UNREPRESSED
UNCONSCIOUS,
IMPLICIT MEMORY,
AND CLINICAL WORK
ed ited by
Giuseppe Craparo and Clara Mucci
;201
KARNAC
98
UNREPRI:SSl:D UNCONSCIOUS, IMPllcrr MEMORY, AND ClINI(~AL WORK
Stern, D. N. (2005). Intersubjeclivity. In: E. S. Person, A. M. Coo per, &
G. O. Gabbard (Ed •. ), Textbook of PSyc/lOallalysis (pp. 77- 92).
Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing.
Stern, D. N., Bruschweiler-Stern, N., Ha rri son, A. M ., Lyons-Ruth, K.,
Morgan, A. c., Nahum, J. P., Sander, L., & Tronick, E. Z. (1998). The
process of therapeutic change involving implici t knowledge: some
implications of developmental observations fo r adult psychotherapy.
Illfalli Mental /-Ieallh lotlmal, 19: 300-308.
Sulli van, R. M., & Dufresne, M. M. (2006). Mesocortical dopamine and
HPA axis regulati o n: ro le of laterality and ea rly envi ronment. 8rahl
Research, W76: 49- 59.
Uddin, L. Q., Molnar-Szakacs, I., Zaidel, E., & lacoboni, M. (2006). rTMS
to the right inferior parietal lobu le disrupts self-other discrimination .
Social Cognitive mld Affective Neuroscience, 1: 65-71.
Van Lancker, D., & Cummings,). L. (1999). Expletives: neurolingusitic and
ncurobeha viora l perspectives on swearing. Brahl Rt.'searcll l~eviews, 31:
83- 104.
Volz, K. G., & von C ramnn, D. Y. (2006). What neuroscience can le Jl abou t
in tuit ive processes in th e con text of perceptual discovery. !ulImal of
Cogllitive Neuroscience, 18: 2077- 2087.
Welling, H. (2005). The intuitive process: the case of psychotherapy.
10l/mal of Psychothemp'/ Intr8ratioll, 15: ·19-47.
Zanocco, G., De Marchi , A., & Pozzi, F. (2006). Sensory empathy a nd
enactment. I"temational!oumal of Psycllom1alys;s, 87: 145-"158.
CHAPTER FIVE
Implicit memory, unrepressed
unconscious, and trauma theory:
the tu rn of the screw between
contemporary psychoanalysis
and neuroscience
Clara Mucci
Where is the unconsciolls in the brain?
And which unconscious are we talking about?
he question of the relations hip between implicit me mory and
the so-ca lled " unrepressed un con cious" (Maneia, 2006) (as
opposed to freud's repressed content, therefore define d as
unconscious, a nd /o r as the mechanism of repressio n at work in the
hum an psyche, a force cuntrary to awa re ness) a llows for a rehea rsa l
of the fundamental theoretical and clinical ques ti ons in the present
debate in contemporary psychoanalys is and neuroscience and li es at
the corc of both inte r pe rsona l neuroscie n ce and re lationa l psychoana lysis.
It a lso affords an occasion for a re-exa mination of the e fforlsFreud
made as ea rl y as his "Projecl for a scientific psychology" in IR95 to
find fundamenta ls for a neurobiology of the mind and it enables us
in tu rn, in the third millennium, to evaluate and rewrite his project in
co ntemporary terms, a review that Schorc, in his writings, has very
thoroughly conducted with his extraordinary interdisciplinary ex perli ~ .. ~lI"lrl ~ bc:.k C;olm .. ,.. . nO-;l\T{'s w ith intrieuin\!lv within this vo lume.
IUlJ
UNKU'KlY) U ) UNCl JN:'l llJU:' . IMt'Ul.11 Nlt Wll Jr.. • • '"'II '''
. .... ~ . ~ ... . . " .• " ".. . . . ' . • " ,.," "11' "'''1\\-1,.''' 11/1 1,' ,'\ ''''1 II( r\lJMA IHtUKl'
\ . <"" " I\ .rll.. "" ...... " 1\
I st~rt with a rewriting of Freud's definition of the "unconscious",
as it is cur rent today in psychology and neuroscience: that is, as w~at
is no t conscious but, none the less, gu ides most o f our mental hfe,
including attitud es, behaviour, and affects.
We now agree that much of what con!;titutes or de!;cribes menlal
life in huma ns is unconscious but thi s very sentence is in need of clarification in the li ght of the modern concept o f unconscious in u se here.
This unconscious is an implicit nucleus of the self (Schore, 2012, and
see Sch on~, thi s volume) which was o rig inall y crea ted in connect io n
w ith genetica lly inherited possibilities by the regulatory movem~nt
occurring betwecn the mothe r's and thc child 's ri~ht brams, ,,:hlch
took place primarily in the first year of the chIld s hfe, the cntl ca l
period for attachment. This regulation he lps to d evelop. the fight brain
of the child before the left bmin, hinting a t a pre-emmence of emotional and affective life over analytic, d ecisional, and lingui stic processes, and it c rea tes a diffe ren ce in the two systems of memory,
impli cit and explicit. Allan Schore (2003b, 20·12) has proposed a
, modern view of attachment theory as a form of regulatory process
that sets the basi s for the creation of a biologi ca l substratum for a
dynamic unconscious which remai~ls at. work ~uring all further. social
exchanges and re lationship formation, IIlciudlllg the the ra~euhc OI~e.
As we shall see, this dynami c uncon scious is endowed WIth speCIal
potential for reparation.
..
.
Thi s implicit self-system encoded in the nght bram that evolves m
the inte raction with a primary carer d e velops through preverbal and
bodily stages and signals of communication; the mother, Schore
writes, "is thus a regulator of arou sal (van d e r Kolk & FIsher, 1994)
and the transfer of affect between mother and child is thus mediated
I lJ I
also dominant for "imp li cit " le(\rnil'~ (HlI~dl, hl , IY9S), lin adoptive
process that underlies all emo ti onal pbenomcno, Including those at
the core of the psychotherapeutic relationshi p. (200Jb, p. 222)
It is possible to say, with Schore, that by the end of the first year of
life, right latera lised corti ca l- subcortica l circuits have imprinted, in
implicit procedural me mory, a n internal working model of attachment
which en codes strategies o f affect regulation that unconsciously gUide
the individual in future interpersonal exchanges.
The orbitofrontal cortex, that is, the central mechanism of affect
regulation in the dual hemisphere brain, accesses memory functions
•
by implicit processing (Schore, 2012; Stuss et aI., ] 982). What Freud '
wOllld term " preconscioll s" fun c tioning (Schore, 2003b, p. 272) is
directly influenced by this regulatory activity that from the exte rnal •
becomes a form of inte rnal self-regulation . The nellral cells, loca ted in
I.
the orbitofrontal cortex and in the amygdala, respond to visual and
facial expressions and these essential components of active socia l communi cations specifica ll y activate these areas in the brain (Brothers,
1997). The orbitofrontal cortex also exerts an essential role in co-ordinating internal states of the organism and th e various representational
processes that lie at the core of reasoning, motivation, and the creation
of emotional meaning (Damasio, 1994; I'll stel; 1985; Rolls, ]996).
According to Schore, the limbic system is a three-tiered hierarc hical
system, with each lev e l (amygdala, anterior cinculate, and insulaorbitofrontal) containing separable state-dependent affective, cognitive, and behavioural functions . Each level contains imprinted ,
stored representations of early sensory- affectively charged traces,
which means that, at different moments, different levels of implicit
memory can be activated:
•
, by right-hemis phcre-to right-hemisphere arollsal-regul~ting tra~sac­
tions" (Schore, 2003b, p. 222). During spontaneous. T1ght-br~m to
right-brain visual- facial, auditory- prosodic, and ta~hle-proprl~~e p­
tive emotionally charged attachment communi ca tlOns, a. senslhve,
psychobiologically attuned carer is ca pabl e of regulatmg, at an
implicit level, the infan~s states of arousal.
Scho re continues,
These events arc inscribl,d in implicit procedural memory in the early
developing right hemisphere that is specialized for the processing ~f
visuospatial information (Galin, 1974). But the right cerebral cortex 1S
Each of the three leve ls also manifests itself in different stales of
consciousness, with the am ygdahl being th e dee pes t unconsciolls
level, and the orbitofrontal the highest. The primitive ~mygdala level,
farthest. from higher cortica l operations yet closely adja cent to hypothalamic and autonomic structures, would contain the realm of
Freud's (1923) "bodily ego" and Bollas's "unthought known" (1987).
(Schore 2003b, p. 234)
From these bodily imprints, the traces of internali sed representati o ns of re lati o nship are crea ted, some thing we can assimilate to the
102
U NRFPR~ SSt:I ) U NCON )(:1()U~, IMI'UC.t I M EMURY, AND ( tINt( :Al W< )RK
internal working models (IWM) as explained by Bowlby (1969).
ijecCiLIse this system develops in stages, if early relational trauma
interferes with the experience-dependent maturation of the interconnections of these systems, they might lose the oppurtunity of integration so that dys regulatcd somatic states are subsctluenUy created. This
is coherent with the present-day description of the development of
personalily disorders based on dysregulation of affect and related
pathologics (Schore, ·1994, 2003a,b).
Before the hippocampus develops, between the second and the
third year of life, the brain is not capable of properly encoding memories in the sense of episodic memory, or autobiographical memory; it
ca n only retrieve memories encoded in the body in the implicit form,
through behaviollral, emotional, perceptive, and so ma to-sensorial
cues. If recalled and reactivated, they are not linked to a clear sense of
subjectivity but they embody the mental experience of preconscious
emotions, behaviours, Clnd perceptions. Enrly traul11n and insecure
form s of attachment, incluuing disorganised nltachrncnt, [Ire cncoded
in implicit mcmory, so that, to quote a f<1mous rcmark made by vall
der Kolk (20·14), " the body keeps I·he sco re" even when the subject
" docs not know". Implieit mcmories arc formed by the attachment
experience, both positive [md negaLive, and by future traumatic experiences. Interes tingly, in inlcrgcnerational transmission of i.1ttachmcnt
(and trauma), not only d oes the parent trnns mit his/her diso rganised
modalities to th e child, but it works in both uircctiol1s: that is, di so rgnnised attachment in the ch ild might also reactivate th e painful
a tta c hment memories in the parent, in a circuit that could becornc
unnge rou s for the more vulnerable of the two in the relation. In the
child, they can be reactivated eas ily, eve n il fter a long time has gone
by and the c hild is, indeed, an adult (Perry ct 111., 1995). In this chain,
the transgel1cra tional experience is trans ferred llutomatically, thal is,
un consciollsly, without- consciuus participation, between pnrent a nd
ch ild (sec Liolli in this voluIlle).
