections beginning
in June 1991, it could be determined that only 12 fixed-missile sites were destroyed. Also, it was
found that during the war Iraq did not fire Scuds from its fixed sites1. In such a scenario,
where the TBM are launched primarily from mobile launchers(as they would be in a War)
and the problem(s) in detecting the launchers from air as they can be easily hidden, the
responsibility to counter them has to fall back on the GBADWS.
A similar problem exists in case of cruise missiles. It is appreciated that as the TBM
defences mature and become more capable, the efforts will shift towards cruise missiles.
The lower investments in terms of cost and technology required to develop cruise missiles
as compared to TBMs is another reason for the shift towards cruise missile development.
The recent developments in the South Asia also portend to this trend2. As with TBM, Air
Forces have serious limitations in countering the cruise missile threat. Though one option
remains of developing a ‘punitive action’ against cruise missile threat the deterrence by
punishment as one commentator calls it3, the fact remains that in any defence against cruise
missile threat, the GBADWS would be an important component without which the defence
would be ineffective.
Attack Helicopters, even as they are operated by Air Forces also, remain another threat
which cannot be counted by Air Force without reliance on GBADWS. Joint Countering Attack
Helicopter (J-CATCH)4, conducted in 1978-9, was a joint US Army-US Air Force experiment
in dissimilar air combat between jet fighters and attack helicopters. The helicopters proved
extremely dangerous to the fighters and racked up a 5-to-1 kill ratio over the fighters when
fighting at close ranges with guns. The lesson was that fixed-wing aircraft should not attack
helicopters except at long range and/or high altitudes with long range missiles. The AH
flying at terrain contour or Nap of the Earth (NOE) are however difficult targets for even the
advanced Air Force look down-shoot down radar systems and if the aircraft itself flies in the
low level regime, the aircraft becomes the target of GBADWS and Air to Air Missiles
mounted on attack helicopters–the hunter becomes the hunted. This only reinforces the
need to rely on GBADWS for countering the attack helicopter threat.
The other threats that Air Force has difficulties in countering is the UAV threat which are
difficult to detect and engage by aerial platforms, shifting the focus back on ground based
systems. Not only the aforementioned threats, the Rocket Artillery and Mortar(RAM) threat
is another emergent threat which the ground based systems are better placed to counter5.
Lastly, the inability of Air Forces to prevent any leakers getting through their defence is the
most important reason for the continued relevance of GBADWS. Though it was almost a
century ago, in 1932, that Stanley Baldwin said that the Bomber will always get through6, the
adage remains relevant even today. There have been instances when with the best of
defensive and surveillance networks that leakers have got through. If Mathias
Rust7 managed to penetrate the Soviet Air Defence network in 1987, an Iraqi SU-24
penetrated the Coalition defences during Operation Desert Storm8. Such a scenario remains
possible even today.
Air Force may be able to dominate a given space for a given time period but it does not have
the capability of a continued presence or of countering all threats for all the time9. To do so,
it needs GBADWS. However advanced and capable the Air Force may become, it will
continue to need GBADWS to provide effective Air Defence.
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Notes
Eric Schmitt PENTAGON CLAIMS ON SCUDS DISPUTED, New York Times, June 24, 1992
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/24/world/pentagon-claims-on-scudsdisputed.html
Pakistan test-fires first nuclear-capable submarine cruise missile Babur-3, Times of
India, Jan 9, 2017, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/pakistanclaims-it-has-fired-first-submarine-launched-nuclear-capablemissile/articleshow/56423333.cms
Debalina Ghoshal, India: Defeating the Cruise Missile Threat, The Diplomat October 26,
2013 http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/india-defeating-the-cruise-missile-threat/
Dr Carlo Kopp Defeating Cruise Missiles Technical Report APA-TR-2007-0402 Air Power
Australia, http://www.ausairpower.net/Analysis-Cruise-Missiles.html
J-CATCH https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J-CATCH
Mr Baldwin on Aerial Warfare – A Fear for the Future.The Times. London, ENG, UK: 7
column B. 11 November 1932.
Chloe Hadjimatheou Mathias Rust: German teenager who flew to Red
Square, BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-20609795
Major General Donald M Lionetti Air Defence and the Land War, ARMY July 1991
‘Airpower by itself cannot achieve lasting victory or success without boots on the
ground’ http://www.spslandforces.com/story.asp?id=169
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