Very sim ilar v icws were held by neuroscientist a nd psyc honnal yst
Mduro Mancia, who, from the IYYOs onward s, fucused on impli cit
nll'mory ilnd unrepressed l1ncon sc h)lI~:
AI birth lhl' inf,1I1"S expt:!ril'llces dnd conseque ntly hi s or ht::'r
Illernory Ml' purely se nsory (fI['sfhesis): thl' mother's odor, her word s,
h/l lM 1111' h :l h v 1" .. 1.... (' nnl ~lin .. d ;"lIld W;1tc\wti , nil convev <lffectivt:'
1MI'll CIT MEMORY,
U NRI-PRI-~~l lJ
UNCONS( IOUS, AN D t RAUMA TH FO KY
103
messages essentidl to the organi zation uf these ve ry first representa tions. These preverbal experiences arc filed in the implicit memory.
But the baby mily also have occas iuns to file gross and microscopic
tr~lUmn thcrt, too: loss of the parents, abandon, neglect, serious fru stra lions, humiliation, incomprehension, physical mental and cven sexual
violence <1nd abusc. These trnumas may undermine the baby's attachment system (Bowlby '1969; FOl1agy & TiHget 1997) and endanger the
orgnnization of his or her self (Stern '1985), (Mancia, 2007, p. 43)
Maneia speculates that th e repressed un consciOlls, with the material that has undergone repression as explained by Freud, is located in
the structures of the explicit autobiographic memory. Anderson and
co lleagues (2004), to 0 certain extent, seeIll to support this view when
they s how that purposely forge tting mllterial, comparable to Freudian
repression of material, is accompanied by increased activity in the
prefrontal areas and a parallel reduction in hippocampal activity. This
would be the reverse of what happens in dreams, during REM sleep,
when hippocnmpaJ activity increases lind there is reactivation of
dorsolateral prefrontal co,"lex (Braun et ai., 1998).
Maneia believes that" unrepressed unconscio us or implicit memory
is loca ted in the posterior te mporo- parieto-occipital associative cortica l areas of the right hemis phere. These llreas lire morc nctive during
REM sleep nnd, therefore, during dream activity, in comparison to the
left hemisphere. Solms (1995) has also found that patients with les ions
to th e posterior associative areas do not dream .
Freud's "unconscious" and "repression" and our
present view of [he so-called unconscious
Let us htl ve a closer look at Freud's idell of th e " unconsciou s" and how
his views are both accepted and disclaimed by present psychoanalytic
a nd neuropsychologi Gl1 discoursc.
As Drew Westen has thoroughly il1us trllt ed in a se ri es of studies in
the IY90s (e.g., Westen, IY97, 1999), a massive body of recent psychological rcsetlrch has demons trated Ihllt, th ough Freud is rc pclltcdly
pronounced "dc.1d" by other di SCiplines, he is sti ll in good ShllpC a nd,
indeed , W.1S right in a numbe r of his le nets: from the fact thlll many
enduri ng aspects of perso nality coalcscL' in ch ildhood (as infJnt
I"t's£'arc h has t'vidt'nrC'clt 10 till' f,,('1 Ih<l l mC'nl ,ll I"PI'"I'·I"'>f'nt-;lt-inn<.; nf o.:.. lf
104
UN IU' PI{~SSl[)
UNlONS(:t{ )US, IMl'll(.! r MI-MOI{Y, ANI) ( ' LtNI( .Al W()I{K
and other do begin to be built up neurological1y and psychologically
in very early s tages of childhood (often becoming n cause for mental
pathology), to the conflict tha t mo tivati ons and affects in individua ls
might undergo simultaneous ly, so that awa re ness is a non-linea r but
complex and multi-dimens ional reality, and, firs t and foremost, his
tene t that "most of mental life is un conscious" (Westen, 1999, p. 1062)
or that it "operates unconscio u sly" (So hns & Turnbul1, 2002, p. 79).
The Freudian image of consciousness as the top of the famolls iceberg
seem s confirmed by current day resea rch in cognitive s tudies, in so far
as it claims that although the la rgest part of Ollr consciou sness is
s ubmerged it nonetheless directs or primes our me ntal life in open
or subtle ways (Westen 1999). I will not go through all the details of
thi s disclission beca use Westen does thi s magis te ri a ll y, and so I refe r
the read er 10 his work. I would s tart instead by rephras ing Ihe major
questions we a re facing in contemporary psychOt1l1alys is and ne uroscience when we s pea k of conscious ness and th e un conscious, with a
consideration of the neurobiolog ica l underpinnings.
First of all, whnt was Fre ud 's un conscious?
A century ago, in "On mctapsychology" (1915), in the Prefa ce to
the paper on "The un conscious", freud stated that
We have learned from psychoan<llysis that the csst..!ncc nr the process
of rcpn.!Hsioll lies, nut in putling ,m cn d to, in ~nnihibting, the idea
th at represen ts an instinct, but in prcventing it from becoming
conscious. When this h appens we s~y of the id ea th<1t it is in a s tale of
being ' uncollscious', and we ca n produce good evidence to SII010 lhal
i'V<'1I wllt'll il is IIIlCOIISciollS il en/I IJI'ocfucc effects, even including some
which finally reach conscio ll s ness ... [very/hill:': tlmt is rCI'"ess{'d IIIl/sf
"ell/nill 1I11[f)/IscioIfS; but let us s tale althe very outscl lh~ t lI,c r('prcsscd
cover l'very/hillS
cOlI/pnss: li't' repressed is
dOfS 11(1/
/lUI/
II
is
II I IC(JI/scio/ls.
The
IIIIC(}IIS!'ioll~ Iras
part of tlJe IlIICUIl5CivIIS.
111(' wida
(F relld, 1915e, p. 166,
my l'mp hasis)
In thi ~ passage, Freud is clearly stating that the repressed and the
unconscious are not one and the sa me thing: the repressed is o nl y a
part of the unconscious (and is precisely wha t has un dergone repressio n) and a wider area has to be d efi ned as unconscious, meaning,
non-conscious, the effects o f w hich a rc fe lt in behilvioul' and atti tud es
in human bei ngs and can be reconstructed retrospectively or, as Freud
says, "translated " back to consciOllsness.
IMPI K11 MI::MOI{Y, UNRFPRI::SSFD UNCONSCIOUS, AN1J rRAlJMA TII[ORY
105
The mude rnity of thi s s tateme nt is proved by the distinction we are
now capa ble of m ak ing th a nks to the differe ntiation of the two
systems of memory, the implicit a nd the explicit systems, discovered
roughly thirty years ago. It would appear, as we have seen in Schore's
explanation, that implicit me mory, based in the ri g ht brain, accounts
for what is un conscious (as non-conscio us) but not represscd, influencin g behaviour and re lational altitudes and priming responses
and s tates of mind. Implicit memory points not at what ha s und e rgone rcp ression, but at wh<1t is not available for immediate retri eva l
because of the immaturity of the m e m o ry sys te m and ye t, as is
obvious in several s ituations in which affects and motivations are
involved, has an enduring and sometimes un ca nny or des tru ctive
e ffect, as appears clearly in traumatic m e rn o ri es influencing pathological beliefs and future d estructive be haviour, or a tend e ncy to
rcvi ctimisa tion.
Repression, in contrast, as Freud had illready s tated, has to do with
a n active re moval from conscious ness o f materia l 01' conte nts that
have undergone a process of repress ion by a subject, almost by inte ntional defence, or, at Icast, a defence initiated by intentional movement
and subsequently being forgotte n as s uch .
It would, th e refore, seem that only within the explicit and episodi c
memory, or autobiographical memory, where an " 1" has been modulated and the structure of thc brain and th e fun ctions pertaining to
me mo ry are more mature, is it possible to have the kind of defence
that s ubtracts those contents from the mass of conscio us information,
and represses them. As processes controlled by the left brain, they
dea l with contents that ha ve been conScious ly learnt and maintaincd
(following th e second or third year of d evelopment of the brain); th ey
mlls t have und ergone rep ression only in a la ter mo men t <mel subsequentl y mi g ht becom e re trieva ble under ce rt a in circumstan ces (linked
to a col laboration of both irnplicit and exp licit systems a nd throu gh
Irmg ua gc).
The right brain, ~s the si te of implicit memory, becomes the
psychobiological base of the unconscious in its most compre hens ive
meaning in terms of "wha t is not conscious" and, none the less, leads
relevant aspects of our Ii fc. In doing so, it is th e basis of our 1110tiVdtiona I and affective life, in the three-tien'd leve ls dt'scribed; impli cit
[lffectivc processes become distinguished from explicit cognitive and
Ipflrninf7 nroc(>s<:;pc;; 1'hi" I'ro;;lIl t c;; in ~ c;;nll llinn ~o thl-' mi"'ll11n(>t·<:. I ~nn in~Yo.;.
between cognitivi sts and psychoanalysts in so far as cognitivism has,
by now, accepted the fact that memory, cognition, learning, and decisiona l processes cannot be understood w ithout the contribu ti on of
affection a nd motivation, while psychoanalysis is accepti ng the reality
that affects and motivation are embod ied and better understood in a
mind- body connection summarised by the brain itself as the site
where both mental (mostly cu ltu ra l) and biological (mostly natural)
clements intersect. The im portance of a mind- body connection situ-
ated precisely in the bra in (as has been shown by all the research on
mirror neurons and oth er bodily interpersonal aspects rooted in th e
brain) explains why the body in the mind is so p re-em inent in ne u roscientific studies nowadays (Amma niti & Ga llese, 2014). The recent
developme nt of epigene tics is a further case in point.
Also, the concept of the d rive, bodily rooted for Freud, need s to be
und erstood w ithin this wider interrelati onal and intersubjective frame
of bodily rooted processes mediated intersubjectively throughout the
entire life of a person and developmentally constituted by two minds
(and two bodies) in rel ation. It also ca1ls to mind, as Damasio has
pointed out, Decal'tes's error, (Damasio, 1994), whi ch we are now
ca pable of aVOiding throu gh a number of interdi sci plinilry connection s.
In this way, not onl y does the fi eld of discussion opened by the
recognition of the existe nce of the two syste ms of implicit a nd ex plicit
memory shed li ght on the functioning of unconscious processes of
which Fre ud was well aware and relentl essly exposed in his work
from the end o f the nine tee nth to the middl e of the twent ie th century,'
Freudian psychoanalysis, of fantasy over reality (Bohleber, 2010;
Mucci, 2008, 2013).
Freud, with his rejection of the seduction theory in 1897, radica lised a view that made drive, fantasy, and intrapsychic reality the
bulwarks of his idea of psychoanalytic theory and practice, leavi ng
aside another path, th at of dissociation as the response to a real, over-
whelming encounter between a young and too fragile subject incapable of sustaining such an attack and an uncaring adu lt. In so doing,
he rejected the possibility that psychoanalysis, born out of an ac ti ve
act of li stening between two subjects, could, in effect, be founded on
an intcrsubjcctive practice. l11is refusa l of early overwhe lming trauma
also explains why he needed a theory of Ilncil traglichkeit, to say tha t the
original traumatic blow to a younger subject becomes traumatic and
causes pathology only afte rwa rd s, or belated ly.
This other path left open to Freud's conte mporaries (that of ea rl y
rea l traum a and subsequent dissocia tion, encoded implicitly in the
body) would be the cou rse taken by Pierre Jane t's theori sation, on one
hand, and Sandor Ferenczi's theory and practice, on th e other
(Lingiardi & Mucci, 2014).
Ye t, in several places in Studies a ll Hystuin, the existence of di ssociation is posited and described and only later, throu gh an active form
of disavowa l, does Freud era se dissociation as the ea rl y respon se of an
repressed (by the subject) and what is unconscious as belonging to
implicit m emo ry and, the refore, recorded in the body a nd capable of
overwhelmed, too you ng s ubject (a response e ncoded in impli cit
memory) to a voluntary form of re pression implying an older, more
ma ture subject (what would be, in our conte mpo rary language)
encoded and subsequently rejected by explicit memory).
The discovery of what is inscribed in impli cit memory (unconscious but organ ising what the subject ex pe ri ences and directing
future social exchanges and even personality d eve lopment) s hows
retrieval through ta ctil e, olfactory, vocal, and in general non-verbal
that experi ence is not encoded by a Self in the sense of an auton-
cues. It would seem that re pression is linked to a syste m tha t suggests,
so to speak, a one-pe rson psychoana ly tic model vs. a two-person (relational, inte rsubjective) psychoanal ytic model that would lead to an
omous, inte ntional subject as agent, but a Self that is, none the less,
capable o f encoding in the body a pe rsonal piece of experience. In
other word s, it points a t the rea lity of some kind of utter experience
not registered verbally, no r encoded semantically (episodic and a utobiographi ca l m emory, expli cit system) but, none the less, ex isting,
directing and influencing the subject in his/he r life and often crea ting
suffe ring.
but it also aims at sustaining the debate about what is unconscious as
interpersonal and intersubjective debate, as opposed to psychoanalysis, which is mainly dri ve based, libido centred , and roo ted in one
subject only. It is in the fi eld of trauma that the debate was born
(which means, of course, that it has been going on since the very
beginning of psychoanalytic theory and practice) and this debate has
generated a variety of different positions, with the pre-eminence, in
In "Abs tracts for the preliminary commun ica ti on", written ri ght
before Stu dies
011
Hysteria, Freud a rgues (in point 3) that the memory
lOB
l INRLI'I{I
~~!
I) UN«( )N~( IOUS, lMI'I.I( .11 MlMOI{Y, ANI) ClINll At W()RK
IMI'liC
creating the conten t of hysterical attacks is nil unconsciou s memory,
of th e memory in hysterical attacks coincides w ith the question of what
the normiJ 1cond itiolls arc II nd e r which an even L(representJ lioll, intention) is adm itted into the "second stilte of consciousness", If th e even t
is deliberately forgott en, Ihis physical activity is transformed into il
hyst-crica I a tt-.?I ck.
In "On the psychict:'d mech<'l11isl1l of hyst-erical phenomena: prel im -
MI MC)I{Y. UNRI PI{I S':JlI) lJNe ()NS( I()l i\ ANI)
·1 1~AIJM"
I{P,
TI oe )I..:Y
Repression vs. dissociation: the road that Freud
(and psychoanalysis) rrnJid have taken
and contemporary developments
or belongs to the "second st<1tc of co n sciousness", It is L"lbscnt from
the memory of the patient, but if he/she succeeds in carrying thi s
memory through to consciollsness the capac ity to evoke an att;.1Ck
ccases.
In point 4, he ~d so adds that the problem of th e origin of th e con tent
n
Recent sLudi es on ellrly rel<1tionlll traurnJ an d disorgJnisct..! ;ltt.l1'l 1
Illenl by Schol"e, van del" Kolk (2014; va n del" Kolk & Fisher, 1')'1.1).
I .intti (2000), (1nd ParinC1, among otlwrs, ilnL! on 1ll,11trf".1tl11ent, !legit'I 'I,
dnd abuse or incest, by Perry and colleagues (1995), Briere (1<)1) 2),
Courtois C1996), I iL'rm<11l and co ll eClgues (1989), i1nd many olhl'l'
ollithors, stress how trauma results in a c.1llcc ll alion of memory, 01
.Ill imp li cit- response, le<1ding, in the presence of a vu lne rabilit y, III
{j issociat'ion.
clc<lrly, Freud himself talks of dissociation and of J "splitt ill)"
in consciousness" in the case of Miss Lucy in Studies (}1/ f-fljsll'rill, hilt
Vcry
inary communication" (I HlJ3a) by Freud and Breuer, we react,
for him w h at causes the splil in consc i ollsness (llrigin<lting hysl<' rk ,1I
symp tom s) is an " intentioll.1 1 .Jet":
('(Iell illdividual IIy::;/t'I'I(a/ Sylll{J tOIll ill/Illcdill/ely WId JltTIIIIIIH'lIlly dis(fl']ll'II/'ctf lflltell WI' JlI1d ~1I('('{,t'd('rI ill briIlS';II:': c/(,(Irly 10 IiSIl' Ille 1111'11101',11 of
1I1l' /,(1('/11 /1.11 w/licll il {PII~ 1!/'{I'{l(Jket/ /11/11 ill 11/,()II~iIlS ib {1((OIIlI'IlI'.lJiIlS
IIJJi'c/' rlllIl wileJ/ till' 1IIIIil'lli {1II1i "('~(rill('d /lla/ ("{)('1I1 ill IIII' SI'I'nll'sl possihle
ddaillll/(l {llid pI/I If/(' II./Ji·('/ ill/o d'(I1'1/.<.. (Freud, I H91<.l, p . 0, ori~inal
rill"
.lClu;]llraulll<.llic mOlllL"llt,
UWl1 ,
ihilily forces ibt:'lf upon the e~o and
is till" t)ne.ll which thl" incol1l[1dl
ill
which Ihe 1,1tk'f decidt."s
Pll
tIlt'
it was a question of things which the p<lticnt wis hed to forget, and
I'l"pudi;)tion of the inCOlllp_ltiblt., idc'-l. Thilt idc<l is 1101 annihilated by "
repudidt iol1 of this kind, but 1l1t.'!'("ly rl:'pressl"d into the Ul1collscitHtS.
Whell this process occurs for tilt:" first time', there COIlll'S into ll("ill~~ "
nucleus and centre of crysl,dli7,)tion for the form ,l t ion of a psychi(',d
tll!'n1il/'c illtclltiollally 1't'/'fL't:t:n/, from his conscious thuught ,lIld inhib-
group divorced frolll till" ego - a group <.ll'Ound which l'verything
emph ':lsis)
Aga in, the "inlcntion.t1 <lspel.' t" is explained as follows: "becJLlst'
iLed Jnd supp resseJ" (p. '10, rny emphasis). And the au Lh ors go 0 11 :
"The second group o f cO lld iL ions drc determined not I),l} lilt' physical
slolcs ill w/lieh 'lie IJaliclI1 received
fill'
experir'!lc(','i in question" (p. 10, my
emph.Jsis).
It would S4;."l"m th,lt the di stinctio ll betwt'cn a SI.1L(" where the
subjecL intentiondlly represses an iJecl
the subj ec t undergoes the traunlJtic
0 1'
COIlIc'nl ,1 11<.1 d sta le in which
pron"~s
tlc(onlill,IJy
/I
dl'li/II'I'II/(' III/(/ ill/m/iolllli 01/1'. At k~lst one is oftl'n illt rn·
duced by;)n <let of volition; for tl1l.." <lCtu.d outcome is somet hing di1t~'r
enl from vvhi.lt the ~ ubjf.:!d intended. Wh,ll he wanted w,]s
\0
do
.I1V.1)'
with <.l11 idl"<.l, .1S though it h<ld nevI..'!' <.lplwa rcd, but ,111 hl' ~ UCCL'l'lb ill
doing is 10 isolate it psychic<llly. (Frl'ud, IKY5d, p. 12.1, my l,I11]1I1,1......-;)
t-hctl lead s to symp tom s
instead of mcmuries is already there: the two ways of reacting to
d
lraumatit.' evenL, repression, w iL h intenliun t:'l l proct.'sscs implying tht,
subject'S effort, dnt..! di ssociation, impl y ing impli ci t memory enl'oding
ilnd t:'Ill overwhelming bodily rL"t:'Ietiun, arc something Freud considers,
but decides to leave aside.
The rOdd Lowdrds repression becLlmes the wt:'ly of explilining thL"
p':lthogcnesis of hysteria and ncuropsychosis, while dissoci<ltivc
,
.,
,
,
••
"
,.
.
\·vouJd imply ;)n ;:tcceplancl' of th~ iIlCOIllP<.llibll' ide,] subsequcn ll y
collects. TIl(' sp/illi",': (~f CllllSdoIlSIIt'::>S ill /llI'sl' (Usc:> t~r (lo{lIil'l'Il IIyslaitl i ...
Ilcrl", FrL"ud is hinting at (1 splitti ng in consciousness, a l't'tldinll 10
tr<Wll1a that Ill' h<1 5, in hi s theory alld pr,lCLice, hi sLO l'il\ lIly dis.lv()wl'd ,
in the mOlllent thdt he posits lln intentional desire 10 er.1SL' tilt.' di.-; tllill
illg ide.1 thtll, .1:-' d con sequen ce, hdS become repressed ,"1111..1 h,IS lTt'dll'.!
d sy mpLom in its turn; in place of <1 l1Ie1110 I'y th.ll is repressed, d ~y llql
L(J1ll is cl'c<1Lt.:d, sonw thin g t"l11bt.:'dded ill till' budy. In COlllr\lSI, Lilt ' poItll
01 splitting, or .1L,ttl.11Iy III dissocialioll or of fr.l gllH"ntcl tioll, WIIIII.!
,
_."
I,
110
UNR!;PRfSSlD
UNCON~CI()tJS,
IMI'Ll( IT MEMORY, AND CUNI( Al WORK
to the tra umati c s hock, or by Fcrenczi when, in hi s th eo rcti c.:d .:Inc!
cl inic, 1 reflections (1932), he talks ,bout fra g m en ta tion in personality.
I fere is Ferenczi, w ith the famolls entry on "Fragm entation" in hi s
Clillical Diary ( 1988[1 9321), o n 21 Feb ru a ry 1932:
A child is the victim of ovcrwhelming aggression, whi c h results in
"giv ing up the gh ost" ... wit h the firm convicl ion th ~l t this sel f-aban donm e nt (f'linting) means death. I low eve r, it is prec isely thi s
complete re laxat ion in d u ced by scir-abanLion mf'nl that may create
more favorable cond itio ns for him to en d u re the violt.:! Il Lt.! .... Therefore someullc who hilS "given up the g hos t" survi ves thi s dt.:ilth physiCillly and wit h a p<1rt of hi s e nergy begins to live again ; he eve n
s uccctxb in reest<lb lishin g unity with the pre-traum a ti c personality,
although Ihi s is us ually accompanied by memory lapses and retroncli ve amnes iC"! of varying dur<l tion . But thi s <lll1 nesic piece is <lCtually il
part of the person, who is s till "dead", or ex is ts pc rl11ilnen tly in the
agony of anxiety. The tilsk of th e analysis is to re mo ve this spli L.
(Fcrcnczi, 1988, p. :19)
The cx traordin<.lry .:l('curacy of thi s d esc ription or the dissocialive
lr<J umali c re<.lc tion w hi ch mi g ht even result in a faintin ~ of th e body,
a freez ing response, has been confirm ed by neurophys iu logica l find ings, as in the research by Ste phen Porges (20'11), or the vagal res ponse
ICi.1d ing to blunting and analgeSia (co mpatible with the "shrinkin g or
co nsc iou s experience " as d esc ribed by Ja net, l H99). More th a n a
defen ce, a nd ce rtainl y not a n inte nti onal o r eve n partially inten ti ona l
defence, th e neu roph ysio logy of tra uma describes a co ll apse of mental
L1nd psychi ca l resou rces as a respo nse to th e external ove rwhelm ing
expe ri e ncc, more th a n the intrapsych ic defence at work.
Thi s has a lso been described by Schore as follows:
The ui ssoci,-ltivl' n)d8boii c shutdown s t\1tl' is ~l primary regulator y
procc!'s, u~l'd throughout the life-spa n, in which tht' s tressed individ lIill pass ivl'!Y disengage:-; in order to ,"onserve energies, foster slirviv<:ll
by tht.' ri s ky po:;lu rl' of "ft:' ign in g eleilth", <:lnd illlow the rc:-; titution of
deplded resources by immobili ty. In th is pd ssivc h ypumet aboli c stDte
he<lrt rel te, blood preSSllrfo', [mel rc:-; pir<ltion <:In' dec rea sed , wh ile p<:lin
numbing Lind blunting endof,l'1l0llS opiates 41rc eleva ted . ft is thi s
t'I)l' rgy-con"l'l'ving parasy mpathetic (vilg<:l l) mechanism that rnediatps
IMPLICIT M~M()RY, UNRI PRfSSl1) lJNCONS( IO US, ANI) II\AU MA 1111 ()I{y
I1I
In another revealin g passage, ext reme ly I'elewmt for developmen ts
ill psyc hoa nal y ti c theo ry and in prac ti ce, o n 25 March 1932 ("Psych ic
bilildage"), Ferenczi desc ribes h ow th e overwhelming experie n ce
leaves a pe rmane nt m a rk, and results in a splitting in the personality,
a nd , ultimately, in a c hange in the v ictim's behavior:
From the moment w he n bitte r experie nce lCilches li S to lose faith in the
benevolence of the environment, a !lcn/w llclIl splil ill Ihe In'I'... ol/alil ll
OCC /irs . ... Actuill trauITI<:l is l'xperi enced by child ren in s ituation':,
whe re no immt'diatc remedy is pru v idcd il nd whcl'l' <ldilptiltion, th .. t
is, <:l chilnge in their own be havio r, is furced on them ~t"(' firs l slep
lowards cslabiishillg 1"(' differentiatioll iJL'lwcclI illllf'r IImf OIlier world,
slI/Jject ({I/(I ubjecl. FWI/I IltclI
0/1 ,
lIeither su/Jjecl ivl'
I/O/,
uJljccfivc ('-'paieIlCl'
almlc w ill IJ(: perceived flS ffli inlegral ['lIwlilJ/lnl I/Ilil ... (Ferenczi, 19H8,
p. 69, my emph as is)
I\.s a con sequ c n ce of trauma, th e child adap ts his/he r be hav iour to
Ih(' environment- and in thi s way a pe rm ~1I1e nt cognitive di s turtion a nd
,1 twi s t in personality is initia ted . For I'erenczi, trauma a lso bears the
1.I\lLes of an external, overwhelming interpersonal expe rien ce that has
bt'('ome internali sed , intrapsyc hi c, but mi.1intains a n interperso n a l
force in so far as the re lat-io ns hip with th e ex te rnal world is con ce rned
(a so rt of IWM, in Bowlby'S te rm s, o r n rep resentatio n, a system s imiI,ll· to Bucci's sy mboli c sub-sy mboli c communications (Bucci, 1997).
Moreover, what I,' crenczi s tresses in hi s tra uma theory and clinical
impl ica tions is th at the child will very probably inte rnalise the aggress iveness and the di ssociated se nse of g uilt of th e pe rsecutor (w hich are
.llso ex tre m e ly important c leme nts fo r ruture pathology) .
S imil a rl y to Fc rc n czi's traum atic and dissocia tive model, Ja ne t had
p~' i vile~ed .th e id e<.l that a t the ba s is of p at ho logica l hyster ia la y a
dl'saggregnllO/1 psyc/lVloXiqllC.' that was th e cont ra ry or that sy nth e tic a nd
integrated s uperior run ction in wh ich high e r le ve ls of consciollsness
I'L's ted (Jane t, '1899). Fo r Ja net, an e nvironmental trau m a, not necessdri ly a sex u a l trauma, had arres ted th e cog nitive a nd a rfec ti ve d evelopment of the subject and ca u sed the "shrin king or the field of consciuusness" so typical of the traumatic effect (Lingiardi & Mucci, 2014,
p . 4J). Severa l stud ies by Jane! s tressed the re leva n ce of c nvi ron menta l conditi o ns, or primary relations, cl.'i we would ca ll them today. As
Ciovanni Lintti has dearly underlined in a recen t recon s idcra tion of
Ihl' l'I'itillllf' of Irlnrl ~n F.-Plld 's ".,.,lIrnnlinn ..,
I
II 2
lINRti'i{!. '>'>11) lJNC '()NS( Ie )lIS, IMI'LICII MI Me )RY, ANI) (IINI( At W(HU(
J;lI1et':. id,,-,tl [hilt thl' palholo~ic.ll rcspnnsc to ps),chulogic<ll (r;tum.),
onc(' the abuvl' mentioned VUIlll'f.1bdity hd S been posited. is the
ptlssivt:.' cun::'l''-juencL' of th l' overwhelming emotion ()VL'r Ih t' supcrior
(oreL's of consl-ioll~nl'ss (namcly, that it is a function,)1 deficit inducl'd
by the trauJll<ltic Illcnlory) is clL-'lfly opposed to Freud' s idea th.l!
p,)lhulogy dcpl'nLis on .111 .. ctive til- tenet.' un bL'h.llf (If the ego <,il11mg
<It excluding lIlle,lIm y emotions .1Ild rcprcscnt<ltions (rom con:,cillllsncs:-.. (Li(ltti, 20 14, p. :12, Ir.:m:-.l'111'd (or thi s (-'dilion)
Both J..Hlet- ,lnd h'renczi privilege the bodily rCilction and the
nbsencc or cO ll sdouslle~s, and or subjec ti vity, in traulllntic stull'S, le,lving SPdce to rJ trdullldti sed subjcc t IllrJl is literally in a place or
estrangell1pnt and errJsure of supc rior, co rti ca l strat cgies, and might be
present only through SOIT1i:lt ic, non-verbal ulfO:Ktory and sensorimotur
clIes, .1 liell where subjectivity (.,nd consciousness) arc, by ddinitioll,
deleted , l'l"lsed ; w lll're trauIna is, only Ihe body is present with its
peculinr Iclllgtl.lgl' .1Ild the expericnce GII1 be recnllcd as if it belonged
to someonc elsl', sinct' subjccti vity "'H.I conscio u sncss arc not therc.
In privilcging till' dclibl'riltl' .md inlentional ddcnce of repression
of iln id{'<l (and .1 memory) that (rC<ltl's, in turn, i1 symptom root-cd in
the comprom ise (ormation betwL'en the repressed idea Jncl the pnil1 o(
the ullilcceptilbility oj thl.' idl.'.l 10 consciousness, Freud hrts opened the
road to tl psycholll1rJlysis (<IS opposl'd to Jand's "psychologicdl ana lysis") in which filntilsmnlic reil ctioll is privileged over thl' coll.lpse of a
body thrJI is the on ly witness It'll there wilhout awareness, il dissociilted .lIld divided body. In Freud 's thcorisiltion, the libido systel"l1 <lIld
til<' drive were to prevail OVl'r till' 1"l'I8tionill, intersubjective, environnwntdlly determined l]uality of th e mind- body sys tem (all clements
Hwt subsclJuent interdiscipl in ary stud ies on how th e subject is born
have proved, ..IS is l'vidpnl fro III slIch ~tlld ies in inL:lI1t resc.1rch, nltachmen I sludies, dnl! inteqwrsonal nl'urobi(J logy or rq~ulation II1('oI"Y).
In ddditioll, in describing a systcm that pri vileges the Wily the ('go
responds with ddl'nsivc slratq.!,ip'"i ,1S d way to protect ilself, FrC'ud
privileges a top-down sysh~111 th.lt modern Ilt'uroscicnce see m s to
havl' replaced \",ith a bOLtom - up model, as in Porges's findings : the
response goes from the bollom (rom the stein to the corLex, that is
I'Jlher deprived ill its rt'spon s(' (Liolli, 2014, p. ?'!'1; Porges, 2(11).
As ., consequL'nCt' o( this Freudian iltlitud{', thp pathology tll .11
h ·l'ud .In,.ll yst'ci and lrctlted Wd'l more likely III be of a neurotic ~lIld
It'!'>s ~ l 'Vl'n' I\lnl!.t' tlh1n Iht' 'It'vl'l"l'lv Ir.lll1l1;"1ti"l~d n.llil'nl~ Ff'rI ' I1( ·1 i . llld
IMl'lle II MI M( JRY, lINRll'RI S'il
f)
llNC UN'it I()ll". I\NI) rR!\lIM /\ 1111 r
I ,'
II I
I·Hle! wen' willing to Irc.]t. Thi s is illsll why the diss()cidliv( ' 1'II,Id III
p.1lhology is more in linl' wilh prcsent ti,lY -;evcJ'l.:' bortit' rlillv 1',1111411 ..
gil'S or seve re soma ti s,llioIlS, in contrast wit h the llt'll!'(IP"\,1 Iii I' d ',
tn'dted by Frcud .
As Schore cogent ly highlighted over len yenrs ago,
cu rrellt Ilt'ul'obio\ogy slIggt.'s l s thJ! rcpl'l'ssioll is
dl..'vl'l ol'1111"11I.111, I
more ddv.lI1cl'd left br<1in dd12I1 Sl' Clg<1insl affects like ~H1Xidy 111", ,111 '
l'l'pl't:'sl::'nll'd .11 Ihl' corlic<11 il'v('1 of the righl br~ill , bill lIlt' ' ..11'11 1 "
.lppe<1ring ,md mort' primilivl' di -;soci.l lion is a ddL'llse <lg.liIlSI
m,llie <lflccts likl' Il'ITor Ih,ll <Ire s tored stl b('o rticilily in 1111' right hr.ll"
Ll
',01"
Thi . . IH'II/'1l/Ii< I/OSitlll cOllnpllllllizlllioll illdh'/lle:; 111(// Fn·/III'.... id"11
1//1/1///
11"111111111 IIIII~I /It' l't'IIS .... C.'> .... I·t/ (v,1I1 Lil'l' Kolk, WCi S.lt.'1h,
& V.lll dn 11.111 .
}'cillc(IIpomlccl i,lin /1" '11
I ')1.)6) Wid 111111 fill' wlln'I'1 of di~~/lt /(/Iioll 11111." / /II'
rl"licfI/ flHd diJlinil Jl~.'Idlfll/l/llI.If..;i .... It is nov.' ck.u Ih,ll dissocidtitlll " '1'1. '
st'nl s thL' most primitivl' lldt.'nsl' <lg<linsl Ir,nllll.1Iic Jffl'cti\'I' sl, lIl ·:. 01".1
IhJI it
nltl ...,1
lit· .Iddn. ·~st'd in till' trmlnK'nl (If Sl.'verl'
PSYI hnpollhlllH
gic·s. (5('hnl'(', 2()0.1b, p . 246, m)' c'mphelSi,,)
h)r SchorI...', Jnd I cou ld not ,lgrl'C more, I'Iw cOllsequl'tlCl' ttl tll h h
Ih,lt th e tre~llml'nt muslm.llch the developml'ntallevL'i 01 tlH' p.tIIl 'III
.lnd, thcreforl" "lP illr crlrly forl/lillX Sl'nITI' riSIi/·{,,·{/ill 1/fIIlIOloSi.··, . 111,
,lil/in'III/'::; prill/ary fi"lclio/l i~ (IS 1/1/ I~a('c/ n'Xllln/or fnr /lIt' I'II/it',,/',' ; 1'111111
1i!'1', Imlllllil/ie :i/li/I'S, iI/elI/dillS /IrOSf' IIlli'elillt' slnles 11111/ I/n' (Pldlnl rl/l /,,/
t!i~~ot"il1liOIl" (Schore, 200Jb, p. 246, my crnph<1s is).
We shall deill further with thl'st, important implic.lliol1s III, 11\ '. 11
Illt.'nt in thl' IdSI parilgraph of our ess.1Y nn t!"eillmcn\.
S,.lflc'.ssness ,Inri {("lima: or where {r,/lIm" i\
{here is no .sllhjec{ V"IIS{ {he /)or/yJ
[Ill' trL1UIl1,ltic terr~lin is also Ihl' plJcl' of dllolltl'r fund ,lllll,,,t.lIlwl ', 1 III
till' Iheory of sl'1f .1Ild sc lfk':-.sncss, or UIlCOtl!'ll.'iOllS .o.;t,I((·: It 11.1 " III ti,t
w ith the {ad 111.11 ill order for episodic I1ll'lllory 10 lll' .IlIIVI·, tlll 'I\ '
lIl'('d~ In bl' ., subject- (~lPdbll' 01 nilrr.1tillg Iltt' l'Xrlt'ril'IIl·I· (will, II, .lIt
Iw dOI1t' .11 .... 0 rt'lrosp('diVl'ly, .1S d cOnSl'qlll'nn' til 11ll' tlll'r''1lt"lltll l'ttl
I'l'ss). III ntlwl' words, when' tr"lUtlld is, thl' subjl't.! hd '; 111'1'11 d"lt'I. 'd
Itlgl'llwr wilh Ilw C<lpdcity to rl'Illl'llllWf ill ,1 Idt -br,lill hint! ,II " \ I.tlt II
11.II"I",1Iil)l1. illV()lviIH' lilll'I'I"li, · .I U'. II·' '<1.' '':'': " •• 1.·. ",,·.,,·, .•.•. , .....
r
I 14
UNI<U 'RI
~~LI)
liN( ()No,,( I()ll"!, IMI'LI( II M!,\I\()RY, ANI) (IINI( Al \V(>I<K
As L[lub and Aut'rl1i1hn htlvc cogL'lltly w ritten,
)\IlI'II( II MI M( )I{Y, \ INRI 1'l<l'l\1 I ) LIN( ()N"'( l(lU .... , ANI) J 1</\1 IMI\ 1III (>RY
to retrieve
d
.
Sell for th<lt l'xpcncllce. Ilere
dfl'
Lclub
dilL!
Auerhillill
(1~~3):
Freud labels "hystl'ril:.l l fdnl,l~ic~ " Wh,l! wc would nnw lIlllicrs l.lIld dS
rC-l.'l1ddlllt;'nl 01 ( h ildhood [r,!llma in disso(iJtivl' sl.ltes ... It j:., the
nature of IrclUI1l,1 In dlldc our kmlwlcdgl', bl'G1USl' vi both dekru.:c ':Ind
deficit. During rnd ssivl' lraum ,l ... this blurring of bOllnti.Hic s
betwl'l'1l re<llit y .1Ilt! frlllt.l sy conjures up dfkct s so violl'nl thai it
excl'eds thl' ego's cdpJci ly uf n.'g ul,llion. (19Y3, p. 2HH)
LllIb ;) n ci AlIcr h<1hn define the spec iFic st<1tus of trlllll11<1 tic subjc('tivity llS ,I pilradoxi cd l s talu s 0 1 "k nuwing ,:md not knowing", ZI pl<lcl'
\luls id e temporal and spalidl fr.nnin h for the s u bject. In other words,
where traul11a is, there is no subject (or consc iousncss). four the subject
10 ex isl, there needs to be a retricVlllllf thl' expericnce thruugh v('rb..11
.lIld episod ic memory, thcrdon' lIwrc is consciuusncss (but Ihil t st ...1Lt'
is nul thl' t"!\ 11lITl ...1tiC st<lle).
I\s S()lms and Turnbull wrill' (2002,1'. 1(0):
W llt.·n
\\f('
S.l), "I fl·!lll.:mlwr ... [.lllylhingl " Wl' <11"l' ~pl'" king of .111
L'pisodil· memory. According hI Sch i.lcil'r (ISllJ6), Ihl'l'pisudic lllemory
sys l(,111 "<l llows f'\Jllidlfy III !"{x.:-dl Ihl' pl'r:-'ollal incidenls Ih<ll III/iqlle/y
ddilll'oli r lives". (p. "17)
TIlt' ZlU ("hoI'S con ti nul',
1Jl ollwr world :-., sl<..lh's 01 Ihl' 51:1.1· l1li g hll w in trin sic~llly conslious (One
('.lIlI10 t
:-'<l)'
Ihl....· " I" in "I rClIll'rnbl'r ... " \-\'ilhollt sil1llllt,lllL'Olisly being
il). TilL' .... l·ll!:>l' Ilt :-.df (o f "I
\.V,J :-'
Ihere ... "; "i t
IhlPPl·lll·d
III Illl' ... ")
,l ppL·.lrS 10 be lleCt'ssMily consciou s. 1 hi:-. il1lplic~ tlidt ..dlhough l:XIL'rn ..ll
evcnts (',Ill be l'IK(llkd 1IIlcon:-;( iou :-. ly in Iht, br.lin (.lS :-'l·Ill.lnlic, pt'ITL'p-
IlI ..d, or proCl'dul'tlI Ir.1(L's), lIw l'pi:->odil' liVing of IhtlSI' l'VI....'lll s ,lpp ,lr
L'IlII)' c,mllo!. b,pl'rietKt· . . drL' nlll I1ll'I'l' Ir,u·(·~ ot Pd st slimuli. Expl'ri 1'IKL':-' h.lVl·
10 ilL' liVl'd . It is Ihl' reli,·ing of ,Ill l'vl'nl .1S l'xpl'r il' IKl' (" I
I n thi s form of Ir,lll1ndlil' menlory, the cen ler of {,xpt'ril'nc~ is no longt'l'
in Ihe ~xpl:riL'll(ing " I". Evt'nls hdrpt'll sonll'wh~ rl:, but nrc no longt:1"
l"onlll'ded with tIll' ("oll~ci{)us SllbjL·Ct. The .sl'lf is frilgl11l'l1ted into d
" me" .1I1d
iI
"Iw l - ow" <lnd .:my cOlllledion bl'l\Vl'Cn thl' t\-\'o has bet'n
!'>l·vercd. Wh,lt tIll' survivo r Ill<lnilesl s is <l p<linflll ~ l<ltL' of concu rrcnt
,IW'li"l'Ill'SS 01 ,I dcplell'd sl·1f dnd of ~111 inh.·nsl' l'xperieno: thilt i:-.
di sconncclL·d ,Inti "1( lrgtlllcn ", but I1t·verlhde:-.s .Iffl·ctivl'ly Pl'I"I1lt..'<ltc:-.
<lllll compromises Ii it' str.1 tegil's of 'Id,'ptatilln <lilt! ddl·nsc. This
dllUbll' st<1ll' of k n owing <lnd not knowing leaves the survivor in gril'f
nut only for his deild 10vL'd Olll'S hut .llso for hi s lost memories. Th,ll
Idl·r... 01 knowkdgl' prl'vents Ihl: rl· viv.1I 01 dL'spair Ih<ll would <let'om
p<lIlY mourning, bul !t..·dVl'S IhL' sur v ivor ,llorll' .lJld unknown hi
himsl'I L ( 1991, p. 29 1).
Very ilpprop rid lely, Laub .md Ll't.' (2003) fin d th e presc ncL' of.:l 11I Lli
dl'.lth ins tinct dnd.l w il hdr.lwZlJ uf cdthcxi s at wurk in seve re s talt':-. 01
Ir.lUll1dtic experience (dllolher point J. .1I1et criticised in I:n.: ud: d ea th i:-.
not the o th er side of .1 lib ido-erot ic or life forrL' w i thin the subjl'l.'I ;
dl'dlh has to do with .lnnih ii.Jli oll be-caIISt.' of .111 ex trcmely l1eg.l ti\,\·
rcl(lliolld l expl'l"ieIlCe, il is not ZlI1 in lril psych ic force urigil1<lting from
wilhin) (sel' ,1 lso Liolli, 20 14 ; Mucci , 2013):
'I Ill' wilhdrdw.l1 of c,lllwxis or till' I.lilml' of Ihe 1..'111 p<..l Lh it.. l'onlll'cli(lil
,II lilt..· l i ml' (If II"<Ulllldli/o1(ion is Ihl' strongest ch.tr':lCle ri slic 01 IlhlSsivl'
pSyl"hic 11'.111111,1. Tr,llIrn ':llir loss llf I Ill' illlt..'rlhil good nbjecI <HId of l ibid
ilhl l ties SCL'llb Itl relt..'.lSt· Ihl' hithl'rlo lihidilldll y IIl'utmli/l'd \tI ITL':-' Ilt
till' dl'.Ith instinci .lIld Itl
inl('Il~ify 1I1L' dinic<11 m.lI1iie~lali(lIl S of IIwi1
deriv.J l ivl's in llll' .Jttl'nn.lth of llld Ss i vl' t l\lUIl1 .1. (L.llIb &
I .l'(·,
2(){)l,
1'. 41l4)
rl'IlH'IllIll'r ... " th.lllll'l'l'S:-..Hilv I"l·l lI..lers It consciolls. And it is Iht' '> L'n<-;e
l'xl.:writ'IlCl'.
['Ill' loss of Ihl' inll'rlltll object .1Ild the dec.lllwxis Ie.ld tn.1 1.1illlH '
Thi s is ,lIlotllL'1" 1<\'.l Y of s<lving Wh<11 WI.' s<lid in ch.:lpll'r 1 in 1'('l.11iol1 10
ill n'pl"l'sl'n t ~l ti()n dnd vl'rb ..llislliion , liwrdore d CO Il ,'pSt' of l"11 Ii\ II
oj sell (of "heing Ilwfl''') Ih.11 c01l1him':-' Ihl' Irdces inlo i1l1
gl·lll'r.ll: it i~
Ihe SI'. I.F thJI bind :-. our fr<lgllll'lltt..'d
rl'pn'sent.ltioIlS of Iht' world into lIni lll'd, l ivL'd l'XpL'ril'IlCl':-'. Thl ·link In
J svll world coupling is Ihl'rd(lI'l' Ihe SI': I F ilst'lf. (2002, p. 1(1)
nlil s citJlI .... tll.:SS
in
llH 'TnOry, .1n
inilbility to
Stly .lI1d,
t1wrdorC', 10 l"l'llll'mher,
till' su bject is 11101'(' nMturl" or is an ..ldolt:
11ll' vic tim, to wtlf(l otl till' horrors uJ
ThIS i!-. exactly wh;]! is nol possi ble in the ll"i.llIl11<.ltic expl'rience,
Ch.H...lctlTi~l'd
by
.J COIl,lPSL'
of
<..l
sens(' o f se ll , .llld so the "cu rl''' dims
~'Vl'1l wllt'll
ohil'Ll ll 'SSI1l'~:-;'
intl'l"ll.1Ii .... t ·:-; dod
Ilknlifil's wilh the olllv ob,l.,t! <.wail dhk ttl lIim : till' Jlt·l"jl(' tl.. lltll", d h .. d
nhll'li ... F.lIlllrt, 1111111' (·IlIII.llhie ..... "u ·,·II"n .101.111 " . •." .. .... .. . " .. ". I.. ,.,
II
of (he internill good object produce feel in gs of nb~cn("(' and of rupture,
.J Ill~S of repn..-' s cntd lioll, all ina bility to grasp ,lI1d remembe r traulll<J,
~lI1d a loss of coheren ce. Libidin al binding to nssociative link s, Lo
meaning and to words, as well as to lhl::'! intcrna ll1bject .. n d to oneself,
becomes ;)1 Il'.uil tempo rar ily suspended. There is a profound sense
that s tru ct uft-' ri nd rcpresent~llion - l1w ab ilit y III tt'll one's s tory to
oneself and 10 ano ther- are mi ss ing from the survivor's ex perience.
(Laub & l.ee, 2003, p. 44 1)
In other words, the survivor's C'xperience re mains rnute, encoded
in the body .:md in implicit memory, J lld canno t be possessed a nd
exp ressed by expli cit memory and the self.
This e rasu re and this annihilation or the resources of the self in
tra um a li c experience are mu ch m ore simila r 10 what Jemct, on the one
hand, and Ferc nczi, o n th e o th e r, h ad described , in co ntras t to Freud 's
inte nti o na l repression by th e s ubject.
If trauma mea ns the rup ture of the "e m pa thi c dyad " (Laub &
Auerhahn, '1989), it is onl y in a relational process that vital tru st ca n
be recovered : this is w h y, be fore giving tes timon y, o r be fo re th e
the rape uti c work, the s ubject d oes not necessa ril y know his e ntire
s to ry. He re is La ub again (Laub, 2(05):
To begin with, the survivor does no t full y know w h~l he or she knows.
It is only as th e tes timony emerges Ih<lt the s urvi vo r comes to know
I his or her full s tory [I nti Ihe impact it has had on his or her life. Even
, th cn, pa rts th a t lI f C beyon d th e ill1.1ginnblc will rc mnin left out or
rptaincd as frozen, encapsu lat ed , and split-of( fo reign images, These
Me the parts of the sto ry that are no t to be told. Off- limits, abys mally
cold and empty, while at the s ame lime ~Iso threa te ningl y viol ent,
tumultu ou s, and dangerous, th ey have n o form. Th ese parts of the
s urvi vo r's s to ry, <l nd thus a piece of hum an hi s to ry, are los t to silence.
I have ea rli e r se<lrched fo r a word fo r this l11utin g or loss- and I have
come to ca ll it nil ernsllrc. (p. 257)
\
Erasure is' this blank in pla ce of experience, something that
leaves no me mury trace a nd no wo rd s except in th e body and in
th e right brain . It is a lIIil1lque iilre of the s ubject, it cannot be the
inte nti o na l a tte mpt of th e su bject to c rase memory. Eras ure is th e
missing part in lieu of experience, that for which th ere are no words
becLl use in that place or position there is no s ubject and consciou sness is s plit, divid ed, dissoci ated, w h ile re pression com es afterward s,
a
•
nl n loter time, somehow vo lun tari ly e nforced by the ego throu g h
the dynamiCS o f the explicit selC a nd, therefo re, im p lies a subject and
o conscious ness.
This is confirmed by Sohns ond Turnbu ll whe n they write, "111us
Wl..' seem to have redi scove red, from a neul'oscicn tifi c standpoint, the
obvious fact that w hat we feel about our expe ri e nce is what rend e rs
them susce ptible to " repression" (Solms & Turnbull, 2002, p . ·162).
At· th e sa m e tim e, this tes tifi es to the fac t th at until a memory
Iwcomes an episodi c memory, reactivated by a curre nt self, usually in
thl.' th erapeuti c process, it is ju st an unconsciou s memo ry, or a n as- if
memory; " for a memory to be exp ressed in scmtlntic m em o ry and
I:wco m e a utob iog raphical , episodi c me m ory th ere need s to be a
HubjecI" (Solms & Turnbull, 2002, p. 162).
What th e rapy, when s lI ccessful , can do is to rellcliv<lte those
memories in th e current self, and a t th a t poi nt th ey (as su ch ) ex is t
(Solms & Turnbull, 2002).
What contempora ry trau ma th eo ry a nd p rac ti ce has taught us is
thnt the "know ing" of the traumatic expe ri ence e me rges, o r ca n be
rl'cupe rated, as a piece of reality Jnd trllth (belonging no t only the
individual, but also to society and his to ry) o nl y within a relations hip .
As in the practice of testimony, the retri eva l o f the me rn o ry requires
nn apt lis ten er who beco mes, in turn .. a wit-ness; as Dori Laub hn s
frcqu entl y affirmed, for th e witness to becom e J witness, there need s
to be a companion, an apt co mpanion : "a totall y present listener who
~ rea tes the holding s pace for th em to do it" (L.aub, in Cor uth 20"15,
p. 48). Testimony does not come and ca nnot be vCl'bn\iscd in n void;
th c re need s to be an other, that inte rnal-ex te rnal other who, by
definition, has bee n d es troyed in the traumatic ex pe ri ence (the break
of the e mpathic dyad, th e la ck of th e presence of an inte rnal, maternal
good object, in Loub's definition ). Testimony is
a healing way to put frag ments togeth er. But to get it o ut in the interperso nal s pace there has to be a co mpan io n. B<lsica ll y I th ink it's the
necessity for an internal compa ni o n, beca use the process of sy mbol ization and the forma tion of narrative only happe ns wit h in an in ternal dialogue, that addressee ...
There has to be a ce rtain <ll11otl1lt of ego s tructure, a ce rtain amount of
object rela tion ship, a certain connectedness, and appropri ate o thers in
order to s peak. (Laub, in Caruth, 2015, pp. 48-49)
1111"1', hnw p SYChll<llhllvsi s, lrom lwing ... impl\' ,1 lheorv <lnd .1 clinic;l!
1"01IIII 't ' Ill., y I-W(,Ollil', in m )' mind, ,1 form of leslimlH1Y (Mucci, 201.1).
II i" .11 0..; 0 ill lo lll'l't'IlCl' w ith FerCl1l'/i's rL'.liis.,lioll Ih,11 th c .1l1itudl'
1111111' tlll'r.lpi o.; l jo.; 01 pJ'il11~ry import.m('L' if tht' p<ltit'nl is In t1CCl'pt ,lnd
IH'III'vt'" wh,,1 h(l s h.1PIll'IWd . th.lt is, 11ll' rl'lilily 01 hit.; lrtlUm.l lic p.l sl :
" "P IlI '.lrs Ih.ll ,J.llil'llb (,111110\ believe Ih.ll till l'vt'nl look pl.Kc, or
, .1111101 lully belil'vl' ii, if the .111.1Iyst, .IS Ill(' soil, wi tn ess llf the event...
11"1 ',1" '" in hi s cool, UlwlllOtion.1i .1Ild ... purl'l \' inl c IlL'c tu ,11 ,I ttiludl'"
11 " ' II ' tll 'z i, IlJHHI19.l2 1, p, 24). A nd Ill' cOl1rluLit's, in oppo " ilion 10
"" 'Ild , Ih,l\ " .111 .lbrC'.lclion 01 qUil lllitil's 01 tr.lunhl is Ilol cnough ;
Ilw ... illl.llion must be difll'J'cnl 11'0111 till' .Jdu zll! y tr.lUnl~llk Dill' in
111' .11'1' IOIll l'lke possible tl dilfl'l'l'lll, positivl' oull..'ot11c " (p, 10K). Wh.11 is
ILI 'I'I!t,d is.1 lot.lll y cllnllllillt'd, benevoknl (h'l'enc/i, IYHHlllJ:12 I, p. 24)
lilt'ftll'li s l ('tlptlbll' 01 rt'wriling ,1 diflercnl s lory \\, ilhin the ther;qwuliL'
H'I,lIillnship, ('Vl'l1 il l thl' h'vl'l oj implicit nll'l1lnry ilnd IWM .
/ h,. consequL'l1cC'< of this discourse on rC'IH,,<siol1 v,. dissociatiol1
on cuntefllj.l0r,,,y j.lsychol'.Ith%gy .Inri psychotherapy
I.
I )i "org,Ini "l'd .1 11.KI1I11L'Ilt, in thL' preS('IH'l' of (Lldors of v llll1l'rJ-
hilily
1.
r<'p.J ra lory ClL'I1Wllts, prl'Li lS pOSt'S to Ihe ins tnbilities
,lIld 11ll' d ys rq.,; uldtion lhl'll chJr.wh'ri sl' borderline di sorders,
(FIlIl,'g V, 2(X)(); I.YIllls- Ruth & Jacobv;I/., IYY9; I'alrick el ,11., 1994).
Ahu se .1Ild ('S ~Wci ..1I1y sl'xual llbllS(> .mel inces t hCivc bl'l' n ide nti fit'd i1s ,1 caU Se fur the killd of d ys fun c l1on.ll H'SPOI1 Sl ' 10 imngcs
(If s('11 ,111 d u lher ,lllJ d('sf ru ct i vt'n('~s ,lIld impul ... i v it y in Sl'Vl'J'<l1
lIfl'.1S wlllc h s e e m 10 be one ol thl' Illdjur d imel1 sion s of the
pninflll condition of borderlinl' disorder').
.1Ilt! 110
C"bb,ml (2011), 1',lr;s (2()Hl), a nel l.,lIla r;n; .lnel coll",lgllcs (19K'l)
.111 teslify 10 the high percentage uf .,bUSl' ('s p('(i~llly <;cx u a l .lbuse) in
p.ltil'nts \Vbu h.lVt' bel'n diJgnosl'd .1S borderline. 0110 Kl'rnbl'rg .JS
wf,.' !1 h,lS dckno\lvlL'dgl'd "t hl' prl'vnlL'nn' of ph ys ic.lI ,md st'Xlid l Jbusl'
ill the history of piJlienls with severe pL'r~on<lljly di sordt'rs" (Ca rkil11
'" ,I I., IY9\), p. 243); v.ln dcr Kolk (2014) ,lIld 1',1 1 Ogden and colleJglles
(20()6) id c nlify in .lffcclivl' dysrl'gul.llion and in dis soci.llion lhL' m.ljor
t.llise of th L' p .llhulogy.
In Schon!'!'> cxpl~n~lion,
Implll'l .11'l tl y, du e 10 Ihl.' r.ltl.'r lll,ltur.l t inn of till' p .l r.1!'ty mpilllll'tic
I'll(' las t H",lm ill whi c h dj ssllci~lion 11-". rq)J'l'ssion opl'n~ ,I di vide i"
lli,\\ of psychnp.1thulogy. P,llhologics Ih.l \ h.l v e repre~sinn ,11 their
I'not 'HC ty pical of Iwurotic slruclurt', \-vhile pJlholligil's b.lscd on di ssociation .Wl' 01 mort' Sl'Vl'J'L', lllustly borderlil1l' n.lturc. Ill'n' is how
HrombC'rg, working mostl y on di ssociation vvith tl\lUllhlti sl'd p':ltienls,
defines till' two "ddl'll cl's":
Rcp"l'~s ion ;)s ,1 dl'll'nSl' is rt'spol1sivl' In .lIl xil'ly
tl lH'g,)j
iVl' but reg u-
1.lbll' .:1ffecl th,1\ ~ i gll,lls thL' polt'llti<11t'I11l'll"l'Ill'l' into consciolls nl'ss 01
nwnt.,lt:unh'lll s Ih .11 1ll ,ly ITt 'JIl' ullph"I .....1llL but be.lI'.lblc inlt.. lp . . ych ic
connie !. i)i SSllCit1 l ioll ,I S
J
ddl'llsl' i" rt'S Pllllsivl'
III Ir.llll11J
Ihl'
c h,1ot ic, c onvubi vl' flolldi ng by 1IIl1'q!,UI,1IJbk ,llfl'd tll.ll 1.lke" OWl' till'
mind , thn'.llt ' llillg till' ~ I,lhilit y {If "l' lfhood .1Ild " nowlinit's ".mil \'.
lll' rVOIi S ""s tem .lIld till' rt'Millilnl (ogn it ivl' dd v. lIlcl'~ of till' l,llt' PI'.1('
lisi n g Pt'l'illd , Ihl' chi ld 's .JlIl.'mpts to ddt'IlSivI 'l v t'OPI' with thl' !'t lrl'SS
inducing nlllllll'r <lI'l' more com pll'x, Wilh Iht' ;,dd it if)lI.1 I m .ltul'Jtion of
till' ANS, Ihl' dlild can now lock ill 10 two di ~ tinct. n0l1ovl'rI.1ppillg
di ssoCj,lll'd psyc hobiolo gic.11 ~ t.lll 'S Ilf l'xi stl'IH,'(' . According to
Kt'rnlwrg ( 1975), tl I1hljor s lrll Clufi11 c hM.:lt::tl'l'i .... ti c llf tht: bordl'rlil1l'
( ondition i .... thl' uliliL.:1tioll of thl' splittin g ddC' n~t' .... Ih.1t dliow fur the
prl'Sl'IWl' (If 1l1l111ldlly di ssociJ tL'd or s plit off s t.l tes. It is now thllUghL
Ihtll till' cognitive preconditions for ddt'IlSivL' splillin g hl'col1w ('sltlh
li shl'd h v Ilw t inl{' tlw In(,1111 is bl'lWl 'l'll 12 III I S monlhs old (Cf,.'rgl'ly.
191.)2). Il ~ hrn ctioll 1ll~ly iw to ,1vo id l 'x (l'n1,d stimuli Ihilt co uld precipilJll' In UIlr('gll l.1tl'ri or hypoarolls('d <; I:lll', (1<.)'.)4, p. 420)
(Urol1lheq!" 21l11 , p. -19)
I .,wk of (,l11oliOlltll rq~lIlati()n, wilh dissocitllion, projective idcntilj(~llion , Ol nd primitive dl'h.'ncl's, co mbines with th e inte rn .... 1 illl -
rhe Irtlul11.ltk .letiupiltholov,y of borde rline' di sord('rs i<; nol ea "y 10
pt)ssibilily of
define Jnd spve r.11 ,lll tilors du indeed nol tlccepl cu rrent attcmpts .... 1 .J
definition .
Non c til(' less, many olul h ors and .1 n l'xten"ivL' body of re~cnrch
seel11s to pro Vl' th Ll !
s oolhing object to which 10 rl'lurn when they arc
imb.ll;:Jnn·d <ll1d oVl'rwheime d , becau s e of vcry poor nlltlchmcnt
t"pl'ril'I1l'l's t)J' l'V('n neglect, 111altI'1'.1t111l' nt, and abuse protracted over
.I !lIng lil11l'. Self- regulating strategies <Jl'e not C.1pilblc of prevenling
lilt' s ubjec ts frol1l going from hyper.lCtivity to L'x trc n1l' h ypo;,ct ivi ty of
d
I}.O
1111 ' IlIhihllnml.)ictlrh'x ,1Ild of the .1mygdaJ<1, so Ih']l
internal void
l 'i dlI II III P,l1lil'd by intl'nl,'li d'dOS LInd constant turmoil. Right pariet,,1
[111
oIlhl 110111.11 rq.;ioll s r,,-'vt'i.11 deficit s in thest' pJticn ts.
1\.., ...t'Vl'f.l1 ~llIlhors have prov~d in their research, the right hl'mi-
',plwn' is domini.1nt not only for regulating <l ff('cl, but J lso for l11[1il11.II1llllg ,1 ,'oh('ITnt scnSl' nf one's body (Tsnkiris et <11., 200R), for
.,'iI'lll"'"
(I{oz. 2(04). ol1d for POill prorcssinp, (Symonds cI 01.,2006),
,ltld . . 0 Ihe right-brnin Slr<l tl'gy of dissociation represe nts the ultimate
dt ' !t ' I H: I' for b locking emotiona l, bodil y- ba sed pai n (Schnre, 20 11 ,
1" \\i\)
nil
1111'111
J
th e lin k betwl'en disorg<1nisl'd Jtitlchnwnl [lnt..! thl' Ch~Vl' l()p(If .1 hord c rlir'll' d isordl'r, s(,veral au thor s underline ho w thl"'
j'l'rslln.llily of nn individual is th e resu lt of th e continuou s inlcr ilc tioll s
Iw tWt 'l' ll gl'ndi (~l ll y in h e rit ed trait-s and the fL'l<ltion.,1 intcrs ubj{,(,ti vl'
1"l'l'ril'I1C(' frolll hi sjlwr e l1 vironnlf'nt (Bou ch a rd , 1994; Ca lk ins & Fox,
l'IY4; K.,!\an , 1\1\17; Kendler & Eave'S, I\lXC,; I<o lhbor l & A ho<ii . 1994;
'I'll< "n ;lS & C hess, 1997).
Fro m a It ;:u.: hIll enl rcl.1lion s hip s to follnwin~ SOci~ll cxclhlnges,
IH 'lII"ll con nections cl nd synapses (.1n be reinforced , reduced, or m odilit'd even in adu lt c in,,: ulll s tallces; while trallm.l li c H' la tiun nl expe ri t ' lll'l'S have a tox ic e ffeel es pccinlly un tht' c hild : co rti sol a nd ot her
hunnon('s affect cor ti ca l and limbic processes that reg ulate e m o tion s.
Disorganisation in .:1 11dc hm l'nt has been id entified by Lyons- Ruth
.. nd Jo cobv itz ( 199\1), by John Gunderson ( 19%), b y Fo n agy <l nd
collengucs (2004) as a deviant d evc lopment n \ ptlttcrn that, w h e n
present, mig ht be .,n id cn tifi <lb le ri s k fnctor for till' late r d eve lop m e nt
01 131>1). Also, disorgzlI1isL'd n\t Jchment has beL'n Sl'c n ~l S the possible
bJ sis for a furtlwr dissociative disorder. In general, bordcrliTll' personillity di sord ers, in so fa r JS th ey imply a di s lu rbtl ll ce in the integ rat ed
tllld s ta ble r('pn.!se nt~lti oll of self nlld othe r, wi th d ysl'egu1zdioll (o r
impulsi v ity a nd dysrcgulation) as its bas is, can be understood ,1S a
pllrticuiar right-brain di so rd er (Scho rc, 20'12) tha t requ ires J pLlrt icula r ri g hl-b roin Ilwrapy (vo n d (' r Kolk. in C01'l1lh, 20 15, p . 1C,5).
Bo rd e rli ne di sorders mi g ht o r might 1101 imply hi g h levels of di ssocia ti o n .
Eve n if dissociJtive responses mi g ht not h<l vC bee n activ<lh:'d
by the self in th e bord erline pLltiL'nl, they h<lvc, none the less, pcrm<lncntly c<l u scd a sp lit in till' orgnn i sa ti o n of self LInd o lher representa ti ons. Splitting is n ot Ji ssoci'ltion, but it still im plil's th e preSCIltT of
opposih' view..; ullhl' Dbject, both inll'rn.ll .:l1ld l'x l('I'I1.lI (thi s is, according to Kt'rn lwJ'g, tilt' nJn' of Illl' p.llhnlogy, which is expressed in the
St'S~ illn through dyndic, opposite elements rehearsing an intern<ll
t'lIlllrildiclory, or ('veil torturing, emotional and cognitive process, so
th.ll , .11 th e Stl llll' Illoment, different levels of se lf cHe ava il ab le).
()n dbusc as ~lC'tiopalhogenetiis o f borderline disorders, ve r y
cogen ll y Schorc writes,
It is ntHV wdl eslilhlis lll'd thill early childhood . lbIl Sl ' s pl'ciJil.l lly dlters
l.llL'I\lliSl'd limbic- systl'm I1hlluralioll, producing nl'lIrohinlo)!,ic.ll .llter
,ltiol1s th .] l ~Kt .IS .1 binlogic,,1 slI bslr,lle for .1 v.uil'l y tlf psychi'ltrk
consequ l'no's, including <lffL'c tive ins t;l hilit y, ilH'ffidL'nt st ress tokr.1110', nwmory impuinnent, .:1111.:1 dissoci<:ltivl' d ist urb .l llces. (Schore,
2011 . p. xx)
IlermLlIl dnd Vdn der Kolk, ill Ih(' ir 1987 research, found th Llt
borderline pa t-i e nt s had suffe re d SCVl~ r(' tr<l lll11 t1, w ith p h ys ica l .lnd
Sl'XlW] v io lcnce before th e ngc uf s ix; only" minorit y of pilticilts did
unt !'l'fe r to traumati c ('vents, but they suff(' n 'd from sevc re dl1lnesi.l;
s imilar d nta cmcrge from th e s tud y of Og,lt,] ( 19lJO) a nd from Z~l narini
,l11d colleo!\"l's (I\1H9).
As Scho rl' (2012) writes dbout attdchmpnt Ir.IUllhl p~lti ('nts (whom
Ill' defin es as pprso nality di so rd e r patients),
ThL' p.1IiL'nt brings int o Ire<llme nt .m enduring imp rint of .ltt'lI.:hmL'1l1
tr'Wllla: an im pJ ircd cap<lcity to rq!, lIldll' s tress fu l ~lffecl and ,111 overrdidncc 011 th L' uffc cl-dl'<ldL'ning defcll sl' of p.lt h() logiG11 di sSllci(ltioll
1nnd m ;my oth ers ]. Unde r rel"tional stress thi s <:l frL'ct di s l'l.'g ulati on
dd ic it is ch<lr<lc lcrn]ogi c;dl y l~x pre ssed ill <t tl'ndcllcy lo w;:nd low thres hold, hi g h-i ntcnsity, emotional rcact io ns followed by s low rl'lu rn
to bn s(:.' linc. Il ig hs <tlld lows arc too L'x ln:'llle, too prol onged, or Ion
r.l p idly cy(led .lnd u npredict.1 bl c. l\llicnls with histories o f <lltuch~
menl tr"lllm<l (i.e. pcrsonuli ty di s tlrdl-'rs) thus conldin u ll consc ioll s
insecure working Ill ode ls th.1 t <llltom.ltically Irigge r right br<lin st ress
rl'SpnnSL's <It lo w thrl'shuld s of ruptures of lhl' thcriJpc ulic illliilnce. In
..ddition 10 thei r hypt.' rs('nsiti vity to L've n low levels of inll' rpe rsonil l
Ih rcilt (n.l rcissistic injuries), Ihey <lI s!) frcllul'nll), L'xpt.'ricnce cndu ring
s ln tcs of hi g h · intensi ty neg<ltive ilffl'ct ilnd ddt'nsivl' ly dissociiltc il t
lowe r ievl.:'l s of s tressful nrousnl. (2012, p. 1(4)
Int ercst in g ly, <lnd in connecti on with Schorc's fin din gs, VJIl del'
i-..nlk has obse rved a s lrong lat(' rfllis<1lion o f Hll' <lClivity of th e right
l2'Z
brllin when traumatic memories arc react i vated, in [Iddition to a
striki ng red uction of acti vity of the Bfl)Ca arca in the left hemisphere,
th e ilfC'(l known to be implicated in language an d vcrbalisation of
me.lnin~fll l expe rien ces. The possibili ty of attributing new meaning to
thl' traumatic events restructures the brain activity, making it 1110re
ba lanced, and dCtlctivl1 tes the excessive respon se of the li mbic systelll,
while a ugmenting Iht' possibi lity uf cort ical awareness and cxplicil
Vl 'rba l is<1 I ion.
Ruth Laniu s ond co ll eogucs (2005) hove shown, in functional
11l.1gnctic rl.!SOllilIlCL', a preduminant" right·h emi sphcric activation in
I'"st traumati c stress disorder (PTSD) potients, while th cy are dissociating: pahe nts dissociate in order to escape th e overwhelming
e motiun s for w h ich they have no words.
Im plidt traumatic memories thus encod ed <1111..1 e ncysled in the
ri g ht brain, in connecti on w ith amygdala activatio n morc than cortica l ~wa ren ess, hnve to find a path toward s explici t consciousness and
verbal exp ression, which in turn m ea ns that a self with wider awa reness has been restored to reality. 111is is the route of psychotherapy. A
psychotherapy that is fine-tuned betwccn potient a nd th e rapist
through the right brain, in any case, is particularly useful for thi s kind
of (traumat-ised, right-brain lateralised) pa tien t. Narra ti o na l processes
seem to be ab le to perfo rm the neuronal integra tion that is missing or
poor in traumill:i sed minds.
Psychothe rap y will work on th e impli cit, bodi ly imprints, the
tra ces of internalised rep resentatio ns of pas t rc lationships, s ta rtin g
from attachment traces. As Siegel (1999) confirms, when implicit
m e mory is retri eved , th e neural ne t profil es that arc reactivated
involve circuits on th e brain that are a fundam ental part of Ollr everyda y expe ri e nce o f life: behaviours, e motions, and ima ges that are
encoded in non-verbn l operational models o f the mind are the re in th e
he re and now o f th e session . Destru ctive patterns are there repeated
a nd e nacted in m o me nts of one-to-one exchanges in which both
participants in the dialogue rehea rse a ri g ht-brai n-implicit mode l lh a t
has been inle ri orised (bu t the therapist can make li se of le ft -brain
s tmtegies thro ug h language and interpre ta tion, too). Especiall y severe
pCttients, such as the borderline on es, prone as they are to n mass of
unregulated em o ti ons and massive primitive d('fcnces, will enact a
flood of unstable and violent affects th at is mostly IInconscious in the
sense th at· th ey cannot be cortica lly controllcd and balanced. Any
occasion in the limits of the sctting of the theropy w ill re-enhance and
reactivate the emotional siurm 11m/ Dmllg they arc subject" to: the continuous storm of enactments wi ll, on the one hand, enable the repetition of w hat has not been dominated and unders tood consciously; on
the ot her hand wi ll be the object of thc exploration a nd the exchange
with th e ongoing dia logiC mental and bodily proce" of th e therapeutic encoun ter: it is the process that guides the con tent, this is w hy
cun ten l per se and interpretation per f'e will not affec t the process.
Mureover, as Laub has argued, language has to be understood and
will he understood w ithin a relational proCt.'ss in which Freudian
ubrcactiun is not e nou gh (as Ferenczi s tated as early as 1932) and a
rcal change in the implicit interiorisecl rep resenta ti o n of ex pe rien ce
hos to bc re inscri bed.
As Laub ond Auerhahn argue in "Fa iled e mpa th y" (1989, p. 392), 1
IIsir~ cc th e traumati c state can nol be represent-cd it ca nnot be modified I
by mterpre tation ... and what is initially req u cstcd by th e therapy
Is not th e e lucidati o n o f the con fli ct but the restru cturin g o f a new .
I'eldtionship and a new connecti o n between sel f and o ther ".
I to ta ll y ag ree with Lyo ns- Ruth a nd coll eagucs of thc Bos ton
hange Process Stud y G roup (2001, pp. 13-- 17, in parti cular p. 17)
when they a ffirm that:
If clinical process is affect-guided ralher lh an cognition g uided , lthenJ
therape uti c change is j] process th<lt lends to the e me rgence of new
forms of rela ti onal organizat ion. New expe riences ~ me rge but they are
not created by the therapist for the benefit of the piJlient. Ins tead , they
('merge somewhat unprediclably fro m the mutu al sea rching of pJtient
Jnd therapisl for new forlll s of recog nition, or new forms of fittin g
together of initiatives in the intl:!raction betwel:!n thl.'m . (De ll & O'Neil,
2009, p. 647)
In other words, the content of the inte raction needs to be "embedded "
In relational ex pe rie nce that embodies what they ca ll " implicit relalio nal knowing"-an ongoing process tha t is itself part of the conte nt.
Enactme nts are fundamental mo me nts in the the rapy with these
patients, both because they a re prone to act out the ir s tressful affects
and because cnactments are unmediated by the le ft he misphere.
As "affective ly dri ve n repe titio n o f converging e motio nal scenarIos from the patient's and the ana lyst's lives" (Maroda, 1998, p. 520)
nnd righl'-brain pa tte rns of interacti on b<lscd on thei r own implicit and
unconscious representations, enactments are fundamental tools in the
therapeutic process; they are not only repetilions, but active reinscriplions of differenl mode ls of relationships thai provide "a new
opportunily for awareness and integral ion" (Maroda, 1998, p. 520).
The therapeutic movement is from unconscious cognition to
unconscious el11otion and self-regulatory processes. Affect regulation
therapy is linked to intersubjeclivity and implicit- procedural
processes. In Schorc's (2012) terms, enactments arc right brilin to right
brain transference-cou ntertransferencc COIllI11U n icat-ions, interact ions
occurring between the pnlicnt's rclntiol1al unconscious and the thera pist's relational unconscious,
From Freud's univocal ilnd intrapsychic perception (correspondi n g
to a neutral, one-sided, and, according to I:ercnczi, hypocritica l and
cold thcrtlpcutk process) we have, therefore, arrived at an intcrsubjective, relational unconscious that is right-brain based. To conclude with Sch o re, "ena ctments, co mmon in psychotherapy with
borderline patients, potentially allow for the reorgi1nization or cortica l
(orbitofrontal)-subcortical (amygdala) connectivity" (2012, p. ·175).
Note
1.
I refer, of COLIrse, to Freud 's Lh cor isa tion thi.1l mu ch mental life is
unconscious, and within this rea lity some mental lire is characterised
by repression as an active force, established to s ubtra ct certain
e lements rrom conscio usness, elements that would be unacceptable
to consciousness and censorship.
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